legislative influence: toward theory development through causal analysis

Legislative Influence: Toward Theory Development through Causal AnalysisAuthor(s): Katherine MeyerSource: Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Nov., 1980), pp. 563-585Published by: Comparative Legislative Research CenterStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/439574 .

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KATHERINE MEYER Ohio State University

Johns Hopkins University

Legislative Influence: Toward Theory Development Through Causal Analysis

Theory and empirical findings were combined to develop a causal model of reputed influence in legislatures. The model was tested for majority and minority members in a one-party dominant state legislature (North Carolina) where 99 percent of the legislators were interviewed. Emergent models illustrated majority-minority differences. Minority members needed expertise in certain legislative areas and formal office more than majority members to be considered influential. Achievement of formal office impeded minority members' gaining that expertise. For majority members, seniority alone paid off and social backgrounds were a factor in their being considered influential. The findings suggest further exploration of interparty differences.

By the late 1960's and early 1970's, a great deal of research on power and influence in legislatures and other organizations had been done. A plethora of subconcepts of power and of measures of power had been identified (Hawley, 1963; Parsons, 1960; Schattschneider, 1960; Hunter, 1953; March, 1955). Distinctions among such concepts as power, influence, authority, and force had been made (Bachrach and Baratz, 1963; Mott, 1970; Lieberson, 1971). In 1968, Dahl stated the need for causal analysis in studying power relations, so that the diverse findings and disparate insights could begin to cumulate into unified theory. He relied heavily on Blalock (1961) and pointed out that systematically establishing the linkages among variables would be an important advance. Causal modeling has been applied to studying power and influence in some organizations but has rarely been applied to legislatures (e.g., Miller and Stokes, 1963).

In this paper, two causal models of influence in legislatures are developed: a model of influence in a state legislature for majority members, and one for minority members. The literature on legislatures served as a guide to examining the relationships between a reputational measure of influence and explanatory variables. Data were drawn from the 1973 North Carolina state legislature.

Legislative Studies Quarterly, V, 4, November, 1980 Copyright 1980 by the Comparative Legislative Research Center 0362-9805/80/0504-0563$01.15 563



Katherine Meyer

Before data analysis, separate consideration of majority and minority parties seemed appropriate because party histories were different, although a joint analysis was also conducted.1 When findings revealed two distinct models, what began as a theoretical concern became an empirical necessity. Single analysis masked the interaction effects of majority-minority status with other variables and was basically invalid because the two subpopulations (majority and minority parties) exhibited different patterns. In fact, the two models developed here displayed some variables not only important to both parties but also unique to each. This outcome suggested the importance of examining interaction in similar research.

The research focused on several goals. One was to organize many of the discrete findings from the 1960's and 1970's into models of influence so that the relative importance of various explanatory variables could be made clear. This was in keeping with Dahl's proposal. Another goal was to identify emergent propositions, as suggested by Glaser and Strauss (1967). A third goal was to examine legislative influence in the context in which it often operates; namely, within a majority-minority party structure. Since the operation of structures most often is revealed when it is disturbed, even for a short period of time, the 1973 North Carolina legislature was chosen as a case study for analysis. That legislature was undergoing a period of change in party composition; like many Southern legislatures, its one party dominance was being shaken.

Development of the models presented here came from using a strategy which combined deductions from theory and previous findings with inductions from data in the following way. First, a conceptual model showing presumed relationships among major variables was constructed. Then, a process of successively estimating linear equations was used to eliminate independent variables which lacked either substantive or statistical significance. Last, a final model was set forth which provided a set of estimated causal relationships based partly on theoretical considerations and partly on empirical findings.

Although the model is called "final," it is actually a beginning approximation to a more fully developed model of influence in legislatures. It is "final" for this paper only. Other models need to be constructed using a measure of influence different from the one used here, a reputational one. By comparing such models, we will have advanced from the controversies of the 1960's over measurement of power and influence to a more comprehensive understanding of the environment surrounding influence in legislatures.

The Model

The reputational measure of influence was based on legislator's responses to the question, "Who are the five most influential members of

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Legislative Influence

the House?" Gamson (1966), Presthus (1964), Clark (1968), and Parsons (1963) have pointed out that reputation is a resource which is persuasive and which gives potential power to the reputed influential.2 Following Francis's work (1962), the study presented here examined the association between reputation for generalized influence and reputation for influence in specific legislative areas; gamma = .67. That association indicated that the measures of influence were largely interchangeable. Hence, studying reputation for general influence may tell us much about influence in general although causal models utilizing other measures of influence should be examined to see whether or not that is so.

In this study, all legislators responded to the question about influence, rather than just a panel of judges. In the 1973 North Carolina House of Representatives with 120 members, the number of mentions received by individual legislators ranged from 0 to 83.

