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THE IN FAN TR!SCHOOL PRE SSM

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by L" Col. R . 1 . R 6 1 3 , Inf . )

The A l l i ed Pow ers entered P a1 1 11s , 1\f9-

. 1 rh

Napoleon abd i cated the throne 0 . 1 1 131 11 1111 addthe treatof peace w a s s igned Ami i 1 1th “1 11 0 11 1 11 11 1 0 1

1 1111 11 10 0 19 10 0 131 1 elea sedthe B rit i sh mi l i tary and naval 10 1 mom that sphe1 e 0 1 opel ations andrendered them ava i lable 1 0 1 se1 v 10 e el sewhere . \ v 91 1" w i th the Un itedStates st i l l conti nued , and pess i11 1 istie l etters from our peace commiss ioneer s in London ind i cated 9. reluctance 0 11 the part of Great Br ita i n to cons ider terms of peace , butrather to p 1 0 secute the W 9 1 w ith“eater V ig0 1 ,and events proved th i s to be true

The w a r in E urope W 21 8 ha rdly a t 9 11 endW hen the Br i t i sh gove rnment made a r r a ngemen1ts to send fontbrigades from W el l i ngton

’s armyto A 111 e1'10 9;th11 ee 0 1

”the1 1 to a ndene c s 9 1 1 e xped it i onary forceagainst coasts OIthe U ni ted States 111161er of M a i . G f-1 11 . R ober tR oss . The mi ss i on of th i s 1 0 1 0 9 , a ccozding to the 0 11 2111 66110 1 of the ex

chequer ( 111 91 speech afterth OV nt111 the H ouse of Commons , Nov emoerw a s

‘to retal i ate upon the Anmr ica ns for the outrages wh ichthey had eonnnitteduponthe 11 0 11t1e1 =

The command of Geneml Ross sa i ied 1 1 0 111 the 111 o 1 th of the r iverG9 1°0 11 11e 111 F 1 9. 11 ee , J 1 1 10 , 2 , 814 0 0 1 ted 8 11119 011 0 11 0 1 1310 1 1

0 1 1 shi p ,

of w a r W ith se feral store ship a ndtr ansports , and r ea ched 139 1muda ,Ju ly 24th. The exped_t10 n 1 1

1

9 s here 1 0 511 1 0 1 0 9 11 by the 2 lstReg iment andsai led 10 1 the 11 11 1 9 1 1 0 91 11 coa st August 31ds10 ht111g l9 hdA ugust i 4thand coming to anchor off the mouth of the Potomac 0 11the 1

Oh th i s date Gene1 9i R 1)ss issueda d i v i s ion 0 1 de13 1 1

g9.11 iz.111 0 39 1 1 1

mand : lstB rigade 4th, 0 1

1 King' s 0 1

19 11 a 11di-4-th R eg ime11ts , 0 0 10 111 el

Brooke , Comma nding;2 11d1'1g91c e 2 1 9 1;R 0 3 o cotts F 119 111e1 s , 2 11 c1 Bat

Colonel Patte1 5 01 1 comnmndfng;a .z1 r3the L ight B 1 '1g ade -85th Regiment ,4th, 2 1 3t44th Light Infantry Compahies . One company of M ari nes”the Colonial M a1i 11 es and a deterchmem of ti l l ery 2 3-

p0 1 111 119 1 8 , one s ix ,

Colonel T hornton 0 0 111n1 9 11d111g . 2

In strength th i s commanddidnot exceed 44500 l1 1e11 . 3

111 9 11

1 1V 1 1 1g at a de0 1'

s10 11 as 10 h} 3 future 0 13

0

9 1 9. 1t' f 10 11 s Ross had the 111v a hza ble counsel a nd. adv i ce 0 1 1 . 1 11111 11 9” 3 11 Gemge Cockb u rn , who

W lth hi s 11 9 V9 1 force h9dbeet0 1 19 1 9 1 1 11“fo1 '

r

111 0 11ths p 1 ev iously along thecoast of 1119 19 1 19 1161 T 11 e1

' 1

e 1 do 1btthat the feas ibi l i ty1 . Gleig 42 , 69 , 89 .

2 . Spectator 22 .

3. Gleig 95 .

2 BAT T LE O F BLADENSBURG

of an attack 0 11 W ash ington w a s d i scussed at th i s t ime , but a dec i s i onupon that po int w a s permitte d to rest upon the course of events . 4

The American flot i l la under command of CommodoreJoshua Barneyhad given cons iderabl e annoyance , and at t imes had show n stout res i stance to the operat i ons of the Bri t i sh Navy in the Chesapeake and ther ive rs flow ing i nto it. T h i s flotilla had now w i thdraw n up the Patuxent .!t w a sthere fo i e determined to 11.1 a ke the destruct ion of th i s flotilla the11 1

1 5 11 91 111“11

'

1 iss ion, Ross’s command to cooperate by land w i th Cockburn ’s

111 11 .c upthe river . W i th th i s end i n v i ewthe exped i t i on proceeded111) the Patuxent to the head of nav igatio n for l arge sh i ps , abreast Bened ict

, rea chin f r that p lace August l0th, and effect ing a land ing on the 20th.

A (1111 111 11 C e chi 'a ne sent outtwo smal l er naval exped it i ons , one under Captai n Gordon up the Potomac to bombard F ort W ash ington , the other,under Captai n S i r Peter Parker , up the Chesapeake above Bal t imore , todixe rtthe attention 0 1

’the enemy in that quarter . 5‘ ltl1 0 u 1

'

h B ri t i sh Naval depreciati ons along the coast of M arylandand irg ini a began in F ebrua r v , 1 81 8, l i ttle w a s done by the Nati onalGovernment to res i st these ope rati ons , the only effect ive force used forthi s 11 111 11 0 5 0 be ing Barney ’s flot i l la . D ependence w a placed almostenti rely upon the loca l mi l i ti a cal l ed outby the local authorit i es or by the~tates concerned . 6

The fi rstdefinite i nformat ion of the stupendous change 111 cond it ions111 E urope brought about by the (1 Napoleon , and i ts poss ible

eff

ect upon the B r i t i sh camp aign aga inst the Uni ted Statesreached -" 11 211g

't0 11 M a y 9 , 1 814,and w a s constantly be ing confirmed

i n later d i spatches .

The gro wrnment, and part icu larly the W 9 1° D epartment

,treated the

threatening aspect o f ' a fl'

a ir s w i th great apat 1 31 , and i t w a s not unti lv uihmi 'rativ e d i spatche s w ere rece ived by the Pres ident 0 11June 26thfrom the peace commi ss ioners (Gal l at in and Bay ard ) i n E urope thatthe fz

'

ov e11

11 1 11c1 1tw a s st i rred to act i on . 0 11July lstPres ident M ad i son1-1 1“

1 1 meeting of the cab inet to cons ider measures of defense . As 911 1.

outcome o f th i s meeti ng , 0 11July 2dthe 1 0th M i l i tary D i stri ct w a s creted . cons i sti ng 0 1 the State 0 1. M aryland

,the D i str i ct of Columbia , and

that par t 0 1"

V i rgin i a ly ing betw een the R a ppa ha nnoek and Potomac r ive r s , and 1311 1 1 9 0 10 1 1 General W i l l i am H . W i nder of the Un ited StatesA rmy w a s a s s i gned to command . July 4th the Pres ident i nv i ted “the( erectitiv es o f certa in States to 0 13119 11 171 0 and hold i n read iness for immedi ate se rv i ce , a cor ps of n inetv -thi '

ee thousandfiv e hundred men ,

”the1 1110 1 11 0 1

"

M aryland be ing (10 00 , V i rgin i a Pennsylvani a 8

1 111 0 11 rece i pt of h i s order General W i nder immed iately took activeconmand , 9 11 11 i f hi s act iv i t i es w ere

,perhaps i n part

, w rongly d i rected ,

l.trzm’

s re po rt, P a lme r IV , 137.to ( 710 11 11 1 110 , 1 7Jul. 1 11, M . S S . L . C .

o f (‘

ochra ne , (“ov kbm'm henna n , 1 37, Gle ig 88-96.

0 . N at. Int. M a r . 17, 18 1 1;N iles Reg ister VI, 45 .

I’nlmtr II, I

’. 80 .Ja mes VI,

N ut. M a y 0, 181-1 . 11) i «1 M a y 18 ,June 30 .July 1

, 1 814.

Q ‘

Me e rr , M ilitar v A fl’

a ir s I, 5411.

BATTLE O F BLADENSBURG

they were no less ardent and strenuou s 1 11 hi s letter ofJu ly 9111 toGeneral Armstrong

,Secretary of W a r , he makes a good estimate of the

situation,particu larly inv iting the attention of the Secretary to the im

possib i l ity of assembl ing in time a mi l it i a not al ready c a l led out andorganized , shou l d the enemy suddenly advance against Anna pol is , Balti ~

more,or W ashington , and 1

1

eco111 111e11di 11g that , a force of fou r thou sandbe immed iately placed at h i s di sposal . A rmstrong did not replyto th isl etter . 9

The Secretary of W a r Ju ly i 2th authorized General W i nder , i n caseof actual or menaced invasion of the 1 0th D i strict , to ca l l for a part , 0 1 1for the whol e of the quota (6000 ) ass igned to the state o f Maryland ,w hich shal l have been organi zed and equ ipped u 11 de1 the a foms a idrequ is ition . In performing thi sdutv , you w i l l be ca 1 e 1 111 to avoid a n11 6c a V

cal l s and to proportion the cal l to the exigency .

”Late 1 under ( late of

the 1 8thW inder w a s authorized to draw under the same cond itions fromthe quota of V i rgin ia 20 0 0 men , and f 1 om that of Pennsyi v a ni a 500 0

The whole of the mi l it i a of the D ist11 1ct0 1 Co iumb ia , amounting to about2000 , w a s al so placed subj ect to h i s o1

1 der s . 1 0

Here w a s a paper sti ength of mi l it i a , but S 11 1)JCCtto cal l onlvi n case of actual 0 1 menaced invasion .

It i s not w ith in the l imits of thi s paper to cons ider , the mass ofcorrespondence betw een Ge11 e1 a 1 W i 11 de1 and the Secretam of W a 1

, thegovernors of the States of M a 1 y1a 11d, V 1 1 0 111 1 a and Pem1 sylv an ia andthseveral commanders of m il it ia

, 0 1 the co1 1 1 11s 1lo11 , obstacles and vexatious

delays which attended upon hi s endeavor to organi ze a dependable forcefor the defense of hi s d i strict . Suffice i t to state that despite hi s moststrenuous efforts , he w a s abl e to march to thefieldof B ladensbmg 110 1:

one mi l it iaman f1 on1 Pe11nsyl11

a ni a,notone 1 1 0 11 1 V imin1 a , only one thi 1;

of the quota from M a 11

y1a nd, notthe fu l l quota even 1 1 0 111 the D istl ietof Co lumb ia, 1 1

On the 17th of A 11 01 t,us the day the Br i t i sh a po ea r edoff the mouth

of the Potomac , Gene1 al W i 11de1 had under h isdi 1 ectcommand a deta chmentof the 36th and 38th Reguia r Inf a 11t1 y, number ing 330 l1 ,1el1

under command of Lieutenant Colonel Scott,a mi l i t i a fo1 ce of 250 men

under Maj or Kramer at Bladensburg and the arti l l ery garri sons at FortsWash ington , M cH enry , Severn a ndM adiso11 , 11u111ber i11g in tota l

It w a s therefore now necessary,the cond it ion of actual in a s ion

exi st ing, to mob i l i ze and concentrate the mi l i ti a;and 1'

111 11 1ediate1y upon‘

1 eceiptof the infO Imation on the 1 8th 0 1 the a opea 1 a 11ee of a gr eatlvre inforced enemy, i n the Chesapeake , orde1 s 1 1.

