1st set crimpro cases, finals

Crimpro Case Digests By: Maria Victoria Z. MatillanoFinal Half Set 1, Judge Paño

People vs. Odilao

Facts: Herein respondent David S. Odilao, Jr. together with Enrique Samonte and Mario Yares, was charged with Estafa in an Information[2] filed by the Asst. City Prosecutor Feliciano with the RTC of Cebu City. the said accused, conniving, confederating and mutually helping with one another, having received in trust from Trans Eagle Corporation a luxury car known as “Jeep Cherokee Sport 4wd” valued at P1,199,520.00 with the agreement that they would sign the document of sale if they are interested to buy the same and with the

obligation to return the said car to Trans Eagle Corporation if they are not interested, the said accused, once in possession of the said luxury car, far from complying with their obligation, with deliberate intent, with intent to gain, with unfaithfulness and grave abuse of confidence, did then and there misappropriate, misapply and convert into their own personal use and benefit the same or the amount of P1,199,520.00 which is the equivalent value thereof, and inspite of repeated demands made upon them to let them comply with their obligation to return the luxury car, they have failed and refused and instead denied to have received the luxury car known as “Jeep Cherokee Sport 4WD” and up to the

present time still fail and refuse to do so, to the damage and prejudice of Trans Eagle Corporation in the amount aforestated.

Issue: W/N the court of appeals committed reversible error in granting the injunction sought by the respondent which enjoined the trial court from implementing the warrant of arrest and from further conducting proceedings in the case until the petition for review of the reinvestigation report of the city prosecutor is resolved by the department of justice?

Held:

the Court enunciated the following ruling in Crespo vs. Mogul,[23] to wit: The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion the criminal action against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for appropriate action. While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court or not, once the case had already been brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court. The only qualification

is that the action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People to due process of law. Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to the Court, the Court in the exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require that the trial on the merits proceed for the proper determination of the case. However, one may ask, if the trial court refuses to grant the motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal upon the directive of the Secretary of Justice will there not be a vacuum in the prosecution? . . . The answer is simple. The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as We all know is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused before the Courts. Thus, in spite of his opinion to the contrary, it is the duty of the fiscal to proceed with the presentation of

evidence of the prosecution to the Court to enable the Court to arrive at its own independent Yes. The rule in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.


Thus, in Perez vs. Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc.,[24] the Court held that the trial court judge’s “reliance on the prosecutor’s averment that the Secretary of Justice had recommended the dismissal of the case against the petitioner was, to say the least, an abdication of the trial court’s duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case, in blatant violation of this Court’s pronouncement in Crespo vs. Mogul .IT BEARS STRESSING THAT THE COURT IS HOWEVER NOT BOUND TO ADOPT THE RESOLUTION OF THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE SINCE THE COURT IS MANDATED TO INDEPENDENTLY EVALUATE OR ASSESS THE MERITS OF THE CASE, AND MAY EITHER AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE. RELIANCE ALONE ON THE RESOLUTION OF THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE WOULD BE AN ABDICATION OF THE TRIAL COURT’S DUTY AND JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE PRIMA FACIE CASE.

Verily, the proceedings in the criminal case pending in the trial court had been held in abeyance long enough. Under Section 11, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the suspension of arraignment of an accused in cases where a petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the Department of Justice or the Office of the President “shall not exceed sixty days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office.” Although in this case, at the time that the trial court deferred the arraignment in its Order dated October 30, 2000, the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure had not yet taken effect and there was as yet no prescribed period of time for

the suspension of arraignment, we believe that the period of one and a half years from October 30, 2000 to June 13, 2002, when the trial court ordered the implementation of the warrant of arrest, was more than ample time to give private complainant the opportunity to obtain a resolution of her petition for review from the DOJ. Indeed, with more than three years having elapsed, it is now high time for the continuation of the trial on the merits in the criminal case below as the sixty-day period counted from the filing of the petition for review with the DOJ, provided for in Section 11, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure now applicable to the case at bar, had long lapsed.

People vs. Oden

Facts: The Court is confronted with yet another case where a home ceases being an abode of safety and protection, this time to a motherless daughter who has accused her own father, herein appellant, of having repeatedly had carnal knowledge of her "by means of force and intimidation." Appellant Mario Oden was charged with twelve (12) counts of "rape,". "Due to fear, Anna Liza did not report to anyone all the twelve (12) incidents of sexual molestation. "However, unknown to Anna Liza, her Ate Mercy (wife of the complainant’s brother – Arnold Oden) witnessed the rape that took place on 08 January 2001. Ate Mercy saw through a small hole on the wall inside the house - separating her bedroom from that of Anna Liza’s – what accused had done to her (Anna Liza). And it was not only Ate Mercy who witnessed the rape. Arnold Oden (brother of

Anna Liza) also saw what the accused had done to Anna Liza. Arnold was mad at accused; however he was not able to do anything because he, together with the rest of the siblings, were afraid of their father (accused) - the reason being that everytime accused would get angry, he would beat all of them. "Nonetheless, Ate Mercy reported to a neighbor, Nanay Ludy, Anna Liza’s harrowing experience on 08 January 2001. In turn, Nanay Ludy talked to Anna Liza and directed her to report the incident to the barangay. Anna Liza heeded Nanay Ludy’s directive. She proceeded to the barangay - together with her Ate Mercy and Ate Marilou (wives of Anna Liza’s older brothers) - and reported her father’s outrageous wrongdoings. On 28 January 2001, based on Anna Liza’s sworn statement, the barangay officials, together with the police, arrested accused-appellant."2 After the prosecution had rested its case with the testimony of its lone witness (the private complainant), Atty. Harley Padolina (PAO) manifested that the defense would not present any evidence.

