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Copyright(c)TheRegentsoftheUniversityofCalifornia1995.UCLALawReview

October,1995

43UCLAL.Rev.139

LENGTH:8000words

BOOKREVIEW:TheModernMachiavelli:Legitimacy,ConflictandPowerintheInternationalLegalOrderReviewofHenryKissinger'sDiplomacy

NAME:ElizabethKopelman*

BIO:

*ActingAssistantProfessorofLaw,StanfordLawSchool,andResearchFellow,StanfordCenteronConflictandNegotiation.TheauthorthanksKurtBorgwardt,ThomasEhrlich,BrianGanson,MelanieGreenberg,DavidM.Kennedy,MarcMiller,JackRakove,andDouglasStonefortheircommentsonthisEssay.

LEXISNEXISSUMMARY:...ArguingthatKissinger'snostalgicharkingbacktotheEuropeanbalanceofpowersystemisasahistoricalandunworkableasitisundesirable,KopelmanhighlightsthreefactorsinpostColdWardiplomacythatKissinger'sanalysisleavesout:(1)theroleofthedemocraticprocessingarneringlegitimacyfordefiningandpursuingthe"nationalinterest"(2)theroleofpublicinternationallawinaddressingconflictthroughinstitutionaldesignandconsensusbuildingandfinally,(3)theburgeoningroleof"transformative"diplomacy,inotherwords,thecontributionsof"citizendiplomats"whochangenotonlytherulesbutalsothecontoursoftheplayingfielditselfbyworkingoutsideformalgovernmentalnegotiationchannels....Amoreexpansivedefinitionoftheconceptof"power"could,forexample,encompassthepowerofideasinforeignpolicythepowerofa"specialrelationship"betweenalliesthepoweroflegitimacyinademocracyorthepowerofdefttimingincapitalizingonauniquelyfluidhistoricalmoment,suchastheendoftheSecondWorldWar,asdiscussedbelow....

TEXT:[*139]

AbstractThisReviewEssaysummarizesandcritiquesHenryKissinger'sapproachtotheroleofpowerintheinternationallegalorder.ArguingthatKissinger'snostalgicharkingbacktotheEuropeanbalanceofpowersystemisasahistoricalandunworkableasitisundesirable,KopelmanhighlightsthreefactorsinpostColdWardiplomacythatKissinger'sanalysisleavesout:(1)theroleofthedemocraticprocessingarneringlegitimacyfordefiningandpursuingthe"nationalinterest"(2)theroleofpublicinternationallawinaddressingconflictthroughinstitutionaldesignandconsensusbuildingandfinally,(3)theburgeoningroleof"transformative"diplomacy,inotherwords,thecontributionsof"citizendiplomats"whochangenotonlytherulesbutalsothecontoursoftheplayingfielditselfbyworkingoutsideformalgovernmentalnegotiationchannels.

TheEssayrejectsKissinger'simplicitimageofpowerinforeignaffairsasastackofpokerchipsinthegameofnations,andpositsinsteadanimageofpowerasprocessthatsuggeststhepossibilityofgametransformingmovesaswellaspointscoringmoves.TheauthorconcludesbyframingconflictintheinternationalsphereneitherasthenorminaHobbesianjunglenorasanaberrationinaworldofpeaceandunderstanding,butratherasaninevitablebyproductoftheinteractionofstatesandotherentitiesthatcanbemanagedwiselyandcreatively.[*140]DiplomacybyHenryKissinger.NewYork:Simon&Schuster.1994.912pp.$35.00(hardcover).

HenryKissinger'sDiplomacyisthelatestinstallmentintheformerSecretaryofState'ssearchforausablepast.n1

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Kissingerdoesnotpurporttopredictthefuture,butratheroffersinstructiveexamples,dissectsmistakes,andattemptstovindicateparticularhistoricalactors,includingbutnotlimitedtohimself.

TheEssaybeginswithadiscussionofKissinger'sperspective,andhowonemightsituateDiplomacyinthecontextofhowotherpractitioners,historians,andsocialscientistswriteaboutAmericanforeignpolicy.Kissinger'sbookisbothmemoirandhistoryitcombinesthereminiscencesofaconsummateinsiderwiththereflectionsofanacademicobserver.DiplomacysimultaneouslyembodiesthetwodominanttraditionsfoundinnarrativeanalysesofAmericanforeignrelations:thepersonal,anecdotal"portraitgallery"ofelites,n2aswellasaseeminglydispassionateanalysisoftheimpersonalworkingsofwhatKissingerlovestocall"geopolitics."n3

TheEssaygoesontohighlightthreeaspectsofacontemporaryunderstandingofdiplomacythatKissinger'sanalysisleavesout:(1)theroleofthedemocraticprocessingarneringlegitimacyfordefiningandpursuingthe"nationalinterest"(2)theroleofpublicinternationallawinaddressingconflictthroughinstitutionaldesignandconsensusbuildingandfinally,(3)theburgeoningroleof"transformative"diplomacy,inotherwords,the[*141]contributionsof"citizendiplomats"whochangenotonlytherulesbutalsothecontoursoftheplayingfielditselfthroughtheirworkoutsideformalgovernmentalnegotiationchannels.n4WhileKissinger'svisionencompassesthebackroomdiplomacyofSecretaryofStateJamesBakerduringtheGulfCrisis,itdoesnotextendtothecitizendiplomacyofJimmyCarterinHaiti.KissingertakesaccountofthesummitdiplomacyofReykjavik,butnotthebackchanneldiplomacyoftheOsloConnection.n5Tomorrow'sdiplomacywillneedtotakeinthewholespectrumastransnationalactivitycontinuestochallengetraditionalnotionsofsovereignty.

I.KissingerinContext:WritingAboutAmericanForeignPolicyDiplomacyoffersastimulating,ifsometimesexasperating,explorationofanunderstudiedaspectoftheAmericanexperience:theparadoxofhowAmerica'svisionofitsroleintheworldholdsusbackevenasthatvisionconstitutesourmainstrength.AlthoughtheheartofKissinger'sbookisitssweepingdepictionoftheriseandfalloftheConcertofEurope'selaboratebalanceofpowersystem,itsmissionistotellussomethingaboutourselvesasAmericans.

ThethemesthatrunthroughDiplomacywarnaboutthelimitationsofwhatKissingerperceivestobeapeculiarlyAmericanworldview:amoralisticselfabsorption,adeepsuspicionofhistory,andanaiveandidealisticfaithinthevalueofgoodintentions.[*142]

Kissingersummarizesthisoutlookas"Americanexceptionalism,"andcontrastsitunfavorablywiththehardheaded,pragmaticrealismofAmerica'snineteenthcenturyEuropeancounterparts.n6Hisbriefisbothdescriptiveandprescriptive:InadditiontoexaminingastaggeringvarietyofhistoricaleventsthroughhishighlypolishedlensofRealpolitik,heprodsustolearnfromothers'mistakes,andtoavoidputtingtoomuchfaithinlegaldocuments,cordialrelations,orhighmindedprinciples.n7Inshort,thebookisdesignedasanextendedtutorialoftheNewWorldbytheOldintheeffectivedeploymentofpower.Likeanyrebelliousadolescentsubjectedtounsolicitedadvice,however,theNewWorldmaynottakeawaythelessonsthetutorintends.