1e1 e exmescodto the go "

ernor s and the sev e1 a l comma nders of mi l i t ia . 1 3

The resu lting movements w ere :General T . E . Sta nsbury ’

s Brigade, number inw

O1 358. composed o

'

9 . State Pa per s , M ilita ry Affa ir s , I, 543.

1 0 . Publi shedin Ingr a ham p . 1 2 .

State Pa per s . M il. Affa ir s , 549 .

1 1 . State Pa per s . M il. Affa ir s I. 524 etseq.

1 2 . State Pa per s . M il. I. 554.

13. W inder ’s Court. M . S . S .J. A . G . O .

4 BATTLE O F BLADENSBURG

the lstRegiment under Lt. Colonel Regan , and the 2dRegiment, underLt. Co lonel Shutz , l eft Baltimore A ugust 20th and reached Bladensburgon the even ing of the 22d. 14

Colonel Joseph Sterrett ’s 5th Regiment , numbering 500 , to which

w ere attached Major W i l l iam Pinkney’

s R ifle Battal ion , 1 50;andtwo compa nies oi arti l l ery under Captains Iuyer a ndMagruder, w i th six s ixpounders and 1 50 men , marched f rom Balt imore August 2 1 stand arrived

sfifiat Bladensburg about sunset on the g od1 5

C ol onel W m. D . Beal l’s Annapol i s Regiment (C0 1. Hood attached)

800 strong , reached B ladensburg on the 24th and marched through thev i l lage not half an hour before the arr ival of the Briti sh . 1 6

The several detachments of mi l it ia or volunteer cav a lry, Lieut . Col.Ti lghman

,Senior

, z'

i inéuntedto about 260 troopers . Two troops of U . S .

Light D ragoons , 1 25 men, under Lieut . Col.JLav a l], j u st organized ofrecru its mounted on horses , most of w h ich w ere purchasedtwo weeksbefc re . reported at W ashington August 20th. 1 7

Thc lstColumbian Brigade , Brig . General W . Smith , commanding,composed oftwo regiments under C 0 18 . Magruder and Brent;two compa nies arti l l ery , tw elve six-pounders , andtwo compan ies r ifl emen, arm

edw i th nmskets , mder Maj or Peter , total li ng me 1 , w a s orderedout onthe mfrhtof the 1 8th, assembled on the 1 9th,

a nde fter greatdi fficulty i n ohta imne the necessary equ ipment , sueeededin taking up,the march o v e r the Eastern Branch br ida e l ate inthe afternoon ofthe 20th. 18

These , w i th 9 . batta l i on of 1 50 men under M ajor Waring of Md .

Mil it ia,constituted the Whole force under General W inder

’

s command atthe battle of Bladensburg . Commodore Barney, W i th 500 flotilla men and1 03 marines under Captain M ilier coop e rated w i th him on thatfield.Reports in the archives of the W a r Department give the total Americanforces at B ladensburg‘

, 540 1 .

General!oung’

s 2dColumbian Br i g ade 450 stron g w a s sent on Aug .

20th to the defense of Fort W ash ington, 3 1m Colonel Miner’s V i rgin iaregiment w a sdelayed in W a sh ington anddid. not reach Bladensburg . 1 9

The Secretary of State Colonel h emoe v olupteer edon the 1 8th tomake a reconnai ssance 0 1the enemy , and w i th 21 detachment o fD i str ict Cav alry sta rted out on the next morning . H e furni shed General W inder w i th almost the only dependable in format ion he received ofthe enemy

’

s march north to Nottingham H e est imated the enemy’

sstrength atfiv e to seven thousand .

14. Stunsbury ’

s Report. State P a per s . M i ] . A ff a ir s I. 560 .

1 5 . Ste r i 'ett’s P inkney’s Reports .

State P a per s , M il. A ffa i r s . I. 5 68 ,

1 6. Bea n’

s a w l l’inkney

’

s Zopo rts . State Pa pe r s . M il. A ff a ir s I. 571 .

17. Lm'

a ll’

s. Ilopurt. State P a pe r s . M il. A ffa i r s I. 569 , 575 .

18 . Smi fh’

s Repo rt. State P a per s .

M il. A ffa ir s 1 . 563.!oung ’

s. a ndM ine r ’

s Repo rt.State P a per s I. , 566, 568.

20 . Monroe’

s r epo rt. W imler ’

s N a r rativ e . State P a per s . M il. Affa ir s I, 506,

BATTLE O F BLADE NSBURG 5

Oh the 2oth, Winder sent Col . Ti lghman with h i s squadron of cavalryv i a Woodyard with orders to

“ha r r a ss , obstruct and impede

” the marchof the enemy . 2 1

Oh Monday morning, the 22d, there were assembled at W oodyard General Smith ’s Brigade, Scott

’

s Regulars , La v a ll’

s Caval ry , and Kramer’s

Battal ion,and General W inder ea1 ly sent out the detachment of the Reg

u lar infantry and Maj or Peter ’s command , w i th La v a ll’

s caval ry preceding to make a 1 econ11 a i ss a nce i n 1

'

o1 cetow a 1dNottingham xv l1e1 e 111

Briti sh were known to have camped the n ight be 1 0 1 e W inde1 a ccompa niedthe caval ry, and hav ing p 1 oceededaboutfou 1 miles he perce ived theBrit i sh marching by the d irect roadtow a ldUppe1 M a rlbo1 ough. W 1thout attempting to engage the enemy he ordered the W i thdraw al of thewhole command to Battal ion Old Fields , a point about eight mi les fromUpper Marlborough and the same d istance from Washington . Aboutnoon of th i s day, Commodore Barney being conv inced that hi s fl otillaw a s doomed to capture destroyed it and with his seamen jo ined GeneralW inder

’s comma nd at Battal ion Old Fields . Captain M i l ler W i th hi smarines had al so j o ined . The next day , the 23d, a simi lar manoeuver wasrepeated, the advance of a detachment tow ard the enemy in the d irect ionof Upper Marlborough, a meeting, a W i thdraw al W i thout an engagementto Battal ion Old Fields W i th the enemy halted only three mi les d istant;then in the even ing a most extraord inary dec i s ion on the part of General W inder, even at var iance with hi s own est imate of the s ituat ion ,caused him to w i thdraw hi s whole force into the C ity of W ashington acrossthe Eastern Branch Bridge . Thus were the Briti sh permitted a h

‘ uninter ruptedand an almost total ly unha r r a ssedmarch of forty-fiv e milesintothe enemy’s country . 22

General Winder found himsel f the next morning out of touch w i ththe enemy , andthe V i ctim of many contrad ictory rumors as to hi s movements . How ever, about ten o

’

clock, defin ite intel l igence was rece ived thatthe Brit i sh were marching on Bladensburg . As soon as he had issuedthe necessary orders placing hi s command in march

,he preceded it in

haste to B ladensburg. In the meantime General Stansbury,in command

at B ladensburg, hav ing rece ived information of Winder’s retreatacross the Eastern Branch , and a lso

'thatthe Briti sh w ere advancing onBladensburg, determined to march tow ard W ashington to form a j unction with General Winder . After having proceeded about a mil e and ahal f in that d irect ion he w a s met by hi s Adj utant, Major W oodyea r ,return ing

“from General W i nder w i th posit ive orders to give the enemy

battle at B ladensburg, and that he w ou ld be reinforced . General Stansbury at once counter-marched hi s command, proceeded toward Bladensburg,

' aud sel ected the ground along the right bank of the Eastern Branchj ust west of B ladensburg for defense . 23.

The b attlefieldof B ladensburg is a terrain gradual ly r i s ing to thewest from the Eastern Branchterminat ing one mi l e d i stant in a 1OW l ine21 . W inder ’

s Court. M . . S J. A . G. O .

22 W inder ’s N a r r ativ e .

b

Snrith’

s Report. C atlett’s Report.3. Sta nsbury , Ster retta ndP inkney .

State Pa per s , 1 , 361—371 .

6 BATTLE O F BLAD E NSBURG

o i'

hi l l s perpend icu lar to the W ash ington tu rnpike . The river bank i s low

a ndmarshy back about 30 0 yards from the river w here there i s a lowterrace .The o ld W a sh ington road forms a j unction w i th the p ike near

the bridge a ndleads in a w esterly d i rection . About 1 1 00 yards fromthe bridge i s a broa d , deep 1 avine ( the oldduel ing ground ) cross ingthp ike perpend icu larly . F r om the bridg e in thi s rav ine to the l ine o f hi l l s thed ist a nce i s 65 0 yards . The ground w est of the rav ine and north of thepike i s considerably cut up by gul l ies;to the south it i s fai rly level .

In making hi s d isposi ti ons,assi sted by the Secretary of State who

hadj o ined him,General Stansbury placed Myer and Magruder

’

s arti l l eryin a trench prep a red theda y be i ore by Colonel Deci u s W adsw orth , C . E . ,

onthe crest of the low ter race , to the north of the pike . Maj or P inkney’

s

ba tta l ion supportedthe arti l lery ,tw o compan ies on the right near the p ike ,a ndone on the l eft . H e concealed hi s men behind fences and in the underb rush. C a pta ip D oughty ’

s company of the Fi fth Regiment al so supported the a rtillery ‘

on the right .About 250 yards in rear, w i th an orchard intervening, y ere d i spose d

Colone l Hagan w i th h i s right 0 11 the road , Colonel Schutz in the centerand Colonel Sterrett ou the left somew hat farther advanced and nearerthe arti l l ery . General St11 sbury states that h is enti re l ine w a s l atermoved back 250 yards , by w hose authority he does not know

, pr esumably Colonel Monroe ’s 24.

General W i nder arrived on the held a ndapproved these d ispos it ions .

H e brought w i th him Captain Bu rch ’s Battery,tw o guns of w hich w ere

pl a ced on the pike on Ragan ’s right a ndthr ee on the old road to Sterr ett

'

s l eft . L a v a ll’

s caval ry w a s i n r ear to the l eft of Sterrett .