Issue: W/N the accused plea has been improvidently made? YES

Held: In the review of his various cases by this Court, appellant asserts that his plea of guilty has been improvidently made on the mistaken belief that he would be given a lighter penalty with his plea of guilt.4 On this particular score, the Solicitor General agrees.THERE IS MERIT IN THE OBSERVATION.Section 3, Rule 116, of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure is explicit on the procedure to be taken


when an accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, viz:"SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. - When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may present evidence in his behalf."The trial court is mandated (1) to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the plea of guilt, (2) to require the prosecution to still prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability, and (3) to inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present evidence on his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires. The records must show the events that have actually taken place during the inquiry, the words spoken and the warnings given, with special attention to the age of the accused, his educational attainment and socio-economic status, the manner of his arrest and detention, the attendance of counsel in his behalf during the custodial and preliminary investigations, and the opportunity of his defense counsel to confer with him. All these matters should be able to provide trustworthy indices of his competence to give a free and informed plea of guilt. The trial court must describe the essential elements of the crimes the accused is charged with and their respective penalties and civil liabilities. It should also direct a series of questions to defense counsel to determine whether or not he has conferred with the accused and has completely

explained to him the legal implications of a plea of guilt.5The process is mandatory and absent any showing that it has been duly observed, a searching inquiry cannot be said to have been aptly undertaken.6 The trial court must be extra solicitous to see to it that the accused fully understands the meaning and importance of his plea. In capital offenses7 particularly, life being at stake, one cannot just lean on the presumption that the accused has understood his plea.8While the records of the case are indeed bereft of any indication that the rule has sufficiently been complied with, the evidence for the prosecution outside of the plea of guilt, nevertheless, would adequately establish the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt.9 THE MANNER BY WHICH THE PLEA OF GUILT IS MADE, WHETHER IMPROVIDENTLY OR NOT, LOSES MUCH OF GREAT SIGNIFICANCE WHERE THE CONVICTION CAN BE BASED ON INDEPENDENT EVIDENCE PROVING THE COMMISSION BY THE PERSON ACCUSED OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED.10 THE PROSECUTION PRESENTED AT THE WITNESS STAND ANNA LIZA. SHE RECOUNTED STRAIGHTFORWARDLY AND IN SUFFICIENT DETAIL THE TWELVE HARROWING AND HUMILIATING INCIDENTS OF RAPE SHE HAD SUFFERED IN THE HANDS OF HER OWN FATHER.

Soriano vs. People, BSP and PDIC

Facts: A bank officer violates the DOSRI 2 law when he acquires bank funds for his personal benefit, even if such acquisition was facilitated by

a fraudulent loan application. Directors, officers, stockholders, and their related interests cannot be allowed to interpose the fraudulent nature of the loan as a defense to escape culpability for their circumvention of Section 83 of Republic Act (RA) No. 337. HILARIO P. SORIANO and ROSALINDA ILAGAN, as principals by direct participation, with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence and taking advantage of their position as President of the Rural Bank of San Miguel (Bulacan), Inc. and Branch Manager of the Rural Bank of San Miguel-San Miguel Branch [sic], a duly organized banking institution under Philippine Laws, conspiring confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there, willfully and feloniously by making it appear that one Enrico Carlos filled up the application/information sheet and filed the aforementioned loan documents when in truth and in fact Enrico Carlos did not participate in the execution of said loan documents and that by virtue of said falsification and with deceit and intent to cause damage, the accused succeeded in securing a loan in the amount of eight million pesos (PhP8,000,000.00) from the Rural Bank of San Miguel-San Ildefonso branch in the name of Enrico Carlos which amount of PhP8 million representing the loan proceeds the accused thereafter converted the same amount to their own personal gain and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the Rural Bank of San Miguel-San Ildefonso branch, its creditors, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, and the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation.The other Information 17 dated November 10, 2000 and docketed as Criminal Case No. 238-M-2001, was for violation of Section 83 of RA 337, as


amended by PD 1795. The said provision refers to the prohibition against the so-called DOSRI loans.NOTE: 2 INFORMATION WAS FILED ESTAFA and VIOLATION OF DOSRI LAWSRULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS The CA denied the petition on both issues presented by petitioner. On the first issue, the CA determined that the BSP letter, which petitioner characterized to be a fatally infirm complaint, was not actually a complaint, but a transmittal or cover letter only. This transmittal letter merely contained a summary of the affidavits which were attached to it. It did not contain any averment of personal knowledge of the events and transactions that constitute the elements of the offenses charged. Being a mere transmittal letter, it need not comply with the requirements of Section 3 (a) of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. 30 The CA further determined that the five affidavits attached to the transmittal letter should be considered as the complaint-affidavits that charged petitioner with violation of Section 83 of RA 337 and for Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial Documents. These complaint-affidavits complied with the mandatory requirements set out in the Rules of Court — they were subscribed and sworn to before a notary public and subsequently certified by State Prosecutor Fonacier, who personally examined the affiants and was convinced that the affiants fully understood their sworn statements. 31 AEScHa

ANENT THE SECOND GROUND, THE CA FOUND NO MERIT IN PETITIONER'S ARGUMENT THAT THE VIOLATION OF THE DOSRI LAW AND THE COMMISSION OF ESTAFA THRU FALSIFICATION OF

COMMERCIAL DOCUMENTS ARE INHERENTLY INCONSISTENT WITH EACH OTHER. It explained that the test in considering a motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, is whether the facts alleged, when hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements of the offense charged. The appellate court held that this test was sufficiently met because the allegations in the assailed informations, when hypothetically admitted, clearly constitute the elements of Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial Documents and Violation of DOSRI law. 32On June 8, 2001, petitioner moved to quash 21 these informations on two grounds: that the court had no jurisdiction over the offense charged, and that the facts charged do not constitute an offense.

Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.

Issues:1. Is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65

the proper remedy against an Order denying a Motion to Quash?

