loc gov comp6

8/22/2019 Loc Gov Comp6

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PART III

III. Elective Officials, Vacancies, Succession, Disciplinary Actions

Sec. 39-75 LGC

a. Elective Officials

i. Qualifications

Abella v COMELEC 1991

Facts: Initially, Silvestre dela Cruz (Benjamin Abella was allowed to intervene) filed a petition with the

COMELEC to disqualify petitioner Larrazabal from running as governor of Leyte on the ground that she

misrepresented her residence in her certificate of candidacy as Kananga, Leyte. It was alleged that she was in

fact a resident of Ormoc City like her husband who was earlier disqualified from running for the same office.

The COMELEC granted the petition. However, when the Commission granted the decision, Larrazabal was

already proclaimed the Governor, hence, when she was disqualified, Abella, who gathered the second highest

votes in the said area, sought to take his oath as governor of Kananga, Leyte.

The petitioner, however, avers that the COMELEC decision is erroneous when it relied on the provisions of

the Family Code to rule that the petitioner lacks the required residence to qualify her to run for the positionof governor of Leyte. She opines that under "the Election Law, the matter of determination of the RESIDENCE

is more on the principle ofINTENTION, the animus revertendi rather than anything else."

In this regard she states that ... "her subsequent physical transfer of residence to Ormoc City thereafter, did

not necessarily erased (sic) or removed her Kananga residence, for as long as she had the ANIMUS

REVERTENDI evidenced by her continuous and regular acts of returning there in the course of the years,

although she had physically resided at Ormoc City."

Issue: Whether or not the candidate who got the second highest vote may be proclaimed as governor when

the candidate for such position was disqualified.

Held: The Supreme Court held that while it is true that SPC No. 88-546 was originally a petition to deny due

course to the certificate of candidacy of Larrazabal and was filed before Larrazabal could be proclaimed, thefact remains that the local elections of February 1, 1988 in the province of Leyte proceeded with Larrazabal

considered as a bona fide candidate. The voters of the province voted for her in the sincere belief that she was

a qualified candidate for the position of governor. Her votes were counted and she obtained the highest

number of votes. The net effect is that the petitioner lost in the election. He was repudiated by the electorate.

As regards the principle of ANIMUS REVERTENDI (Faypon v. Quirino:[M) ere absence from one's residence

or origin-domicile-to pursue studies, engage in business, or practice his avocation, is not sufficient to

constitute abandonment or loss of such residence.' ... The determination of a persons legal residence or

domicile largely depends upon intention which may be inferred from his acts, activities and utterances. The

party who claims that a person has abandoned or left his residence or origin must show and prove pre-

ponderantly such abandonment or loss.) In the instant case, there is no evidence to prove that the petitioner

temporarily left her residence in Kananga, Leyte in 1975 to pursue any calling, profession or business. What

is clear is that she established her residence in Ormoc City with her husband and considers herself a residenttherein. The intention of animus revertendi not to abandon her residence in Kananga, Leyte therefor, is nor

present. The fact that she occasionally visits Kananga, Leyte through the years does not signify an intention to

continue her residence therein. It is common among us Filipinos to often visit places where we formerly

resided specially so when we have left friends and relatives although for intents and purposes we have

already transferred our residence to other places.

Whether or not the petitioner is a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte (the petitioner insists that she is

such a registered voter based on the following antecedents: 1 She cancelled her registration in Ormoc City on


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Nov 25, 1987, and 2 she then transferred her registration to Kananga, Leyte on November 25, 1987 by

registering thereat and 3) she later voted on election day (Feb 1, 1988) in Kananga, Leyte. )

We find the version pressed by respondent unworthy of belief. The story is marked by so many bizarre

cirumtances not consistent with the ordinary course of events or the natural behavior of persons. Among

these are:

The application for cancellation of registration by respondent Adelina Y. Larrazabal happened to bemisplaced by a clerk in the Election Registrar's Office for Ormoc City so it was not sent to the Board of

Election Inspectors in a sealed envelope;

The 'inadverterment' (sic) misplacement was discovered only on January 9,1988;

The voter's affidavit was delivered by itself without any endorsement or covering letter from the Election

Registrar or anybody else;

The election clerk delivered the application for cancellation only towards the last hour of the revision day,

allegedly at 4:30 P.M., January 9, 1988;

All the members of the BEI had already signed the Minutes indicating that no revision of the voter's list was

made as of 5:00 PM

The poll clerk and the third member prepared another minutes stating that the election clerk had delivered

the application for cancellation at 4:30 P.M. without any reference to the minutes they had previously signed;Emeterio Larrazabal, who was supposed to have registered in Precinct 17, Mahawan, Kananga, was supposed

to have filled up an application for cancellation of his registration in Precinct No. 15, Ormoc City at Precinct

17 concurrent with his registration. His application for cancellation was never submitted in evidence.

The serial number of the voter's affidavits of the spouses Larrazabal in Precinct No. 17 are far removed from

the serial numbers of the other new registrants in November 28, 1987 in the same precinct.

The most telling evidence is the list of voters, that the Chairman and the poll clerk had written in Part II of the

same, closed by the signatures of both officials showing that there were only 9 additional registered voters in

Precinct 17, petitioner was not there. It was only on February 15, 1988, or two weeks after the election day

that the same Registrar certified for the first time that there were two voters lists, the first without the names

of the Larrazabals and the second, which appeared only after February 1, submitted by the Chairman of the

Board for Precinct 17 which contained the spouses Larrazabals' names.

Failing in her contention that she is a resident and registered voter of Kananga, Leyte, the petitioner poses an

alternative position that her being a registered voter in Ormoc City was no impediment to her candidacy forthe position of governor of the province of Leyte.

Section 12, Article X of the Constitution provides:

Relating therefore, section 89 of R.A. 179 to section 12, Article X of the Constitution one comes up with the

following conclusion: that Ormoc City when organized was not yet a highly-urbanned city but is, nevertheless,

considered independent of the province of Leyte to which it is geographically attached because its charter

prohibits its voters from voting for the provincial elective officials. The question now is whether or not the

prohibition against the 'city's registered voters' electing the provincial officials necessarily mean, a

prohibition of the registered voters to be elected as provincial officials. The argument is untenable.

Section 12, Article X of the Constitution is explicit in that aside from highly-urbanized cities, component cities

whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials are independent of the

province. In the same provision, it provides for other component cities within a province whose charters do

not provide a similar prohibition. Necessarily, component cities like Ormoc City whose charters prohibit their

voters from voting for provincial elective officials are treated like highly urbanized cities which are outside

the supervisory power of the province to which they are geographically attached. This independence from the

province carries with it the prohibition or mandate directed to their registered voters not to vote and be

voted for the provincial elective offices. The resolution in G.R. No. 80716 entitled Peralta v. The Commission on

Elections, et al. dated December 10, 1987 applies to this case. While the cited case involves Olongapo City

which is classified as a highly urbanized city, the same principle is applicable.

Moreover, Section 89 of Republic Act 179, independent of the constitutional provision, prohibits registered

voters of Ormoc City from voting and being voted for elective offices in the province of Leyte. We agree with

the COMELEC en banc that "the phrase 'shall not be qualified and entitled to vote in the election of the


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provincial governor and the members of the provincial board of the Province of Leyte' connotes two

prohibitions one, from running for and the second, from voting for any provincial elective official."