Three general categories of independent variables were drawn from social organization and social psychological theorists interested in the distri- bution of influence in a social system; namely, synthetic theorists in the field of stratification (Ossowski, 1963; van der Berghe, 1963; Lenski, 1966); human ecologists concerned with systems of cities (Hawley, 1950, 1971); formal organization theorists (Blau and Scott, 1962; Katz and Kahn, 1967; Thompson, 1967; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1969); and students of leadership (Gibb, 1949, 1954, 1958; Hopkins, 1964; Bass, 1960; Katz, 1968). From such theorists came a general level hypothesis governing the model: variations in reputations for influence can be explained by the formal positions of units in a social system, their individual attributes and skills, and the environmental influences and constraints within which they must operate. The former two explanatory categories contribute positively toward the building of a reputation for influence, because they provide opportunities for acquiring visibility and information to the unit, and the last category impedes that building because it creates pressures and conflicts for the unit.

Less abstract independent variables were culled from the literature on "influence" in legislatures. In Table 1, those variables were matched with the more abstract categories mentioned above. The theoretical and empirical works from which the operational variables were drawn are cited beside each variable in the table. Direction of effect was induced from the literature as well.

Formal Position

The number of citations in Table 1 indicates that formal office is frequently seen as an important ingredient of legislative behavior. Generally, it is viewed as a combination of one's party position and committee positions.

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TABLE 1 Explanatory Categories and Variables Related to Influence

General Categories of Independent Variables

1. Formal position of units in a social system

2. Environmental influences and constraints

3. Individual attributes and skills of units

Independent Variables in Theoretical and Empirical Tradition

Formal office in legislature (Bell, 1969; Froman, 1967; Ripley, 1969; Zemsky, 1970; Matthews, 1960; Clapp, 1963; Francis, 1962; Truman, 1959).

Safety of legislator's district, i.e., absence of strong electoral competition

(Matthews, 1960; Clapp, 1963; Fenno, 1966).

Strength of interest groups in legislator's district

(Patterson, 1965; Gross, 1953; Walker, 1948; Patterson and Wahlke, 1969).

Expertise (Eulau, 1962;Clapp, 1963; Francis, 1962; Matthews, 1960; French and Raven, 1959).

Personal background variables: Occupational prestige, level of education, political experience, and political philosophy

(Zemsky, 1970; Pederson, 1966; Jewell, 1969; Clapp, 1963; Patterson, 1965).

Formal office is expected to increase one's reputation for influence. Here, range of formal office (X7 in Figure 1 below) was a six-point ordinal scale incorporating both party position (Matthews, 1960) and committee position (Francis, 1962). It assigned the following values to positions: Party Leader or Whip = 5; Committee Chair and Vice Chair simultaneously on different committees = 4; Committee Chair only = 3; two or more Committee Vice Chairs = 2; Committee Vice Chair only = 1; and Member only = 0. This measure allowed both majority and minority members to receive the highest, lowest, and intermediate scale values. Minority as well as majority members had scores ranging from 0 through 5 because members of both parties held committee chairs or vice chairs. And minority scores had a skewness coefficient of only 1.54, which was considered worth noting but not large enough to require a mathematical correction.

Individual Attributes

Expertise is also seen as a source of influence. Many scholars simply discuss the importance of expertise, but others (Matthews, Clapp, and Francis) discuss whether experts need wide or narrow ranges of knowledge to be considered influential. All three researchers agree that influential legislators

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are not extreme generalists. Matthews's and Francis's research indicated that extreme specialization was not desirable either. Influential legislators seem to be experts in several closely related legislative areas. In this study, expertise (X8) was a four-item scale, based on a two-step procedure. When interviewed, legislators identified their areas of expertise from a list of 20 areas, used in a 1959 study by Matthews and others.3 Unknown to legislators, two social science professors (E. Colin Campbell and T. Eamon) weighted items on the list based on their relevance to the greatest number of legislative bills and their involvement with the bulk of legislation. Appropriations, constitutional amendments, law, and taxation emerged as the areas of expertise most needed in lawmaking, based on a tally of the scores assigned by the two raters. Then, legislators who claimed expertise in all four areas received a score of 4, etc. The reliability coefficient, Q2, (Heise and Bohnstedt, 1970) for the expertise scale was .45; construct validity (Pts) .68; and invalidity ( 2), .01.

Some students of legislatures concentrate on personal background variables; apparently they are interested in how certain socialization and political opportunities channel an individual's interests and options within a legislature. Occupations, education, and political experience including seniority provide bases for gaining influence. In contrast, political liberalism may work against a legislator's influence, for state legislatures are frequently conservative and Southern legislatures, like the one studied here, may be more conservative than many. Further, personal background variables are viewed as determinants of formal office (Zemsky, Clapp) as well as of influence. Education, occupation, and political experience should enhance one's opportunity for formal office. Only political liberalism lessens one's chances, since state legislatures favor conservatism.