2. Is a Rule 65 petition for certiorari the proper remedy against an Order denying a Motion to Quash?

1st Issued Held:The second issue was raised by petitioner in the context of his Motion to Quash Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. 43 It is settled that in considering a motion to quash on such ground, the test is "whether the facts alleged, if

hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the offense charged as defined by law. The trial court may not consider a situation contrary to that set forth in the criminal complaint or information. Facts that constitute the defense of the petitioner[s] against the charge under the information must be proved by [him] during trial. Such facts or circumstances do not constitute proper grounds for a motion to quash the information on the ground that the material averments do not constitute the offense". 44 SaITHC We have examined the two informations against petitioner and we find that they contain allegations which, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime of DOSRI violation and estafa thru falsification of commercial documents. In Criminal Case No. 238-M-2001 for violation of DOSRI rules, the information alleged that petitioner Soriano was the president of RBSM; that he was able to indirectly obtain a loan from RBSM by putting the loan in the name of depositor Enrico Carlos; and that he did this without complying with the requisite board approval, reportorial, and ceiling requirements. In Criminal Case No. 237-M-2001 for estafa thru falsification of commercial documents, the information alleged that petitioner, by taking advantage of his position as president of RBSM, falsified various loan documents to make it appear that an Enrico Carlos secured a loan of P8 million from RBSM; that petitioner succeeded in obtaining the loan proceeds; that he later converted the loan proceeds to his own personal gain and benefit; and that his action caused


damage and prejudice to RBSM, its creditors, the BSP, and the PDIC. TEHIaD Significantly, this is not the first occasion that we adjudge the sufficiency of similarly worded informations. In Soriano v. People, 45 involving the same petitioner in this case (but different transactions), we also reviewed the sufficiency of informations for DOSRI violation and estafa thru falsification of commercial documents, which were almost identical, mutatis mutandis, with the subject informations herein. We held in Soriano v. People that there is no basis for the quashal of the informations as "they contain material allegations charging Soriano with violation of DOSRI rules and estafa thru falsification of commercial documents". Petitioner raises the theory that he could not possibly be held liable for estafa in concurrence with the charge for DOSRI violation. According to him, the DOSRI charge presupposes that he acquired a loan, which would make the loan proceeds his own money and which he could neither possibly misappropriate nor convert to the prejudice of another, as required by the statutory definition of estafa. 46 On the other hand, if petitioner did not acquire any loan, there can be no DOSRI violation to speak of. Thus, petitioner posits that the two offenses cannot co-exist. This theory does not persuade us. Petitioner's theory is based on the false premises that the loan was extended to him by the bank in his own name, and that he became the owner of the loan proceeds. Both premises are wrong. ACTISE The bank money (amounting to P8 million) which came to the possession of petitioner was money

held in trust or administration by him for the bank, in his fiduciary capacity as the President of said bank. 47 It is not accurate to say that petitioner became the owner of the P8 million because it was the proceeds of a loan. That would have been correct if the bank knowingly extended the loan to petitioner himself. But that is not the case here. According to the information for estafa, the loan was supposed to be for another person, a certain "Enrico Carlos"; petitioner, through falsification, made it appear that said "Enrico Carlos" applied for the loan when in fact he ("Enrico Carlos") did not. Through such fraudulent device, petitioner obtained the loan proceeds and converted the same. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that petitioner became the legal owner of the P8 million. Thus, petitioner remained the bank's fiduciary with respect to that money, which makes it capable of misappropriation or conversion in his hands. The next question is whether there can also be, at the same time, a charge for DOSRI violation in such a situation wherein the accused bank officer did not secure a loan in his own name, but was alleged to have used the name of another person in order to indirectly secure a loan from the bank. We answer this in the affirmative. In sum, the informations filed against petitioner do not negate each other.

2nd Issue Held:In fine, the Court has consistently held that a special civil action for certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an information. The proper procedure in such a case is for the accused to enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice on his part to present the

special defenses he had invoked in his motion to quash and if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law. Thus, petitioners should not have forthwith filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA and instead, they should have gone to trial and reiterated the special defenses contained in their motion to quash. There are no special or exceptional circumstances in the present case that would justify immediate resort to a filing of a petition for certiorari. Clearly, the CA did not commit any reversible error, much less, grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition.People vs. Elarcosa and Orias

Facts: Jorge, Segundina, Jose and Rosemarie, all surnamed dela Cruz, heard some persons calling out to them from outside their house, which is located Negros Occidental. Since the voices of these persons were not familiar to them, they did not open their door immediately, and instead, they waited for a few minutes in order to observe and recognize these persons first. It was only when one of them identified himself as Mitsuel L. Elarcosa (Elarcosa), an acquaintance of the family, that Segundina lighted the lamps, while Jose opened the door. 1 Elarcosa and his companion, accused-appellant Orias, then entered the house and requested that supper be prepared for them as they were roving. Both Elarcosa and accused-appellant Orias were Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) members. 2 Segundina and Rosemarie immediately went to the kitchen to prepare food, while Jose and Jorge stayed in the living room with Elarcosa and accused-appellant Orias. 3


Since the rice was not cooked yet, Rosemarie first served a plate of suman to Elarcosa and accused-appellant Orias, who were then engaged in a conversation with her father, Jorge, and her brother, Jose. She heard accused-appellant Orias asked her brother why the latter did not attend the dance at Sitio Nalibog. Her brother replied that he was tired. Suddenly thereafter, Elarcosa and accused-appellant Orias stood up and fired their guns at Jose and Jorge.

Segundina, who was busy preparing supper in the kitchen, ran towards the living room and embraced her son, Jose, who was already lying on the floor. Elarcosa and accused-appellant Orias then immediately searched the wooden chest containing clothes, money in the amount of forty thousand pesos (PhP40,000) intended for the forthcoming wedding of Jose in October, and a registration certificate of large cattle. During this time, Rosemarie escaped through the kitchen and hid in the shrubs, which was about six (6) extended arms length from their house. She heard her mother crying loudly, and after a series of gunshots, silence ensued. 5 Shortly thereafter, Rosemarie proceeded to the house of her cousin, Gualberto Mechabe, who advised her to stay in the house until the morning since it was already dark and he had no other companion who could help them. The following morning, Rosemarie returned to their house where she found the dead bodies of her parents and her brother. 6 The money in the amount of PhP40,000, as well as the certificate of registration of large cattle, were also gone. 7

Eventually, Elarcosa and accused-appellant Orias, as well as a certain Antonio David, Jr., were charged with robbery with multiple homicide.