The petitioner takes exception to this interpretation. She opines that such interpretation is "wrong English"

since nowhere in the provision is there any reference to a prohibition against running for provincial elective

office. She states that if the prohibition to run was indeed intended, the provision should have been phrased

"Shall not be qualified TO RUN in the election FOR provincial governor." A comma should have been used

after the word qualified and after the word "vote" to clearly indicate that the phrase "in the election of theprovincial governor" is modified separately and distinctly by the words "not qualified" and the words "not

entitled to vote."

The Court finds the petitioner's interpretation fallacious.

In the case of Mapa v. Arroyo, the conjunction andbetween the phrase shall not be qualified and entitledto

vote refer to two prohibitions as ruled by the COMELEC in relation to the demonstrative phrase "in the

election of the provincial governor and the members of the provincial board of the Province of Leyte."

Finally, the petitioner contends that the February 14, 1991 decision of the COMELEC's second division is null

and void on the ground that on that date, the term of Commissioner Andres Flores, one of the signatories of

the majority opinion (vote was 2-1) had already expired on February 2, 1991. Commissioner Flores was

appointed for a three-year term from February 15, 1988 to February 15, 1991. In these three years he

exercised his duties and functions as Commissioner. Granting in the absence of a statute expressly stating

when the terms of the COMELEC Chairman and members commence and expire, that his term expired onFebruary 2, 1991 to enable a faithful compliance with the constitutional provision that the terms of office in

the COMELEC are on a staggered basis commencing and ending at fixed intervals, his continuance in office

until February 15, 1991 has a color of validity. Therefore, all his official acts from February 3, 1991 to

February 15, 1991, are considered valid.

Issue: WON Abella can assume position of governor by virtue of Section 6 RA 6646

Ratio: Abella claims that the Frivaldo and Labo cases were misapplied by the COMELEC. According to him

these cases are fundamentally different from SPC No. 88-546 in that the Frivaldo and Labo cases were

petitions for a quo warranto filed under section 253 of the Omnibus Code, contesting the eligibility of the

respondents after they had been proclaimed duly elected to the Office from which they were sought to be

unseated while SPC No. 88-546 which was filed before proclamation under section 78 of the Omnibus

Election Code sought to deny due course to Larrazabal's certificate of candidacy for materialmisrepresentations and was seasonably filed on election day. He, therefore, avers that since under section 6

of Republic Act 6646 it is provided therein that: Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to

be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes case for him shall not be counted.

The votes cast in favor of Larrazabal who obtained the highest number of votes are not considered counted

making her a non-candidate, he, who obtained the second highest number of votes should be installed as

regular Governor of Leyte in accordance with the Court's ruling in G.R. No. 88004.

While it is true that SPC No. 88-546 was originally a petition to deny due course to the certificate of candidacy

of Larrazabal and was filed before Larrazabal could be proclaimed the fact remains that the local elections of

February 1, 1988 in the province of Leyte proceeded with Larrazabal considered as a bona-fide candidate.

The voters of the province voted for her in the sincere belief that she was a qualified candidate for the

position of governor. Her votes were counted and she obtained the highest number of votes. The net effect is

that the petitioner lost in the election. He was repudiated by the electorate. In the Frivaldo and Labo cases,

this is precisely the reason why the candidates who obtained the second highest number of votes were not

allowed to assume the positions vacated by Frivaldo the governorship of Sorsogon, and Labo, the position of

mayor in Baguio City. The nature of the proceedings therefore, is not that compelling. What matters is that in

the event a candidate for an elected position who is voted for and who obtains the highest number of votes is

disqualified for not possessing the eligibility requirements at the time of the election as provided by law, the

candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes for the same position can not assume the vacated

position. It should be stressed that in G.R. No. 88004, the Court set aside the dismissal of SPC No. 88-546, and

directed the COMELEC to conduct hearings to determine whether or not Larrazabal was qualified to be a


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candidate for the position of governor in the province of Leyte. This is the import of the decision in G.R. No.

88004. Thus, the Court ruled in the case ofLabo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections:

Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed the quo warranto petition,

can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as he obtained only the second

highest number of votes in the election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City.

The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission on Elections, decided in 1985. In that case,

the candidate who placed second was proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning rival, who wasdisqualified as a turncoat and considered a non-candidate, were all disregard as stray. In effect, the second

placer won by default. That decision was supported by eight members of the Court then, with three dissenting

and another two reserving their vote. One was on official leave.

... it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a

candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the

representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that

they do not choose him.

Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of

votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government

that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority

or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election.

The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or

not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained thesecond highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead,

disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid the vote the winner into office or maintain him there.

However the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary politics and legislative policy on the matter,

if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not

be treated as stray, void or meaningless.

In sum, the Court does not find any reason to reverse and set aside the questioned decision and resolution of

the COMELEC. The COMELEC has not acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or in grave abuse of discretion

Labo v COMELEC (1989)

FACTS: Ramon Labo, Jr. married an Australian citizen in the Philippines. He was granted Australian

citizenship in 1976. In 1980, the marriage was declared void for being bigamous.

Labo returned to the Philippines in 1980, using an Australian passport, and obtained an Alien Certificate of

Registration (ACR). He later applied for a change in status from immigrant to returning Filipino citizen.However, the Commission on Immigration and Deportation denied his application for the cancellation of his

ACR since he has not applied for reacquisition of his Filipino citizenship.

According to the records of the Australian Embassy (as certified by the Australian Consul), Labo was still an

Australian citizen as of April 12, 1984. Although no direct evidence was presented to prove that he took an

oath of allegiance as a naturalized Australian citizen, the laws of Australia at the time required any person

over the age of 16 years who is granted Australian citizenship to take an oath of allegiance. The wording/text

of this oath includes a renunciation of all other allegiance.

Labo ran and won as Mayor of Baguio City in the local elections held on January 18, 1988. The second-placer,

Luis Lardizabal, filed a petition for quo warranto, alleging that Labo is disqualified from holding public office

on the grounds of alienage, and asking that the latter's proclamation as Mayor be annulled.

ISSUES: *The original issue raised before the Supreme Court concerned only the COMELEC's jurisdiction over

Lardizabal's petition. Labo contended that the petition for quo warranto was not filed on time, hence theCOMELEC lacks the jurisdiction to conduct an inquiry regarding his citizenship. However, the SC decided to

rule on the merits of the case, given that the issue is also of considerable importance (a foreign citizen holding

public office in the Philippines), and in the interest of the speedy administration of justice.

Does the COMELEC have the jurisdiction to inquire into Labo's citizenship?

Is Ramon Labo, Jr. a Filipino citizen?

Is he qualified to hold public office in the Philippines?

If Labo is not eligible to serve as Mayor, can Lardizabal, as the runner-up in the elections, replace him?


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HELD/RATIO:

Yes. Contrary to Labo's claim, the petition for quo warranto was filed on time. Lardizabal did not immediately

pay the filing fee because the COMELEC had at first considered the petition as a pre-proclamation proceeding,

which does not require the payment of such a fee. When the COMELEC reclassified the petition, Lardizabal

immediately paid the filing fee -- thus, he still complied with the prescribed 10-day period. Furthermore, the

Court held that such technicalities should not hinder judicial decisions on significant issues, such as the onebeing decided in this case.