W hen the column from W ashington ar rived , Gener a l Smith placedthem in posi tion a long the l i ne of h i l l s al r eady mentioned . Commodore!Jammy w ith histw o 1 8 pounders occup iedthe center on the pike,the sai l

o r s armed as infantry on hi s right,the l ine being farther extended b ,

C aptain Mi l l er ’

s marines a l ittl e more advanced . Colonel Beal l w i th hi sAnnapol i s mi l i t ia w a s a l rea dy in a pos iti on on a hi l l about 250 yards fromthe road on Barney

’

s right . The leftw a s extended by Co lonel M a g rude i ’

regiment, Maj or Peter’

s battery and r ifl emen, w i th Colonel Scott’s Reg

i ‘izl i '

S onthe extreme le ft . Thi s w a s the hual d i sposit ion after somesh i fting . Maj or Kramer

’

s battal ion“as advanced in fr ont of the sai lors1 0 the edg e of the rav ine . 25

On the morning of the 28dat Upper Marlborough fol l ow ingthedo :truction 0 1”

flo t i l l a . Genera l Ross and Rea r A dmi ral Cockbu rnheld a conference a ndi t w a s qu ickly dec ided that an attempt shou ldbe m a deto captu r e the c ity of W ashing ton . Accord ingly Ross tookthe ma r ch on the afte rnoon o f the sa me (la y . in the 24th the troop .

res umedthe march and r ea ched B la-i clensburg . On the opposite s ide ofthe lla'te rn li r a m'hthe enemy d i scovered a ndfrom Lowndes H i l l

loss i'

v cmi no ite rml h i s po sition . D i spo s ition fo r attack ha ving been

1 1. bury , l’inknv y . M o nroe .

lupe r s , I, 36 1 -971 .

"w ith. (

‘

0 10 11 0 l

State Pa pe r s , M i l ita ry A f fa ir s , l. ,6631

BATTLE O F BLADENSBURG 7

made,i t w a s commenced w i th much impetuosity by the Light Brigade ,

under Colonel Thornton . Thefir stl ine w a s soon carried,the enemy

reti ri ng to higher ground . The Light Brigade being unable to carrythsecond l ine , i t w a s reinforced by the 1 stBrigade, under Co lonel Brooke ,the 44th attacking the enemy ’

s l eft, the 4th press ing hi s rightthe W ho lel ine soon gave w a y, and the Americans hed. This i s the Briti sh a c

count . 26

On the American s ide , the art i l l e ry w ith P inkney’

s battal ion insupport, rece ived

'

the brunt of thefir stassau lt . The Briti sh w ere forcedoff the streets 0 1

'

Bladensburg to cover of the bu i ld ings , and w ere cons ider a bly delayed in cro ss ing the r iver . Maj or Pinkney w a s soon forcedback

,w ithdrew to the le1ta ndformed again on Colonel Sterrett ’s let.

The reg iment of Colonel s Ragan a ndS ehutz w ere qu ickly driven back , theuntrained mil it ia being unabl eto w ithstand the d ischarge of the C ongreve rockets used by the Briti sh . Colonel Sterrett maintained his

pos 1t ion unti l h is i ightfl a nk ,now e} :prn eJ, w a s complete ly t in ned a nd

hi s l eft threatened,and only w i thdrew when orde1 edto do so by Genera l

W inder . Laval l’s r egular ea v a hy retreated in the melee w i thout being 0 1

any serv i ce . This whole force w a s completely demoral ized , and the rretreat became a rout . Fortunately thei r l ine of retreat led them north

and clear of the second l ine .

The Brit i sh attack developed enti rely on the right of th i s line , sou1.hof the mad. Maj or Kr amei ’s battal i on 0 11 the crest of the r a w he w a s

soon forced to w ithdraw , but every attempt the enemy made to advancefrom the rav ine against Barney and Mi l l er’s front w a s repu lsed w ithheavy loss . Maj or Peter W ith h i s art i l l ery on the left rendered eo: 1:31u

‘

er a ble ass i stance W i th h is crossfir e in the early stages of thi s act ion .

Being reenforced and w orking around to thei r l eft the Briti sh assau ltedthe hi l l occup ied by the Annapol i s troops under Colonel Beal l , who , a 1terhr ing three or four rounds , retreated in d isorder . Barney ’s right w a s

new fl a nkedby the enemy . This being observed by General W i nder ,ordered a general retreat which w a s executed in good order by the troopsthat remained . General Smith ’s D i stri ct Mi l i tia and Colonel Scott’s li e:u lar Detachment w ere not engaged . Commodore Barney w a s severelyw ounded and w a s taken pri soner . W hat remained of General W indercommand retreated through the c ity to the heights of Georgetow n , a ndl ater to Montgomery Courthouse . 27

The Brit i sh d id not pursue . A fter a halt upon the battlefield ,themarch w a s resumed and the command l eached the outski i '

es of W ash inton about p . m. Ross and Cockburn entered the ci ty w i th about 2 1 10n en and the w ork of destruction began . The Capitol

,the W hite House

,

1ndthe publ i c offices , Treasury , State, W a r and Navy and Publ i c Libraryw ere burned;a rope w alk and long bridge over the Potomac destroyed °the print ing establ i shment of the National Inte l l igence w recked;thedestruct ion of the Navy!ard was made complete . The total publ i c l oss

26. Ros s’

a ndCockburn ’

s r eports .

P a lmer IV , 142 , Gleig , 1 22 .

7. Ross ’s r eport

P a lmer IV , 148, M i l ita ry Affa ir s I.

8 BATTLE O F BLADENSBURG

w a s The Briti sh hasti ly retreated from W ashington on then ight o f the 25th and reached Benedict on the 29th. 28

The Briti sh loss at the battl e of B ladensbu rg w a s 64 offi cers andmen ki l led , and 185 ofl icer s and men wounded , the total casualt ies 249 , aca sualty percentage of The heav iest losses w ere in the 85 th and the4th,

both o f whicl‘ regiments were in Barney’

s front . The 85th al so madethefir stadvance .

The American losses w ere, according to reports in the archives ofthe W a r Department , 25 otiieer s and men ki l l ed , an 41 ofilcer s and menw ounded , total 66, giv ing a casualty percentage of The heav i estlosses w ere su stained by Captain Mi l ler

’s detachment of Marines , ColonelSterrett ’s Regnnentand Connnoclme Barney

’

s seamen . Captain M il l erlost 2 1 per cent of hi s force .

In frontages . ourfir stl ine w a s occupi ed by about 5 men per yardand the second l ine by 8 men per yard;seemingly sufficientfor defenseagainst an infer ior force .

The cause for th i s d i saster and the fa i lu re ofthe American armsare not far to seek .

Many in authority at ?ash ington did not th ink it possible that theBriti sh w ou ld have the temerity to a dvance so far in land as to attack thecap itol , w hen Annapol i s and Balt imore w ere so much more access ib le .

Chief among these w a s the Secretary of W ar himsel f, which may accountin part for the hal f hearted support he gave to General Vincler .

Atany rate, there w a s a notabl e lack of organ izati on and train ingi n the force hurried ly assembled on thefieldof Bladensburg . It w a sl i ttl e more than a mob . General W inder fel t keenly the necess ity of attain ing thesetw o G reat factors for 111 ilita ry

'

sueces s , but w a s again metw ith the opin ion of General Armstrong

“that the most advantageous

mode of us inO;mi l iti a as upon the spur of the occasi on , and to bring themtofightas soon as cal l ed .

The d i latory pol i cy of the government caused to exist a great shorta ge of transportati on , 11 11111 it1'ons , rations and suppl ies of every kind, r

e

‘u l ting in de lay in assembl ing and in unnecessary hardship and sufferingfor the troons .

In leadership Gene”

a l W inder, 88 years of age , w a s a l aw yer in Baltimore unt i l he a Lieutenant Colonel in the Regular ArmyinJuly , 1 81? li e v a r;a ppo inted Br i gadi er Gen ral in March , 1 813, w a s

captured bythe Briti sh on the northern f lontier June 1 , 1 813, and re

mained a pr ixor ei en ( 110 unt i l he took connna ndo f the 1 0thmil itaryd i stri ct . lie coulJnot hope to have the mi l itary attainments 0 1" Ins op

ponent,General Ros s , 48 year s of age , 2 5 years a British officer and

a ccu -temed to l arge commands .

A d i scus s ion or comparison ofthe quali ty of troops i s needless;W ellinqton’

s vetera n s r a w mil i t ia .

The d isposit ions at Bladensburg w ere taken up hurried ly a ndW uhout coord ination . The l ines w er e fo rmed not w i thin supporting: d istance ,the effective range ofthe 1

'

1usketatthat time being not more than 20 07 8 . Ilo ss

’

r eport.l

'

ulmer IV, 148, M i l ita ry A fl'

a ir s I.

BATTLE O F BLADENSBURG 9

ya rds . Thi s permitted the enemy to defeat each l ine in detai l. Th

successive l ine formation i s not for untrained troops in the open.

'

l he t imid tactical pol icy of General W inder w a s deemed to f a ilui ee shoul d have p i epa r eddefenses fo1 the nea 1 app 1 eachesto the c i ty .

shou ld have moved w i th al l hi s avai labl e force to ga i n quzck contactth the enemy , being r einf0 1 cedas othe1 hoops assembled . Had hemaintained cl ose contact w i th the enemy , fought delaying actions , deterin ined. using hi s own w ords to C0 1. Ti lghman to obstruct

,harass

,impede

him in every w a y your resource and ingenu ity can suggest ,” he 11 11: 1.

ra m achieved success .If after al l h i s efforts he had sti l l been forced to meet the enemy 0 11

‘

hefieldof B ladensburg and suffer defeat , he should not have fl edthroughthe streets of W ashington to the heights of Georgetow n ,but shou ld have

contested every foot of ground from thatfieldto the very doors of thecap itol .

STATEMENT O F GENERAL W IN DE R TO IN VE ST IGAT ION IN

THE IN VA S ION AND CAPTURE O F W ASH INGTON .

A s soon as I lea 1 ncdthe enemy w ere movingtow a ldB ladensb i zi g Ie ide i edGene1 al Smith , w i th the whol e of the troops , to move i in znedately to that po int .

>i< >i<

I arrived at the bridge at B ladensburg about tw e lve o ’clock,where I

found Lieutenant-Colonel Beal l had that moment passed w ith h i s command

,having j ust arrived from Annapol i s . I had passed the l ine of

Sta nsbury’

s brigade , formed in thefieldupon the left of the road . atabout a quarter of a mi l e i n the rear of the bridge;and on the road , ashort d istance in the rear of Sta nsbury’

s l ine, I met several gentl emen ,

1ndamong the others , I th ink , M r . Franci s Key , of Georgetow n ,who ih

ormedme that he had thought that the troops coming fromthe c itycou l d be most advantageously pos1 ed on the right and l eft of thenear that point . General Smith being present , M r . Key undertook

,I

bel i eve,being sent for that purpose, to show the posit ions proposed . I

l eft General Smith to make a d isposit ion of these troops , and procederlto the bridge

, where I found Lieutenant-Colonel Beal l , as before stated.I inqu i red whethe1 he had any d irections as to hi s pos it ion;he r eplmnhe had been show n a h igh hi l l upon the right of the r ,oad 1 a nging w iththe 11 1 oposedsecond l ine . I t being a commanding posit ion , and necessaryto be occup ied by some corps,

‘

I d i rected him to proceed agreeably totheinstruct ions he had rece ived . I then rode up to a battery w hich ha f

‘

Jeen throw n up to command the street w hich entered Bladensburg frothe side of the enemy and the bridge , where I found the Baltimore arti ll ery posted

, w ith the Balt imore r ifl emen to support them . Upon inqu i ry ,

I l earned that General Stansbury w a s 0 11 a ri s ing ground upon the leftof hi s l ine . I rode immed iately th ither, and found him and Colonel Mon

soe together . The latter gentleman informed me that he had been aid ingGeneral Stansbury to post hi s comma nd , a ndwished me to proceed to

1 0 BATTLE O F BLADENSBURG

exam ine it w i th them , to see how far 1 approved of it. W e w ere j ustproce ed ing w i th th i s V i ew , w hen some person rode up and sta ted thatthe new s had j ust been received of a signal v ictory obtained by Genera l Izard over the enemy , in wh ich one thousand of the enemy w ereslain , a ndmany pri soners taken . I ordered the new s to be immedia te ly 1

1

0 111 111 1111 icatedto the troops , for the pur pose o f giving add itionalimpu l seto the i r sp irit and courage . T he column of the enemy at thi smoment appea red in s ight, moving up the Eastern branch paral lel toour pos iti on . From the l e ft , w here I w a s , I perce ived that i f the posit ionofthe advanced arti l l ery w ere forced ,tw o or three p ieces upon the left0 1 Stansbury w ou l d be necessary to scour an orchard which lay betw eenhi s l ine and hi s art i l l ery , and for another r ifl e company to increase thes uppor t of th is art i l l ery .