Issues:

1. W/N alibi of accused-appellant Orias should be given wheight. NO

2. W/N there is duplicity of offense? (ground for a MTQ) YES

Held:

1st Issue:

Although the alibi of accused-appellant Orias appears to have been corroborated by a CAFGU member by the name of Robert Arellano and by a vendor present during the dance, said defense is unworthy of belief not only because of its inherent weakness and the fact that accused-appellant Orias was positively identified by Rosemarie, but also because it has been held that alibi becomes more unworthy of merit where it is established mainly by the accused himself, his relatives, friends, and comrades-in-arms, 37 and not by credible persons.

2nd Issue: In the instant case, conspiracy is manifested by the fact that the acts of accused-appellant Orias and Elarcosa were coordinated. They were synchronized in their approach to shoot Jose and Jorge, and they were motivated by a single criminal impulse, that is, to kill the victims. Verily, conspiracy is implied when the accused persons had a common purpose and were united in its execution. Spontaneous agreement or active

cooperation by all perpetrators at the moment of the commission of the crime is sufficient to create joint criminal responsibility. 49 ACCUSED-APPELLANT ORIAS SHOULD BE CONVICTED OF THREE (3) COUNTS OF MURDER AND NOT OF THE COMPLEX CRIME OF MURDER We, however, disagree with the findings of the CA that accused-appellant Orias committed the complex crime of multiple murder. Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines the concept of complex crime, states: ART. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. — When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. (As amended by Act No. 4000.) In a complex crime, although two or more crimes are actually committed, they constitute only one crime in the eyes of the law, as well as in the conscience of the offender. Hence, there is only one penalty imposed for the commission of a complex crime. Complex crime has two (2) kinds. The first is known as compound crime, or when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies. The second is known as complex crime proper, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other.CONSIDERING OUR HOLDING ABOVE, WE RULE THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT ORIAS IS GUILTY, NOT OF A COMPLEX CRIME OF MULTIPLE MURDER, BUT OF THREE (3) COUNTS OF MURDER FOR THE DEATH OF THE THREE (3) VICTIMS.

Since there was only one information filed against accused-appellant Orias and Elarcosa,


the Court observes that there is duplicity of the offenses charged in the said information. This is a ground for a motion to quash as three (3) separate acts of murder were charged in the information. Nonetheless, the failure of accused-appellant Orias to interpose an objection on this ground constitutes waiver. 55

Albert vs. Sandiganbayan and People

Facts: That in (sic) or about May 1990 and sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Davao, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused RAMON A. ALBERT, a public officer, being then THE PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL HOME MORTGAGE AND FINANCE CORPORATION (NHMFC), occupying the said position with a salary grade above 27, while in the performance of his official function, committing the offense in relation to his office, taking advantage of his official position, conspiring and confederating with accused FAVIO D. SAYSON, then the Project Director of CODE Foundation Inc. and accused ARTURO S. ASUMBRADO, then the President of the Buhangin Residents and Employees Association for Development, Inc., acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality and or gross neglect of duty, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause undue injury to the government and public interest, enter and make it appear in

Tax Declarations that two parcels of real property particularly described in the Certificate of Titles are residential lands which Tax Declarations accused submitted to the NHMFC when in truth and in fact, as accused well knew, the two pieces of real property covered by Certificate of Titles are agricultural land, and by reason of accused's misrepresentation, the NHMFC released the amount of P4,535,400.00 which is higher than the loanable amount the land could command being agricultural, thus causing undue injury to the government. On 18 December 2000, pending the resolution of the Motion to Dismiss, petitioner filed a Motion to Lift Hold Departure Order and to be Allowed to Travel. The prosecution did not object to the latter motion on the condition that petitioner would be "provisionally" arraigned. 6 On 12 March 2001, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Amend Motion to Lift Hold Departure Order and to be Allowed to Travel. The following day, or on 13 March 2001, the Sandiganbayan arraigned petitioner who entered a plea of "not guilty". In the Resolution dated 16 April 2001, the Sandiganbayan granted petitioner's Urgent Motion to Amend Motion to Lift Hold Departure Order and to be Allowed to Travel. On 26 November 2001, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss and ordered the prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation of the case with respect to petitioner. In a Memorandum dated 6 January 2003, the SPO who conducted the reinvestigation recommended to the Ombudsman that the indictment against petitioner be reversed for lack of probable cause. However, the Ombudsman, in an Order dated 10 March 2003, disapproved the Memorandum and

directed the Office of the Special Prosecutor to proceed with the prosecution of the criminal case. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the Ombudsman. In a Resolution promulgated on 16 May 2003, the Sandiganbayan scheduled the arraignment of petitioner on 24 July 2003. However, in view of the pending motion for reconsideration of the order of the Ombudsman, the arraignment was reset to 2 October 2003. HAICTD In a Manifestation dated 24 September 2003, the SPO informed the Sandiganbayan of the Ombudsman's denial of petitioner's motion for reconsideration. On even date, the prosecution filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Amended Information. During the 2 October 2003 hearing, this ex-parte motion was withdrawn by the prosecution with the intention of filing a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Information. The scheduled arraignment of petitioner was reset to 1 December 2003. 7 On 7 October 2003, the prosecution filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Information.

THE RULING OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN In its Resolution of 10 February 2004, 9 the Sandiganbayan granted the prosecution's Motion to Admit Amended Information. At the outset, the Sandiganbayan explained that "gross neglect of duty" which falls under Section 3 (f) of RA 3019 is different from "gross inexcusable negligence" under Section 3 (e), and held thus: In an information alleging gross neglect of duty, it is not a requirement that such neglect or refusal causes undue injury compared to an information alleging gross inexcusable negligence where


undue effect constitutes substantial amendment considering that the possible defense of the accused may divert from the one originally intended. ATDHSC It may be considered however, that there are three modes by which the offense for Violation of Section 3(e) may be committed in any of the following: 1. Through evident bad faith; 2. Through manifest partiality; 3. Through gross inexcusable negligence. Proof of the existence of any of these modes in connection with the prohibited acts under said section of the law should suffice to warrant conviction. 10 However, the Sandiganbayan also held that even granting that the amendment of the information be formal or substantial, the prosecution could still effect the same in the event that the accused had not yet undergone a permanent arraignment. And since the arraignment of petitioner on 13 March 2001 was merely "provisional", then the prosecution may still amend the information either in form or in substance.