Level of education (X1) was an eight-point scale ranging from graduate or professional training to elementary school education. Occupational prestige (X2) was determined by assigning a prestige score from the 1970 census occupational ranking to each legislator's occupation. Census ranking ranged from 15 to 82. Reliability scores for level of education and for variables based on occupation (i.e., occupational prestige and situs, used as an instrumental variable in two-stage least squares discussed later) were determined by comparing data from questionnaires with publications of North Carolina state. Proportion of agreement (reliability) for level of education was .92; for occupation, .95.

Political liberalism (X3) was a six-item scale devised by Eamon (1974) to tap legislator's attitudes on items which were to come before the 1973 North Carolina state legislature.4 The reliability coefficient, Q2, was .73; validity coefficient, Pts, .85; invalidity coefficient, I2, .01.

Political experience (X4) was a summary concept for several variables treated separately in data analysis: number of years of elective office excluding

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568 Katherine Meyer

FIGURE 1 Descriptive Model Summarizing Hypotheses

Based on Literature on Legislators' Reputed Influence

X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 Level of Occupational Political Political Intensity of Perceived Education Prestige Liberalism Experience Electoral Strength of

Scale Variables Competition Interest in a District inr Group Pressure 1972 General Distct in District

+ t972 Generalction Scales

- X7

- -N +or -

Range of Range of Claimed Formal - 4- Expertise in Office '- + Areas Routinely

Needed for '- Lawmaking

Reputation for+

Reputation for Influence

service in the legislature, ranging from 12 to 1; number of campaigns in which a legislator served, ranging from 16 to 0 and excluding the legislator's own campaigns; degree of father's activity in politics; ranging from 2 (very active) to 0; and experience holding important offices in state and county party politics, ranging from 4 to 0. Reliability for each variable-based on comparison of data from two sources, on multiple indicators from the questionnaire, or on factor analytic scale construction-was > .68. The median reliability score for the political experience variables was .74.

Environmental Influences

Like personal background variables, the safety of legislators' districts and the strength of interest groups in those districts are seen determining both influence and formal office. Studies of the U.S. Congress (Matthews, Clapp, Fenno) found that legislators from competitive (unsafe) districts seldom achieved important committee positions or assignments. Nor were they considered influential. In state legislatures, Jewell and Patterson (1966) found that influential legislators were from safe districts. Combining insights from the U.S. Congress and state legislatures, we expected competition in a district to decrease one's chances for formal office as well as for influence.

Index of competition in a legislator's district (X5) was an index x-Y 1- - , where X = the number of votes a legislator received in the 1972

(X+Y) 5 general election campaign and Y = the number of votes which the strongest losing competitor received. So in multi-member districts with 3 seats and 5

__ _ _




competitors, for example, "Y" consisted of the votes received by the candidate who came in fourth. The measure, based on MacRae (1952), considered the number of additional votes needed by the main losing competitor to have defeated the legislator in question (i.e., X-Y). If that quantity was small (or the overall index was large), competition was great, and vice versa.

The relationship between interest group strength in a district and influence of the district's legislator is not explicitly discussed in the literature, but many writers consider how interest group pressure affects legislative roles. Some suggest that strong interest group pressure can enhance a legislator's position, especially if the interest group is important to the legislator's party. Others suggest that the legislator required to cater to diverse interest groups would be in a position similar to the legislator from an "unsafe" district. Environmental pressures weaken freedom to bargain within the legislature, and that freedom is a base of influence (French and Raven, 1959). So the direction of effect of strong interest groups was an empirical question.

Perceived strength of interest group pressure in a district (X6) was a summary concept for three sets of interest groups which were developed in a lengthy procedure. All legislators assigned weights from 0 to 5 to 20 interest groups. The weights assigned by the legislators in a district were averaged, yielding a district interest group strength score. Use of multiple informants to calculate a measure minimized bias of a single legislator and enhanced objectivity (Seidler, 1974). Scores for the 20 interest groups were factor analyzed, using the district as the unit of analysis. The three sets of interest groups which emerged were: a general complex of interest groups, utilities interest groups, and farming interest groups. The resultant three variables each ranged from 0 to 5. Reliability coefficients for each set of interest groups were: 2 > .71.

Relationship Between Variables

In addition to guiding choice of operational variables and predicting the relationship between variables, the literature on legislatures suggested what the direction of relationships is between most variables. However, in certain places, the literature was not clear. Formal office was clearly endogenous since personal background and environmental constraints influenced it. Yet, Eulau (1962) and Francis (1962) discussed the relationship between formal office and expertise without establishing directionality. That ambiguity was shown in Figure 1. A two-stage least squares procedure was used to untangle directionality of effect in the models for majority and minority members before regression analysis of the causal models proceeded.

Further, the literature discussed the relationship of expertise with formal office and influence but ignored expertise's relationship with other

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Katherine Meyer

variables. We considered the possibility of relationships between expertise and the exogenous variables. One relationship was predicted in advance of analysis of a full recursive model. Political experience would seem to enhance one's expertise in legislative areas, because knowledge should lead to skill.

