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Language Maintenance: A Liberal Approach Dr Huw Lewis Department of International Politics Aberystwyth University Penglais Aberystwyth SY23 3FE Wales, U.K. Tel: +44 (0) 1970 628638 Email: [email protected]
Prepared for delivery at the 2012 IPSA World Congress Madrid, July 8‐12, 2012 Work in progress: not for citation
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Language Maintenance: A Liberal Approach Introduction Over the past decade, an expanding body of literature has developed focusing on the normative questions that arise from discussions concerning language policy. This has been one of the many consequences of the wide‐ranging debate concerning cultural diversity and minority rights that has attracted the attention of a substantial number of political theorists since the early 1990s. This paper will seek to contribute to this developing debate on language by outlining the features of a liberal approach to the issue of language maintenance.
Thus far, the vast majority of those liberal theorists who have considered the issue of language policy have focused on one specific question: whether languages other than the state’s majority language should be accorded public recognition. However, the more far‐reaching issue of language maintenance has received much less attention. 1 Language maintenance efforts not only seek to ensure that a particular language is recognised and can be used in public settings by those who speak it now, but also that it will continue to be spoken in the future by a community of people. How should liberals view language policies that have such outcomes as their objectives? Is it acceptable, from a liberal perspective, to pursue language maintenance? And if it is, what kind of maintenance measures should a liberal be willing to endorse?
In this paper it will be argued that liberals should view language maintenance efforts as morally permissible endeavours, provided they satisfy two important conditions. Firstly, the decision to embark on a maintenance effort should reflect a democratic consensus within society. Secondly, the practical measures implemented in pursuit of maintenance ‐ the various laws and policies ‐should not transgress key liberal constraints.
The argument in support of these claims will unfold as follows. Initially, the idea of language maintenance will be discussed, and contemporary examples of such endeavours will be highlighted. Then the conditions under which a liberal should be willing to embark upon an effort to maintain a particular language will be considered. In this section, the arguments of Alan Patten will be discussed and critiqued.2 It will be claimed that Patten's contention that language maintenance efforts should be endorsed by liberals only when there are “plausible and urgent”
1 Two prominent exceptions are Alan Patten, “Political Theory and Language Policy,” Political Theory 15 (2001): 691‐15, and “Liberal Neutrality and Language Policy,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 31 (2003): 356‐86; and Philippe Van Parijs, “The Ground Floor of the World: On the Socio‐economic Consequences of Linguistic Globalization,” International Political Studies Review 21 (2000): 217‐33, and Linguistic Justice for Europe and the World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). However, as will become clear during the paper, there are elements of their respective approaches to the issue of language maintenance that I find unsatisfactory. 2 In particular, the arguments advanced in his “Liberal Neutrality and Language Policy.”
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reasons of social utility is too restrictive, and that a much more appropriate condition would be the existence of a democratic mandate. Having established the grounds on which liberals should be willing to embark on language maintenance, the paper will then consider the type of practical measures they should permit to be implemented in pursuit of that goal. What should liberals rule in and what should they rule out? Two key liberal constraints will be established: firstly, that language maintenance measures should not curtail key individual freedoms; and secondly, that they should not impose unfair costs or burdens on individuals. It will then be demonstrated that although these constraints rule out certain methods, in particular the general endorsement of the kind of official monolingualism advocated by Jean Laponce and, more recently, by Philippe Van Parijs,3 they allow for a wide range of promotional methods that, if implemented properly, could have a substantial impact on the degree to which a particular language can be maintained. What is Language Maintenance? The modern world is marked by substantial diversity, and language is one field in which this diversity is particularly apparent. According to the estimates of many linguists, around 6,000 languages are spoken across the world – a number 25 to 30 times greater than the number of states currently in existence.4 Of course, this linguistic diversity is not spread evenly across the world: 70 per cent of all languages are spoken in just twenty states.5 Despite this, “some degree of bi‐ or multilingualism is present to some degree in practically every country in the world.”6 Indeed, it has been suggested that in many states language minorities account for about 10% of the population, and in many more they account for about 25%.7 Therefore, the striking extent of the world’s linguistic diversity cannot be denied, nor its relevance for nearly every state across the globe. However, this pattern of linguistic diversity is not fixed or static nor is it immune from any form of fluctuation. People have, and often exercise, the ability to learn new languages and also to adopt new patterns of language use. Over time, the use of this ability may cause changes in a society's linguistic make up. Certain languages may experience decline, as their speakers adopt a new tongue as their main medium of communication in key social domains, or decide not to transfer their traditional language to their descendants. Equally, other languages may
3 Jean Laponce, Languages and their Territories (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987); Van Parijs, “The Ground Floor of the World” and Linguistic Justice. 4 See David Crystal, Language Death (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Michael E. Krauss, “The World’s Languages in Crisis,” Language 68 (1992): 4‐10; and Daniel Nettle and Suzanne Romaine, Vanishing Voices: The Extinction of the World’s Languages (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 5 Nettle and Romaine, Vanishing Voices, p. 32. 6 Ibid. 7 Patten, “Liberal Neutrality,” p. 358.
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increase in size and status. Sociolinguists describe such a change in linguistic patterns as the phenomenon of 'language shift'8 As John Edwards explains, it was once common to view language shift as an organic process; languages were deemed to have a “natural lifespan.” These days, however, nobody adheres to the view that “languages behave like beans or chrysanthemums, living out their allotted life, and fading away in due course.” 9 Rather, social scientists generally agree that language shift will be driven by various social, political and economic forces. Among the most frequently discussed factors are: population movement; economic change; education policy; and a language's level of public recognition.10 Naturally, the exact causes will vary from case to case. However, it is usually a mixture of these factors that will, over time, cause the members of a particular language community to alter their traditional speech patterns and, as a result, institute a process of language shift. When language shift does occur, a key question that must be addressed is how to respond. One potential response is to engage in language maintenance, an endeavour that is defined by Moshe Nahir as follows:
Language Maintenance is the preservation of the use of a group’s native language ... where political, social, economic, educational, or other pressures threaten or cause (or are perceived to threaten or cause) a decline in the status of the language as a means of communication, cultural medium, or a symbol of group or national identity.11
Put simply, therefore, language maintenance “is the opposite of language shift.”12 An effort is made to ensure that a vulnerable language does not decline, but rather that it continues to be used into the future. In practice this involves public institutions adopting measures “that give threatened language communities the tools and resources that they need to resist the tendency towards uniformity.”13 Until relatively recently, the idea of responding to language shift by engaging in language maintenance would not have been given much serious consideration. During the nineteenth and the early part of the twentieth centuries, the accepted view was that the decline of weak, marginal languages should be
8 See, in particular, Uriel Weinreich, Languages in Contact: Findings and Problems (The Hague: Mouton de Gruyter, 1968); Joshua A. Fishman, “Language Maintenance and Language Shift as a Field of Enquiry,” Linguistics 9 (1964): 32‐70. 9 John Edwards, Language, Society and Identity (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1984), pp. 48‐9. 10 See, for example, Joshua A. Fishman, Reversing Language Shift (Clevedon: Multilingual Matters, 1991), pp. 55‐67; Peter Nelde, Miquel Strubell and Glyn Williams, Euromosaic: The Production and Reproduction of the Minority Language Groups of the European Union (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications for the European Communities, 1996), pp. 4‐13. 11 Moshe Nahir, “Language Planning Goals: A Classification,” in Sociolinguistics: The Essential Readings, ed. Christina B. Paulston and G. Richard Tucker (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), pp. 423‐48, at p. 439. 12 Peter Turdgill, A Glossary of Sociolinguistics (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003), p. 75. 13 Patten, “Liberal Neutrality,” p. 363.