Issues:

1. WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ADMITTING THE AMENDED INFORMATION.

2. WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF

JURISDICTION IN FURTHER PROCEEDING WITH THE CASE DESPITE THE VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO A SPEEDY TRIAL.

Held: 1st ISSUE: The original information filed against petitioner alleged that he acted with "evident bad faith and manifest partiality and or (sic) gross neglect of duty". The amended information, on the other hand, alleges that petitioner acted with "evident bad faith and manifest partiality and/or gross inexcusable negligence". Simply, the amendment seeks to replace "gross neglect of duty" with "gross inexcusable negligence". Given that these two phrases fall under different paragraphs of RA 3019 — specifically, "gross neglect of duty" is under Section 3 (f) while "gross inexcusable negligence" is under Section 3 (e) of the statute — the question remains whether or not the amendment is substantial and prejudicial to the rights of petitioner. The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or information is when a defense under the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might have, would be inapplicable to the complaint or information as amended. 26 On the other hand, an amendment which merely states with additional precision something which is already contained in the original information and which, therefore, adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged is an amendment to form that can be made at anytime. 27 In this case, the amendment entails the deletion of the phrase

"gross neglect of duty" from the Information. ALTHOUGH THIS MAY BE CONSIDERED A SUBSTANTIAL AMENDMENT, THE SAME IS ALLOWABLE EVEN AFTER ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA BEING BENEFICIAL TO THE ACCUSED. 28 As a replacement, "gross inexcusable negligence" would be included in the Information as a modality in the commission of the offense. This Court believes that the same constitutes an amendment only in form. The Court held that a conviction for a criminal negligent act can be had under an information exclusively charging the commission of a willful offense upon the theory that the greater includes the lesser offense.

2nd Issue: Petitioner's contentions are futile. This right, however, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. 32 A simple mathematical computation of the period involved is not sufficient. We concede that judicial proceedings do not exist in a vacuum and must contend with the realities of everyday life. After reviewing the records of the case, we believe that the right of petitioner to a speedy trial was not infringed upon. The issue on the inordinate delay in the resolution of the complaint-affidavit filed against petitioner and his co-accused and the filing of the original Information against petitioner was raised in petitioner's Motion to Dismiss, and was duly addressed by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution denying the said motion. It appears that the said delays were caused by the


numerous motions for extension of time to file various pleadings and to reproduce documents filed by petitioner's co-accused, and that no actual preliminary investigation was conducted on petitioner.

Dino vs. OIlivarez

Petitioners instituted a complaint for vote buying against respondent Pablo Olivarez. Based on the finding of probable cause in the Joint Resolution issued by Assistant City Prosecutor Antonietta Pablo-Medina, with the approval of the city prosecutor of Parañaque, two Informations were filed before the RTC on 29 September 2004 charging respondent Pablo Olivarez with Violation of Section 261, paragraphs a, b and k of Article XXII of the Omnibus Election Code .

On 11 October 2004, respondent filed a Motion to Quash the two criminal informations on the ground that more than one offense was charged therein, in violation of Section 3(f), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. This caused the resetting of the scheduled arraignment on 18 October 2004 to 13 December 2004. Before Judge Madrona could act on the motion to quash, Assistant Prosecutor Pablo-Medina, with the approval of the city prosecutor, filed on 28 October 2004 its "Opposition to the Motion to Quash and Motion to Admit Amended Informations." The Amended Informations sought to be admitted charged respondent with violation of only paragraph a, in relation to paragraph b, of

Section 261, Article XXII of the Omnibus Election Code. CEaDAc On 1 December 2004, Judge Madrona issued an Order resetting the hearing scheduled on 13 December 2004 to 1 February 2005 on account of the pending Motion to Quash of the respondent and the Amended Informations of the public prosecutor.

On 14 December 2004, respondent filed an "Opposition to the Admission of the Amended Informations," arguing that no resolution was issued to explain the changes therein, particularly the deletion of paragraph k, Section 261, Article XXII of the Omnibus Election Code. Moreover, he averred that the city prosecutor was no longer empowered to amend the informations, since the COMELEC had already directed it to transmit the entire records of the case and suspend the hearing of the cases before the RTC until the resolution of the appeal before the COMELEC en banc. On 12 January 2005, Judge Madrona issued an order denying respondent's Motion to Quash dated 11 October 2004, and admitted the Amended Informations dated 25 October 2004. Respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration dated 20 January 2005 thereon. On 1 February 2005, Judge Madrona reset the arraignment to 9 March 2005, with a warning that the arraignment would proceed without any more delay, unless the Supreme Court would issue an injunctive writ. aCIHAD On 9 March 2005, respondent failed to appear before the RTC. Thereupon, Judge Madrona, in open court, denied the Motion for Reconsideration of the Order denying the Motion

to Quash and admitting the Amended Informations, and ordered the arrest of respondent and the confiscation of the cash bond. On 11 March 2005, respondent filed an "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and/or to Lift the Order of Arrest of Accused Dr. Pablo Olivarez," which was denied in an Order dated 31 March 2005. The Order directed that a bench warrant be issued for the arrest of respondent to ensure his presence at his arraignment. On 5 April 2005, the Law Department of the COMELEC filed before the RTC a Manifestation and Motion wherein it alleged that pursuant to the COMELEC's powers to investigate and prosecute election offense cases, it had the power to revoke the delegation of its authority to the city prosecutor.