The Data

Data for analysis of the models came from two sources. The primary source of data was a questionnaire administered by interview between March and May, 1973, to 99 percent of the 120 members of the House of Repre- sentatives in North Carolina (one member refused to be interviewed). The questionnaire provided data for all variables except intensity of electoral competition in a district, formal office, and instrumental variables needed to work out the directionality problem between formal office and expertise. Those data came from publications of the state of North Carolina. (See "North Carolina" in bibliography.) These state publications were also used to check the reliability of data on the attributes and skills of legislators which were gleaned from the questionnaires.

Brief Profile of the North Carolina House

A brief profile of the 1973 North Carolina House points out the role of the legislature in state government and the position of the minority party in the house chamber. The legislature was in many respects stronger than the governor, who lacked veto power. Within the legislature, the House was perceived as the more active chamber for legislation for many years. And it historically served as a spawning ground for election to the executive branch and to higher political office.

By 1973, political parties in the House had reached a noteworthy point in their development. For the first time in the twentieth century, Republicans were a recognizable minority, similar in size to U.S. Congress- ional minorities which often include one-third of the membership. As a result of two successive reapportionments, 29 percent of the members were Repub- lican; (before reapportionment, twelve percent were Republican). Republican representatives came from urban areas throughout the state as well as Appala- chian regions, where they had been a strong force since the Civil War. And they had an ally in the governor, who was a Republican for the first time in 70 years.

Republicans took advantage of their new-found strength in the House. They forced roll-call votes on legislation which they felt would embarass Democratic opponents, especially laws dealing with civil rights. And

570




in 1973, Republicans felt they profited from an informal agreement with Democratic leaders in 1969, which stated that Republican strength on committees should be proportional to Republican strength in the chamber as a whole. Recommendations of minority leaders for committee assignment of Republicans were generally followed. Republicans held a range of formal positions within the House, including chairs and vice chairs.

The growth of the Republican Party resulted in some attempts by the Democrats to curb Republican strength. For example, Democrats introduced legislation to eliminate primary run-offs so they could conserve party strength for the general election. They also sought to remove the power to appoint members of the State Board of Elections from the governor's control. Activities like these led us to expect some evidence of Democrats' handling growing Republican strength in our analysis of the routes to legislative influence for members of each party.

We also expected to find some traces of factionalism among Demo- crats, since it existed in the preceding (1971) legislature. In the 1971 House, there had been an important contest between two Democrats for the 1973 speakership. The winner, a moderate, defeated a long-term legislator, who symbolized an "old-guard," vested interest kind of legislature. Also, in 1971, there was a struggle over how much control private versus public utilities should have. While these and other issues illuminated factions within the Democratic Party, Republican factionalism was not obvious in roll-call votes, floor debate, etc. (Mitchell and Joines, 1971). Overall, Republican voting was unified. Even in seven roll calls where it was not (Rice index > .3), members voting together were not consistent across the seven votes (Mitchell and Joines, 1971). Yet, as a minority, Republicans would have been brought into majority party struggles either directly or indirectly. So, we would expect Democratic factionalism to affect senior Republicans who were around in 1971 or before (50%), since they must have aligned themselves with one faction or the other in considering and voting on controversial issues.

Estimating the Models

Meeting Assumptions for Regression

Examination of means and variances indicated that legislators of both parties had many similarities, but some differences. Democrats had slightly more prestigious occupations than Republicans; they served in a greater number of campaigns; and they held elective office outside the legislature slightly longer. Republicans had a smaller percentage of chair positions in the legislature, and they faced stronger competition in the general election campaign in 1972. Most of the differences between

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Katherine Meyer

Democrats and Republicans could be expected in a predominantly Democratic state; however, greater variations around the mean for Democrats indicated that great differences between parties occurred only for some Democratic legislators, not for all.

Table 2 presents intercorrelations among the variables, the empirical basis for estimating the model's path coefficients. Correlations for majority Democrats are to the upper right of the diagonal; those for minority Repub- licans are to the lower left. The table was examined for multicollinearity. Zero-order correlations did not suggest a problem, defined by Althauser (1971) as a correlation > .85. Calculation of multicollinearity statistics (Lemieux, 1978) yielded no coefficients > .63.6 Even so, there were two intercorrelations (or multicollinearity coefficients) that could trouble a conservative critic. The correlation between education and occupation was: .76 (R2 1 _ .64; R2 2 .57) for majority Democrats,

and .56 (R2 = .47; R22 = .57) for the Republican minority. Note, however, that these variables were discussed here together as socio- economic variables. Their relative difference of effect was not germane to the analysis. Since the differential effect of paths is confounded by multicollinearity, when differential effect is not an issue, multicollinearity is unimportant. Thus, we can be satisfied that multicollinearity was not a problem in this research.

Finally, three skewed variables were recoded so that all were normally distributed for tests of significance. And an analysis of scattergrams indicated that the form of the relationships of each variable to reputation for influence in both parties was approximately linear.

