u n i ve r s i t y o f co pe n h ag e n

Transcendental Philosophy and its Transformations

Heidegger and Nishida's critical engagements with transcendental philosophy in thelate 1920sIshihara, Yuko

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Citation for published version (APA):Ishihara, Y. (2016). Transcendental Philosophy and its Transformations: Heidegger and Nishida's criticalengagements with transcendental philosophy in the late 1920s. Det Humanistiske Fakultet, KøbenhavnsUniversitet.

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TranscendentalPhilosophyanditsTransformations:

HeideggerandNishida’scriticalengagementswithtranscendentalphilosophyinthelate1920s

APhDthesis

SubmittedtotheFacultyofHumanities,

UniversityofCopenhagen

by

YukoIshihara

August2016

ii

Contents

EnglishAbstract.......................................................................................................................................iv

DanishAbstract.........................................................................................................................................v

Acknowledgements................................................................................................................................vi

Abbreviations..........................................................................................................................................vii

Introduction................................................................................................................................................1

PartI:Whatistranscendentalphilosophy?

Chapter1:TranscendentalphilosophyinKantandHusserl........................................................................9Introduction.....................................................................................................................................................................................91 Kant’stranscendentalphilosophy..............................................................................................................................102 Husserl’stranscendentalphenomenology.............................................................................................................24

Chapter2:Theessenceoftranscendentalphilosophy..................................................................................46Introduction...................................................................................................................................................................................461. Transcendentalreflectionandconditionsofpossibility..................................................................................462. Alterationofourrelationtotheworld.....................................................................................................................493. Transcendentalfoundationalism................................................................................................................................534. Threecriteriaoftranscendentalphilosophy.........................................................................................................67

PartII:Heideggerandtranscendentalphilosophyinthelate1920s

Chapter3:Heidegger’sprojectinBeingandTime...........................................................................................69Introduction...................................................................................................................................................................................691. Formulatingthequestionofbeing.............................................................................................................................702. Thedemandforafundamentalontology................................................................................................................743. TowardstheexistentialanalyticofDasein............................................................................................................774. Thephenomenologicalmethod...................................................................................................................................805. TheincompletenessoftheprojectinBT.................................................................................................................90Conclusion......................................................................................................................................................................................91

Chapter4:Heidegger’scriticalengagementwiththetranscendentalinBeingandTime..............93Introduction...................................................................................................................................................................................931. ThetranscendentalorientationofBT......................................................................................................................962. Heidegger’shermeneutictransformationoftranscendentalphilosophyinBT.................................129

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PartIII:Nishidaandtranscendentalphilosophyinthelate1920s

Chapter5:Nishida’searlytheoryofbashointhelate1920s...................................................................133Introduction................................................................................................................................................................................1331. Towardsthetheoryofbasho.....................................................................................................................................1342. TheoryofbashoinFromtheActingtotheSeeing(1927).............................................................................1443. TheoryofbashoinTheSelf-awareSystemofUniversals(1930)................................................................162Conclusion...................................................................................................................................................................................169

Chapter6:Nishida’scriticalengagementwiththetranscendentalinhisearlytheoryofbasho.................................................................................................................................................................................171Introduction................................................................................................................................................................................1711. Transcendentalorientationoftheearlytheoryofbasho..............................................................................1752. Nishida’schorologicaltransformationoftranscendentalphilosophyinhisearlytheoryofbasho...............................................................................................................................................................................................206

Conclusion:Possibilitiesoftranscendentalphilosophy....................................................209

GlossaryofKeyJapaneseTerms..................................................................................................212

Bibliography.........................................................................................................................................213

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EnglishAbstract

Most comparative studies of Heidegger and Nishida have focused on comparing and contrasting Nishida’s

philosophy with later Heidegger’s thought. This is not surprising since, of all Western philosophers, Nishida probably

resonatesmostwiththe laterHeideggerafterthe“turn”(Kehre).ButistherealsoacommongroundbetweenNishidaand

early,pre-turnHeidegger?The presentwork attempts to shed light on this question by uncovering their earlier critical

engagementswith transcendentalphilosophyduring the late1920s.Morespecifically, it aims toarticulate theextent to

whichtheystillworkwithinatraditionaltranscendentalframeworkandthewaysinwhichtheyattempttogobeyondthis

intheirtransformationsoftranscendentalphilosophy.ForHeidegger,myfocusishisprojectinBeingandTime(1927).For

Nishida,Ifocusonhistheoryofbashoasdevelopedintwoofhisworksfromthelate1920s,FromtheActingtotheSeeing

(1927) andTheSelf-aware SystemofUniversals (1930).My aim is to show theways inwhich Heidegger’shermeneutic

transformation and Nishida’s chorological transformation of transcendental philosophy resemble and differ from each

other.

Ibeginbyclarifyingtheessenceofthe“traditionaltranscendentalframework.”FromanexaminationofKantand

Husserl,Idrawthreecriteriaoftranscendentalphilosophy:(1)transcendentalphilosophyisasearchforthefoundationof

ourexperienceandknowledge,(2)itemploystranscendentalreflection,and(3)itentailsanalterationofourrelationtothe

worldfromthenaiverealistviewoftheworldasexistingindependentlyofustoseeingtheworldasexistingonlyinsofaras

it is constitutedby transcendental subjectivity. Taking these criteria as a heuristic device, I thenquestion the extent to

which both Heidegger and Nishida work within a traditional transcendental framework and the extent to which they

attempttogobeyondit.

Firstly,Iarguethattheybothsawtheimportanceofseekingakindoftranscendentalfoundation.ButwhileDasein

isstillakindoftranscendentalsubjectivitythat“constitutes”theworldinthesensethatitisworld-disclosing,Iarguethat

absolutenothingness isno “subjectivity” that “constitutes” objects since there is absolutelyno-thing that canbe said to

constitute objects. Secondly, while they both seek a transcendental ground through transcendental reflection, they also

renderitamatterofdisclosingandawakeningtoone’sfacticalsituation.Yet,unlikeHeidegger,forNishida,transcendental

reflectionmust beginwith our facticity and historicity but itmust not end there. Itmust delve deeper and reveal the

absoluteno-thingnessofourbeing.Thirdly,forboththinkers,transcendentalphilosophyessentiallyaltersthenaiverealist

view of the world. For Heidegger, we come to see the world through transcendental subjectivity (Dasein), one whose

ontological constitution is articulated as disclosedness to the world, factical, and is always already projecting its

possibilitiesupontheworld.Inotherwords,wecometoseetheworldthroughDasein’sbeing-in-the-world.ForNishida,

however,wecometoseetheworldthroughabsoluteno-thingness.Thisisnotatallequivalenttosayingthatwecometo

seetheworldasabsolutelynothingasiftoimplyanihilisticposition.Rather,wecometotheself-realizationthat“I”amthe

placeof absoluteno-thingnesswherein “reality” realizes itself. In thisway, I argue that,whilehavingmuch in common,

Nishida’s chorological transformation is more radical than Heidegger’s hermeneutic one. Ultimately, the radicalness of

Nishida’s transformation lies in its enigma, namely that transcendental reflection brings us back in touchwith thenon-

reflectiveexperiencepriortothesubject-objectsplit.

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DanishAbstract

DeflestecomparativestudieromHeideggerogNishidaharfokuseretpåsammenfaldogforskellemellemNishidas

filosofiogdenseneHeideggerstænkning.DetteerikkeoverraskendedaNishida,blandtallevestligefilosoffer,nokminder

mestomdenseneHeideggerefterdennes“vending”(Kehre).MenkanderogsåfindeslighedermellemNishidaogdentidlige

Heidegger, altså før sidstnævntes ”Kehre”? Denne afhandling forsøger at belyse dette spørgsmål ved at fremstille deres

tidligerearbejdermedtranscendentalfilosofiislutningenaf1920’erne.Merenøjagtigtforsøgerafhandlingenatbeskrivei

hvilkengraddetokansigesstadigvækatarbejdeindenforentraditioneltranscendental forståelsesrammeogendvidere

måderne,påhvilkedeforsøgeratbrydeudafdengennemderestransformationeraftranscendentalfilosofien.IHeideggers

tilfældefokusererjegpåhovedværketVærenogTid(1927).INishidastilfældefokusererjegpåhansteoriombashosom

udvikletitoafhansværkerfradesene20’ere,FromtheActingtotheSeeing(1927)ogTheSelf-awareSystemofUniversals

(1930). Det er mit mål at vise, på hvilke måder Heideggers hermeneutiske transformation og Nishidas “korologiske”

transformationafdentranscendentalefilosofilignerogadskillersigfrahinanden.

Jegbegyndermedenafklaringafessensenafden“traditionelle transcendentale forståelsesramme.”Gennemen

undersøgelseafKantogHusserlopridserjegtrekriterierfortranscendentalfilosofi:(1)transcendentalfilosofierensøgen

eftergrundlagetforvorerfaringogviden,(2)denanvendertranscendentalreflektion,og(3)denledertilenforandringaf

voresforholdtilverdenfradennaiverealismesoverbevisningifølgehvilkenverdenanskuessomeksisterendeuafhængigt

afos,tilatdensessomeksisterendekunsåfremtdenerkonstitueretafentranscendentalsubjektivitet.Medudgangspunkt

idissekriterierspørgerjeg,ihvilkengradHeideggerogNishidakansigesatarbejdeindenforentraditioneltranscendental

forståelsesramme,ogihvilkengraddeforsøgeratbrydeudafden.