These w ere promptly sent fo rw ard by Genera Smitl a ndposted ashasti ly as poss ible, and it w a s barely accompl ished before I w a s obl igedto give orders to the advanced arti l lery to open upon the enemy , who w a sdes cend ingthe street tow ard the bridge . A ll farther examination ormovement w a s now imposs ible , and the pos it ion w here I then w a s , i 111

111edi ately in the rear of the l eft of Sta nsbury’

s l ine, being the most adv a ncedpositi on from Which I cou ld have any con1 111 a 11ding V i ew

,1

r e n a inedthere . Thefir e of our advanced arti l l ery occasioned the enemy ,who w ere advanc ing, and who w ere l ight troops , to leavethe street, andthey crept dow n under the cover of houses and trees ,

'

11 l oose order , soa s notto expose them to ri sk from the shot;i t w a s therefore only occa:

'

io :1 a lly that an obj e ct presented at w hich the arti l l ery couldfire .

In th is sort of suspension , the enemy began to throw hi s rockets , andh is l ight troops began to accumulate down in the low er parts of the towna ndnear the bridge , but principal ly covered from view bythe

‘

houses .

'

lheir l ight troops , however , soon began to i ssue out and press acrossth1

Cree" , which w a s everywhere fordable , and in most places l i ned w ithus hes or trees , which w ere sufficient, how ever , to conceal the mo v e

of l ight troops, who act , in the manner of thei rs , s ingly .

'

Iheadvanced r ifleni en now began tofir e , and cont inued i t for hal f a dozenmunds when I observed them to run back to the ski rts of the orchard onthe l eft , where they became V i s ib le , the boughs of the orchard trees concea ling

“thei r ori ginal pos it ion , as al so that of the arti l l ery from view . Aret r eat o i

’

tw enty or thirty yards from the ir original posi t ion towardthe le i

'

t brought them in view 0 11 the edge ofthe orchar d . T hey haltedther e , and seemed for a moment returning to thei r position , but in a fewminutes ent i rely broke

,and reti red to the le ftof Sta nsbury ’

s l ine . I

immed iately ordered the 5th Bal timore regiment, Lieutenant-ColonelSterr ett . being;the l e ft of Sta i r 'bury

'

s l ine , to a d v a nce and susta inthea r ti l l ery . They promptly commencedthi s 11

‘

10 1'

0 11 10 11t;but the rockets ,W h ich had for thefir stthree or four passed very h igh above the headso f thetin l ow 1 1 1 1

1 31 1 11 a mor e ho r imnta ldi rection ,and passed very

close abovetl1 ‘ heads of Shutz ’s and Ra ga n’

s r eg iments , composingthecent r e and ic i

'tm Sta nsbury’

s l ine . A uni v ers a l fl ight 0 1. these regimentsw a sthe con sequence . Th is leaving;the right o f the 5 th whol ly unsup

po rted ,I o rde red it to ha l t , r ode sw i ftly acros s thefieldtoward those

who had so -.ha i1 i et'ully l i ed , and exe r ted my vo ice tothe utmo stto arrest

BATTLE O F BLADENSBURG 1 ]

them . They ha lted,beg a n to co l l ect and seemed to be re tu rni ng to thei r placos . Ah i l l—founded re l iancethat thei r o fficer s w ou ld succeed in ra l ly ing themwhen I had thus succeeded in stopping the gr eatest part of them

,induced

me immediate ly to return tothe 5th , the situation of whi ch w a s l i kelyto became very criti cal , and that positio n gave me the best command o f

V i ew . To my aston ishment and mortification,how ever

, when I hadrcgained my posi tion , I found the whole of these reg iments ( except thi r tyor forty of Ragan

’

s ral l ied by himsel f , and as many ,perhaps , of Shutz

’s,

ral l i ed , I l earn , by Capta in Show er and Captain whose name 1donot recol l ect) w ere flying in the utmost prec ipitation and d iso rder .

The advance arti l l ery had immediate ly fol lowed the r iflemen,and

reti red by the left of the 5th . I d i rected them to take post 0 11 a ri singground w hich I pointed out in the rear . The 5th, and the ar ti l l ery on itsl eft, st i l l rema ine and I hoped that thei rfire, notw i thstand ing the oh

struction of the boughs of the orchard,whi ch , being below ,

covered theenemy , w ou ld have been enabled to scou r thi s approach and prevent h

'

advance . The enemy ’s l i e ht tr oops, by s ingle men , show ed themselves onthe l ow er edge of the left of the orchard and received thefir e of thi sarti l l ery a ndthe 5th,

w hich made them draw back . The cover to themw a s , how ever , so complete that they w ere enabled to a dvance singly a 1 1

take positions from which.thei rfir e annoyed the 5th considerably , w ith

out e ither that regiment or the arti l l ery be ing able to return thefire w ithany probabi l i ty of efi‘ect. In th i s si tuati on I had actual ly given an orderto the 5th and the arti l l ery to reti re up to the hi l l , tow ard. a w ood moreto the l eft and a l ittl e in the rear

,for the purpose of draw ing them far

ther from the orchard , and out of reach of the enemy’s fire w hi l e he w a s

sheltered by the orchard . As aversi on , how ever, to reti re before thenecess ity became stronger

,and the hope that the enemy w ou ld i ssue in a

body from the left of the orchard and enable us to act upon him on terms:f equal ity, and the fear that a movement of retrea t might in r a w troopsproduce some confusion and lose us thi s chance , induced me instantly tocountermand the order , and direct the arti l l ery tofire into a w ooden barnon the low er end of the orchard

,behind w hich I supposed the enemy

might be sheltered in considerable numbers . Thefir e of the enemy now

began , how ever , to annoy the 5 th sti l l more in w ound ing several of them ,

and a strong column of the enemv having passed up the road as high asthe right of the 5th, and beginn ing to deploy into the held to take themin fl a nk , I di rected the arti l l ery to ret i re to the hi l l to w hich I had di rectedthe Baltimore arti l lery to proceed and halt , and ordered the 8th regimental so to reti re . Thi s corps , w hich had heretofore acted so fi rmly , evinced.the usual incapacity of r a w troops to make orderly movements in theface of the enemy, and thei r retreat in a very few moments became afl ightof absolute and total d i sorder .

The d irect l ine of retreat to the w hole or thi sfir stl ine being to thehi l l on w hich I had d i rected the arti l l ery to halt , and i 11 1 1nedi ately in connection w i th the positions of General Smith

’

s corps , w hich w ere not arrayed in l ine

,but posted on advantageous posit ions in connection w i th

and supporting each other,accord ing as the na tu re of the sr roundadmit

rl and requ i red , I had not for a moment , di spersed and d isordered a s

the Whole of Sta nsbury ’

s command , supposed that thei r retreat wouid

1 2 BATTLE O F BLADENSBURG

-ave taken a d ifferent d i recti on . But it soon became apparent that theho l e mass were throw ing themselves off to the right 0 11 the retreattow ard Montgomery Court Hou se , and flying: w ide of th is point;thewhol e of the caval ry , probably from the pressure of the infantry thaty a y, w ere al so throw n w ide of the l ine of retreat toward the right .

A fter making every effort to turn the current more tow ard GeneralSm ith

’

s command the c ity in vain , andfinding that i t w a s imposs ible tocol lect any force to support the arti l l ery , which I had d irected to halt,. 1 11dfinding also that the enemy ’

s l ight troops were extend ing themselvesin that d i rect ion , and press ing the pursu it, I d irected the arti l l ery to continne thei r retreat on the road they then w ere tow ard the Capitol

,i t

oeing imposs ibl e for them to get across to the turnp ike road or un ite w ithGeneral Smith ’s brigade .

The hope of again forming thefir stl ine at th i s po int,and there r e

new i ng the retreat , or , at al l events , o f being able to ral ly them betw eenthe Cap itol and that point and renew ing the contest

,induced me

,at the

moment I d irected the 5th regiment to retreat, to request M r . Riggs , ofGeorgetow n , to proceed to the President and inform him that w e hadbeen driven back, but that i t w a s my hope and intention to form andrenew the contest betw een that pl ace and the Capitol .

As soon as I found it vain longer to endeavor to turn the tide of r etreat tow ard the l eft , I turned tow ard the posi tions occup ied by Lieutant-Col onel Beal l , Commodore Barney, and General Smith . By thi s URLthe enemy had advanced up the road , had driven back Lieutenant-ColonelKramer’s command , posted on the right of the road , and in advance o f

Commodore Barney , after hav ing w el l maintained hi s posit ion and muchhurt the enemy , and al so continued tofire during hi s retreat . H e hadcome under the destructivefire of Commodore Barney , w hich had turned.him up the hi l l tow ard Lieutenant-Colonel Beal l , w hose detachment gaveone ortw o ineffectivefires and fled. Thei r position w a s known to me ,w a s y ery consp icuous , and the extreme right . The enemy , therefore, hadg a inedthi s command ing pos it ion , and w a s passing our right fl a nk;hiforce pursu ing on the left had al so advanced to a l ine w i th ou r l eft , andthere w a s nothing there to oppose h im . To preserve Smith

’

s commandfrom being pressed in front by fresh troops of the enemy , who w ere coming on at the same time , whi le they w ere under the certa inty of beine

assai led on both fl a nks and the rear by the enemy , who respectively gainedthem ,in w hich ci rcumstances thei r destruction or surrender w ou ld have

s een inevitabl e , I sent (my horse being unable to move w i th the rapid i ty1 w i shed ) to General Smith to retreat . I am not acquainted w iththe

rel a tive posi ti on of the d ifferent corps composing h is command , and cannot

.therefo re , determine who of them engaged the enemy , nor cou l d I see

howthey acted;but when I arrived in successi on at hi s d i fferent corps ,whi ch I d id as soon as practicable , I do not recol lect to have found a ny

o fthemtha t w ere not in order , and retreating w ith a s l i ttl e confusion ascouhl lunwr been cnqnx i ed. VVhen I i e a ched‘Uuz roadfiI fonndConnnodor e

men al so reti ring on the road , he hav ing been overpow ered by

tho se who drove o ff Beal l ’s regiment about the time I sent the o rdertoretrea t .