ThehistoryofAmericanforeignpolicyisrepletewithintriguingdualities:powerversuslawisolationismversusinternationalismrealismversusidealismmoralprincipleversusRealpolitikandvisionsofcooperativesecurityversustheprimacyofnationalsovereignty.Commentatorsandhistoriansontheleftofthepoliticalspectrum,suchasWilliamApplemanWilliamsandGabrielKolko,tendtofocustheircritiquesontheinternalmotorsdrivingforeignpolicydecisionmaking,suchastherapacityofcorporateandotherspecialinterests,thecontinuousneedfornewmarketsanddocilesuppliersofrawmaterials,andtheutilityofperiodicnationalemergenciesforcrackingdownondomesticdissent.These"internalist"analysesofU.S.foreignpolicygrowoutoftheirauthors'broaderpoliticalperspectivesonAmericancultureandsociety.n8Bycontrast,"externalist"analysts,manyofthemformerpractitionerssuchasGeorgeKennan,GeorgeShultz,andKissingerhimself,emphasizetheexogenousconstraintsimposedbytheinternationalsystemandtheessentialHobbesianamoralityofforeignaffairs.n9Theirconcernsusuallyreflectthepoliticalprioritiesofrightwingactivists:increaseddefensebudgets,ColdWarinterventionism,andlately,[*143]postColdWarisolationism.Often,analystsofU.S.foreignrelationsreproduceandextendthecontraststheypurporttodissect.Withina"powerversuslaw"ora"realistversusidealist"duality,forinstance,an"internalist"criticmightfocusontheneedtostrengthenrespectforinternationallaw,whilean"externalist"pessimistwouldstresstheirrelevanceofanyconsiderationbeyondsheerpowerpolitics.

Inadditiontosubstantive(powerversuslaw)andpolitical(internalistversusexternalist)dualities,writingaboutAmericanforeignpolicyalsooffersmethodologicaldualities:historiansversussocialscientistsacademicsversuspractitionersandlawyersversusdiplomats.Historiansgenerallycreditgovernmentdecisionmakerswithmorecoherentintent

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thandosocialscientists,whilesocialscientistsaremorelikelytoemphasizethebureaucraticandorganizationalconstraintsonindividualchoice.n10Lawyers,aparticularhobbyhorseofKissinger's,inhisviewtendtosettoomuchstorebylegislation,whileprofessionaldiplomatsdisplaytoomuchdeferencetoprotocolandestablishedprocedures.n11

OneofthemostilluminatingaspectsofKissinger'sbookishowhisparsingofsomeofthesedualitiestransformsourunderstandingofpreviousworkinthisfield.Forexample,underKissinger'sanalysis,thelongrunningdebateaboutAmerica'sisolationismversusitsinternationalismsuddenlyseemsofmarginalconcern.n12Forhim,isolationismandinternationalismarebothexpressionsofthesamedeeprootedmoralismintheAmericanworldview.Whileisolationistslookinward,seekingtoperfectdemocracyathome,internationalistsseetheUnitedStatesasamissionary[*144]crusadingforthebenefitofhumanity.EachapproachisanexpressionofAmericanexceptionalism,stemmingfromavisionoftheAmericanpolityasamicrocosmforhumanity,possessedofuniversallyapplicableandinnatelysuperiorvalues.n13ThisAmericanexceptionalismisinturnafoilforEuropeanrealism,whichlookstocontingentexpressionsofnationalinterestsratherthanuniversallyapplicableprinciplesforguidanceonforeignpolicy.PartoftheappealofKissinger'sidealism/realismdualityisthatitdefiesthetraditionalleftrightcategoriesthatoftenobscuremorethantheyreveal.Forexample,asKissingerexplainsit,RonaldReaganbelongsinthemoralistic,visionarycamp,whileRichardNixonturnsupinthebunkerswithotherpractitionersofEuropeanstyleRealpolitik.Kissingerconfusestheissuessomewhatwithsloppyequationsofterminology:moralist=idealist=optimist.ThisformulaisproblematicforafiguresuchasTheodoreRoosevelt,whomJohnMiltonCooperpersuasivelyshowstobeanidealist,butwhoremainsthequintessentialrealistinKissinger'sview.n14

Kissinger'suseofideologicalcategoriesisinterestingonlyinsofarashehighlightsthesometimessurprisingcrosscuttingcleavagesamongthem.Whatismostdisappointingistheextenttowhichheletsthesecategorieslimithim.Kissingerposes,forexample,abinarychoicebetweenmoralismandpragmatism,realismandoptimism.Yetitisarguablytherealistwhoisalsoanoptimistwhowilldominatethediplomaticgameinthenextcenturythe"ultimatelystrategic"playerwhocanputherselfinotherplayers'shoesandanticipatetheirmoves,yetalsoenvisionatransformedfutureofcollaborativeeffort.n15Itispreciselythisindividualwhomgametheoretic"rationalactor"modelstellusshouldnotexist,muchlessthrive,inacompetitiveuniverse.This"transformativediplomacy"becomespossiblewhenfactorsthatwereformerlyfixedorslowtochangeininternationalnegotiations,suchastheplayers,context,orinterestsatstake,become[*145]variables.n16Kissinger'sbalanceofpowerparadigmhasnowayofengagingthiskindoftransformativediplomacyhisapproachislikeamapistoaninteractivecomputergame:astaticmodelversusadynamicone.

II.Kissinger'sApproach:EverythingYouWantedtoKnowAbout"Geopolitics"Kissinger'sbookhastwoparts,woventogetherthroughouthisnarrativeratherthanpresentedindistinctsections.Hefirsttracesthefortunesofwhatheconsidersthekeyconceptindiplomatichistory,thenotionofthebalanceofpower,fromitsinceptionintheseventeenthcenturytoitsdemiseinthefirsthalfofthetwentieth.n17Kissingerexplainsthattheprimarygoalofthisbalancingperspectivewastopreservetheinternationalorder,notbypreventingconflicts,butbylimitingthem.n18Hedefinesabalanceofpowersystemasastateof"geopoliticalequilibrium"whereinstatesactingintheirownselfinterestachievegreaterstabilitythanideologicallymotivatedactorsactivelypursuingpeace.n19Secondlyandmoretendentiously,KissingerexploreshowU.S.foreignpolicyisaffectedby[*146]America'srejectionofthisEuropeanbalanceofpowerworldviewandofthatsystem'sunderlying"realist"philosophyofinternationalrelations.

Diplomacy'sstructureisingenious.TheformerSecretaryofStateframeshisenterprisethroughopeningandconcludingchaptersonAmerica'sroleinpostColdWarpowerpolitics.HeplacestheentirenarrativeinanAmericancontextbysettingupthecentralcontrastbetweenidealismandrealismasacontestbetweenthevisions,styles,andachievementsoftwoAmericanpresidents:WoodrowWilsonandTheodoreRoosevelt.n20Kissingercanthenreferbacktotheconceptsintroducedinhisopeninganalysisashetakesupthechronologicalnarrativethatoccupiesmostoftherestofthebook.Thiscrossreferencinggreatlyclarifieshisdiscussionsoftheoftenarcanepoliticalmachinationsofeighteenthandnineteenthcenturystatecraft.n21

KissingerengaginglyoutlinesthecollapseofmedievalaspirationstoauniversalchurchandempiretheriseoftheEuropeansystemofnationstatestheadoption,afterthePeaceofWestphaliaof1648,ofraisond'etatasaguidingprincipleofstatecraftandtheimpactofEnlightenmentthinkingabouttheessentiallycompetitivenatureofthehumancondition.Thesedisparatedevelopmentsallculminatedinthe"newworldorder'inauguratedattheCongressofViennaattheendoftheNapoleonicwarsin1814,andinthedevelopmentoftheCongresssystemasthegreatpinnacleofwhatKissingercalls"geopoliticalequilibrium."Kissingercombineshisnarrativeofgreateventsandtrendswithvividprofilesofthevirtuosiwhoweretheantecedents,architectsandpreserversofthebalanceofpowersystemamongthemCardinalRichelieu,withwhomtheauthorseemsto[*147]identifyWilliamofOrangetheyoungerPittMetternichDisraeliandBismarck.n22

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Thebook'stitleissomewhatmisleading.Diplomacyisfarfrombeinganinsider'staxonomyoftheprotocol,methods,andtacticsdeployedintheconductofinternationalrelations,despiteitsdedicationto"themenandwomenoftheForeignService."n23ThereislittleofthesmokefilledroominKissinger'sapproach,anditwillfalltoanotherauthortoproduceatributetothecolorfulworldofthe"stripedpantsboys"whoonceconductedAmericanforeignpolicy,evenasdiplomacy'srarefiedprovenanceyieldstonegotiationsviasummitandmodem.Kissingerpreferstostakeoutaroleasamodernphilosopherofgreatpowerrelationships.But,asdiscussedintheremainderofthisEssay,hisconceptionofthebalanceofpowerderivesfromavisionofpowerthatisamuchmorelimitedandhistoricallycontingentconstructthanheiseverwillingtoconcede.