With assumptions for regression met, analysis of models from Democrats and Republicans proceeded in two steps. First, the directionality problem between range of formal office (X7) and range of claimed expertise (X8) was worked out using instrumental variables in a two-stage least squares procedure. Second, full recursive models for each party were tested for purposes of theory trimming, and trimmed models were analyzed by regression procedures.

Solving the Directionality Problem

To conduct two-stage least squares analysis, instrumental variables were added to the model. The income of legislators (Z1), ranging from 5 to 0, was introduced as an instrument for range of formal office, while occupational situs (Z2), coded "1" if a legislator had a situs classified as either "legal authority" or "finance and records" and "0" otherwise, was an instrument for range of claimed expertise.

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TABLE 2 Zero-Order Correlations Between Exogenous Variables Determining Legislators' Reputed Influence

Determinants of Reputed Influence X1 X2 X3 X4a X4b X4c X4d X4e X5 X6a X6b X6c

X1 Education .76 -.07 -.41 -.20 .13 .05 -.05 -.01 .18 .06 .00

X2 Occupation .56 -.18 -.37 -.10 .14 .04 -.00 -.03 .13 .00 -.01

X3 Liberalism -.13 -.24 .15 -.01 -.15 .09 .16 -.09 -.08 -.08 .18 X4a Elective Office

Outside Legislature -.12 .04 .02 -.11 -.04 -.18 .02 -.04 -.16 -.15 .06 X4b Legislative Terms -.18 -.19 .24 -.22 -.09 .10 -.04 .05 -.31 -.05 .05 X4c Campaigns Served .20 .31 -.32 -.04 -.44 .20 .23 .23 .01 .10 .04 X4d Father's Activity

in Politics -.13 -.40 .47 .02 .02 -.06 .08 .11 -.09 .04 .16 X4e Party Offices Before

Legislative Election .15 .21 -.07 .15 -.34 .12 .07 -.02 .01 .09 -.06

X5 Competition -.20 -.12 -.30 .15 -.26 .04 -.17 -.01 -.01 -.09 .02 X6a Perceived Strength of

Interest Groups -.11 -.06 -.28 -.08 .27 .01 -.40 -.12 .16 .26 -.03 X6b Perceived Strength of

Utilities -.26 -.17 .02 .25 .21 -.08 -.24 -.23 .22 .42 .00

X6c Perceived Strength of Farmers .09 -.16 .16 .31 .04 -.16 .19 .08 -.05 -.20 -.17

Note: The upper right-hand section of the table refers to the Democrats; the lower left-hand part refers to the Republicans.

-1

CD C)

(1 '-. 0aO



Katherine Meyer

The effect of Variable X7 on X8 (b87 = .63; standard error = .53; "t" = 1.20) was greater than the effect of X8 on X7 (b78 = -.05; standard error = 1.01; "t" = -.05), and there was no strong reason to suspect feedback. Therefore, it seemed that the higher ranked the combination of formal offices a legislator held, the more likely she or he was to claim a range of expertise in areas routinely needed in lawmaking.

Theory Trimming of Full Recursive Models

In trimming models for majority and minority members, three sets of equations were calculated. In the first, all possible paths from independent variables to the three endogenous variables were assessed. In the second, variables having path coefficients > .10, variables having significant effects on at least one endogenous variable, or variables explaining a good amount of variance in two out of three endogenous variables, were considered. In the third, only variables having path coefficients > .20 in either model were considered. The procedure implied successively omitting variables that made slight contributions to variation in the dependent variables.

Findings

Full Models

Table 3 shows the regression analysis for estimating path coefficients in the first set for both models. If we comment on only major patterns in this paper, it was immediately clear that two variables pertaining to the internal legislative environment-number of terms in the legislature (X4b) and range of formal office (X7)-had some important direct and indirect effects on reputation for influence (Y) for both parties. Also, the insignificance of amount of competition in a district (X5) stood out. All three findings were notable.

Range of Formal Office. Several things should be noted about range of formal office. First, its positive direct influence on legislators' reputations for both parties confirmed much of the literature (see Table 1, item 1). That confirmation, in turn, demonstrated the validity of the measurement for formal office used in this study. Previously, both Matthews (1960) and Francis (1962) had operationalized formal position, which was already considered important in theoretical literature (e.g., Gross, 1953; Truman, 1959; French and Raven, 1959). Both had separated majority and minority members; and both had incorporated party and committee positions. Yet the

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TABLE 3 Coefficients for Full Recursive Model of Determinants of Legislators' Reputed Influence, for Democrats and Republicans

(Betas-Dependent Variable)

Range of Claimed Expertise Reputation for Influence in Routine Lawmaking Areas Range of Formal Office

(Y) (X8) (X7) Majority Minority Majority Minority Majority Minority

Independent Variables Democrats Republicans Democrats Republicans Democrats Republicans

XI Education .23*** .14 .22 .09 -.01 .15 X2 Occupation .01 -.12 .20 .02 .24** -.01 X3 Liberalism -.04 .04 -.01 -.16 .05 -.10 X4a Elective Office