Fordetførsteargumenterer jeg foratdebeggesåvigtighedenafat ledeefteretslagstranscendentaltgrundlag.

Men hvor Dasein stadigvæk forbliver en art transcendental subjektivitet der ”konstituerer” verden, forstået som

verdensafdækkende,argumentererjegforatdenabsolutteintethedikkeeren”subjektivitet”der”konstituerer”objekter,

fordi der er absolut ingen-ting, der kan siges at konstituere objekter. For det andet, altimens de begge leder efter et

transcendentaltgrundlaggennemtranscendentalrefleksion,gørdedetogsåtiletspørgsmålomatafdækkeogopvågnetil

ens faktiske situation. For Nishida, ulig Heidegger,må den transcendentale refleksion begyndemed vores fakticitet og

historicitet,mendenkanikkeendeder.Denmådykkedybereogafslørevoresværensabsolutteintethed.Fordettredje,i

følge begge tænkere ændrer transcendental filosofi fundamentalt den naive realismes verdensbillede. Ifølge Heidegger

begynderviatseverdengennemdentranscendentalsubjektivitet(Dasein),hvisontologiskekonstitutionartikuleressom

verdensafdækkende,faktiskogsomaltidalleredeudkastendesinemulighederiverden.Medandreord,begynderviatse

verdengennemDaseinsværen-i-verden.MenifølgeNishidabegynderviatseverdengennemdenabsolutteintethed.Dette

eroverhovedetikkedetsammesomatsige,atvibegynderatseverdensomabsolutintet,altsåsomenformfornihilistisk

position.Snarereopnårvidenindsigt,at”jeg”erdenabsolutteintethedssted,ihvilken”virkeligheden”realiserersigselv.

På denne vis argumenterer jeg for, at selvom de har meget til fælles, så er Nishidas korologiske transformationmere

radikalendHeideggershermeneutiske.AltialtskalradikalitetenafNishidastransformationfindesidensgåde,nemligat

dentranscendentalerefleksiontagerostilbagetildenikke-refleksiveoplevelse,dereksisterførsubjekt-objektskellet.

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Acknowledgements

Iwouldliketofirstthankmysupervisor,ProfessorSørenOvergaard,forhiscontinuoussupport,

expertise, encouragement, and patience during the composition of this dissertation. His careful and

critical reading of my writings, as well as comments and advice on my presentations, has been truly

invaluable. I donot think I couldhave completed this dissertationwithout his great supervision. I also

wanttothankProfessorDanZahaviforhisinsightfulcommentsandvaluablesuggestionsthroughoutmy

Ph.D.study.Iamespeciallygratefulforhisdeepunderstandingandsupportinengagingwiththedialogue

betweentheEasternandWesterntraditions.Myworkwouldnothavebeenpossiblewithouttheopenand

stimulatingenvironmentattheCenterforSubjectivityResearch.

I am also indebted to a number of people outside the Center. I would like to express my

appreciation toProfessor JeffMalpas,whohasreadandcommentedonearlierversionsof the first two

chaptersduringmystayattheUniversityofTasmaniain2014.ThestimulatingdiscussionsIhadwithhim

hada lastingeffectonme, andhis comprehensiveworkon transcendentalphilosophyandHeideggera

continuinginspiration.

IamdeeplyindebtedtothepeoplefromtheJapanesePhilosophyDepartmentatKyotoUniversity.

I express my gratitude to my former supervisors Professor Fujita Masakatsu and Professor Uehara

Mayukofortheirwordsofencouragementthroughoutthisproject.Special thanksareduetomyformer

colleagues,YasakaAkihiroandNagaokaTetsurō,forhelpingmegatherreferencesonNishidafromJapan.

I also want to thank my friend and former colleague, Erol Copelj, for taking the time to read

throughthemanuscripts,bothearlierandlater.Hisconstructivecriticisms,stylisticsuggestions,anddeep

understanding of the topic have helped tremendously. I am also very much indebted to the Heiwa

NakajimaFoundation forproviding funding from2013-2015. Finally, Iwould like to thankmypartner,

FilipGurjanov, forhisunderstandingandpatienceduringthefinalmonthsofwriting,andmyfamilyfor

theirsupportandencouragement.Especiallyduringthetoughtimes,mysiblingslivingaroundtheworld,

Reiko Ishihara-Brito, Takeki Ishihara, and Sachiko Ishihara gaveme themotivation I needed. I cannot

thankmyparentsenough forgivingmetheirsupportandunderstanding throughout themanyyearsof

mystudies.Idedicatethisworktomyparents,OsamuandYohkoIshihara.

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Abbreviations

WorksbyMartinHeidegger

AllworksbyHeideggerarecitedfromtheGesamtausgabe(abbreviatedas“GA”)exceptforSeinundZeit,

whereIcitefromthestandardMaxNiemeyeredition.Theabbreviationisfollowedbyvolumeandpage

number.Inthetext,IhavegiventhepaginationfromtheoriginalGermanfirstfollowedbyaslashand

paginationfromtheEnglishtranslation,whereveravailable.IhavefollowedtheavailableEnglish

translationsinmycitations.FullinformationabouttheworksisgivenintheBibliography.

GA10 DerSatzvomGrund

GA20 ProlegomenazurGeschichtedesZeitbegriffs

GA24 DieGrundproblemederPhänomenologie

GA26 MetaphysischeAnfangsgründederLogikimAusgangvonLeibniz

GA41 DieFragenachdemDing:ZuKantsLehrevondentranszendentalenGrundsätzen

(Wintersemester1935–1936)

GA56/57 ZurBestimmungderPhilosophie:1.DieIdeederPhilosophieunddas

Weltanschauungsproblem

GA63 Ontologie(HermeneutikderFaktizität)

GA65 BeiträgezurPhilosophie(VomEreignis)(1936–1938).

SZ SeinundZeit

WorksbyNishidaKitarō

AllworksbyNishidaarecitedfromtheNishidaKitarōZenshū[CompleteWorksofNishidaKitarō]

(abbreviatedas“NKZ”).Theabbreviationisfollowedbyvolumeandpagenumber.Inthetext,Ihavegiven

thepaginationfromtheoriginalJapanesefirstfollowedbyaslashandpaginationfromtheEnglish

translation,whereveravailable.IhaveoftenrevisedtheavailableEnglishtranslationsinmycitationsfor

thepurposeofliteralprecision.WhentheEnglishtranslationswerenotavailable,Ihavetranslatedthe

passagesmyself.FullinformationabouttheworksisgivenintheBibliography.

NKZ1 Zennokenkyū[AnInquiryintotheGood],Shisakutotaiken[ThoughtandExperience]

NKZ2 Jikakuniokeruchokkantohansei[IntuitionandReflectioninSelf-awareness]

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NKZ4 Hatarakumonokaramirumonoe[FromtheActingtotheSeeing]

NKZ5 Ippanshanojikakutekitaikei[TheSelf-awareSystemofUniversals]

NKZ7 Tetsugakunokonponmondaizokuhen(benshōhōtekisekai)[FundamentalProblemsof

PhilosophyContinued(TheDialecticalWorld)].

NKZ8 Tetsugakuronbunshūdaini[PhilosophicalEssays,Vol.2]

NKZ10 Tetsugakuronbunshūdaiyon[PhilosophicalEssays,Vol.4]

NKZ11 Tetsugakuronbunshūdairoku[PhilosophicalEssays,Vol.6]

NKZ12 Zokushisakutotaiken[SequeltoThoughtandExperience]

NKZ13 Shōhentonōto[ShortWritingsandNotes]

NKZ16 Shokisōkō[EarlyWritings]

NKZ18 Shokanshū[CollectionofLetters]

Squarebrackets(“[…]”)withinquotationsindicateadditionsorchangesmadebyme,andoftentimesthe

originalGermanorJapanesephrase.Anglebrackets(“”)indicateadditionsandchangesmadebythe

bytheEnglishtranslator.

1

Introduction

Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) andNishida Kitarō (1870-1945) are two of themost influential

philosophers of the twentieth century. While coming from very different cultural and intellectual

backgrounds,theybothtookupthetaskofovercomingtheWesternmetaphysicaltradition.Comparedto

Heidegger,Nishidahasyettogainacknowledgmentintheacademicworld.Sadlyenough,hisphilosophy

hasnotevengainedtheacknowledgement itdeserveswithin Japan,where itoriginated.Onereasonfor

thisneglectisthedifficultyofunderstandingNishida’sphilosophy.IfHeideggerisdifficulttoread,Nishida

isalmostincomprehensibleformany,eveninJapanese.1ButoneshouldnottakethisasasignthatNishida

was confused. As Ueda Shizuteru2states in “The Difficulties of Reading Nishida,” the difficulty is a

reflectionofthedifficultprojectNishidasetforhimself.3NotunlikeHeidegger,inordertobreakwiththe

Western metaphysical tradition, Nishida felt the need to create his own language. But what makes

Nishida’s language particularly difficult is the fact that his thinking developed between the two very

differenttraditionsoftheEastandWest.Ontheonehand,hewasfirmlyrootedintheEasternBuddhist

tradition and especially in Zen Buddhismwhere the practice of “non-thinking” is said to be the key to

understanding reality. On the other hand, he was “philosophizing” in the sense of engaging in the

reflectivepracticeofphilosophycarriedoutintheWesternphilosophicaltradition.AsUedanicelyputsit,

Nishidawas a Zen practitioner philosophizing and, at the same time, a philosopher practicing Zen.4He

alsonotesthatsuchanattempttothinkbetweenthetwopolesiscomparabletolaterHeidegger’sattempt

to think the relationship between the two very different ways of saying, “thinking” (Denken) and

“poetizing” (Dichten).5Indeed, of all Western philosophers, Nishida probably resonates most with the

laterHeideggerafterthe“turn”(Kehre).