ThisEssaynextexploressomeoftheterrainleftunmappedbyKissinger'satlas,namely(1)theroleofdemocraticvaluesinlegitimizingthepursuitofthenationalinterest,and(2)theroleofpublicinternationallawinaddressingconflict,bothasan"anchor"toconsolidateexistingconsensusandasa"sail"toleadtheinternationalcommunityintonewwaterswherefutureconsensusmightbepossible.n24TheEssayconcludesbyillustratingtherestrictivenessofKissinger'sboundariesthroughsketchingout,asacounterexample,asetofinternationalnegotiationswherehiscategorieshavesharplydiminishedexplanatorypower.

A.TheLimitsofKissinger'sNotionofLegitimacyPerhapsKissingerisattachedtothebalanceofpowerideabecauseheinternalizeditasthestandardforinternationalrelationsinhisintellectually[*148]formativeyears.n25HearguesthatthegenesisofWorldWarIlaynotinthisequilibriummodel'sinherentlimitationsinthefaceofincreasingdemocracyandnationalistpassions,butratherinGreatBritain'slossofinterestinmaintainingthebalance,andintheGermanEmpire'slackofinterestinpanderingtoit.Similarly,WorldWarIIwasunleashedbecauseAmericawassuspiciousoftheconceptof"balance,"andbecauseBritainwasnolongercapableofrestoringit.KissingerarguesthatwearenowinamultipolarworldthatagainmakesaMetternichianbalancingactdesirable:"atimewhenAmericaisableneithertodominatetheworldnortowithdrawfromit."n26

Yetentanglingalliancesmayexacerbateconflictsamonghostileregimesanddragstatesintowarinsteadofkeepingthemsafeandpeaceful.WhilethebalanceofpowermayhaveservedEuropeandiplomacyintheeighteenthandnineteenthcenturies,itseemsbizarretoharkbacktothatnarrowandcontingenteraofregionalhistory,asKissingerdoes,asifitwereauniversaldefaultplanforinternationalpolitics.ThemostglaringanachronismresultingfromsounwarrantedageneralizationisthewayinwhichKissingerconsistentlyignoresdomesticconsiderationsandthesocialandeconomictransformationsthatmadeupthecontextofforeignpolicies.

Forexample,themuchadmiredRichelieu'slegacyincludedabrutalseriesofcivilwarsfinancedbyoppressivetaxes.Ensuingdomesticunrestwasinturncrushedbyarelentlessdespotism.Kissingerconsistentlyrefusestopursuetheimplicationsofthedomesticideologiesofthoseregimesheholdsupasforeignpolicymodels,writingasthoughforeignanddomesticpoliciesexistedinwhollyseparatespheres.n27

WhenKissingerwritesof"sharedvalues"intheconductofforeignrelationsduringtheeighteenthandnineteenthcenturies,heoftenexplains[*149]thattheleadersintheseerashadcomplementaryperceptionsoftheirrespectivenationalinterests.Yetamongthe"sharedvalues"oftheleadersattheCongressofViennawasabitterhostilitytoliberalconstitutionalismandnationalselfdetermination.AsKissingerputsit,thepeaceofEuropedeterioratedbecausestatesmenfromBismarckon"ignoredMetternich'soldpieties:thatintheinterestofstabilitythelegitimatecrownedheadsofthestatesofEuropehadtobepreserved,thatnationalandliberalmovementshadtobesuppressed,andthat,aboveall,relationsamongstateshadtobedeterminedbyconsensusamonglikemindedrulers."n28Severalpageslaterhedefineslegitimacyas"theprincipleoftheunityofconservativerulersthathadmitigatedtheharshnessofthebalanceofpowersystemduringtheMetternichyears."n29ThereisnosenseinKissinger'sanalysisthattheconceptoflegitimacyhadbeenundergoingadrastictransitionduringthisera,fromanintrinsicfeatureofthebloodlinesofheadsofstatetoamoreamorphousqualityinherentintheworkingsofthedemocraticprocess.Legitimacybecamesomethingthatcouldbegeneratedbyadulyelectedparliament,say,orevenmoreradically,somethingresidingwiththepeoplethemselves.n30

Itwasnot,asKissingerimpliesthroughouthisargument,becauseofunskillfuladministrationthatthisequilibriummodelhadfailedbythebeginningofthetwentiethcentury.Instead,itwasbecausethehermeticallysealedpoliticalapparatusofeighteenthandnineteenthcenturyEuropewasthrownintochaosbyincreasingdemocracy.Between1650and1850inEurope,transnationalinterestswerealsominimal,theconductofforeignpolicywasinthehandsofatinyelitewhosharedtiesofbloodandmarriage,andpublicopinionandnationalismdidnotplaymuchofarole.Themessyvicissitudesofpublicopinionwereanathematothetightlycontrolledimageofthenationstateasahomogenous,unitary"actor"ontheworldstage.

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Kissingerisanunrepentantadherentofthe"greatman"theoryofhistorythenotionthatthereiswisdomforthepresentinstudyingthechoicesofleaderspast.Thisapproachrestsonthetheorythathistorical[*150]leadersactuallymadechoicesandthatthesechoicesmattered.n31Thereisofcourseadistinguishedtradition,reachingsomethingofanapexinMachiavelli'sDiscourses,ofusing"greatman"historyasateacherofstatecraft.n32Certainly,itwouldbeavirtualcontradictionintermstoadopta"grassroots"approachtodiplomacyinatextcoveringanyerabeforeWorldWarIIindeed,thefieldofdiplomacyisoftenusedasanexampleoftheultimatein"highpolitics."Thestudyofinternationalrelationsingeneralsimplydoesnotlenditselftothesamekindof"bottomup"socialhistoryorwiderangingintellectualhistorythatispossiblewithdomesticissues.

YetrecentinterdisciplinaryworksuchasBenedictAnderson'sImaginedCommunitiessuggeststhatthereareways,otherthanstudyingthelifeandtrialsofgreatmen,tothinkandwriteabouthowleadersmightdiscoverandpursuethenationalinterestintherealmofforeignaffairs.n33Anderson'ssyntheticinquiryintohowconceptionsof"thenation"areshapedboilsdowntoasharednotionof"nationalinterests"onthelevelofakindofculturalcommunion,andhedevotesmostofhisshortbooktodissectinghowthisprocessworks.UnlikeKissinger,however,Andersonshowshow,atleastsincethemidnineteenthcentury,nationalinterestshavebeendistilledbymeansofaniterative,interactiveprocessbetweenelitesandmasses.n34WhileKissinger'sconcludingchaptercentersaroundacallforredefiningAmerica'snationalinterests,thereisnosenseofhowthisredefinitionmighthappen,wherenationalinterestscomefrom,andbywhatprocesstheyareabletochangeovertime.Oncedemocraticprocessesbecomethemajorsourceoflegitimacyforpolicy,equilibriumtheoriesthat[*151]seestatesasmonolithicactorssubjecttothewhimofisolated,secretivedecisionmakersaremissingabigpieceoftheexplanatorypuzzle.

