lcas/lcmaps and wss site access control boundary conditions

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INFSO-RI-508833 Enabling Grids for E-sciencE www.eu-egee.org LCAS/LCMAPS and WSS Site Access Control boundary conditions David Groep et al. NIKHEF

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LCAS/LCMAPS and WSS Site Access Control boundary conditions. David Groep et al. NIKHEF. Outline. Local authorization Local authorization decisions Integrating with the Unix domain Managing the work space. Authorization context. Policy comes from many stakeholders. Graphics from - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: LCAS/LCMAPS and WSS  Site Access Control boundary conditions

INFSO-RI-508833

Enabling Grids for E-sciencE

www.eu-egee.org

LCAS/LCMAPS and WSS Site Access Controlboundary conditions

David Groep et al.

NIKHEF

Page 2: LCAS/LCMAPS and WSS  Site Access Control boundary conditions

Site Access Control LCAS/LCMAPS and Unix-domain limitations, September 12, 2005 2

Enabling Grids for E-sciencE

INFSO-RI-508833

Outline

• Local authorization• Local authorization decisions• Integrating with the Unix domain• Managing the work space

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Site Access Control LCAS/LCMAPS and Unix-domain limitations, September 12, 2005 3

Enabling Grids for E-sciencE

INFSO-RI-508833

Authorization context

Key Material

Group of unique names Organizational role

Server

UserAttributesVO

Policy

ResourceAttributesSite

Policy

Policy

Authorization PolicyArchitecture

Local SiteKerberosIdentity

PolicyEnforcement

Point

VOOther

Stakeholders

Site/Resource

OwnerAuthorization

Service/PDP

Policy andattributes.

Allow orDeny

Resource

Standardize

Delegation

User

Process actingon user’s behalf

PKI/KerberosIdentity

TranslationService

PKIIdentity

Delegation Policy

Graphics fromGlobus Alliance& GGF OGSA-WG

Policy comes from many stakeholders

Page 4: LCAS/LCMAPS and WSS  Site Access Control boundary conditions

Site Access Control LCAS/LCMAPS and Unix-domain limitations, September 12, 2005 4

Enabling Grids for E-sciencE

INFSO-RI-508833

Local Authorization

• EGEE Architecture– Policy providers orchestrated by a master PDP (not shown)

– Authorization Framework (Java) and Local Centre Authorization Service LCAS (C/C++ world)

– both provide set of PDP implementations (should be the same set, or a callout from one to the other)

– PDPs foreseen: user white/blacklist VOMS-ACL Proxy-lifetime constraints Certificate/proxy policy OID checks peer-system name validation

(compare with subject or subjectAlternativeNames)

Page 5: LCAS/LCMAPS and WSS  Site Access Control boundary conditions

Site Access Control LCAS/LCMAPS and Unix-domain limitations, September 12, 2005 5

Enabling Grids for E-sciencE

INFSO-RI-508833

Local Authorization Today

• Current Implementation– Only a limited set of PDPs:

ban/allow and VOMS-ACL

– Authorization interface is proprietary (at least for C/C++) change foreseen soon to a ‘v2’ standard interface

– Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) part of the (container) runtime(i.e. all evaluation is in-line) source modifications needed to legacy (C-based) services

(GT gatekeeper, GridFTP server) AuthZ framework for Java as loadable classes

– No separate authorization service (no site-central checking)– Policy format is not XACML everywhere (i.e. GACL)

Page 6: LCAS/LCMAPS and WSS  Site Access Control boundary conditions

Site Access Control LCAS/LCMAPS and Unix-domain limitations, September 12, 2005 6

Enabling Grids for E-sciencE

INFSO-RI-508833

Black List Services

• BL-PDPs return Deny or Not-Applicable– Master-DPD treats “Permit” as Not-Applicable

• Only interested whether the black-list services deny access to the subject– They are not to be used for rendering of general purpose policy

decisions

• Query the configured black-list services before the general purpose PDPs– Pushing of black-list assertions or EPRs not allowed

• “Deny-Override” rules for the black-list services

• …pragmatic way to address deny-requirements…– note that you are still allowed to shoot yourself in the foot with deny-policies

“behind” the PDP interface…

Page 7: LCAS/LCMAPS and WSS  Site Access Control boundary conditions

Site Access Control LCAS/LCMAPS and Unix-domain limitations, September 12, 2005 7

Enabling Grids for E-sciencE

INFSO-RI-508833

What’s within reach?