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welcomed and even encouraged.14 However, during the second half of the twentieth century, as many minority groups began to mobilize politically, this logic was challenged and the welfare of languages prone to shift came, increasingly, to be recognised as a subject that could not simply be dismissed. This striking change in attitudes has meant that, over the past few decades, the issue of language shift has risen to a more prominent position on the political agenda of many Western democracies. Consequently, there has been a substantial increase in the number state‐led language maintenance efforts. Today, efforts to arrest the decline and maintain supposedly vulnerable languages are evident in a number of different places across the world, and in particular, in minority nations such as Quebec, Catalonia, the Basque Country and Wales. Moreover, the steps taken as part of such efforts have gradually grown more far‐reaching in their scope. Indeed, it is now common for them to influence many aspects of the workings of the modern democratic state, including the justice system, the education system, the media and even the economy. However, despite the increase in organized, state‐led language maintenance efforts, liberals, on the whole, have not systematically assessed their normative implications. As was noted in the introduction, the debate among liberals regarding language policy has tended to focus on the specific question of whether languages other than the state’s majority language should be accorded public recognition. Undoubtedly, this important question needs to be discussed. Yet, such a discussion does not exhaust the normative issues surrounding language maintenance, which is, as any study of the cases referred to above will demonstrate, a much more far‐reaching endeavour. Language maintenance requires the state not only to concern itself with ensuring that a particular language can be used in public settings by those who speak it now, but also, to try to ensure that it will continue to be spoken in the future by a community of people. In other words, the state does not limit its actions merely to the establishment of certain official linguistic opportunities; it also concerns itself with the degree to which these opportunities are exploited and whether, subsequently, the language goes on to flourish or decline. How should liberals view language policies that have such outcomes as their objective? Is it acceptable, from a liberal perspective, to pursue language maintenance? And if it is, what type of maintenance measures should a liberal be willing to endorse? Alan Patten's Liberal Neutrality Approach Thus far, one of the most prominent contributors to the normative debate on language policy has been Alan Patten. He has developed a normative framework to guide liberals with regards to decisions relating to language policy. This framework is based on the belief that, apart from in a limited number of cases, liberals should favour an approach to language policy that is consistent with the principle of state neutrality.
14 Nelde et al, Euromosaic, pp. 2‐4.
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State neutrality is a principle that plays an important role in contemporary liberal thought. It is central to many of the arguments advanced by key thinkers such as John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin.15 According to Patten, neutrality requires the state to refrain from promoting specific outcomes with regard to the success or failure of different ways of life or conceptions of the good.16 This means that the state should not concern itself with the degree to which particular practices and traditions happen to flourish or decline over time. Rather, their long‐term sustainability should be the responsibility of private citizens. It is they who should be responsible for attracting sufficient adherents in order to allow their chosen way of life to survive. The state's only responsibility is to ensure that these efforts can take place under fair background conditions. However, how is this achieved in practice? As Patten explains, in the case of religion liberals have traditionally sought to realize state neutrality by adopting a policy of disestablishment.17 According to this policy, there should be no established religion at all. Rather, the religious and the political domains should be separated ‐ the state should stand back, neither promoting nor hindering any particular religious tradition. Religion is therefore treated as a privatized activity ‐ religious establishments are defined as voluntary associations that “grow or shrink in accordance with their ability to gain and maintain the voluntary adherence of individual members.”18 Yet, although disestablishment may be a practical policy with regard to religion, it cannot be applied to language. The state cannot privatize language issues. Decisions must be made regarding which language(s) should be used within public administration and which language(s) should be used by the courts, the bureaucracy, the army, state schools, public media, road signs, town names etc. As Rainer Bauböck observes, we must accept “the fact of linguistic establishment.”19 Therefore, is a neutral approach to language policy simply out of the question? Drawing on the work of Brian Barry and Joseph Carens,20 Patten demonstrates that this is not the case. He reminds us that disestablishment is not the only way in which the state can realize the ideal of neutrality. It is also possible
15 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 190‐200; Ronald Dworkin, “Liberalism” in Public and Private Morality, ed. Stuart Hampshire (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 127; A Matter of Principle Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 203. 16 Patten, “Liberal Neutrality,” p. 368. 17 Ibid., 369. 18 Will Kymlicka and François Grin, “Assessing the Politics of Diversity in Transition Countries,” in Nation Building and Language Politics in Transition Countries, ed. Farimah Daftary and François Grin (Budapest: Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative, 2003), pp. 1‐29, at p. 8. 19 Rainer Bauböck, “Cultural Citizenship, Minority Rights and Self‐Government,” in Citizenship Today: Global Perspectives and Practices, ed. T. Alexander Aleinikoff and Douglas B. Klusmeyer, (Washington D. C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001), pp. 319‐48, at p. 328. 20 Brian Barry, Culture and Equality (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), pp. 24‐32; Joseph Carens, Culture, Citizenship and Community: A Contextual Exploration of Justice as Evenhandedness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 8‐14.