Itisnotsurprising,then,thatmostcomparativestudiesofHeideggerandNishidahavefocusedon

comparing and contrasting Nishida’s philosophy with later Heidegger’s thought.6For example, Ōhashi

RyōsukehasarguedthatthelaterHeidegger’sideaof“Dasein”astheplaceofthe“event”or“happening”1KobayashiHideo,aJapaneseliterarycritic,famouslycriticizedNishida’swritingsin1939,sayingthatalthoughtheyareofcoursenotwritteninaforeignlanguage,theyarealsonotwritteninJapanese(1968,p.84).2AllJapanesenamesinthiswork(exceptinthebibliography)arewrittenintheJapaneseorderoffamilyname,followedbygivenname.3Ueda1994,pp.231-241.4Ibid.,p.194.5Ibid.,p.235.6Admittedly,mostofthecomparativestudieshavebeenattemptedbyNishidascholarsandnotbyHeideggerscholars.ThisfactalsoshowsthatNishidahasyettogainacknowledgmentoutsidethecircleofscholarsworkingwithinJapanesephilosophy.

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(Ereignis)ofbeingitselfiscomparabletoNishida’sideaof“theself-determinationoftheworld”(sekaino

jikogentei) developed from the mid-1930s.7More recently, John Krummel has compared the “quasi-

religious”languagethatbothemployindiscussingthe“originalwherein”ofhumanexistence.Ontheone

hand,fromthe1930sonwards,Heideggerspeaksof“thesacred”thatclearsspaceforbeingstoappear.On

the other hand, in the 1940s, Nishida comes to relate this place, what he calls “the place of absolute

nothingness,” to the “absolute” (zettai) or “god” that envelops the world as its place through its own

“kenotic self-negation.”8Others have also noted the affinity between Heidegger’s notions of “clearing”

(Lichtung)or“openness”(Offenheit)andNishida’sideaofthe“placeofnothingness”(munobasho).9Itis

worthnotingthatmostofthesestudiesalsofocusonthelaterperiodofNishida’sthought,fromthe1930s

onwards.

ButcanwealsofindcommongroundbetweenNishidaandearly,pre-turnHeidegger?Ōhashiseems

toanswerintheaffirmative,notingthatNishida’sthoughttookasimilarturntoHeidegger’s.ForŌhashi,

the significanceofNishida’s philosophy in thehistoryof philosophy is tobe found inhis “bashoronteki

tenkai,”or “turn tobasho.”10According toŌhashi, thiswasa turn from“seeing theworld fromtheself,”

which includedNishida’s earlier position, to “seeing theworld from theworld,” developed in themid-

1930s.Indeedin1934,Nishidawritesthathisearlierwork,TheSelf-awareDeterminationofNothingness

of 1932, “still remained in the standpoint of seeing theworld from the individual self.”11Thus, just as

Heideggerlaterturnedawayfrom“Dasein”astheplaceofthehumanunderstandingofbeing,Nishidaalso

turned away from “seeing theworld from the individualself.”Heidegger later expressly stated that this

7Cf.Ōhashi1995,chapter2(“NishidatoHaidegaa”[NishidaandHeidegger]).8Krummel2010.9Seeforexample:AndrewFeenberg(1999)andElmarWeinmayr(2005).Foraconciseyetcomprehensiveoverviewofthecomparativestudiesuntilnow,see:Krummel(2010,note4).10ItisnoteasytotranslatewhatŌhashicalls“bashorontekitenkai.”Theissueconcerns,ontheonehand,howoneshouldtranslateNishida’s“basho”and,ontheotherhand,howoneshouldinterpretŌhashi’sunderstandingofNishida’sbasho.AswewillseeinChapters5and6,“basho”inJapaneseliterallymeans“place.”Inthiswork,Ihavesometimestranslated“basho”asplaceandothertimeskepttheoriginal,whenIfeltthatitwasbettertoemphasizethatitisNishida’sspecificterm.SomecommentatorswritinginEnglishhaverenderedthetermas“topos”(e.g.Yusa(1986&1987),Baek(2008),andMaraldo(2015)).Accordingly,wemighttranslateŌhashi’s“bashorontekitenkai”to“topologicalturn.”However,KrummelhaspointedoutthatthemeaningofNishida’s“basho”isclosertoPlato’s“chōra”thanto“topos.”AccordingtoKrummel,“fortheancientGreeks,toposisthephysicallocationthatamaterialthinghappenstooccupyatthemomentandthatisindependentofitsbeing.Chōra,ontheotherhand,isthefieldthatgivesroomforsuchlocalitiesandprovidesthecontextualsignificanceforthings”(2015,p.203).Ifwefollowhisinterpretation,whichIamsympathetictoandwhichIbelieveŌhashiwouldbealso,wemightrenderhis“bashorontekitenkai”as“chorologicalturn.”Butforthesakeofsimplicity,Ihaveheregivenasimplerenderingas“turntobasho.”11NKZ7,p.210.ThequotationistakenfromtheprefacetoFundamentalProblemsofPhilosophyContinued(TheDialecticalWorld)publishedin1934.

3

turn was a turning away from transcendental thinking.12While Nishida himself does not make such

statement, the same could be said of his turn. For both Heidegger and Nishida, then, the turn in their

thinkingseemstohavebeenrelatedtotheengagementwiththetranscendentaltradition.

ThepresentstudygoesinthesamedirectionasŌhashi’sinthesenseofopeningupthecommon

groundbetweenHeideggerandNishida.Butinsteadofcomparingthenatureofthe“turn”intheirthought,

Ifocusontheirearly,“pre-turn”period.13Iattempttoshedlightonthisfurthercommongroundbetween

HeideggerandNishidabyuncoveringtheirearliercriticalengagementswithtranscendentalphilosophy.In

recentyears,Heideggerscholarshavebeguntospeakofthe“transcendentalHeidegger.”14Ithascometo

berecognizedthat,atleastduringtheMarburgperiod(1923-1928),Heideggerwasstill largelyworking

withinthe frameworkof transcendentalphilosophy.Thus, thoughthere isyet tobeaconsensusonthis

matter, it is nowadays less controversial to read Being and Time (1927) as an attempt to critically

appropriate transcendental philosophy. Yet, “transcendental Nishida” is still an undeveloped idea in

Nishidascholarship.Ontheonehand,itiswidelyacknowledgedthatearlyNishidacriticallyengagedwith

neo-KantianismandFichteaswell asHegel andKant.On theotherhand,however, theextent towhich

Nishida’sideasofjikakuandbasho,bothdevelopedintheperiodofthisengagement,arecontinuouswith

thetranscendentaltraditionisstillamatterawaitingclarification.

Accordingly, in this work, I propose to articulate Heidegger and Nishida’s critical engagements

withtranscendentalphilosophyduringthelate1920s.Morespecifically,Iaimtoarticulatetheextentto

whichtheystillworkwithinatraditionaltranscendentalframeworkandthewaysinwhichtheyattempt

togobeyond this in their transformationsof transcendentalphilosophy.ForHeidegger,my focus ishis

projectinBeingandTime.ForNishida,Ifocusonhisearlytheoryofbashoasitwasdevelopedintwoof

his works from the late 1920s, From the Acting to the Seeing (1927) and The Self-aware System of

12Cf.ContributionstoPhilosophy(FromEnowing),§§132-134(GA65,pp.250-254).13Infact,itiscontroversialwhethersucha“turn”reallyexistsinNishida’sthought.Ontheonehand,therecanbenodenyingthat,inthe1930sand‘40s,ashisconcernmovesawayfromepistemologicalproblemstowardsthesocio-historicalworld,Nishidacomestorevisehisearlierviews.Anditistruethathisstatementin1934pointstoanimportantchangeinhisthinking.Ontheotherhand,however,whetherthischangeamountstoa“turn”comparabletoHeidegger’sKehreasŌhashisuggestsissomewhatquestionable.ItseemstomethatNishida’s“topologicalturn”tookplacealreadyinthelate1920s.Perhapsitwasonlylaterthathecametofullyappreciatethenatureofthisturnas“seeingtheworldfromtheworld.”Nonetheless,Iwouldsubmitthatarevolutionary“topologicalturn”(orchorologicalturn)takesplaceinthelate1920sthatwasthenfurtherdevelopedinthe1930sand‘40s.ButIwillnotbeconcernedwiththisissueinthiswork.14Thecollectiveefforttobringattentiontothetopicgoesbacktoaconference,“HeideggerandTranscendentalPhilosophy,”heldatRiceUniversityin2003.Themanuscriptsfromtheconferencewerethencompiledinabookunderthetitle,TranscendentalHeidegger(2007),co-editedbyJeffMalpasandStevenCrowell.ThisvolumehasgreatlycontributedtotheacknowledgmentofthesignificanceofthetranscendentalinHeidegger’sthought.