Labo is not a Filipino citizen. He had lost his Philippine citizenship by all 3 modes specified in the

Constitution: (1) naturalization in a foreign country, (2) express renunciation of citizenship, and (3)

subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. He has not

reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of the 3 methods prescribed in the Constitution: (1) direct act of

Congress, (2) naturalization, and (3) repatriation.

Contrary to Labo's claim, his naturalization in Australia did not confer him with dual citizenship. The

Constitution explicitly states that dual citizenship is inimical to national interest.

The contention that his marriage to an Australian national did not automatically divest him of Filipino

citizenship is irrelevant. There was no claim that Labo had automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of

that marriage. Also, his Filipino citizenship has not been automatically restored upon the annulment of his

Australian citizenship, when his marriage was declared void on the grounds of bigamy.The Commission on Immigration and Deportation held in in 1988 that Labo was not a Filipino citizen. The

earlier contrary decision by the COMELEC in 1982 is totally baseless, and is even alleged to have been

politically motivated. The latter can be reversed because the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to

questions of citizenship.

Labo is not eligible to hold public office in the Philippines. He was not even a qualified voter when he was

elected.

Despite getting the second highest number of votes, Lardizabal cannot assume the position of Mayor because

he has not been duly elected by the people of Baguio City. Labo's disqualification alone does not entitle him to

take office. Instead, the elected Vice Mayor shall replace Labo.

*Separate concurring opinion (Gutierrez Jr., J.):Although no decision has been rendered by the COMELEC and elevated to the SC for review, it is undeniable

that a foreigner cannot be allowed to hold public office in the Philippines. It is regrettable, however, that Labo

should be disqualified on the basis of his citizenship because he has already achieved a lot while serving as

Mayor during the pendency of the case.

Labo v COMELEC (1992)

Facts: petitioner Ortega filed on March 26, 1992, a disqualification proceeding against Labo before the

Commission on Elections (Comelec) on the ground that Labo made a false representation when he stated

therein that he (Labo) is a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines. Ortega presented the decision of thisCourt in Labo v. Commission on Elections (176 SCRA 1 [1989]) declaring Labo not a citizen of the Philippines.

Labo, on the other hand, though represented by counsel, did not present any evidence. It was only on May 5,

1992 that petitioner submitted his Answer claiming Filipino citizenship.

COMELEC: cancelled Labos COC. May 10, 1992, the Commission resolves that the decision promulgated on

May 9, 1992 disqualifying respondent Ramon L. Labo, Jr., shall become final and executory only after five (5)

days from promulgation. Accordingly, respondent (Labo) may still continue to be voted upon as candidate for

City Mayor of Baguio City on May 11, 1992 subject to the final outcome of this case in the event the issue is

elevated to the Supreme Court either on appeal or certiorari. On May 13, 1992, respondent Comelec resolved,

motu proprio to suspend the proclamation of Labo in the event he wins in the elections for the City Mayor of

Baguio.


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May 15, 1992 petitioner Ortega filed before the Comelec an urgent motion for the implementation of its May

9, 1992 resolution cancelling Labo's certificate of candidacy. After an exchange of pleadings, respondent

Comelec, in its resolution dated May 26, 1992, denied Ortega's motion in view of the pending case (G.R. No.

105111) earlier filed by Labo of the same nature before this Court.

I. GR 105111

Petitioner faults the Comelec for the supposed abbreviated proceedings in SPA No. 92-029 which denied him

adequate opportunity to present a full-dress presentation of his case. Thus: a) only one (1) day was set for

hearing of the case, i.e., May 4, 1992; b) two days later, May 6, 1992 the hearing was set; c) instead of holding

a hearing, the Comelec issued the questioned resolution on May 9, 1992.

SC: records disclose that summons were issued by respondent Comelec as early as March 27, 1992 followed

by a telegram on April 1, 1992. But petitioner chose to ignore the same. Came April 15, 1992, petitioner

Ortega filed a motion to declare petitioner Labo in default. Over-extending him (Labo) the benefit of due

process, respondent Comelec issued another order dated April 24, 1992, this time directing the Acting City

Election Registrar of Baguio to personally serve the summons. The alleged delay in the resolution of SPA No.

92-029 can only be attributed to petitioner Labo and no one else.

Petitioner (Labo) filed his verified Answer, insisting that he is a Filipino citizen and continue to maintain and

preserve his Filipino citizenship; that he does not hold an Australian citizenship; that the doctrine of res

judicata does not apply in citizenship; and that "existing facts support his continuous maintenance and

holding of Philippine citizenship" and "supervening events now preclude the application of the ruling in the

Labo v. Comelec

SC: No evidence has been offered by respondent to show what these existing facts and supervening events are

to preclude the application of the Labo decision. The Commission is bound by the final declaration that

respondent is not a Filipino citizen. The fact remains that he has not submitted in the instant case anyevidence, if there be any, to prove his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship either before this Court or the

Comelec. On this score alone, We find no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent Comelec in

cancelling his (Labo's) certificate of candidacy and declaring that he is NOT a Filipino citizen pursuant to our

ruling in the 1989 case of Labo v. Comelec

Petitioner Labo claims, however, that Sec. 72 2 of the Omnibus Election Code "operates as a legislatively

mandated special repatriation proceeding" and that it allows his proclamation as the winning candidate since

the resolution disqualifying him was not yet final at the time the election was held.

SC: In the first place, Sec. 72 of the Omnibus Election Code has already been repealed by Sec. 6 of RA No. 6646,

to wit:Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be

disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a

candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and

receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or the Commission shall continue with the

trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may

during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the

evidence of his guilt is strong.


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Comelec can legally suspend the proclamation of petitioner Labo, his reception of the winning number of

votes notwithstanding, especially so where, as in this case. Labo failed to present any evidence before the

Comelec to support his claim of reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Petitioner Labo's status has not

changed in the case at bar. To reiterate, he (Labo) was disqualified as a candidate for being an alien. His

election does not automatically restore his Philippine citizenship, the possession of which is an indispensable

requirement for holding public office. Mere application for repratriation, does not, and cannot, amount to an

automatic reacquisition of the applicant's Philippine citizenship.

II. GR 105384

Petitioner Ortega submits that since this Court did not issue a temporary restraining order as regards the May

9, 1992 resolution of respondent Comelec cancelling Labo's certificate of candidacy, said resolution has

already become final and executory. Ortega further posits the view that as a result of such finality, the

candidate receiving the next highest number of votes should be declared Mayor of Baguio City.

SC: At the time petitioner Labo filed his petition (GR No. 105111) on May 15, 1992, the May 9, 1992

resolution of respondent Comelec cancelling his (Labo's) certificate of candidacy had already become final

and executory a day earlier, or on May 14, 1992, said resolution having been received by petitioner Labo on

the same day it was promulgated, i.e., May 9, 1992 and in the interim no restraining order was issued by this

Court. The resolution cancelling Labo's certificate of candidacy on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen

having acquired finality on May 14, 1992 constrains Us to rule against his proclamation as Mayor of Baguio

City. To begin with, one of the qualifications of an elective official is that he must be a citizen of the

Philippines.

Undoubtedly, petitioner Labo, not being a Filipino citizen, lacks the fundamental qualification for the

contested office. Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective office. As

mandated by law: "An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines."