Kissingerrealizesthisonsomelevel,ashedidina1973speechwhereheobservedthat"noforeignpolicynomatterhowingenioushasanychanceofsuccessifitisborninthemindsofafewandcarriedintheheartsofnone."n35Hefallsshortbothintheoryandinpractice,howeverinbothhiscurrentMachiavelliandiscoursesandinhisearlierappliedstatecraftthatreliedonsecretbombingsand"doublebookkeeping"whenitcomestoworkingthroughtheimplicationsofdemocraticlegitimacyforAmericandiplomacy.n36Kissingerwritesthattoday,theUnitedStatesfindsitselfincreasinglyinaworldwithnumeroussimilaritiestonineteenthcenturyEurope,albeitonaglobalscale.OnecanhopethatsomethingakintotheMetternichsystemevolves,inwhichabalanceofpowerisreinforcedbyasharedsenseofvalues.Andinthemodernage,thesevalueswouldhavetobedemocratic.n37Inotherwords,hewantshisconceptionsoflegitimacyandsharedvaluestobeintegratedwithdemocracy.Yet,especiallywhereKissinger'snarrowdefinitionsoflegitimacyandsharedvaluesevolvedinexplicitlyantidemocraticcontexts,onecannothelpbutfeelthatthe"democratic"featureisasomewhatincongruousaddonthatKissingerdoesnotreallyfeelthisinhisheart.n38

B.LimitingConflictThroughPublicInternationalLawDiplomacyalsodisplaysKissinger'sownbrandofAmericanexceptionalism.WhenheassertsthatanaiveandidealisticalternativetoRealpolitik[*152]isanexclusivelyAmericanvision,heignoresasignificantstrandofinternationalrelationstheorythatmakesitshomeintheunderstudiedrealmofpublicinternationallaw.Forexample,thetraditionofdevelopingcriteriaforjustandunjustwars,extendingbacktotheologianssuchasSaintAugustine(354430)andSaintThomasAquinas(12251274),wasawellarticulatedbodyofworkbythemidseventeenthcentury.JuristssuchasHugoGrotius(15831645)andtheologianssuchasFranciscoSuarez(15481617)analyzedthenatureofaggression,selfdefense,andtheprotectionofciviliansininternationalconflict.Thesescholars'explorationsofmoderateconsensualregulationallofwhichenvisionedasignificantroleformoralconsiderationsaretheheritageofnineteenthcenturystatesmensuchasWilliamGladstone,aswellasthetwentiethcenturyHagueandGenevaConventions.n39

Kissingeroughttohavepaidmoreattentiontothis"Grotiantradition."n40Inhisfirstbook,heobservedthat"wheneverpeaceconceivedastheavoidanceofwarhasbeentheprimaryobjectiveofapoweroragroupofpowers,theinternationalsystemhasbeenatthemercyofthemostruthlessmemberoftheinternationalcommunity."n41Thisstarkstatementofthe"prisoner'sdilemma"dynamicinherentininternationalconflicthighlightsanimportantpoint:Lawmustembodypreexistingvaluesitcannotcreatevalues,orcommunity,ormoralitywherenoneexists.n42Yetwheredotheseunderlyingvaluescomefrom,andhowcantheyeverevolveovertime?Perhapslawandlegalinstitutionscanplaytherolethat[*153]Kissingerinsistsindividualleadersandstatesmenmustplayvisavistheirdomesticconstituencies:tobeoutaheadofthecommunitythatsupportsthem,justnotsofaraheadastolosetouchwiththe"wellspringsof[their]motivation."n43

KissingeriscontemptuousofutopianAmericanvisionsof"aglobalinternationalorderbasedondemocracy,freecommerce,andinternationallaw."n44Lawhasatleastthreepotentiallybeneficialfunctionsintheinternationalarena,yet

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Kissingerseemsblindtoallofthem:(1)toactasaconstraintonaction(2)asawayofjustifyingorlegitimizingactionand(3)asofferingstructure,process,andforum.n45Tobesure,sweepinglegalisticprescriptionssuchastheKelloggBriandPactof1928areeasytargetsforderision.n46WhatismoreinterestingisnotwhyaccordssuchastheGenevaConventions,theLawoftheSeaConvention,ortheNuclearNonProliferationTreatysooftenfallshortoftheirsignatories'hopes,butwhytheyevendoanythingatall.n47Justaswiththe"realisticoptimist"mentionedinthefirstsectionofthisEssay,n48theseinternationallegalregimesshouldnotevenexistunderKissinger'srubric,muchlessfunctionbeneficially,andhisanalysishasnothingtosayaboutthemthatwouldhelpusreplicateorextendtheirsuccesses.

C.AnAlternativeApproachtotheProblemofPowerinInternationalRelationsPowerforKissingerseemstoencompassatleasttwodistinctconcepts:astatusofcontrollingsuperiorresourcesvisavisone'sperceivedcompetitors,andaprocessofsuccessfullymatchinggoalstoresources.Thus,Diplomacydefinessuccessfulstatecraftastherecognitionandacceptanceofthelimitsofone'sownpower(powerasstatus),butalsoastheactivityofsettingprioritiesamongcompetingnationalinterests,realisticallycalculatingresources,andaligninginterestsandresources(powerasprocess).Kissingerfavorstheprocessdefinition,mostmemorablyinthelastlineof[*154]thebookwherehequotesaSpanishproverbthatsays,"Traveler,therearenoroads.Roadsaremadebywalking."n49YetKissingerfailstoexploretheimplicationsofthiswayofthinking,bothforimaginingthefutureofAmericanforeignpolicyandforexplainingitspast.

Powerasstatusandpowerasprocessarebothlinkedtoeffectivelyexertinginfluenceinacompetitiveworld.Themoredynamic"process"definition,however,suggeststhepotentialforanexpandedapproachtothinkingabouttheproblemofpower,anapproachwhichcouldtranscendthenotionofthesuccessfulmanipulationofresources.

Amoreexpansivedefinitionoftheconceptof"power"could,forexample,encompassthepowerofideasinforeignpolicythepowerofa"specialrelationship"betweenalliesthepoweroflegitimacyinademocracyorthepowerofdefttimingincapitalizingonauniquelyfluidhistoricalmoment,suchastheendoftheSecondWorldWar,asdiscussedbelow.Thesefactorsamounttomorethanamodernwayofthinkingaboutwhatconstitutesa"resource."Deployedjudiciously,theyhavethepotentialtochangethegamefromazerosumtugofwar,wheremoreforonestateequalslessforanother,intoajointjourneytowardtheParetofrontier,wherestatesnegotiateoveranexpandingsetofoptions.n50

Thenotionoftransformativediplomacycanbeillustratedconcretelywithabriefexamplefromtherealmofeconomicdiplomacy,bymeansofascenariothatshouldnothavebeenpossibleunderKissinger'snotionof"geopolitics."n51Arguablythemostsalientdevelopmentininternationalrelationsinthelasthalfcentury,intermsofbothitsimpactonpeople'sdailylivesanditsimplicationsforthefuture,hasbeentheregimeforthemanagementofinternationaleconomicsthatemergedfromtheBrettonWoodsAgreementof1944.n52Aglanceathowthatagreementwas[*155]negotiatedsuggestsanalternativevisionoftheroleofpowerindiplomacy.BritishandAmericanexpertswithvaryingdegreesofKeynesianorientation,suchasHarryDexterWhiteandotherofficialsworkingunderTreasurySecretaryHenryMorgenthau(andofcourse,ontheBritishside,Keyneshimself!),brokethroughearlierimpassestomoveAngloAmericandialogueawayfromthecontentioustradeissuesthathadstallednegotiationsinthepast.Theyarticulatedasetoffreshideasaboutmonetarypolicyandabouttheorganizationofthepostwarindustrialeconomies.Theseideasmarginalizeddifferencesandadvancedagreementonawiderangeofpostwaraims.ThesepolicyexpertsfoundamiddlegroundbetweenlaissezfaireandinterventionismbasedonarobustconsensusthatNewDealassumptionsaboutthedomesticeconomycouldbeusefullyappliedintheinternationalarena.

