Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

 

G.R. No. 66140 January 21, 1993

INDUSTRIAL TEXTILE MANUFACTURING COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner, vs.LPJ ENTERPRISES, INC., respondent.

Bengzon, Zarraga, Narciso, Cudala, Pecson, Azcuna & Bengzon Law Office for petitioner. 

MELO, J.:

Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the November 9, 1983 decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court inCA-G.R. CV No. 68281, penned by the Honorable Justice Eduardo P. Caguioa, with Justices Gaviola and Quetulio-Losa concurring, which dismissed petitioner's complaint and absolved herein respondent from any liability to the former.

It appears on record that respondent LPJ Enterprises, Inc. had a contract to supply 300,000 bags of cement per year to Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation (Atlas for short), a member of the Soriano Group of Companies. The cement was delivered packed in kraft paper bags, then as now, in common use.

Sometime in October, 1970, Cesar Campos, a Vice-President of petitioner Industrial Textile Manufacturing Company of the Philippines (or Itemcop, for brevity), asked Lauro Panganiban, Jr., President of respondent corporation, if he would like to cooperate in an experiment to develop plastic cement bags. Panganiban acquiesced, principally because Itemcop is a sister corporation of Atlas, respondent's major client. A few weeks later, Panganiban accompanied Paulino Ugarte, another Vice-President of Itemcop, to the factory of respondent's supplier, Luzon Cement Corporation in Norzagaray, Bulacan, to test fifty (50) pieces of plastic cement bags. The experiment, however, was unsuccessful. Cement dust oozed out under pressure through the small holes of the woven plastic bags and the loading platform was filled with dust. The second batch of plastic bags subjected to trial was likewise a failure. Although the weaving of the plastic bags was already tightened, cement dust still spilled through the gaps. Finally, with three hundred (300) "improved bags", the seepage was substantially reduced. Ugarte then asked Panganiban to send 180 bags of cement to Atlas via commercial shipping. Campos, Ugarte, and two other officials of petitioner company followed the 180 bags to the plant of Atlas in Sangi, Toledo, Cebu where they professed satisfaction at the performance of their own plastic bags. On December 29, 1970, Campos sent Panganiban a letter proclaiming dramatic results in the experiment. Consequently, Panganiban agreed to use the plastic cement bags. Four purchase orders (P.O.s) were thereafter issued, to wit:

DATE NUMBER OF BAGS UNIT COST AMOUNT

5 January 1971 53,800 P .83 P44,654.0024 February 1971 11,000 .90 9,900.00March 1971 41,000 .92 37,720.006 April 1971 10,000 .92 9,200.00

————TOTAL: P101,474.00

Petitioner delivered the above orders consecutively on January 12, February 17, March 19, and April 17, 1971 (p. 74, Rollo). Respondent, on the other hand, remitted the amounts of P1,640.00, P2,480.00. and P13,230.00 on March 31, April 31, and May 3, 1971 respectively, thereby leaving a balance of P84,123.80 (p. 58, Ibid.). No other payments were made, thus prompting A. Soriano y Cia of petitioner's Legal Department to send demand letters to respondent corporation. Reiterations thereof were later sent by petitioner's counsel. A collection suit was filed on April 11, 1973 when the demands remained unheeded.

At the trial on the merits, respondent admitted its liability for the 53,800 polypropylene lime bags covered by the first purchase order. (TSN, January 5, 1971, p. 131). With respect to the second, third, and fourth purchase orders, respondent, however, denied full responsibility therefor. Respondent said that it will pay, as it did pay for, only the 15,000 plastic bags it actually used in packing cement. As for the remaining 47,000 bags, the workers of Luzon Cement strongly objected to the use thereof due to the serious health hazards posed by the continued seepage of cement dust. Notwithstanding the measures adopted by respondent such as the use of masks, gloves. and conveyor system, the workers still refused to utilize the plastic bags. Respondent was, therefore, constrained to revert to the use of kraft paper bags in packing cement. Thereafter, petitioner was asked to take back the unused plastic bags. Considering however, that the bags were in the cement factory of respondent's supplier, petitioner maintained that it was respondent's obligation to return the bags to them. Apparently, this was not done and so petitioner demanded payment for the said bags.

On May 25, 1981, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered sentencing the defendant to pay the sum of P84,123.80 with l2% interest per annum from May, 1971 plus 15% of the total obligation as attorney's fees, and the costs.

SO ORDERED. (p. 80, Ibid.)

Respondent corporation's appeal was upheld by the appellate court when it reversed the trial court's decision and dismissed the case with costs against petitioner. (p. 28, Ibid.). Hence, the present recourse.

The first issue to be resolved is the propriety of this petition as it calls for a re-examination of the factual findings of the appellate court.

As asserted by herein respondent, it is well-entrenched in Our jurisprudence that this Court is not a trier of facts (Valdez v. CA, 194 SCRA 360 [1991]). As a rule, it is also settled that the factual findings of the appellate court are final and conclusive (Bustamante v. CA, 193 SCRA 603 [1991]; Radiowealth Finance Company v. Palileo, 197 SCRA 245 [1991]). However, in a long line of cases, We have pronounced certain exceptions, as when the inference made is manifestly mistaken or when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts or when the appellate court overlooked relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion (Aquino v. CA, 204 SCRA 247 [1991]; Manlapaz v. CA, 147 SCRA 236 [1987]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593, [1986]; Moran v. CA, 133 SCRA 88 [1984]).

A review of the record instantly reveals that the case at bar falls under the last exception. As earlier adverted to, respondent has repeatedly admitted its liability for the 53,800 plastic lime bags amounting to P44,654.00 yet the appellate court disregarded this fact and totally cleared respondent from all responsibility. On this point alone, the decision of the appellate court may be overturned, or at least modified.

Let Us now turn to the crux of the controversy, which is whether or not respondent may be held liable for the 47,000 plastic bags which were not actually used for packing cement as originally intended.

It is beyond dispute that prior to respondent's transaction with petitioner, the bags were already tested and the results thereof, albeit initially unsuccessful, were nevertheless favorably considered after due alterations were made. Verily, it is on the basis of such experimental findings that respondent agreed to use the plastic cement bags and thereafter issued the purchase orders heretofore mentioned. Significantly, the quantity of bags ordered by respondent also negates its position that the bags were still under experimentation. Indeed, if it were so, the bags ordered should have been considerably lesser in number and would normally increase as the suitability of the plastic bags became more definite. Likewise, it is worthy to note that as of the date of petitioner's third delivery on March 19, 1971, respondent has received a total of 52,000 bags. By then, it was very probable that the problems alluded to by respondent could no longer be resolved, thus, only 15,000 bags were actually used and 37,000 bags were already considered unfit for packing cement. Under such predicament, it was but logical for respondent to cancel then the fourth purchase order for another 10,000 bags. Surprisingly, respondent still accepted the same upon delivery on April 17, 1971 and remitted its payments until May 3, 1971. When petitioner sent letters demanding the full payment of the bags, respondent simply declared that it did not receive any because it transferred its offices to another place. In the meantime, the bags remained in the custody of Luzon Cement, respondent's supplier and virtually a stranger as far as petitioner is concerned. It is for this reason that petitioner may not be expected to just pull out its bags from Luzon Cement.

Not to be overlooked also is the fact that Panganiban, respondent corporation's president, also collected due commissions for the four purchase orders issued in favor of petitioner. (p. 79, Rollo).

Finally, the conditions which allegedly govern the transaction according to respondent may not be considered. The trial court correctly observed that such conditions should have been distinctly specified in the purchase orders and respondent's failure to do so is fatal to its cause. We find that Article 1502 of the Civil Code, invoked by both parties herein, has no application at all to this case. The provision in the Uniform Sales Act and the Uniform Commercial Code from which Article 1502 was taken, clearly requires an express written agreement to make a sales contract either a "sale or return" or a "sale on approval". Parol or extrinsic testimony could not be admitted for the purpose of showing that an invoice or bill of sale that was complete in every aspect and purporting to embody a sale without condition or restriction constituted a contract of sale or return. If the purchaser desired to incorporate a stipulation securing to him the right of return, he should have done so at the time the contract was made. On the other hand, the buyer cannot accept part and reject the rest of the goods since this falls outside the normal intent of the parties in the "on approval" situation. (67 Am Jur 2d, pp. 733, 748).

In the light of these principles, We hold that the transaction between respondent and petitioner constituted an absolute sale. Accordingly, respondent is liable for the plastic bags delivered to it by petitioner.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE and the decision of the trial court REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 72025 June 30, 1988

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.CARLOS COLINARES Y SOLMERANO alias Caloy (ARRESTED) & ERNANI BASAYSAY alias Dominador Italia y Plofino--(AT LARGE), accused-appellants.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Antonio F. Dasalla for accussed-appellant.

 

PARAS, J.:

Carlos Colinares y Solmerano and Ernani Basaysay alias Dominador Italia y Plofino were charged before the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City with the crime of murder allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 29th day of November, 1981, in Quezon City, Philippines, the abovenamed accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and treachery and taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one ARMANDO CARDINAS (sic.) Y LUBERIANO, by then and there, stabbing him on the parts of his body with the use of one (1) single-bladed knife, hereby inflicting upon said Armando Cardenas y Luberiano serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim in such amount as may be awarded to them.

Contrary to law. (p. 10, Rollo)

Basaysay having remained at large, trial proceeded with Colinares after which the trial court rendered a decision 1finding him guilty as charged, with the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Armando Cardenas in the sum of P30,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and with the accessories provided for by law.

Hence, this appeal with the following:

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

I

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN TOTALLY DISREGARDING THE TESTIMONY OF GOVERNMENT WITNESS, COL. GREGORIO C. BLANCO, MEDICO LEGAL EXPERT AND CHIEF OF THE MEDICO LEGAL BRANCH PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, CAMP CRAME, THAT THE CADAVER OF THE VICTIM WAS ALREADY IN RIGOR MORTIS (MORE THAN TWELVE (12) HOURS DEAD) WHEN HE AUTOPSIED IT AT HIGH NOON OF NOVEMBER 29, 1981 WHICH PROVE FALSE THE CHARGE THAT ACCUSED COMMITTED THE CRIME OF MURDER IN THE MORNING OF NOVEMBER 29, 1981 AT ABOUT 10:00 O'CLOCK

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN TOTALLY DISREGARDING THE CONTRADICTORY STATEMENTS OF GOVERNMENT WITNESSES ON VERY MATERIAL MATTERS WHICH WOULD CREATE SERIOUS DOUBTS AS TO THE CULPABILITY OF ACCUSED WHICH IS A GROUND FOR ACQUITTAL.

III

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN TOTALLY DISREGARDING THE INHERENT IMPROBABILITIES IN THE TESTIMONIES OF GOVERNMENT WITNESSES THAT WOULD LIKEWISE GENERATE SERIOUS DOUBTS AS TO THE CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF ACCUSED.

IV

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE ACCUSED COMMITTED THE CRIME OF MURDER ON ONE CIRCUMSTANCIAL EVIDENCE.

V

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN SENTENCING HEREIN ACCUSED TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

From the testimonies of five witnesses, namely: spouses Roberto and Trinidad Lopez, their granddaughter Rowena Lopez, Col. Gregorio C. Blanco, Chief of the Medico Legal Branch, PC, Camp Crame, and Police Sgt. Amador Morris, SID, QCPS, the version of the prosecution is briefly stated as follows:

The victim Armando Cardenas just recently arrived from the Visayas, was the nephew of spouses Roberto and Trinidad Lopez, residents of Don Fabian Subdivision, Fairview, Quezon City.

Roberto Lopez testified that at about 10:00 o'clock A.M., November 29, 1981 a quarrel between his neighbors the de Leon family and the Martinez family ensued in front of his house.

Shortly thereafter, some thirty armed persons among whom was accused Carlos Cardenas, arrived at the residence of the above-named spouses. Inside the house at that time were spouses Roberto and Trinidad Lopez, their son Romeo and the latter's daughter 13 years old Rowena and the victim Armando Cardenas. Some of these thirty persons hit with their guns, mauled and kicked Roberto Lopez, Romeo Lopez and the victim Armando Cardenas. The accused, Carlos Colinares, together with some of his companions chased and continued to maul Armando Cardenas as the latter ran towards the back of the house. Meanwhile, Roberto Lopez was able to run and to hide himself in the nearby cogon grass. He could see what Carlos Colinares and companions were doing to Armando but he could not do anything to help his nephew. Armando Cardenas, sprawled on the ground and bleeding, was picked up and taken to the barangay service jeep by accused Carlos Colinares and the sons of Rosendo de Leon, a neighbor of the Lopezes. After Armando was taken away, Roberto Lopez came out of the cogon grass and together with his wife, Trinidad, rode on a passenger jeepney to find out where Armando was being taken. They saw the barangay service jeep in front of the Commonwealth Barangay Hall, along Don Mariano Marcos Avenue. They alighted from the passenger jeepney and went near the barangay jeep. They saw their nephew Armando Cardenas, bleeding and seated on the floor of the vehicle leaning against the driver's backseat. Sitting beside

the victim was accused Carlos Colinares, while sitting beside the driver (Ernani Basaysay) was Ely Colinares, brother of the accused and the chairman of Barangay Commonwealth at that time. Aside from these persons, they also saw others among them a son of Rosendo de Leon seated inside the jeep.

Upon seeing Roberto and Trinidad Lopez, Armando Cardenas spoke and implored their help as he was afraid he would be killed by his companions inside the jeep. Roberto Lopez assauged Armando's fears by telling him that these persons are government authorities (barangay) and that they would not kill him. (t.s.n., March 3, 1982, p. 3). Trinidad Lopez, thinking that Armando would be brought to a hospital, wanted to board the barangay jeep to accompany her nephew but accused Carlos Colinares prevented her from doing so. That was the last time that Roberto and Trinidad Lopez saw Armando Cardenas alive.

As per records, Armando Cardenas was brought to the Quirino Memorial Hospital, Quezon City at about 10:40 o'clock in the morning of November 29, 1981. He was pronounced dead on arrival, per medicolegal necropsy report, dated January 6, 1982 issued by Lt. Col. Gregorio C. Blanco (Exh. "A"). The same Lt. Col. Blanco performed the autopsy on the cadaver of Armando Cardenas at about 12:00 o'clock noon on November 29, 1981 at the Oro Memorial Homes, Cubao, Quezon City. Armando Cardenas sustained several injuries, but the fatal wounds were the following:

a) hacked wound, neck, measuring 15 x 3 cm, crossing the anterior midline 7 cm to the left and 8 cm to the right, lacerating the larynx, trachea, esophagus, left common carotid artery and vein;

b) stab wound, right hypochandriac region measuring 2.5 by 0.3 cm, 11 cm from and anterior midline, 5 cm deep, directed upwards, posteriorwards and medialwards, piercing the 7th right intercostal space, lacerating the right lobe of the liver and right dome of the diaphragm. (Exhibit "A").

Armando Cardenas died of cardio-respiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage secondary to the stab wound of the trunk and the hacking wound on the head. (Exhibit "A-1").

On the other hand, the version of the defense is simply stated as follows:

Accused Carlos Colinares testified that at about 7:00 o'clock A.M. of November 29, 1981, he was putting up an electrical post at Barangay Commonwealth, which task he finished at about 9:00 o'clock A.M. of the same day. He then went home which is about 10 meters away from the barangay hall to get some wires which he brought back to the barangay hall and left these wires with Barangay Tanod Domingo Tuazon. From here, he proceeded to the "paradahan" (parking lot) of the "Manila Bus" bound for Quiapo, where he was one of the dispatchers assigned that morning. Patrolmen Moris. Dizon and Belen of the Quezon City Police Force, approached and invited him to go to the Quezon City Police Headquarters to see Maj. Romeo San Diego. He was brought to the headquarters in EDSA, Kamuning where he was left to await Major San Diego. Nobody arrived until 3:00 P.M. When the complainants arrived at headquarters, accused was informed that there is a complaint against him but not told of the nature of their complaint. Thereafter, accused was brought at 8:00 o'clock P.M. by Pats. Dario and Balia to the house of a certain Fiscal located at the back of PHHC. Later, he was brought back to the police headquarters and detained at Quezon City Hall. Accused denied having known the victim and his relatives, Roberto, Trinidad, Romeo and Rowena, all surnamed Lopez. Accused also denied knowledge or awareness of the incidents testified to by prosecution witnesses.

The corroborative testimonies of Rosendo de Leon and son Mario showed that in the morning of November 29, 1981 at about 7:00 o'clock A.M., Prudencio Martinez and son Jojo Martinez had a fight with them after an argument regarding a fence constructed on the lot of de Leon. After the fight the de Leons proceeded to the Iglesia ni Cristo Central Clinic a distance of about 10 kilometers from their place to be treated for their wounds. They went back to their house at about 11:30 o'clock A.M. but did not notice if accused Carlos Colinares was there. They also denied having known the deceased.

Witness Charles Bitoon, a neighbor of the de Leon and Lopez families, testified that from his house, he saw on November 29, 1981, at about 9:00 A.M. two Metrocom soldiers remove the walls of the house of Roberto Lopez. Short of this, he did not notice any unusual incident that morning.

Barangay Commonwealth Captain Nemesio T. Manaog testified that on November 29, 1981 at about 9:00 o'clock A.M. Trinidad Lopez arrived at the Bgy. Hall and stated before him "ganoon nga ba tayo ngayon kapitan, banat na lang ng banat wala ng tanungan," referring to the mauling of her nephew Armando. He advised her not to worry but to make inquiry first as to where or what hospital Armando was brought and to come back after his office to lodge her complaint, if any. More than five minutes after Trinidad Lopez had left witness saw accused Colinares walk by the Hall with a pair of pliers, screw driver and a few rolls of electric wire towards the direction of Tandang Sora. Witness admitted on cross-examination that he does not have any personal knowledge as to the killing that took place on November 29, 1981 in his barangay because he conducts investigations only when the office is informed and no such information reached his office as Trinidad Lopez never came back to make any complaint. He only came to know of such incident when he went to the office of the Criminal Investigation Section (CIS) to follow up the release of the barangay jeep which had been impounded by the CIS. He testified further that the first time he saw the barangay jeep in question on that fateful day, November 29, 1981, was at about 11:00 o'clock A.M. being driven by Ernie Basaysay, the authorized driver of the jeep, who informed him that he just came from the Labor Hospital where he brought a patient whose Identity he does not know. Thereafter Basaysay left to clean the jeep. Manaog claimed he did not know the suspect in the case until he appeared before a certain Fiscal residing at Teacher's Village.

The appeal deserves consideration. In finding the accused guilty, the lower court relied heavily on the positive Identification by government witnesses Roberto, Trinidad and Rowena, all surnamed Lopez, of the accused as the perpetrator of the alleged mauling incident equating it also as a positive Identification of the same accused as the one who killed Armando Cardenas. Such inference has no legal and/or factual basis. It is noted that the lower court admitted in its decision that there is "no evidence presented to show where the crime took place and who inflicted the fatal wounds sustained by Armando Cardenas," (p. 6, Decision, Crim. Case No. Q-18289) and yet the same court concluded that the accused committed the crime charged based on the circumstantial evidence that accused was Identified by the prosecution witnesses as the one who mauled the victim and that the victim was last seen alive in his company, among others. Such finding cannot be sustained. To uphold a judgment of conviction on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances must be "an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion, which points to the defendant to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. (U.S. vs. Villar, 6 Phil. 510; People vs. Subano, 73 Phil. 692). It would have been a different judgment if the prosecution witnesses saw herein accused kill the victim and testified thereon. Such would have been positive evidence because his pointing to said accused as the perpetrator is positive Identification which will defeat the defense of alibi put up by the accused.

Aside from the fact that there is no evidence presented to show where the crime took place and who inflicted the fatal wounds sustained, the record is not clear as to the time of the mauling incident and the death of the victim. Roberto Lopez testified that the mauling incident happened on November 28,

1981 between 10:00 o'clock A.M. and 11:00 o'clock A.M., Trinidad Lopez testified that it happened on the same day but at 7:30 o'clock A.M. and Rowena Lopez testified that it happened at 10:00 o'clock A.M. Another witness for the prosecution Col. Gregorio C. Blanco after qualifying himself as a medico-legal expert testified that the cadaver of the victim was already inrigor mortis (more than twelve (12) hours dead) when he autopsied it at high noon of November 29, 1981. Taking into consideration this unimpeachable testimony of the doctor and the necropsy report (Exh. "A") which substantially supported the doctor's oral testimony, the death of the victim could be calculated to have occurred at least 12 hours before time of necropsy which is about November 28, 1981 at 12:00 o'clock midnight. Thus the mauling incident of the victim did not happen or could not have happened because the victim was already dead at that time of the alleged mauling incident. There is no inconsistency between the doctor's oral testimony and the Necropsy Report because the time and date of death of the victim appearing on the Necropsy Report as a/1040 H 29 November 1981 pertains to the time and date as reported to the doctor by the authorities concerned since the victim was DOA (Dead on Arrival) at 10:40 o'clock A.M. November 29, 1981 at the Quirino Memorial General Hospital, Quezon City.

Furthermore, We cannot entertain the claim of witness Rowena Lopez that their failure to report the incident to any police authority near them was because they were afraid since they were guarded. The fact that Roberto and Trinidad Lopez freely left their house to search allegedly for their nephew belies Rowena's claim that they were guarded. Very intriguing also is the fact that in spite of witness Rowena Lopez testimony of the presence of Metrocom soldiers during the mauling incident, the prosecution failed to implead these Metrocom soldiers and/ or the other occupants of the barangay service jeep where the victim was allegedly last seen alive. These are material facts which cannot just be ignored and certainly cast grave doubt as to the guilt of the herein accused.

Premises considered, the prosecution has failed to establish the guilt of the accused Carlos Colinares beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the Court hereby ACQUITS him of the crime charged and hereby ORDERS his immediate RELEASE with costs de officio.

SO ORDERED.

Yap, C.J., Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

 Separate Opinions

 MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.; dissenting

The chain of circumstances point to appellant's guilt, at the very least, for homicide. After the victim was initially mauled and kicked and as he ran to the back of the house, appellant Carlos Colinares and his companions chased and continued to maul the victim (p. 4, Decision). Roberto Lopez witnessed the mauling of the victim, his nephew, but could not do anything to help (ibid.). Roberto then saw the victim sprawled on the ground, bleeding. Appellant picked him up and placed him inside a barangay service jeep. Thereafter, Roberto and his wife followed the jeep up to the barangay hall. There, Trinidad saw the victim slumped on the floor of the jeep against the driver's seat, still bleeding. Sitting beside the victim was the accused Carlos Colinares, while sitting beside the driver was Ely Colinares, brother of Carlos and Chairman of the so-called Barangay Commonwealth. Aside from these persons, they also saw others seated inside the jeep (ibid.) The victim implored his aunt and uncle for help as he was afraid he would be killed by his companions inside the jeep. Trinidad wanted to accompany the victim in the jeep, thinking that he would be taken to the hospital. But Carlos prevented her. That was the last time the spouses saw their nephew alive.

While it may be that there was no eyewitness who testified to having seen appellant inflict the fatal blow, yet, the circumstances above narrated point to no other conclusion but that appellant and companions were responsible for the victim's death (People vs. Lingao, L-28506, January 31, 1977, 75 SCRA 130). Appellant and his companions acted in conspiracy (People vs. Del Rosario, 68 Phil. 720 [1939]) and the act of one must be deemed as the act of all (People vs. Paredes, No. L-19149, August 16, 1968, 24 SCRA 635).

The medico legal expert's testimony as to the hour of death was far from accurate, was merely an estimate ("more than twelve [12] hours") and cannot be made to negate a finding of culpability considering the attendant circumstantial evidence leading to a fair and reasonable conclusion of guilt.

 

Separate Opinions

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.; dissenting

The chain of circumstances point to appellant's guilt, at the very least, for homicide. After the victim was initially mauled and kicked and as he ran to the back of the house, appellant Carlos Colinares and his companions chased and continued to maul the victim (p. 4, Decision). Roberto Lopez witnessed the mauling of the victim, his nephew, but could not do anything to help (ibid.). Roberto then saw the victim sprawled on the ground, bleeding. Appellant picked him up and placed him inside a barangay service jeep. Thereafter, Roberto and his wife followed the jeep up to the barangay hall. There, Trinidad saw the victim slumped on the floor of the jeep against the driver's seat, still bleeding. Sitting beside the victim was the accused Carlos Colinares, while sitting beside the driver was Ely Colinares, brother of Carlos and Chairman of the so-called Barangay Commonwealth. Aside from these persons, they also saw others seated inside the jeep (ibid.) The victim implored his aunt and uncle for help as he was afraid he would be killed by his companions inside the jeep. Trinidad wanted to accompany the victim in the jeep, thinking that he would be taken to the hospital. But Carlos prevented her. That was the last time the spouses saw their nephew alive.

While it may be that there was no eyewitness who testified to having seen appellant inflict the fatal blow, yet, the circumstances above narrated point to no other conclusion but that appellant and companions were responsible for the victim's death (People vs. Lingao, L-28506, January 31, 1977, 75 SCRA 130). Appellant and his companions acted in conspiracy (People vs. Del Rosario, 68 Phil. 720 [1939]) and the act of one must be deemed as the act of all (People vs. Paredes, No. L-19149, August 16, 1968, 24 SCRA 635).

The medico legal expert's testimony as to the hour of death was far from accurate, was merely an estimate ("more than twelve [12] hours") and cannot be made to negate a finding of culpability considering the attendant circumstantial evidence leading to a fair and reasonable conclusion of guilt.

Footnotes

1 Penned by Judge Antonio P. Solano promulgated on July 22, 1985.

G.R. No. 70836 October 18, 1988

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.TIMOTEO TOLENTINO y MAPUA alias "TEM" defendant-appellant.