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1 4 BATTLE O F BLADENSBURG

rea r , and the regiments o f Colonel s Ragan and Shutz w ere al so halted inthe orchard , i n the rear and 0 11 the left fl a nk,near the creek . My intentions

w ere that they shou ld remain here to refresh thems e lve s as l ong as poss ible , and , as soon as the enemy appeared, to form Colone l Ste rrett

’s regiment ( in w hom I placed g reat confidence ) 0 11 the right , thei r l eft rest ing 0 11and supporting the right of Maj or P inkney

’

s r ifleni en,in V i ew of the

bridge and fronting the road , along wh ich ran a fence , and act as occasionshould requ ire . Colonel s Ragan

’

s and Shutz ’s regiments w ere to be draw nup in eche lon , thei r right re st ing 0 11 the l eft of C a ptains Ducker

’s and Go rsuch

’

s r ifle compan ies,i n order to preventthe enemy f rom pressi ng and

tu rning our left , hop ing that General W inder w ou ld j oin me before thebattle w ou ld commence

,and occupy the ground in my rear as a second

l ine . About 1 1 o ’cl ock a . m. I w a s informed by a drageon from Lieutena nt-Col onel Beal l that he w a s on the road from Annapol i s to B ladensburg .

w i th about e ight hundred men, d i stant from me aboutfiv e miles , andw i shed to know the d istance and s ituation of the enemy . I d i rected thedragoon to return and inform him.thatI had that moment rece ived ihformation that the Briti sh , w i th thei r w hole force , w ere approachingBladensburg by the r iver road, and that they w ere on ly three and a hal fmi les d i stant, and advi sed the col onel to fi l e off to hi s right and cro ssabove Bladensburg, to fal l into an old road w hich I understood led to ourl eft tow ard W ash ington , and take a posi tion 0 11 the high grounds northa ndnorthw est of B ladensburg

, which w ou ld completely protect my leftby preventing the enemy from outfl a nk ing us that w a y , and force thei rmain body across the bridge , in the face o f my arti l l ery and r ifl e inen 0 11the main road , and expose them to the fi re of the 5th regiment underColonel Sterrett , who w ou l d be protected by the fence .

Thi s advice,i t appeared , Colone l Beal l only took i n part, I pre sume

from an anxious w i sh to place h imsel f betw een the enemy and the c i ty .

H e sent h i s baggage off to the right , and w i th hi s troops passed the bridgeatB l a densbu rg about thi rty minutes before the enemy appeared on M r .

Low ndes ’ hi l l , and took hi s stati on 0 11 the hi l l , as I w a s informed , nearthebrick-ki ln w here w e halted in the morning , about one and a hal f m i les inmy rear

, a ndon the l eft of the road lead ing to the c ity . Aboutmerid ianthe enemy cou ld cl early be seen making tow ard 1i s by the river road .

W hi l e I w a s giving some d i recti ons to the arti l l ery , I found L‘

ieuten-i nt-Co l onel s Ragan ’s and Shutz ’s regiments had been moved from the.

place w here I hadsta ti oned them ,and m a rched outof the orch a rd up the

hi l l and formed in order of battle abouttw o hundred andfifty yardsa bove the orchard

,and upw ard offiv e hundred yards in the rea r o f ih

rtille ry and rifl emen . Thus uncovered by the trees of the or chard ,thei .

si tu a t ion and numbers w ere c l ea r l y seen bythe enemy i'rem Low ndes 'H i l l

, a ndthe flanks of the arti l l ery and r iflemen unprotected a ndl ai d liableto be tu rned , our main body being pl acedtoo fa r o (i

'

to render themany aid . 0 11 rid ing up the hi l l to know who hadorder ed thi s movement,l w a s in fo rmed that General W inder w a s onthe g round . Atthi s time Imetw i th Brig a d ier General Smith , of the D i stri ct of Co l umbia . a ndsomeconve rsa tionto ok place betw een us respecting:the o rder o f b a ttl e a nds enio rity;the pa rticu l a r s Ido notreco l l ect . l innncdiately r odetothemil l

,whe re I understood ( ic i i er a l W inder w a s ,

a ndfound him recon

BATTLE or BLADENSBURG 1 5

O

noiter ing the pos it ion of the enemy . W hi l e in conversation w i th him ,the

5th regiment w a s taken out of the orcha rd,m a rched upthe hi l l

,and stationed0 11 the left of Colone l Shutz ’

s r egiment,that of Colonel Hagan

being 0 11 the right , i ts right resting 0 11 the main roa d;but , a s 1 beforeobserved , the w ho l e atso great a d istance fr om the a r ti l l ery a ndriflemen tha t they had to contend w ith the w hole B r i t i sh for ce

,and so much

exposed that i t has been a cau se of astoni shment they preserved thei rground so long and u ltimately su 1 cceded in retreating . W hose plan thi sw a s I know not;i t w a s not mine nor d id i t meet w i th my a pprobat ion;but ,finding a superior ofiicer onthe ground

,I concluded he hadordered.

it, consequentl y d id r ot inter fere . General W inder asked n i e wher e I

meant to take my stati on . I a nsn cred , about the centre of my brigade .

H e said he w ou ld take his on the left of the 5th r egiment . General W inderas extremely active 0 11 giving di rect ions and encouraging the men . l

took my station in the centre of C ol onel s Raga n’s a ndShutz ’s regi ments ,

but occasional ly rode al ong the l ine,encouraging the men and giv ing

orders to the officer s . Maj or W oodyea r I d irected to keep w i th the la 1

of Colonel Shutz’

s r emment, to cheer upthe men and ass ist the officer s .

Maj or Randal l rod e w ith me . Soon after , the acti on commenced by thearti l l ery and riflemen atthe battery . The fire of the arti l l ery had greateffect , and evidently produced contusien in the ranks of the enemy , whotook shelter behind a w arehouse

,from w hence they fired rockets;but. a

few w el l-d irected shots drove them from thi s pos ition . A hanking party,

concealed by the banks and bushes,pushed up the river to turn our lf

w hi l e a strong force attempted the bridg e;but the inces s ant a ndw e l ld irected fi re from our arti l l ery and rifl emen at the battery occa si onedevident confus ion among thei r ranks

,so much so that thei r officers cmi

";be seen actively engaged preventing thei r retreating, and push ing themon to the bridge , and here I think the enemy suffered cons iderably . Atl ength they succeeded in pass ing the bridge in smal l part i es attu i l speed .

which formed after crossing . I had ordered forty horsemen w i th axes tocut aw ay thi s bridge before the nea r a pproach ofthe enemy , and s a wthem w i th their axes . W hy th is order w a s not executed I nev er co uldl earn . It i s certain the enemy could have forded the stream above;butI considered it wou ld

,i n some degree

,impede thei r progress and give our 1

ar t i l l ery and r ifl emen more time and opportunity to a ctw ith effect againstthem .

The arti l l ery,under the command of Captains Myer and Magruder ,

a ndthe r ifl emen ,the w hol e under the command of Maj or Pinkney , be

haved in the most gal lant manner ( this gal lant officer in the course ofthe

'

action w a s severely w ounded ) , but the superior force of the enemy ,

and the rap id ity w ith w h ich he moved , compel l ed them to reti re;but oneof the pieces w a s l ost , and thi s w a s rendered harmless before i t w a s abandomed .

The enemy took every advantage of the cover afforded them by thetrees of the orchard . and thei r l ight troops from thence kept up a gal l ingfir e upon our l ine . On th i s party 11

'

1 eh a dvanced nearer , the 5th reginent , under Colonel Sterrett ,

opened a stea dy and w el l-d irec tedfir e , Whichw a s foll ow ed by thefir e from the right , and ult imately from our centre ,

when thefir ing on both sides became general . After a ew rounds , the

16 BATTLE OF BLADENSBURG

troops on the right began to break . I rode along the l ine, and gave ordersto the officers to cut down those who attempted to fly, and suffer no manto l eave the l ines . On arriv ing at the left of the centre regiment

,I found

Lieutenant-Colonel S chutz ’

s men giv ing way , and that brave officer , withMaj or Kemp , aided by my aid-de-camp , Maj or W oodyea r , exe rt ing themselves in ral lying and forming them again . Captain Gal law ay’s companyand part of Captains Shower

’

s and R a nda llfs compan ies were ral l ied andformed again , and behaved gal lantly . The rest of Colone l s Shutz ’s andRagan ’s regiments fl edin d i sorder, notwithstand ing the extraord inaryexertions of thei r officer s to prevent it. On the left I soon afterdiscovered a part of the 5th regiment giv ing w a y, and that excel lent officer ,Lieutenant-Colonel Sterrett, with those under h im , most act ive ly engagedforming them again . Soon after the retreat became general , and al l attempts to ral ly them , and make a second stand , were fru itless . With abody of United States caval ry, I endeavored to protect the rear and righto f the retreating men , so as to preventthe ir fal l ing into the enemy’s possess i on .

The men under my command were worn down and nearly exhaustedfrom long and forced marches, want .of food , and watching . They hadbeen

,with very l ittl e intermiss ion , under arms and marching from the

time of thei r departure from Balt imore , with but l i ttl e sl eep , bad prov i s ions , and but l ittl e opportun ityto cook . They certa inly were not in acond ition to go into battle;but my orders were posit ive, and I w a s determinedto obey them .

=k

On arriv ing at the c ity , with part of Colonel La v a ll’

s United StatesCaval ry cover ing the retreat, and col lect ing the rear of our scatteredtroops , I found General Winder

’

s command had passed through it towardGeorgetown . I proceeded there, and then fol lowed to a v i l l age a fewmil es beyond it, where I overtook him with troops col lecting under hi scommand , and some of those of my brigade . The army thence proceededto Montgomery Court House on the 25th of August, where it w a s hourlyre-enforced by those who fledfrom thefield.

As there had been no place ass igned by the command ing general prev ious to the act ion to which the men shoul d retreat in case of a defeat ,many of those under my immed iate command had fledfrom thefieldtoward Baltimore .

Reports from Georgetown and the c ity reached me that the arms ofmany of the enemy had fal l en into the hands of the blacks, and it wasapprehendedthat they wou ld take advantage of the absence of the mento insu l t the females , and complete the work of destruction commencedby the enemy .

REPORT OF GENERAL SM ITH

Here , at the Long oldFields , pursuant to d irections from GeneralWinder, I assumed the command of the assembled forces , those of Commodore Barney excepted , consi st ing now of the fol low ing troops, vi z

BATTLE OF BLADE NSBURG

make, I appri sed General Stansbury of my V i ew s as to the troops undermy command , suggest ing that , i f h i s l ine shou ld be forced and he cou ldagain form 0 11 my left , the nature of the ground there w ou ld be favorabl e for a renewal of the acti on , which might then become general . Bythi s t ime we rece ived adv i ce that the enemy w ere near B ladensburg , a ndI l eft h im to hasten the arrival of my tr0 0 ps . They moved rapid ly oh,

notwithstand ing the excess ive heat of the day , cov ered w ith clouds o fdust , and were promptly d isposed of as fol l ows : Lieutenant-ColonelScott, with the 36thU . S . regiment, was posted in afieldon the l e ft 0 '

the road , hi s right rest ing upon it, and command ing the road descend inginto the rav ine before mentioned

,in the rear of General Sta nsbury ’

s

right, and the rest of hi s l ine command ing the ascent from the rav ine .