Diplomacydoesnottakeplaceintheabstractitunfoldsintheparticular.TheBrettonWoodsexampleillustrateswaysinwhichKissinger'sdense,amalgamatedconceptsof"power"and"nationalinterest"canusefullybedisaggregatedandredefined.ConsidertheBritishpositionintheBrettonWoodsscenario:Theyfoundpowerinanewoption,poweringoodtiming,powerinthestrongworkingrelationshipbetweenBritainandtheUnitedStates,andpowerinthelegitimacyofdrawingonthememoryoftheirpasteconomicdominance,allfaroutofproportiontotheirresourcesasanation.Thesekindsoffactors,whiletheycouldnotmake,say,postwarBritain"morepowerful"thantheUnitedStatesintheabstract,neverthelesshelpexplainhowsmallstatesareroutinelyabletoleveragebigonesinspecificcases.

Thistransformativeperspectiveondiplomacywasalsoanoutgrowthoftheoptimistic"AtlanticCharter"ideologythatexploredtheouterboundsofchangeatasingularlyflexiblehistoricaljuncture.n53TheUnitedStates,aswhatpoliticalscientistswouldcallan"ascendinghegemonicpower,"naturallysoughttobuildasystemconsonantwithitsinterests.n54Butto[*156]showhowagivenoutcomeadvancedtheinterestsofaparticularnationorgroupisnotsufficienttoexplainthatoutcome.n55Whilepowerstructuresandinterestgroupsmatter,thereareturningpointswhere"uncertaintiesaboutpowerstructuresandunhappinesswithpastorcurrentdefinitionsofinterestsprovideopeningsforrethinking."n56

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AcontemporaryexampleoftheBrettonWoodsphenomenonisthenotionofsecondtrack,"transformative"diplomacy:contacts,connections,andconciliationamongprivatesectorprofessionals,secondtierofficialswithsubstantiveexpertise,andactivistsinnongovernmentalorganizations.n57Thevalueoftheseinformalrolesisperhapsbestillustratedbywhathascometobeknownasthe"OsloConnection,"leadingtotheMideastPeacePactofSeptember1993,signedbyYitzhakRabinofIsraelandYasirArafatofthePalestineLiberationOrganization.Inthelate1980s,aNorwegianacademichadextendedastandingoffertoputanIsraelifriendintouchwithseniorPalestinianofficials,anoffertheIsraelioppositionmemberaccepteduponbecomingDeputyForeignMinisterin1993.TheeffortsoftheNorwegianacademicandhiscolleaguesledtoNorwayservingasabehindthescenesconduitfordirecttalksbetweentheIsraeligovernmentandthePLO.Participantsinthosebackchannelnegotiationsemphasizedthattheinformalatmosphereandtheconfidentialnatureofthediscussionsweremajorfactorsintheirsuccess.n58Thefresh,forwardlooking,problemsolvingorientationofthelowprofile,nongovernmentalactorsintheOsloConnectionstorymakesKissinger'snostalgicdescriptionsofelite,highpoliticalminuetsseemmustyandoutdated.

III.Conclusion:TheTransformativePowerofProcessKissinger'sapproachinonesensevaluesprocessoverstatus:Itisbetter,byhislights,toseekaperpetuationofabalanceofpowerratherthanattemptsomesortofultimateresolutionofconflict.Buthedoesnotgofarenoughintermsofconceptualizingwhat"process"reallymeans.For[*157]him,the"power"componentofhisbalanceofpowerformulaismorelikeasubstantiveentitythatistransferredamongcontendingplayerslikechipsinapokergame.Asnoted,thisisazerosumnotion,wheremoreforoneplayermeanslessforanother.Inaddition,Kissinger'sassumptionsaboutdiplomacy'splayers,rules,andtheboundsoftheplayingfielditselfarehistoricallycontingentandincreasinglyirrelevant.Today,theexerciseofpowerintheinternationalarenaencompassesgameshapingandgametransformingmovesaswellaspointscoringmoves.

TheBrettonWoodsexampleshowssomethingofhowanalternativeapproachmightbegleanedfromthesamepostwarhistoricalmoment.BrettonWoodswouldbeavirtuallyinexplicableanomalyundermoretraditionalmodelsofinternationalrelations.A"process"focuseschewsboththesoftheadedmoralismthatKissingerdecrieswhereconflictistreatedasanaberrationtobebanishedaswellasthesterile,Hobbesianrealismheadvocates,whereconflictisseenasthenorm.Itpointstoathirdapproachthatviewsconflictneitherasadevianceresultingfromfalseconsciousnessinanotherwiseharmoniousworld,norasthedefaultconditionprevailingbetweennaturallyantagonisticnationsandindividuals.Toillustratewithaprosaicexamplefromtheenvironmentalfield,underthiswayofthinking,conflictismorelikegarbage:Everycommunityproducesit,andwisemanagementrequiresproceduresthatminimizehowmuchisgeneratedinthefirstplace,thendisposeoftherestsafely.n59Itwouldnotbe"natural,"however,foracommunitytoproducenogarbageatallnorwoulditbenaturalforwasteproductionandmanagementtobethedominantfocusofacommunity'slife.

ThisalternativeorientationtakesthehistorianSimonSchamauponhisdelightfullyexpressedadvicetoKissingertoconcentratehisgazeonthatjuncture"wherethebeadyeyedmeetsthestarryeyed."n60Itisaperspectiveanimatednotsomuchbyanidealistichopefulnessthatobstacleswillnotarise,asbyapragmaticoptimismthatpeoplecanfindawayaroundtheobstaclesthatinevitablydoarise.

SuchanapproachpartakesofKissinger'sanalysisthatAmericanthinkingonforeignrelationshasbeenatriumphoffaithoverexperience,butitdivergesfromhisviewinseeingacontinuing,positiveroleforAmericanexceptionalism.UponbeingsworninasSecretaryofStateashisparentslookedon,GermanimmigrantandHolocaustrefugeeHenryKissingerremarkedthataprofessionalascendancysuchashisowncouldonlyhave[*158]happenedinAmerica.n61YetwerewetotaketheadviceKissingeroffersinDiplomacy,wewouldundercuttheveryaspectsoftheAmericantraditionthatmakethistraditionworthpreserving,andworthsummoninginemotionalswearinginceremonies.Kissinger'sconceptionsoflegitimacy,ofinternationallawandofpowerareultimatelytoonarrowtogeneratethekindofpolicyAmericanscouldever"carryintheirhearts."n62Similarly,hisuseofsecrecyandduplicityduringhistenureasSecretaryofState,oftenas"shortcuts"togoodoutcomes,fundamentallyunderminedthelegitimacyofthoseoutcomes.Weshouldlistencarefullytothetalesofthisexperiencedtraveler,andthenchooseanotherpath.