4

Universals(1930).15Bycomparingandcontrastingtheirengagements,Iattempttoshedlightontheways

inwhichtheirtransformationsoftranscendentalphilosophyresembleanddifferfromeachother.

But at this pointwemust clarifywhy examining this periodof their thought isworthour time.

Afterall,onemaywonder,didn’tbothofthemcometoseethelimitsoftheirearlierapproach?Tobegin

with, both Heidegger’s project in Being and Time and Nishida’s theory of basho in the late 1920s are

important,attheveryleast,forunderstandingthetrajectoryoftheirthought.Butapartfromthat,theyare

also significant for understanding the possibilities, as well as possible limitations, of transcendental

philosophy itself.For,as Iwillbearguing,bothHeideggerandNishidaattempt to transformtraditional

forms of transcendental philosophy in important respects. Thus, their critical engagements with

transcendentalphilosophyreflecttheirattemptstoovercometheWesternmetaphysicaltraditionbystill

working within but also going beyond the traditional transcendental framework. In this way, at least

duringthisperiod,boththinkersbelievedinthepossibilitiesoftranscendentalphilosophy,namelythatit

could clear the way towards overcoming the Western metaphysical tradition, if it were transformed.

Therefore, if the later period of their thought sheds light on the possible limitations of transcendental

philosophy, the earlier period goes some way towards illuminating its possibilities. Since the present

workfocusesonlyontheearlierperiod,thepossiblelimitationsoftranscendentalphilosophywillnotbe

thematized.

Before turning to an outline of the work, I will discuss its approach. When one engages in

comparative philosophy that attempts to articulate a non-Western tradition in light of someWestern

philosophicalconcept,onemustbeespeciallycarefulnottomakethefatalerrorof“recreatingtheother

traditionintheimageofone’sown,”asLittlejohnwritesintheentryon“ComparativePhilosophy”inThe

InternetEncyclopediaofPhilosophy.16This error is based on the chauvinistic assumption that the other

traditionisjustdoingthesameorsimilarthingas“we”aredoing,thusfailingtounderstandtheotherfor

its own sake. Now, one may suspect that I am in danger of doing this by interpreting Nishida as a

transcendental philosopher, which is certainly a Western concept. However, such a worry can be

immediately dismissed since it simply fails to see what John Krummel calls the “eclectic nature” of

Nishida’s philosophy.17Namely, one of the characteristic features of Nishida’s philosophy is that it

developedoutofcriticalappropriationsofideasfromvarioussources,notonlyfromtheEasternBuddhist

15Thoughthisbookwaspublishedin1930,itisacollectionofessayspublishedbetween1928and1929.16Littlejohn:http://www.iep.utm.edu/comparat/#SH3a(accessedAugust15,2016).17Krummel2015,p.4.

5

tradition but, in fact, especially from the Western philosophical tradition.18Thus, we find Nishida

borrowingtermssuchas“pureexperience”(WilliamJames),“apriori”(Kantandneo-Kantians)19,“noesis-

noema”(Husserl),whileemployingtheminaratherpeculiarmanner for thepurposeofarticulatinghis

own position. Nishida’s critical engagementwith transcendental philosophy is also part of this eclectic

natureofhisphilosophy.Therefore,myattempttoarticulatethe“transcendentalNishida”isinessenceno

differentfromarticulatingthe“transcendentalHeidegger.”Atthesametime,however,itisalsoimportant

tonotethatIhavenointentionofclaimingthatNishidaandHeideggeralikewereonlyworkingwithinthe

bounds of a traditional transcendental framework. It is my aim to articulate their critical (this is the

crucial word) engagements with transcendental philosophy. Accordingly, the present work takes its

departure from the understanding that, in their critical engagements during the late 1920s, both

Heidegger and Nishida work within but also attempt to go beyond the traditional transcendental

framework through a kind of transformation. The study therefore begins with a clarification of the

“traditionaltranscendentalframework.”

Thiswork isdivided into threeparts.The firstpart consistsof apreliminary studyofKant and

Husserl’stranscendentalphilosophies(Chapters1and2);thesecondpartdealswithHeidegger’scritical

engagementwith transcendental philosophy (Chapters 3 and4); and the third part examinesNishida’s

criticalengagementthereofincomparisonwithHeidegger’s(Chapters5and6).Iassumethatmostofmy

readersarelessacquaintedwithNishida’sthoughtthanwithHeidegger’s.Thus,IfirstpresentHeidegger

and thenNishida,making references to Heidegger’s ideaswhere the associationmay be helpful to the

reader.ThemaincomparativepartofthestudyisundertakeninChapter6.

InPartI,Iposethequestion,whatistranscendentalphilosophy?InChapter1,Iexaminetwocases

of transcendental philosophy: Kant’s transcendental philosophy and Husserl’s transcendental

phenomenology. In Chapter 2, I work out the essence of transcendental philosophy based on the

investigations inChapter1. I chooseKantandHusserlnotonlybecause theyare representativesof the

tradition but also because they are two key figures that both Heidegger and Nishida engagedwith. In

Chapter1,IarguethatKant’scontributionliesinintroducinganewquestiontotheproblemofknowledge

(“How is synthetic a priori knowledge possible?”) and seeking the answer through transcendental

18Seealso,Davis(2013and2014).19Seemyarticle,“Nishidaniokeru‘apriori’gainen”[Nishidaonthe“apriori”concept](2015b).There,IanalyzedNishida’sappropriationorreinterpretationof“apriori”duringtheperiodfrom1916to1926,whenthetermwasmostemployed.Iarguedthathereinterpretsthe(neo-)Kantianaprioriastheunifyingconstitutiveprincipleofourvariouskindsofexperience,whichisnotmerelypositedastheconditionsofpossibilityforourexperience,but,also,giveninourintuitiveexperience.

6

reflection, namely a second-order reflection into the a priori subjective conditions of possibility of our

knowledge of objects. I then identify Husserl’s main differences from Kant in his insistence on the

phenomenological method, which is characterized by the phenomenological reduction, its descriptive

nature and its appeal to intuitive evidence. I further articulate the specific sense in which Husserl’s

transcendental-phenomenological method is reflective. I argue that, for Husserl, the transcendental-

phenomenologicalepochéandreductionarethespecificmethodsthattogetherconstitutetranscendental

reflection.

InChapter2,Idrawoutthreecriteriaoftranscendentalphilosophybasedontheinvestigationsin

Chapter1.(1)Transcendentalphilosophyisasearchforthefoundationofourexperienceandknowledge.

Transcendental foundationalism differs from other kinds of foundationalism in that the foundational

relationisunderstoodintermsoftranscendentalpriority,i.e.transcendentalsubjectivityhaspriorityover

theworld in the sense that it constitutes the latter’smeaning. (2) It employs transcendental reflection.

Transcendentalreflection isasecond-orderreflectionthatdoesnot thematizeobjectsstraightforwardly

todeterminetheirrealpropertiesbut,rather,thematizestheconditionsofpossibilityforourexperience

of objects. (3) It entails an alteration of our relation to the world. One of the important metaphysical

implicationsoftranscendentalphilosophyisthatitawakensusfromthenaiverealistviewoftheworldas

existing independently of us to seeing the world as existing only insofar as it is constituted by

transcendentalsubjectivity.

Parts II and III deal with Heidegger and Nishida’s critical engagements with transcendental

philosophyrespectively.Thethreecriteriaareemployedasaheuristicdevicetodeterminetheextentto

whichtheyworkwithinatraditionaltranscendentalframeworkandthewaysinwhichtheyattempttogo

beyondit.

InPartII,IfirstarticulateHeidegger’sprojectinBeingandTime(Chapter3)andthenexaminehis

critical engagement with transcendental philosophy (Chapter 4). I argue that the proposed project in

BeingandTimeistoclarifythemeaningofbeingingeneral(i.e.thetaskoffundamentalontology)byway

of first undertaking a hermeneutic phenomenology of the existential analytic of Dasein. In Chapter 4, I

beginbyexaminingthetranscendentalorientationofBeingandTimeinlightofthethreecriteria.Iargue

thatHeidegger’sproject is transcendental insofar as: (1) it is foundational in the sense thatDaseinhas

transcendentalpriorityovertheworld,(2)itemploystranscendentalreflectiontodisclosetheconditions

ofpossibilityforourexperience,and(3)itbringsaboutanalterationofourrelationtotheworldfromthe

naive-realistviewtoanunderstandingthatworld-disclosuredependsonDasein’sbeing.Iendbydrawing

out Heidegger’s hermeneutic transformation of transcendental philosophy to see the ways in which he

7

attempted to go beyond a traditional transcendental framework. I argue that the core of this

transformationliesintheradicalnessofhermeneuticreflection.

In Part III, I present an outline of Nishida’s early theory of basho (Chapter 5) and examine his

critical engagementwith transcendental philosophy (Chapter 6). I argue that Nishida’s early theory of

basho in the late 1920swas an attempt to provide a theory of knowledge that avoids various sorts of

subjectivism.Hesoughttosecuretheobjectivevalidityofknowledgebyshowingthatourknowledgeof

objects ultimately presupposes the place of absolute nothingness, i.e. by grounding our knowledge of

objects in the experience of “transcendent objects,” that is, the experience of oneself as absolute no-

thingnesswherein“reality”realizes itself. InChapter6, I firstexaminethetranscendentalorientationof

Nishida’s early theory of basho. Then, I draw out his chorological transformation of transcendental

philosophy. (I adopt Krummel’s rendering of “basho” as “chōra.”) While the general structure of this

chapterparallels thatofChapter4, IwillherecontrastNishida’spositionwithHeidegger’s. Iarguethat,

unlike Heidegger’s project in Being and Time, which still stays close to the core of traditional

transcendentalphilosophy,Nishida’searlytheoryofbashoradicallytransformsallthreecriteria.(1)Itis

foundational,butonlyintheweaksensethatabsolutenothingnessisstillseenasatranscendentalground.