Outside Legislature .15** -.07 .23*** -.13 -.04 .11 X4b Legislative Terms .39*** -.46 .02 .80*** .61*** .65*** X4c Campaigns Served -.02 .10 .07 -.08 -.06 -.18 X4d Father's Activity

in Politics .08 .28 .18** -.11 .02 -.04 X4e Party Offices Before

Legislative Election .12* .24 .18** .45*** -.08 -.25* X5 Amount of District

Competition in 1972 General Election .06 -.07 .04 -.03 .01 -.09

X6a Perceived Strength of Interest Groups .04 .12 -.08 -.08 -.05 -.01

X6b Perceived Strength of Utilities -.01 .13 .00 -.25 .01 -.32**

X6c Perceived Strength of Farmers -.08 .01 -.04 .13 -.03 -.10

X7 Range of Formal Office .46*** .88*** .17 -.47** - - X8 Range of Claimed Expertise .08 .20 -

R2 .61 .48 .25 .54 .45 .65

i) CD

o cl

***Slope (b) significant at .001 level *Slope (b) significant at .05 level **Slope (b) significant at .01 level



Katherine Meyer

Matthews measure had a nominal measurement scale and the Francis measure made parties incomparable and excluded many party offices within the legislature-a fact which may have led to his unusual finding of a negative relationship between formal position and reputed general influence in the Indiana legislature. In this study, the measure of formal position incorporated party and committee positions like the Matthews and Francis measures. But it gave comparable rankings to members of the legislature regardless of party, unlike Francis's measure, and yielded an ordinal level or measurement, unlike Matthews's measure. Since findings based on the measure used here confirmed the bulk of the literature and since its properties are more amenable to sophisticated techniques of data analysis, it apparently should be added to the storehouse of measurement developing from legislative studies.

Second, range of formal office was a very important explanatory variable for both parties, but it was significantly more important for minority members than for majority members. (Note: The difference between the regression coefficients (b's) was significant at the .05 level two-tailed test.) Range of claimed expertise in areas assential to the legislative process (X8) was also more important for minority members than for majority members but the difference was not statistically significant.

Third, if we look at claimed expertise (X8) as the dependent variable, we note that office boosted expertise for Democrats but lessened it for Republicans. (Differences of slopes were significant at the .10 level, two-tailed test.) While both variables cumulatively enhanced Democrats' reputations, those same variables-more essential for Republicans-worked against each other in their effect on minority Republicans' influence. Since the Democratic leadership controlled access to committee positions, the Democratic leadership probably appointed Democrats to positions that gave them essential legislative skills and generally withheld those positions from Republicans.

From looking at the important effects of range of formal office, then, we can develop some propositions related to minority-majority status in a one-party dominant state; namely, range of formal office and expertise are more essential to minority members' reputations. Yet achievement of the former frequently thwarts achievement of the latter; the same does not hold for majority party members.

Number of Terms in the Legislature. Seniority signaled differences between parties in a one-party dominant state. Seniority's strong direct effect for Democrats indicated that seniority alone granted Democrats influential status: it did not do that for Republicans. (See direct effects of seniority on reputed influence.) The difference between slopes was significant at the .001 level, two-tailed test. Further, seniority operating through formal office and

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expertise enhanced Democrats' reputations, but the intervening variables were not essential. In contrast, Republicans needed formal office and expertise for their seniority to pay off. Apparently, longevity in the legislature alone granted Democrats reputed influence, but Republicans who did not have legislative skills or who did not get favored appointments from Democrats had little influence despite long years of legislative service. An emergent proposition from these findings was: seniority must be channeled through formal office and expertise for it to make a positive contribution to minority members' reputations for influence.

Amount of Competition in a District (XS). Finally, the amount of competition in a legislator's district (X5) was an unimportant explanatory variable, contrary to expectations. In the literature, the safety of a district (i.e., absence of competition) is considered important in Congress (Matthews, 1960; Clapp, 1963; Fenno, 1966) and in state legislatures (Jewell and Patterson, 1966). Legislators from competitive districts are not expected to be powerful or to gain important formal offices, because competition at home diverts a legislator's attention from the legislative body and suggests to other legislators that the term of office of a competition-ridden colleague may be short. Despite the importance of safety of a district in theoretical pieces and studies using bivariate analysis, the multivariate analysis conducted here showed that amount of competition in a district bore little relationship to formal office (X7), claim of expertise (X8), or reputation for influence (Y). Apparently, when many variables were controlled simultaneously, the importance of the safety of a district for a legislator's career within the legislature was weak compared to the influence of political socialization and social background variables.

"Final" Trimmed Models

Some other findings can be seen more clearly if the third set of equations (i.e., the set including only variables having path coefficients > .20 in either model) are examined in Table 4. (Since in all three sets of equations in the trimming process the same coefficients were > .20, examination of the third set excludes no important variables and displays all the potent variables in two parsimonious "final" models.)