LegalTopics:

Forrelatedresearchandpracticematerials,seethefollowinglegaltopics:CivilProcedurePartiesInterventionGeneralOverviewCivilProcedureDiscoveryMethodsForeignDiscoveryInternationalLawSovereignStates&IndividualsGeneralOverview

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FOOTNOTES:

n1.AnalyzinghistoryasapossiblekeytoactionisanintellectualprojectoflongstandingpedigreeforKissinger.Hebeganhishistoricalandphilosophicalinquirywithhisundergraduatethesis,TheMeaningofHistory:ReflectionsonSpengler,ToynbeeandKant(1951)(unpublishedUndergraduateThesis,WidenerLibrary,HarvardUniversity),anddeepenedhisquestthroughhisdoctoraldissertation,Peace,Legitimacy,andtheEquilibrium:AStudyoftheStatesmanshipofCastlereaghandMetternich(1954),submittedtoHarvardUniversityin1954andpublishedin1957asAWorldRestored:Metternich,CastlereaghandtheProblemsofPeace181222(1957)[hereinafterKissinger,AWorldRestored].KissingercontinuedtopublishassortedarticlesonrelatedthemesuntilheleftHarvardforWashingtonin1968seeespeciallyHenryA.Kissinger,TheConservativeDilemma:ReflectionsonthePoliticalThoughtofMetternich,48Am.Pol.Sci.Rev.1017(1954)HenryA.Kissinger,TheCongressofVienna:AReappraisal,8WorldPol.264(19551956)HenryA.Kissinger,ReflectionsonPowerandDiplomacy,inTheDimensionsofDiplomacy17(E.A.J.Johnsoned.,1964)HenryA.Kissinger,ClassicalDiplomacy,inPowerandOrder:6CasesinWorldPolitics1(JohnG.Stoessinger&AlanF.Westineds.,1964)HenryA.Kissinger,TheWhiteRevolutionary:ReflectionsonBismarck,97Daedalus888(1968).

n2.ThehistorianSimonSchamahasdescribedDiplomacyas"asortofdiplomaticportraitgallery."SimonSchama,TheGamesofGreatMen,NewYorker,May2,1994,at93(reviewingKissinger'sDiplomacy).Seeinfranotesandaccompanyingtextforadiscussionofthecontinuingvalidityof"greatman"theoriesofhistory.

n3.OnKissinger'suseoftheterm"geopolitics,"seeinfranote.

n4.Thisnongovernmentalresolutionofpublicdisputes,orresolutionby"secondtier"expertsorofficialswithoutformalnegotiatingauthority,isalsosometimesreferredtoas"tracktwodiplomacy."See,e.g.,PhilipD.Stewart,TheDartmouthConference:U.S.U.S.S.R.Relations,inForeignServ.Inst.,U.S.Dep'tofState,ConflictResolution:TrackTwoDiplomacy21(JohnW.McDonald,Jr.&DianeB.Bendahmaneeds.,1987)JohnW.McDonald,FurtherExplorationofTrackTwoDiplomacy(July1989)(unpublishedworkingpaperonfilewiththeStanfordCenteronConflictandNegotiation).

n5.TheReykjavicSummitofOctober1986betweenRonaldReaganandMikhailGorbachevwasatraditionalmeetingofheadsofstate,whilethesocalled"OsloConnection,"seeinfratextaccompanyingnote,wasa"secondtrack"associationoflowerlevelofficials,academics,andotherexpertsmeetingtodiscussPalestinianIsraelirelations.Other"secondtrack"diplomaticroleswouldincludetechnicalexperts,informationgatherersfornongovernmentalorganizations,andconvenersofsmall,behindthescenesconferencessuchasthosesponsoredbytheStanfordCenteronConflictandNegotiation,theHarvardNegotiationProject,ortheCarterCenteratEmoryUniversity.See,e.g.,HerbertC.Kelman,ContributionsofanUnofficialConflictResolutionEfforttotheIsraeliPalestinianBreakthrough,11NegotiationJ.19(1995)FrameworkforaPublicPeaceProcess:TowardaPeacefulIsraeliPalestinianRelationship(1991)(FrameworkAgreementfacilitatedbyHaroldSaunders,formerAssistantSecretaryofStateforNearEasternandSouthAsianAffairsavailableatStanfordCenteronConflictandNegotiation).

n6.SeeHenryKissinger,Diplomacy46,67(1994)[hereinafterKissinger,Diplomacy].

n7.Seeid.at1819.

n8.ThereisasubtlebutimportantdifferencebetweentheperspectivesofKolkoandWilliams.Williamsisadisillusionedliberal,disgustedwiththeU.S.whenitdepartsfromitsideals.Kolkoisagenuineradical:Americanideals,tohim,arethemselvestherootoftheprobleminotherwords,therealtragedyisnotthatAmericansfailtofulfilltheirideals,butthattheysooftensucceed.SeegenerallyGabrielKolko,ThePoliticsofWar:TheWorldandUnitedStatesForeignPolicy,19431945(2ded.1990)WilliamApplemanWilliams,TheTragedyofAmericanDiplomacy(2d.rev.ed.1972).

n9.SeeKissinger,Diplomacy,supranoteseealsoGeorgeF.Kennan,AmericanDiplomacy19001950(4thed.1984)(originallypublishedasthefamous"X"articleseeX,TheSourcesofSovietConduct,25ForeignAff.566(1947))GeorgeP.Shultz,TurmoilandTriumph:MyYearsasSecretaryofState(1993)ArthurSchlesinger,Jr.,TheNecessaryAmoralityofForeignAffairs,Harper'sMag.,Aug.1971,at73.

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n10.Compare,e.g.,AlexanderL.George&RichardSmoke,DeterrenceinAmericanForeignPolicy:TheoryandPractice(1974)(socialscience)withJohnMiltonCooper,Jr.,TheWarriorandthePriest:WoodrowWilsonandTheodoreRoosevelt(1983)andRobertDallek,FranklinD.RooseveltandAmericanForeignPolicy19321945(1979)(history).SocialscientistsGeorgeandSmokeemployavarietyofhistoricalcasestudiesasawayofexplainingwhatarebasicallygametheoreticmodelsofdecisionmaking,whilethenarrativesofJohnMiltonCooperandRobertDallekareoverwhelminglydrivenbypersonalities.

n11.OntheAmericantraditionofinvokingtheruleoflawandofappointinglawyersasdiplomatsKissingerobservedinanearlierexegesis:

Our[U.S.]traditionoflawencouragedrepeatedattemptstolegislatesolutionstointernationalconflicts.Arbitration,conciliation,internationallegalarrangements,neutralitylegislation,collectivesecuritysystemsallthesewereinvokedtobanishtherealityofpower.HenryKissinger,AmericanForeignPolicy201(3ded.1977).

n12.Classicquestionsintheisolationismversusinternationalismdebatewouldinclude:HowcouldAmericaadoptaninternationalistorientationtoworldaffairssorapidlyattheendofWorldWarII?WhydidAmericaabandonisolationismafterWorldWarIIbutnotafterWorldWarI?SeegenerallyRobertDallek,TheAmericanStyleofForeignPolicy:CulturalPoliticsandForeignAffairs(1983)ManfredJonas,IsolationisminAmerica19351941(1966).

n13.TheseAmericanvalueswereembodiedinwhatKissingertermsthe"crusadingideology"ofWoodrowWilson'sapproachtoAmericanforeignrelations:

.America'sspecialmissiontranscendsdaytodaydiplomacyandobligesittoserveasabeaconoflibertyfortherestofmankind.

.Theforeignpoliciesofdemocraciesaremorallysuperiorbecausethepeopleareinherentlypeaceloving.

.Foreignpolicyshouldreflectthesamemoralstandardsaspersonalethics.