(2)Itemploysatranscendentalreflectionthatisradicallytransformedthroughchorologicalreflectionto

disclosetheconditionsofpossibilityforourexperience.(3)Itbringsaboutanalterationofourrelationto

the world from our naive belief in the independent existence of objects and the world, to our direct

experience with the world in pure experience, rather than seeing the world through transcendental

subjectivity. In the final part, I clarify the ways in which Heidegger’s hermeneutic and Nishida’s

chorological transformationsof transcendentalphilosophyarecomparablewhilstdifferent in important

respects. I argue that, if Heidegger’s hermeneutic transformation of transcendental philosophy was

ultimately the result of the acknowledgement of the facticity of our being, Nishida’s chorological

transformationofitwastheresultoftheacknowledgementoftheabsoluteno-thingnessofourbeing.

In the Conclusion, I recapitulatemy findings by asking how their hermeneutic and chorological

transformations shed light on the possibilities of transcendental philosophy thatmay in fact reveal its

limitationsinlaterHeideggerandNishida.

8

PartI:Whatistranscendentalphilosophy?

9

Chapter1:TranscendentalphilosophyinKantandHusserl

Introduction

BeforewecanproceedtoaddressthequestionwhetherHeidegger’sprojectinBeingandTimeand

Nishida’searlytheoryofbasho is transcendentalornot,what ismeantby ‘transcendental’must firstbe

clarified.Here,however,wearealreadyconfrontedwithahostofdifficulties.Firstofall,wedonothavein

hand a ready-made definition of the transcendental nor do we have a general agreement as to what

transcendental philosophy is. The understanding of what it attempts to do, its essential features, etc.

simply diverges amongst philosophers who identify themselves as either working within or without

‘transcendental philosophy.’ Some historical figures that have identified themselves as transcendental

philosophersincludeKant,theGermanidealists(e.g.Fichte,Schelling,Hegel),Neo-Kantians(e.g.Rickert,

Cohen) and some phenomenologists (e.g. Husserl). There are also more recent defenders of

transcendentalphilosophycomingfromthephenomenologicaltradition(e.g.J.N.Mohanty,DavidCarr)as

wellastheanalytictradition,specificallyinthephilosophyofscience(e.g.MichaelFriedman).Theabove

brieflistofnamesalonesufficestoshowthattranscendentalphilosophyisanumbrellatermthatcoversa

wide-range of philosophers coming from various philosophical backgrounds and specifically with very

different metaphysical views. Moreover, most of these thinkers would probably not be happy being

categorizedunderthesamelabelwiththeothersinthelist.Thisleadsustothefollowingworry:Istherea

commonthread that runs throughoutsuchdiverseviews?Orare theseviewsbound togetherby family

resemblance? In relation to this point, there is the further difficulty: How should we even proceed to

pursuethequestionofwhetherthereisacommonthreadorifitisacaseoffamilyresemblance?Indeed,

there is even the possibility that the term is being applied to wholly different phenomena and hence

nothingreallybindsthemtogether.Thefollowinginvestigation,however,proceedsundertheconviction

that there is in fact an essence pertaining to transcendental philosophy. But needless to say, such

conviction cannot simplygowithout some sortof justification.Accordingly, this chapterwill serveas a

waytowardsunravelingtheessenceoftranscendentalphilosophy.Howthenshouldweproceed?

Althoughitisidealtogothroughalloftheviewsraisedearlier,Iwillonlyfocusontwo.Yet,such

narrowingdownshouldnotatallbetakenasevidencefortheinadequacyoftheapproach.Foronething,

a comprehensive study of all the instances is impossible not just practically but alsomethodologically.

Thisisbecausethecriteriarequiredforidentifyingtheinstancesisexactlywhatweareseeking.Butitis

also not necessary to do so for the purpose of our project. We are not seeking a comprehensive all-

inclusivenotionoftranscendentalphilosophybutonlyonethat issufficienttoseekoutHeidegger’sand

10

Nishida’srelationtotranscendentalphilosophy.Therefore,forthesakeofourinvestigation,Iwilllimitthe

scopetotwocases:KantandHusserl.Ihavespecificallychosenthesetwocasesnotonlybecausetheyare

representativesof the traditionbutbecause theyare twokey figures thatonenecessarilycomesacross

whencomparingHeidegger’sandNishida’srelationtotranscendentalthought.Thisisduetothefactthat

KantandHusserlwere influentialon themboth, though indifferentways.RegardingNishida,however,

thereareotherfiguresinthetranscendentaltraditionthatarguablyhadmoreinfluenceonhim,suchas

HegelandFichte.IwilltouchontheirinfluenceonNishidainPartIIIwhenweexamineNishida’sproject

butforthepurposeofPartI,Ihavelimitedmyfocustothecommondenominators.Inthefollowing,we

willfirstlookatKant’stranscendentalphilosophyandthenproceedtoexamineHusserl’stranscendental

phenomenology. The aim of this chapter is to pave the way towards unraveling the essence of

transcendental philosophy. The subsequent chapter will then proceed to articulate the essence of

transcendentalphilosophybasedontheinvestigationsinthischapter.

1 Kant’stranscendentalphilosophy

1.1 Againstthewayofideas

Kant is generally regarded as the father of transcendental philosophy due to his systematic

construction of a radically novel approach in philosophy. This is not to say that he came up with a

completely new set of philosophical problems by ignoring the tradition before him. Just like any good

philosopher(atleastinmydefinitionoftheterm),hefollowedthemindsofhispredecessorsandindoing

so,hesawtheimportanceoftheproblemsthattheyweregrapplingwith.Kant’snoveltyliesnotinsetting

forthnewproblemsbutinseeingtheoldproblemsinacompletelydifferentlight.

ThecardinalproblemthatKanthadinheritedwastheproblemofhowknowledgeoftheworldis

possible.Thisproblemofknowledgeisaspecificallymodernprobleminsofarasitarosefromthetheory

of ideas originatingwith Descartes. Philosophers before Descartes naturally held the view thatwe are

directlyintouchwiththeworld.Withoutgoingintothedetails,itwastheskepticismregardingsuchnaive

realismthatledtoDescartes’discoveryoftheideas.Descartes’theoryofideas,atleasttraditionally,has

beeninterpretedasarepresentationalistview.1Accordingtothisinterpretation,Descartessubscribedto

theviewthatweareimmediatelyawareofideasandonlymediatelyawareofexternalobjects.Toputit1TherearerecentscholarswhohaveproposedanalternativereadingofDescartes’position.RatherthaninterpretingDescartesasarepresentationalist,theyhaveinterpretedhimasadirectrealist.Cf.Nadler(1989)andYolton(1975).Iwillleavethisissueaside.

11

another way, the immediate objects of all forms of consciousness are ‘ideas’ (which are eithermental

states or mental entities), and these ideas refer to something beyond themselves, i.e. they represent

objects. Such a representationalist view of consciousness is also commonly referred to as the “way of

ideas.”ThiswasaviewsharedbymanymodernphilosopherssuchasLocke,BerkeleyandHume,though

theydisagreedonthenatureoftheseideas.Now,sincetheseideasaresomehowgiventothesubjectand

itisonlyviaideasthatwebecomeawareofobjects,thecrucialproblemwastofigureouthowthiscould

becarriedout.Inotherwords,thepressingquestionwas:Howcanideasrepresentexternalobjects?Or

formulated differently: How can ideas or representations (I use these terms interchangeably for my

purposeshere)correspondtoobjects?Themodernproblemofknowledgearoseinthiscontext.Namely,

whatjustifiesourknowledgeoftheexternalworldifthereisaveilbetweenusandtheworld?

MostcommentatorsonKantagreethatwhatdistinguishesKantfromhispredecessorsisthathe

breakswiththistradition.Butratherthandenyingtheexistenceofideasandrepresentationsaltogether

andreturningtothepre-modernnaiveviewthatwearesomehowdirectlyintouchwiththeworld,Kant

addressedacompletelydifferentquestionthantheproblemofrepresentation.Transcendentalphilosophy

begins with Kant’s discovery of this new question. As David Carr puts it, transcendental philosophy

“attemptstorevampthephilosophicalproject,attemptstoposenewquestionsratherthanprovidenew

answerstooldquestions.”2Insteadofaskinghowrepresentationscancorrespondtoobjects,Kantasked:

How is representation possible at all? Here, it is important to understand that the two questions are

radicallydifferent.Thetraditionalquestionaskshowamentalstateoramentalentitycancorrespondto

somethingcompletelydifferentfromitself,i.e.non-mentalobjects.Theproblemwiththisquestionisthat

itinevitablygivesrisetoskepticismregardingtheexternalworld,namelyCartesianskepticism.Ifweonly

have direct knowledge of ideas or representations and our knowledge of the externalworld is always

indirectlyinferred,howcanwebecertainthatourrepresentationsreallycorrespondtoobjects?