 

CORTES, J.:

In the instant appeal from a conviction for murder, the Court is once more tasked with the resolution of the pivotal issue of whether the prosecution has successfully discharged the onus probandi imposed upon it in criminal cases. The case stemmed from an information charging the accused Timoteo Tolentino y Mapua and one John Doe with the crime of murder committed as follows:

That on or about the 26th day of July, 1982, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and aiding one another, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, qualified by evident premeditation and treachery, attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of Alfredo Quitoriano y Bayot, by then and there throwing at him stones hitting him on the head and stabbing the said victim thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said Alfredo Quitoriano y Bayot. [Information, Rollo, p. 3.]

In order to determine the Identity of the other accused, the fiscal conducted a reinvestigation and thereafter submitted his resolution to the trial court wherein he noted the failure of the complainant during the investigation to present any witness to establish the Identity of said John Doe. Hence the reinvestigation was terminated with the Identity of said John Doe still undetermined [Original Records, p. 55.1 Accordingly, only the herein accused Tolentino was arraigned and tried. A plea of not guilty was entered by the accused. His application for bail dated August 2, 1982 was denied and so he remained in jail during the trial.

After the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution, accused Tolentino filed a demurrer to the evidence, captioned "Motion to Dismiss," alleging:

1. That there is no evidence adduced by the prosecution to show that herein accused stabbed the deceased or conspired with somebody who might have inflicted the stab wound sustained by the deceased;

2. That the evidence adduced by the prosecution shows that the injuries sustained by the deceased, particularly on the head, were caused by some other means and not by stoning;

3. That the testimony of the prosecution witness, Bienvenido Ferrer, does not indicate that the deceased was hit by a stone allegedly thrown by accused towards the deceased;

4. That the deceased died because of the fatal wounds caused by a sharp instrument, according to the testimony of the medicolegal officer;

5. That the prosecution failed to prove the crime charged and therefore the case against the herein accused should be dismissed. [Original Records, p. 95.]

However, the trial court resolved to defer its resolution thereon, stating in its Order dated May 27, 1983 that "the resolution of this motion to dismiss ... is held in abeyance until the defense shall have presented its evidence and the complete records of the proceedings from the beginning shall be available." [Original Records, p. 123.]

Relying strongly on the merits of his demurrer to the evidence, accused waived his right to present any evidence and moved that the case be submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence presented by the prosecution and his demurrer to the evidence. He likewise filed a second motion to be released on bail. After a consideration of the evidence presented by the prosecution, the trial court resolved to grant the application for bail on July 18, 1983. Thereafter, the trial court rendered its judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the guilt of the accused having been proved beyond reasonable doubt is (sic) hereby convicted of the crime of Murder and is hereby sentenced to life imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of Alfredo Quitoriano the amount of P15,000.00. [Rollo. p. 22.]

From said decision, Tolentino interposed an appeal to this Court.

In his brief, the accused made the following assignments of errors:

I. That the trial court erred in finding that the victim was hit at the back of his head by a stone thrown by the accused.

II. The trial court erred in not finding that the victim's wounds at the back of his head was caused by a sharp instrument as borne by the findings and testimony of the medicolegal expert who performed the autopsy of the body of the victim.

III. The trial court erred in not finding that accused had nothing to do with the infliction of the mortal wounds sustained by the victim, nor he conspired or acted in concert with the person who inflicted such injuries, much less he acted as an accomplice (sic.)

IV. The trial court erred in not rendering a judgment of acquittal. [Brief for Defendant-Appellant, p. 2.1

To support the first and second assigned errors, the appellant relies heavily upon the testimony of the medicolegal officer, Dr. Gregorio Blanco, who performed the autopsy on the body of the victim. According to the appellant, the finding of the trial court to the effect that the wound located at the back of the victim's head was caused by a stone is erroneous as the same is not supported or confirmed by the finding of the medicolegal officer and his expert testimony before the lower court.

The necropsy report filed by Dr. Gregorio Blanco, the Chief of the Medico- Legal Division of the PC Crime Laboratory shows the following injuries found on the body of the deceased, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

HEAD, TRUNK AND EXTREMITIES:

(1) Abrasion, right supra-orbital region, measuring 0.7 by 0.2 cm. 8 cm. from the anterior midline.

(2) Lacerated wound, right post-auricular region, measuring 2.5 by 0.3 cm. 10 cm. from the posterior midline.

(3) Contusion, right pre-auricular region, measuring 6 by 5 cm. 13 cm. from the anterior midline.

(4) Contusion, right supra-scapular region, measuring 6 by 6 cm. 13 cm. from the posterior midline, with a superimposed abrasion, measuring 3 by 3 cm.

(5) Abrasion, right infrascapular region, measuring 5 by 0.3 cm. 10 cm. from the posterior midline.

(6) Stab wound, left axillary region, measuring 1.8 by 0.4 cm. 18 cm. from the anterior midline, 11 cm. deep, directed downwards, posterior wards and to the right, fracturing the 5th left thoracic rib, along the mid-axillary line, lacerating both lobes of the left lung.

(7) Abrasion, dorsum of the left hand, measuring O.6 by O.5 cm. 2 cm. lateral to its posterior midline.

(8) Abrasion, left knee, measuring 0.7 by 0.5 cm. 1.5. cm. lateral to its posterior midline.

xxx xxx xxx

REMARKS:

Cause of death is cardio-respiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage secondary to injuries of the head and stab wound of the trunk. [Original Records, p. 74.]

It must be noted that the injuries denominated as Nos. 1, 2, and 3 in the necropsy report were all located in the victim's head while the rest of the injuries denominated as Nos. 4, 5, and 6 were located on the trunk and Nos. 7 and 8 on the extremeties of the victim. The two fatal injuries though are the lacerated wound at the back of the victim's head (wound No. 2) and the stab wound at his left chest (wound No. 6). The prosecution deposits that since the accused hurled stones at the back of the victim's head, the infliction of wound No. 2 can be ascribed to him and accordingly, he can be held liable for the victim's death.

However, inasmuch as the medicolegal officer testified that the fatal injury sustained by the deceased at the back of the head was caused by a sharp instrument [TSN, November 5, 1982, p. 81, appellant maintains that the allegation of another prosecution witness, Bienvenido Ferrer in his sworn statement to the effect that the accused came from behind the victim and threw a stone hitting the back of the latter's head and causing him to fall on the cemented ground, cannot be given any credence at all. He asserts that in view of Dr. Blanco's unquestioned qualifications, experience and

expertise and his opportunity to examine the nature and extent of the injury inflicted upon the victim, his testimony should prevail over that of Ferrer.

The apparent conflict in the evidence introduced by the prosecution brings to the fore the main issue of whether the guilt of the accused has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. In resolving the question, the Court has to determine how much weight should be given to the opinion of the medical expert vis-a-vis that of the other witness.

The prosecution's case is anchored principally upon the sworn statement and testimony ** before the court a quo of the lone eyewitness, Bienvenido Ferrer. While his testimony dwelt on the fact that he saw the appellant throwing stones at the victim, nowhere from said testimony can it be gleaned that the stones allegedly thrown actually hit the victim and caused such injury as will constitute a penal offense. In the light of the absence of any other corroborating testimonies, the sparseness in details of Ferrer's testimony has certainly weakened the prosecution's case.

Neither is the sworn statement executed by Ferrer on July 22, 1 982 and formally presented in evidence before the court of any help to the prosecution. While said statement serves to amplify Ferrer's narration of the stoning incident, it has not sufficiently established Tolentino's liability for the death of the victim. This conclusion is supported by a close scrutiny of said statement:

T - Ano ba ang nakita ninyong pagkapatay nitong si Fred Quitoriano Victoriano?

S - Ng humigit kumulang sa 8:30 ng gabi kagabi July 26,1982, ng ako'y dumating sa aming bahay ay nakita ko si FRED QUITORIANO na nakaupo sa may tabi ng isang lamesa sa harapan ng aming tindahan sa No. 822 T. Sora Avenue, Old Balara, Quezon City, at siya ay kumakain ng dinuguan at ako'y niyaya na umupo sa tabi at doon ay nakita ko rin si TRANCING na si Mrs. TOLENTINO na kausap ng asawa ko, at hindi nagtagal ay dumating ho si Mr. SATURNINO MOGADO na kapitbahay rin namin kaya niyaya rin namin al FRED na kumain si SATURNINO at pati si TRANCING ay niyaya na rin namin na kumain kaya naman nga ginawa ni TRANCING ay naupo sa aming lamesa, subalit hindi nagtagal ay dumating si Mr. SIXTO TOLENTINO kaya siya ay inanyayahan namin na kumain din ngunit hindi siya kumibo at siya ay umorder na lang ng isang boteng beer sa tindahan namin at iniinom niya iyon habang siya ay nakatayo sa tabi ng counter pagkatapos na maubos niya ang laman ng bote ng beer ay umalis na si Mr. SIXTO TOLENTINO, tapos ho hindi pa nagtatagal ay umuwi na rin si TRANCING at ako naman ay pumasok na sa loob ng aming bahay at ako'y humiga sa supa namin sa sala at ako'y naidlip ng sandali at ako nagising na lang ng ako makarinig ng sigawan ng mga tao na nanggaling sa harapan ng tindahan namin kaya ang ginawa ko ay agad akong tumayo at nagtungo sa pintuan ng bahay namin at nakita ho si FRED QUITORIANO na kasalukuyang naglalakad patungo sa looban namin at pagkatapos ho ay bigla kong nakita si TIMOTEO TOLENTINO na sumulpot sa may likuran ni FRED at nakita ko na binato niya ng isang pirasong bato si FRED at tinamaan sa ulo haya ho napatumba si FRED sa semento at pagkatapos ay binato na uli ni TEM si FRED habang ito'y nakahiga sa semento at tinamaan na muli si FRED, pagkatapos ho ay tumakbo na si TEM palabas ng aming bakuran at noon naman ay kinarga na nina Mr. MOGADO at ni CAMILO LOPEZ si FRED sa kotse ni CAMILO at sinamahan ko sila na dalhin itong is

FRED sa Labor Hospital subalit siya ay namatay doon makalipas ang 20 minutos. [Original Record, p. 85, Emphasis supplied.)

From the said statement it can be gathered that the stabbing of Quitoriano occurred while Ferrer was taking his nap, causing a commotion and eliciting shouts from the people outside which awakened him. Ferrer categorically admitted before the trial court having seen only the stoning and not the stabbing [TSN, August 25, 1982, pp. 7 and 1 0.1 There was therefore no evidence linking the appellant to the stabbing as witness Ferrer never saw the stabbing. This fact was conceded by the Assistant City Fiscal in his resolution dated July 28, 1982, ordering the filing of the information against Tolentino [Original Records, p. 8.1 The indictment for murder was accordingly premised on the appellant's act of throwing stones at the victim.

But the evidence on record is bereft of any affirmative and positive showing that such act of the appellant produced any fatal wound or any injury for that matter. The testimony of Ferrer, it bears reiteration, merely established the fact that appellant threw stones at the victim. While in his sworn statement, Ferrer alleged that the stones hit the victim's head and caused him to fall, such allegation is belied by the clear and categorical findings of the medicolegal officer who conducted the autopsy on the victim, that such injuries were caused by means other than stoning. Thus:

xxx xxx xxx

Q Now, doctor, in layman's language, will you please explain your findings relative to the finding No. 1, where is this located?

A Abrasion. The collision of the surface of the body affected by falling down or it could be inflicted by instrument which is rough which will cause abrasion and it is located in orbitrary region, I have here in my possession the diagrammatic representation of different injuries incurred by the victim.

xxx xxx xxx

Q How about item No. 2 (lacerated wound), what had caused this injury? ***

A I would say, sharp instrument which could have been inflicted to the body of the victim thus producing lacerated wound.

Q What could have caused the wound, doctor?

A Possible may be a "balisong.

Q How about item No. 3?

A This injury is contusion...

Q Where is this located?

A It is here. (Witness indicating diagram 1, 2, 3... wait a minute... this No. 3, right aurecular region...

COURT:

Witness is marking in chronological order corresponding to the necropsy report the injuries sustained by the victim.

Q What could have caused injury No. 3?

A Maybe it was caused by a fistic blow. (TSN, November 5, 1982, pp. 8-9; Emphasis supplied.]

Ferrer's testimony thus finds no corroboration even from the opinion given by the medicolegal officer who was presented by the prosecution itself to testify on the cause of the victim's injuries. In this jurisdiction, expert opinion constitutes one of the few exceptions to the general rule that a mere opinion of a witness regarding a particular matter is not admissible. In this connection, Rule 130, Section 43 provides: "The opinion of a witness regarding a question of science, art or trade, when he is skilled therein, may be received in evidence."

In the field of medicine, opinions of doctors qualified by training and experience as to causation are competent and in many cases controlling and binding upon the court [People v. Castro, G.R. No. L-38989, October 29, 1982, 117 SCRA 101 4; See also Murray v. Industrial Commission, 349 P. 2d 627, 87 Ariz 190 (1960).] In this case, Dr. Blanco's opinion as to the cause of the victim's injuries should be accorded great respect, it being peculiarly within the expertise of medical practitioners.

A careful examination of the findings of the medicolegal officer in his necropsy report, particularly on the wounds found on the victim's head, bolsters the appellant's claim that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Wound No. 1, an abrasion, was located above the victims right eyebrow and therefore, could not have been inflicted by the appellant as Ferrer plainly testified that the appellant was behind the victim when he threw the stones. The same can be said of Wound no. 3, a contusion located near the right cheek of the victim. The infliction of the fatal wound, Wound No. 2, a lacerated wound measuring only 2.5 by 3 cm., located at the back of the victims head cannot likewise be attributed to appellant as, according to the expert opinion of the doctor who examined the wound, it was caused by a sharp instrument like a "balisong." While the doctor's testimony on! record does not preclude the possibility that the wound could have also been caused by a stone, it was incumbent upon the prosecution, for its case against the accused to succeed, to elicit a positive statement to that effect from the doctor. But the prosecution absolutely failed in this task.

That the prosecution's evidence falls short of the standard degree of proof that will sustain a judgment of conviction is manifest from its belated attempt to cure the deficiency by a motion for correction of transcript of stenographic notes [See Original Records, p. 111, et. seq..] The motion adverted to an alleged omission in the transcript of stenographic notes of a question propounded to Dr. Blanco which allegedly elicited a response to the effect that the hitting of the head with a stone could have caused the injury. The motion however was filed only after the accused-appellant had already filed his demurrer to the evidence, pointing out to the absence of evidence to show that the injuries sustained by the deceased, particularly on the head, were caused by stoning [Original Records, p. 95.] It was denied by the trial court as "there (was) no showing that the stenographer concerned who took (sic) the proceeding and transcribed the notes failed in her duty' [Original Records, p. 115.]

Further, the prosecution during the trial manifested that it has in its possession the stones allegedly used in the commission of the crime [TSN, March 15, 19831 and yet, the prosecution rested its case without formally offering in evidence the said stones. The ineptness of the prosecution in handling this case, while certainly prejudicial to the State and the private offended party, cannot be treated by

this Court with indulgence as it will result in a complete disregard of the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent until his guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

In fine, the failure of the prosecution to prove that the act of the appellant produced such injury as will constitute a penal offense is fatal to their case. In criminal cases, the burden of proof as to the offense charged lies on the prosecution [Rule 131, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court.] As the accused has in his favor the constitutional presumption of innocence, the quantum of proof that will warrant a verdict of guilt must be strong enough to erase any reasonable doubt as to his culpability. True, the trial court found the prosecution evidence sufficient for purposes of conviction. As a rule, this Court usually desists from disturbing the conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, in deference to the basic precept that the lower court, having seen and heard the witnesses and observed their demeanor and manner of testifying, is in a better position to appreciate the evidence. But this doctrine must bow to the superior and immutable rule that the guilt of the accused must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, because the law presumes that a defendant is innocent and this presumption must prevail unless overturned by competent and credible proof (People v. Galvez, G.R. Nos. L-26944-45, December 5, 1980, 101 SCRA 544.] As authoritatively set forth by this Court in a fairly recent decision:

Appellants have in their favor the presumption of innocence as guaranteed by the Constitution. Proof against them must survive the test of reason. Every circumstance against guilt and in favor of innocence must be considered. Suspicion no matter how strong should not sway judgment, for well-established is the rule that the prosecution must rely on the strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of the defense; that appellants need not prove their innocence because that is presumed; that the presumption of innocence is a conclusion of law in favor of the accused, whereby his innocence is not only established but continues until sufficient evidence is introduced to overcome the proof which the law has created-that is, his innocence; "that conscience must be satisfied that defendant has been proven guilty of the offense charged. Only by proof beyond reasonable doubt which requires moral certainty, 'a certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of those who are to act upon it' may the presumption of innocence be overcome. [People v. Clores, G.R. No. 61408, October 12, 1983, 125 SCRA 67, 75 citing People v. Inguito, G.R. No. 53497, October 18,1982,117 SCRA 641, 649.]

Here, the evidence of the prosecution, far from proving the culpability of the appellant for the crime charged, discloses several probabilities, some of which point to his innocence. For one thing, Ferrer's testimony that the appellant had just alighted in front of the carinderia at the time he threw stones at the victim negates any possibility that he was the one who assaulted the victim with a sharp instrument [TSN, August 25, 1982, p. 10.1 Moreover, while the established facts do not entirely rule out the possibility that the accused could himself have inflicted the fatal wounds, the Court cannot base its conviction upon mere possibilities. It should be stressed anew that 'possibilities and suspicion are not evidence" [Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 66497-98, July 10, 1986,142 SCRA 593, 6121 and therefore should not be taken against the accused. Here, what the prosecution managed to establish were mere circumstances which were not sufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. While circumstantial evidence may suffice to support a conviction, it is imperative, though, that the following requisites should concur:

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt [Rule 133, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Court.]

For the well-entrenched rule in evidence is that "before conviction can be had upon circumstantial evidence, the circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the defendant, to the exclusion of all others, as the author of the crime' [People v. Subano, 73 Phil. 692 (1942); Emphasis supplied.] In this case the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution does not conclusively point to the liability of the accused for the crime charged.

Bearing in mind that circumstantial evidence in order to warrant conviction "must fairly exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence' [Doronado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 57744, August 31, 1987, 153 SCRA 420, 433], the Court concludes that the prosecution has miserably failed to adduce such circumstantial evidence as would produce a moral certainty that the accused committed the crime charged. The accused is not duty-bound to dispel the doubts regarding his innocence. Accordingly, the constitutional presumption of innocence prevails.

The third assignment of error-that the trial court erred in not finding that the accused had nothing to do with the infliction of the mortal wounds sustained by the victim nor did he conspire or act in concert with the person who inflicted such injuries, much less act as an accomplice-is thus impressed with considerable merit.

Since it does not appear that any of the mortal wounds were inflicted by the accused, it behooves the prosecution to establish the existence of conspiracy in order to hold the accused liable as a principal in the crime of murder. But in this task, the prosecution failed utterly as admitted by the Solicitor General himself in the appellee's brief [Reno, p. 47.] " the came as an

Neither was the a 's participation m accomplice sufficiently proved. For the doctrine -steadfastly adhered to by this Tribunal is that '. . . (i)t is an essential condition to the existence of complicity, not only that there should be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice, but it is furthermore necessary that the latter, with knowledge of the criminal intent, should cooperate with the intention of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way." [People v. Tamayo, 44 Phil. 38, 49 (1922); Emphasis supplied.] None of these essential rudiments of complicity were shown to exist in the instant case.

From the foregoing, it is clear that the fourth assignment of error-that the trial court erred in not rendering a judgment of acquittal-is meritorious.

The fundamental precept that the prosecution has the burden of establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt commands strict compliance with the requisite degree of proof for discharging that burden. A painstakingly thorough appraisal of the evidence presented by the prosecution yields no legal basis for a verdict of conviction for it failed to meet the test of moral certainty.

WHEREFORE, for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused Timoteo Tolentino is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan (C.J.) Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.

 

Footnotes

** It should be noted that during the hearing of the first petition for bail, as the defense admitted the affidavit of Ferrer for purposes of such petition, the prosecution decided not to present him for direct examination. The Court however called Ferrer to the witness stand to answer some questions and this is the testimony referred to in this decision. Ferrer was likewise not called upon to testify during the trial proper.

*** Wound No. 2 is a lacerated wound located at the back of the right ear, described by Dr. Blanco in the necropsy report as one of the wounds causing the victim's death.

SECOND DIVISION APRIL JOY ASETRE, BENJIE EBCAS, GALINZCHEL GAMBOA, AND BUENAVENTURA GAMBOA,Petitioners,

- versus -

G.R. No. 171536

Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,CARPIO MORALES,TINGA,VELASCO, JR., andBRION, JJ.

JUNEL ASETRE, CHARITY DAINE ALAGBAN, COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FORMER EIGHTEENTH DIVISION),Respondents.

Promulgated:

April 7, 2009

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision[1] dated October 18, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78493. Said decision had reversed the Resolution[2] dated December 17, 2002 of the Department of Justice (DOJ) which ordered the withdrawal of an information for parricide against petitioner April Joy Asetre and for murder against petitioners Benjie Ebcas, Galinzchel Gamboa and Buenaventura Gamboa.

The facts, based on the findings of the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

On December 27, 2000, Hanz Dietrich Asetre was found dead in his residence, which also housed his printing press business. He was 26 years old.

Petitioner April Joy Gonzaga-Asetre, Hanzs wife, alleged that her husband committed suicide by hanging himself using bedcovers. She said Hanz was depressed, suicidal, a drug dependent, an alcoholic and violent even before they got married. She also claimed that when Hanz got high on drugs and alcohol, he would break things. When his mother contracted cancer, he became despondent, losing concentration in his work as well as lacking sleep at night. Then, after his mother died of cancer, he started writing letters expressing his desire to follow his mother. He also became depressed because they were left with huge debts and he had to assume payments. It was recommended that Hanz undergo rehabilitation in Cebu City, but he stayed there only for two weeks.[3]

However, respondent Junel Asetre, Hanzs brother, claimed that the mark on Hanzs neck was not that of bedspreads but of a rope. He claimed that petitioner Buenaventura Gamboa knew who killed Hanz, but was reluctant to divulge it lest he be charged or harmed by Aprils father.

On her part, respondent Charity Asetre-Alagban, Hanzs sister, claimed that Hanz confided to her a few days before his death that April issued checks without his knowledge, and that Hanz died without reconciling his differences with April.[4]

In a Resolution[5] dated October 3, 2001, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Bacolod found probable cause against April, Hanzs first cousins Galinzchel and Buenaventura Gamboa, and printing press worker Benjie Ebcas. The investigating prosecutor held that from the evidence adduced by the parties, herein petitioners were physically and actively interacting with Hanz shortly before he was found dead. Moreover, from the actuations of petitioners and the events that took place, it can be gleaned that they connived in killing Hanz and later tried to cover up the crime. Further, the prosecutor rejected petitioners suicide theory because it is inconsistent with the medico-legal findings that while Hanz might have wanted to end his life, the circumstances of his death proved he could not have done it himself. The prosecutor explained that the possibility of murder is not negated even if Hanz sustained no wounds or injuries, since he had been drinking shortly before his death which could have rendered him too drunk to be aware that he was being strangled. Thus, the prosecutor recommended that murder charges under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code[6] be filed against Ebcas and the Gamboas and a parricide charge under Article 246[7] of the Revised Penal Code be filed against April. The cases[8] were filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental, Branch 50.

Subsequently, on November 26, 2001, the four accused asked the DOJ for a review of the prosecutors findings.

In a Resolution dated December 17, 2002, DOJ Acting Secretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez absolved petitioners and reversed the investigating prosecutors resolution, not because she believed the suicide theory of the petitioners, but rather because she did not find sufficient evidence to sustain the theory of the prosecution of conspiracy to commit murder. Secretary Gutierrez explained that while there is overwhelming proof that Hanz might not have committed suicide, there is no direct or circumstantial evidence that could link petitioners as the authors of the crime. She reasoned in this wise: (1) the prosecution failed to establish petitioners motive to kill Hanz; (2) the alleged quarrel incident of the spouses was not substantiated; (3) Aprils actuations during the incident should not be taken against her as there is no standard human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange or frightful experience; (4) even her actuations after the incident, like burning the bed sheets and alleged suicide letters of Hanz, and her opposition to the exhumation/autopsy of Hanzs body because they could only traumatize her and her children, could not cast doubt on Aprils innocent intentions. An ordinary person like her could believe that the police investigation done at the time of the incident and the initial post-mortem examination on Hanzs body were more than enough to conclude and close the investigation; (5) even the apparent inconsistent testimonies of the other petitioners on their participation during the incident could not be taken against them because witnesses to a stirring incident could see differently some details thereof due in large part to excitement and confusion that such an incident usually brings.

Accordingly, Secretary Gutierrez directed the prosecutor to withdraw the information against petitioners in Criminal Case No. 01-23021. The dispositive portion of the ruling reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed resolution is REVERSED. The City Prosecutor of Bacolod City is hereby directed to withdraw the information filed against April Joy Asetre, Benjie Ebcas, Galinzchel Gamboa and Buenaventura Gamboa for murder in Criminal Case No. 01-23021 and to report the action taken therein within five (5) days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.[9]

Pursuant to the ruling, the prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw Information in Criminal Case No. 01-23021, which was granted by the RTC on January 21, 2003.[10]The trial court also recalled the warrant of arrest issued

against the accused, and later denied private respondents motion for reconsideration in an Order[11] dated February 27, 2003.

On June 16, 2003, the DOJ denied[12] the Asetre siblings motion for reconsideration of the Secretarys Order dated December 17, 2002. Thereafter, respondent Asetres filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the Court of Appeals, arguing that the DOJ Secretary acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the December 17, 2002 Resolution despite the circumstantial evidence against petitioners.