.Thestatehasnorighttoclaimaseparatemoralityforitself.Kissinger,Diplomacy,supranote,at46.

n14.SeeCooper,supranote.

n15.JamesSebeniusoftheHarvardBusinessSchoolcoinedtheterm"ultimatelystrategic"aspartofhispioneeringofthefieldofnegotiationanalysis.SeeJamesK.Sebenius,NegotiationAnalysis:ACharacterizationandReview,38Mgmt.Sci.18(1992)seealsoRobertAxelrod,TheEvolutionofCooperation(1984)(especiallyPartIII,pp.73105,"CooperationwithoutFriendshiporForesight").

n16.Foradiscussionofsomeofthepsychologicalaspectsofthis"transformative"dynamic,seetherecentworkofDanielKahnemanandAmosTversky,especiallyDanielKahneman&AmosTversky,ConflictResolution:ACognitivePerspective,inBarrierstoConflictResolution44(KennethArrow,RobertH.Mnookin,LeeRoss,AmosTversky&RobertWilsoneds.,1995).KahnemanandTverskyperceivea"certaintyeffect"wherebynegotiatorstendtoweighmoreheavilythoseelementsthatarecertainrelativetothosethataremerelyprobable,orsimplyveryhardtomeasure,suchasgoodwill.Inadiplomaticcontext,thiskindofpsychologicalphenomenoncanhaveprofoundconsequences.Forexample,ifitisadvantageoustoholdstrategicterritoriessuchastheGolanHeightsbothinwarandinpeacetime,thenlogicallyIsraelshouldnevergivesuchterritoriesup.Yetthisargumentdoesnotaccountforthepossibilitythatterritorialconcessionscouldsignificantlydecreasethechancesofwarhappeninginthefirstplace.Futuregoodwilldiffersfromotherconsequencesinthatitisnotnecessarilyinlimitedsupplyyetthewaypeoplethinkaboutuncertainoutcomesfavorsasystematicunderweightingoftheseintangible,transformativeconsequencesofagreement.

n17.Thereisavastliteratureontheconceptofthebalanceofpoweranditsroleinworldaffairs.Forexcellentintroductions,seegenerallyAHRForum,97Am.Hist.Rev.683(1992)(forumonthebalanceofpower)SpecialIssueontheBalanceofPower,15Rev.Int'lStud.75(1989)AlfredVagts&DetlevF.Vagts,TheBalanceofPowerinInternationalLaw:AHistoryofanIdea,73Am.J.Int'lL.555(1979).ClassictextsincludeLudwigDehio,ThePrecariousBalance:FourCenturiesoftheEuropeanPowerStruggle(CharlesFullmantrans.,1962),andEdwardV.Gulick,Europe'sClassicalBalanceofPower:ACaseHistoryoftheTheoryandPracticeofOneoftheGreatConceptsofEuropeanStatecraft(1955).

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n18."Tothehardheadedstatesmenoftheeighteenthcentury,theeliminationofconflict(orofambitionorofgreed)wasutopianthesolutionwastoharnessorcounterpoisetheinherentflawsofhumannaturetoproducethebestpossiblelongtermoutcome."Kissinger,Diplomacy,supranote,at67.

n19.Seeid.at5859,182.

n20.ThisisthesubjectofDiplomacy'ssecondchapter,awkwardlyentitled,"TheHinge:TheodoreRooseveltorWoodrowWilson"(presumablyatipofthehattoWinstonChurchill'sWorldWarIImemoir,4WinstonChurchill,TheHingeofFate(1950)).Rooseveltislabeledthe"warriorstatesman"Wilsonthe"prophetpriest."Kissinger,Diplomacy,supranote,at47.Surprisingly,JohnMiltonCooper'sdualbiographyofTheodoreRooseveltandWoodrowWilson,TheWarriorandthePriest,Cooper,supranote,isnotcredited,althoughalaterworkofCooper's,PivotalDecades,iscitedlaterinthechapternotes,JohnMiltonCooper,Jr.,PivotalDecades:TheUnitedStates,19001920(1990).

n21.Forexample,ofGermanChancellorBismarck'sassessmentofEngland'sPrimeMinisterWilliamGladstone,Kissingerwrites:"Bismarck'sattitudetowardGladstoneparalleledthatofTheodoreRoosevelttoward[Woodrow]Wilson:heconsideredthegreatVictorianparthumbug,partmenace."Kissinger,Diplomacy,supranote,at162.Thistypeofcommentalonemakesthebookworthits$35pricetag.

n22.KissingerwritesadmiringlyofCardinalRichelieu,France'sFirstMinisterfrom1624to1642,asastatesman"whoachievedvastsuccessesbyignoring,andindeedtranscending,theessentialpietiesofhisage."Id.at58.CriticsofKissingermightcounterthatPopeUrbanVIII'sassessmentofRichelieu'scareercouldserveasanepitaphforKissingerhimself:"IfthereisaGod,theCardinaldeRichelieuwillhavemuchtoanswerfor.Ifnot...well,hehadasuccessfullife."Id.

n23.Id.atdedicationpageseealsoGordonCraig,LookingforOrder,N.Y.Rev.Books,May12,1994,at8(reviewingKissinger'sDiplomacy)MichaelHoward,TheWorldAccordingtoHenry:FromMetternichtoMe,ForeignAff.,May/June1994,at132(reviewingKissinger'sDiplomacy).

n24.IamgratefultoThomasEhrlichofStanfordLawSchoolforthisimage.

n25.Seesupranote.

n26.Kissinger,Diplomacy,supranote,at834.

n27.Arguably,partoftheappealofdiplomatichistory,andofitstheoreticalexpressioningametheory,ispreciselythissimplicityandsharpnessoftheissues.Thesamerationaleisprobablywhatunderliesthewidespreadfascinationwithmilitaryhistoryandwithgamessuchaschess:thenotionofadefinedarenawherehumanagencyaffectsstrategicchoicesunderavarietyofwelldefinedconstraints.Unlikechess,however,moralambiguitiesaboundininternationalrelations.See,e.g.,RichardA.Falk,What'sWrongwithHenryKissinger'sForeignPolicy?,PolicyMemorandumNo.39,at18(July1974)(publishedaspartofapolicymemorandumseriesavailableatPrincetonUniversity,CenterofInternationalStudies)("TheattractivenessofKissinger'sapproachderives,inpart,fromitssimplicityandclarity.Assoonasissuesofdignityandequityaretakenintoaccount,mattersofchoiceandpolicyenteramorecomplex,ambiguousframeofreference.").SeegenerallyMichaelWalzer,JustandUnjustWars:AMoralArgumentwithHistoricalIllustrations(2ded.1992).

n28.Kissinger,Diplomacy,supranote,at104.

n29.Id.at119.

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n30.ThisargumentisofcourseamuchsimplifiedversionofanimportantstrandofpoliticalthoughtunderlyingtheAmericanRevolution:thenotionthatlegitimacywasforfeitedbytheBritishKingandParliamentthroughmisruleandthuscametoresidewiththecoloniststhemselves.SeegenerallyGordonS.Wood,TheCreationoftheAmericanRepublic17761787(1969).

n31.Whiletheseassumptionsmayseemliketruisms,Marxistandothermaterialisttheoriesofhistoricalchangeseetheindividualdecisionmakerasconstrainedbyforcesbeyondhisorhercontrol.Similarly,somesocialscienceapproachesseetheindividualdecisionmakeraspreemptedbybureaucraticstructuresandthusasnotterriblyconsequential.Forananalysisfavoringthecontinuedexaminationofindividualchoiceasatoolforunderstandinghistoryandcurrentaffairs,seeRogerFisher,ElizabethKopelman&AndreaKupferSchneider,BeyondMachiavelli:ToolsforCopingwithConflict1012(1994).

n32.Foradiscussionofwhethersuchaheroichistoricalactorcanalsobeacriminal(orsimplyevil),seethefascinatingdiscussioninSanfordV.Levinson,FidelitytoLawandtheAssessmentofPoliticalActivity(Or,CanaWarCriminalBeaGreatMan?),27Stan.L.Rev.1185(1975)(usingHenryKissingerasanexample).

n33.BenedictAnderson,ImaginedCommunities:ReflectionsontheOriginandSpreadofNationalism(rev.ed.1991).

n34.ForAnderson,factorsinthismixincludetheadventofprintcapitalismandwidespreadliteracytheexampleof"culturalrevolutions"ineighteenthcenturyAmericaandFrance,aswellastheEuropeanrevolutionsof1848andthetransformationofroyalfamiliesintoemblematiccitizensratherthanasupranationalsodalityofelites.KaiserWilhelmIIwouldrefertohisroleasthe"NumberOneGerman"thatis,asfirstamongequalsofthesamekindashimself.SuchaperspectivewouldhavebeenunthinkabletoaHabsburgtwocenturiesearlier.Id.at81.