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for it to do so by adopting a policy of evenhandedness.21 According to this alternative policy, the state does not stand back completely. Rather, it accords to each way of life or conception of the good “some roughly equivalent form of assistance and support.”22 Therefore, in the case of religion, an even‐handed approach “would allow religion into the schools and could even allow sectarian schooling, but would insist that all religions be afforded some roughly comparable time or space in the curriculum.”23 While the institutional implications of even‐handedness are different from those of disestablishment, they are both methods of ensuring state neutrality. Neither approach has the aim of achieving specific social or cultural outcomes, nor do they involve an explicit effort on behalf of the state to gauge the extent to which a particular practice or tradition flourishes or declines over time. The aim is simply to establish certain fair background circumstances, and once that is done, the sustainability of various ways of life should depend “on the convictions and choices of ordinary people.”24 Therefore, the existence of the even‐handedness option means that it is possible to develop a coherent approach to language policy based on the principle of neutrality. According to Patten, such an approach would call on public institutions to “offer a roughly equivalent level of recognition or support to each of the various languages spoken by their citizens.”25 In practice, this would mean adopting a policy of official multilingualism, a policy that would work as follows:
... if a particular public service (e.g. advice about tax matters from a government office) is offered in one language spoken in the community, then the same service is also offered in other languages spoken in the community. Or, if a particular piece of public business (e.g. filing a suit in a court of law) can be conducted in one language, then it can also be conducted in the others.26
Patten claims that, given the status accorded to neutrality within their general political morality, this even‐handed approach to language policy is the one that liberals should favour. According equal recognition to each language spoken within the community would establish the necessary fair background conditions. However, once this basic “fairness requirement” has been met, liberals should expect the state to stand back and not concern itself with the degree to which particular languages may then go on to flourish or decline. Adopting a policy that sought to achieve specific linguistic outcomes would move beyond neutrality and, therefore, should be viewed with suspicion by liberals.27
21 Patten, “Liberal Neutrality,” 369. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid., p. 370. 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid., p. 371. 26 Ibid., pp. 371‐2. 27 Patten offers a further argument as to why liberals should be suspicious of outcome‐orientated language policies such as language maintenance. He claims that it would not be possible to realize such a goal without implementing measures that “risk violating either core individual liberties or
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Nevertheless, despite their potential cost in terms of liberal principles, it should be emphasized that Patten does not rule out completely the validity of adopting outcome‐orientated language policies. There are certain limited circumstances under which he would be willing to endorse such policies, and therefore move beyond neutrality. According to Patten, in a few cases there may be “plausible and urgent” reasons that “defeat the prima facie appeal of neutrality”28 and convince us of the need to adopt a policy that seeks to realize a specific linguistic outcome. A class of reasons that may meet these criteria are reasons relating to social utility. Such reasons would point to the manner in which the realization of a specific linguistic outcome could serve to ensure certain interests that are deemed to be vital for individual and social well‐being. One such interest that is given particular attention by Patten is social mobility.29 This is a vital interest that influences the degree to which an individual can live life in accordance with his own personal objectives. Moreover, it is an interest that depends on the existence of a favourable linguistic context: to take advantage of various opportunities it is necessary for an individual to be able to communicate effectively in the relevant domains and this, in turn, depends on the degree to which he or she possesses the necessary linguistic competence. Given such considerations, Patten goes on to observe that “the state should not be wholly neutral with respect to linguistic outcomes.”30 Should it be the case that the neutral approach is deemed to be harmful ‐ for example in relation to vital interests such as social mobility ‐ he argues that it would be acceptable for liberals to abandon their preferred position and adopt an outcome‐orientated approach to language policy. Indeed, under such circumstances it seems that he is of the opinion that adopting such an approach should be seen as morally required. Where does this leave us with respect to the acceptability of language maintenance efforts? As Patten demonstrates, there are certain circumstances in which pursuing a policy that has the explicit aim of establishing a widely spoken language as a common public medium might be considered socially useful on grounds of social mobility.31 However, to what extent could pursuing a policy that seeks to maintain a vulnerable language be viewed in the same light? Can language maintenance also be considered useful with respect to interests such as social mobility and, therefore, be endorsed within the parameters of Patten's liberal framework?32
an idea of fairness." See his “Liberal Neutrality,” p. 377. I set this additional claim to one side for now, but it will be discussed during the next section of the paper. 28 Patten, “Liberal Neutrality,” pp. 377‐8. 29 Other social interests that are referred to by Patten, but given less attention, are democratic deliberation; the cost of public administration; and a common identity. See his “Liberal Neutrality,” pp. 378‐9. 30 Patten, “Liberal Neutrality,” p. 381. 31 Ibid., pp. 382‐5. 32 Patten does not provide an answer to this question. He sets it to one side in order to focus on other issues. See his “Liberal Neutrality,” p. 378.
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There are certain cases where language maintenance could, potentially, be seen as performing such an important social role. Take, for example, the case of Quebec. In the 1960s, before the adoption of a series of far‐reaching language policy measures, French was not only the first language of the majority of the province's population, but also the only language spoken by a substantial number of that majority. Yet, despite this, due to various demographic changes the long‐term prospects of the language were by no means secure, and French risked being marginalized in a range of key social domains.33 Indeed, in relation to employment, this was already the case, especially if one rose above the lower levels of various institutions ‐ a fact that was emphasized in the respective reports of federal and provincial commissions of enquiry.34 Therefore, at the time, the linguistic structure of Quebec’s economy militated against the advancement of the large monolingual French‐speaking population. Given these circumstances, a case could be made in favour of viewing the language maintenance measures that were later adopted as ones that sought to improve social mobility, particularly the steps taken to ensure that French could be used in key domains such as those relating to employment. Nevertheless, it is important to note that Quebec is an exception rather than a norm as far as language maintenance is concerned. It is one of only a few cases where a majority speaks the language that is the target of the maintenance effort and, more importantly, where personal bilingualism among those people is limited. Most other cases ‐ particularly those in Western democracies – do not demonstrate such characteristics. Consider, for example, some of the other examples of language maintenance that were highlighted in the introductory section. According to the most recent census results, only 21 per cent of the population of Wales are able to speak Welsh and only 23 per cent are able to understand it. Moreover, the number of monolinguals with no grasp of English is almost non‐existent.35 Even in other places, such as Catalonia, where the target language is spoken by a majority of the population, bilingualism is extremely widespread.36 In such cases, given the prevalence of bilingualism among those who speak the target language, it is difficult to argue that pursuing language maintenance is necessary and socially useful due to social mobility considerations.37 As a result, it would seem that such
33 See Mark V. Levine, The Reconquest of Montreal: Language Policy and Social Change in a Bilingual City (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990). 34 See Government of Canada, Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Vol. 3: The Work World (Ottawa: Queens printer, 1969); and Le Gouvernement du Québec, Report of the Commission of Enquiry on the Position of the French Language and Language Rights in Quebec (Gendron Commission) (Québec: Editeur Officiel du Québec, 1972). 35 See Welsh Language Board, ‘2001 Census: Main Statistics about Welsh’. Available from: http://www.byig‐wlb.org.uk/English/publications/Pages/PublicationItem.aspx?puburl=/ English%2fpublications%2fPublications%2f332.doc [Accessed 9 November 2011]. The results of the 2011 census are due to be published shortly. 36 See Generalitat de Catalunya, "Language Policy Report 2010." Available from: http://www20.gencat.cat/docs/Llengcat/Documents/InformePL/Arxius/IPL2010_EN.pdf [Accessed 11 November 2011]. See also the various cases discussed in Fishman, Reversing Language Shift. 37 It would also, I believe, be difficult in such contexts to make a case in favour of language maintenance based on some of the other social utility interests highlighted by Patten, such as the cost of public administration and the need for democratic deliberation.
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cases, in contrast with that of Quebec, fail to meet the criteria whereby, according to Patten, liberals should be prepared to abandon neutrality and endorse language policies that are outcome‐orientated in nature. Such a conclusion, if sound, would be extremely significant. As was argued above, cases such as Quebec are the exception rather than the norm as far as language maintenance is concerned. The majority of maintenance efforts currently operating in Western democracies are similar in characteristics to the Welsh and Catalan cases ‐ the vast majority of the minority language speakers are bilingual and an argument relating to social utility is difficult to sustain. Therefore, are we to conclude that when viewed from a liberal perspective the majority of contemporary language maintenance efforts are morally unacceptable ventures? In the remainder of this section, it will be demonstrated that such a conclusion would be misguided. Patten's contention that language maintenance should only be deemed acceptable when there are “plausible and urgent” reasons of social utility is too restrictive.