Onewaytoreplytotheskepticistodismissthequestionasill-founded.Whenvariousattemptsto

solveaproblemhavefailedtosucceed,thenitisalwaysagoodtactictoaskwhetheritisn’ttheproblem

itselfthatisproblematic.ThisisindeedwherewefindKant’ssuccess.Ratherthanwardingofftheskeptic

by trying to come up with a good reply and thereby admitting the legitimacy of the question, Kant

dismissed the question to begin with. In this sense, though Kant’s argument can be understood as a

refutation of skepticism, it must be kept in mind that Kant was not trying to prove what the skeptics

doubted,namelywhetherornotwehaveknowledgeoftheexternalworld.Toattemptsuchproofwould

betoadmitthatsuchproofiswanting.Rather,hesawthatsuchproofisunnecessaryforitwasbasedon2Carr1999,p.31.

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questionableassumptionsaboutthewaythemindworksinitsrelationtotheworld.Insteadofassuming

thatthemindisequippedwithrepresentationsthatsomehowreachouttotheworld,hebeganwiththe

lesscontroversialview thatweare inpossessionof someaprioriknowledge, i.e.knowledge thatholds

universallyandnecessarily.Thesuccessofmathematicsandthenaturalsciencesatthetimewastakenas

evidence for this.Accordingly, granted that there is syntheticaprioriknowledge,namelyuniversaland

necessaryknowledgethat isnotmerelytautologicalbutaddstoourbodyofknowledge,thequestionto

askwashow this is possible.Moreover, in reorienting the problem thisway,Kantwas questioning the

veryconceptionofknowledgeandrepresentation,i.e.whatknowledgeandrepresentationareinessence.

ToquoteCarragain:

Kantismoreconcernedwithwhatsuchknowledgeisratherthanwhetherwehaveit.Inthissensehisquestionwouldbepriortothatoftheskeptic.Thewhatquestionis,ifyouwill,aquestionofessenceratherthanexistence,ofpossibilityratherthanactuality.3

While this prima facie looks like Kant is avoiding what seems like the most important issue,

namelytheactualityofrepresentationorknowledgeratherthantheirmerepossibility,thisissoonlyon

the faceof it. Firstly, inquestioning thepossibilityof representation,Kantwas reconfiguringwhat isat

stake.Inotherwords,hewasredefiningwhat“representations”are.AsFrederickBeiserwrites:

For Kant, no idea is simply given, but all are constructed, the products of more basic syntheticactivities.[…]Representationisneversomethingsimple,basic,andgiven,butitisalwayssomethingcomplex,derived,andconstructed.4

ThisisnottosaythatKantclaimedthatourmindconstructsrepresentationsonitsownwithnoexternal

input.Onthecontrary,representationsareproductsofourmind’sspontaneityandreceptivity.Themind

activelyorganizes thematerial given tous fromoutside themind.As the famousquotegoes, “thoughts

without content are empty, intuitionswithout concepts are blind” (A51/B75)5. And, as Lee Braver has

rightly noted, Kant’s discovery does not lie in the rather uninteresting claim that our mind makes a

contributiontoexperience.Noonewasdenyingthatthemindcontributestoourexperience.Forexample,

DescartesandLockebothtooksecondaryqualitiesasarisingfromourcontributiontoexperience.6What

marks Kant’s position is that,while all of these thinkers took themind’s contribution to be a negative

3Ibid.,p.48.4Beiser2002,p.134.5IfollowthestandardpracticeofreferringtothepagesoftheAcademyEdition.ThesearegiveninboththeEnglishandtheGermanversionsonwhichIdraw.6Braver2007,p.36.

13

contributionthatdistortsreality,Kanttookthistobeessentialforourknowledgeofreality.Namely,Kant

reversed the idearegardingwhat theminddoes: “Kant’srevolution is to find thiscontributionnotonly

acceptable but in fact essential for knowledge.” 7 In this way, in questioning the possibility of

representation,Kantwasaskinghowitispossiblethatknowledgeofobjectsessentiallyinvolvesthework

ofourminds.Furthermore,Kantwasspecificallyinterestedinaparticulartypeofknowledge:knowledge

ofobjectsthatholdsnecessarilyanduniversallyor,touseKantianlanguage,apriorisyntheticknowledge.

Hence,thequestion“Howisrepresentationpossibleatall?”isfurthertransformedinto,“Howissynthetic

aprioriknowledgepossible?”Therefore,itisnotcorrecttosaythatKantwasavoidingtheissueconcerning

theactualityof representationsincehewas indeedgivingapositiveaccountof it, albeitadifferentone

fromthatofhispredecessors.8

Moreover, it is in this regard thatKanthasbeenacclaimed tohavereconciled the twoopposing

schools, rationalism and empiricism. And it is common to hear that this is where Kant’s greatest

accomplishment lies. To put the opposition rather crudely, while rationalists demanded universal and

necessaryknowledgeapparentlyunattainablethroughexperience,empiricistsinsistedonthenecessityof

experience for knowledge. Kantwas able to reconcile these two positions by claiming that knowledge

depends on experience but only to the extent that itwould lack contentwithout thematerial given in

experience. Inotherwords,universalityandnecessityweregrantedby themind’sapriori contribution

whilestillaffordingthemind’sopennesstotheworld.

Secondly, and related to the first point, it is not true that Kant was avoiding the issue of the

actualityofrepresentationsince,inquestioningthepossibilityofrepresentation,heintroducedadifferent

dimensiontothepicture,sotosay,thatinfactrevealstheactualityoftherepresentationinanewlight.

Simplyput,whileKant’spredecessorswereworkingwithtwocategories,thesubjectiveandtheobjective

or the mental and the physical, Kant introduced a new category: the transcendental. While his

predecessorswereconcernedwithhowasubjective(ormental)thingcancorrespondtoanobjective(or

physical) thing, Kant questioned how it is possible that the subjective and the objective together

constituteourknowledge.Accordingly,hequestionedtheconditionsofpossibilityforthesynthesisofthe

subjective and the objective (or the mental and the physical) and sought the answer in the newly

discovered transcendental realm. Put differently, in questioning the possibility of representation, he

sought the answer in neither the subjective nor the objective (or themental and the physical) but the

transcendentaldimension,sotosay.Tobesure,thisdoesnotyetclarifyhowtheintroductionofthisnew

7Ibid.,p.37.8ForadetaileddiscussionofhowKant’sviewofrepresentationsdiffersfromhispredecessors’,seeBeiser(2002).

14

transcendental dimension reconfigures the actuality of representations, but we will come back to this

pointlater.

HeretowehaveseenthatKantintroducedanewquestion(“Howissyntheticaprioriknowledge

possible?”) and a new dimension (the transcendental) in addressing the problem of knowledge. But in

order to understandKant’s originality in full,wemust get a grip onwhat this newdimension actually

amounts to. Namely, what is the transcendental? Moreover, I have been freely using the word

“transcendental” toqualify “dimension”and“realm”upto thispoint,but thewordqualifiesmanyother

things: knowledge, inquiry, argument, philosophy, etc. In fact, there is one concept that is particularly

importantforclarifyingtheexactmeaningofthisterminsofarasitdefinesthespecificmethodemployed

intranscendentalphilosophy:transcendentalreflection.Accordingly,inthefollowing,letusseewhatKant

hastosayaboutthistranscendentalreflectioninrelationtootherkindsofreflection.

1.2 TranscendentalreflectioninKant

Reflection, as generally understood in philosophical discourse, is the turning back of

consciousnessontoitself.Butreflectioncanbefurtherdistinguishedintovariouskindsdependingonhow

it turns back onto itself and what is thematized as a result. A typical kind of this turning back of

consciousnessontoitself is introspection,or“innersense”(innereSinn)asKantcalls it intheCritiqueof

PureReason(Kritikder reinenVernunft, hereafterCritique).Whilewe use our outer sense to represent

objectsthatareexternaltous,itiswithinnersensethatwerepresenttoourselvesourownmentalstates.

AccordingtoKant,whilstdistinguishedvis-à-vistheformsrequiredforprovidingrepresentations(space

foroutersenseandtimeforinnersense),bothsensesgiveusrepresentationsof“objects”inabroadsense.

Justasoutersensegivesusrepresentationsofexternalobjects, innersenseprovidesrepresentationsof

ourselvesasobjects.Butthisisnottheonlywaywecanbecomeawareofourselves.AsKantsays,“this[i.e.

innersense]presentsevenourselves toconsciousnessonlyasweappear toourselves,notasweare in

ourselves”(B152-153).WhatKantisalludingtohereisthedistinctionbetweenourselvesasobjects(“as

weappeartoourselves”)andourselvesassubjects(“asweareinourselves”).Innersensemakesusaware

ofourselvesonlyintheformerwaybutnotthelatter.Sinceinnersense,inasimilarveintooutersense,

makes us aware of ourselves as objects and only as objects, Kant designates such consciousness of

15

ourselvesas“merelyempirical,forevervariable”(A107).9Letuscallthiskindofreflection(introspection

or inner sense) “empirical reflection” as others havedone10since it is consciousness turning back onto

itself and takes itself as objects for further empirical investigation (e.g. it inquires about the real

properties ofmy perception, its causal origins, etc.).We can also call this reflection,more specifically,

“psychological reflection” as it is in psychology that this kind of reflection is typically employed to

investigatetherealpropertiesofthemind.