This pos ition was about one hundred andfifty yards in the rear of thefront l ine , but extend ing to the right . In the same fie ld , about one hundred yards in the rear of the 36th regiment , Colonel Magruder w a s postedwith a part of the lstregiment of D i stri ct M i l i t ia , hi s right al sorest ing upon the road, the left advanced , present ing a front obl ique lytothe road , and situated to cover and cooperate w ith the 36th regiment;Maj or Peter, W i th h i s art i l l ery, s ix s ix-pounders;Captain Davidson ’

l ight infantry, and Captain Stu l l’s r ifl e corps , armed w i th muskets , a h

of the same regiment, were order edto take possessi on of the abruptaccl iv ity before ment ioned , terminating the ra v ine . This w a s deemed adesi rabl e pos ition , becau se i t commanded compl etely the ravine andthroad cross ing it, and a cons iderable extent of the ground over Wh ich thefront l ine wou ld necessari ly reti re i f forced back but , after a short spaceo f time , report was made to me that broken grounds interrupted theapproach to it W i th arti l l ery but a c i rcu itous route that w oul d consumemuch time, and that in case of retreat, the ground in the rear w a s suchas might endanger the safety of the guns . It w a s mentioned , at thesame t ime , that near to it was a commanding pos it ion for art i l l e ry , a ndeasy of access from and to the road . I yi e lded W ith reluctance to theabandonment of the posit ionfir stordered , but t ime did not admit ofhesitat ion. Mea nwhile I had posted Li eutenant-Colone l Kramer , w i th

his battal ion of Maryland drafted mi l it i a , in the woods on the right ofthe road , and commanding the rav ine which continued in that d irect ion ,

with orders that,if forced

,he shou l d ret ire , by hi s right , through a body

of woods in that d irect ion , and ral ly and form w ith the troops stat ionedin

‘

the rear, on the extreme right . Upon examining the pos it ion takenby Maj or Peter’s battery

,i t w a s found that the range of h i s guns w a s

principal ly through that part of the he ld occup ied by the 36th reg iment . To remove one or the other became necessary , and the d ifficu ltyof the gr oundfor mov ing arti l l ery, and the exigency of the movement lettno alternat ive . The 36th fel l back about one hundred yards , l os ing, insome measure

,the advantage of i ts e l evated ground , and l eav ing the

road . The pos it ion of the lstregiment D i strict mi l it ia , from thi s c ircumstance

,was al so necessari l y changed. It fe l l back about the same d i s

tance,i ts right st i l l rest ing on the road , and now formed nearly in lme

w i th the 36th. O f the 2dregiment , D i strict mi l it ia ,two p ieces o f art i lelry and one company of r ifiemen, armed with muskets , were , byd1r ect ions of General Winder , sent on to the front;with these he fl a nkedthe

BATTLE O F BLADENSBURG

LD i strict vol unteers and mi l it ia, 1 070;Lieutenant-Co lonel Scott ’s 361 i

United State s regiment , 350;Lieutenant-Co lone l Kramer ’s battal ion o“

drafted mi l it ia , and Maj or W'

aring’

s battal ion of Prince George’smi l itia , about 1 50;total , about 180 0 men . A 11 encampment w a s formedfor the n ight , and such posit ions taken as vere best ca eulated110 resi sta night attack;the cava l ry being al ready stati oned in advance on thed ifferent roads l ead ing to Marlborough , w i th orders to keep patrol l ingparties constantly upon the enemy ’s quarters , a ndto advi se of al l h i smovements . The troops , being greatly fatigued , sought in sleep thatrepose they so much w anted . In th i s they w er e d i sappointed . Ah alarmgun aroused them about 2 o ’clock in the morn ing of the 23 They w erequ ickly formed in the front of their encampment

,and di spos it ions made

to meet and repel the expected attack;but in a short time it w a s a scerta inedto be a fal se alarm , and the troops w ere d ismi ssed , but w i th ordersto hold themselves ready for thei r posts at a moment’s w arning .

Atdayl ight,General W inder gave orders to have the tents struck and

thet-a gga ge-w agons l oaded , and that the w hol e shou ld be ready to mo v ein one hour . These orders w ere compl i ed w i th w ith al l possible expe

d it ion . Shortly after the troops w ere got under arms , and w ere j o inedby another smal l detachment of Prince George ’s mi l iti a , under the command of Maj or Maynard , about one hundred andfifty . The whole w ereheld r ad)to move accord ing to orders . About th is time I rece iveddi recti ons from General W inder to have formedan advance corps , constructed as the one of the preced ing day, and be prepared to move as hi ssubsequent orders shou ld des ignate .

Oh Wednesday morn ing, the 24th of August , at 1 1 a;m. I rece ivedorders from General W inder to detach one p iece of arti l l ery and one

company of infantry to repair to the Eastern Branch Bridge , and therereport to Colonel W adsw orth;and to proceed w ith

‘

the residue of thetroops to B ladensburg

,and take a position to support Genera l Stansbury .

Thi s order w a s put in immediate execution , and the troops for Bladensburg moved off w i th al l the exped i tion of whi ch they w ere capabl e . Having put them in motion

,I passed 0 11 ahead , i n order that I might select

my position against thei r arrival . I found General Stansbury . postedonthe w est s ide of the Eastern Branch , h i s r i ght resting on the mainroad

,d i stant from the b r i dge at B ladensl‘iurgfiv e or s ix hundred yards .

and extend ing northeastwardly , h i s l e ft approaching nearer to the creek .

Ah extensive appl e orchard w a s in h i s front . and , one hundred totwohundred yards in adva nce , a work th rown up , command ing the bridge ,occupied by a co rps o f arti l leri sts w i th five or s ix p ieces , and appearedto be supported by some r ifl e and l ight companies .

”

In hi s rear , 0 11 theright w a s athi ck undergr ow th o r wood , a nddi rectly behind that a deephol low . o r . ra v i 11e , o pen mu cle a r vd, o f about sixty yards i h 1 11 idt.h-,n-wl1 ichthe main road c ro sses .

The r avine terminates 0 11the . l e ft in a bo ld a ccliv ~

‘

ity , a bouttwo hundred ya rds fr om the r oad;the rest o fthe ground inhi s r e a r w a s open ,

unbroken,and gradu a l ly ascend ingfields . Having

hasti ly examinedthe grounds , and con c l uded onthe d i sposi tions I shou ld

BATTLE or BLADENSBURG i s)

extreme left of the front l ine;two pieces more of arti l l e ry were postedin the road near the bridge at Bladensburg;the residue of that regiment,about three hundred andfifty strong, under the command of ColonelBrent , w a s formed as a reserve a short d i stance in the rear of Maj orPeter’s battery, and so d isposed as to act on the right, or l eft, or in front,a s occasion might requ ire . Near them w a s posted , i n the same manner,Maj or W aring

’

s Prince George ’s battal ion of mi l iti a , about one hundredandfifty . Colonel Wi l l iam D . Beal l , W ith a regiment of troops fromAnnapol i s, passed through Bladensburg

‘ as our troops arrived,and took

a position on the r ight o f the road and nearly fronting it, at a d istanceof abouttwo hundred andfifty yards . Prev i ou s to the arrival of thetroops on the ground , General W i nde r came up from the c ity , and , beingmade acquainted with the intended d isposit ions of the troops

,as w el l as

the ground reserved for Commodore Barney and the marines , approvedof and confirmedthem .

About half past twe lve o ’

c lock, and whi l e the troops w ere yet takingthe i r d iff erent pos it ions, innumerabl e rockets, thrown from the heightsat B ladensburg, announced the arrival of the enemy there;and at thi speriod Commodore Barney

’

s sai lors and marines , in qu ick march , arrivedand took possess ion of the ground prev iously ass igned them , h is arti l l e rybe ing posted in and near the road upon its right , command ing the roadand openfieldin front;and hi s infantry, together w ith the marinesunder Captain M i l l e r, extend ing to the right, thus occupying the inter v a 1of ground betw een Colone l Magruder

’

s lstregiment D i str ict mi l it ia andColonel B eal l ’s Maryland regiment . The hring of arti l l ery m f ront sooncommenced

,and immed iately after that of musketry , in qu ick and rap id

successi on . In a few minutes the whole right and centre of the front l ine ,W ith some smal l exceptions, were seen retir ing,

in d i sorder and confusion .

The hring sti l l cont inued on the extreme left, but shortly after it a lso

broke,and

,although it ret ired in more order, yet none cou ld be ral l i ed

so as to renew the action with effect , and also soon ent irely qu itted the

neld.Meanw hi l e the l eft of the enemy, in heavy column , passed along the

road cross ing the rav ine . They were here encountered by the troops or

Colone l Kramer,posted in the woods 0 11 the edge of the ravine . These ,

after a short confl ict, were compel l ed to ret ire, w hich they d id princ ipal ly under cover of the adj acent w oods and formed w ith the troops ofColone l Beal l on the right . The enemy s column now d isplayed in thefieldon the right of the road . They here became exposed to the obl iquefire of Major Peter’s battery, which w a s keptup with great an imation .

Sti l l pressing on to the front of our right , they came in contactw ith theheavy art i l l ery of Commodore Barney , and of the troops posted there .

Here thefir ing became tremendous . They were repul sed , again r eturnotto the charge

,su cceeded in forc ing the troops on the right, andfina lly

carr ied the posit ion of Commodore Barney .

The d ispers ion of the front l ine caused a dangerou s open i ng 0 11 ourl eft

,of w hichthe '

enemy i n that quarter promptly avai l ed . H e advancedrap id ly;then , w heel ing on hi s l eft , soon gained , and w a s turning ou rl eft flank . To oppose thi s alarming movement, I d irected Colonel Brent ,W ith the 2dregiment of D i str ict mi l it ia, to take a posit ion st i l l more to

20 BATTLE OF BLADENSBURG

the left;and he w a s proceed ing i n the executi on of thi s order w henorders came from General W i nder for the w ho le of the troops to retreat .The efforts of the enemy had h itherto been d irected princ ipal ly

,

againstthe right and left of our w hol e l ine of battle .

The troops of th is D i stri ct, and a part of those attached to them ,

occupying positions mostly in the centre , and some of them difficul t ofaccess , w ere consequently but part ial ly engaged

,and this princ ipal ly

w i th l ight troops and skirmishers, now press ing forw ard , supported bya col umn of infa ntry .

The order to retreat w a s executed by regiments and corps,as they

had been formed , and w i th as much order as the nature of the groundw ou ld permit . The fi rst and second regiments halted and formed

,after

retreating five or s ix hundred paces, but were again ordered by GeneralW inder to ret ire . Atthi s moment I fel l in w i th General Winder, and ,after a short conference w i th h im , was d i rected to move on and coi lectthe troops, and prepare to make a stand 0 11 the he ights w estward of theturn p ike gate . Thi s w a s done as fast as the troops came up . A frontw a s again presented tow ard the enemy , cons i st ing principal ly of thetroops of thi sdi stri ct, a partof those who had been attached to themin the act ion , and a V i rg i ni a reg imentof about four hundred men , uhder (Joln i w r l\ 1 inm;, wh i chmetus atth is pla ce . W hi l e the line was yetfo rming . I rece ived o rders fro mGene r a l ‘Jv i i ider f f.) i ’

a li hack to the Capitol , a ndther e form. for battle . I tool: the 15131 1 1 15: o i

'

suggesting my impression of the preferable s itu a ti on w e then occup i ed;but , expect ing thathe mi ght be i o ineci the re by some ofthedi spersed. troops of the frontl ine . he chose to make the stand there . App roaching the Cap itol , I haltedthetrooli s , and r equested hi s orders as to the formation of the l ine .