n35.HenryA.Kissinger,AddressDeliveredtotheInternationalPlatformAssociation,Washington(Aug.2,1973),inHenryA.Kissinger,AmericanForeignPolicy181,186(expandeded.1974)[hereinafterKissinger's1973Address].

n36.OnKissinger'spenchantforsecrecyandduplicity,especiallyasregardsthesecretbombingofCambodia,his"doublebookkeeping"systemofdisseminatingseveralversionsofthesamememo,andsecretwiretappingofhisrivalsandevenhisownstaff,seeWalterIsaacson,Kissinger21256(1992).

n37.Kissinger,Diplomacy,supranote,at166.

n38.WhatKissingerisreallylookingfor,arguesdiplomatichistorianJohnLewisGaddis,are"waysinwhichdemocraticstatescouldbehavewithauthoritarianpurposefulnesswhentheirglobalinterestsrequiredit,withoutatthesametimesacrificingthosedemocraticprinciplesthatprovidedthereasonsuchstatesexistedinthefirstplace."JohnLewisGaddis,RescuingChoicefromCircumstance:TheStatecraftofHenryKissinger,inTheDiplomats,19391979,at571(GordonCraig&FrancisLoewenheimeds.,1994).ItisdebatablewhetherKissingereverfoundtherightbalancehere,seeinfraConclusioninanyevent,suchanapproachframesdemocracyasmoreofanobstaclethanavirtue.

n39.SeeConventionRelatingtoPrisonersofWar,July27,1929,47Stat.2021,118L.N.T.S.343[hereinafterGenevaConvention]ProtocolfortheProhibitionoftheUseinWarofAsphyxiating,PoisonousorOtherGases,andofBacteriologicalMethodsofWarfare,June17,1925,26U.S.T.571,94L.N.T.S.65[hereinafterGenevaProtocol]ConventionRespectingtheLawsandCustomsofWaronLand,Oct.18,1907,36Stat.2277,205Consol.T.S.277ConventionRespectingtheLawsandCustomsofWaronLand,July29,1899,32Stat.1803,187Consol.T.S.429.SeeElizabethKopelman,IdeologyandInternationalLaw:TheDissentoftheIndianJusticeattheTokyoWarCrimesTrial,23N.Y.U.J.Int'lL.&Pol.373,396401(1991)foradiscussionoftheGrotiantraditioninthecontextofWorldWarIIeradiplomaticpolicymaking.

n40.Indeed,hisanalysishasnothingtosayaboutitatall.SaintAugustine,SaintThomasAquinas,Grotius,andGandhiarenotmentionedinKissinger'sindexEmmerichdeVattelgetsonedisparagingreference.

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n41.Kissinger,AWorldRestored,supranote,at1.

n42.KissingerciteswithapprovalMetternich's"rationalistconvictionthatlawsandrightsexistedinnatureandnotbyfiat.[Metternich's]formativeexperiencehadbeentheFrenchRevolution,whichstartedwiththeproclamationoftheRightsofManandendedwiththeReignofTerror."Kissinger,Diplomacy,supranote,at85.ItisworthrememberingthatmanyofKissinger'sownformativeexperiencesoccurredinGermanyduringtheNaziHolocausthemaybemorethanusuallyawareofthedarksideofthepopularwill.SeeIsaacson,supranote,at2932.

n43.Kissinger,Diplomacy,supranote,at91.

n44.Id.at18.

n45.ParaphrasedfromAbramChayes,TheCubanMissileCrisis7(1974).

n46.SeeTreatyfortheRenunciationofWarasanInstrumentofNationalPolicy,Aug.27,1928,46Stat.2343,94L.N.T.S.57(KelloggBriandPact).

n47.GenevaConvention,supranoteGenevaProtocol,supranoteTreatyontheNonProliferationofNuclearWeapons,July1,1968,21T.S.483,7I.L.M.809ThirdUnitedNationsConferenceontheLawoftheSea:UnitedNationsConventionontheLawoftheSea,U.N.Doc.A/Conf.62/122(1982).

n48.Seesupratextaccompanyingnote.

n49.Kissinger,Diplomacy,supranote,at835.

n50.Inasense,ofcourse,thediplomaticgamehasalwaysbeennonzerosum:Itisalwayspossibleforallsidestolose,asinanuclearexchange.OnParetooptimalityinnegotiations,seeHowardRaiffa,TheArtAndScienceofNegotiation15864(1982).

n51.Indeed,Kissinger'sconstrictedconceptionofpowerishighlightedbyhiseverpresentuseofthemuddyterm"geopolitics,"usuallyasaproxyfor"powerpolitics."SometimesKissingerusesitasasynonymfor"power"or"strategy,"asin,"TheGermantermswerebothmorepreciseandmoregeopolitical,"or,"Wilsonwasproposingaworldorderinwhichresistancetoaggressionwouldbebasedonmoralratherthangeopoliticaljudgments."Kissinger,Diplomacy,supranote,at220,227.Othertimes,thetermisdeployedmerelyasawayofavoidingthestuffyterm"internationalrelations,"asin,"Amongpostwarpresidents,onlyNixonconsistentlydealtwiththeSovietUnionasageopoliticalchallenge."Id.at813.

n52.TheBrettonWoodssystemcalledfortheoperationofarelativelyopensystemoftradeandpaymentswhilealsoprovidingarrangementstosupportdomesticfullemploymentandsocialwelfare.Inaddition,itcreatedtheinstitutionstosupporttheseobjectives:theInternationalTradeOrganization(latertheGeneralAgreementonTariffsandTrade,nowtheWorldTradeOrganization),theInternationalMonetaryFund,andtheWorldBank.SeegenerallyG.JohnIkenberry,CreatingYesterday'sNewWorldOrder:KeynesianNewThinkingandtheAngloAmericanPostwarSettlement,inIdeasandForeignPolicy:Beliefs,InstitutionsandPoliticalChange57(JudithGoldstein&RobertKeohaneeds.,1993).

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n53.TheAtlanticCharter,promulgatedbyPresidentFranklinRooseveltandPrimeMinisterWinstonChurchillafterasecretmeetingin1941aboardawarshipoffthecoastofNewfoundland,wasoneofthefirstdocumentsspellingoutaspirationsforapostwarinternationallegalorder.TheCharterlisted"fourfreedoms":freedomofexpressionandworship,andfreedomfromfearandwant.AngloAmericanConference,AtlanticCharter(Aug.14,1941),reprintedinU.S.Dep'tofState,TheAxisinDefeat:ACollectionofDocumentsonAmericanPolicyTowardGermanyandJapan12(1945).

n54.Ikenberry,supranote,at60.

n55.Butcf.Kolko,supranote.Kolkoarguespreciselythishegemony,forhim,explainsoutcomes.

n56.Ikenberry,supranote,at59.

n57.Seesupranotes.

n58.Incontrasttothehighpoliticsofformaldiplomacy,theOsloConnectionoffered"amoresubtlecombinationofrelaxedsettings,homecookedmeals,mutualesteem,aknackfortellingtherightjoketoeaseatensesituationand,moreimportant,anabilitytokeepsecrets."ClydeHaberman,HowOsloHelpedMoldtheMideastPact,N.Y.Times,Sept.5,1993,atA1,A10seealsoJaneCorbin,TheNorwayChannel:TheSecretTalksThatLedtotheMiddleEastPeaceAccord(1994)Fisher,Kopelman&Schneider,supranote,at13536(discussinginformalthirdpartyroles).

n59.IamindebtedtoLoreleiKellyofStanfordUniversity'sProgramonInternationalPolicyStudiesforthisillustration.

n60.Schama,supranote,at97.

n61.Isaacson,supranote,at506.

n62.Kissinger's1973Address,supranote.