Majority Members. In addition to formal office and seniority discussed above, it was obvious that several other kinds of variables were important for Democrats. First, social background variables, level of education (X1) and occupational prestige (X2), were important through either their direct

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TABLE 4 Coefficients of Trimmed Model of Determinants of Legislators' Reputed Influence,

For Democrats and Republicansa (Betas-Dependent Variable)

Range of Claimed Expertise Reputation for Influence in Routine Lawmaking Areas Range of Formal Office

(Y) (X8) (X7) Majority Minority Majority Minority Majority Minority

Independent Variables Democrats Republicans Democrats Republicans Democrats Republicans

X1 Education .23*** -.22 - -.08 X2 Occupation - -.21 - - X4a Elective Office

Outside Legislature .12* - .24*** - - -

X4b Legislative Terms .36*** -.42* .79*** .64*** .72*** X4d Father's Activity

in Politics .05 .35** .19** -.14 -

X4e Party Offices Before Legislative Election .12 .21 .20*** .47*** - .25**

X6b Perceived Strength of Utilities - - - -.26 --.34***

X7 Range of Formal Office .47*** .85*** .17 -.42* X8 Range of Claimed Expertise .08 .20 -

R2 .59*** .46* .23** .53* .43*** .64***

*Slope (b) significant at .05 level **Slope (b) significant at .01 level ***Slope (b) significant at .001 level

aThe "final" models included variables that had strong effects on at least one dependent variable. These models contained linkages which either were important in themselves or essential for linking each exogenous variable to two endogenous ones (Blalock, 1961).

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or indirect effects. Second, political experience variables-number of years of elective office outside the legislature (X4a), party offices held before election to the legislature (X4e), and, to some extent, degree of father's activity in politics (X4d) led Democrats to claim legislative expertise, which then advanced their reputations. The significance of these social background variables and political experience variables (including seniority) added support to the findings of researchers and theorists who cite the importance of socialization for political success (Hyman, 1959; Greenstein, 1965; Langton, 1969). But these findings further specified our knowledge of socialization and took it beyond the frequent considerations of childhood socialization alone. The significance of social background and political experience variables for Democrats clearly demonstrated the relevance of adulthood socialization experiences to legislative influence.

Minority Members. In addition to formal office and expertise, other variables were important for Republicans' reputations. In particular, some political experience variables (including seniority) had strong effects for Republicans as they did for Democrats. Thus, the significance of political socialization variables was underlined. But, in contrast to the consistent, positive, cumulative support that some political experience variables gave to Democrats' reputations, they had some positive and some negative direct and indirect effects for Republicans. For example, Republicans holding party offices before election to the legislature (X4e) gained influence and expertise but not formal office. It would seem that the majority leadership did not give important positions to minority members who had built up a strong party base before entering the legislature, even though Republicans needed formal office more than Democrats, as shown above.

Other variables, important to the minority model, showed further contrasts with the majority model. Whereas social background variables (education and occupation) were important for Democrats, they were unimportant for Republicans. Apparently, only what minority Republicans did in the legislature itself (seniority, formal office, expertise) and some political socialization (party offices, fathers' activity) mattered. From these observations, another proposition could be induced: the paths to influence for minority members were more restricted to political life than the routes to influence for majority members.

Finally, the strength of utilities' interest groups in a district (X6b) had negative indirect effects in the Republican model. While the content of that finding was probably peculiar to the legislature studied, it did suggest that members of the minority party felt the negative aspects of interest group pressure more strongly when that pressure had surfaced over a controversial

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issue, such as whether utilities should be held publicly or privately. (Difference of slopes was significant at .05 level, two-tailed test.)

Moreover, the importance of only this type of interest group pressure for Republicans made it very obvious that the three scales of perceived strength of interest group pressures in a district (X6a-X6c) had weak explanatory power for both Democrats and Republicans. Also, as discussed earlier, amount of competition in a district (X5) was unimportant for both models. Thus, contrary to expectations, the variables indicative of environmental influences and constraints (see Table 1, category 2) had unremarkable effects, when they were considered in the context of other variables tested simultaneously in regression analysis of causal models.

Emergent Propositions and Conclusions

The "final" models constructed in this study add several dimensions to existing studies of influence in legislatures. They confirm hypotheses about the importance of formal office, expertise, and political experience for gaining a reputation for influence. They fail to support hypotheses suggesting the significance of district electoral competition and strength of interest groups in a district. And the models demonstrate the need for conducting separate analyses for majority and minority parties-here Democrats and Republicans.

Separate analyses for Democrats and Republicans yielded different models for each. Some social background and political experience variables enhanced Democrats' reputations either directly or cumulatively with formal office and expertise. The model for Republicans was more complex. Social background was unimportant for them; only events in the political arena mattered. And not all political items enhanced Republicans' reputations either separately or cumulatively. For example, holding party office before election, having seniority, and occupying a highly-ranked range of formal offices had mixed (positive and negative) effects on minority members' reputations.