The disqualification of petitioner Labo does not necessarily entitle petitioner Ortega as the candidate with thenext highest number of votes to proclamation as the Mayor of Baguio City.While Ortega may have garnered

the second highest number of votes for the office of city mayor, the fact remains that he was not the choice of

the sovereign will. Petitioner Labo was overwhelmingly voted by the electorate for the office of mayor in the

belief that he was then qualified to serve the people of Baguio City and his subsequent disqualification does

not make respondent Ortega the mayor-elect.

The latest ruling of the Court in this issue is Santos v. Commission on Election, (137 SCRA 740) decided in

1985. In that case, the candidate who placed second was proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning

rival, who was disqualified as a turncoat and considered a non-candidate, were all disregarded as stray. In

effect, the second placer won by default. That decision was supported by eight members of the Court

Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be reversed in favor of the earlier case

of Geronimo v. Santos (136 SCRA 435), which represents the more logical and democratic rule. That case,

which reiterated the doctrine first announced in 1912 in Topacio vs. Paredes (23 Phil. 238) was supported by

ten members of the Court. Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have

received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all

republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried

unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election.


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The rule would have been different if the electorate fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate's

disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety, would nonetheless cast their

votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. In such case, the electorate may be said to have waived the validity

and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing away their votes, in which

case, the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected.

But this is not the situation obtaining in the instant dispute. It has not been shown, and none was alleged, that

petitioner Labo was notoriously known as an ineligible candidate, much less the electorate as having known

of such fact. On the contrary, petitioner Labo was even allowed by no less than the Comelec itself in its

resolution dated May 10, 1992 to be voted for the office of the city mayor as its resolution dated May 9, 1992

denying due course to petitioner Labo's certificate of candidacy had not yet become final and subject to the

final outcome of this case.

As a consequence of petitioners' ineligibility, a permanent vacancy in the contested office has occurred. This

should now be filled by the vice-mayor, in accordance with Sec. 44 of the Local Government Code

Frivaldo v COMELEC 1996

Facts: Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect and assume office in due time. The Leagueof Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for annulment of Frivaldos election and proclamation onthe ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States. Frivaldo admitted

the allegation but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that his naturalization was merely forced upon

himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting prosecution by the Martial Law Dictators agent abroad.

Issue: Whether or not Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election.

Held: No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other

qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article

V, Section 1, of the Constitution.

Even if he did lose his naturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture did not and could not have the effect

of automatically restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that he had earlier renounced. Qualifications for

public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment orelection or assumption of office but during the officers entire tenure.Frivaldo declared not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore disqualified from serving as a Governor of the

Province of Sorsogon.

In the certificate of candidacy he filed, Frivaldo described himself as a "natural-born" citizen of the

Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows, however, that he

was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the following certification from the United States

District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the

Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.

This evidence is not denied by the petitioner. In fact, he expressly admitted it in his answer. Nevertheless, as

earlier noted, he claims it was "forced" on him as a measure of protection from the persecution of the Marcos

government through his agents in the United States.

The Court sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner was one of the enemies of the Marcos dictatorship.

Even so, it cannot agree that as a consequence thereof he was coerced into embracing American citizenship.His feeble suggestion that his naturalization was not the result of his own free and voluntary choice is totally

unacceptable and must be rejected outright.

There were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as Frivaldo, and some of them subject

to greater risk than he, who did not find it necessary nor do they claim to have been coerced to abandon their

cherished status as Filipinos. They did not take the oath of allegiance to the United States, unlike the

petitioner who solemnly declared "on oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance

and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty of whom or which I have heretofore been a

subject or citizen," meaning in his case the Republic of the Philippines. The martyred Ninoy Aquino heads the


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impressive list of those Filipinos in exile who, unlike the petitioner, held fast to their Philippine citizenship

despite the perils of their resistance to the Marcos regime.

The Nottebohm case cited by the petitioner invoked the international law principle of effective nationality

which is clearly not applicable to the case at bar. That case is not relevant to the petition before us because it

dealt with a conflict between the nationality laws of two states as decided by a third state. No third state is

involved in the case at bar; in fact, even the United States is not actively claiming Frivaldo as its national. The

sole question presented to us is whether or not Frivaldo is a citizen of the Philippines under our own laws,regardless of other nationality laws. We can decide this question alone as sovereign of our own territory,

conformably to Section 1 of the said Convention providing that "it is for each State to determine under its law

who are its nationals." It is also worth noting that Nottebohm was invoking his naturalization in Liechtenstein

whereas in the present case Frivaldo is rejecting his naturalization in the United States.

If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, the petitioner

should have done so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473

and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by

repatriation.

It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these categorical acts. He contends that by simply filing his

certificate of candidacy he had, without more, already effectively recovered Philippine citizenship. But that is

hardly the formal declaration the law envisions surely, Philippine citizenship previously disowned is not that

cheaply recovered. If the Special Committee had not yet been convened, what that meant simply was that the

petitioner had to wait until this was done, or seek naturalization by legislative or judicial proceedings.

Gutierrez Jr, Concurring: I concur in the pragmatic approach taken by the Court. I agree that when the

higher interests of the State are involved, the public good should supersede any procedural infinities which

may affect a petition filed with the Commission on Elections. I fail to see how the Court could allow a person

who by his own admissions is indubitably an alien to continue holding the office of Governor of any province.

It is an established rule of long standing that the period fixed by law for the filing of a protest whether quo

warranto or election contest is mandatory and jurisdictional.

As a rule, the quo warranto petition seeking to annul the petitioner's election and proclamation should have

been filed with ten days after the proclamation of election results. The purpose of the law in not allowing the

filing of protests beyond the period fixed by law is to have a certain and definite time within which petitions

against the results of an election should be filed and to provide summary proceedings for the settlement of

such disputes. The Rules of Court allow the Republic of the Philippines to file quo warranto proceedings

against any public officer who performs an act which works a forfeiture of his office. However, where theSolicitor General or the President feel that there are no good reasons to commence quo warranto

proceedings, the Court should allow a person like Estuye or his league to bring the action.

I must emphasize, however, that my concurrence is limited to a clear case of an alien holding an elective

public office. And perhaps in a clear case of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. Where the

disqualification is based on age, residence, or any of the many grounds for ineligibility, I believe that the ten-

day period should be applied strictly.

The pragmatic approach is also shown by the fact that the Court found it inexpedient to wait for the final

decision of COMELEC. This step is most unusual but considering the total lack of any serious grounds for the

petitioner's claim of having regained his Philippine citizenship, I am constrained to concur in the procedure

pro hac vice.

Mercado v Manzano 1999

FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the resolution of the COMELEC en banc and todeclare Manzano disqualified to hold the office of vice-mayor of Makati City . Important details on Edu

Manzano: born September 4, 1955 in San Francisco, California, USA to Filipino parents.

On the May 11, 1998 elections for vice-mayoralty of Makati City, 3 candidates competed for the post: Eduardo

B. Manzano, Ernesto S. Mercado, and Gabriel V. Daza III. Manzano won the elections but his proclamation was

suspended due to a pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril alleging that

Manzano was an American citizen. On May 7, 1998, the Second Division of the COMELEC cancelled the

certificate of candidacy of Manzano on the grounds of his dual-citizenship, which disqualifies him according


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to Sec.40(d) of the Local Government Code. Manzano filed a motion for reconsideration. Mercado sought to

intervene in the case for disqualification. Manzano opposed the motion to intervene. The motion was

unresolved. But on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en banc (with 1 commissioner abstaining) reversed the

Second Divisions ruling on the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy and directing the proclamation ofManzano as winner, saying:

Manzano, being born in the USA, obtained US citizenship by operation of the US constitution and laws underprinciple ofjus soli (basis is place of birth).