Of course, Patten places the bar so high because he assumes that pursuing an explicitly outcome‐orientated language policy would compromise the key liberal principle of state neutrality. Therefore, he is only willing to consider such language policies in extraordinary circumstances; ones where the over‐riding of neutrality can be deemed acceptable. Yet, to what extent is he correct to assume that neutrality will inevitably be undermined, and therefore to limit so drastically the circumstances under which a policy of language maintenance can be legitimately pursued?
As was seen, Patten interprets neutrality in an extremely broad manner, as
a principle that holds that the state should refrain from promoting specific outcomes with regards to the success or failure of different ways of life or conceptions of the good. In other words, he assumes that the state contravenes neutrality if it starts to concern itself with the degree to which particular practices and traditions happen to flourish or decline over time. The broadness of this interpretation is emphasised when one considers that it would not only call into question particular language policies, but also a wide range of other seemingly legitimate public policies. Take, for example, state‐led efforts to support certain forms of art or music, or efforts to maintain key historical sites or monuments. Such policies also involve the state taking an active interest in the degree to which particular goods continue to be available over time, and therefore, according to Patten’s account, they should be seen as ones that contravene neutrality and should only be countenanced in extraordinary circumstances when there are “plausible and urgent” reasons of social utility.
However, Patten’s interpretation is excessively broad. Neutrality should not
be seen as a principle that demands that the state takes no interest in the long‐term sustainability of different ways of life, and therefore refrains completely from promoting the maintenance of particular traditions or practices. Rather, neutrality simply demands that the state does not engage in such promotional activity based
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on an assessment of “the intrinsic superiority or inferiority of conceptions of the good life.”38 As Dworkin argued in his famous essay, Can a Liberal State Support Art? 39 it is not prohibited, form a liberal perspective, for the state to take steps to support certain forms of art, so that they continue to prosper. Dworkin merely argued that it would be unacceptable for such steps to be taken if they were justified by arguments that appealed to the intrinsic superiority of these artistic activities; in other words, arguments that claimed that a life spent appreciating them and learning about them would somehow be more worthy and more fulfilling than one spent pursuing other interests.40 Therefore, neutrality actually allows for a wide range of public policies to fall into the category of that which is morally acceptable within a liberal‐democracy. In contrast to Patten's assertions, it does not rule out public policies that seek to promote the maintenance of certain practices and traditions. It merely seeks to rule out certain reasons for adopting such policies. As Kymlicka observes, neutrality “simply rules out certain kinds of arguments or justifications ... namely those which appeal to a ranking of the intrinsic merits of conceptions of the good life.”41
Therefore, the pursuit of outcome orientated language policies such as
language maintenance does not necessarily compromise the principle of state neutrality. Granted, if the reason offered by public officials to explain why a policy of language maintenance is to be pursued is that the language to be targeted by such a policy is an intrinsically better language than all others, and that a life lived through its medium would be intrinsically more worthy and fulfilling than one lived through the medium of others, then liberals should object, as such an argument would be based on an assessment of the intrinsic worth of various languages. However, if ‘neutral’ non‐perfectionist reasons are offered to support such a policy, then liberals should not object.
Naturally, this leads to the question of what kinds of reasons could qualify
as neutral ones. The first thing to note here is that the urgent social utility reasons cited by Patten would clearly qualify. These are reasons that do not lead to the state making declarations regarding the intrinsic merits of various languages. However, as was argued earlier, the instances in which the case in favour of language maintenance could be based on urgent reasons of social utility, such as the promotion of social mobility, are likely to be extremely rare. Yet, this does not mean that the discussion must come to a halt. There are other neutral reasons that can also be used to justify the pursuit of language maintenance. On the whole, one would not attach the same level of urgency to these additional reasons as one would in the case of social mobility. However, given that we are no longer framing the discussion regarding the legitimacy of language maintenance in terms where a key principle will inevitably be compromised, they can be considered.
38 Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 217. 39 Ronald Dworkin “Can the Liberal State Support Art?” in his A Matter of Principle (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985). 40 Ibid., 233. 41 Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, p 344.
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One such reason is the existence within a given society of a democratic mandate in favour of a policy of language maintenance. This is another reason in favour of following a particular policy course that does not call on public officials to engage in a ranking of the intrinsic merits of different traditions. If the pursuit of language maintenance has been clearly endorsed by the public ‐ for example in a referendum or, alternatively, through the election of a government that had clearly signalled its intention to pursue such a language policy ‐ then public officials are not required to advance arguments regarding the intrinsic worth of various languages. Rather, they can simply point to the democratic decision and declare that a majority within society clearly wish that the state implements measures that have the goal of seeking to ensure that one of the languages spoken by its members does not disappear.
Therefore, in summary, it would be wrong for liberals to follow Patten's
lead and conclude that outcome‐orientated policies such as language maintenance would inevitably compromise the key principle of state neutrality, and as a result, should only be countenanced in exceptional circumstances where there are clear and urgent social utility considerations. As has been demonstrated, such policies do not inevitably transgress neutrality. Provided that the reasons offered to explain the policy decision are neutral and non‐perfectionist ones, the state’s claim to neutrality remains intact. Therefore, liberals should be able to view language maintenance in a much more favourable light and should be less restrictive when it comes to identifying the conditions under which they would be willing to endorse the adoption of such a policy. Indeed, provided there is democratic support for the policy, a liberal should be able to view efforts to maintain a particular language as morally acceptable ventures.42
However, before this argument can be allowed to go through, and the focus
can turn to the kinds of specific measures that liberals should allow to be implemented in pursuit of the goal of language maintenance, two potential objections to the argument developed in the above paragraphs need to be considered. Firstly, some may wish to challenge the neutrality of a language maintenance policy that is justified by reference to a democratic mandate, by observing that it is possible that the support for such a policy may stem, at least partly, from a belief among some sections of the population in the intrinsic superiority of the language to be targeted. Certainly, such a possibility must be acknowledged. However, to what extent would it undermine the state’s claim to neutrality?
42 For the purpose of this paper, I have assumed that the issue of how internal state boundaries should be drawn and how the responsibility for language policy decisions should be divided between central and regional government has already been resolved in a satisfactory manner. I have not made this assumption because I view the issue as a trivial one. On the contrary, it is a very important matter, but one that demands a paper in its own right and therefore it has not been possible to discuss it in detail here. For a short discussion of this issue see Anna Stilz, “Civic Nationalism and Language Policy,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 37 (2009): 257‐92, at pp. 282‐9.