W e found no auxi l iariesthe i e . he then conferred for a few momentsw ith Gener al A rmstrong

,who w a s a short d i stance from us , and then

gave orderstha t the w hole sh ou ld retreat through W ash ington a ndteorgetown . It i s impossibl e to do j ustice to the angu ish evinced by thetroops of W ashington and Georgetow n on the receiv ing of thi s order .

the id ea of lea v ing thei r fami l i es , thei r houses, a ndthei r homes at themercy of an enraged enemy w a s insupportable . To preserve that order

which w a s 1 11 a i11ta inedduring the retreat w a s now no l onger practi cable .

A s they reti red through W ashington and Georgetown , numbers w ere ohtamingr a ndtaking l eaveto v isi t their homes , and then aga in rej o in ing;and w ith ra nks thus broken a ndscattered , they halted at n ight onthehe ights near T enleytonm,

and 0 11 the ensuing assemble at MontgomeryCourt House .

The troops o f and Georgetown h a ve been assai l ed , i nthe publ ic pr i nts a ndel s ew he re , w ith ca l umni es as unmerited as they

i re crue l and wanton . They have heard of them w i th indignant astonishment. Cons c iou s that in no in stan ce have they been w anting inthe duty they ow ed to thei r country or to themsel ves , but , on the contra ry ,

in obed iencetothe cal l of the i r government , have w i th alacrityobeyed its orders

,and intr epid ly fr onted an enemy vastly thei r super i or

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22 BATTLE OF BLADENSBURG

ment continued , and the enemy advanc ing, our own army retreatingbefore them , apparently in much di sorder . Atl ength the enemy madehi s appearance on the main road, in force , and in front of my battery,and on seeing i 1s made a halt . I reserved ourfire . In a few minutes theenemy aga in advanced , when I ordered an 1 8 pounder to befired, w hichcomplete ly c leared the road;short ly alter , a second and a th ird attemptw a s made by the enemy to come forw ard , but al l were destroyed . Theythen crossed over into an open field, a nd(ttemptcdto fl a nk our 1 i9;;hthe w a s there met by three 1 2 pounders , the marines under Captain Mi ll e r

,and my men , acting as infantry , and w a s again total ly outup . By

th is time not a vest ige of the Ameri can army remained,except a bodyfiv e or s ix hundred , posted 0 11 a height 0 11 my right

,from w hom I expect.

edmuch support , from theirfine s ituation .

The enemy from th is pe riodnever 1

ppe a redi n force in fr ontof us;they pushed forw ard the ir sham) shooters;one 0 1

°

w hich shot my horseunder me , who fel l dead betw eentw o of my <

guns . The enemy,Who had

been kept in check by ourthe for nearly hal f an hour, now began to outfl a nk us on the right;our guns w e1 e turned that w a y;he pushed up thehi l l

,abouttwo or th1 ee hundi ed,tow a 1ds the c0 1 ps of Americans stationedas above described , who , to my great mortificati on , made no r e

s ista nce , giv ing afir e ortw o and retired . In th i s s ituat ion w e had thewhole army of the enemy to contend w ith . Our ammunition w a s expended;and , unfortunately , the drivers of my ammunition w agons hadgone oh

”

in the general pan ic . Atth is time I received a severe wound inmy thigh;Captain M i l l er w a s wounded;sai l ing master W arner ki l led;act ing sai l ing master Martin ki l l ed;and s ai l ing master Martin w ounded;but

,to the honor of my officer s and men , as fast as their compan ions and

messmates fel l at the guns , they w ere in s tant l y repl aced from theinfantry .

Find ing the enemy now‘ complete ly in our rear , and no means of defense, I gave orders to my officer s and men to reti re .

REPORT OF ADM IRAL COCKBURN .

Atday-l ight , on the morning of the 24th, the maj or-general again putthe army in motion , d i recting hi s march upon Bladensburg;on reachingwhich place

,with the advanced brigade , the enemy w a s observed draw n

up in force on a ri s ing ground beyond the tow n;and by thefire he soonopened on us as w e ente red the p la c e a v e i 1

'

sto 1 1 11e 1 sta nd he w as ywe l lprotected by art i l l ery . General Ross . howey e i , d id not hesitate in immediately adva ncing to attack h im ,

a l though 0 111ti oop s w ere almost exhaustedw i th the Fatigue o f the ma i ch they hadinstmade , a ndbut a smal lp 1 opo 1tion o f 0 11 1 l i ttl e a 1my hadyet got1111 . Thi s dash ing mea sme w a s ,

how ever , I am ha ppyto add , cr owned w ith the success i t meri ted;for ,in spite of the g a l l i ng fi re of the enemy , our troops advanced stead i lyon both h i s flanks

, a ndin h i s front;a nd. as s oon a s they arrived on evenground w i th h im

,he fledi n every d i rect ion ,

l eaving beh ind h im 1 0 pieces

BATTLE O F BLADEN SBURG 23

of cannon , and a considerabl e number of ki l led'

and Wounded;amongstthe latter Commod0 1 e Ba i ney , and several othe 1 office 1 s . S on1 e othe 1

pr isone i s w e 1 e al so taken , though not many , ow ing to the S 11 i ftnes s w i thwhich the enemy w ent off , and the fatigue 0 11 1 army hadp1 ev ious lyundergone .

It would , s i r, be deemed presumption in me to attemptto g ive youparticu lar deta i l s re spect ing the nature of thi s battl e;I sha l l , ther e fore ,only remark general ly , that the enemy , strong , on ground he h a cichosen as best adapted for him to defend , where he had time to erect h isbatteri es , and concert al l h i s measure s , w a s d islodged as soon as reached ,

and a v i ctory gained over him by a d iv i s ion oftthe Brit i sh army , notamounting to more than 1 50 0 men , headed by our gal lant genera l , w hosebri l l iant achi evements of th is day it i s beyond my pow er to do j u sti ceto ,

and indeed no poss ibl e comment cou ld enhance .

J

RE PORT OF MAJOR GENERAL ROSS .

TON N AN T , IN TH E PATU!E N T ,

AUGUST 30 , 1 814.

My Lord ,I have the honor to communicate to your lordship , that on the 2

instant , after defeating the army of the United States on that day , thetroops under my command ente1 eda ndtook possession of the c ity ofW ashington .

It w a s determinedbetw een S ir Al exander Cochrane and myse lf,todisemba rkthe army at the V ill age of Bened ict , on the right bank of 1“

Patuxent , with the intent ion of cooperat ing w i th Rear-A dm iral Cm"

burn, i n an attack upon a fl otilla of the enemy ’s gun-boats,under the

command of Commodore Barney . 0 11 the 20th instant , the army com ~

menced- its march , hav ing landed the previous day w i thout opposi tion;on the 2 1 sti t reached Nottingham , and 0 11 the 22dmoved on to U pperMarlbo rough , a few mi les d istant from Pig Point, 0 11 the Patuxent ,Admiral Cockburn fel l in w ith and defeated the flotilla ,

taking and cle ~

stroy ing the whol e . Having advanced w i th in 1 6 mile s of W a shingtO L ,

and ascerta ined the force of the enemy to be such as might authori ze {11 1attempt at carrying hi s cap itol , I determined to make it, and a ccordin ffl y

put the troops in movement onthe‘

e v ening of the 23rd. A corps of ab out1 200 men appeared to oppose us , but r etir ed’ a fter ‘fir ing a few shots . O r

the 24th the troops resumed the ir march and reached Bladenz v urg , 1 .

vi l lage situate on the l eft bank of the eastern branch of the Potomac,

aboutfiv e mil e s from Washington .

Oh the opposite s ide of that r iver the enemy w a s d i scovered stronglyposted on very commanding heights, formed intwo l ines , hi s advanceoccupying a fortifiedhou se w hich , W i th arti l l ery , cove red the bridgeover -the eastern branch , which the Briti sh had to pass . A broad a nd.

24 BATTLE OF BLADENSBURG

stra ight road l ead ing from the bridge to Washington , ran through theenemy ’s position , w h ich w a s care fu l ly de fended by art i l l e ry and r ifle

men .

The di sposi t ion for the attack be ing made, i t was commenced withso much impetuos ity by the l ight brigade , consi st ing ofthe 85 th l ightinfantry and the l ight infantry compani es of the army under the commandof Colone l Thornton , that the fort ified hou se w a s shortly carri ed ,the enemy retiring to the higher grounds .

In support of the l ight brigade , I ordered up a brigade under thecommand of Colonel Brooke, who , with the 44th regiment , attacked theenemy ’s left

,the 4th regiment press ing h is r ight with such effect as to

cause him to abandon hi s guns . Hisfir stl ine giv ing way,was driven

on the second , which , yie ld ing to the i rres i stabl e attack of the bayonet,and the w el l-d irected d i scharge of rockets, got into confusion a ndfl ed,l eaving the Briti sh masters of thefield. The rap id fl ightof the enemy,and h i s know l edge of the country, precl uded the poss ib i l ity of manypri s< ners being taken , more par ti cu larly a s the troops had , during theda y,

‘undergone cons iderabl e fatigu e .

The enemy’s army, amount ing to 8000 or 9000 men, with 300 or

400 caval ry , was under the command of General Winder, be ing formedof troops drawn from Balt imore and Pennsylvania . His ar ti l l e ry, tenp ieces of which fe l l into our hands , w a s commanded by Commodore Barney

, who w a s w ounded and taken pri soner . The a rti l l ery I d irectedtobe destroyed .

Having halted the army for a short t ime , I determined to marchupon Wa sh ington , and reached that c ity at 8 o

’clock that n ight . Judgingi t of consequence to complete the de struction of the publ i c bu i ld ingswith the l east poss ibl e del ay , so that the army might reti re withoutl ossof time , the fol l ow ing bu i l d ings w ere setfire to and consumed— the capitol

,incl ud ing the Senate-house and House of Representat ives;the Ar

senal , the Dock-yard;Treasury , War O ffice, Pres ident’s Palace, Ropewalkand the great bridge across the Potomac;i n the Dock-yard a frigatenearly ready to be launched , a nda sloop of w a r , were consumed . Thetwo bridges l ead ing to Washington over the eastern branch had beendestroyed by the enemy , who apprehended an attack from that quarter .The obj ect of the exped it ion being accompl i shed , I determined , beforeany greater force of the enemy cou l d be assembled , to withdraw thetroops , and accord ingly commenced reti r ing on the n ight of the 25th.