Yet, by being born to Filipino parents, Manzano natural born Filipino citizen, by operation of the 1935

Philippine Constitution and laws under principlejus sanguinis (the right of blood).

Although he is registered as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration and holds and American

passport, he has not lost his Filipino citizenship since he has not renounced it and has not taken an oath of

allegiance to the USA.

Manzano, after the age of majority, registered himself as a voter and voted in the 1992, 1995, and 1998

Philippine elections which effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law. Under Philippine

law, he no longer had US citizenship.

Private respondent Manzano was then proclaimed as vice-mayor of Makati City.

ISSUES:WON petitioner Mercado has personality to bring this suit considering that he was not an original party in the

case for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril nor was his motion for leave to intervene granted.

WON respondent Manzano is a dual citizen and if so, WON he is disqualified from being a candidate for vice-

REASONS: Manzano argues that Mercado has neither legal interest in the matter of litigation nor an interest

to protect because he is a defeated candidate for the vice-mayoralty post of Makati City [who] cannot beproclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City even if the private respondent be ultimately disqualified by final

and executory judgment.This assumes that at the time intervention was sought, there had already been a proclamation of the election

results for the vice-mayoralty elections when in fact, there has not been such a proclamation. Certainly, the

petitioner had, and still has an interest in ousting private respondent from the race when he sought to

intervene. The rule in Labo v. COMELEConly applies when the election of the respondent is contested, and thequestion is WON the second placer may be declared winner. If Mamaril was competent to bring action, so was

Mercado, being a rival candidate.

Petitioner has right to intervene even if he filed the motion on May 20, 1998, when it was shown that the

private respondent had the most votes. Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 provides that intervention may

be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has been no final judgment

rendered. Failure of COMELEC en bancto resolve petitioners motion for intervention was tantamountto denial of the motion, justifying this petition for certiorari.

Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner contends that through Sec.40(d) of the Local Government

Code (which declares as disqualified from running for elective local position Those with dual-citizenship),Congress has command[ed] in explicit terms the ineligibility of persons possessing dual allegiance to holdelective office.

Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is involuntary; it arises out of

circumstances of birth or marriage, where a person is recognized to be a national by two or more states. Dual

allegiance is a result of a persons volition; it is a situation wherein a person simultaneously owes, by somepositive act, loyalty to two or more states. Dual citizenship is an issue because a person who has this raises a

question of which states law must apply to him/her, therefore posting a threat to a countrys sovereignty. InSec.5 Article IV of the Constitution on Citizenship, the concern was not with dual citizenship per se, but with

naturalized citizens who maintain allegiance to their countries of origin even after naturalization. Hence,

dual citizenship in the aforementioned disqualification clause must mean dual allegiance. Ther efore,persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.

It should suffice that upon filing of certificates for candidacy, such persons with dual citizenships have elected

their Philippine citizenship to terminate their dual citizenship. In private respondents certificate of


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candidacy, he made these statements under oath on March 27, 1998 : I am a Filipino citizenNatural-

born. I am not a permanent resident of , or immigrant to , a foreign country. I am eligible for theoffice I seek to be elected. I will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will

maintain true faith and allegiance thereto The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed torenounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual-

citizen. In Frivaldo v. COMELEC, it was held that By laws of the United States Frivaldo lost his American

citizenship when he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the

Philippine Government. Therefore, petitioner Mercados contention that the oath of allegiance contained inprivate respondents certificate of candidacy is insufficient to constitute his renunciation of his Americancitizenship. Also, equally without merit is his contention that, to be effective, such renunciation should have

been made upon reaching the age of majority since no law requires the election of Philippine citizenship to be

made upon majority age.

Plus, the fact that Manzano admitted that he was registered as an American citizen with the Philippine Bureau

of Immigration and Deportation and that he holds an American passport which he used for his last travel to

the US dated April 22, 1997should not be such a big deal. At the time of said travel, the use of an American

passport was simply an assertion of his American nationality before the termination of his American

citizenship. Admitting that he was a registered alien does not mean that he is not still a Filipino (Aznar v.

COMELEC).

Manzanos oath of allegiance, together with the fact he has spent his life here, received his education here, andpracticed his profession here, and has taken part in past Philippine elections, leaves no doubt of his electionof Philippine citizenship.

WHEREFORE, petition for certiorari, DISMISSED. *Ineligibility refers to lack of qualifications prescribed.

Coquilla v COMELEC (2002)

Nature: Petition for certiorari to set aside the resolution, dated July 19, 2001, of the Second Division of the

COMELEC, ordering the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of petitioner Teodulo M. Coquilla for the

position of mayor of Oras, Eastern Samar in the May 14, 2001 elections and the order, dated January 30, 2002,

of the COMELEC en banc denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.Special Civil Action in the SC.Certiorari

Facts: February 17, 1938 Coquilla was born of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew up andresided there until 1965, when he joined the US Navy. He was subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen.

1970-1973, petitioner thrice visited the Philippines while on leave from the U.S. Navy. Otherwise, even after

his retirement from the U.S. Navy in 1985, he remained in the U.S.

October 15, 1998, petitioner came to the Philippines and took out a residence certificate, although he

continued making several trips to the U.S. the last of which took place on July 6, 2000 and lasted until August

5, 2000.

Subsequently, petitioner applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 81715 to the Special Committee on

Naturalization which was approved Nov. 7, 2000

Nov. 10, 2000 oath-taking as Filipino citizen; issued Certificate of Repatriation No. 000737 and Bureau of

Immigration Identification Certificate No. 115123 three days after

November 21, 2000 - applied for registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar. Approved by Election

Registration Board on January 12, 2001.

February 27, 2001 filed certificate of candidacy stating therein that he had been a resident of Oras, EasternSamar for "two (2) years."

March 5, 2001, Neil M. Alvarezrespondent, incumbent mayor of Oras and reelectionistsought

cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy on the ground that the latter had made a materialmisrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by stating that he had been a resident of Oras for two years

when in truth he had resided therein for only about six months since November 10, 2000, when he took his

oath as a citizen of the Philippines.

COMELEC unable to render judgment on the case before the elections on May 14, 2001 where petitioner won

over private respondents by 379 votes.


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May 17, 2001 - petitioner proclaimed mayor of Oras by the Municipal Board of Canvassers and subsequently

took his oath of office.

July 19, 2001, the Second Division of the COMELEC granted private respondents petition and ordered the

cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy on the basis the respondents frequent or regular trips tothe Philippines and stay in Oras, Eastern Samar after his retirement from the U.S. Navy in 1985 cannot be

added to his actual residence thereat after November 10, 2000 until May 14, 2001 to cure his deficiency in

days, months, and year to allow or render him eligible to run for an elective office in the Philippines. The 1-yrresidency requirement of Sec 39(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 in relation to Secs 65 and 68 of the

Omnibus Election Code contemplates of the actual residence of a Filipino citizen in the constituency where he

seeks to be elected.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the COMELEC en banc on January

30, 2002. Hence this petition.

Issues:

WON the 30-day period for appealing the resolution of the COMELEC was suspended by the filing of a

motion for reconsideration by petitioner.