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It is inevitable that people’s decision to endorse a particular policy proposal ‐ either in a referendum or during an election ‐ will be based on a range of different reasons. As acknowledged, on the issue of language maintenance some may base their support for such a policy on perfectionist grounds. However, others may do so on different, and from a liberal perspective, more acceptable grounds. For example, some may believe that a policy of language maintenance should be pursued because they believe that the world's linguistic diversity represents an important public good ‐ either in esthetical or scientific terms ‐ and therefore steps should be taken to prevent linguistic decline. Alternatively, others may believe that a policy of language maintenance should be pursued because they feel that the language in question represents an important aspect of their society's history and, therefore, regardless of whether it is the mother tongue of the majority, an effort should be made to ensure its survival. Now, these reasons and more may be behind why the members of a particular society decide to endorse the pursuit of a policy of language maintenance. On the whole, there is little that the liberal state can do to regulate these individual and private views. However, provided that it does not respond to the democratic debate among its citizens by moving to endorse some of the perfectionist views that may be expressed by some participants, for example in subsequent policy documents and legislation, its claim to linguistic neutrality would remain intact.
A second, and arguably more important, objection that could be raised
focuses on the potential implications of the argument advanced here for what could be deemed acceptable in other areas of social policy. To some, it may seem that a position that endorses democratically mandated language maintenance efforts would also lead to endorsing democratically mandated efforts to maintain particular religions. Now, given the general agreement among liberals that the state should in no way adopt an outcome‐orientated approach in relation to religion, such a possibility would, naturally, be seen as a cause for concern and, for some, would represent a fundamental blow to the argument that has been advanced here. Therefore, I need to explain why endorsing language maintenance does not necessarily entail a similar commitment in relation to religion.
There are important qualitative differences between a language and a
religion which mean that it would not be contradictory to endorse language maintenance when this reflects a clear democratic consensus, but to oppose such efforts in relation to a particular religion, regardless of public opinion. Generally, religions advocate certain beliefs with regard to what represents a virtuous life ‐ beliefs that touch on issues such as the nature of the family and sexuality, as well as other aspects of private morality. As a result, any effort by the state to promote the prospects of a particular religion would, by nature, involve promoting a particularly 'thick' conception of the good. This, however, does not apply to language. People can share the same language, but at the same time subscribe to radically different views regarding what constitutes a virtuous life. Language is a much 'thinner' subject, and thus the state can adopt outcome‐orientated language policies such as language maintenance without concerning itself with a range of controversial behavioural norms. Therefore, we see that the analogy between
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maintaining languages and maintaining religions does not hold and, given this, liberals should not use their concern regarding the second as a reason for withholding their support in relation to the first. Language Maintenance and Liberal Constraints While covering many important issues, the preceding discussion only provides a partial account of how liberals should approach the issue of language maintenance. The grounds on which a liberal should be prepared to embark on such a project have been established, yet this conclusion only leads to further questions. One set of questions would arise if a community were to decide, by democratic means, that it does not wish to pursue a policy that has the specific aim of seeking to maintain one of the languages spoken by its members. Under such circumstances what would happen to those who had argued in favour of language maintenance? Would they still be able to set constraints on the kind of language policy that would eventually be implemented? In particular, would they be able to demand that, despite the absence of a democratic consensus in favour of a policy of language maintenance, certain provisions in relation to the language that would have been targeted by such a policy should still be made available to them as a matter of right? For example, would they be able to demand that certain public services should still be made available through the medium of that language? A second set of questions would arise if the democratic process led to the opposite conclusion, and a consensus in favour of pursuing language maintenance was obtained. If this were the case, what would happen to those who did not support the adoption of such a policy? Some opponents may have argued against the policy simply because they did not speak the language that would have been targeted by the maintenance effort and, therefore, did not see how they would benefit from public policies that seek to ensure that it did not disappear. Others may have spoken the target language, but, despite this, viewed efforts to maintain it as misguided and a waste of public resources, either because they believed that such a goal was impossible to achieve or because they believed that it would be better for the community if an alternative language policy were adopted, possibly one that adopted a global lingua franca as the common public language. While they may have lost out in the democratic debate, would these people still be able to demand that certain constraints be placed on the particular type of language maintenance measures that could be adopted or the manner in which they could be implemented? In this section of the paper the second group of questions will be considered in detail. The issues connected to the first group will be set to one side for discussion at a later date. Therefore, the question under consideration is the following: if a democratic consensus exists in favour of pursuing a policy of language maintenance, to what extent should liberals place constraints on the type of measures that can be implemented in pursuit of such a goal, and if so, what form
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should these constraints take and what type of maintenance measures would they rule in or out? The first and second parts of this question can be answered relatively easily. Even if there were a clear democratic consensus in favour of language maintenance, liberals would all agree that certain constraints should be placed on the kind of practical measures that could be implemented in pursuit of that goal. This arises from the fact that, despite a long tradition of endorsing democratic arrangements, liberals do not believe that majority opinion can be allowed a completely free rain. Rather, the liberal position is a more limited one: it endorses democratic decisions and the laws and public policies that flow from them, provided the interests of those who find themselves in the minority are given proper consideration. This does not mean that liberals insist that democratic governments should take account of every possible dissenting opinion and then adapt their actions accordingly. Rather, and this leads to the second part of the question outlined above, liberals insist that laws and policies should be designed and implemented in a manner that ensures that the vital interests of individuals are not undermined. This, in turn, leads to two important constraints that liberals believe that democratic governments should seek to respect: firstly, that laws and policies do not curtail key individual freedoms; and secondly, that they do not, as far as possible, impose unfair burdens or costs on certain individuals. As should be evident, both constraints appeal to the liberal belief in the need to uphold individual freedom and to treat individuals with equal concern and respect. Therefore, it is has been established that liberals would wish to place constraints on the type of measures that could be implemented in pursuit of language maintenance, and that these constraints would insist that such measures did not curtail key individual freedoms and, moreover, that they did not impose unfair burdens or costs. However, what would be the implications of these constraints on the manner in which a liberal language maintenance effort could be designed? Which measures would they rule in and which would they rule out? These questions will be explored by considering three different examples of language maintenance in action. Example 1 In this case legislation has been passed declaring that the language targeted by the maintenance effort is the only language that individuals are allowed to use in both public and non‐public domains. As a result, individuals are required by law to refrain from using any other language and this is a requirement that applies not only when accessing public services ‐ for example schools, hospitals and social services ‐ or when conducting public business ‐ for example in the legislature, the courts or when dealing with public officials ‐ but also when conducting more private and informal conversations, for example with friends or family members. Moreover, in addition to legislation that seeks to ensure that the target language will be used as widely as possible, the maintenance effort features measures that seek to ensure that the community of speakers will not decline in size. For
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example, legislation has been passed that places tight restrictions on individual mobility in order to counter any harmful outward‐migration. If faced with such a language maintenance effort one concern that could be raised would be practicality. To what extent would it really be practical for the state to monitor every individual conversation and to ensure that the target language is the only one used on all occasions? However, when viewed from a liberal perspective, it would not be these practical concerns that would be the primary cause for alarm, nor the main reason for concluding that a language maintenance effort featuring such coercive measures should be opposed vigorously. Rather, a liberal would reach such a conclusion because this is an example of language maintenance where the first constraint outlined above ‐ the need for the state to respect key individual freedoms ‐ is clearly being transgressed. Firstly, the measures passed to ensure that the language community does not decline in size leads to the state interfering with individual rights in fundamental areas such as the individual’s right to exit the community. However, even without these measures, substantial problems would remain, as the legislation that declares that the target language is the only language that individuals are allowed to use in both public and non‐public domains represents a clear breech of freedom of expression. Indeed, this would remain the case even if the legislation were restricted solely to public domains. Even under this more limited policy, the prohibition on the use of languages apart from the target language would remain and, therefore, freedom of expression would not be respected. Therefore, Example 1 features language maintenance measures that liberals would clearly class as being morally unacceptable. Moreover, this is a view that would hold regardless of the circumstances ‐ the precariousness of a language's prospects would not lead to these measures being regarded in a more favourable manner. Example 2 In this second case legislation has been passed declaring that the language targeted by the maintenance effort is the only officially recognized language and, therefore, the only language used by public institutions. As noted earlier, this is the kind of approach to language maintenance that has been advocated by Jean Laponce and that, more recently, has been central to the arguments advanced by Philippe Van Parijs.43 However, is it an approach that respects the two key liberal constraints?