In its Decision dated October 18, 2005, the appellate court found that the DOJ Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in reversing the investigating prosecutors finding of probable cause. According to the Court of Appeals, the congruence of facts and circumstances of the case strongly shows a reasonable ground of suspicion that crimes of murder and parricide had been committed by the petitioners. It agreed with the investigating prosecutor that the physical evidence at hand negates the suicide theory of petitioners. It further held that the medical findings of the three medical doctorsthat it was improbable for Hanz to have committed suicidewere credible, impartial and unbiased. It added that when an information has already been filed in court, the latter acquires jurisdiction over the case until its termination, and any relief desired by any party should be addressed to the trial court. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari and mandamus is granted. Accordingly, the Resolutions dated December 17, 2002 and June 16, 2003 of the Secretary/Acting Secretary of Justice of the Department of Justice, in Criminal Case No. 01-23021, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.[13]

On February 13, 2006, the Court of Appeals denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration.[14] Hence, the instant petition before us.

Petitioners raise the following issues: 

I.

WHETHER THE PURPORTED OPINIONS OF DR. SAMSON GONZAGA, DR. LUIS GAMBOA, AND DR. NICASIO BOTIN, THAT HANZ ASETRE DID NOT COMMIT SUICIDE HAVE

SUFFICIENT WEIGHT, AS COMPARED TO THE DIRECT TESTIMONIES OF THE PETITIONERS, THEIR WITNESSES, AND THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT INDEED HANZ ASETRE COMMITTED SUICIDE.

II.

WHETHER THE CONCLUSION OF THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS, THAT THERE IS PROBABLE CAUSE TO CHARGE PETITIONERS FOR PARRICIDE IS SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE, AND IN ACCORD WITH JURISPRUDENCE AND LAW.

III.

WHETHER THE [CONCLUSION] OF THE RESPONDENT COURT THAT THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND HAS EXCEEDED HIS JURISDICTION IS CORRECT AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND PROCEDURE.

IV.

WHETHER THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS BEFORE THE RESPONDENT COURT, SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED CONSIDERING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BR. 50, WAS NOT IMPLEADED AND THE INFORMATION WAS ALREADY ORDERED WITHDRAWN, AND SUCH FACT WAS NOT REVEALED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN THEIR PETITION FOR CERTIORARI BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS EVEN IN THEIR DISCLAIMER OF FORUM SHOPPING.[15]

Briefly stated, the main issue presented for our resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the ruling of the DOJ Secretary and in finding probable cause to indict petitioners for murder and parricide.

In their brief and memorandum,[16] petitioners insist that the Court of Appeals should not have relied on the opinion of the three medical doctors, who executed affidavits stating that it was improbable that Hanz killed himself, because they are not forensic experts.[17]

Petitioners also argue that there are forensic yardsticks in this case consistent with suicide: total absence of stains, injuries, defense wounds on the bodies of Hanz and petitioners; a chair in the premises where Hanz committed suicide; no sign of struggle in Hanzs body; Hanz attempted suicide twice sometime in the middle of 2000; Hanz wrote letters indicative of his frustrations in life; the material used in hanging was accessible to Hanz; he had a history of reverses in life like drug addiction, losing his mother and financial problems; he was hooked on drugs and he had an unpredictable personality.

They also criticize the appellate court for its failure to specifically point out a portion in the Resolution of the DOJ Secretary that showed that she acted with grave abuse of discretion. They insist that the Secretary of Justices reversal of the investigating prosecutors resolution was within her authority as the head of the DOJ.[18] They stress that mere abuse of discretion is not sufficient to justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari as the abuse of discretion must be grave, patent, arbitrary and despotic.[19]

They further aver that after the DOJ Secretary reversed her subordinate prosecutor, the motion to withdraw information filed by the prosecutor was granted by the RTC onJanuary 21, 2003, and private respondents motion for reconsideration was denied on February 27, 2003. This means that the DOJ Secretarys ruling was not attended with grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners argue that private respondents failure to question the aforementioned orders should have been fatal to their petition before the appellate court, and private respondents are guilty of forum-shopping for not informing the Court of Appeals that the RTC had already issued an order granting the withdrawal of the information.[20]

In their Memorandum,[21] private respondents argue that the petition, filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, should be limited to questions of law but petitioners raised pure questions of fact. They argue that the evidentiary weight of the opinion of expert witnesses, the weighing of facts to determine probable cause, and the determination of whether there is sufficient evidence to support the same are all factual questions.[22]

They enumerated circumstantial evidence which warrant the finding of probable cause against the petitioners, to wit: (a) the victim died at around 2:00 p.m. on December 27, 2000; (b) the victim was brought to the hospital dead; (c) respondent Junel Asetre was not informed of the victims death and became aware of it through a friend; (d) at the hospital, April already hired a counsel; (e) Hanz was hurriedly buried on December 29, 2000 even before an autopsy could be conducted and despite the prior request of private respondents for an autopsy; (f)

the following day, December 30, 2000, April, despite the request of a police investigator to keep the bedspreads allegedly used by the victim in hanging himself, burned them; (g) she also burned the alleged suicide note of the victim; (h) April objected to the suggestion of private respondents to have the body exhumed to determine the cause of death, and even threatened them with trouble; (i) April and her counsel objected to the authority granted by the city prosecutor to exhume the body and conduct an autopsy; (j) when private respondents filed a petition in court for the exhumation of the body, April objected; (k) when the petition was granted, April filed a multi-million damage suit before the RTC against private respondents and the NBI agents who conducted the examination, although the case against the NBI agents was later withdrawn by April; (l) April also filed a criminal case, which was later dismissed, against private respondents and the NBI agents before the city prosecutors office for exhuming the victim to determine the cause of death; (m) she also filed another case, which was also dismissed, against the NBI agents before the Office of the Ombudsman; (n) petitioners went into hiding after the information was filed; (o) the first to arrive at the crime scene were the policemen of Bago City where Aprils father was vice mayor at the time of the incident, and not the policemen of Bacolod City; (p) the suicide theory was debunked by the NBI medico-legal officer, the investigating prosecutor and the acting Secretary of Justice as it was contrary to physical evidence; (q) all the petitioners were present at the scene shortly before, during, and after the victim died and they were the last persons seen with the victim.[23]

After serious consideration of the circumstances in this case, we are agreed that the petition is impressed with merit.

A preliminary investigation falls under the authority of the state prosecutor who is given by law the power to direct and control criminal actions. He is, however, subject to the control of the Secretary of Justice. Thus, Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

SEC. 4. Resolution of Investigating Prosecutor and its Review. −

x x x x

If upon petition by a proper party under such Rules as the Department of Justice may prescribe or motu proprio, the Secretary of Justice reverses or modifies the resolution of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, he shall direct the prosecutor concerned either to file the corresponding information without conducting another preliminary investigation, or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or information with notice to the parties. The

same Rule shall apply in preliminary investigations conducted by the officers of the Office of the Ombudsman.

The Secretary of Justice, upon petition by a proper party, can reverse his subordinates (provincial or city prosecutors and their assistants) resolutions finding probable cause against suspects of crimes.[24]

The full discretionary authority to determine probable cause in a preliminary investigation to ascertain sufficient ground for the filing of information rests with the executive branch. Hence, judicial review of the resolution of the Secretary of Justice is limited to a determination whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Courts cannot substitute the executive branchs judgment.[25]

Grave abuse of discretion is defined as such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law.[26]

The determination of probable cause to warrant the prosecution in court should be consigned and entrusted to the DOJ, as reviewer of the findings of the public prosecutors; to do otherwise is to usurp a duty that exclusively pertains to an executive official.[27]

As department head, the Secretary of Justice has the power to alter, modify, nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. While it is the duty of the fiscal to prosecute persons who, according to evidence received from the complainant, are shown to be guilty of a crime, the Secretary of Justice is likewise bound by his oath of office to protect innocent persons from groundless, false or serious prosecutions. He would be committing a serious dereliction of duty if he orders or sanctions the filing of charge sheets based on complaints where he is not convinced that the evidence would warrant the filing of an action in court. He has the ultimate power to decide which as between the conflicting theories of the parties should be believed.[28] The Secretary is empowered to order or perform the very acts questioned in this case.[29]

In Joaquin, Jr. v. Drilon,[30] this Court affirmed the DOJ Secretarys power of control over the authority of a state prosecutor to conduct preliminary investigations on criminal actions. Thus, we held:

In reviewing resolutions of prosecutors, the Secretary of Justice is not precluded from considering errors, although unassigned, for the purpose of determining whether there is probable cause for filing cases in court. He must make his own finding of probable cause and is not confined to the issues raised by the parties during preliminary investigation. Moreover, his findings are not subject to review unless shown to have been made with grave abuse.[31]

It is only where the decision of the Justice Secretary is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction that the Court of Appeals may take cognizance of the case in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court of Appeals decision may then be appealed to this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari.[32]

In this case, however, the Secretary of Justice committed no grave abuse of discretion. Based on the totality of the evidence presented by both parties, it is clear that there is a dearth of proof to hold petitioners for trial.

The disquisition of the Secretary of Justice deserves more credence than that of the Court of Appeals, because of the following reasons:

First, Dr. Samson Gonzaga, the private physician who signed the death certificate, and Dr. Luis Gamboa, the medico-legal officer of Bacolod City who conducted the post-mortem autopsy on Hanzs body, are not expert witnesses, nor were they offered to testify as medico-legal experts. Dr. Nicasio Botin, medico-legal officer, NBI-Iloilo City, who prepared the exhumation report is also not a forensic expert. They never opined that it was improbable for the deceased to have committed suicide. The death certificate signed by Dr. Gonzaga indicated asphyxia secondary to strangulation as the cause of death, without explaining whether it was suicide or not. It pointed to depression as the antecedent cause, implying that Hanz committed suicide. Thus, the appellate court lacks sufficient basis to conclude that it was improbable for Hanz to commit suicide based on the opinions of the three doctors.

Dr. Gamboas post-mortem findings, we note, also did not categorically state foul play as the cause of death:

x x x x

9. Q: Was the death of HANZ DIETRICH ASETRE, based on your findings, suicidal or there was (sic) foul play?

A: I cannot determine that but based on my findings the cause of death was strangulation.[33]

x x x x

Second, we note also that while there is physical evidence to buttress private respondents assertion that there was foul play, that evidence is inconclusive. The ligature that was seen on December 27 or 28, 2000 was no longer the same ligature seen on March 1, 2001. Since Hanz was obese, the entire ligature will not be very conspicuous. Further, the absence of an upward direction ligature did not necessarily mean that Hanz was strangled. If the bedsheet was tightly wound around Hanzs neck, it is possible that there will be no room for the bedsheet to form an upward direction ligature because of the fatty folds in the skin of Hanz at his neck.

Third, the finding that there was conspiracy to kill Hanz is not supported by any evidence on record and hence must be discarded.

Under Article 8[34] of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy if two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy must be proven during trial with the same quantum of evidence as the felony subject of the agreement of the parties. Conspiracy may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence consisting of acts, words, or conduct of the alleged conspirators before, during and after the commission of the felony to achieve a common design or purpose.[35]

The Bacolod City Prosecutors Office, in this case, ruled that conspiracy can be deduced from petitioners actuations before, during and after the incident, pointing to a joint purpose of killing Hanz: they were physically and actively interacting with Hanz shortly before he was found dead; they tried to cover up the crime by narrating stories which border on the impossible to the bizarre; nowhere in their counter-affidavits is it stated that Hanz had gone wild when drinking Tanduay that day; Hanz was very quiet at the childrens room and even partook lunch with his cousins; it was unusual for April to call a specific person to pacify Hanz who had allegedly gone wild earlier on the day he died, and unusual for her not to shout for help when she saw Hanz hanging; if she was shocked, her voice could have impelled other people to immediately come upstairs and respond; but it was only Ebcas who came up; Buenaventura Gamboa came up later only when told

to call for a taxi; the other employees just continued with their work as if nothing unusual was happening. The Bacolod City Prosecutors Office further ruled that April, as the widow, should have demanded full and exhaustive investigation surrounding Hanzs death to put an end to the questions and speculations on the real cause of death. Also, according to said office, her reason in opposing the exhumation, e.g., that her prior consent was not secured, is flimsy.

All circumstances considered, we find that the DOJ Secretary correctly held that the circumstantial evidence presented by private respondents to prove probable cause against petitioners, does not support the theory of conspiracy to commit murder. Such circumstantial evidence in our view, would not sufficiently warrant a conclusion that private respondents are responsible for the death of Hanz. Petitioners mere presence at the death scene, without more, does not suffice to establish probable cause against them. It is noteworthy that complainants failed to establish conclusively that April, Hanzs cousins, and his workers had an ax to grind against Hanz. The alleged quarrel of the couple the night before the incident is hearsay and could not establish enough credible motive on the part of April, contrary to the opinion of the investigating prosecutor, because the same witness who testified about the alleged fight also stated that the couple had a good relationship and that it was not unusual for the couple to have verbal altercations occasionally. Equally worth stressing is the positive proof that the accused were not the only persons present inside the couples house; and that the door of the gate of the house, including the door of the room where the victim was found hanging, were not so well secured as to exclude the possibility that the act was committed by other persons who were also then present in the house, or even by intruders. April was not attempting to reduce the number of possible witnesses as stated by the investigating prosecutor when she sent her children to Iloilo as it was the victims decision to send their children to Iloilo upon his cousins invitation. Likewise, concerning the act of burning the bedsheets, we find no grave abuse of discretion in the ruling of the DOJ that an ordinary person like April could have believed that the police investigation made at the death scene and the post-mortem examination conducted on the body of the victim were already more than enough to conclude and close the investigation. Thus, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Secretary of Justice.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 18, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 78493 is REVERSED and the Resolution dated December 17, 2002 of the Department of Justice is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-26657 September 12, 1974

VISAYAN STEVEDORE & TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, petitioner, vs.WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and JULIETA S. LABIYO respondents.

Efrain B. Trenas for petitioners.

P. C. Villavieja & D.C. Arellano for respondent Commission.

Amado B. Atol for respondent Julieta S. Labiyo.

 

MAKALINTAL, C.J.:p

Appeal from the decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission requiring petitioner Visayan Stevedore & Transportation Company to pay respondent Julieta S. Labiyo compensation benefits, burial expenses and costs in connection with the death of her husband Eduardo Labiyo.

The deceased, employed as engineer by Visayan Stevedore & Transportation Company with a monthly salary of P235.00 was part of a 3-man crew of the tugboat "M/T DILIS." His main duty consisted in his starting the engine and seeing to it that it functioned properly during the voyage, with the actual navigation of the tugboat being the responsibility of his 2 other companions, the "Patron" who controlled the wheel and a helper (timonel) who operated the rudder. According to Federico Sespene, "patron" of the tugboat when the deceased died,

... from February 10 to 17 (1964) they were given orders to tow barges to the ship and load it with cargoes. They also had to shift or bring barges to dry dock at the company's compound in Iloilo. Aside from that, their other work was to bring the barges from Jordan to Iloilo City, from the terminal to the middle of Guimaras Strait or to bring workers, food and checkers to the ship and back. As a consequence of this work, they were compelled to stay in the tugboat. On that fatal day of February 17 (1964), they had received various orders. And at about 4 a.m. of the same day, they were towing barges from the Shell wharf to Tabangao, and while they were navigating, Eduardo Labiyo visibly tired and in active duty asked for permission to take a rest. When the tugboat reached Tabangao, witness Sespene was ordered by

Orleans to start towing the barge but when Sespeno called Labiyo to start the engine, there was no answer from Labiyo. The Quartermaster was the one who responded instead and was the one ordered to wake up Labiyo, who at the time was already dead. It was about 6:30 o'clock in the morning of February 17, 1964. ...

A subsequent autopsy of the deceased's remains conducted by Dr. Raymundo L. Torres, the assistant medicolegal officer of the Iloilo City Police Department, — traced the cause of Eduardo Labiyo's death to "bangungot." The autopsy report reads:

AUTOPSY FINDINGS

HEAD AND NECK — No apparent external lesion was found.

THORAX — No apparent lesion was found.

ABDOMEN — No apparent external lesion was found. Stomach was full.

UPPER AND LOWER EXTREMITES — No apparent external lesion was found.

CAUSE OF DEATH — BANGUNGUT.

(Sgd.) — RAYMUNDO L. TORRES Asst. Med. Legal Officer

On March 16, 1964 respondent Julieta Labiyo, the widow, filed a claim for compensation with the Department of Labor, Regional Office No. VII, Iloilo City. After appropriate proceedings, the acting referee of the Workmen's Compensation Unit in Iloilo City dismissed the case upon a finding that "the cause of death of Eduardo Labiyo did not arise out of and was aggravated by the nature of his employment." Upon review this decision was set aside by the Workmen's Compensation Commission in a decision dated June 16, 1966, ordering at the same time the petitioner to pay compensation benefits, burial expenses and costs. Petitioner thereafter moved to reconsider but the Commission, in a resolution en banc dated August 30, 1966, denied the motion.

The decision appealed from states:

..., there is no question that Eduardo Labiyo, together with the Patron and Quartermaster were at work twenty-four (24) hours a day. That although they could rest and sleep for sometime still they were always ready to be called to duty anytime, for busy or not busy they remained in the tugboat, the premises of their employment subject to call anytime. That the nature of their work had prevented them from leaving the tugboat. It must also be remembered that from February 10 to 17, 1964, the three (3) complement of the `M/T DILIS' were busy at work. Evidence supports the finding that about 4 o'clock in the morning of February 17, 1964, Engineer Labiyo requested permission to sleep for a while and which request had been granted. And it appears that about 6:30 o'clock of the same morning, when he was being awakened for duty he was already found cold and lifeless in his bunk lying on his back dressed in his maong pants and white T/shirt. The theory of the Medico-Legal Officer who autopsied his body was that the cause was due to 'bangungot.' To this view we cannot subscribe. In the first place we have already learned that there is no such thing as 'bangungot;' that is, at least as of this moment, the term has not as yet been clearly explained, particularly its cause and effect. This Commission, after considering the evidence and the facts, is of the view that Eduardo Labiyo must have

died due to over fatigue or over exertion. Or that there must have been heart failure due to some factors. Our view is supported by the fact that Labiyo asked permission to sleep at an early hour in the morning of February 17. Why he asked permission to sleep must have been due to the fact that he was actually very tired and exhausted due to the continuous performance of their work from February 10 to 17. If work was not heavy that morning or previous to it, and that the complement was already resting, there was no necessity for the deceased to plead for sleep. Moreover, the allegation that his stomach was full of food cannot be given weight because at 4:00 a.m. any meal taken in the evening however late it may have been was already digested.

Petitioner now assails the Commission's finding that Eduardo Labiyo "must have died due to over fatigue or over exertion," arguing that said conclusion is not at all supported by the result of the autopsy which traced the cause of the deceased's death to "bangungot." In taking issue with the Commission's conclusion, it is pointed out, first, that the deceased could not have over exerted himself since he was not performing any physical or manual labor previous to his death; and second, that the nature of the deceased's work gave him more than ample time to rest and sleep.

We do not think that the main point pressed by petitioner, namely, that death caused by "bangungot" is not compensable, is at all decisive in the case at bar. What is not denied, and this is crucial insofar as the compensability of Eduardo Labiyo's death is concerned, is that when death came to the deceased he was in active duty as an engineer-employee of the petitioner. This being the case, the need to pinpoint the cause of his death as work — connected in Order to render it compensable assumes very little importance. "(It) is to be presumed, under section 44 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, that the employee's death, supervening at the time of his employment, either arose out of, or was at least aggravated by said employment. With this legal presumption the burden of proof shifts to the employer, and the employee is relieved of the burden to show causation. ... The mere opinion of doctors presented by petitioner as evidence cannot prevail over the presumption established by law." (Abana vs. Quisumbing, 22 SCRA 1278, 1282)

The liberal attitude displayed by this Court in considering as compensable the death by heart attack of an off-dutyemployee helping in the loading operation of a vessel (William Lines, Inc. vs. Sanopal, 42 SCRA 48), or the disappearance of an off-duty crew member of a vessel who has no choice but to be in the vessel during the voyage (Aboitiz Shipping Corporation vs. Pepito, 18 SCRA 1028), or the death by drowning of an employee whose duty was to watch over and take charge of a barge in the absence of the patron (Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc. vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 10 SCRA 207), proceeds from an awareness of the fact that when an employee undertakes to satisfy, in the course of employment, certain human wants, i.e. eating, freshening up, sleeping and the like, "and something takes place that may cause injury, harm or death to the employee or laborer, it is fair and logical that the happening be considered as one occurring in the course of employment for under the circumstances it cannot be undertaken in any other way" (Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc. vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, supra), unless it can be clearly shown that the mishap occurred because the employee acted beyond his duty or outside the course of employment, which is not so in the case at bar. For aside from the conclusion arrived at by the medicolegal officer who conducted the autopsy that "bangungot" was the cause of Eduardo Labiyo's death, * there was hardly anything else that would disconnect the deceased's death from his employment, In other words, petitioner had not proved that death was not and could not be caused or aggravated by the deceased's work as engineer who, at the time of his death, was practically on 24-hour continuous duty.

The petitioner's reliance on the case of Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc. vs. Dayao, et al., 105 Phil. 525, particularly that portion of the decision which reads:

That Antonio Dayao died of heart failure is not disputed. The point of controversy is: what caused such failure? Was it — as the petitioner Company claims — a natural disease locally called 'bangungot' where the victim dies in his sleep allegedly due to bad dreams or nightmares? If this be the case then the death is not compensable. Or, was it — as maintained by the respondents — the over-exertion or undue fatigue their deceased father suffered in helping lift, carry and transfer from one place to another the heavy household effects belonging to Mr. Karning or Cummins? If this be the cause then the death is compensable.

is misplaced to justify its claim of non-liability under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The aforequoted portion of the decision was evidently intended merely to emphasize that in said case the theory that "bangungot" could have caused the deceased's death appeared to be tenuous, there being competent contrary evidence that excessive exertion and physical strain accounted for the deceased's heart failure, In fact, in the very same case doubt was expressed as to the soundness of the theory that "bangungot" by itself can be the cause of death, thus:

Although the enlightening points ... brought out about the dreaded disease are worthy of note, still the inescapable conclusion is that 'bangungot' is still a theoretical disease — whose remote and immediate cause, pathology and cure have not as yet been accurately determined and scientifically established and confirmed. Whether it is a natural phenomenon that by itself can destroy or snuff the life out of a human being is still a question to which medical science has yet to give a more definite and conclusive answer. That 'bangungot' is still veiled in its own mystery is openly admitted by Dr. Santa Cruz who, on the witness stand, declared that 'until now, the real cause of bangungot is not known and that its pathology cannot be found in any textbook on medicine.

The decision under review is affirmed, with costs against the petitioner.

Castro, Teehankee, Esguerra and Muñoz Palma, JJ., concur.

Makasiar, J., took no part.

 

Footnotes

* Regarding the probative value of said autopsy findings to establish the cause of the deceased's death, it is noticeable that the medicolegal officer who performed the autopsy failed to testify at all despite notice.

G.R. No. L-31284 June 11, 1975

SEVEN-UP BOTTLING COMPANY, INC., ILOILO, petitioner, vs.WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and HENRIETTA VDA. DE PENAFLORIDA for herself and in behalf of her minor child WILLENETTE PENAFLORIDA, respondents.

Efrain B. Treñas & Sergio D. Mabuhay for petitioner.

Nicolas B. Centeno & Jose M. Celo for private respondents.

 

MAKALINTAL, C.J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission dated August 26, 1969 in its WCC Case No. R07-8957.

On October 2, 1962, at about 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon, a hand grenade exploded inside the office of the Seven-Up Bottling Company, Iloilo Plant, in Iloilo City, instantly killing William Peñaflorida, a stock clerk of the company, and Felixberto Herrera, the branch cashier. Another employee, Victorino Trespeces, was wounded seriously.

Within the reglementary period the Seven-Up Bottling Company filed with the Workmen's Compensation Unit in Iloilo City its Employer's Report of Accident or Sickness regarding the death of William Peñaflorida and indicating therein its intention to controvert any claim for compensation. On November 2, 1962 the deceased employee's widow, Henrietta Vda. de Peñaflorida, filed a notice and claim for compensation in her own behalf and that of her minor child. In answer, the employer disclaimed any liability.

When the case was heard the employer presented Victorino Trespeces, who testified that the late William Peñaflorida was intoxicated at the time of the fatal incident and was himself the one who exploded the hand grenade. It also submitted the police investigation report tending to corroborate the testimony of said witness. In view of the extended stay in Manila of the claimants' rebuttal

witness, Dr. Teodoro Centeno, the medico-legal officer of the Iloilo Police Department at the time of the incident, the case was submitted for decision without his testimony.

On September 11, 1964 the Acting Referee rendered a decision holding that the claim was not compensable, thus:

After carefully evaluating the evidence and facts of the instant case, it is the considered opinion of this Office that the claim is not compensable, it not having arisen out of and in the course of employment. Granting arguendo, that the deceased died during his working hours the claim arising therefrom could not be automatically construed as compensable inasmuch as it lacks the vital element of causal relationship between the death of the employee concerned and his employment. Stated otherwise, his death must be service-connected in order that the claim could well prosper.

It was unequivocably shown at the hearing that William Peñaflorida was a stock clerk at the time of the fatal incident and as such he had no right toying a hand grenade which is not used in connection with the business of respondent, a company engaged in the manufacture of soft drinks, much less threaten his fellow workers should they fail to come across with the loan requested by him. The actuations of the deceased on that eventful day of October 2, 1962 can be interpretative of either of the following: intent to inflict injury upon himself or upon others or horseplay or larking in order to display his bravado, so much so that fortified with liquor and armed with a hand grenade, he strode forth and accosted his two fellow workers (Trespeces and Herrera) for a loan of money and threatening to explode the hand grenade if refused by Herrera. Whether what transpired later on was intentional or accidental, the grenade exploded, killing its possessor and the cashier and wounding Trespeces.

On October 2, 1964 the claimants moved to reopen the case to enable Dr. Teodoro Centeno to testify but were turned down. Their subsequent petition for review was also denied for having been filed allegedly out of time.