Private respondent contention: petition should be dismissed cause his motion for reconsideration was denied

for being pro forma and did not suspend the running of the 30-day period for filing this petition, pursuant to

Rule 19, 4 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, so and since the resolution was received on July 28, 2001 and

the petition in this case was filed on February 11, 2002, the same should be considered as having been filedlate and should be dismissed.

Petitioners MFR and petition for certiorari were filed within the prescribed periods. 5 -day period for filingMFR under Rule 19, 2 should be counted from receipt of decision, resolution, order, or ruling of COMELEC. In

this case, petitioner received a copy of COMELECs Second Division July 19, 01 resolution on July 28, 2001. 5

days later, on Aug. 2, 01, he filed his MFR. On Feb. 6, 02, he received a copy of the order, dated Jan. 30, 02, ofthe COMELEC en banc denying his MFR. 5 days later, on Feb 11, 02, he filed this petition for certiorari.

Contention that petitioners MFR did not suspend the running of the period for filing this petition because themotion was pro forma and, thus, petition shouldve been filed on or before Aug 27, 01 is not correct. It wasactually filed, however, only on February 11, 2002. The MFR was not pro forma and its filing did suspend the

period for filing the petition for certiorari in this case. The mere reiteration in a motion for reconsideration of

the issues raised by the parties and passed upon by the court does not make a motion pro forma; otherwise,

the movants remedy would not be a reconsideration of the decision but a new trial or some other remedy.

In the cases where MFR was held to be pro forma, the motion was so held becauseit was a second motion for reconsideration, or

it did not comply with the rule that the motion must specify the findings and conclusions alleged to be

contrary to law or not supported by the evidence,or

it failed to substantiate the alleged errors, or

it merely alleged that the decision in question was contrary to law, or

the adverse party was not given notice thereof.

Petitioners MFR suffers from none of these defects, and COMELEC erred in ruling that petitioners MFR waspro forma because the allegations raised therein are a mere "rehash" of his earlier pleadings or did not raise

"new matters." Hence, the filing of the motion suspended the running of the 30-day period to file the petition

in this case, which, as earlier shown, was done within the reglementary period provided by law.

WON COMELEC retained jurisdiction to decide this case notwithstanding the proclamation of

petitioner.R.A. No. 6646, Sec 6 & 7: Candidates who are disqualified by final judgment before the election shall not be

voted for and the votes cast for them shall not be counted. But those against whom no final judgment of

disqualification had been rendered may be voted for and proclaimed, unless, on motion of the complainant,

the COMELEC suspends their proclamation because the grounds for their disqualification or cancellation of

their certificates of candidacy are strong. Meanwhile, the proceedings for disqualification of candidates or for

the cancellation or denial of certificates of candidacy, which have been begun before the elections, should

continue even after such elections and proclamation of the winners.


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In Abella v. COMELEC and Salcedo II v. COMELEC the SC, in the first case, affirmed and, in the second,

reversed the decisions of the COMELEC rendered after the proclamation of candidates, not on the ground that

the latter had been divested of jurisdiction upon the candidates proclamation but on the merits.

WON petitioner had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at least one (1) year before the elections

held on May 14, 2001 as he represented in his certificate of candidacy.

No.First, 39(a) of the Local Government Code (R.A No. 7160) provides: An elective local official must be a citizen

of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a

member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where

he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least 1 year immediately preceding the day of the election;

and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.

Residence" is to be understood as referring to "domicile" or legal residence the place where a partyactually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given

time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi).

A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the pla ce where the childs parentsreside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice).

In the case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming a U.S. citizen after enlisting in the

U.S. Navy in 1965. From then on and until Nov. 10, 00, when he reacquired Philippine citizenship, petitioner

was an alien without any right to reside in the Philippines save as our immigration laws may have allowedhim to stay as a visitor or as a resident alien.

If immigration to the United States by virtue of a "greencard," which entitles one to reside permanently in

that country, constitutes abandonment of domicile in the Philippines (Caasi v. CA), much more does

naturalization in a foreign country result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines, as was the case

with the petitioner.

Petitioner was repatriated not under R.A. No. 2630, which applies to the repatriation of those who lost their

Philippine citizenship by accepting commission in the Armed Forces of the US, but under R.A. No. 8171, which

provides for the repatriation of, among others, natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of

political or economic necessity. In any event, the fact is that, by having been naturalized abroad, he lost his

Philippine citizenship and with it his residence in the Philippines and had not reacquired it until November

10, 00

Second, petitioner did not reestablished residence in this country in 1998 when he came back to prepare for

the mayoralty elections of Oras by securing a Community Tax Certificate in that year and by "constantlydeclaring" to his townmates of his intention to seek repatriation and run for mayor in the May 14, 2001

elections.

The status of being an alien and a non-resident can be waived either separately, when one acquires the status

of a resident alien before acquiring Philippine citizenship, or at the same time when one acquires Philippine

citizenship. As an alien, an individual may obtain an immigrant visa under 13 of the Philippine Immigration

Act of 1948 and an Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) and thus waive his status as a non-resident.

On the other hand, he may acquire Philippine citizenship by naturalization under C.A. No. 473, as amended,

or, if he is a former Philippine national, he may reacquire Philippine citizenship by repatriation or by an act of

Congress, in which case he waives not only his status as an alien but also his status as a non-resident alien.

In the case at bar, the only evidence of petitioners status when he entered the country on Oct and Dec 98, Oct99, and June 00 is the statement "Philippine Immigration () Balikbayan" in his 1998-2008 U.S. passport. As

for his entry on Aug 5, 00, the stamp bore the added inscription "good for one year stay." Under 2 of R.A. No.6768 (An Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program), the term balikbayan includes a former Filipino citizen who

had been naturalized in a foreign country and comes or returns to the Philippines and, if so, he is entitled,

among others, to a "visa-free entry to the Philippines for a period of one (1) year" (3(c)). It would appear

then that when petitioner entered the country on the dates in question, he did so as a visa-free balikbayan

visitor whose stay as such was valid for 1-yr only. Hence, petitioner can only be held to have waived his status

as an alien and as a non-resident only on Nov 10, 00 upon taking his oath as a citizen of the Philippines under

R.A. No. 8171. He lacked the requisite residency to qualify him for the mayorship of Oras

Petitioner cannot invoke the ruling in the cases Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections and Bengson as

residency was not an issue in these.


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Third, petitioners contends that his registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar in January 2001 isconclusive of his residency as a candidate because 117 of the Omnibus Election Code requires that a voter

must have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the city or municipality wherein he proposes

to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. But, registration as a voter does not bar the

filing of a subsequent case questioning a candidates lack of residency (Nuval v. Guray).Fourth, petitioner was not denied due process because the COMELEC failed to act on his motion to be allowed

to present evidence. Under 5(d), in relation to 7, of R.A. No. 6646 (Electoral Reforms Law of 1987),proceedings for denial or cancellation of a certificate of candidacy are summary in nature. The holding of a

formal hearing is thus not de rigeur. In any event, petitioner cannot claim denial of the right to be heard since

he filed a Verified Answer, a Memorandum and a Manifestation, all dated March 19, 2001, before the

COMELEC in which he submitted documents relied by him in this petition, which, contrary to petitionersclaim, are complete and intact in the records.