One can begin by declaring that a maintenance effort centred on a policy of official monolingualism does not transgress key individual liberties such as freedom of expression. It should be recognized that on various occasions it has been claimed that not being able to be served by public bodies or public officials in
43 Laponce, Languages and their Territories; Van Parijs, “The Ground Floor of the World”; and Linguistic Justice.
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your chosen language also represents a transgression of freedom of expression.44 However, such claims have consistently been dismissed. Generally, it is agreed that while freedom of expression should outlaw efforts to prohibit individuals from using a particular language as they choose, its provisions do not extend to placing a duty on others to understand what is being said and, therefore, to respond in the same language.45 Therefore, it can be concluded that a policy of official monolingualism does not transgress key individual liberties. Nevertheless, does it conform to the second liberal constraint that was identified? Does it impose unfair costs or burdens on individuals?
One obvious burden that could result from the adoption of a policy of
official monolingualism is that those individuals who do not speak the target language would find it extremely difficult to communicate in public settings and, in particular, to access public services or to conduct public business. If not addressed, this would clearly be an unfair burden: one that individuals should not be expected to shoulder in the cause of language maintenance. However, should the state be required to abandon monolingualism in order to accommodate this lack of competence in the target language? After all, as has already been emphasized, people are able to learn more than one language, particularly during childhood. Therefore, the communicative difficulties of those who do not speak the target language could be eased with an extensive publically funded programme of language training. Some may respond by observing that learning a new language is not something that happens over‐night. It is a difficult and time‐consuming process, particularly for adults, and preventing individuals from gaining proper access to key services while they develop the necessary linguistic competence would be unfair. Yet, such an argument would not demonstrate that monolingualism should be abandoned completely. Rather, it would only show that care should be taken when implementing such a policy; in particular that the state should seek to phase it in gradually.46
However, as is increasingly acknowledged, language is much more than
simply a means of communication and, therefore, instrumental burdens are not the only ones that could result from the adoption of a policy of official monolingualism. Some may claim that such a policy expects them to shoulder a heavy expressive burden, as it allows no public recognition for the particular language that they happen to view as important from the point of view of identity.47 Significantly, this
44 See some of the cases discussed by Fernand de Varennes, “Language and Freedom of Expression in International Law,” Human Rights Quarterly, 16 (1994), 163‐86. 45 See, for example, José Woehrling, ‘L’Evolution du carde juridique et conceptuel de la législation linguistique du Québec’, in Le français au Québec: les nouveaux défis ed. Alexandre Stefanescu and Pierre Georgeault (Montréal: Conseil supérieur de la langue française, 2005), pp. 253‐356. 46 For a similar argument see Alan Patten, “What Kind of Bilingualism?” in Language Rights and Political Theory, ed. Will Kymlicka and Alan Patten (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 296‐321, at pp. 305‐6. 47 On the significance of the link between language and identity see, among others, Green “Are Language Rights Fundamental?” p.659; Denise Réaume, “The Constitutional Protection of Language: Security or Survival?” in Language and the State: The Law and Politics of Identity, ed. David Schneiderman, (Cowansville: Éditions Yvon Blais, 1991), pp. 37‐57, at p. 45; and Stephen May,
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expressive burden is not one that could be eased by the implementation of certain transitional measures, as the issue at stake here is not linguistic competence. Even if knowledge of the target language were universal, individuals who identified strongly with another tongue may still find the monolingual policy symbolically demeaning. Indeed, it is possible that they would view public investment in programmes seeking to encourage them to adopt another language as their main medium of communication as simply a means of intensifying their degradation.
According to Helder De Schutter,48 the implications of this expressive
burden, and the fact that it cannot be eased through transitional measures, should lead liberals to question the appropriateness of adopting a policy of official monolingualism. De Schutter reminds us that “different people within the same polity or territory may have different language identity interests,”49 and that when this is the case a policy of official bi‐ or multilingualism should be favoured. He insists that this is required in the name of “linguistic justice,” as persisting with monolingualism in such circumstances would mean treating the linguistic preferences of some as “deviant” and as “less legitimate than those of others.” 50 Indeed, when considered from a Rawlsian perspective, one might conclude that a policy of official monolingualism, where only one language is used by public institutions, may seriously undermine feelings of self‐respect and self‐worth among those individuals who happen to identify with other languages. After all, as Rawls famously argued, “self‐respect depends upon and is encouraged by certain public features of basic social institutions.”51 As a result, it seems that the identity interests of different language groups need to be taken seriously, and therefore, liberals should tread with care when considering whether official monolingualism should be endorsed as an acceptable means of pursuing language maintenance. The concerns regarding identity should mean that liberals refrain from issuing a general endorsement of such an approach.
However, in contrast to De Schutter, I do not believe that official
monolingualism should be ruled out completely. One reason for this is the fact while the linguistic identity interests of different people need to be taken seriously, it is also reasonable to treat them as interests that only take on significance, and therefore influence language policy decisions, when they are held in common by a sufficiently large number of people. The fact that one individual on his own happens to identify with another language would surely not count as a blow against the legitimacy of a policy of official monolingualism. The same would surely be true if it was only a very small number of people who happened to identify with another language. Rather, it seems reasonable to expect that a significant number of people would need to identify with a particular language “Misconceiving Minority Language Rights: Implications for Liberal Political Theory,” in Language Rights and Political Theory, ed. Will Kymlicka and Alan Patten (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 123‐52, at pp. 139‐43. 48 Helder de Schutter, “The Linguistic Territoriality Principle – A Critique,” Journal of Applied Philosophy, 25 (2008): 105‐120. 49 Ibid., 112. 50 Ibid., 112 and 117. 51 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 319.