Oh the even ing of the 29th w e‘

reached Bened ict, and r e-embarked thefol l ow ing day . In the performance of the ope ration I have detai led iti s w i th the utmost sati sfaction I observe to your l ordsh ip that cheerfu lnczs s in undergoing fatigue

,the anxiety for the accompl i shment ofthe

obj ect , w ere ( zonsp imious i n al l ranks .>I<

LETTER O F A BR IT ISH OF F ICE R IN M ILITAR!OCCURRE N C E S .

on turn ing a sudden angle in the road , and pass ing a smallplantati on , wh ich obstructed the v i s ion tow ards the l eft, the Brit i sh andAmerican armies became v i s ibl e to one another . The posit ion occup ied

BATTLE O F BLADENSBURG 25

by the latter was one of great strength and command ing att itude . Theyw ere draw n up in three l ines upon the brow of a h i l l , hav ingthei rtroutand l eft fl a nk cov ered by a branch o f the Potomac, and thei r right re sting upon a thick w ood and a deep ravine . This river , w hich may beabout the breadth of the Is i s at Oxford , flowedbetw een the he ights occup ied bythe '

Amer ica n forces and the l ittl e town of B ladensbu rg . Acrossit was thrown

‘

a narrow bridge , extend ing from the chief streetin thattown to the cont inuation of the road , w hich passed through the verycenter of thei r pos it ion;and its right bank ( the bank above Which theywere drawn up ) was covered w ith a narrow strip of w i l lows and larchtrees , whi l st the left was al together bare , low and exposed . Such wasthe general aspect of the i r position as

'

at thefir stglance i t presenteditsel f;of which I mustendeavor to give a more detai l ed account, thatmy de script ion of the battle may be in some degree intel l igibl e .

I have said that the right bank of the Potomac w a s covered w itha narrow strip of w i l l ow a ndl arch tree s Here the Americans had stationedstrong bod ies of r ifl '

emen, who, in ski rmish ing order, covered thewhol e front of the i r army . Behind th is narrow plantation

,again

,thefields w ere open and clear , inter sected, . atcertain d istances , by row s of

h igh and strong pal ings . About the middl e of the ascent , and in therear of these row s , stood thefir stl ine , composed ent irely of infantry;at a proper interval from thi s , and in a simi lar s i tuation , stood the second l ine;w hi l e the thi rd , or reserve , w a s posted w ith in the skirts of awood , which crowned the heights . The arti l l e ry , again , of which theyhad tw enty p ieces in thefield, w a s thus arranged : On the high road , andcommand ing the bridge, stoodtwo heavy guns;and four more ,two oneach s ide of the road, swept partly in the same d irection , and partlydown the w hole of the slope into the streets of Bladensburg . The restw ere scattered , w i th no great j udgment , along the second l ine of infa ntry , occupying d ifferent spaces betw een the right of one regiment andthe leftof another;wh i le the caval ry show ed itse l f in one mass , withi na stubbl efield, near the extreme left of the posit ion . Such w a s the natureofthe ground which they occup ied , and the formidabl e posture in whichthey w aited ou r approach;amount ing, by thei r own account , to 90 00men , a number exactly doubl ing that of the force which w a s to attackthem .

In the meantime , our column continued to advance in the same orderwh ich it had hitherto preserved . The road conducted us for abouttw omi les in a d irect ion paral l e l w ith the river, and of consequence w i th theenemy ’s l ine;w hen it suddenly turned , a ndl ed d irectly tow ards the townof B ladensburg . Being , of course , ignorant whether thi s tow n might notbefilledwith Ameri can troops , the main body paused here , ti l l the advance guard shou ld reconnoitre . The re su lt proved that no opposit ionw a s intendea i n that quarter , and thatthe whole of the enemy

’

s armyhad been w ithdraw n to the opposite side of the stream , whereupon thearmy w a s again put in motion , and in a short time arrived in the streetsof B ladensburg, and w ithin range of the American arti l l ery . Immediate ly on our reaching thi s point , several of the i r guns opened upon us ,andkept' up a qu ick and wel l d irected cannonade , from w hich , as w e w ereagain commanded to halt, the men w ere d irected to shel ter themselves as

26 BATTLE O F BLADENSBURG

much as poss ibl e behind the houses . The obj ect of th is hal t,it w a s con

jectured, was to give the General an opportunity of examin ing the Ameri can l ine , and of try ing the depth of the river;becau se at pre sent therea ppeared to be but one practicabl e mode of attack

,by cro ss ingthe

bridge , and taking the enemy d irectly in front . To do so ,however

,ex

_losed as the bridge was , must be attended w ith bloody consequence , norCould W e delay of a few minutes produce any misch ie f w hich thediscove r y o f a ford w ou l d not amply compensate .

But in th is conj ecture w e were altogether mistaken;for withoutal low ing t ime to the column to cl ose its ranks or to be formed by some orthe many straggl ers , who were now hurrying, as fast as w ea r lness wouldpermit , to regain the ir place s , the order to halt w a s countermanded , andthe w ord given to attack , and w e immed iately pushed on at double qu icktime , towards the hea d of the bridge . W h i l e w e w ere moving along thestre et , a continuedfire w a s kept up , with some execution , from thoseguns w hich stood to the l eft of the road;but it w a s not t i l l the bridgew a s covered w i th our people that thetwo-gun battery upon the road itse lfbegan to play . Then , i ndeed , i t al so opened , and w i th tremendous effect ,Ior at thefir std ischarge almost an entire company w a s sw ept dow n '

but whether i t w a s that the guns had been previously l a id with measurede xactness, or that the nerves of the gunners became afterw ards unsteady ,the succeed ing d i scharges w ere much l ess fatal . The r iflemen l ikew i senow gal led us from the wooded bank with a runningfire of musketry,and it w a s not w i thout trampl ing upon many of the i r dead and dyingcomrades that the l i ght brigade establ i shed itsel f on the oppos ite s ide ofthe stream .

W hen once there , how ever , everything el se appeared easy . Wheeli ng off to the right a ndl eft of the road , they dashed into the thicket andqu ickly cleared i t of the American skirmishers , who , fal l ing back withp recip itat ion upon thefir stl ine , threw it into d isorder before it hadfireda shot . The consequence w a s that our troops had scarcely shown thei rse lves when the whole of that l ine gave w a y and fled in the greatest confusion

,l eav ing thetw o guns upon the road in possess ion of the v ictors .

But here it must be confessed that the l ight brigade w a s gu i lty ofimprudence . Instead of pausing t i l l the rest of the army came up , theyl ightened themselves by throw ing aw ay thei r knapsacks and haversacks ,a nd, extend ing thei r rank so as to show an equal front w i th the enemy ,pushed on to the attack of the second l ine . The Americans , how ever,s a w the i r w eakness a ndstoodfirm, and , h a ving the whol e of thei r art i ll e ry

,with the exception of those captured on the road , and the greater

pa r t o fthei r i nfantry in thi s l ine , theyfir stchecked the ardour of theassai lants by a heavyfire ,

and then i n the ir tu rn , advanced to recoverthe g round wh ich w a s l ost . Against thi s charge the extended order ofthe Brit ish troops w ou ld not permit them to offe r an effectual resi stance ,and they w ere accord ingly borne backto the verythicket upon the river’sbrink

, where they mainta ined themselves w ith determined obst inacy , r e

pel l ing al l attempts to drive them through it, and frequently fol l ow ing,to w ith in a s ho rt d ista nce of the cannon’s mouth , such parts of the en

emy’

s l ine a s gave w a y .

0

In th is sta te the action continued ti l l the second br igade had likew rse

BATTLE OF BLADENSBURG 27

crossed and formed upon the right bank of the river, when the 44thReg

imentmoving to the right and driv ing in the skirmishers,debouched upon

the left fl a nk of the Americans , and completely turned it. In that quarte r, there fore , the battl e w a s won, because the r a w mi l iti a-men

, whowere stationed there as being the l east assai labl e point

, w hen once brokencoul d not be. ral l i ed . But on thei r right

,the enemy sti l l kept the i r ground

with much resol ut ion;nor w a s i t unt i lthe arrival of the 4th Regimentand the advance of the Briti sh forces infirm array to the charge, thatthey began to w aver . Then , i ndeed , se e ing thei r l eft in ful l fl ight, andthe 44th gett ing in thei r rear, they lost al l order and d ispersed , l eavingc louds o f r iflemen to cover the i r retreat, and hastened to conceal themse lves in the woods, where it w oul d have been vain to fol l ow them . Therout w a s new general throughoutthe whol e l ine . The reserve , w hichought to have supported the main body

,fled as soon as those in i ts front

began to give away;and the ca y a iry , instead of charging the Briti shtroops, now scattered in pursu it , tu r ned thei r horses

’ heads and gal l opedoff, l eaving them in undi sputed possessi on of thefield, and of tenoutofthe tw enty p i eces of a rti iiery .

Thi s battle, by which the fate of the American cap itol w a s decided ,

began about one o ’cl ock in the afternoon and lasted ti l l four . The losson the part of the Engl i sh w a s severe, s ince , out of thetw o—th i rds of thearmy

,which were engaged , upw ards of f ive hundred men w ere ki l l ed

and wounded;and w hat rendered it doubly severe w a s , that amongthese w ere numbered several officers of rank and di st incti on Oh

the side of the Americans the sl aughter w a s not so great . Being in possession of a strong posit ion

,they w ere of course l ess exposed in defend

ing,than the others in storming it;and had they conducted themselve s

w ith coolness , and resolution ,i t i s not conce ivabl e how the day cou ld

have been w on . But the fact i s , that w ith the exception of a party ofsai lors from the gun boats

,under the command of Commodore Barney ,

no troops cou ld behave w o rse than they did . The slzir rnisher s w eredr iven in as soon a s attacked , thefir stl ine gave w a y w ithout offering thesl ightest res i stance

,and the l eft of the main body w a s broken W i th i n

hal f an hour after it w a s seriously engaged . O f the sai l ors , how ever ,

it would be inj ust i ce not to speak in the terms which the i r conductmerits

.They were employed as gunners , and not only d id they serve

the i r guns with a qu ickness and preci s ion wh ich aston i shed the i r as

s a ila nts , but they stood unt i l some of them w ere actual ly bayoneted ,w i th

fusees in thei r hands;nor w a s i t t i l l thei r l eader w a s wounded and taken ,

and they s a w themselves deserted on al l s ides by the soldi er snthatthey

qu itted thefield. With respect to the Briti sh army , aga i n , no l ine ofdi stinction can be draw n . Al l d id the i r duty ,

a ndnone more a a lla ntlythan the rest;and though the brunt of the affai r fel l on the l i ght b l‘

l

gade,thi s w a s owing chiefly to the c ircumstances of its be i ng at the

head of the col umn,and perha o s ,

al so , i n some degree , to its own rashimpetuousity

.The arti l l ery

,i ndeed

,could do l ittl e;be i ng unabl e to show

itse lf in presence of a force so superior;but the s 1x-pounder w a s nevertheless brought into act ion ,and a corps of rockets proved of str 1k1n <r

utility .

Our troops being w orn dow n from fat i gue , and of course asi gnma nt

28 BATTLE O F BLADENSBURG

of the country , as the Americans w ere the reverse , the pursu it cou ld notbe continued to any d i stance . Neither w a s itattended w i th much sla ughter . D iv ing into the recesses of the forests , and covering themselves w i thr iflemen,the enemy w ere qu ickly beyond our reach;and having no cava lry to scour even the high road , ten of the l ightest of thei r guns w erecarried off i n the fl ight . The defeat , how ever , w a s absol ute , and the army,which had been col l ected for the defence of W ashington w a s scatteredbeyond the poss ib i l ity of , at least , an immediate reun ion;and as thed istance from Bladensburg to that c ity does not exceed four mi les , thereappeared to be no further obstacle in the w a y, to prevent its immed iatecapture .