Unable to secure a reconsideration of the last order of denial, the claimants filed a petition with the Workmen's Compensation Commission for it to require the Acting Referee to give due course to their appeal. By order of January 26, 1965 the Commission directed that the record of the case be elevated to it, but on June 9, 1967 remanded the case back to the office of origin for the reception of additional evidence. Pursuant to said order the Acting Referee received the testimony of Dr. Teodoro Centeno to the effect that he did not find any trace of liquor in the body of the late William Peñaflorida and that the hand grenade "could have been thrown from somewhere."

Finding that William Peñaflorida's death arose out of and in the course of his employment, the Workmen's Compensation Commission in its decision dated August 26, 1969 reversed that of the Acting Referee and awarded compensation to the claimants. Said the Commission:

In dismissing the case at bar, the referee had relied so much on the police report which pictured the deceased William Peñaflorida in the state of intoxication, holding a live grenade and threatening the cashier, Mr. Felixberto Herrera to let off said grenade should his (Peñaflorida's) request for a loan of P5.00 be denied. Without the least casting any aspersion on the good standing of the police department that investigated the fatal accident, we say that its report on the matter should not, hook, line and sinker, be taken into account lest, a grave injustice is (sic) committed against the dependents of the deceased Peñaflorida. For while it is stated in said report that

Peñaflorida was drunk at the time of the explosion, the medico-legal officer (Dr. Teodoro Centeno) of same department who, together with the Chief of Police and Assistant Fiscal, went immediately to the scene of the accident and autopsied the prostrate corpse of the deceased Peñaflorida, did not find traces of liquor in the latter's body. This bluntly belies Trespeces' (respondent's witness) allegation or testimony that Peñaflorida was intoxicated at the time of the fatal accident.

Whether or not the deceased Peñaflorida was drunk is a matter for the medico-legal officer to determine. For this reason, we are more inclined to give more weight to Dr. Centeno's finding than to that of the police report on the matter. And if the deceased was not in a state of inebriety, then necessarily a denial of compensation predicated on the theory of intoxication is believed not in order.

But drunkenness does not seem to be the only ground relied on by the referee in dismissing the claim. For it has been intimated all the while that the deceased being the aggressor, as he was the one holding the grenade and threatening the cashier, the claim could not proper even under the most liberal rule on "horseplay". Having lied in one, he must lied (sic) in all, falsus in unosfalsus in omnibus, runs an old Latin Maxim. Trespeces, as shown by Dr. Centeno's finding, had lied on Peñaflorida's condition at the time of the incident. If, he, without rancor and compunction, could lie on so important a point as the deceased's mental condition (drunkenness), then it is not really difficult to imagine how he could have again twisted the facts by so stating that the deceased Peñaflorida was the one holding and toying with the life hand grenade. Dr. Centeno had advanced the theory which we are inclined to adopt as our own, and with reason, that the grenade must have been thrown by someone from somewhere, judging by the positions of Peñaflorida's (right on his back on the floor) and Herrera's (stooping) bodies; and that Peñaflorida's wounds were on his abdomen and face.

Granting, arguendo, that in the face of the foregoing conflicting versions of the incident, no one could really tell, with certain degree of accuracy, who was lying or not, we still believe the scale of justice should be tipped on the side of the claimants, if only to lend substance to the words of the late President Ramon Magsaysay that "he who has less in life should have more in law". After all, the Workmen's Compensation Act is a social legislation, which, in case of doubt, should be construed in favor of the injured or his dependents. We therefore find that William Peñaflorida's death arose out of and in the course of his employment.

In seeking the reversal of the decision of the respondent Commission the petitioner contends that it is not only unsupported by substantial evidence but also entirely contrary to the evidence presented during the hearing of the case. The determinative question is whether or not Dr. Centeno's testimony may be considered "substantial evidence."

In view of the nature of the issue We reviewed the record of this case. Concerning his finding that there was no trace of liquor in the body of the late William Peñaflorida, Dr. Teodoro Centeno declared:

Q You also conducted the autopsy of the body of the deceased?

A Yes sir.

Q And you found no traces of liquor or other beverages in the body of the deceased?

A Yes sir.

Q How did you come to that conclusion that there was no trace of alcohol found in the body of the deceased?

A I had that experience, even by smell only, I can detect the alcoholic smell from the breath of the man.

Q Previous to this case, have you also investigated other dead cadaver of persons and have you experienced having also autopsied a person who have drunk alcohol before his death?

A Yes. Many because I had been the medico-legal of the Iloilo Police Department for five years and I have thousands of cases within these period and usually I encounter dead persons who are alcoholic, and I can usually detect in the breath especially if the cadaver is fresh.

(t.s.n., p. 4, hearing of April 3, 1968)

Evidently the medico-legal officer arrived at the conclusion that there was no trace of liquor in the body of the late William Peñaflorida because of the absence of alcoholic odor in his breath. There is no showing that the deceased's stomach or intestines were opened and their contents analyzed for possible alcohol contents. Since he was already dead it was impossible to detect the presence of alcohol in his breath. The means employed by the doctor in arriving at his conclusion was inherently unreliable, and his testimony does not meet the test of substantiality of the evidence, let alone its sufficiency to contradict the police investigation report and the positive testimony of Victorino Trespeces.

With respect to the finding that the hand grenade must have been thrown by someone from somewhere, "Dr. Centeno's testimony on direct examination is as follows:

Atty. Centeno:

All right. Doctor, in your testimony in the affidavit you said that it is possible that the grenade was having (sic) thrown from outside the place where the incident happened?

Atty. Mabunay:

There is no statement here that the grenade was thrown from outside.

Atty. Centeno:

It says here, from somewhere.

Witness:

I concluded in that statement because when I arrived there, the cadaver of Pe_¤_aflorida was right on his back on the floor and that of Herrera was stooping, so I concluded that the hand grenade could have been exploded from somewhere or it could have been thrown from somewhere.

(t.s.n., pp. 5-6, hearing of April 3, 1968)

On cross-examination Dr. Centeno said:

Q You stated in direct examination that it was your conclusion that the hand grenade was thrown from somewhere.

A That is a possibility.

Q And a conjecture?

A That is a possibility.

Q And it can happen.

A That is possible.

Q It is possible that it could not have been thrown from outside.

A It is possible that it was thrown from outside.

Q You have no basis for that, only it is possible.

A It is possible.

(t.s.n., pp. 17-18, hearing of April 3, 1968)

And on re-direct examination, the witness testified:

Atty. Centeno:

What is the basis of your testimony in your affidavit that it is possible that the hand grenade must have been thrown from somewhere? What is the basis of that statement?

A In this case, because it is hard and you could not always determine the position there.

(t.s.n., p. 19, hearing of April 3, 1968)

At best Dr. Centeno's testimony on this point is merely a conjecture, an inference without logical basis. Again it cannot be given any weight in the face of the testimony of Trespeces. Even in itself alone it cannot be considered substantial evidence.

WHEREFORE, the decision and the resolution of the Workmen's Compensation Commission dated August 26, 1969 and October 24, 1969, respectively, are hereby set aside and in lieu thereof judgment is rendered reinstating the decision of the Acting Referee, dated September 11, 1964, dismissing the claim for compensation.

Castro, Teehankee, Makasiar, Esguerra and Muñoz Palma, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 113116. October 30, 1996]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RONALD DE VERA, accused-appellant.

D E C I S I O N

VITUG, J.:

Ronald De Vera was charged with the crime of parricide under an information that read:

That on or about the 30th day of September, 1990, in Quezon City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with evident premeditation, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one IRMA ASPURIAS DE VERA, his wife, by then and there strangling her neck with a sash, thereby causing her instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of the heir of the said Irma Aspurias de Vera.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]

He pleaded not guilty to the accusation.

The prosecutions account of the incident may be narrated, as follows:

In the afternoon of 30 September 1990, Irma Aspurias De Vera, the young housewife of the accused, was at home with household helper Francisca Eugenio (Francing), their tenant Lorna Anteola, the accuseds sister Rowena de Vera Jesuitas and the latters husband Arnel Jesuitas. At about 3:00 p.m., Irmas husband, accused Ronald De Vera, arrived. Ronald asked Irma, who was then at the kitchen with Francing and Lorna, to join him in the bedroom

upstairs in order to discuss an important matter. Within minutes, Lorna heard a commotion in the couples bedroom. She could hear that the two were engaged in a shouting match. Then, there was complete silence. After a while, sensing that all was well again, Lorna went upstairs. To her surprise, she saw Ronald, assisted by Arnel, carrying a disabled Irma out of the room. The latter was brought to the Quezon City Medical Center where she was pronounced dead on arrival. Looking over at the couples bedroom, Lorna and Francing saw that the place was in disarray.

The Quezon City Police conducted that evening an investigation of the incident. SPO1 Jose Gil Gregorio made an ocular inspection. He reported that the built-in cabinets in the couples bedroom were open, the bedsheets were crumpled, and clothes and perfume bottles were scattered all over the place.

In the medico-legal examination conducted on 04 October 1990, by the police, the cause of death was said to be asphyxia by hanging.[2]

The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), at the request of the Commission on Human Rights,[3] undertook its own investigation of the case. Irmas body was exhumed, and a second autopsy was conducted.[4] This time, the cause of death was found to be asphyxia compatible with strangulation.[5]

The defense sought to convince the trial court that Irma took her own life. Its version of the incident follows:

Ronald and his wife had a heated argument about their failure to attend the wedding of his sister, Rowena, to Arnel Jesuitas. Irma and Rowenas relationship concededly was strained.According to Ronald, Irma became hysterical during the confrontation. Ronald tried, but failed, to calm down his wife. He later left the room, purportedly to get his toothbrush from the bathroom. When he returned, he found the door of their room already locked. He knocked at the door repeatedly but Irma would not let him in. Ronald went downstairs and, after about ten minutes, he went back but he still could not get in. Finally, he decided to enter the room through the window. He found Irma sitting with her head down and motionless. He tapped her on the shoulder and called her name but she did not respond. He felt pulse. He notice a sash around her neck which was tied to an iron bar of the cabinet. Ronald removed the sash from the cabinet and took it off from Irmas neck. He then, with the help of Rowena and Arnel, rushed Irma to the hospital where the attending physicians tried, but failed, to revive his wife.[6]

On 14 December 1993, the trial court[7] decided the case; it concluded:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Ronald De Vera guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide charged herein, defined and punished in Art. 246 of the Revised Penal Code, as principal in the commission thereof and, accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Irma Aspurias De Vera in the sum of fifty thousand pesos as death indemnity; to pay her mother, Melanda Aspurias, the sum of fifteen thousand four hundred fifteen pesos as actual damages; and, to pay the costs, without prejudice to the application of Rep. Act No. 6127 in his favor.

SO ORDERED.[8]

In his appeal to this Court, accused-appellant makes the following submissions: That

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT IRMAS DEATH WAS CAUSED BY ASPHYXIA THROUGH HOMICIDAL STRANGULATION.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RELYING ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT ITS CONCLUSION THAT RONALD CAUSED IRMAS DEATH THROUGH STRANGULATION.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED.[9]

Dr. Renato Bautista, the Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI, concluded that the cause of death was asphyxia compatible with strangulation. While Dr. Bautista conceded that an autopsy on a fresh cadaver would normally by more reliable in determining the cause of death than that conducted at a later time, much would depend, however, he said, on how the autopsy was undertaken and on the condition of the cadaver. It would appear that the post-mortem investigation on the cadaver conducted by the NBI was decidedly more extensive and exhaustive than the cursory examination previously made by the police. Dr. Bautista testified:

Q What made you conclude, Mr. witness that the cause of death was asphyxia compatible with strangulation?

A Well, sir, aside from the absence of any ligature mark on the neck, the presence of the different injuries located on the neck and the findings on the inferior third of the thyroid cartilage towards and including superior part of the first portion of the trachea revealed marked congestion, I believed that the cause of death was strangulation.

x x x x x x x x x

Q Mr. witness, based on your findings, how was the strangulation done, in your opinion, Mr. witness?

A It was done manually, sir.

Q What made you conclude Mr. witness that it was done manually?

A Well, sir, since the different contused-abrasions on the neck of the victim made me conclude said opinion because this could have been caused, these contused-abrasions could have been caused by fingernails, sir.

x x x x x x x x x

Q How about these things which you are referring to as ligature marks, is that not also a specific example of vital evidence that is usually tempered with or even destroyed by the process of embalming?

A No, your Honor.

Q Could you enlighten us why you say so?

A On the contrary, there are injuries especially these ligature marks which might appear on the cadaver which might not be seen immediately after death of the victim and in this particular case, if there were ligatures marks present on the neck, I should have readily seen it.

Q Could you kindly explain the nature of the ligature marks?

A A ligature mark, your Honor is the inflictment of the ligatures on the skin.

Q Is it usually inflicted or produced in the skin?

A Because of the tightness on the particular portion of the skin, ligature mark will leave its mark therefore, there is that situation now if it is a case of soft material, let us say, the linen in most cases that dont leave a mark but definitely on autopsy you will see that there is a vital reaction underneath the skin.

Q What is the vital reaction underneath the skin?

A There is reddening of the muscle tissue sometimes congestive, sometimes there is fractures on the trachea.

Q Could you still see the reddening or the congestion left by such even after embalming?

A Yes, sir.

Q So these marks of evidence can survive the process of embalming?

A Yes, sir.

Q And in your autopsy, none of these evidence is present in this particular victim?

A There was, sir.

Q What was that?

A There was a slight congestion, and there was a marked congestion of the lower third of the thyroid cartilage towards and including the superior part of the first portion of the trachea revealed marked congestion (cricoid cartilage).

x x x x x x x x x.

ATTY. MARTINEZ:

Q Will not the lapse of time of about one and one half month between death and autopsy erase or blurred the trace of the ligature marks?

A May I qualify my answer, in cases of victim that were not embalmed and submerged in water, yes, but in case of embalming, no.

Q So if the victim is not embalmed and not submerged in water, it will erase the marks?

A Yes, sir.

Q And you would like us to understand that the embalming would preserve ligature marks?

A Yes, sir.

Q And you are 100% certain that the cadaver had undergone embalming?

A Yes, sir, and there were no ligature marks in the neck.

COURT:

I have some clarificatory questions. (to the witness)

Q You said that there were no ligature marks in the neck, is that correct?

A Yes, sir.

x x x x x x x x x.

PROS: (to the witness)

Q Doctor, in your opinion, do the contusions and abrasions that appeared in the cadaver could have been self-inflicted?

ATTY. MARTINEZ: (to the Court)

Objection, not covered in the cross.

PROS:

I withdraw. (to the witness)

Q In your opinion, were the contusions and abrasions. . .

I reform.

In your opinion, were the contused-abrasions appearing in the cadaver and referred to by you in Exhibit F-1, self-inflicted or not?

ATTY. MARTINEZ: (to the Court)

Objection, not covered in the cross-examination.

COURT

Ruling: May answer.

A No, sir.

PROS: (to the witness)

Q What made you conclude, Doctor, that the contused-abrasions were not self-inflicted?

A It is very hard for an individual to strangulate oneself manually because in the process, there will be a diminish flow of oxygen to the brain resulting to the state of unconsciousness, whereby releasing the said strangled hold on ones neck.

Q In your autopsy and examination of the cadaver, did you notice any breakage in the trachea?

A None, sir.

Q In your opinion, what could be the evidences that would appear in the neck or in the trachea if a person died by hanging?

A Usually, there is a presence of ligature marks, the presence of the knot either on the left side or at the right side of the neck and no evidence of fracture of the hyoid bone, and in some cases, there is fracture on the lower portion of the thyroid in such a way that it was vertical as to wherever the knot is located.

Q Did you observe these marks that you stated in the cadaver of the victim?

A No, sir.[10]

Relative to the contention that the condition of the cadaver could have been materially altered in the process of embalming, Dr. Bautista explained:

COURT:

Let me go to the contused-abrasions that you referred to in your direct examination, You said that these can be caused by fingernails, could that have been caused by some other thing, that is, other than fingernails?

A There is a possibility, your Honor.

Q What is the possible competent cause of such contused-abrasions other than fingernails?

A Pieces of wood, sir.

Q So you can give an example other than fingernails?

A I would say a small piece of wood. For example pieces of woods with bristles hard enough to cause, I mean three pieces of wounds on the right and two on the left side of the neck.

Q Nothing in the process of embalming could have possibly cause that contused-abrasions?

A Nothing, a possibility exists your Honor, in the use of suturing materials.

Q And this suturing materials are normally used or part of the equipment of the embalmer?

A Yes, sir.

Q In fact the embalmer can not proceed without suturing materials?

A Yes, sir.

Q And these suturing materials which are normally used by the embalmer are usually used particularly in the neck of the cadaver?

A No, your Honor.

Q What particular part are usually dealt with suturing materials by the embalmer?

A They can make incision in the left side of the neck where they inject the formalin to the brain and also an incision on the thigh. Now if this was caused by the suturing materials, there could be no reaction.

Q So the person is dead?

A Yes, sir.

Q But in the process of embalming in order to reach the carotid, the embalmer would be using the head in doing that?

A Yes, sir.

Q And so he would be doing a manual handling of the neck?

A Yes, sir.

Q And in fact the embalmer would appear to be strangulating the cadaver so as he will reach the carotid, is that correct?

A No, sir.

Q Why not?

A To the point that the embalmer will reach on the lateral portion.

Q But the possibility is that, there is a manual handling of the neck that can cause contused-abrasions as he tried to reach the carotid?

A Yes, sir.[11]

It might be stressed that Dr. Bautista, in making his examination and in identifying the cause of death, did not fail to take into account the wounds which were apparently inflicted after Irmas death, such as the incise wound on the other right side of her neck and the wound on the wrist of the left side or the antero-lateral aspect.[12]

The court a quo has found no reason to distrust the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and the veracity of their testimonies. Just as it is often done that an appellate court would defer to the sound judgment of the trial court in assessing the credibility of witnesses, so, also, this Court in this appeal must duly and rightly accord that same respect.[13]

The Rules of Court, on circumstantial evidence, provides:

SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. -- Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[14]

In this case, the Solicitor General aptly enumerated these circumstances to be

First, the existence of a motive to kill her wife. Appellant clearly testified that his purpose for demanding from the victim to talk inside their room was due to their non-appearance on the wedding day of Rowena (appellants sister), who incidentally was not in speaking terms with the victim, and the hurt feelings generated on appellants friends and relatives on account of their non-attendance (pp. 23-25, tsn, September 10, 1993; pp. 4-5, tsn, August 12, 1993).

Second, the fact that appellant and the victim proceeded upstairs inside their bedroom and were alone at the time the incident occurred (p. 9, tsn, August 12, 1993).

Third, the violent commotion inside the bedroom of the appellant and the victim exemplified by loud thuds or kalabog and shouts of anger of the victim to the appellant which the latter even acknowledged (pp. 24-26, tsn, September 10, 1993; pp. 5 & 13, tsn, August 12, 1993).

Fourth, the duration of the violent commotion which lasted for approximately ten minutes evinces that a violent struggle took place (pp. 5, 13-14, tsn, August 12, 1993).

Fifth, the fact that the appellant was seen together with his brother-in-law carrying the victim downstairs immediately after the said commotion took place (p. 5, tsn, August 12, 1993).

Sixth, the physical condition of the room evincing that a violent struggle took place characterized by the presence of a bolo on top of the table in the room with its bedsheets and pillows disarrayed, the built-in cabinet doors open, clothes and perfume bottles scattered (p. 13, tsn, August 16, 1993; p. 6, August 12, 1993; p. 13, tsn, August 6, 1993).

Seventh, the corpus delicti indicating that the victim was strangled to death exemplified by contuse-abrasions on the victims neck and other parts of the body characterized by marked congestions on the superior part of the first portion of the trachea and the thyroid cartilage which was even detected by the NBI Medico Legal Officer Dr. Bautista at the time he conducted an autopsy on the victims body (p. 10, tsn, August 6, 1993, p. 20, tsn, June 21, 1993; Exhibits F, F-1, F-2, F-3, F-4).

Eighth, the attempt on the part of the appellant to mislead the police investigators and cover-up the corpus delicti by making it to appear in his Sinumpaang Salaysay (Exhibit N) that the victim died due to suicidal hanging (p. 8, tsn, September 10, 1993).[15]

All the above, taken collectively, sufficiently constituted an unbroken chain of events that indeed would point to accused-appellant, to the exclusion of all others, to be the author of the crime.[16]

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla (Chairman), Bellosillo, Kapunan, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

EN BANC  ANTONIO LEJANO, G.R. No. 176389

Petitioner,Present:

CORONA, C.J.,

CARPIO,

CARPIO MORALES,

VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

- versus - BRION,

PERALTA,

BERSAMIN,

DEL CASTILLO,

ABAD,

VILLARAMA, JR.,

PEREZ,

MENDOZA, and

SERENO, JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.

x --------------------------------------------- x

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 176864Appellee,

- versus -

HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB,

ANTONIO LEJANO, MICHAEL

A. GATCHALIAN, HOSPICIO

FERNANDEZ, MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ,

PETER ESTRADA and GERARDO Promulgated:

BIONG,

Appellants. January 18, 2011

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

 RESOLUTION

ABAD, J.:

 

On December 14, 2010 the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals   (CA)  and acquitted the  accused  in   this  case,  Hubert   Jeffrey  P.  Webb, Antonio  Lejano,  Michael  A.  Gatchalian,  Hospicio  Fernandez,  Miguel  Rodriguez, Peter Estrada, and Gerardo Biong of the charges against them on the ground of lack of proof of their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

 

On  December   28,   2010   complainant   Lauro  G.   Vizconde,   an   immediate relative of the victims, asked the Court to reconsider its decision, claiming that it 

denied the prosecution due process of  law; seriously misappreciated the facts; unreasonably   regarded   Alfaro   as   lacking   credibility;   issued   a   tainted   and erroneous decision; decided the case in a manner that resulted in the miscarriage of   justice;   or   committed   grave   abuse   in   its   treatment   of   the   evidence   and prosecution witnesses.[1]

 

But, as a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it places the   accused   under   double   jeopardy. The   Constitution  provides   in   Section   21, Article III, that:

 

Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. x x x

 

To reconsider a judgment of acquittal places the accused twice in jeopardy of being punished for the crime of which he has already been absolved. There is reason for this provision of the Constitution. In criminal cases, the full power of the   State   is   ranged   against   the   accused. If   there   is   no   limit   to   attempts   to prosecute  the  accused for   the same offense after  he has  been acquitted,   the infinite power and capacity of the State for a sustained and repeated litigation would eventually overwhelm the accused in terms of resources, stamina, and the will to fight.

 

As the Court said in People of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan:[2]

 

[A]t the heart of this policy is the concern that permitting the sovereign freely to subject the citizen to a second judgment for the same offense would arm the government with a potent instrument of oppression. The provision therefore guarantees that the State shall not be permitted to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense, and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that

even though innocent he may be found guilty. Societys awareness of the heavy personal strain which a criminal trial represents for the individual defendant is manifested in the willingness to limit the government to a single criminal proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in the enforcement of criminal laws.[3]

 

Of course, on occasions, a motion for reconsideration after an acquittal is possible. But   the grounds  are  exceptional  and narrow as  when the  court   that absolved the accused gravely abused its discretion, resulting in loss of jurisdiction, or when a mistrial has occurred. In any of such cases, the State may assail the decision by special civil action ofcertiorari under Rule 65.[4]

 

Here, although complainant Vizconde invoked the exceptions, he has been unable to  bring  his  pleas   for   reconsideration  under   such  exceptions. For   instance,  he avers that the Court must ensure that due process is afforded to all parties and there   is  no  grave  abuse  of  discretion   in   the   treatment  of  witnesses   and   the evidence.[5] But   he   has   not   specified   the   violations   of   due   process   or   acts constituting grave abuse of discretion that the Court supposedly committed. His claim that the highly questionable and suspicious evidence for the defense taints with   serious   doubts   the   validity   of   the   decision[6] is,   without  more,   a   mere conclusion drawn from personal perception.

 

Complainant Vizconde cites the decision in Galman v. Sandiganbayan[7] as authority that the Court can set aside the acquittal of the accused in the present case. But the government proved in Galman that the prosecution was deprived of due process since the judgment of acquittal in that case was dictated, coerced and scripted.[8] It was a sham trial. Here, however, Vizconde does not allege that the Court held a sham review of the decision of the CA. He has made out no case that the Court held a phony deliberation in this case such that the seven Justices who voted   to  acquit   the  accused,   the   four  who dissented,  and  the   four  who inhibited themselves did not really go through the process.

 

Ultimately, what the complainant actually questions is the Courts appreciation of the evidence and assessment of the prosecution witnesses credibility. He ascribes grave  error  on   the  Courts  finding   that  Alfaro  was  not  a  credible  witness  and assails the value assigned by the Court to the evidence of the defense. In other words,  private complainant wants the Court to review the evidence anew and render   another   judgment   based   on   such   a   re-evaluation. This   is   not constitutionally allowed as it is merely a repeated attempt to secure Webb, et als conviction. The   judgment  acquitting  Webb, et al is  final   and  can  no   longer  be disturbed.

 

WHEREFORE,   the   Court DENIES for   lack   of  merit   complainant   Lauro   G. Vizcondes motion for reconsideration dated December 28, 2010.

 

For essentially the same reason, the Court DENIES the motions for leave to intervene of Fr. Robert P. Reyes, Sister Mary John R. Mananzan, Bishop Evangelio L. Mercado, and Dante L.A. Jimenez, representing the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption and of former Vice President Teofisto Guingona, Jr.

 No further pleadings shall be entertained in this case.

 

SO ORDERED.

 G.R. No. 176389               December 14, 2010

ANTONIO LEJANO, Petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 176864

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs.HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB, ANTONIO LEJANO, MICHAEL A. GATCHALIAN, HOSPICIO FERNANDEZ, MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ, PETER ESTRADA and GERARDO BIONG, Appellants.

D E C I S I O N

ABAD, J.:

Brief Background

On June 30, 1991 Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela, nineteen years old, and Jennifer, seven, were brutally slain at their home in Parañaque City. Following an intense investigation, the police arrested a group of suspects, some of whom gave detailed confessions. But the trial court smelled a frame-up and eventually ordered them discharged. Thus, the identities of the real perpetrators remained a mystery especially to the public whose interests were aroused by the gripping details of what everybody referred to as the Vizconde massacre.