WON COMELEC was justified in ordering the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy since the

statement in petitioners certificate of candidacy that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samarfor "two years" at the time he filed such certificate is not true.

Yes. Petitioner made a false representation of a material fact in his certificate of candidacy, thus rendering

such certificate liable to cancellation.

Sec 78 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel

a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any materialrepresentation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false.

In the case at bar, what is involved is a false statement concerning a candidates qualification for an office forwhich he filed the certificate of candidacy. This is a misrepresentation of a material fact justifying the

cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy. The cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy inthis case is thus fully justified.

Judgment: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the resolution of the Second Division of the

Commission on Elections, dated July 19, 2001, and the order, dated January 30, 2002 of the Commission on

Elections en banc are AFFIRMED.

Japzon v COMELEC 2009

Facts: Both petitioner Manuel B. Japzon (Japzon) and private respondent Jaime S. Ty (Ty) were candidates for

the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, in the local elections held on 14May 2007. Japzon instituted SPA No. 07-568 by filing before the COMELEC a Petition 5 to disqualify and/or

cancel Tys Certificate of Candidacy on the ground of material misrepresentation. Japzon averred in his

Petition that Ty was a former natural-born Filipinoto spouses Ang Chim Ty (a Chinese) and Crisanta Aranas

Sumiguin (a Filipino). Ty eventually migrated to the United States of America (USA) and became a citizen

thereof. Ty had been residing in the USA for the last 25 years. When Ty filed his Certificate of Candidacy on 28

March 2007, he falsely represented therein that he was a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General

Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for one year before 14 May 2007, and was not a permanent resident or immigrant

of any foreign country.

In fact, even after filing his application for reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, Ty continued to make

trips to the USA, the most recent of which was on 31 October 2006 lasting until 20 January 2007. Moreover,although Ty already took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, he continued to comport

himself as an American citizen as proven by his travel records. He had also failed to renounce his foreign

citizenship as required by Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and

Reacquisition Act of 2003

Ty claimed, however, that prior to filing his Certificate of Candidacy for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality

of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 28 March 2007, he already performed the following acts: (1) with
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the enactment of Republic Act No. 9225, granting dual citizenship to natural-born Filipinos, Ty filed with the

Philippine Consulate General in Los Angeles, California, USA, an application for the reacquisition of his

Philippine citizenship; (2) on 2 October 2005, Ty executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the

Philippines before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General in Los Angeles, California,

USA; (3) Ty applied for a Philippine passport indicating in his application that his residence in the Philippines

was at A. Mabini St., Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. Tys application was approved

and he was issued on 26 October 2005 a Philippine passport; (4) on 8 March 2006, Ty personally secured and

signed his Community Tax Certificate (CTC) from the Municipality of General Macarthur, in which he stated

that his address was at Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; (5) thereafter, on 17 July

2006, Ty was registered as a voter in Precinct 0013A, Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern

Samar; (6) Ty secured another CTC dated 4 January 2007 again stating therein his address as Barangay 6,

Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; and (7) finally, Ty executed on 19 March 2007 a duly notarized

Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship.

Ty won pending resolution of the case. COMELEC First Division found that Ty complied with the

requirements of Sections 3 and 5 of Republic Act No. 9225 and reacquired his Philippine citizenship. Although

[Ty] has lost his domicile in [the] Philippines when he was naturalized as U.S. citizen in 1969, the

reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship and subsequent acts thereof proved that he has been a resident of

Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar for at least one (1) year before the elections held

on 14 May 2007 as he represented in his certificate of candidacy

Issue: WON Ty is DQ-ed

Held: No

Ratio:

On 2 October 2005, Ty reacquired his Philippine citizenship by taking his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of

the Philippines before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General in Los Angeles,

California, USA, in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225.16At this point, Ty still held dual

citizenship, i.e., American and Philippine. It was only on 19 March 2007 that Ty renounced his Americancitizenship before a notary public and, resultantly, became a pure Philippine citizen again.

It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225 governs the manner in which a natural-born Filipino may

reacquire or retain17 his Philippine citizenship despite acquiring a foreign citizenship, and provides for his

rights and liabilities under such circumstances. A close scrutiny of said statute would reveal that it does not at

all touch on the matter of residence of the natural-born Filipino taking advantage of its provisions. Republic

Act No. 9225 imposes no residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship;

nor does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current

residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino. Clearly, Republic Act No. 9225 treats citizenship

independently of residence. This is only logical and consistent with the general intent of the law to allow for

dual citizenship.

Residency in the Philippines only becomes relevant when the natural-born Filipino with dual citizenship

decides to run for public office.Breaking down the afore-quoted provision, for a natural born Filipino, whoreacquired or retained his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, to run for public office, he

must: (1) meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing

laws; and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any public

officer authorized to administer an oath.
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That Ty complied with the second requirement is beyond question. On 19 March 2007, he personally

executed a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship before a notary public. By the time he filed his Certificate of

Candidacy for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 28 March

2007, he had already effectively renounced his American citizenship, keeping solely his Philippine citizenship.

The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to "dwelling" or

"habitation," but rather to "domicile" or legal residence, that is, "the place where a party actually or

constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time,

eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi)."18

A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the childs parents

reside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice). In

Coquilla,19 the Court already acknowledged that for an individual to acquire American citizenship, he must

establish residence in the USA. Since Ty himself admitted that he became a naturalized American citizen, then

he must have necessarily abandoned the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, as

his domicile of origin; and transferred to the USA, as his domicile of choice.

As has already been previously discussed by this Court herein, Tys reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship

under Republic Act No. 9225 had no automatic impact or effect on his residence/domicile. He could still

retain his domicile in the USA, and he did not necessarily regain his domicile in the Municipality of General

Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines. Ty merely had the option to again establish his domicile in the

Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, said place becoming his new domicile of

choice. The length of his residence therein shall be determined from the time he made it his domicile of

choice, and it shall not retroact to the time of his birth.

The principle of animus revertendi has been used to determine whether a candidate has an "intention to

return" to the place where he seeks to be elected. Corollary to this is a determination whether there has been

an "abandonment" of his former residence which signifies an intention to depart therefrom. In Caasi v. Court

of Appeals, this Court set aside the appealed orders of the COMELEC and the Court of Appeals and annulled

the election of the respondent as Municipal Mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan on the ground that respondents

immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in thePhilippines.

In Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, the Court held that "domicile" and "residence" are synonymous.

The term "residence," as used in the election law, imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but

also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. "Domicile" denotes a

fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to

return. The Court explained that in order to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur (1)

residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to

abandon the old domicile. There must be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose

to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must

be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.

As espoused by Ty, the issue of whether he complied with the one-year residency requirement for running for

public office is a question of fact. Its determination requires the Court to review, examine and evaluate or

weigh the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties before the COMELEC.

The COMELEC, taking into consideration the very same pieces of evidence presently before this Court, found

that Ty was a resident of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, one year prior to the 14 May

2007 local elections. It is axiomatic that factual findings of administrative agencies, such as the COMELEC,

which have acquired expertise in their field are binding and conclusive on the Court
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Tys intent to establish a new domicile of choice in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar,

Philippines, became apparent when, immediately after reacquiring his Philippine citizenship on 2 October

2005, he applied for a Philippine passport indicating in his application that his residence in the Philippines

was at A. Mabini St., Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. For the years 2006 and 2007,

Ty voluntarily submitted himself to the local tax jurisdiction of the Municipality of General Macarthur,

Eastern Samar, by paying community tax and securing CTCs from the said municipality stating therein his

address as A. Mabini St., Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. Thereafter, Ty applied for

and was registered as a voter on 17 July 2006 in Precinct 0013A, Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur,

Eastern Samar.