• Some additional PDPs– Policy OID checking– Proxy certificate lifetime constraints– Limit to specific executable programs– …

• Standard white list, blacklist service for all services• Better integration between Java and C worlds & the

upcoming standards

Page 8: LCAS/LCMAPS and WSS  Site Access Control boundary conditions

Site Access Control LCAS/LCMAPS and Unix-domain limitations, September 12, 2005 8

Enabling Grids for E-sciencE

INFSO-RI-508833

LCMAPS

Once authorisation has been obtained

• acquire local (Unix) credentials to run legacy jobs• enforce those credentials on

– the job being run or – FTP session started

• LCMAPS is the back-end service used by– GT2-style edg-gatekeeper (LCG2)– edg-GridFTP (LCG2)– glexec/grid-sudo wrapper– WorkSpace Service

Page 9: LCAS/LCMAPS and WSS  Site Access Control boundary conditions

Site Access Control LCAS/LCMAPS and Unix-domain limitations, September 12, 2005 9

Enabling Grids for E-sciencE

INFSO-RI-508833

LCMAPS – control flow

• User authenticates using (VOMS) proxy

• … do local authorization …

• LCMAPS invoked– Acquire all relevant credentials– Enforce “external” credentials – Enforce credentials on

current process tree at the end– Order and function policy-based

• Run task (e.g. job manager)

CREDs

LCMAPSCredential Acquisition

& Enforcement

Task

Service

Page 10: LCAS/LCMAPS and WSS  Site Access Control boundary conditions

Site Access Control LCAS/LCMAPS and Unix-domain limitations, September 12, 2005 10

Enabling Grids for E-sciencE

INFSO-RI-508833

LCMAPS – functionality view

• Unix mapping based on VOMS groups, roles, and capabilities• Possibly pool groups as well as pool accounts• Granularity set by the site administrator (see example following)• Primary group set to first VOMS group – accounting

• More than one VO/group per grid user allowed [but…]• Each VOMS unique FQAN listed translates into 1 Unix group id• Each user-FQAN combination translates into 1 Unix user id

• New mechanisms could mitigate issues:– groups-on-demand, support granularity at any level– Central user directory support (nss_LDAP, pam-ldap)

Not ready – and priorities have not been assigned to this yet.

Page 11: LCAS/LCMAPS and WSS  Site Access Control boundary conditions

Site Access Control LCAS/LCMAPS and Unix-domain limitations, September 12, 2005 11

Enabling Grids for E-sciencE

INFSO-RI-508833

VOMS to Unix domain mapping

# groupmapfile

"/EGEE/picard/*“ iteam"/EGEE/picard/Role=Manager" iteamsgm

“/Wilma/Role=prod” wilmgr

"/Wilma/*" .wilma

"/EGEE/riker/grp1" rikerhg

“/EGEE/riker/grp2” rikermed

“/EGEE/riker/grp3” rikerlow

example

Page 12: LCAS/LCMAPS and WSS  Site Access Control boundary conditions

Site Access Control LCAS/LCMAPS and Unix-domain limitations, September 12, 2005 12

Enabling Grids for E-sciencE

INFSO-RI-508833

Work Space Service

On the road towards virtualized resources:

Work Space Service

• Managed accounts– enable life cycle management– controlled account management (VO can request/release)– “special” QoS requests

• Use to request credentials (groups) with specific prios?• WS-RF style GT4 service

– uses LCMAPS as a back-end

http://www.mcs.anl.gov/workspace/

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Enabling Grids for E-sciencE

INFSO-RI-508833

LCMAPS usage in the job chain

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Site Access Control LCAS/LCMAPS and Unix-domain limitations, September 12, 2005 14

Enabling Grids for E-sciencE

INFSO-RI-508833

Summary

• Control over running jobs is via site mechanisms

• Authorization to (Java) services part of container– Fine-grained control is left as a service specific issue– Standard hooks for this are about to appear

• Mapping of credentials required for legacy programs– limited to Unix domain account mechanisms– Needs to remain manageable for site administrators– Scheduling/priorities based on Unix user and group names– Accounting based on uid, gid pairs– Unix domain is not very flexible. Sorry.

• Virtualisation is coming, but how far down the road?

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Enabling Grids for E-sciencE

INFSO-RI-508833

Page 16: LCAS/LCMAPS and WSS  Site Access Control boundary conditions

Site Access Control LCAS/LCMAPS and Unix-domain limitations, September 12, 2005 16

Enabling Grids for E-sciencE

INFSO-RI-508833

EDG Gatekeeper (current)

GatekeeperLCAS

GACL

timeslot

banned

policy

C=IT/O=INFN /L=CNAF/CN=Pinco Palla/CN=proxy

VOMSpseudo-cert

Job Managerfork+exec args, submit script

LCMAPS open, learn,&run:

… and return legacy uid

LCMAPS open, learn,&run:

… and return legacy uid

LCAS authZ call out

GSI AuthN

accept

TLS auth

assist_gridmap

Jobmanager-*

Ye Olde Gatekeeper

GSS context+ RSL