Four years later in 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation or NBI announced that it had solved the crime. It presented star-witness Jessica M. Alfaro, one of its informers, who claimed that she witnessed the crime. She pointed to accused Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Artemio "Dong" Ventura, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez, and Joey Filart as the culprits. She also tagged accused police officer, Gerardo Biong, as an accessory after the fact. Relying primarily on Alfaro's testimony, on August 10, 1995 the public prosecutors filed an information for rape with homicide against Webb, et al.1

The Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 274, presided over by Judge Amelita G. Tolentino, tried only seven of the accused since Artemio Ventura and Joey Filart remained at large.2 The prosecution presented Alfaro as its main witness with the others corroborating her testimony. These included the medico-legal officer who autopsied the bodies of the victims, the security guards of Pitong Daan Subdivision, the former laundrywoman of the Webb’s household, police officer Biong’s former girlfriend, and Lauro G. Vizconde, Estrellita’s husband.

For their part, some of the accused testified, denying any part in the crime and saying they were elsewhere when it took place. Webb’s alibi appeared the strongest since he claimed that he was then across the ocean in the United States of America. He presented the testimonies of witnesses as well as documentary and object evidence to prove this. In addition, the defense presented witnesses to show Alfaro's bad reputation for truth and the incredible nature of her testimony.

But impressed by Alfaro’s detailed narration of the crime and the events surrounding it, the trial court found a credible witness in her. It noted her categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, and frank testimony, undamaged by grueling cross-examinations. The trial court remained unfazed by significant discrepancies between Alfaro’s April 28 and May 22, 1995 affidavits, accepting her explanation that she at first wanted to protect her former boyfriend, accused Estrada, and a relative, accused Gatchalian; that no lawyer assisted her; that she did not trust the investigators who helped her prepare her first affidavit; and that she felt unsure if she would get the support and security she needed once she disclosed all about the Vizconde killings.

In contrast, the trial court thought little of the denials and alibis that Webb, Lejano, Rodriguez, and Gatchalian set up for their defense. They paled, according to the court, compared to Alfaro’s testimony that other witnesses and the physical evidence corroborated. Thus, on January 4, 2000, after four years of arduous hearings, the trial court rendered judgment, finding all the accused guilty as charged and imposing on Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, and Rodriguez the penalty of reclusion perpetua and on Biong, an indeterminate prison term of eleven years, four months, and one day to twelve years. The trial court also awarded damages to Lauro Vizconde.3

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, modifying the penalty imposed on Biong to six years minimum and twelve years maximum and increasing the award of damages to Lauro Vizconde.4 The appellate court did not agree that the accused were tried by publicity or that

the trial judge was biased. It found sufficient evidence of conspiracy that rendered Rodriguez, Gatchalian, Fernandez, and Estrada equally guilty with those who had a part in raping and killing Carmela and in executing her mother and sister.

On motion for reconsideration by the accused, the Court of Appeals' Special Division of five members voted three against two to deny the motion,5 hence, the present appeal.

On April 20, 2010, as a result of its initial deliberation in this case, the Court issued a Resolution granting the request of Webb to submit for DNA analysis the semen specimen taken from Carmela’s cadaver, which specimen was then believed still under the safekeeping of the NBI. The Court granted the request pursuant to section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence6 to give the accused and the prosecution access to scientific evidence that they might want to avail themselves of, leading to a correct decision in the case.

Unfortunately, on April 27, 2010 the NBI informed the Court that it no longer has custody of the specimen, the same having been turned over to the trial court. The trial record shows, however, that the specimen was not among the object evidence that the prosecution offered in evidence in the case.

This outcome prompted accused Webb to file an urgent motion to acquit on the ground that the government’s failure to preserve such vital evidence has resulted in the denial of his right to due process.

Issues Presented

Accused Webb’s motion to acquit presents a threshold issue: whether or not the Court should acquit him outright, given the government’s failure to produce the semen specimen that the NBI found on Carmela’s cadaver, thus depriving him of evidence that would prove his innocence.

In the main, all the accused raise the central issue of whether or not Webb, acting in conspiracy with Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, Ventura, and Filart, raped and killed Carmela and put to death her mother and sister. But, ultimately, the controlling issues are:

1. Whether or not Alfaro’s testimony as eyewitness, describing the crime and identifying Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and two others as the persons who committed it, is entitled to belief; and

2. Whether or not Webb presented sufficient evidence to prove his alibi and rebut Alfaro’s testimony that he led the others in committing the crime.

The issue respecting accused Biong is whether or not he acted to cover up the crime after its commission.

The Right to AcquittalDue to Loss of DNA Evidence

Webb claims, citing Brady v. Maryland,7 that he is entitled to outright acquittal on the ground of violation of his right to due process given the State’s failure to produce on order of the Court either by negligence or willful suppression the semen specimen taken from Carmela.

The medical evidence clearly established that Carmela was raped and, consistent with this, semen specimen was found in her. It is true that Alfaro identified Webb in her testimony as Carmela’s rapist and killer but serious questions had been raised about her credibility. At the very least, there exists a possibility that Alfaro had lied. On the other hand, the semen specimen taken from Carmela cannot possibly lie. It cannot be coached or allured by a promise of reward or financial support. No two persons have the same DNA fingerprint, with the exception of identical twins.8 If, on examination, the DNA of the subject specimen does not belong to Webb, then he did not rape Carmela. It is that simple. Thus, the Court would have been able to determine that Alfaro committed perjury in saying that he did.

Still, Webb is not entitled to acquittal for the failure of the State to produce the semen specimen at this late stage. For one thing, the ruling in Brady v. Maryland9 that he cites has long be overtaken by the decision in Arizona v. Youngblood,10 where the U.S. Supreme Court held that due process does not require the State to preserve the semen specimen although it might be useful to the accused unless the latter is able to show bad faith on the part of the prosecution or the police. Here, the State presented a medical expert who testified on the existence of the specimen and Webb in fact sought to have the same subjected to DNA test.

For, another, when Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule governing DNA evidence did not yet exist, the country did not yet have the technology for conducting the test, and no Philippine precedent had as yet recognized its admissibility as evidence. Consequently, the idea of keeping the specimen secure even after the trial court rejected the motion for DNA testing did not come up. Indeed, neither Webb nor his co-accused brought up the matter of preserving the specimen in the meantime.

Parenthetically, after the trial court denied Webb’s application for DNA testing, he allowed the proceeding to move on when he had on at least two occasions gone up to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court to challenge alleged arbitrary actions taken against him and the other accused.11 They raised the DNA issue before the Court of Appeals but merely as an error committed by the trial court in rendering its decision in the case. None of the accused filed a motion with the appeals court to have the DNA test done pending adjudication of their appeal. This, even when the Supreme Court had in the meantime passed the rules allowing such test. Considering the accused’s lack of interest in having such test done, the State cannot be deemed put on reasonable notice that it would be required to produce the semen specimen at some future time.

Now, to the merit of the case.

Alfaro’s Story

Based on the prosecution’s version, culled from the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, on June 29, 1991 at around 8:30 in the evening, Jessica Alfaro drove her Mitsubishi Lancer, with boyfriend Peter Estrada as passenger, to the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center parking lot to buy shabu from Artemio "Dong" Ventura. There, Ventura introduced her to his friends: Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Michael Gatchalian, and Joey Filart. Alfaro recalled frequently seeing them at a shabu house in Parañaque in January 1991, except Ventura whom she had known earlier in December 1990.

As Alfaro smoked her shabu, Webb approached and requested her to relay a message for him to a girl, whom she later identified as Carmela Vizconde. Alfaro agreed. After using up their shabu, the group drove to Carmela’s house at 80 Vinzons Street, Pitong Daan Subdivision, BF Homes, Parañaque City. Riding in her car, Alfaro and Estrada trailed Filart and Rodriguez who rode a Mazda pick-up and Webb, Lejano, Ventura, Fernandez, and Gatchalian who were on a Nissan Patrol car.

On reaching their destination, Alfaro parked her car on Vinzons Street, alighted, and approached Carmela’s house. Alfaro pressed the buzzer and a woman came out. Alfaro queried her about Carmela. Alfaro had met Carmela twice before in January 1991. When Carmela came out, Alfaro gave her Webb’s message that he was just around. Carmela replied, however, that she could not go out yet since she had just arrived home. She told Alfaro to return after twenty minutes. Alfaro relayed this to Webb who then told the group to drive back to the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center.

The group had another shabu session at the parking lot. After sometime, they drove back but only Alfaro proceeded to Vinzons Street where Carmela lived. The Nissan Patrol and the Mazda pick-up, with their passengers, parked somewhere along Aguirre Avenue. Carmela was at their garden. She approached Alfaro on seeing her and told the latter that she (Carmela) had to leave the house for a while. Carmela requested Alfaro to return before midnight and she would leave the pedestrian gate, the iron grills that led to the kitchen, and the kitchen door unlocked. Carmela also told Alfaro to blink her car’s headlights twice when she approached the pedestrian gate so Carmela would know that she had arrived.

Alfaro returned to her car but waited for Carmela to drive out of the house in her own car. Alfaro trailed Carmela up to Aguirre Avenue where she dropped off a man whom Alfaro believed was Carmela’s boyfriend. Alfaro looked for her group, found them, and relayed Carmela’s instructions to Webb. They then all went back to the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center. At the parking lot, Alfaro told the group about her talk with Carmela. When she told Webb of Carmela’s male companion, Webb’s mood changed for the rest of the evening ("bad trip").

Webb gave out free cocaine. They all used it and some shabu, too. After about 40 to 45 minutes, Webb decided that it was time for them to leave. He said, "Pipilahan natin siya [Carmela] at ako ang mauuna." Lejano said, "Ako ang susunod" and the others responded "Okay, okay." They all left the parking lot in a convoy of three vehicles and drove into Pitong Daan Subdivision for the third time. They arrived at Carmela’s house shortly before midnight.

Alfaro parked her car between Vizconde’s house and the next. While waiting for the others to alight from their cars, Fernandez approached Alfaro with a suggestion that they blow up the transformer near the Vizconde’s residence to cause a brownout ("Pasabugin kaya natin ang transformer na ito"). But Alfaro shrugged off the idea, telling Fernandez, "Malakas lang ang tama mo." When Webb, Lejano, and Ventura were already before the house, Webb told the others again that they would line up for Carmela but he would be the first. The others replied, "O sige, dito lang kami, magbabantay lang kami."

Alfaro was the first to pass through the pedestrian gate that had been left open. Webb, Lejano, and Ventura followed her. On entering the garage, Ventura using a chair mounted the hood of the Vizcondes’ Nissan Sentra and loosened the electric bulb over it ("para daw walang ilaw"). The small group went through the open iron grill gate and passed the dirty kitchen. Carmela opened the aluminum screen door of the kitchen for them. She and Webb looked each other in the eyes for a moment and, together, headed for the dining area.

As she lost sight of Carmela and Webb, Alfaro decided to go out. Lejano asked her where she was going and she replied that she was going out to smoke. As she eased her way out through the kitchen door, she saw Ventura pulling out a kitchen drawer. Alfaro smoked a cigarette at the garden. After about twenty minutes, she was surprised to hear a woman’s voice ask, "Sino yan?" Alfaro immediately walked out of the garden to her car. She found her other companions milling around it. Estrada who sat in the car asked her, "Okay ba?"

After sitting in the car for about ten minutes, Alfaro returned to the Vizconde house, using the same route. The interior of the house was dark but some light filtered in from outside. In the kitchen, Alfaro saw Ventura searching a lady’s bag that lay on the dining table. When she asked him what he was looking for, he said: "Ikaw na nga dito, maghanap ka ng susi." She asked him what key he wanted and he replied: "Basta maghanap ka ng susi ng main door pati na rin ng susi ng kotse." When she found a bunch of keys in the bag, she tried them on the main door but none fitted the lock. She also did not find the car key.

Unable to open the main door, Alfaro returned to the kitchen. While she was at a spot leading to the dining area, she heard a static noise (like a television that remained on after the station had signed off). Out of curiosity, she approached the master’s bedroom from where the noise came, opened the door a little, and peeked inside. The unusual sound grew even louder. As she walked in, she saw Webb on top of Carmela while she lay with her back on the floor. Two bloodied bodies lay on the bed. Lejano was at the foot of the bed about to wear his jacket. Carmela was gagged, moaning, and in tears while Webb raped her, his bare buttocks exposed.

Webb gave Alfaro a meaningful look and she immediately left the room. She met Ventura at the dining area. He told her, "Prepare an escape. Aalis na tayo." Shocked with what she saw, Alfaro rushed out of the house to the others who were either sitting in her car or milling on the sidewalk. She entered her car and turned on the engine but she did not know where to go. Webb, Lejano, and Ventura came out of the house just then. Webb suddenly picked up a stone and threw it at the main door, breaking its glass frame.

As the three men approached the pedestrian gate, Webb told Ventura that he forgot his jacket in the house. But Ventura told him that they could not get in anymore as the iron grills had already locked. They all rode in their cars and drove away until they reached Aguirre Avenue. As they got near an old hotel at the Tropical Palace area, Alfaro noticed the Nissan Patrol slow down. Someone threw something out of the car into the cogonal area.

The convoy of cars went to a large house with high walls, concrete fence, steel gate, and a long driveway at BF Executive Village. They entered the compound and gathered at the lawn where the "blaming session" took place. It was here that Alfaro and those who remained outside the Vizconde house learned of what happened. The first to be killed was Carmela’s mother, then Jennifer, and finally, Carmella. Ventura blamed Webb, telling him, "Bakit naman pati yung bata?" Webb replied that the girl woke up and on seeing him molesting Carmela, she jumped on him, bit his shoulders, and pulled his hair. Webb got mad, grabbed the girl, pushed her to the wall, and repeatedly stabbed her. Lejano excused himself at this point to use the telephone in the house. Meanwhile, Webb called up someone on his cellular phone.

At around 2:00 in the morning, accused Gerardo Biong arrived. Webb ordered him to go and clean up the Vizconde house and said to him, "Pera lang ang katapat nyan." Biong answered, "Okay lang." Webb spoke to his companions and told them, "We don’t know each other. We haven’t seen each other…baka maulit yan." Alfaro and Estrada left and they drove to her father’s house.12

1. The quality of the witness

Was Alfaro an ordinary subdivision girl who showed up at the NBI after four years, bothered by her conscience or egged on by relatives or friends to come forward and do what was right? No. She was, at the time she revealed her story, working for the NBI as an "asset," a stool pigeon, one who earned her living by fraternizing with criminals so she could squeal on them to her NBI handlers. She had to live a life of lies to get rewards that would pay for her subsistence and vices.

According to Atty. Artemio Sacaguing, former head of the NBI Anti-Kidnapping, Hijacking, and Armed Robbery Task Force (AKHAR) Section, Alfaro had been hanging around at the NBI since November or December 1994 as an "asset." She supplied her handlers with information against drug pushers and other criminal elements. Some of this information led to the capture of notorious drug pushers like Christopher Cruz Santos and Orlando Bacquir. Alfaro’s tip led to the arrest of the leader of the "Martilyo gang" that killed a police officer. Because of her talent, the task force gave her "very special treatment" and she became its "darling," allowed the privilege of spending nights in one of the rooms at the NBI offices.

When Alfaro seemed unproductive for sometime, however, they teased her about it and she was piqued. One day, she unexpectedly told Sacaguing that she knew someone who had the real story behind the Vizconde massacre. Sacaguing showed interest. Alfaro promised to bring that someone to the NBI to tell his story. When this did not happen and Sacaguing continued to press her, she told him that she might as well assume the role of her informant. Sacaguing testified thus:

ATTY. ONGKIKO:

Q. Atty. Sacaguing, how did Jessica Alfaro become a witness in the Vizconde murder case? Will you tell the Honorable Court?

x x x x

A. She told me. Your Honor, that she knew somebody who related to her the circumstances, I mean, the details of the massacre of the Vizconde family. That’s what she told me, Your Honor.

ATTY. ONGKIKO:

Q. And what did you say?

x x x x

A. I was quite interested and I tried to persuade her to introduce to me that man and she promised that in due time, she will bring to me the man, and together with her, we will try to convince him to act as a state witness and help us in the solution of the case.

x x x x

Q. Atty. Sacaguing, were you able to interview this alleged witness?

WITNESS SACAGUING:

A. No, sir.

ATTY. ONGKIKO:

Q. Why not?

WITNESS SACAGUING:

A. Because Jessica Alfaro was never able to comply with her promise to bring the man to me. She told me later that she could not and the man does not like to testify.

ATTY. ONGKIKO:

Q. All right, and what happened after that?

WITNESS SACAGUING:

A. She told me, "easy lang kayo, Sir," if I may quote, "easy lang Sir, huwag kayong…"

COURT:

How was that?

WITNESS SACAGUING:

A. "Easy lang, Sir. Sir, relax lang, Sir, papapelan ko, papapelan ko na lang ‘yan."

x x x x

ATTY. ONGKIKO:

Q. All right, and what was your reaction when Ms. Alfaro stated that "papapelan ko na lang yan?"

WITNESS SACAGUING:

A. I said, "hindi puwede yan, kasi hindi ka naman eye witness."

ATTY. ONGKIKO:

Q. And what was the reply of Ms. Alfaro?

WITNESS SACAGUING:

A. Hindi siya nakakibo, until she went away.

(TSN, May 28, 1996, pp. 49-50, 58, 77-79)

Quite significantly, Alfaro never refuted Sacaguing’s above testimony.

2. The suspicious details

But was it possible for Alfaro to lie with such abundant details some of which even tallied with the physical evidence at the scene of the crime? No doubt, yes.

Firstly, the Vizconde massacre had been reported in the media with dizzying details. Everybody was talking about what the police found at the crime scene and there were lots of speculations about them.

Secondly, the police had arrested some "akyat-bahay" group in Parañaque and charged them with the crime. The police prepared the confessions of the men they apprehended and filled these up with details that the evidence of the crime scene provided. Alfaro’s NBI handlers who were doing their own investigation knew of these details as well. Since Alfaro hanged out at the NBI offices and practically lived there, it was not too difficult for her to hear of these evidentiary details and gain access to the documents.

Not surprisingly, the confessions of some members of the Barroso "akyat bahay" gang, condemned by the Makati RTC as fabricated by the police to pin the crime on them, shows how crime investigators could make a confession ring true by matching some of its details with the physical evidence at the crime scene. Consider the following:

a. The Barroso gang members said that they got into Carmela’s house by breaking the glass panel of the front door using a stone wrapped in cloth to deaden the noise. Alfaro could not use this line since the core of her story was that Webb was Carmela’s boyfriend. Webb had no reason to smash her front door to get to see her.

Consequently, to explain the smashed door, Alfaro had to settle for claiming that, on the way out of the house, Webb picked up some stone and, out of the blue, hurled it at the glass-paneled front door of the Vizconde residence. His action really made no sense. From Alfaro’s narration, Webb appeared rational in his decisions. It was past midnight, the house was dark, and they wanted to get away quickly to avoid detection. Hurling a stone at that glass door and causing a tremendous noise was bizarre, like inviting the neighbors to come.

b. The crime scene showed that the house had been ransacked. The rejected confessions of the Barroso "akyat-bahay" gang members said that they tried to rob the house. To explain this physical evidence, Alfaro claimed that at one point Ventura was pulling a kitchen drawer, and at another point, going through a handbag on the dining table. He said he was looking for the front-door key and the car key.

Again, this portion of Alfaro’s story appears tortured to accommodate the physical evidence of the ransacked house. She never mentioned Ventura having taken some valuables with him when they left Carmela’s house. And why would Ventura rummage a bag on the table for the front-door key, spilling the contents, when they had already gotten into the house. It is a story made to fit in with the crime scene although robbery was supposedly not the reason Webb and his companions entered that house.

c. It is the same thing with the garage light. The police investigators found that the bulb had been loosened to turn off the light. The confessions of the Barroso gang claimed that one of them climbed the parked car’s hood to reach up and darken that light. This made sense since they were going to rob the place and they needed time to work in the dark trying to open the front door. Some passersby might look in and see what they were doing.

Alfaro had to adjust her testimony to take into account that darkened garage light. So she claimed that Ventura climbed the car’s hood, using a chair, to turn the light off. But, unlike the Barroso "akyat-bahay" gang, Webb and his friends did not have anything to do in a darkened garage. They supposedly knew in advance that Carmela left the doors to the kitchen open for them. It did not make sense for Ventura to risk standing on the car’s hood and be seen in such an awkward position instead of going straight into the house.

And, thirdly, Alfaro was the NBI’s star witness, their badge of excellent investigative work. lavvphil After claiming that they had solved the crime of the decade, the NBI people had a stake in making her

sound credible and, obviously, they gave her all the preparations she needed for the job of becoming a fairly good substitute witness. She was their "darling" of an asset. And this is not pure speculation. As pointed out above, Sacaguing of the NBI, a lawyer and a ranking official, confirmed this to be a cold fact. Why the trial court and the Court of Appeals failed to see this is mystifying.

At any rate, did Alfaro at least have a fine memory for faces that had a strong effect on her, given the circumstances? Not likely. She named Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez as one of the culprits in the Vizconde killings. But when the NBI found a certain Michael Rodriguez, a drug dependent from the Bicutan Rehabilitation Center, initially suspected to be Alfaro’s Miguel Rodriguez and showed him to Alfaro at the NBI office, she ran berserk, slapping and kicking Michael, exclaiming: "How can I forget your face. We just saw each other in a disco one month ago and you told me then that you will kill me." As it turned out, he was not Miguel Rodriguez, the accused in this case.13

Two possibilities exist: Michael was really the one Alfaro wanted to implicate to settle some score with him but it was too late to change the name she already gave or she had myopic vision, tagging the wrong people for what they did not do.

3. The quality of the testimony

There is another thing about a lying witness: her story lacks sense or suffers from inherent inconsistencies. An understanding of the nature of things and the common behavior of people will help expose a lie. And it has an abundant presence in this case.

One. In her desire to implicate Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and Filart, who were supposed to be Webb’s co-principals in the crime, Alfaro made it a point to testify that Webb proposed twice to his friends the gang-rape of Carmela who had hurt him. And twice, they (including, if one believes Alfaro, her own boyfriend Estrada) agreed in a chorus to his proposal. But when they got to Carmela’s house, only Webb, Lejano, Ventura, and Alfaro entered the house.

Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, and Rodriguez supposedly stayed around Alfaro’s car, which was parked on the street between Carmela’s house and the next. Some of these men sat on top of the car’s lid while others milled on the sidewalk, visible under the street light to anyone who cared to watch them, particularly to the people who were having a drinking party in a nearby house. Obviously, the behavior of Webb’s companions out on the street did not figure in a planned gang-rape of Carmela.

Two. Ventura, Alfaro’s dope supplier, introduced her for the first time in her life to Webb and his friends in a parking lot by a mall. So why would she agree to act as Webb’s messenger, using her gas, to bring his message to Carmela at her home. More inexplicably, what motivated Alfaro to stick it out the whole night with Webb and his friends?

They were practically strangers to her and her boyfriend Estrada. When it came to a point that Webb decided with his friends to gang-rape Carmela, clearly, there was nothing in it for Alfaro. Yet, she stuck it out with them, as a police asset would, hanging in there until she had a crime to report, only she was not yet an "asset" then. If, on the other hand, Alfaro had been too soaked in drugs to think clearly and just followed along where the group took her, how could she remember so much details that only a drug-free mind can?

Three. When Alfaro went to see Carmela at her house for the second time, Carmella told her that she still had to go out and that Webb and his friends should come back around midnight. Alfaro returned to her car and waited for Carmela to drive out in her own car. And she trailed her up to Aguirre Avenue where she supposedly dropped off a man whom she thought was Carmela’s

boyfriend. Alfaro’s trailing Carmela to spy on her unfaithfulness to Webb did not make sense since she was on limited errand. But, as a critical witness, Alfaro had to provide a reason for Webb to freak out and decide to come with his friends and harm Carmela.

Four. According to Alfaro, when they returned to Carmela’s house the third time around midnight, she led Webb, Lejano, and Ventura through the pedestrian gate that Carmela had left open. Now, this is weird. Webb was the gang leader who decided what they were going to do. He decided and his friends agreed with him to go to Carmela’s house and gang-rape her. Why would Alfaro, a woman, a stranger to Webb before that night, and obviously with no role to play in the gang-rape of Carmela, lead him and the others into her house? It made no sense. It would only make sense if Alfaro wanted to feign being a witness to something she did not see.

Five. Alfaro went out of the house to smoke at the garden. After about twenty minutes, a woman exclaimed, "Sino yan?" On hearing this, Alfaro immediately walked out of the garden and went to her car. Apparently, she did this because she knew they came on a sly. Someone other than Carmela became conscious of the presence of Webb and others in the house. Alfaro walked away because, obviously, she did not want to get involved in a potential confrontation. This was supposedly her frame of mind: fear of getting involved in what was not her business.

But if that were the case, how could she testify based on personal knowledge of what went on in the house? Alfaro had to change that frame of mind to one of boldness and reckless curiosity. So that is what she next claimed. She went back into the house to watch as Webb raped Carmela on the floor of the master’s bedroom. He had apparently stabbed to death Carmela’s mom and her young sister whose bloodied bodies were sprawled on the bed. Now, Alfaro testified that she got scared (another shift to fear) for she hurriedly got out of the house after Webb supposedly gave her a meaningful look.

Alfaro quickly went to her car, not minding Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and Filart who sat on the car or milled on the sidewalk. She did not speak to them, even to Estrada, her boyfriend. She entered her car and turned on the engine but she testified that she did not know where to go. This woman who a few minutes back led Webb, Lejano, and Ventura into the house, knowing that they were decided to rape and harm Carmela, was suddenly too shocked to know where to go! This emotional pendulum swing indicates a witness who was confused with her own lies.