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before the refusal to accord it with public recognition begins to appear as an unfair burden.52
Furthermore, even in cases where we do find a significant number of people
identifying with other languages, it is possible that careful contextual analysis may lead to the conclusion that some form of monolingualism can still be deemed acceptable, regardless of the expressive burdens that this may entail. Consider, for example, the following case discussed by Patten.53 Language X is spoken by a clear majority of the population within a particular territory and, moreover, a substantial proportion of this majority is monolingual X‐speakers. As things stand, a full range of life options is available to these people through the medium of X. In other words, X provides them with a meaningful “context of choice.”54 However, this is not a stable state of affairs as X is not the only language spoken by individuals who live within the territory's borders. A small, but not insignificant minority speak Y, a language that, internationally, possesses a greater status. Imagine now that over a relatively short period of time a number of the bilingual members of the X‐speaking community are drawn, due to its greater international prestige, to using Y instead of X in a series of key domains (mainly employment related ones), and this leads to Y being normalized as the main language of interaction in these domains. As a result of this sudden linguistic change, the large group of monolingual X‐speakers become stranded. As Y encroaches as the normal language of interaction in an increasing number of key domains, the life opportunities of X‐speakers are curtailed substantially and their ability to enjoy a meaningful context of choice is undermined. When a case of language shift displays such features, liberals should be more sympathetic to calls for a policy of official monolingualism to be adopted, since a policy of official X‐Y bilingualism would not halt the sudden language shift that has left the monolingual X‐speakers with an increasingly limited range of life opportunities. However, given the expressive burden that monolingualism might impose on some Y‐speakers, before fully endorsing the adoption of such a policy, a liberal would need one further condition to be satisfied: the circumstances need to be ones which mean that it is unlikely that the monolingual X‐speaking majority will be able to develop competence in the encroaching language. To what extent is
52 I set aside for now the issue of whether, in such circumstances, the linguistic identity interests of immigrants should be treated in the same manner as the ones of settled national groups. However, whichever side one happens to take in relation to this debate, I believe that the fundamental point that I make here would still be relevant, namely that a significant number of people would need to identify with a particular language before the refusal to accord it with public recognition begins to appear as an unfair burden. For further discussion of the immigrant/national group dichotomy see see Carens, Culture, Citizenship and Community, pp. 77‐87; Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 95‐100; and Ruth Rubio‐Marin, “Exploring the Boundaries of Language Rights: Insiders, Newcomers and Natives,” in NOMOS: Secession and SelfDetermination, Volume XLV, ed. Stephen Macedo and Alan Buchanan (New York: New York University Press, 2003), pp. 136‐73. 53 See Patten “What Kind of Bilingualism?” pp. 306‐10. 54 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, ch. 5; Patten, “What Kind of Bilingualism?” p. 307.
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it likely that this will ever to be the case? It will probably be extremely rare, particularly if there is an increasingly strong employment incentive to learn Y. However, as Patten observes, the realization of such circumstances is not beyond possibility.55 Consider, for instance, that in our example the majority of monolingual X‐speakers live away from the main population centres. Under such conditions, the possibility of X‐speakers achieving the required competence in language Y in order to be able to take advantage of various employment opportunities may prove to be extremely difficult, given their lack of exposure to it.
Therefore, even in cases where we do find a significant number of people
identifying with other languages, concerns for social mobility could allow a liberal to endorse a language maintenance effort that was centred on a policy of official monolingualism. For this to occur, the following conditions must be met: the target language needs to be spoken by a majority of the population and a substantial proportion of that majority need to be monolingual; it needs to be clear that a policy of official bi‐ or multilingualism would lead to a curtailment in life opportunities for these monolingual speakers and that official monolingualism would counter this trend; and, finally, it needs to be clear that the monolingual population is unlikely to be able to learn the encroaching language.56 If these demanding conditions are met it can be concluded that the expressive burdens placed on those who do not identify with the target language should be set aside, as the social mobility related burdens that would result from not adopting official monolingualism would be far greater.
To summarize, while liberals should refrain from issuing a general endorsement to language maintenance efforts that are based on a policy of official monolingualism, given the unfair expressive burden that may be placed on those who view their identity as being closely tied to other tongues, such a policy should not be ruled out completely. In certain circumstances monolingualism may be deemed acceptable. Firstly, a sufficiently significant number of people would need to identify with another language before the refusal to accord it with public recognition begins to appear as an unfair burden; a handful would not be enough. Moreover, even in cases where we do find a significant number of people identifying with other languages, concerns for social mobility could still allow a liberal to endorse official monolingualism.
Nevertheless, despite these caveats, it should be emphasised that it is likely
that only a limited amount of cases would qualify as ones where official monolingualism could be considered as an acceptable method of pursuing language maintenance. Once again, a case could, potentially, be made in favour of Quebec. However, with regards to most of the other cases where there is a desire to arrest and reverse language shift, the demographic and socio‐economic factors point in a very different direction. This conclusion raises an important question Are there any maintenance methods that can be deemed acceptable, from a liberal perspective, when official monolingualism is off the agenda? Or, in such cases, must 55 Patten, “What Kind of Bilingualism?” p. 310. 56 Ibid., p. 309.
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we conclude that while a democratically mandated language maintenance effort may be acceptable in principle, it is impossible to pursue such a goal in practice without imposing excessive burdens? In my opinion such a conclusion is not inevitable. Rather, a range of perfectly acceptable maintenance measures remain available, even if official monolingualism happens to have been dismissed. The nature of these measures will become clearer as we turn to our third and final example of language maintenance in action. Example 3 This is a case where a policy of official multilingualism has been adopted. Thus, in contrast with the two previous examples, the language targeted by the maintenance effort is not the only one that is accorded public recognition. However, the policy of official multilingualism is implemented alongside a wide‐ranging programme that specifically seeks to promote the prospects of the target language and to halt any shift that may be in progress. It features some of the following initiatives: public funding for campaigns that encourage target language speakers to use it wherever possible and to transfer it to their children; public funding for courses that teach the target language to adults; public funding for ventures that provide opportunities to use the target language in informal social settings, such as youth or social clubs; public funding for a target language television channel and radio service; public funding to support book publishing through the medium of the target language; and public funding to support the publication of a target language newspaper. Moreover, these efforts to expand the range of domains in which the target language can be seen, heard and used are accompanied by efforts to maintain a sustainable community of speakers. For example, policies in fields such as economic development and land use planning include a consideration of linguistic sustainability and give public institutions the right to oppose certain schemes if it is deemed that they will undermine the prospects of the target language by facilitating harmful population movement.57 The first question that needs to be addressed in relation to this case is whether it should be considered as an example of language maintenance at all, as in terms of official public recognition the state is not favouring a particular language. Therefore, initially it may appear to some as if there is little to separate this approach and the neutral approach advocated by Patten, where the state explicitly refrains from seeking a particular linguistic outcome. However, making such an assumption would be misguided, as there are important differences between the two cases. Here the policy of official multilingualism is only part of the story. It is supplemented by a series of further publicly funded initiatives that 57 A good example of a language maintenance effort that is consistent with this description is the case of the Welsh language. For further information see the Welsh Government's Welsh language action plans. For the period between 2003 and 2011 see: Iaith Pawb: A National Action Plan for a Bilingual Wales (Cardiff: Welsh Government, 2003). Available from: http://wales.gov.uk/topics/ welshlanguage/publications/iaithpawb/ ?lang=en [Accessed 10 November, 2011]. For the Government’s plans between 2012 and 2017 see: A Living Language: A Language for Living (Cardiff: Welsh Government, 2012) Available from: http://wales.gov.uk/topics/welshlanguage/ publications/ wlstrategy2012/?skip=1&lang=en [Accessed 2 April, 2012].