Issue:

1. W/N court erred in ruling the admission of the two amended informations and in dismissing his motion to quash. (YES the court erred)

2. W/N the city prosecutor defied the order or directive of the COMELEC when it filed the amended informations. (YES CP acted in excess of his authority)

1. Held:

As it stands, since there are no amended informations to speak of, the trial court has no basis for denying respondent's motion to quash. Consequently, there can be no arraignment on the amended informations. In view of this, there


can be no basis for ordering the arrest of respondent and the confiscation of his cash bond. For having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the trial court's orders — dated 12 January 2005 denying the Motion to Quash and admitting the amended information; 9 March 2005 denying the Motion for Reconsideration of the Order denying the Motion to Quash, admitting the amended informations, and ordering the arrest of the respondent and the confiscation of his cash bond; and 31 March 2005 denying respondent's Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and/or to lift the Order of Arrest — are declared void and of no effect. Motion for Reconsideration is Granted/

2. Held: It cannot also be disputed that the COMELEC Law Department has the authority to direct, nay, order the public prosecutor to suspend further implementation of the questioned resolution until final resolution of said appeal, for it is speaking on behalf of the COMELEC. The COMELEC Law Department, without any doubt, is authorized to do this as shown by the pleadings it has filed before the trial court. If the COMELEC Law Department is not authorized to issue any directive/order or to file the pleadings on behalf of the COMELEC, the COMELEC En Banc itself would have said so. This, the COMELEC En Banc did not do. The records are likewise bereft of any evidence showing that the City Prosecutor of Parañaque doubted such authority. It knew that the COMELEC Law Department could make such an order, but the public prosecutor opted to

disregard the same and still filed the Amended Informations contrary to the order to hold the proceedings in abeyance until a final resolution of said appeal was made by the COMELEC En Banc.

Lazarte vs. Sandiganbayan

Facts:

In June 1990, the National Housing Authority (NHA) awarded the original contract for the infrastructure works on the Pahanocoy Sites and Services Project, Phase 1 in Bacolod City to A.C. Cruz Construction. The project, with a contract cost of P7,666,507.55, was funded by the World Bank under the Project Loan Agreement forged on 10 June 1983 between the Philippine Government and the IBRD-World Bank.

A.C. Cruz Construction commenced the infrastructure works on 1 August 1990. 5 In April 1991, the complainant Candido M. Fajutag, Jr. (Fajutag, Jr.) was designated Project Engineer of the project.

A Variation/Extra Work Order No. 1 was approved for the excavation of unsuitable materials and road filling works. As a consequence, Arceo Cruz of A.C. Cruz Construction submitted the fourth billing and Report of Physical Accomplishments on 6 May 1991. Fajutag, Jr., however, discovered certain deficiencies. As a result, he issued Work Instruction No. 1 requiring some supporting documents, such as: (1) copy of approved concrete pouring; (2) survey results of original ground and finished leaks; (3) volume calculation of earth fill actually rendered on site; (4) test

results as to the quality of materials and compaction; and (5) copy of work instructions attesting to the demolished concrete structures.

The contractor failed to comply with the work instruction. Upon Fajutag, Jr.'s further verification, it was established that there was no actual excavation and road filling works undertaken by A.C. Cruz Construction.

On 2 October 2006, petitioner filed a motion to quash the Information raising the following grounds: (1) the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense; (2) the information does not conform substantially to the prescribed form; (3) the constitutional rights of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against them have been violated by the inadequacy of the information; and (4) the prosecution failed to determine the individual participation of all the accused in the information in disobedience with the Resolution dated 27 March 2005. 18 On 2 March 2007, the Sandiganbayan issued the first assailed resolution denying petitioner's motion to quash. We quote the said resolution in part:

Among the accused-movants, the public officer whose participation in the alleged offense is specifically mentioned in the May 30, 2006 Memorandum is accused Felicisimo Lazarte, Jr., the Chairman of the Inventory and Acceptance Committee (IAC), which undertook the inventory and final quantification of the accomplishment of A.C. Cruz Construction. The allegations of Lazarte


that the IAC, due to certain constraints, allegedly had to rely on the reports of the field engineers and/or the Project Office as to which materials were actually installed; and that he supposedly affixed his signature to the IAC Physical Inventory Report and Memoranda dated August 12, 1991 despite his not being able to attend the actual inspection because he allegedly saw that all the members of the Committee had already signed are matters of defense which he can address in the course of the trial. Hence, the quashal of the information with respect to accused Lazarte is denied for lack of merit.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby resolves as follows: (1) Accused Robert Balao, Josephine Angsico and Virgilio Dacalos' Motion to Admit Motion to Quash dated October 4, 2006 is GRANTED; the Motion to Quash dated October 4, 2006 attached thereto, is GRANTED. Accordingly, the case is hereby DISMISSED insofar as the said accused-movants are concerned. (2) The Motion to Quash dated October 2, 2006 of accused Engr. Felicisimo F. Lazarte, Jr. is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Let the arraignment of the accused proceed as scheduled on March 13, 2007.

Issues:

1. W/N the Information filed before the Sandiganbayan insufficiently averred the essential elements of the crime charged as it failed to specify the individual participation of all the accused. NO

2. W/N the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case. YES

Held: The Court is not persuaded. The Court affirms the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.

At the outset, it should be stressed that the denial of a motion to quash is not correctible by certiorari. Well-established is the rule that when a motion to quash in a criminal case is denied, the remedy is not a petition for certiorari but for petitioners to go to trial without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked in their motion to quash. Remedial measures as regards interlocutory orders, such as a motion to quash, are frowned upon and often dismissed. The evident reason for this rule is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single court. 31

This general rule, however, is subject to certain exceptions. If the court, in denying the motion to dismiss or motion to quash acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari or prohibition lies. 32 And in the case at bar, the Court does not find the Sandiganbayan to have committed grave abuse of discretion.

The fundamental test in reflecting on the viability of a motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense is whether or not the facts asseverated, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime defined in law. 33 Matters aliunde will not be considered.

Finally, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction to hear the case. As correctly pointed out by the Sandiganbayan, it is of no moment that petitioner does not occupy a position with Salary Grade 27 as he was a department manager of the NHA, a government-owned or controlled corporation, at the time of the commission of the offense, which position falls within the ambit of its jurisdiction.