4. The supposed corroborations

Intending to provide corroboration to Alfaro’s testimony, the prosecution presented six additional witnesses:

Dr. Prospero A. Cabanayan, the NBI Medico-Legal Officer who autopsied the bodies of the victims, testified on the stab wounds they sustained14 and the presence of semen in Carmela’s genitalia,15 indicating that she had been raped.

Normal E. White, Jr., was the security guard on duty at Pitong Daan Subdivision from 7 p.m. of June 29 to 7 a.m. of June 30, 1991. He got a report on the morning of June 30 that something untoward happened at the Vizconde residence. He went there and saw the dead bodies in the master’s bedroom, the bag on the dining table, as well as the loud noise emanating from a television set.16

White claimed that he noticed Gatchalian and his companions, none of whom he could identify, go in and out of Pitong Daan Subdivision. He also saw them along Vinzons Street. Later, they entered

Pitong Daan Subdivision in a three-car convoy. White could not, however, describe the kind of vehicles they used or recall the time when he saw the group in those two instances. And he did not notice anything suspicious about their coming and going.

But White’s testimony cannot be relied on. His initial claim turned out to be inaccurate. He actually saw Gatchalian and his group enter the Pitong Daan Subdivision only once. They were not going in and out. Furthermore, Alfaro testified that when the convoy of cars went back the second time in the direction of Carmela’s house, she alone entered the subdivision and passed the guardhouse without stopping. Yet, White who supposedly manned that guardhouse did not notice her.

Surprisingly, White failed to note Biong, a police officer, entering or exiting the subdivision on the early morning of June 30 when he supposedly "cleaned up" Vizconde residence on Webb’s orders. What is more, White did not notice Carmela arrive with her mom before Alfaro’s first visit that night. Carmela supposedly left with a male companion in her car at around 10:30 p.m. but White did not notice it. He also did not notice Carmela reenter the subdivision. White actually discredited Alfaro’s testimony about the movements of the persons involved.

Further, while Alfaro testified that it was the Mazda pick-up driven by Filart that led the three-vehicle convoy,17White claimed it was the Nissan Patrol with Gatchalian on it that led the convoy since he would not have let the convoy in without ascertaining that Gatchalian, a resident, was in it. Security guard White did not, therefore, provide corroboration to Alfaro’s testimony. 1avvphi1

Justo Cabanacan, the security supervisor at Pitong Daan Subdivision testified that he saw Webb around the last week of May or the first week of June 1991 to prove his presence in the Philippines when he claimed to be in the United States. He was manning the guard house at the entrance of the subdivision of Pitong Daan when he flagged down a car driven by Webb. Webb said that he would see Lilet Sy. Cabanacan asked him for an ID but he pointed to his United BF Homes sticker and said that he resided there. Cabanacan replied, however, that Pitong Daan had a local sticker.

Cabanacan testified that, at this point, Webb introduced himself as the son of Congressman Webb. Still, the supervisor insisted on seeing his ID. Webb grudgingly gave it and after seeing the picture and the name on it, Cabanacan returned the same and allowed Webb to pass without being logged in as their Standard Operating Procedure required.18

But Cabanacan's testimony could not be relied on. Although it was not common for a security guard to challenge a Congressman’s son with such vehemence, Cabanacan did not log the incident on the guardhouse book. Nor did he, contrary to prescribed procedure, record the visitor’s entry into the subdivision. It did not make sense that Cabanacan was strict in the matter of seeing Webb’s ID but not in recording the visit.

Mila Gaviola used to work as laundry woman for the Webbs at their house at BF Homes Executive Village. She testified that she saw Webb at his parents’ house on the morning of June 30, 1991 when she got the dirty clothes from the room that he and two brothers occupied at about 4.a.m. She saw him again pacing the floor at 9 a.m. At about 1 p.m., Webb left the house in t-shirt and shorts, passing through a secret door near the maid’s quarters on the way out. Finally, she saw Webb at 4 p.m. of the same day.19

On cross-examination, however, Gaviola could not say what distinguished June 30, 1991 from the other days she was on service at the Webb household as to enable her to distinctly remember, four years later, what one of the Webb boys did and at what time. She could not remember any of the details that happened in the household on the other days. She proved to have a selective photographic memory and this only damaged her testimony.

Gaviola tried to corroborate Alfaro’'s testimony by claiming that on June 30, 1991 she noticed bloodstains on Webb's t-shirt.20 She did not call the attention of anybody in the household about it when it would have been a point of concern that Webb may have been hurt, hence the blood.

Besides, Victoria Ventoso, the Webbs' housemaid from March 1989 to May 1992, and Sgt. Miguel Muñoz, the Webbs' security aide in 1991, testified that Gaviola worked for the Webbs only from January 1991 to April 1991. Ventoso further testified that it was not Gaviola's duty to collect the clothes from the 2nd floor bedrooms, this being the work of the housemaid charged with cleaning the rooms.

What is more, it was most unlikely for a laundrywoman who had been there for only four months to collect, as she claimed, the laundry from the rooms of her employers and their grown up children at four in the morning while they were asleep.

And it did not make sense, if Alfaro’s testimony were to be believed that Webb, who was so careful and clever that he called Biong to go to the Vizconde residence at 2 a.m. to clean up the evidence against him and his group, would bring his bloodied shirt home and put it in the hamper for laundrywoman Gaviola to collect and wash at 4 a.m. as was her supposed habit.

Lolita De Birrer was accused Biong’s girlfriend around the time the Vizconde massacre took place. Birrer testified that she was with Biong playing mahjong from the evening of June 29, 1991 to the early morning of June 30, when Biong got a call at around 2 a.m. This prompted him, according to De Birrer, to leave and go to BF. Someone sitting at the backseat of a taxi picked him up. When Biong returned at 7 a.m. he washed off what looked like dried blood from his fingernails. And he threw away a foul-smelling handkerchief. She also saw Biong take out a knife with aluminum cover from his drawer and hid it in his steel cabinet.21

The security guard at Pitong Daan did not notice any police investigator flashing a badge to get into the village although Biong supposedly came in at the unholy hour of two in the morning. His departure before 7 a.m. also remained unnoticed by the subdivision guards. Besides, if he had cleaned up the crime scene shortly after midnight, what was the point of his returning there on the following morning to dispose of some of the evidence in the presence of other police investigators and on-lookers? In fact, why would he steal valuable items from the Vizconde residence on his return there hours later if he had the opportunity to do it earlier?

At most, Birrer’s testimony only established Biong’s theft of certain items from the Vizconde residence and gross neglect for failing to maintain the sanctity of the crime scene by moving around and altering the effects of the crime. Birrer’s testimony failed to connect Biong's acts to Webb and the other accused.

Lauro Vizconde testified about how deeply he was affected by the loss of her wife and two daughters. Carmella spoke to him of a rejected suitor she called "Bagyo," because he was a Parañaque politician’s son. Unfortunately, Lauro did not appear curious enough to insist on finding out who the rejected fellow was. Besides, his testimony contradicts that of Alfaro who testified that Carmela and Webb had an on-going relation. Indeed, if Alfaro were to be believed, Carmela wanted Webb to come to her house around midnight. She even left the kitchen door open so he could enter the house.

5. The missing corroboration

There is something truly remarkable about this case: the prosecution’s core theory that Carmela and Webb had been sweethearts, that she had been unfaithful to him, and that it was for this reason that Webb brought his friends to her house to gang-rape her is totally uncorroborated!

For instance, normally, if Webb, a Congressman’s son, courted the young Carmela, that would be news among her circle of friends if not around town. But, here, none of her friends or even those who knew either of them came forward to affirm this. And if Webb hanged around with her, trying to win her favors, he would surely be seen with her. And this would all the more be so if they had become sweethearts, a relation that Alfaro tried to project with her testimony.

But, except for Alfaro, the NBI asset, no one among Carmela’s friends or her friends’ friends would testify ever hearing of such relationship or ever seeing them together in some popular hangouts in Parañaque or Makati. Alfaro’s claim of a five-hour drama is like an alien page, rudely and unconnectedly inserted into Webb and Carmela’s life stories or like a piece of jigsaw puzzle trimmed to fit into the shape on the board but does not belong because it clashes with the surrounding pieces. It has neither antecedent nor concomitant support in the verifiable facts of their personal histories. It is quite unreal.

What is more, Alfaro testified that she saw Carmela drive out of her house with a male passenger, Mr. X, whom Alfaro thought the way it looked was also Carmela’s lover. This was the all-important reason Webb supposedly had for wanting to harm her. Again, none of Carmela’s relatives, friends, or people who knew her ever testified about the existence of Mr.X in her life. Nobody has come forward to testify having ever seen him with Carmela. And despite the gruesome news about her death and how Mr. X had played a role in it, he never presented himself like anyone who had lost a special friend normally would. Obviously, Mr. X did not exist, a mere ghost of the imagination of Alfaro, the woman who made a living informing on criminals.

Webb’s U.S. Alibi

Among the accused, Webb presented the strongest alibi.

a. The travel preparations

Webb claims that in 1991 his parents, Senator Freddie Webb and his wife, Elizabeth, sent their son to the United States (U.S.) to learn the value of independence, hard work, and money.22 Gloria Webb, his aunt, accompanied him. Rajah Tours booked their flight to San Francisco via United Airlines. Josefina Nolasco of Rajah Tours confirmed that Webb and his aunt used their plane tickets.

Webb told his friends, including his neighbor, Jennifer Claire Cabrera, and his basketball buddy, Joselito Orendain Escobar, of his travel plans. He even invited them to his despedida party on March 8, 1991 at Faces Disco along Makati Ave.23 On March 8,1991, the eve of his departure, he took girlfriend Milagros Castillo to a dinner at Bunchums at the Makati Cinema Square. His basketball buddy Rafael Jose with Tina Calma, a blind date arranged by Webb, joined them. They afterwards went to Faces Disco for Webb's despedida party. Among those present were his friends Paulo Santos and Jay Ortega.24

b. The two immigration checks

The following day, March 9, 1991, Webb left for San Francisco, California, with his Aunt Gloria on board United Airlines Flight 808.25 Before boarding his plane, Webb passed through the Philippine Immigration booth at the airport to have his passport cleared and stamped. Immigration Officer,

Ferdinand Sampol checked Webb’s visa, stamped, and initialed his passport, and let him pass through.26 He was listed on the United Airlines Flight’s Passenger Manifest.27

On arrival at San Francisco, Webb went through the U.S. Immigration where his entry into that country was recorded. Thus, the U.S. Immigration Naturalization Service, checking with its Non-immigrant Information System, confirmed Webb's entry into the U.S. on March 9, 1991. Webb presented at the trial the INS Certification issued by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service,28 the computer-generated print-out of the US-INS indicating Webb's entry on March 9, 1991,29 and the US-INS Certification dated August 31, 1995, authenticated by the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, correcting an earlier August 10, 1995 Certification.30

c. Details of U.S. sojourn

In San Francisco, Webb and his aunt Gloria were met by the latter’s daughter, Maria Teresa Keame, who brought them to Gloria’s house in Daly City, California. During his stay with his aunt, Webb met Christopher Paul Legaspi Esguerra, Gloria’s grandson. In April 1991, Webb, Christopher, and a certain Daphne Domingo watched the concert of Deelite Band in San Francisco.31 In the same month, Dorothy Wheelock and her family invited Webb to Lake Tahoe to return the Webbs’ hospitality when she was in the Philippines.32

In May 1991, on invitation of another aunt, Susan Brottman, Webb moved to Anaheim Hills, California.33 During his stay there, he occupied himself with playing basketball once or twice a week with Steven Keeler34 and working at his cousin-in-law’s pest control company.35 Webb presented the company’s logbook showing the tasks he performed,36 his paycheck,37 his ID, and other employment papers. On June 14, 1991 he applied for a driver's license38 and wrote three letters to his friend Jennifer Cabrera.39

On June 28, 1991, Webb’s parents visited him at Anaheim and stayed with the Brottmans. On the same day, his father introduced Honesto Aragon to his son when he came to visit.40 On the following day, June 29, Webb, in the company of his father and Aragon went to Riverside, California, to look for a car. They bought an MR2 Toyota car.41 Later that day, a visitor at the Brottman’s, Louis Whittacker, saw Webb looking at the plates of his new car.42 To prove the purchase, Webb presented the Public Records of California Department of Motor Vehicle43 and a car plate "LEW WEBB."44 In using the car in the U.S., Webb even received traffic citations.45

On June 30, 1991 Webb, again accompanied by his father and Aragon,46 bought a bicycle at Orange Cycle Center.47 The Center issued Webb a receipt dated June 30, 1991.48 On July 4, 1991, Independence Day, the Webbs, the Brottmans, and the Vaca family had a lakeside picnic.49

Webb stayed with the Brottmans until mid July and rented a place for less than a month. On August 4, 1991 he left for Longwood, Florida, to stay with the spouses Jack and Sonja Rodriguez.50 There, he met Armando Rodriguez with whom he spent time, playing basketball on weekends, watching movies, and playing billiards.51 In November 1991, Webb met performing artist Gary Valenciano, a friend of Jack Rodriguez, who was invited for a dinner at the Rodriguez’s house.52 He left the Rodriguez’s home in August 1992, returned to Anaheim and stayed with his aunt Imelda Pagaspas. He stayed there until he left for the Philippines on October 26, 1992.

d. The second immigration checks

As with his trip going to the U.S., Webb also went through both the U.S. and Philippine immigrations on his return trip. Thus, his departure from the U.S. was confirmed by the same certifications that confirmed his entry.53 Furthermore, a Diplomatic Note of the U.S. Department of State with enclosed

letter from Acting Director Debora A. Farmer of the Records Operations, Office of Records of the US-INS stated that the Certification dated August 31, 1995 is a true and accurate statement. And when he boarded his plane, the Passenger Manifest of Philippine Airlines Flight No. 103,54 certified by Agnes Tabuena55 confirmed his return trip.

When he arrived in Manila, Webb again went through the Philippine Immigration. In fact, the arrival stamp and initial on his passport indicated his return to Manila on October 27, 1992. This was authenticated by Carmelita Alipio, the immigration officer who processed Webb’s reentry.56 Upon his return, in October 1992, Paolo Santos, Joselito Erondain Escobar, and Rafael Jose once again saw Webb playing basketball at the BF's Phase III basketball court.

e. Alibi versus positive identification

The trial court and the Court of Appeals are one in rejecting as weak Webb’s alibi. Their reason is uniform: Webb’s alibi cannot stand against Alfaro’s positive identification of him as the rapist and killer of Carmela and, apparently, the killer as well of her mother and younger sister. Because of this, to the lower courts, Webb’s denial and alibi were fabricated.

But not all denials and alibis should be regarded as fabricated. Indeed, if the accused is truly innocent, he can have no other defense but denial and alibi. So how can such accused penetrate a mind that has been made cynical by the rule drilled into his head that a defense of alibi is a hangman’s noose in the face of a witness positively swearing, "I saw him do it."? Most judges believe that such assertion automatically dooms an alibi which is so easy to fabricate. This quick stereotype thinking, however, is distressing. For how else can the truth that the accused is really innocent have any chance of prevailing over such a stone-cast tenet?

There is only one way. A judge must keep an open mind. He must guard against slipping into hasty conclusion, often arising from a desire to quickly finish the job of deciding a case. A positive declaration from a witness that he saw the accused commit the crime should not automatically cancel out the accused’s claim that he did not do it. A lying witness can make as positive an identification as a truthful witness can. The lying witness can also say as forthrightly and unequivocally, "He did it!" without blinking an eye.

Rather, to be acceptable, the positive identification must meet at least two criteria:

First, the positive identification of the offender must come from a credible witness. She is credible who can be trusted to tell the truth, usually based on past experiences with her. Her word has, to one who knows her, its weight in gold.

And second, the witness’ story of what she personally saw must be believable, not inherently contrived. A witness who testifies about something she never saw runs into inconsistencies and makes bewildering claims.

Here, as already fully discussed above, Alfaro and her testimony fail to meet the above criteria.

She did not show up at the NBI as a spontaneous witness bothered by her conscience. She had been hanging around that agency for sometime as a stool pigeon, one paid for mixing up with criminals and squealing on them. Police assets are often criminals themselves. She was the prosecution’s worst possible choice for a witness. Indeed, her superior testified that she volunteered to play the role of a witness in the Vizconde killings when she could not produce a man she promised to the NBI.

And, although her testimony included details, Alfaro had prior access to the details that the investigators knew of the case. She took advantage of her familiarity with these details to include in her testimony the clearly incompatible act of Webb hurling a stone at the front door glass frames even when they were trying to slip away quietly—just so she can accommodate this crime scene feature. She also had Ventura rummaging a bag on the dining table for a front door key that nobody needed just to explain the physical evidence of that bag and its scattered contents. And she had Ventura climbing the car’s hood, risking being seen in such an awkward position, when they did not need to darken the garage to force open the front door—just so to explain the darkened light and foot prints on the car hood.

Further, her testimony was inherently incredible. Her story that Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and Filart agreed to take their turns raping Carmela is incongruent with their indifference, exemplified by remaining outside the house, milling under a street light, visible to neighbors and passersby, and showing no interest in the developments inside the house, like if it was their turn to rape Carmela. Alfaro’s story that she agreed to serve as Webb’s messenger to Carmela, using up her gas, and staying with him till the bizarre end when they were practically strangers, also taxes incredulity.

To provide basis for Webb’s outrage, Alfaro said that she followed Carmela to the main road to watch her let off a lover on Aguirre Avenue. And, inexplicably, although Alfaro had only played the role of messenger, she claimed leading Webb, Lejano, and Ventura into the house to gang-rape Carmella, as if Alfaro was establishing a reason for later on testifying on personal knowledge. Her swing from an emotion of fear when a woman woke up to their presence in the house and of absolute courage when she nonetheless returned to become the lone witness to a grim scene is also quite inexplicable.

Ultimately, Alfaro’s quality as a witness and her inconsistent, if not inherently unbelievable, testimony cannot be the positive identification that jurisprudence acknowledges as sufficient to jettison a denial and an alibi.

f. A documented alibi

To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear, and satisfactory evidence57 that (a) he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.58

The courts below held that, despite his evidence, Webb was actually in Parañaque when the Vizconde killings took place; he was not in the U.S. from March 9, 1991 to October 27, 1992; and if he did leave on March 9, 1991, he actually returned before June 29, 1991, committed the crime, erased the fact of his return to the Philippines from the records of the U.S. and Philippine Immigrations, smuggled himself out of the Philippines and into the U.S., and returned the normal way on October 27, 1992. But this ruling practically makes the death of Webb and his passage into the next life the only acceptable alibi in the Philippines. Courts must abandon this unjust and inhuman paradigm.

If one is cynical about the Philippine system, he could probably claim that Webb, with his father’s connections, can arrange for the local immigration to put a March 9, 1991 departure stamp on his passport and an October 27, 1992 arrival stamp on the same. But this is pure speculation since there had been no indication that such arrangement was made. Besides, how could Webb fix a foreign airlines’ passenger manifest, officially filed in the Philippines and at the airport in the U.S. that had his name on them? How could Webb fix with the U.S. Immigration’s record system those two dates in its record of his travels as well as the dates when he supposedly departed in secret from the

U.S. to commit the crime in the Philippines and then return there? No one has come up with a logical and plausible answer to these questions.

The Court of Appeals rejected the evidence of Webb’s passport since he did not leave the original to be attached to the record. But, while the best evidence of a document is the original, this means that the same is exhibited in court for the adverse party to examine and for the judge to see. As Court of Appeals Justice Tagle said in his dissent,59 the practice when a party does not want to leave an important document with the trial court is to have a photocopy of it marked as exhibit and stipulated among the parties as a faithful reproduction of the original. Stipulations in the course of trial are binding on the parties and on the court.

The U.S. Immigration certification and the computer print-out of Webb’s arrival in and departure from that country were authenticated by no less than the Office of the U.S. Attorney General and the State Department. Still the Court of Appeals refused to accept these documents for the reason that Webb failed to present in court the immigration official who prepared the same. But this was unnecessary. Webb’s passport is a document issued by the Philippine government, which under international practice, is the official record of travels of the citizen to whom it is issued. The entries in that passport are presumed true.60

The U.S. Immigration certification and computer print-out, the official certifications of which have been authenticated by the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, merely validated the arrival and departure stamps of the U.S. Immigration office on Webb’s passport. They have the same evidentiary value. The officers who issued these certifications need not be presented in court to testify on them. Their trustworthiness arises from the sense of official duty and the penalty attached to a breached duty, in the routine and disinterested origin of such statement and in the publicity of the record.61

The Court of Appeals of course makes capital of the fact that an earlier certification from the U.S. Immigration office said that it had no record of Webb entering the U.S. But that erroneous first certification was amply explained by the U.S. Government and Court of Appeals Justice Tagle stated it in his dissenting opinion, thus:

While it is true that an earlier Certification was issued by the U.S. INS on August 16, 1995 finding "no evidence of lawful admission of Webb," this was already clarified and deemed erroneous by no less than the US INS Officials. As explained by witness Leo Herrera-Lim, Consul and Second Secretary of the Philippine Embassy in Washington D.C., said Certification did not pass through proper diplomatic channels and was obtained in violation of the rules on protocol and standard procedure governing such request.

The initial request was merely initiated by BID Commissioner Verceles who directly communicated with the Philippine Consulate in San Francisco, USA, bypassing the Secretary of Foreign Affairs which is the proper protocol procedure. Mr. Steven Bucher, the acting Chief of the Records Services Board of US-INS Washington D.C. in his letter addressed to Philip Antweiler, Philippine Desk Officer, State Department, declared the earlier Certification as incorrect and erroneous as it was "not exhaustive and did not reflect all available information." Also, Richard L. Huff, Co-Director of the Office of Information and privacy, US Department of Justice, in response to the appeal raised by Consul General Teresita V. Marzan, explained that "the INS normally does not maintain records on individuals who are entering the country as visitors rather than as immigrants: and that a notation concerning the entry of a visitor may be made at the Nonimmigrant Information system. Since appellant Webb entered the U.S. on a mere tourist visa, obviously, the initial search could not have produced the desired result inasmuch as the data base that was looked into contained entries of the names of IMMIGRANTS and not that of NON-IMMIGRANT visitors of the U.S..62

The trial court and the Court of Appeals expressed marked cynicism over the accuracy of travel documents like the passport as well as the domestic and foreign records of departures and arrivals from airports. They claim that it would not have been impossible for Webb to secretly return to the Philippines after he supposedly left it on March 9, 1991, commit the crime, go back to the U.S., and openly return to the Philippines again on October 26, 1992. Travel between the U.S. and the Philippines, said the lower courts took only about twelve to fourteen hours.

If the Court were to subscribe to this extremely skeptical view, it might as well tear the rules of evidence out of the law books and regard suspicions, surmises, or speculations as reasons for impeaching evidence. It is not that official records, which carry the presumption of truth of what they state, are immune to attack. They are not. That presumption can be overcome by evidence. Here, however, the prosecution did not bother to present evidence to impeach the entries in Webb’s passport and the certifications of the Philippine and U.S.’ immigration services regarding his travel to the U.S. and back. The prosecution’s rebuttal evidence is the fear of the unknown that it planted in the lower court’s minds.

7. Effect of Webb’s alibi to others

Webb’s documented alibi altogether impeaches Alfaro's testimony, not only with respect to him, but also with respect to Lejano, Estrada, Fernandez, Gatchalian, Rodriguez, and Biong. For, if the Court accepts the proposition that Webb was in the U.S. when the crime took place, Alfaro’s testimony will not hold together. Webb’s participation is the anchor of Alfaro’s story. Without it, the evidence against the others must necessarily fall.

CONCLUSION

In our criminal justice system, what is important is, not whether the court entertains doubts about the innocence of the accused since an open mind is willing to explore all possibilities, but whether it entertains a reasonable, lingering doubt as to his guilt. For, it would be a serious mistake to send an innocent man to jail where such kind of doubt hangs on to one’s inner being, like a piece of meat lodged immovable between teeth.

Will the Court send the accused to spend the rest of their lives in prison on the testimony of an NBI asset who proposed to her handlers that she take the role of the witness to the Vizconde massacre that she could not produce?

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision dated December 15, 2005 and Resolution dated January 26, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 00336 and ACQUITS accused-appellants Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada and Gerardo Biong of the crimes of which they were charged for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They are ordered immediately RELEASED from detention unless they are confined for another lawful cause.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director, Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City for immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to report the action he has taken to this Court within five days from receipt of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

ROBERTO A. ABADAssociate Justice

EN BANC

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Plaintiff-Appellee,

- versus -

FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAAGA alias "PACO"; JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN alias "WESLEY"; ALBERTO CAO alias "ALLAN PAHAK"; ARIEL BALANSAG, DAVIDSON VALIENTE RUSIA alias "TISOY TAGALOG"; JAMES ANTHONY UY alias "WANGWANG"; and JAMES ANDREW UY alias "MM",

Accused-Appellants.

G.R. Nos. 138874-75

Present:

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.

PUNO,PANGANIBAN,QUISUMBING,

YNARES-SANTIAGO,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,

CARPIO,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CORONA,

CARPIO MORALES,

CALLEJO, SR.,

AZCUNA,

TINGA,

NAZARIO, and

GARCIA, JJ.

Promulgated:

July 21, 2005

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

 R E S O L U T I O N

 PER CURIAM

 

At bar are four (4) motions for reconsideration separately filed by appellants (1) Francisco Juan Larraaga, (2) Josman Aznar, (3) Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Cao and Ariel Balansag, and (4) James Anthony Uy and James Andrew Uy, assailing our Decision dated February 3, 2004 convicting them of the crimes of (a) special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention and (b) simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention, the dispositive portion of which reads: 

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Cebu City in Criminal Cases Nos. CBU-45303 and 45304 is AFFIRMED with the followingMODIFICATIONS:

 

(1) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, appellants FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAAGA alias PACO; JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN alias WESLEY; ALBERTO CAO alias ALLAN PAHAK; ARIEL BALANSAG; and JAMES ANDREW UY alias MM, are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH by lethal injection;

 

(2) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, appellants FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAAGA alias PACO; JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN alias WESLEY; ALBERTO CAO alias ALLAN PAHAK; ARIEL BALANSAG; and JAMES ANDREW UY alias MM, are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA;

 

(3) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, appellant JAMES ANTHONY UY, who was a minor at the time the crime was committed, is likewise found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty ofRECLUSION PERPETUA; in Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, he is declared guilty of simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of TWELVE (12) years of  prision mayor in its maximum period, as MINIMUM, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as MAXIMUM;

 

(4) Appellants are ordered to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Marijoy and Jacqueline, in each case, the amounts of (a) P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, (b)P25,000.00 as temperate damages, (c) P150,000.00 as moral damages, and (d) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.