In the appendix to the Transcendental Analytic of theCritique titled, “On the Amphiboly of the

Concepts of Reflection,” Kant introduces a different kind of reflection to empirical or psychological

reflection (A260-263/B316-319). He calls it “transcendental reflection” (transzendentaleÜberlegungor

Reflexion)andgivesthefollowingcharacterization:

The action throughwhich Imake the comparison of representations in generalwith the cognitivepowerinwhichtheyaresituated,andthroughwhichIdistinguishwhethertheyaretobecomparedto one another as belonging to the pure understanding or to pure intuition, I call transcendentalreflection[transzendentaleÜberlegung].(A261/B317)

Sincethisdefinitionisnotverystraightforward,someexplanationisfitting.Kantbelievedthataspecific

kindofreflectionisrequiredpriortomakinganysortofjudgment.Ashesays:“alljudgments,indeedall

comparisons,requireareflection [Überlegung], i.e.distinctionof thecognitivepowertowhichthegiven

conceptsbelong”(A261/B317).Whathe isreferringtobyreflectionhere isnot theempiricalreflection

thatwe have seen earlier butwhat he calls transcendental reflection. Let us say, for instance, thatwe

makethestatement,“Thiscupisblue.”Kantissayingthat,inordertobeabletomakethisjudgmentand,

indeed, in order to even be able to compare the two representations “cup” and “blue,” we must first

deliberateandworkoutwhichcognitivefaculty,i.e.understandingorsensibility,eachbelongsto.Inother

words, it isonlybecausewecometoknowthroughdeliberationthatcupsaresensibleobjectstowhich

colorconceptscanapplythatweareabletomakethisstatementinameaningfulway.Wewouldbefailing

toproperlyemploytranscendentalreflectionifweweretosay, forexample,“Causesareblue,”sincewe

otherwise know that causes are non-sensible things and hence cannot take on color. Transcendental

reflection, according to Kant, is thus the deliberation of representations with regard to the cognitive

facultytowhichtheybelong.

9InthesamecontextKantcallsthis“empiricalapperception”anddistinguishesitfrom“transcendentalapperception”whichistheconsciousnessofourselvesassubjects.Sincemyfocushereisonthedistinctionbetweenempiricalandtranscendentalreflectionandnotsomuchonthemodesofself-consciousness,thoughcloselyrelated,Ihaveleftoutthediscussionaboutapperceptionhere.10E.g.Schnädelbach(1977)andMohanty(1985).

16

Butthen,howexactlyisthisdifferentfromempiricalreflection?Kantexplains:

Reflection(reflexio)doesnothavetodowithobjectsthemselves,inordertoacquireconceptsdirectlyfrom them, but rather is the state of mind in which we first prepare ourselves to find out thesubjectiveconditionsunderwhichwecanarriveatconcepts.(A260/B316)

Again,whatKant is referring towith “reflection”here is specifically “transcendental reflection”andnot

anyotherkind.Forwehaveseenthatempiricalreflectionisindeedconcernedwithsomekindof“objects

themselves,”i.e.ourownmentalstates.Insteadoftakingadomainofobjectswithaviewtodetermining

its properties, transcendental reflection inquires into the subjective conditions for the possibility of

representations with a view to determining its source, i.e. whether it belongs to understanding or

sensibility.

Transcendentalreflection,understoodinthisway,isinaccordancewiththeoft-quoteddefinition

oftranscendentalknowledgegivenintheIntroductiontotheCritique:

Icallallcognitiontranscendentalthatisoccupiednotsomuchwithobjectsbutratherwithourmodeofcognitionofobjectsinsofarasthisistobepossibleapriori.(A11-12/B25)

Transcendentalknowledgeisnotaprioriknowledgeofobjectsthemselvesbutaprioriknowledgeofour

cognitionofobjects.Somehavegivenexpressiontothisdistinctionbyresortingtoaterminologyusedby

the neo-Kantians, Nicolai Hartmann and Theodor Adorno: intentio recta and intentio obliqua. In the

contextofdistinguishingtranscendentalinquiryfromallfirst-orderinquires,forexample,StevenCrowell

makesuseofthisterminology:

First-order inquiries –whether empirical like physics andpsychology or a priori likemathematicsandmetaphysics–arecarriedoutinan intentiorectaandtheyestablishtherealpropertiesoftheirobjects.Transcendentalcritique,incontrast,askshowitispossiblethatsuchfirst-orderthinkingcanyield knowledge, and it dealswith objects and their properties only in a reflective intentioobliquaconcernedwithwhatmakesthemcognitivelyaccessible.11

Whateverelsethetermsmaysignify,ItakeitthatCrowellwithsomeothers12hasusedthetermintentio

rectatobasicallydenoteourconsciousnessofobjects(whethertheybephysical,psychical,mathematical

or metaphysical) while using intentio obliqua to signify the consciousness of the subjective aspects of

cognitionor,morepreciselyput,thesubjectiveconditions forthepossibilityofourcognitionofobjects.I

add the latter qualification since psychological reflection also inquires into the subjective aspects of

11Crowell2013,p.11.12E.g.Mohanty1985,p.xviii.

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cognitionyetisaversionoftheintentiorectainsofarasitisaninvestigationintothemindunderstoodas

somekindofanobjectorentityexistingintheworld.Intentioobliqua,inthiscontext,specifiesasecond-

orderconsciousness that looks into thesubjectiveconditionsofourcognitionofobjects.The important

observation to note is that, whether it be reflection, knowledge, critique, inquiry or anything else,

whenever the qualification “transcendental” is added, it means that the concern is not so much with

objects themselvesbutwith thesubjectiveconditions for thepossibilityofourknowledgeofobjects. In

this sense (and Iwant to stress thispoint as it is important), thetranscendentalessentiallydesignatesa

second-orderdiscourse.

Transcendentalknowledgeis, furthermore,designatedastheaprioriknowledgeofourcognition

of objects. This means that transcendental knowledge is the necessary and universal knowledge of our

cognition of objects. Importantly, however, a priority is not sufficient to designate transcendental

knowledge.Mathematicalknowledge,forexample,isaprioributnottranscendental.Whatdistinguishes

transcendental knowledge from other a priori knowledge is that it is essentially concerned with our

cognitionofobjects.Accordingly,torephraseourearlierformulation:transcendentalreflectionisasecond-

orderreflectionintotheapriorisubjectiveconditionsofthepossibilityofourknowledgeofobjects.

In the same sectionwhere Kant introduces transcendental reflection, he raises another kind of

reflectionthatistobedistinguishedfrombothempiricalandtranscendentalreflection.Hecallsthisthird

kindofreflection,“logicalreflection.”Logicalreflectionis“amerecomparison”(A262/B318)inwhich“we

simply compareour conceptswith eachother in theunderstanding” (A279/B335). It is through logical

reflection that we come to see, for example, that the concepts “blue” and “color” are related through

inclusion, i.e. that “blue” is a concept that is contained in the concept “color.” Therefore, in logical

reflection, “there is complete abstraction from the cognitive power towhich the given representations

belong”(A262/B318).Logicalreflection,then,isamerelogicaldeliberationthatabstractsawayfromthe

sourceoftherepresentations.

HavinglaidoutthethreekindsofreflectiondiscussedbyKant,namelyempirical,transcendental

andlogicalreflection,wearenowinapositiontoseeinwhatwayKantwasoriginalwithhisanswertothe

problemofknowledgeandmorespecificallytothequestion,howissyntheticaprioriknowledgepossible?

To begin with, it is evident that the answer cannot be sought through logical reflection, for a logical

analysis of the concepts, “synthesis,” “a priori,” and “knowledge,” can yield no more than what the

conceptsalreadyentail,andthepossibilityofsyntheticaprioriknowledgeissimplynotentailedinanyof

the concepts, either taken individually or together. Accordingly, the possibility of synthetic a priori

knowledgecanonlybeinvestigatedthroughempiricalortranscendentalreflection.Itisherethatwecan

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identifyKant’struecontribution.ForKantsoughttheanswertotheabovequestioninthetranscendental

andnottheempirical.Inotherwords,Kantwasspecificallyseekingtheaprioriconditions,whichwerenot

realpropertiesofobjectsbutthatwhichmakespossibleourknowledgeofobjectsand,hence,issecond-

order. Therefore, Kant’s originality lies in discovering transcendental reflection as the specific kind of

methodtoseekouttheanswertothequestion,howissyntheticaprioriknowledgepossible.

1.3 Thestatusofthetranscendental:psychologicalvs.logicalinterpretation

Aswehaveseenabove,oneoftheimportantfacetsoftheKantianlegacyistohavedelineatedthe

transcendentaldimension incontrast tothe logicalandtheempirical.Wehave,moreover,seenthatthe

transcendentaldesignates a second-order inquiry insofar as it turnsaway fromobjects themselves and

inquiresintotheirconditionsofpossibility.Inthisway,Kantseemstohavesuccessfullyfoundanovelway

to dealwith the old problemof knowledge. Yet despite the alleged discovery of the transcendental, its

exactnaturestillseemselusive.Thequestionremains:Whataretheseconditionsthatmakepossibleour

knowledgeofobjects?