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specifically seek to promote the long‐term prospects of the target language. Steps are taken to encourage those who speak it to do so wherever possible and to transfer the language to their children. Those who do not speak the language are given opportunities to learn it. Moreover, the state takes an interest in the impact of macro forces such as population movement. This means that, in contrast to the neutral approach, the state has not adopted a disinterested attitude. Rather, it is explicitly concerning itself with the degree to which the target language flourishes or declines over time. Therefore, this third case should also qualify as an example of language maintenance. Nevertheless, the question of how liberals should view the particular maintenance measures employed in this case remains. Does a policy of official multilingualism, supplemented by a programme of additional support for the target language (mainly in the form of public subsidy), conform to the two key liberal constraints? In relation to the first constraint ‐ the need for the state to respect key individual freedoms ‐ there seems to be no problem. Here, as in Example 2, there is no effort to curtail provisions such as freedom of expression or the freedom to exit. However, what about the second constraint? Does this third example of language maintenance also avoid the charge of imposing unfair costs or burdens on individuals? The main objection to a language maintenance effort based on a policy of official monolingualism was the manner in which such a policy imposes unfair expressive burdens on those individuals who do not identify with the target language, but rather with another tongue. Could the maintenance measures implemented in relation to Example 3 be opposed on similar grounds? Initially, it is difficult to see how such a claim could be sustained. The fact that the language maintenance effort occurs within the framework of a policy of official multilingualism means that in terms of the territory's linguistic landscape no particular language is systematically accorded a higher status than others. As a result, claims regarding symbolic degradation by individuals who identify with languages other than the target language would seem to possess less force. These individuals may respond by claiming that while the territory's policy of formal official multilingualism does not cause any symbolic harm, the prospects of another language are still being supported systematically, mainly through the allocation of public funds, and that this is perceived as a slight. However, this argument should also be dismissed. Consider the case of the Welsh language and the public funds accorded to the various ventures that seek to promote its prospects.58 The aim of these ventures is not to promote Welsh at the expense of English: they do not make it more difficult for those who wish to identify with English to live their lives through the medium of that language, nor do they seek to
58 See Welsh Government, Iaith Pawb, pp. 42‐3, 51‐2. Indeed, there are signs that these efforts in favour of the Welsh language are bearing fruit. After decades of continues decline, the results of the 2001 census showed that there had been an increase in the numbers of Welsh speakers. Moreover, it is widely expected that the results for the 2011 census, due out later this year, will show a further increase.
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persuade these people that a life lived through the medium of Welsh would be more worthy. Moreover, the public subsidy does not give an unfair advantage to those who identify with Welsh: it does not lead to the creation of goods or opportunities that are not already widely available through the medium of English. Therefore, even in this more limited sense, it can be concluded that the type of maintenance measures implemented in relation to Example 3 do not impose unfair expressive burdens on individuals. However, what about the financial burden that individuals are expected to shoulder as public funds are used to subsidise various language maintenance measures? Could those who do not support the language maintenance effort be able to argue that it is unfair to expect them to pay, through taxation, for such activities? In other words, would they be able to argue that it is unfair to expect them to subsidise initiatives that promote the preferences of others? If this requirement were placed on them without any prior democratic debate then, from a liberal perspective, these opponents would have a case. However, if the decision to pursue language maintenance was the result of a free and fair democratic debate, which is, as has been established earlier, the case here, then their complaint would not hold the same force. Supporters of the language maintenance effort would be able to point out that during the preceding debate opponents were free to argue against the use of public funds to promote the prospects of the target language and to advocate in favour of other preferences. Also they would be able point out that although the decision eventually went against them, opponents are not required now to keep quiet or to refrain from voicing any discontent. For example, it would be perfectly legitimate for an opponent to write to the press explaining why he or she believes that pursuing an alternative path would have been more advisable. However, given that the debate followed fair democratic procedures, those who find themselves on the losing side, and are, therefore, asked to pay through taxation for initiatives that they do not personally support would not be able to claim unfairness. All that has happened is that the democratic process has led to the endorsement of one set of preferences over another. Indeed, if we concluded that individuals could claim unfairness every time public resources were used in a manner that they did not endorse personally, the space left for democratic politics would be curtailed substantially. Thus, when adopted on the basis of a democratic consensus, the maintenance measures that characterize Example 3 would not involve the imposition of unfair financial burdens. Therefore, looking back over the three different examples, what have we learned regarding the type of practical measures that could be implemented as part of a liberal language maintenance effort? Initially, it was established that the type of coercive measures that characterized Example 1 should be deemed morally unacceptable, regardless of the circumstances, since they transgress a number of key individual freedoms. Following that, it was established that a policy of official monolingualism, similar to that which characterized Example 2, should also, on the whole, be classed as unacceptable, because of the expressive burdens it would
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place on those who do not identify with the target language. However, it was acknowledged that these expressive burdens could be set to one side, and monolingualism could be endorsed, in a limited number of cases where certain conditions are met. Finally, it was established that, provided the decision to pursue language maintenance was based on the existence of a democratic consensus, the type of measures that characterized Example 3 should be considered perfectly acceptable from a liberal perspective. As was demonstrated, a maintenance effort that was based on a policy of official multilingualism, supplemented by a programme of additional support for the target language (mainly in the form of public subsidy), did not transgress either of the two key constraints. It did not curtail key individual freedoms, nor did it impose unfair burdens, neither expressive nor financial. Moreover, given the limitations placed on the adoption of official monolingualism, it is likely that these are the type of language maintenance measures that a liberal would be willing to endorse most of the time. Conclusion This paper has sought to set out the features of a liberal approach to the issue of language maintenance. It has been argued that liberals should view language maintenance efforts as morally permissible endeavours, provided they satisfy two important conditions. Firstly, that the decision to pursue maintenance should reflect a democratic consensus within society. Secondly, that the laws and policies implemented in pursuit of maintenance should not transgress traditional liberal constraints: namely, that they do not curtail key individual freedoms; and, that they do not, as far as possible, impose unfair burdens or costs on individuals While developing this argument the work of other contributors to the emerging normative debate on language policy were discussed and critiqued. Firstly, when discussing the conditions under which a liberal should be willing to endorse language maintenance, it was argued that Patten's insistence on “plausible and urgent” reasons of social utility is too restrictive, and that a much more appropriate condition would be the existence of a democratic consensus. Secondly, when discussing the kind of practical measures a liberal should be willing to rule in or out when pursuing language maintenance, it was argued that, apart from in limited number of cases, the type of official monolingualism endorsed by Jean Laponce and Philippe Van Parijs should be classed as problematic. However, despite these caveats, it was concluded that a wide range of promotional methods could still be classed as acceptable from a liberal perspective and if implemented properly these methods would have a substantial impact on the prospects of various languages.