 

Three (3) Justices of the Court maintain their position that RA 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty; nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is constitutional and the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.

 

In accordance with Article 83 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of RA No. 7659, upon the finality of this Decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for the possible exercise of Her Excellencys pardoning power.

 

SO ORDERED.

 Appellants anchor their motions on the following grounds:

 A.    LARRAAGA

  

I 

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN BARRING LARRAAGA AND THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (NBI) REGIONAL DIRECTOR FLORENCIO VILLARIN FROM TESTIFYING;

 II 

THE POLICE PLANTED EVIDENCE ON APPELLANTS; 

III 

LARRAAGA SUFFICIENTLY PROVED HIS ALIBI; 

IV 

THE TRIAL COURT PREVENTED THE INTRODUCTION OF KEY DEFENSE EVIDENCE;

 V 

THE CORPSE FOUND IN THE RAVINE WAS NOT THAT OF MARIJOY; AND    

VI 

PROSECUTION WITNESS RUSIA WAS A COACHED WITNESS.[1]

  

B.     AZNAR

  I 

THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT VIOLATE THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 

II 

THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN (A) DISCHARGING DAVID RUSSIA AS STATE WITNESS; AND (B) CONVICTING THE APPELLANTS MAINLY ON THE BASIS OF THE TESTIMONY OF RUSIA.

 III 

THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN REJECTING THE DEFENSE OF APPELLANT AZNAR. 

IV 

THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY ON THE APPELLANTS.[2]

   

C.    ADLAWAN, BALANSAG, CAO  

I 

PROSECUTION WITNESS RUSIA IS NOT QUALIFIED TO BE A STATE WITNESS UNDER PARAGRAPHS (D) AND (E), SECTION 17 OF THE REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.   

II 

RUSIAS TESTIMONY AND THAT OF THE OTHER PROSECUTION WITNESSES WERE INCREDIBLE, INCONSISTENT, AND UNWORTHY OF BELIEF.

 III 

BIAS AND PREJUDICE AGAINST THE DEFENSE WERE GLARINGLY DISPLAYED BY THE COURT A QUO WHICH GREATLY AFFECTED THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE.

 IV 

THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS FOR THE CRIME CHARGED HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[3]

  

D.    JAMES ANDREW AND JAMES ANTHONY UY  

I 

ACCUSED JAMES ANDREW S. UY WAS, LIKE HIS YOUNGER BROTHER JAMES ANTHONY S. UY, A MINOR AT THE TIME THE OFFENSES AT BAR ALLEGEDLY HAPPENED LAST JULY 16, 1997;

II 

THE IDENTITY OF THE DEAD BODY OF THE WOMAN FOUND IN TAN-AWAN, CARCAR, CEBU LAST JULY 18, 1997 WAS NEVER CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISHED THUS THE NEED FOR ITS EXHUMATION FOR DNA TESTING;[4]

 

 In his supplemental motion for reconsideration dated March

25, 2004, Larraaga submitted a separate study of Dr. Racquel Del Rosario-Fortun, Forensic Pathologist, to show that the examination conducted by the prosecution expert witnesses on the body found in Tan-awan, Carcar is inadequate.

 In a similar supplemental motion for reconsideration[5], Aznar

submitted to this Court the Affidavit dated February 27, 2004 of Atty. Florencio Villarin, Regional Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, Central Visayas, to show that: (1) the police investigation of this case was flawed; (2) he (Aznar) was arrested in 1997 not because of his involvement in this case but because he had in his possession a pack of shabu and firearms; and (3) David Rusia is not a credible witness. 

On July 15, 2004, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated comment[6] praying that the four (4) motions for reconsideration be denied with finality, there being no new argument raised. He responded to appellants assignments of errors by exhaustively quoting portions of our challenged Decision.

 

In his consolidated comment[7] to Aznars supplemental motion for reconsideration, the Solicitor General enumerated the grounds why Atty. Villarins Affidavit should not be given consideration. On February 15, 2005, Aznar filed a reply alleging that the Solicitor General read out of context certain portions of the Affidavit. He argued that the

Affidavit only exposes the flawed investigation of the Chiong case and that, at the time of his arrest, there was no evidence against him. On March 4, 2005, the Solicitor General filed a rejoinder stating that Aznars reply actually supports the undersigned counsels (Solicitor Generals) position that Atty. Villarins Affidavit is utterly inadequate to prove his innocence or at least even acquit them on reasonable doubt, thus, it would be useless to call for new trial on the basis of such Affidavit. On March 29, 2005, Aznar filed a sur-rejoinder insisting that the Affidavit should be given due consideration.

 Except for the motion filed by appellants Uy brothers with

respect to James Andrews alleged minority, we find all the motions bereft of merit.

 At the inception, let it be emphasized that the filing of a

motion for reconsideration does not impose on us the obligation to discuss and rule again on the grounds relied upon by the movant which are mere reiteration of the issues previously raised and thoroughly determined and evaluated in our Decision being questioned. In Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership vs. Velasco,[8] we ruled that, "this would be a useless formality of ritual invariably involving merely a reiteration of the reasons already set forth in the judgment or final order for rejecting the arguments advanced by the movant."

 The foregoing principle applies squarely to the motions filed by

appellants Larraaga, Aznar, Adlawan, Cao and Balansag, it being apparent that the points raised therein are not neoteric matters demanding new judicial determination. They are mere rehash of the arguments set forth in their respective briefs which we already considered, weighed and resolved before we rendered the Decision sought to be reconsidered. 

However, in view of the severity of the penalties for the crimes charged, we deem it necessary to stress once more our basis in convicting appellants.

 The following is a prcis of the issues submitted by appellants in

their motions: This Court erred  first, in according credence to Rusias testimony; second, in rejecting appellants alibi; third, in holding that the trial court did not violate their right to

due process when it excluded the testimony of other defense witnesses; and

 fourth, in holding that the body found in Tan-awan, Carcar was

not that of Marijoy.In deciding a criminal case, the policy of the courts is always to

look at the case in its entirety. The totality of the evidence presented by both the prosecution and the defense are weighed, thus, averting general conclusions from isolated pieces of evidence. This means that an appeal of a criminal case opens its entire records for review.[9]

 I

  Appellants vigorously contend that we should not have

sustained Rusias testimony hook, line and sinker, owing to his tainted record and reputation. However, it must be stressed that Rusias testimony was not viewed in isolation. In giving credence to Rusias testimony, the trial court took into consideration the physical evidenceand the corroborative testimonies of other witnesses. Thus, we find no reason why we should not uphold the trial courts findings.

 We reiterate our pronouncement in our Decision that what

makes Rusias testimony worthy of belief is its striking compatibility with the physical evidence. Physical evidence is one of the highest

degrees of proof. It speaks more eloquently than all witnesses put together.[10] The presence of Marijoys ravished body in a deep ravine at Tan-awan, Carcar with tape on her mouth and handcuffs on her wrists certainly bolstered Rusias testimony on what actually took place from Ayala Center to Tan-awan. Indeed, the details he supplied to the trial court are of such nature and quality that only a witness who actually saw the commission of the crimes could furnish. Reinforcing his testimony is its corroboration by several other witnesses who saw incidents of what he narrated. Rolando Dacillo and Mario Minoza witnessed Jacquelines two failed attempts to escape from appellants near Ayala Center. Benjamin Molina and Miguel Vergara recognized Rowen as the person who inquired from them where he could find a vehicle for hire on the evening of July 16, 1997. Alfredo Duarte saw Rowen when he bought barbeque and Tanduay at Nenes Store while the white van, driven by Cao, was waiting on the side of the road and he heard voices of quarreling male and female emanating from the van. And lastly, Manuel Camingao and Rosendo Rio testified on the presence of Larraaga and Josman at Tan-awan, Carcar at dawn of July 17, 1997. All these bits and pieces of story form part of Rusias narration. Now, with such strong anchorage on the physical evidence and the testimonies of disinterested witnesses, why should we not accord credence to Rusias testimony? Even assuming that his testimony standing alone might indeed be unworthy of belief in view of his character, it is not so when considered with the other evidence presented by the prosecution.

 

II

  Appellants likewise claimed that we should have not sustained

the trial courts rejection of their alibi. Settled is the rule that the defense of alibi is inherently weak and crumbles in the light of positive declarations of truthful witnesses who testified on affirmative matters.[11] Being evidence that is negative in nature and self-serving, it cannot attain more credibility than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify on clear and positive evidence.[12] On top of its inherent weakness, alibi becomes less plausible as a defense when it is corroborated only by relatives or close friends of the accused.[13]

 This case presents to us a balance scale whereby perched on one end is appellants alibi supported by witnesses who were either their relatives, friends or classmates, while on the other end is the positive identification of the herein appellants by the prosecution witnesses who were not, in any way, related to the victims. With the above jurisprudence as guide, we are certain that the balance must tilt in favor of the latter.

Besides, a thorough examination of the evidence for the prosecution shows that the appellants failed to meet the requirements of alibi, i.e., the requirements of time and place.[14] They failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for them to be at the Ayala Center, Cebu City when the Chiong sisters were abducted. What is clear from the evidence is that Rowen, Josman, Ariel, Alberto, James Anthony and James Andrew were all within the vicinity of Cebu City on July 16, 1997.

 

Not even Larraaga who claimed to be in Quezon City satisfied the required proof of physical impossibility. During the hearing, it was shown that it takes only one (1) hour to travel by plane from Manila to Cebu and that there are four (4) airline companies plying the route. One of the defense witnesses admitted that there are several flights from Manila to Cebu each morning, afternoon and evening. Indeed, Larraagas presence in Cebu City on July 16, 1997 was proved to be not only a possibility but a reality.Four (4) witnesses identified Larraaga as one of the two men talking to Marijoy and Jacqueline on the night of July 16, 1997. Shiela Singson testified that on July 16, 1997, at around 7:20 in the evening, she saw Larraaga approach Marijoy and Jacqueline at the West Entry of Ayala Center. The incident reminded her of Jacquelines prior story that he was Marijoys admirer. Shiela confirmed that she knows Larraaga since she had seen him on five (5) occasions. Analie Konahap also testified that on the same evening of July 16, 1997, at about 8:00 oclock, she saw Marijoy and Jacqueline talking to two (2) men at the West Entry of Ayala Center. She recognized the two (2) men as Larraaga and Josman, having seen them several times at Glicos, a game zone, located across her office at the third level of Ayala Center. Williard Redobles, the security guard then assigned at Ayala Center, corroborated the foregoing testimonies of Shiela and Analie. In addition, Rosendo Rio, a businessman from Cogon, Carcar, declared that he saw Larraaga at Tan-awan at about

3:30 in the morning of July 17, 1997. The latter was leaning against the hood of a white van.[15] And over and above all, Rusia categorically identified Larraaga as one of the participes criminis.

 

Taking the individual testimonies of the above witnesses in relation with that of Rusia, we are convinced that Larraaga was indeed in Cebu City at the time of the commission of the crimes and was one of the principal perpetrators thereof.

 

At this juncture, it bears mentioning that this case is not the first time that Larraaga was charged with or complained of pruriently assaulting young female students in Cebu. Months before the abduction of Marijoy and Jackie, the parents of a certain Rochelle Virtucio, complained about Larraagas attempt to snatch their young daughter and drag her in a black, stylish Honda Civic. It happened just near the gate of Rochelles school, thus, showing his impudence. We quote a portion of the transcript of stenographic notes dated September 23, 1998, thus:

ATTY. HERMOSISIMA:

Your Honor please, this is a . Inspector Era handed to this representation a copy of a Letter dated September 25, 1996, addressed to the Student Affairs Office, University of San Carlos,P. del Rosario Street, Cebu City, and this is signed by Leo Abayan and Alexander Virtucio and noted by Mrs. Aurora Pacho, Principal, University of San Carlos, Girls High School, and for the record, I will read the content:

 

TO WHOM THIS MAY CONCERN:

 

We the parents and guardians of Rochelle Virtucio, a first year high school student of your University of San Carlos-Girls High School, are writing your good office about an untoward incident involving our daughter and another student of your school.

 

x x x x x x

 

That last Monday at around 5:00 PM, Rochelle and other classmates, Michelle Amadar and Keizaneth

Mondejar, while on their way to get a ride home near the school campus, a black Honda Civic with five young male teenagers including the driver, suddenly stopped beside them, and simultaneously one of them, which was later identified as FRANCISCO JUAN LARRANAGA, a BSHRM I student of your school, grabbed Rochelle by her hand to try to get Rochelle to their vehicle. She resisted and got away from him. Sensing some people were watching what they were doing, they hurriedly sped away.

We are very concerned about Rochelles safety. Still now, she is suffering the shock and tension that she is not supposed to experience in her young life. It is very hard for us parents to think about what shed been through.[16]

 

The presence of such complaint in the record of this case certainly does not enhance Larraagas chance of securing an acquittal.

 

 

III

  Larraaga and Aznar bewail our refusal to overturn the trial

courts exclusion of Professor Jerome Bailen and Atty. Florencio Villarin, NBI, Regional Director, as defense witnesses. Professor Bailen was properly excluded. First, he is not a finger-print expert but an archaeologist. And second, his report consists merely of the results of his visual inspection of the exhibits already several months old. Anent Atty. Villarins failure to testify before the trial court, suffice it to say that his belated Affidavit, which Aznar submitted via his supplemental motion for reconsideration dated May 5, 2004, raises nothing to change our findings and conclusions. What clearly appears in said Affidavit is a man trying to impress people that he was the one responsible for solving the Chiong case and for that, he deserves a promotion. The trial court, at the onset, must have seen such immateriality in his intended testimony. Indeed, we agree with the Solicitor Generals observation that such Affidavit is neither helpful nor encouraging to Aznars cause. We quote his keen reflection on the matter:

 x x x x x x Third. Atty. Villarins affidavit, in paragraphs 19 and 20

thereof, acknowledged that the body found in the Carcar ravine was that of Marijoy. This assertion immediately conflicts with accused-appellant Aznars claim in his Motion for Reconsideration that the corpse was not Marijoys. Surely, something is amiss in accused-appellant Aznars recollection of his defense.

 Fourth. Atty. Villarin confirmed in paragraph 24 of his

affidavit that accused-appellant Francisco Larranaga was a suspect in the subject crimes. Evidently, this statement completely supports this Honorable Courts findings in its Decision dated February 3, 2004.

 Fifth. In paragraph 30 of Atty. Villarins affidavit, he stated

that: The arrest of Juzman Aznar was the major breakthrough in the investigation of the case because witnesses came out and identified Juzman Aznar as one of those allegedly seen talking to the victims on the night they disappeared. Hence, accused-appellant Aznar was in the beginning already a first-grade suspect in the Chiong sisters celebrated abduction and killing.

 Sixth. Atty. Villarin admitted in paragraph 36 of his affidavit

that: x x x I did not take this against [Supt. Labra] for preempting our next move to get Juzman Aznar as we were already placing him under surveillance because I knew [Supt. Labra] did it in his honest desire to help solve the crime x x x. Clearly, this statement is not an indictment of the investigation that the police undertook in the subject crimes.

 Seventh. Paragraphs 37 to 40 are nothing but personal

tirades against alleged influence peddling by Mrs. Thelma Chiong, mother of the victims, and the purportedly undue promotions of the lawyers and police officers who unearthed the evidence against accused-appellants and successfully prosecuted the latter. In executing the affidavit, it appears that Atty. Villarin would want to impress that he, rather than those promoted, deserved the promotion.

 Eighth. Atty. Villarins inability to testify in the criminal cases

was not due solely to the prosecutions action. Whether he ought to testify or not was an argument openly discussed in court. Hence, for the resulting inability, Atty. Villarin has no one to blame but the defense lawyers who did everything to make a mockery of the criminal proceedings.

 

And lastly, there is nothing in Atty. Villarins affidavit of the quality of a smoking gun that would acquit accused-appellants of the crimes they have been convicted. For he did not finish the police investigation of the subject crimes; this is the long and short of his miniscule role in the instant case. Indeed, judging by the substance of his affidavit, he would not be testifying in case a new trial is held on anything that has not been said and rejected heretofore, except his own unsubstantiated opinions (i.e. not facts as required by evidentiary rules), his self-congratulatory remarks, and his unmitigated frustration over failing to get a promotion when almost everyone else did.[17]

 Neither can we entertain at this late stage Dr. Fortuns separate study to show that the examination conducted on the body found in Tan-awan, Carcar is inadequate. Such study cannot be classified as newly-discovered evidence warranting belated reception. Obviously, Larraaga could have produced it during trial had he wished to.

 

IV

 

Knowing that the prosecutions theory highly rests on the truth of Rusia testimony, appellants endeavor to destroy it by claiming that the body found at the foot of a deep ravine in Tan-awan, Carcar was not that of Marijoy. We must reiterate the reasons why we cannot give our assent to such argument. First, Inspector Edgardo Lenizo,[18] a fingerprint expert, testified that the fingerprints of the corpse match those of Marijoy.[19] Second, the packaging tape and the handcuff found on the dead body were the same items placed on Marijoy and Jacqueline while they were being detained.[20] Third, the body had the same clothes worn by Marijoy on the day she was abducted.[21]And fourth, the members of the Chiong family personally identified the corpse to be that of Marijoy[22] which they eventually buried. They erected commemorative markers at the ravine, cemetery and every place which mattered to Marijoy. As a matter of fact, at this very moment, appellants still fail to bring to the attention of this Court any person laying a claim on the said body. Surely, if the body was not that of Marijoy, other families who had lost someone of similar age and gender as Marijoy would have surfaced and claimed the body. The above circumstances only bolster Rusias narration that Rowen and Ariel pushed Marijoy into the deep ravine, following Josmans instruction "to get rid" of her.

 On the issue raised by appellants Uy brothers that James

Andrew was only seventeen (17) years and two hundred sixty two (262) days old at the time the crimes were committed, the records bear that on March 1, 1999, James Andrews birth certificate was submitted to the trial court as part of the Formal Offer of Additional Evidence,[23]with the statement that he was eighteen (18) years old. On March 18, 1999, appellants filed a Manifestation of Erratum correcting in part the Formal Offer of Additional Evidence by alleging that James Andrew was only seventeen (17) years old.[24]

 Now, James Andrew begs leave and prays that this Court

admits at this stage of the proceedings his (1) Certificate of Live Birth issued by the National Statistics Office, and (2) Baptismal Certificate. He prays that his penalty be reduced, as in the case of his brother James Anthony.

 The entry of James Andrews birth in the Birth Certificate is not legible, thus it is extremely difficult for us to determine the veracity of his claim. However, considering that minority is a significant factor in the imposition of penalty, we find it proper to require the Solicitor General (a) to secure from the Local Civil Registrar of Cotobato City, as well as the National Statistics Office, a clear and legible copy of James Andrews Birth Certificate, and thereafter, (b) to file an extensive comment on the motion for reconsideration filed by James Andrew and James Anthony Uy, solely on James Andrews claim of minority.

 Insofar as James Anthony is concerned, we maintain his

conviction and penalty, there being nothing in his motion which warrants a reconsideration of our Decision.

 In resolving the instant motions, we have embarked on this

painstaking task of evaluating every piece and specie of evidence presented before the trial court in response to appellants plea for the reversal of their conviction. But, even the element of reasonable doubt so seriously sought by appellants is an ignis fatuus which has eluded any intelligent ratiocination of their submissions. Verily, our conscience can rest easy on our affirmance of the verdict of the trial court, in light of appellants clear culpability which demands retribution.

 

WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration filed by appellants Francisco Juan Larraaga, Josman Aznar, Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Cao and Ariel Balansag are hereby DENIED. The Solicitor General is DIRECTED (a) to secure from the Local Civil Registrar of Cotobato City, as well as the National Statistics Office, a clear and legible copy of James Andrews Birth Certificate, and (b) within ten (10) days therefrom, to file an extensive comment on the motion for reconsideration filed by James Andrew and James Anthony Uy, solely on James Andrews claim of minority. The motion is likewise DENIED insofar as James Anthony Uy is concerned.

 SO ORDERED. 

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 123819. November 14, 2001]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. STEPHEN MARK WHISENHUNT, accused-appellant.

D E C I S I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is a direct appeal from the decision [1] of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 152, in Criminal Case No. 102687, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused Stephen Mark Whisenhunt guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder defined and penalized under Art. 248, Revised Penal Code, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties provided for by law, to pay the heirs of the deceased the amount of P100,000.00 representing actual expenses for the funeral services and wake for 5 days, P3,000,000.00 by way of moral damages, exemplary damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00 and attorneys fees in the amount of P150,000.00.

SO ORDERED.[2]

On November 19, 1993, accused-appellant was formally charged with the murder of Elsa Santos-Castillo, under an Information which read:

That on or about September 24, 1993, in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and taking advantage of superior strength, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of one Elsa Elsie Santos Castillo by then and there stabbing her with a bladed weapon in different parts of her body, thereby inflicting upon her mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of her death and thereafter outraged or scoffed her corpse by then and there chopping off her head and different parts of her body.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]

The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City and was raffled to Branch 152. On January 6, 1994, accused-appellant was arraigned with the assistance of counsel de parte. He entered a plea of not guilty.[4]

The evidence shows that accused-appellant and the deceased, Elsa Santos-Castillo, also known as Elsie, were lovers. They met at the Apex Motor Corporation where accused-appellant was the Manager while Elsa was the Assistant Personnel Manager. Both accused-appellant and Elsa were married, but they were estranged from their respective spouses. In April 1993, Elsa resigned from Apex presumably to avoid the nasty rumors about her illicit affair with accused-appellant.[5] It appears, however, that she continued her affair with accused-appellant even after she resigned from Apex Motor Corporation.

On September 23, 1993, Demetrio Ravelo, an Apex employee assigned to drive for accused-appellant, reported for work at 8:30 a.m. at the latters condominium unit at the Platinum Condominium, Annapolis Street, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. [6] Accused-appellant ordered him to fetch Elsa at her parents house in Blumentritt, Manila at 10:30 a.m. He found Elsa standing at a corner near her parents house, wearing a violet-colored blouse with floral prints, and was carrying three bags --- a paper bag, a violet Giordano bag and a thick brown leather bag with the trademark of Mitsubishi. He brought Elsa to accused-appellants condominium unit.[7]

At 2:00 p.m., Elsa told Demetrio to go to the Apex office in Mandaluyong to deliver a paper bag to Amy Serrano, the Personnel Manager. He proceeded to the Apex office, and then returned to Platinum.Accused-appellant asked him to stay because he had to drive Elsa home at 10:00 p.m. He waited until a little past 10:00 p.m. When he had not heard from accused-appellant, he told Lucy, the housemaid, that he was going home.[8]

The following day, Demetrio again reported at accused-appellants unit. At around noon, Lucy asked if he had seen a kitchen knife which was missing. He then overheard Lucy ask accused-appellant who told her that the kitchen knife was in his bedroom. Demetrio saw accused-appellant go inside the room and, shortly thereafter, hand the knife to Lucy.[9]

At 3:40 p.m., Lucy told Demetrio to buy cigarettes for accused-appellant. He went out to buy the cigarettes and gave them to Lucy. At 5:00 p.m., accused-appellant told Demetrio to go home.[10]

On September 25, 1993, Demetrio reported at the Platinum Condominium at around 8:00 a.m. He was allowed by accused-appellant to go to Apex to follow up his salary. While he was there, Amy Serrano asked him if Elsa was still in accused-appellants condominium unit. Although Demetrio did not see Elsa there, he answered yes. Amy gave him black plastic garbage bags which he turned over to accused-appellant upon his return to the condominium. The latter then ordered him to drive Lucy to Cubao and to go home to get some clothes, since they were leaving for Bagac, Bataan. On the way to Cubao, Lucy told Demetrio that she was going home. He dropped her off in front of the Farmers Market. Thereafter, he proceeded to his house in Fairview, Quezon City, to pick up some clothes, then returned to the condominium at around 10:00 a.m.[11]

Accused-appellant asked him to check the fuel gauge of the car. He was told to go to Apex to get a gas slip and then to gas up. At around noon, he went back to the condominium. He had lunch outside atGoodah, then returned to accused-appellants unit and stayed in the servants quarters.[12]

While Demetrio was in the servants quarters watching television, accused-appellant came in. He asked Demetrio how long he wanted to work for him. Demetrio replied that he was willing to work for him forever, and expressed his full trust in him. Upon hearing this, accused-appellant shed tears and embraced Demetrio. Then accused-appellant said, May problema ako, Rio. Demetrio asked what it was, and accused-appellant told him that Elsa was dead. Demetrio asked, Bakit mo siya pinatay?[13] Accused-appellant answered that he did not kill Elsa, rather she died of bangungot.[14]

Demetrio suggested that Elsas body be autopsied, but accused-appellant said that he had already beheaded her. He asked Demetrio if he wanted to see the decapitated body, but the latter refused. The two of them went to Shoppesville at the Greenhills Shopping Center and bought a big bag with a zipper and rollers, colored black and gray. [15] Demetrio noticed that accused-appellant seemed nervous and his eyes were teary and bloodshot.