Emergent propositions related to minority-majority status in a one- party dominant state were:

1) Routes to influence for minority members were restricted to political life. For majority members, education and occupational prestige (social background) provided other paths to reputed influence.

2) Minority members needed range of formal office and expertise more than majority members to gain reputations for influence.

3) Achievement of formal office frequently impeded minority members' claiming expertise in areas routinely needed for legislation. Formal office enhanced that expertise for majority members.

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4) Seniority had to be channeled through formal office and expertise for it to contribute positively to minority members' reputations. Seniority had direct positive value for majority members' influence.

5) Minority members felt more strongly about the negative effects of interest group pressure which surfaced over a controversial issue.

The findings from this study and the formulation of emergent propositions are only steps toward theory building. Reliability of findings awaits replication. Generalizability of propositions requires consideration of legislatures other than one-party dominant ones. Models using other measures of influence need to be tested before an ultimate model of power or influence in legislatures is constructed.

Yet, the propositions induced from this study suggest theoretical directions for future model development. The majority-minority context in which influence and power operate needs further examination. The propositions which emerged here can be retested, added to, and elaborated. Ultimately, theories which consider stratification in organizations, like conflict theory (Collins, 1975), can be drawn on to place a set of propositions and concepts in a broader framework.

NOTES

This research was supported by a departmental grant from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, funded by a National Science Foundation Development grant. An earlier draft was presented at the American Sociological Association Meetings, 1978. I wish to thank the following people in a special way for their helpful suggestions and comments on earlier drafts: E. Colin Campbell, Charles Goldsmid, David Heise, William Keech, Duncan MacRae, Jr., Cecelia McNulty, Richard Robinson, Kent Schwirian, John Seidler, and James A. Wiggins.

1. Results of single analysis, as might be expected, paralleled findings for the majority party, which far outnumbered the minority party.

2. For example, in a study of 54 issues in 18 New England communities ranging in population from 2,000 to 10,000, Gamson found that reputational leaders were on the winning side of controversial issues 75 percent of the time, even when their stands were opposed to the status quo.

3. The list included agriculture, alcohol control, banking, conservation, education, health, insurance, local government, mental health, corrections, social legislation, small business, utilities, highway safety, veteran affairs, and employment, plus open-ended responses, coded post hoc as "other."

4. The items, factor analyzed from a set of ten which were particular to the session studied, were 1) our society has become overly permissive in recent years; 2) I favor state-wide local option on liquor by the drink; 3) any woman wishing to terminate a pregnancy during its first three months should be able to do so provided a trained doctor is secured to perform the abortion; 4) North Carolina should permit open bars in counties where voters favor such establishments; 5) I oppose criminal penalties for the use of marijuana; and 6) North Carolina should permit the sale of

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marijuana to persons over 18 provided this is done in licensed establishments regulated by the state.

5. A case could be made that competition in the general election was not strong or variable and that we should have analyzed competition in the primaries. North Carolina did not compile all primary election returns (North Carolina Manual, 1973); further, not all House seats were involved in primaries since there were multiple seats and multiple candidates from a party in the general election. Thus, "objective" data were not available to refute the criticism. However, 29 percent of the legislators claimed strongly competitive primaries and 31 percent found strong competition in the general election. Within each category of responses, percentages were close in both elections.

More importantly, a case could be made that measuring competition in multi- member districts is very difficult. The coefficient calculated here needs replication in other contexts to establish whether competition is unimportant in reality as we found or if its unimportance results from measurement error.

6. Kmenta (1971) and other econometricians suggest, as found here, that multicollinearity not obvious in a zero-order matrix seldom occurs in auxiliary regressions, or measures based on them, although some (Farras and Glauber, 1967) feel "auxiliaries" should be examined, as done here.

7. See Heise, 1975; Duncan, 1975; or standard econometrics texts for discussion of using instrumental variables in this procedure. Note that variables selected as instruments are unimportant theoretically to the model. They must meet empirical criteria as these did. (Instrumental variables, Z1 and Z2, were correlated with X7 and X8, respectively, and their correlations with each other and with exogenous variables did not constitute a multicollinearity problem. Both variables were approximately normally distributed; correlation between the residuals of X7 and X8-(-.36)-could be safely assumed to be due to measurement error.)

8. In the two-stage least squares procedure, those legislators were analyzed who presumably had been in the legislature long enough for feedback between formal office (X7) and claimed expertise (X8) to stabilize (Heise, 1975), i.e., legislators beyond their first term. Since the number of Democrats beyond their first term (N=64) was greater than the number of Republicans (N=25), more confidence was placed in the direction of effect for Democrats. But the direction of effect was the same for both parties and therefore assumed to be accurate for Republicans.

9. The intent of theory trimming (Heise, 1975) is to eliminate hypothesized links among variables in a causal model. This is done on empirical grounds, including statistical nonsignificance and insufficient linkage within the model. In this procedure theory and research are closely related and the outcome is a reformulation of theory (see Heise, 1975).

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legislative influence: toward theory development through causal analysis

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