The instant petition is DISMISSED. The Resolutions dated 2 March 2007 and 18 October 2007 of the First Division of the Sandiganbayan are AFFIRMED.

ALAWIYA y ABDUL vs. CA

Facts: On 18 September 2001, petitioners executed sworn statements4 before the General Assignment Section of the Western Police District in United Nations Avenue, Manila, charging accused P/C Insp. Michael Angelo Bernardo Martin, P/Insp. Allanjing Estrada Medina, PO3 Arnold Ramos Asis, PO2 Pedro Santos Gutierrez, PO2 Ignacio De Paz and PO2 Antonio Sebastian Berida, Jr., who were all policemen assigned at that time at the Northern Police District, with kidnapping for ransom. The sworn-statements of petitioners commonly alleged that at about 10:00 in the morning of 11 September 2001, while petitioners were cruising on board a vehicle along United Nations Avenue, a blue Toyota Sedan bumped their vehicle from behind; that when they went out of their vehicle to assess the damage, several armed men alighted from the Toyota Sedan, poked guns at, blindfolded, and forced them to ride in the Toyota Sedan; that


they were brought to an office where P10,000,000 and two vehicles were demanded from them in exchange for their freedom; that, after haggling, the amount was reduced to P700,000 plus the two vehicles; that the money and vehicles were delivered in the late evening of 11 September 2001; that they were released in the early morning of 12 September 2001 in Quiapo after they handed the Deed of Sale and registration papers of the two vehicles.

On 24 January 2002, State Prosecutor Velasco filed with the RTC of Manila an Information for Kidnapping for Ransom against the accused with no bail recommended.

On 28 January 2002, the trial court, upon motion by the prosecution, issued a Hold Departure Order against the accused.9 On even date, the trial court issued a Warrant of Arrest against all the accused.10 Meanwhile, on 8 February 2002, the accused filed a petition for review of the Resolution of State Prosecutor Velasco with the Office of the Secretary of Justice.

On 18 February 2002, the accused moved for the quashal of the Information on the ground that "the officer who filed the Information has no authority do so."11

Issue: Whether the accused policemen can seek any relief (via a motion to quash the information) from the trial court when they had not been arrested yet.

Held: NO. At any rate, the accused’s motion to quash, on the ground of lack of authority of the filing officer, would have never prospered because as discussed earlier, the Ombudsman’s power to investigate offenses involving public officers or employees is not exclusive but is concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the government.

When the accused had not been arrested yet People v. Mapalao,27 as correctly argued by the OSG, does not squarely apply to the present case. In that case, one of the accused, Rex Magumnang, after arraignment and during the trial, escaped from detention and had not been apprehended since then. Accordingly, as to him the trial in absentia proceeded and thereafter the judgment of conviction was promulgated. The Court held that since the accused remained at large, he should not be afforded the right to appeal from the judgment of conviction unless he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the court or is otherwise arrested. While at large, the accused cannot seek relief from the court as he is deemed to have waived the same and he has no standing in court.28 In Mapalao, the accused escaped while the trial of the case was on-going, whereas here, the accused have not been served the warrant of arrest and have not been arraigned. Therefore, Mapalao is definitely not on all fours with the present case.lavvphil.net Furthermore, there is nothing in the Rules governing a motion to quash29 which requires that the accused should be under the custody of the law prior to the filing of a motion to quash on the ground that the officer filing the information had no authority to do so. Custody of the law is

not required for the adjudication of reliefs other than an application for bail.30 However, while the accused are not yet under the custody of the law, any question on the jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when the accused invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person.

There is no clear showing that the present case falls under any of the recognized exceptions. Moreover, as stated earlier, once the information is filed with the trial court, any disposition of the information rests on the sound discretion of the court. The trial court is mandated to independently evaluate or assess the existence of probable cause and it may either agree or disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice. The trial court is not bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of Justice.34 Reliance alone on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice amounts to an abdication of the trial court’s duty and jurisdiction to determine the existence of probable cause.35 Considering that the Information has already been filed with the trial court, then the trial court, upon filing of the appropriate motion by the prosecutor, should be given the opportunity to perform its duty of evaluating, independently of the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice recommending the withdrawal of the Information against the accused, the merits of the case and assess whether probable cause exists to hold the accused for trial for kidnapping for ransom.36 WHEREFORE, we REMAND this case to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Manila, to


independently evaluate or assess the merits of the case to determine whether probable cause exists to hold the accused for trial.

Los Banos vs. Pedro

The petition seeks to revive the case against respondent Joel R. Pedro (Pedro) for election gun ban violation after the CA declared the case permanently dismissed pursuant to Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.

Pedro was charged in court for carrying a loaded firearm without the required written authorization from the Commission on Elections (Comelec) a day before the May 14, 2001 national and local elections.

The accusation was based on Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 or the Omnibus Election Code (Code) after the Marinduque Philippine National Police (PNP) caught Pedro illegally carrying his firearm at a checkpoint at Boac, Marinduque.

Pedro filed a Motion for Preliminary Investigation, which the RTC granted. 7 The preliminary investigation, however, did not materialize. Instead, Pedro filed with the RTC a Motion to Quash, arguing that the Information "contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification 8 and/or that the facts charged do not constitute an offense." 9 Pedro attached to his motion a Comelec Certification dated September 24, 2001 that he was "exempted" from the gun ban. The provincial prosecutor opposed the motion.

The RTC quashed the Information and ordered the police and the prosecutors to return the seized articles to Pedro. 10 IHCSET The petitioner, private prosecutor Ariel Los Baños (Los Baños), representing the checkpoint team, moved to reopen the case, as Pedro's Comelec Certification was a "falsification", and the prosecution was "deprived of due process" when the judge quashed the information without a hearing. Attached to Los Baños' motion were two Comelec certifications stating that: (1) Pedro was not exempted from the firearm ban; and (2) the signatures in the Comelec Certification of September 24, 2001 were forged.