When they returned to the condominium, accused-appellant asked Demetrio to help him wrap the body in the black garbage bags. Demetrio entered accused-appellants bathroom and found the dismembered hands, feet, trunk and head of a woman. He lifted the severed head by the hair and, when he lifted it, he saw Elsas face. He placed this in a black trash bag. He helped accused-appellant place the other body parts in three separate garbage bags. They packed all the garbage bags in the bag with the zipper and rollers, which they had bought in Shoppesville. Then, they brought the bag down and loaded it in the trunk of accused-appellants car. After that, they boarded the car. Demetrio took the wheel and accused-appellant sat beside him in front.[16]

It was almost 2:00 p.m. when Demetrio and accused-appellant left the condominium. Accused-appellant told Demetrio to drive around Batangas and Tagaytay City. After leaving Tagaytay, they entered the South Luzon Expressway and headed towards Sta. Rosa, Laguna. When they were near Puting Kahoy and Silangan, accused-appellant told

Demetrio to turn into a narrow road. Somewhere along that road, accused-appellant ordered Demetrio to stop the car.[17]

Accused-appellant alighted and told Demetrio to get the bag in the trunk. Accused-appellant took the plastic bags inside the bag and dumped them by the roadside. Then, accused-appellant returned the empty bag in the trunk and boarded the car. He called Demetrio and said, Tayo na Rio, tuloy na tayo sa Bataan. It was already 6:30 p.m.[18]

Demetrio drove to the Sta. Rosa exit gate, along the South Luzon Expressway, through EDSA and towards the North Luzon Expressway. They stopped at a gasoline station to refuel. They then took the San Fernando, Pampanga exit, and were soon en route to the Whisenhunt family mansion in Bagac, Bataan.[19]

Before reaching Bagac, accused-appellant ordered Demetrio to stop the car on top of a bridge. Accused-appellant told Demetrio to get off and to throw a bag into the river. Later, they passed another bridge and accused-appellant again told Demetrio to pull over. Accused-appellant alighted and threw Elsas clothes over the bridge. On the way, Demetrio noticed that accused-appellant took something from a bag, tore it to pieces and threw it out of the window. When they passed Pilar, Bataan, accused-appellant threw Elsas violet Giordano bag. As they reached the road boundary of Bagac, accused-appellant wrung a short-sleeved dress with violet and green stripes, and threw it on a grassy lot.[20]

It was about midnight when accused-appellant and Demetrio arrived at the mansion. Demetrio was unable to sleep that night, as he was scared that he might be the next victim.[21]

The next morning, at 11:00 a.m., accused-appellant ordered Demetrio to clean the trunk of the car, saying, Rio, linisan mo ang sasakyan para ang compartment hindi babaho.[22] At 1:00 p.m., accused-appellant and Demetrio started off for Manila. As they passed a place called Kabog-kabog, he saw accused-appellant take out an ATM card. Accused-appellant burned the middle of the card, twisted it and threw it out of the window. They arrived at the corner of EDSA and Quezon Avenue at 2:30 p.m. Demetrio asked accused-appellant if he can get off since he wanted to go home to Fairview. Before Demetrio left, accused-appellant told him, Rio, you and your family can go on a vacation. I will give you money. Accused-appellant then gave Demetrio P50.00 for his transportation going to Fairview.[23]

When Demetrio got home, he immediately told his family what happened. His wife told him to report the incident to Fiscal Joey Diaz. Demetrio and his wife went to the house of Fiscal Diaz in Fairview to talk to him.[24]

The following morning, September 27, 1993, Fiscal Diaz, Demetrio, his wife and his brothers went to the Department of Justice. They were referred to the National Bureau of Investigation, where Demetrio gave his statement before Atty. Artemio Sacaquing, head of the Anti-Organized Crime Division.[25]

Initially, Atty. Sacaguing could not believe what he heard and thought Demetrio was exaggerating. He dispatched a team of NBI agents, headed by Marianito Panganiban, to verify Demetrios report.[26]Accompanied by Demetrio, the team proceeded to Barangay Polong, Sta. Cruz, Sta. Rosa, Laguna. There, they found a crowd of people gathered around the mutilated parts of a human body along the road. [27]The body parts had been discovered by tricycle

drivers. The Sta. Rosa Police, under Chief Investigator SPO3 Alipio Quintos, was already conducting an investigation. Agent Panganiban radioed Atty. Sacaguing in Manila that Demetrios report was positive.[28]

The mutilated body parts were brought to the Lim de Mesa Funeral Parlor in Sta. Rosa. Two NBI agents, together with Demetrio, went to the house of Elsas family to inform them of her death. The NBI agents accompanied Elsas two sisters, Amelia Villadiego and Elida Santos, to the funeral parlor, where they identified the body parts as belonging to Elsa.

In the morning of September 28, 1993, accused-appellant was arrested by operatives of the NBI as he drove up to his parking space at Apex Motor Corporation. [29] When Atty. Sacaguing approached and introduced himself, accused-appellant became nervous and started to tremble.[30]

Accused-appellant was brought to the NBI in his car. When he arrived there, Atty. Sacaguing informed him that it may be necessary to impound the car since, based on Demetrios statement, the same was used in the commission of the crime. Accused-appellant asked permission to retrieve personal belongings from the car. After getting his things from the car, accused-appellant opened the trunk to place some items inside. When he opened the compartment, the people around the car moved away because of the foul stench that emanated from inside. Atty. Sacaguing inspected the interior of the trunk and found stains on the lawanit board lying flat inside the compartment, which he suspected to be blood. Thus, he instructed his agents to fetch a technician from the NBI Chemistry Division to examine the stain.[31]

During Atty. Sacaguings interview of accused-appellant, he noticed contusions on accused-appellants lower lip and cheek. As standard procedure, and in order to rule out any accusation of violence on accused-appellant on the part of the NBI agents, Atty. Sacaguing ordered a medical examination of accused-appellant.[32]

The Medico-Legal Officer found contusions on accused-appellants left periumbilical region, right elbow, left and right forearms and right leg.[33]

That same afternoon, before the close of office hours, accused-appellant was brought to the Department of Justice for inquest.[34] However, accused-appellant moved that a preliminary investigation be conducted, and signed a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, he was detained at the NBI.[35]

On September 29, 1993, armed with a search warrant, [36] the NBI agents conducted a search of the condominium unit of accused-appellant. They recovered hair strands from underneath the rubber mat and rugs inside accused-appellants bathroom.[37] In accused-appellants bedroom, they found bloodstains on the bedspread and covers. They also found a pair of Topsider shoes with bloodstains, a bottle of Vicks Formula 44 cough syrup, and some more hair strands on the lampshade.[38]

Later that day, Demetrio Ravelo accompanied some NBI agents to retrace the route he took with accused-appellant going to Bataan, with the objective of retrieving the items thrown away by accused-appellant. They were able to recover a violet bag, one brown sandal and a shirt with violet and green floral prints,[39] which were brought to the NBI office. Amelia Santos Villadiego, Elsas sister, was summoned to identify the items.[40]

In the meantime, Caroline Y. Custodio, Supervising Forensic Biologist of the NBI, who conducted comparative examinations between the hair specimens found in accused-appellants bathroom and hair samples taken from the victim while she lay in state, found that the questioned hair specimen showed similarities to the hair taken from the victim.[41]

Custodio further reported that the bloodstains on the bed cushion cover, bedspread and Topsider shoes, all found inside accused-appellants bedroom, gave positive results for human blood, showing reactions of Group B.[42] The bloodstains on the plywood board taken from accused-appellants vehicle were also examined and found to give positive results for human blood showing reactions of Group B.[43]On the other hand, the examination of blood taken from the victim likewise showed reactions of Group B.[44]

Dr. Ronaldo B. Mendez, the Medico-Legal Officer who conducted the autopsy, concluded that the cause of death of Elsa Santos Castillo were stab wounds. [45] Dr. Mendez found one stab wound on the right breast which penetrated the right lung. He also found two stab wounds under the left breast which penetrated the diaphragm and abdominal cavity, and also penetrated the right portion of the liver.[46]More particularly, the autopsy yielded the following postmortem findings:

Body in moderately advanced stage of decomposition.

Head, decapitated, level above 4th cervical vertebra; both hands severed cutting completely the lower ends of both radius and ulna; both legs, disarticulated at knee joints and cut-off with both patellar bones, missing; both feet, disarticulated at the ankle joints and cut-off; all soft tissues of both thighs and perineum, removed, exposing completely the femoral bones and partially the pelvic bone,

Incised wounds: 19.5 cms., left axillary area; 55.0 cms., thoraco-abdominal area, along median line, with the abdominal incision involving the whole thickness and the thoracic incision involving the soft tissues and cutting the sternum from the xiphoid process up to the level of the third cartilage; from the 3rd cartilage up to the lower border of the neck.

Abdominal organs, removed from the abdominal cavity.

Contusions: 26.0 x 16.5 cms., face, more on the left side involving the forehead, temporal, nasal, orbital and maxillary areas; 25.0 x 11.0 cms., deltoid area, extending down to the upper 2/3, arm, left.

Incised Wound, 3.0 cms., neck area, along anterior median line.

Hematoma, scalp, massive, temporo-parietal, left.

STAB WOUNDS:

1. 1.8 cms., elliptical, clean-cut edges, oriented obliquely with sharp infero-lateral extremity and blunt supero-medial extremity, located at the mammary area, right; 3.0 cms., from the anterior

median line, directed backwards, downwards and laterally, involving the soft tissues, cutting completely the 4th cartilage, right side, into the right thoracic cavity, penetrating the lower of the right lung with an approximate depth 8.5 cms.

2. 0.8 cm., elliptical, clean-cut edges, oriented almost vertically, with sharp inferior extremity and blunt superior extremity, located at the inframammary area, left, 1.1 cms., from the anterior median line, directed backwards, downwards and medially, involving the soft tissues only with an approximate depth of 2.0 cms.

3. 2.0 cms., elliptical, clean-cut edges, oriented obliquely, with sharp infero-lateral extremity and blunt supero-medial extremity, located at the inframammary area, left, 2.2 cms., from the anterior median line, directed backwards, downwards, and from left to right, involving the soft tissues, into the left thoracic cavity, perforating the diaphragm, into the abdominal cavity, penetrating the right lobe of the liver with an approximate depth 10.0 cms.

Brain, markedly softened and reduced to grayish white, pultaceous mass.

Other visceral organs, putrified,

Stomach is almost empty.

CAUSE OF DEATH: --- STAB WOUNDS.[47]

In his defense, accused-appellant alleged that he stayed home on September 23, 1993 because he was not feeling well. He denied that he asked Demetrio Ravelo to fetch Elsa. He refuted Demetrios testimony that accused-appellant asked him to buy cigarettes, or that accused-appellant told him to go home at 5:00 p.m.. Rather, accused-appellant maintained that he did not see Demetrio at any time in the afternoon of September 24, 1993.[48]

On September 25, 1993, accused-appellant alleged that he was feeling better, hence, told Demetrio that they were to leave for Bagac, Bataan that afternoon. They left the condominium at about 1:00 to 1:30 p.m. and proceeded straight to Bagac. When they arrived at Bagac, accused-appellant went straight to the kitchen and met his mother, father, aunt and grandmother. Demetrio got the things out of the car and then asked accused-appellants permission to take the car to go to the town.[49]

Accused-appellants mother, Mrs. Nieves Whisenhunt, testified that accused-appellant arrived at their beach house in Bagac, Bataan on September 25, 1993 at 5:00 p.m. At 7:00 the next morning, she saw accused-appellant clad in beach attire. Later that day, she and her husband had lunch at the clubhouse, which was about three to four minutes drive from their house. When they returned home at 2:00 p.m., accused-appellant and his driver, Demetrio, had already left.[50] This was corroborated by accused-appellants aunt, Ms. Frances Sison.[51]

Accused-appellant claimed that he went jet-skiing in the morning of September 25, 1993. He alleged that the water was choppy and caused his jet-ski to lose control. As a result, he suffered

bruises on his chest and legs. Thereafter, he went home, cleaned up, changed clothes and rested. Later, as he was going down the stairs, he slipped and extended his arm to stop his fall. He had lunch with this family. At 1:30 p.m., he and Demetrio left Bagac for Manila.[52]

According to accused-appellant, he first learned of Elsas death when he was arrested by the NBI on September 28, 1993.[53] He denied having anything to do with her death, saying that he had no reason to kill her since he was in love with her. [54] Sometime during his relationship with Elsa, he claimed having received in the mails two anonymous letters. The first one reads:

Salamat sa pagpapahiram mo ng sasakyan at driver. Pero masyado kang pakialamero, Steve. Walanghiya ka. Para kang demonyo. Pinakialaman mo ang di sa yo. Lintik lang ang walang ganti.Matitiyempuhan din kita. Putang ina mo.[55]

The second letter says:

Steve,

Ang kay Pedro kay Pedro. Kapag pinakialaman ay kay San Pedro ang tungo. Mahal mo ba ang pamilya mo? Iniingatan mo ba ang pangalan mo? Nakakasagasa ka na.[56]

At first, accused-appellant ignored the letters. But when he told Elsa about them, she got very upset and worried. She said the letters came from Fred, her estranged husband.[57]

Ms. Frances Sison, accused-appellants aunt, testified that she and her mother visited accused-appellant at 3:00 p.m. on September 23, 1993. She went inside the bedroom and talked to accused-appellant for about 30 minutes. While they were there, Ms. Sison testified that she did not see anyone else in the bedroom. She also said the door of the bathroom inside the room was open, and there was nobody inside. The next day, at 4:00 p.m., she went back to visit accused-appellant. Again, they went inside accused-appellants bedroom and stayed there for one hour. The door of the bathroom was open, and she saw that there was nobody inside. The following morning, they passed by the condominium before proceeding to Bagac, Bataan. They went inside accused-appellants bedroom and talked to him. As in the last two occasions, Ms. Sison saw through the open door of the bathroom that there was no one inside.[58]

Theresa Whisenhunt, accused-appellants sister-in-law, testified that between December 21, 1991 and January 15, 1992, and again from the middle of April, 1992 to May 15, 1992, she slept in the bedroom subsequently occupied by accused-appellant in the Platinum Condominium; that she regularly has her menstruation around the end of every month; and that her blood type is B.[59]

On January 31, 1996, the trial court promulgated the appealed judgment, convicting accused-appellant of the crime of murder, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to pay the heirs of the deceased actual damage, moral damages, exemplary damages and attorneys fees.[60]

Accused-appellant interposed an appeal from the adverse decision of the trial court, alleging that:

I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED OF THE CRIME CHARGED;

II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION WAS ABLE TO PRESENT ENOUGH CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE CONCLUSION THAT THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED;

III THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REJECTING, DISREGARDING AND/OR NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED.[61]

Much of the evidence on accused-appellants complicity was elicited from Demetrio Ravelo, the so-called prosecution star witness.[62] On the premise that accused-appellants guilt or innocence depends largely on the weight of his testimony, this Court has carefully scrutinized and examined his version of the events, and has found that Demetrio Ravelos narrative is both convincing and consistent in all material points.

Before accused-appellant confessed to Demetrio Ravelo what had happened to Elsa Castillo, he first asked the latter how long he was willing to work for him, and how far his loyalty will go. This was logical if accused-appellant wanted to ensure that Demetrio would stand by his side after learning what he was about to reveal. More importantly, Demetrios description of Elsas dismembered body, as he found it in accused-appellants bathroom, perfectly jibed with the appearance of the mutilated body parts, as shown in the photographs presented by the prosecution.[63]

Likewise, the mutilated body parts, as well as the other items thrown by accused-appellant along the road to Bataan, were found by the NBI agents as Demetrio pointed, which confirms that, indeed, the latter witnessed how accused-appellant disposed of Elsas body and personal belongings one by one.

All in all, the testimony of Demetrio Ravelo bears the ring of truth and sincerity. The records show that he did not waver even during lengthy and rigorous cross-examination. In fact, the trial court gave full faith and credit to his testimony, stating:

The Court had opportunity to observe the demeanor of Demetrio Ravelo when he took the witness stand on several occasions. He was extensively cross-examined by one of the defense counsel and he withstood the same creditably. Demetrio Ravelo is a very credible witness and his testimony is likewise credible.[64]

This Court has consistently ruled that factual findings of the trial court deserve the highest respect. This is based on the fact that the trial judge is in the best position to assess the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before his sala as he had personally heard them and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. [65] Especially, where issues raised involve the credibility of witnesses, the trial courts findings thereon will not be disturbed on appeal absent any clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts, or circumstances of weight or substance, which could have affected the result of the case.[66] Succinctly put, findings of fact of the trial court pertaining to the credibility of witnesses command great weight and respect since it had the opportunity to observe their demeanor while they testified in court.[67]

Perhaps more damning to accused-appellant is the physical evidence against him. The findings of the forensic biologist on the examination of the hair samples and bloodstains all confirm Elsas death inside accused-appellants bedroom. On the other hand, the autopsy report

revealed that Elsa was stabbed at least three times on the chest. This, taken together with Demetrios testimony that accused-appellant kept the kitchen knife inside his bedroom on September 24, 1993, leads to the inescapable fact that accused-appellant stabbed Elsa inside the bedroom or bathroom.

Physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth, and it ranks high in the hierarchy of our trustworthy evidence.[68] For this reason, it is regarded as evidence of the highest order. It speaks more eloquently than a hundred witnesses.[69]

While it may be true that there was no eyewitness to the death of Elsa, the confluence of the testimonial and physical evidence against accused-appellant creates an unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence that naturally leads to the fair and reasonable conclusion that accused-appellant was the author of the crime, to the exclusion of all others. Circumstantial evidence may be resorted to in proving the identity of the accused when direct evidence is not available, otherwise felons would go scot-free and the community would be denied proper protection. The rules on evidence and jurisprudence sustain the conviction of an accused through circumstantial evidence when the following requisites concur: (1) there must be more than one circumstance; (2) the inference must be based on proven facts; and (3) the combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond doubt of the guilt of the accused.[70]

In the case at bar, the following circumstances were successfully proven by the prosecution without a shadow of doubt, to wit: that Elsa Santos Castillo was brought to accused-appellants condominium unit on September 23, 1993; that on September 24, 1993, accused-appellants housemaid was looking for her kitchen knife and accused-appellant gave it to her, saying that it was in his bedroom; that on September 25, 1993, accused-appellant and Demetrio Ravelo collected the dismembered body parts of Elsa from the bathroom inside accused-appellants bedroom; that accused-appellant disposed of the body parts by a roadside somewhere in San Pedro, Laguna; that accused-appellant also disposed of Elsas personal belongings along the road going to Bagac, Bataan; that the mutilated body parts of a female cadaver, which was later identified as Elsa, were found by the police and NBI agents at the spot where Demetrio pointed; that hair specimens found inside accused-appellants bathroom and bedroom showed similarities with hair taken from Elsas head; and that the bloodstains found on accused-appellants bedspread, covers and in the trunk of his car, all matched Elsas blood type.

Accused-appellant makes capital of the fact that the Medico-Legal Officer, Dr. Mendez, did not examine the pancreas of the deceased notwithstanding Demetrios statement that, according to accused-appellant, Elsa died of bangungot, or hemorrhage of the pancreas. Because of this, accused-appellant insists that the cause of death was not adequately established. Then, he relied on the controverting testimony of his witness, lawyer-doctor Ernesto Brion, who was himself a Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI for several years, to the effect that the autopsy report prepared by Dr. Mendez was unreliable and inconclusive. The trial court noted, however, that Dr. Brion was a biased witness whose testimony cannot be relied upon because he entered his appearance as one of the counsel for accused-appellant and, in such capacity, extensively cross-examined Dr. Mendez. Accused-appellant counters that there is no prohibition against lawyers giving testimony. Moreover, the trial courts ruling would imply that lawyers who testify on behalf of their clients are presumed to be lying.

By rejecting the testimony of Dr. Brion, the trial court did not mean that he perjured himself on the witness stand. Notably, Dr. Brion was presented as expert witness. His testimony and the

questions propounded on him dealt with his opinion on the probable cause of death of the victim. Indeed, the presentation of expert testimony is one of the well-known exceptions to the rule against admissibility of opinions in evidence.[71] In like manner, Dr. Mendez was presented on the stand to give his own opinion on the same subject. His opinion differed from that of Dr. Brion, which is not at all unusual. What the trial court simply did was to choose which --- between two conflicting medico-legal opinions --- was the more plausible. The trial court correctly lent more credence to Dr. Mendezs testimony, not only because Dr. Brion was a biased witness, but more importantly, because it was Dr. Mendez who conducted the autopsy and personally examined Elsas corpse up close.

In any event, the foregoing does not detract from the established fact that Elsas body was found mutilated inside accused-appellants bathroom. This clearly indicated that it was accused-appellant who cut up Elsas body to pieces. Naturally, accused-appellant would be the only suspect to her killing. Otherwise, why else would he cut up Elsas body as if to conceal the real cause of her death?

As already stated above, Demetrios testimony was convincing. Accused-appellant attempts to refute Demetrios statements by saying that he had repeatedly reprimanded the latter for discourteous and reckless driving, and that he had already asked the latter to tender his resignation. Thus, accused-appellant claims that Demetrio imputed Elsas death on him in order to get back at him. This Court finds the cruel treatment by an employer too flimsy a motive for the employee to implicate him in such a gruesome and hideous crime. Rather than entertain an accusation of ill-motive and bad faith on Demetrio Ravelo, this Court views his act of promptly reporting the incident to his family and, later, to the authorities, as a genuine desire to bring justice to the cruel and senseless slaying of Elsa Santos Castillo, whom he knew well.

Accused-appellant also argues that his arrest was without a warrant and, therefore, illegal. In this regard, the rule is settled that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. [72] In other words, it is too late in the day for accused-appellant to raise an issue about his warrantless arrest after he pleaded to a valid information and after a judgment of conviction was rendered against him after a full-blown trial.

Accused-appellant presented in evidence two supposedly threatening letters which, according to Elsa, were written by the latters husband. There is nothing in these letters which will exculpate accused-appellant from criminal liability. The threats were directed at accused-appellant, not Elsa. The fact remains that Elsa was last seen alive in accused-appellants condominium unit, and subsequently discovered dead in accused-appellants bathroom. Surely, the place where her dead body was found does not support the theory that it was Fred Castillo who was probably responsible for her death.

We do not agree with the trial court that the prosecution sufficiently proved the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Abuse of superiority is present whenever there is inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor and selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime.[73]The fact that the victim was a woman does not, by itself, establish that accused-appellant committed the crime with abuse of superior strength. There ought to be enough proof of the relative strength of the aggressor and the victim.[74]

Abuse of superior strength must be shown and clearly established as the crime itself. [75] In this case, nobody witnessed the actual killing. Nowhere in Demetrios testimony, and it is not indicated in any of the pieces of physical evidence, that accused-appellant deliberately took advantage of his superior strength in overpowering Elsa. On the contrary, this Court observed from viewing the photograph of accused-appellant[76] that he has a rather small frame. Hence, the attendance of the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength was not adequately proved and cannot be appreciated against accused-appellant.

However, the other circumstance of outraging and scoffing at the corpse of the victim was correctly appreciated by the trial court. The mere decapitation of the victims head constitutes outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the victim, thus qualifying the killing to murder. [77] In this case, accused-appellant not only beheaded Elsa. He further cut up her body like pieces of meat. Then, he strewed the dismembered parts of her body in a deserted road in the countryside, leaving them to rot on the ground. The sight of Elsas severed body parts on the ground, vividly depicted in the photographs offered in evidence, is both revolting and horrifying. At the same time, the viewer cannot help but feel utter pity for the sub-human manner of disposing of her remains.

In a case with strikingly similar facts, we ruled:

Even if treachery was not present in this case, the crime would still be murder because of the dismemberment of the dead body. One of the qualifying circumstances of murder under Article 248, par. 6, of the Revised Penal Code is outraging or scoffing at (the) person or corpse of the victim. There is no question that the corpse of Billy Agotano was outraged when it was dismembered with the cutting off of the head and limbs and the opening up of the body to remove the intestines, lungs and liver. The killer scoffed at the dead when the intestines were removed and hung around Victorianos neck as a necklace, and the lungs and liver were facetiously described as pulutan.[78]

Hence, the trial court was correct in convicting accused-appellant of the crime of murder, qualified by outraging and scoffing at the victims person or corpse. [79] This circumstance was both alleged in the information and proved during the trial. At the time of its commission, the penalty for murder was reclusion temporal maximum to death.[80] No aggravating or mitigating circumstance was alleged or proved; hence, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period.[81] Therefore, the trial courts imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua was correct, and need not be modified.

However, the damages awarded by trial court should be modified. Elida Santos, Elsas sister, testified that the funeral expenses was only P50,000.00. [82] Hence, the trial court erred when it awarded the amount of P100,000.00. Basic is the jurisprudential principle that in determining actual damages, the court cannot rely on mere assertions, speculations, conjectures or guesswork but must depend on competent proof and on the best obtainable evidence of the actual amount of the loss. Actual damages cannot be presumed but must be duly proved with reasonable certainty.[83]

The award of moral damages in murder cases is justified because of the physical suffering and mental anguish brought about by the felonious acts, and is thus recoverable in criminal

offenses resulting in death.[84] It is true that moral damages are not intended to enrich the victims heirs or to penalize the convict, but to obviate the spiritual sufferings of the heirs. [85] Considering, however, the extraordinary circumstances in the case at bar, more particularly the unusual grief and outrage suffered by her bereaved family as a result of the brutal and indecent mutilation and disposal of Elsas body, the moral damages to be awarded to them should be more than the normal amount dictated by jurisprudence. However, the amount of P3,000,000.00 awarded by the trial court as moral damages is rather excessive. The reasonable amount is P1,000,000.00 considering the immense sorrow and shock suffered by Elsas heirs.

The award of attorneys fees of P150,000.00 was duly proved,[86] and thus should be affirmed.

Finally, the heirs of Elsa Santos Castillo should be indemnified for her death. In murder, the civil indemnity has been fixed by jurisprudence at P50,000.00. The grant of civil indemnity in murder requires no proof other than the fact of death as a result of the crime and proof of accused-appellants responsibility therefor.[87]

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 152, in Criminal Case No. 102687, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: Accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of Elsa Santos Castillo actual damages in the amount of P50,000.00; civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00; moral damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00; exemplary damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00; and attorneys fees in the amount of P150,000.00. Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.