The fact that Ty did come back to the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, after

said trips, is a further manifestation of his animus manendi and animus revertendi. There is no basis for this

Court to require Ty to stay in and never leave at all the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for

the full one-year period prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections so that he could be considered a resident

thereof. To the contrary, the Court has previously ruled that absence from residence to pursue studies or

practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected, does not

constitute loss of residence. In Aquino v. COMELEC,25the Court did not find anything wrong in an individual

changing residences so he could run for an elective post, for as long as he is able to prove with reasonable

certainty that he has effected a change of residence for election law purposes for the period required by law.

Robredo v Tan [2008]

Facts: A Complaint8 dated 16 December 1991 was filed by complainant (herein respondent) Orlando P. Tan

(Tan, for brevity) against respondents (herein petitioners) Jose Lim Robredo alias Jose Chan Robredo

(Jose, for brevity) and Jesse M. Robredo (Jesse, for brevity) for Compulsory Registration as Chinese

Nationals and Deportation filed before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. Tan alleged that

Robredos parents were Chinese (mother is lotus feet) did not naturalized and neither did their children .

Robredos sister even applied for naturalization but Robredo still failed to do so.

Jose misrepresented himself as a Filipino and passed this misrepresentation to his son Jesse, by falsely

registering himself as a Filipino citizen with the Local Civil Registrar; when Jose applied for a Philippine

Passport with the Department of Foreign Affairs, he concealed the fact that he has personal knowledge of the

fact that his Record of Birth is intact and on file with the Records Management and Archives Office; by this

falsity, Jose was granted by the DFA with Philippine Passport

Case was elevated to the Board of Special Inquiry for further proceedings.12 Respondents Robredo filed their

Motion to Dismiss13 dated 11 April 1992 and Supplemental Motion to Dismiss14 dated 18 March 1992

praying that the case be dismissed, they being Filipino citizens and the Board of Special Inquiry has no

jurisdiction over the case and over their persons. MTD was denied even on appeal. Tan then filed petition to

reconstitute records of the case mssing and lost. After protracted hearings and resolutions on the matter,

the petition was eventually granted. Thus Office of the President ruled - The issue of jurisdiction aside, we

agree with DOJ Acting Secretary (now Ombudsman) Gutierrez that respondents' citizenship is best settled by

the Board of Special Inquiry in a proceeding for that purpose after the parties have reconstituted the\ records

of the case. Under the principle of equity, respondents must be given a chance to prove their true citizenship

and controvert whatever evidence that complainant would present. This case should be remanded back to the

Bureau of Immigration and/or Board of Special Inquiry for reception of evidence and reconstitution of the

records.
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Petitioners contend that: the ruling of the Office of the President, if implemented will result in disregarding an

elementary tenet in the law of procedure, i.e., a judgment or ruling which has attained finality cannot be

disturbed; from the issuance of the 20 April 1995 Order of the Bureau of Immigration up to the time that the

respondent filed his Petition to Reconstitute Records and to Re-Open the Complaint for Compulsory

Registration as Chinese Nationals and Deportation for Further Proceedings on 14 March 2000, almost five (5)

years or 1,778 days had already passed, thus, the decision has already acquired finality and becomes

immutable and unalterable.

Petitioners posit that: the Office of the President committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the

reconstitution and reopening of the Complaint for further proceedings despite failure of the respondent to

comply with the mandate of Act. No. 3110, which is applicable in supplementary character and despite his

lack of personality to initiate the same; no notice of loss was issued by the office of the clerk having custody of

the records of the case D.C. No. 92-736 and neither was such notice published in the Official Gazette and in a

newspaper of general circulation.

In support of their prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, petitioners basically argues that

the continuation by the Bureau of Immigration of its reconstitution of records and the reopening of the case

against them will work injustice to the petitioners and the people of Naga City as petitioner Jesse is serving

them as their duly elected local chief executive.

Issue: only issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the Office of the President erred in directing the

Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration to take immediate action for the reconstitution of the records in

Deportation Case

Held: No

Ratio:

It is worthy to note that the whole theory of reconstitution is to reproduce or replace records lost or

destroyed so that said records may be complete and court proceedings may continue from the point or stage

where said proceedings stopped due to the loss of the records.40 The matter concerning petitioners'citizenship is not an issue to be passed upon or resolved by Us in the instant Petition but by the Bureau of

Immigration in D.C. No. 92-736. As aptly stressed by the Office of the President, the controversy devolves

solely upon the issue of reconstitution of the records in said D.C. No. 92-736. Thus, without reconstitution of

the records in said deportation case which was filed against petitioners, no further proceedings can be had.

As found by the Office of the President, x x x the Board did not conduct any proceedings thereon as the

records of the case mysteriously disappeared and (c)omplainant was later informed ofthe missing records

The reconstitution is as much the duty of the prosecution as the defense43 and the mysterious disappearance

of the records is an event which weighs equally against all. The said reconstitution cannot be considered as a

filing anew of the complaint but it is merely the reproduction and replacement of the missing or lost records

in D.C. Case No. 92-736.

The Bureau is the best agency that can best determine whether petitioners violated certain provisions of the

Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. In this jurisdiction, courts will not interfere in matters

which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of

activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies. By reason of the

special knowledge and expertise of administrative departments over matters falling within their jurisdiction,

they are in a better position to pass judgment thereon and their findings of fact in that regard are generally

accorded respect, if not finality, by the courts.47 Petitioners insist that respondent failed to comply with the


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mandate of Act No. 3110 with respect to the notice and publication requirement. We are not persuaded. Act

No. 3110,48 is the general law that governs the reconstitution of judicial records. Clearly, it can be gleaned

from the foregoing, that the notice and publication requirements of Act 3110 pertain only to judicial

reconstitution of records and not to the reconstitution of records of a pending deportation case before the

Bureau of Immigration.

ii. Disqualifications

Section 40.Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local

position:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable

by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;

(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;

(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;

(d) Those with dual citizenship;

(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;

(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and

continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and

(g) The insane or feeble-minded.

Election Code on Disqualifications

Caasi vs. CA 1990

Facts: Private respondent Merito Miguel was elected as municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan during the

local elections of January 18, 1988. His disqualification, however, was sought by herein petitioner, Mateo

Caasi, on the ground that under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code private respondent was not

qualified because he is a green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the United States of America, not

of Bolinao.

Issues:

1. Whether or not a green card is proof that the holder is a permanent resident of the United States.2. Whether respondent Miguel had waived his status as a permanent resident of or immigrant to the U.S.A.

prior to the local elections on January 18, 1988.

Held: The Supreme Court held that Miguels application for immigrant status and permanent residence in theU.S. and his possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a permanent

resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. The waiver of such immigrant status

should be as indubitable as his application for it. Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of

that status or that he surrendered his green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor

of Bolinao in the local election on January 18, 1988, the Courts conclusion is that he was disqualified to runfor said public office, hence, his election thereto was null and void.

Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance at all times, and any

public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of anothercountry during his tenure shall be dealt with by law.

In the same vein, but not quite, Section 6

loc gov comp6

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