The RTC reopened the case for further proceedings, as Pedro did not object to Los Baños' motion. 11 Pedro moved for the reconsideration of the RTC's order primarily based on Section 8 of Rule 117, 12 arguing that the dismissal had become permanent. He likewise cited the public prosecutor's lack of express approval of the motion to reopen the case.

THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION The CA initially denied Pedro's petition. For accuracy, we quote the material portions of its ruling: The petition lacks merit.

To summarize this ruling, the appellate court, while initially saying that there was an error of law but no grave abuse of discretion that would call for the issuance of a writ, reversed itself on motion for reconsideration; it then ruled that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion because it failed to apply Section 8, Rule 17 and the time-bar under this provision.

Issue: The issue is ultimately reduced to whether Section 8, Rule 117 is applicable to the case, as the CA found. If it applies, then the CA ruling effectively lays the matter to rest. If it does not, then the revised RTC decision reopening the case should prevail.

Held: We find the petition meritorious and hold that the case should be remanded to the trial court for arraignment and trial.

In People v. Lacson, 21 we ruled that there are sine qua non requirements in the application of the time-bar rule stated in the second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 117. We also ruled that the time-bar under the foregoing provision is a special procedural limitation qualifying the right of the State to prosecute, making the time-bar an essence of the given right or as an inherent part thereof, so that the lapse of the time-bar operates to extinguish the right of the State to prosecute the accused.

c. Their Comparison

An examination of the whole Rule tells us that a dismissal based on a motion to quash and a provisional dismissal are far different from one another as concepts, in their features, and legal consequences. While the provision on provisional dismissal is found within Rule 117 (entitled Motion to Quash), it does not follow that a motion to quash results in a provisional dismissal to which Section 8, Rule 117 applies. A first notable feature of Section 8, Rule 117 is that


it does not exactly state what a provisional dismissal is. The modifier "provisional" directly suggests that the dismissals which Section 8 essentially refers to are those that are temporary in character (i.e., to dismissals that are without prejudice to the re-filing of the case), and not the dismissals that are permanent (i.e., those that bar the re-filing of the case). Based on the law, rules, and jurisprudence, permanent dismissals are those barred by the principle of double jeopardy, 22 by the previous extinction of criminal liability, 23 by the rule on speedy trial, 24 and the dismissals after plea without the express consent of the accused. 25 Section 8, by its own terms, cannot cover these dismissals because they are not provisional. A second feature is that Section 8 does not state the grounds that lead to a provisional dismissal. This is in marked contrast with a motion to quash whose grounds are specified under Section 3. The delimitation of the grounds available in a motion to quash suggests that a motion to quash is a class in itself, with specific and closely-defined characteristics under the Rules of Court. A necessary consequence is that where the grounds cited are those listed under Section 3, then the appropriate remedy is to file a motion to quash, not any other remedy. Conversely, where a ground does not appear under Section 3, then a motion to quash is not a proper remedy. A motion for provisional dismissal may then apply if the conditions required by Section 8 obtain. AHCcET A third feature, closely related to the second, focuses on the consequences of a meritorious motion to quash. This feature also answers the question of whether the quashal of an information can be treated as a provisional

dismissal. Sections 4, 5, 6, and 7 of Rule 117 unmistakably provide for the consequences of a meritorious motion to quash. Section 4 speaks of an amendment of the complaint or information, if the motion to quash relates to a defect curable by amendment. Section 5 dwells on the effect of sustaining the motion to quash — the complaint or information may be re-filed, except for the instances mentioned under Section 6. The latter section, on the other hand, specifies the limit of the re-filing that Section 5 allows — it cannot be done where the dismissal is based on extinction of criminal liability or double jeopardy. Section 7 defines double jeopardy and complements the ground provided under Section 3 (i) and the exception stated in Section 6.

The failure of the Rules to state under Section 6 that a Section 8 provisional dismissal is a bar to further prosecution shows that the framers did not intend a dismissal based on a motion to quash and a provisional dismissal to be confused with one another; Section 8 operates in a world of its own separate from motion to quash, and merely provides a time-bar that uniquely applies to dismissals other than those grounded on Section 3Conversely, when a dismissal is pursuant to a motion to quash under Section 3, Section 8 and its time-bar does not apply.

To recapitulate, quashal and provisional dismissal are different concepts whose respective rules refer to different situations that should not be confused with one another. If the problem relates to an intrinsic or extrinsic deficiency of the complaint or information, as shown on its face, the remedy is a motion to quash under the terms

of Section 3, Rule 117. All other reasons for seeking the dismissal of the complaint or information, before arraignment and under the circumstances outlined in Section 8, fall under provisional dismissal. Thus, we conclude that Section 8, Rule 117 does not apply to the reopening of the case that the RTC ordered and which the CA reversed; the reversal of the CA's order is legally proper.

The grounds Pedro cited in his motion to quash are that the Information contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification [Section 3 (h), Rule 117], and that the facts charged do not constitute an offense [Section 3 (a), Rule 117]. We find from our examination of the records that the Information duly charged a specific offense and provides the details on how the offense was committed. 28 Thus, the cited Section 3 (a) ground has no merit. On the other hand, we do not see on the face or from the averments of the Information any legal excuse or justification. The cited basis, in fact, for Pedro's motion to quash was a Comelec Certification (dated September 24, 2001, issued by Director Jose P. Balbuena, Sr. of the Law Department, Committee on Firearms and Security Personnel of the Comelec, granting him an exemption from the ban and a permit to carry firearms during the election period) 29 that Pedro attached to his motion to quash. This COMELEC Certification is a matter aliunde that is not an appropriate motion to raise in, and cannot support, a motion to quash grounded on legal excuse or justification found on the face of the Information. Significantly, no hearing was ever called to allow the prosecution to contest the


genuineness of the COMELEC certification. 30 aATEDS

Thus, the RTC grossly erred in its initial ruling that a quashal of the Information was in order. Pedro, on the other hand, also misappreciated the true nature, function, and utility of a motion to quash. As a consequence, a valid Information still stands, on the basis of which Pedro should now be arraigned and stand trial.