Kantdidnotinfactgiveadecisiveanswerbutinsteadwaveredbetweentwoconceptions.These

tworatherdifferent conceptionsaremostnotable in theTranscendentalDeductionwherehediscusses

thestatusof thecategoriesandthedifferencesarereflected intheA-andB-editionsof thesection.The

two conceptions,moreover, have become a touchstone that dividesKant’s successors. In theA-edition,

Kanttracestheoriginofthecategoriesinthethreefoldsynthesisofthemind,namelytheapprehensionof

representations in intuition, reproduction in imagination and recognition in concepts. In the B-edition,

however, the spontaneity of understanding is emphasized at the expense of the others. The first

interpretationtakesKant’sappealtothethreefoldsynthesisintheA-editiontoindicatethepsychological

origin of the categories. According to this interpretation, often referred to as the psychological

interpretation, the conditions of possibility for our knowledge of objects are nothing but our cognitive

operations. What makes possible knowledge of objects is what we happen to be equipped with. This

would further imply that Kant is committed to the fallacy of psychologism, i.e. the attempt to ground

logical laws on psychological laws. Yet this interpretation is hardly in line with the description of the

transcendentalthatwehavealreadyseen,namelythatitisaprioriandthatitisasecond-orderinquiry.If

theconditionsofpossibilityforourknowledgeofobjectsarenothingbutourcognitiveoperations,then

transcendentalinquiryreducestopsychologicalinquiry,i.e.afirst-orderempiricalinquiryintoourminds.

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Furthermore,thepsychologicalinterpretationfailstoaccountfortheobjectivevalidityofthecategories.

The aim of the Transcendental Deduction was precisely to show that the categories are not only the

necessary structures of ourmind but that they also hold for all rational beings and are the necessary

structures of objects. As Beiser rightly notes, even if the attempt in the Deduction is a failure, the

psychologicalinterpretationmustfirstcontendwiththeDeductionitselfandprovideanaccountofwhyit

wasafailure.13

Thesecondinterpretation,oftencalledthelogicalinterpretation,takestheB-editionseriouslyand

avoidsthesedifficultiesbymaintainingapurelylogicalreadingofthetranscendental.Theproponentsof

this interpretation see that so long as one is interested in how cognitionmakes knowledge of objects

possible, one is stuck in a first-order inquiry since this entails investigating the mind’s faculties and

activities.Asaresult,thequestionofcognitionisreplacedbythatofthejustificationofsomebeliefs.The

conditions for the possibility of our knowledge of objects then amount to the truth-conditions of our

judgments.14This interpretation is supported by Kant’s famous employment of the juridical distinction

betweenthequidjurisandquidfacti,thequestionofrightandquestionoffact(A84/B116).“Bywhatright

doconceptsrelateaprioritoobjects”(i.e.whatjustifiesourbeliefsabouttheworld)isadifferentquestion

fromthatwhichquestionsthefactualorcausaloriginofthoseconcepts.Onlytheformerisrelevanttothe

transcendentaldeductionofconcepts.AsKantexplains:

I therefore call the explanation of the way in which concepts can relate to objects a priori theirtranscendentaldeduction,anddistinguishthisfromempiricaldeduction,whichshowshowaconceptisacquiredthroughexperienceandreflectiononit,andthereforeconcernsnotthelawfulnessbutthefactfromwhichthepossessionhasarisen.(A85/B117)

This distinction between thequid jurisandquid factiwas later emphasized byHermann Lotze and the

neo-Kantians.Lotzemaintainedthatwemustdistinguishbetweentherealmsofexistence(ormattersof

fact) and validity. To ask about the truth or validity of a judgment is quite different fromasking about

mattersoffact.15FollowingLotze,boththeMarburgschoolandtheBadenschoolofneo-Kantiansagreed

thatthequestionsofbeing,factuality,andcausalityaredifferentsortsofquestionsfromthoseregarding

validity,valueandnormativity.Theybelievedthatpsychologisminlogiccouldonlybeavoidedbyseeing

that thetranscendental investigatesnot the formerbut the latter. In thisway, theneo-Kantiansgavean

unambiguous characterizationof the transcendental by identifying itwith thenormative.Reformulated

13Beiser2002,pp.168-169.14Cf.Ibid.,p.170.15Cf.Lotze1884,§§316-317.

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andrevivedbytheneo-Kantians,transcendentalinquirythereforedesignatedsecond-orderinquiryasthe

normative(andthusapriori)conditionsforthepossibilityofourknowledgeofobjects.

Perhapsthebiggestadvantagethelogicalinterpretationhasoverthepsychologicalisthatitdoes

justice to the defining aspect of the transcendental, namely its second-order status. It is not surprising

then that this interpretation, specifically with its emphasis on normativity, has gained much support

among contemporary Kantian scholars and transcendental philosophers alike. Steven Crowell, for

example,supportsthisinterpretationinhisformulationofKant’stranscendentalproject:

Kant’s project is not concernedwith the real relation between a representation and its object butsolelywiththecognitiveclaimadvancedinit,andthequestionofhowknowledgeispossibleisnotafactualbutanormativeone.Itdoesnotlookforsomecausalconnectionbetweenmindandworldbutinvestigateshowaconceptcanholdofsomething–not“howcansomethingrepresentanobject?”but“howcanitdosocorrectly?”16

Whenthetranscendentalisfleshedoutintermsofjustificationandnormativity,however,transcendental

philosophy begins to look as if it deals exclusivelywith the epistemological problematic. Onemay not

think this is aworry sincewhat prompted Kant to beginwithwas nothing other than the problem of

knowledge. But one must be careful in characterizing Kant’s transcendental philosophy as purely

epistemological.WhileitcanhardlybedoubtedthatKantwasinterestedintheproblemofknowledge,it

is controversialwhether thatwasKant’s sole interest.Or better put, it is highly questionable thatKant

believed that the question regarding our knowledge of objects can be separated from the question

regarding the ontological constitution of objects. This is an important point that deserves a separate

sectionbelowsinceithasimplicationsforthescopeoftranscendentalphilosophy.

But before turning to this point, there is another point worth mentioning regarding the two

interpretations. Although the logical interpretation is more appealing than the psychological, there is

roomtoquestionwhetherwecandoawaywiththelattersidealtogetherindefiningthetranscendental.

For,grantingthatnormativityandfactualityaredifferentissues,theveryideaofnormativityonlymakes

senseagainstthebackdropofouractualactivities.Whatisanormifitisnotanormforourconduct?As

Beisersays:

16Crowell2013,p.11.

21

Thevery ideaofanormis thatofaconstraintonactivity;andthevery ideaofarule is thatwhichgoverns or imposes limits on conduct. So if therewere no activity or conduct, therewould be nopurposeininvokingtheideaofanormorruleinthefirstplace.”17

Ormoresuccinctlyput inadifferentpaper:“‘Ought’ implies ‘can’,sothat ifpeoplecannotactonnorms

theylosealltheirvalidity.18Indeed,theveryideaoftruth-conditionsofourjudgmentsisdependentonthe

fact that we can make true and false judgments. In other words, the possibility of synthetic a priori

knowledgeentailsnotonlyitslogicalbutrealpossibility.

Beisersubsequentlyarguesthatneitherthelogicalnorthepsychologicalinterpretation,takenon

itsown,canprovideacompletepictureofthetranscendental.Theyarenotmutuallyexclusive:

We can consider the transcendental as both logical and psychological, as laying down constraintsbothabouthowweoughttothinkandabouthowwemustdoso[vis-à-vistheactivitiesofourmind].19

This is indeedthe lessonto learnfromtheone-sidednessof thetwointerpretations: thetranscendental

must encompassboth transcendental logicand psychology.Tobe sure, oneof themain challenges that

this then creates is to account for howwe can appeal to our acts of cognitionwithout falling into the

pitfallsofthepsychologicalinterpretation.Transcendentalpsychology,inthewayKanthadenvisionedit,

alsohad itsownproblemssuchas theentirematterof the facultiesof themind.Thesechallengeswere

takenupbyHusserlwhodevelopedthephenomenologicalversionoftranscendentalphilosophytowhich

wewillturnshortly.Butbeforewedoso,letusturntotheaforementionedquestionregardingthescope

ofKantiantranscendentalphilosophy.

1.4 Thescopeoftranscendentalphilosophy:epistemologicalvs.ontologicalreading

Ithasoftenbeenassumedthattranscendentalphilosophyisadisciplineinepistemologyandnot

ontology.LetusreciteKant’sfamousdefinitionofthetranscendental:

Icallallcognitiontranscendentalthatisoccupiednotsomuchwithobjectsbutratherwithourmodeofcognitionofobjectsinsofarasthisistobepossibleapriori.(A11-12/B25)

Primafacie,insofarastranscendentalphilosophyischaracterizedbyaturningawayfromobjectstooura

priori knowledge of them, the claim that transcendental philosophy is essentially epistemological does

17Beiser2002,p.172.18Ibid.,p.16.19Ibid.,p.174.

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seem legitimate. Historically, what made this epistemological reading dominant was the neo-Kantians’

logical interpretation and their identification of the transcendental with normativity. On this account,

transcendental conditions are equivalent to normative conditions and, as a corollary, transcendental

philosophy is primarily epistemological. Now, if the conditions that make our knowledge of objects

possiblearemerelynormativeconditionswithnoontologicalcommitment,assomeneo-Kantianswould

supposedly contend, then these conditionswould determine our knowledge of objects butnot theway

objectsare inthemselves.Accordingtothisview,transcendentalphilosophyhasno implicationsforthe

natureofobjects.Ontologywouldstandoutsidetherealmoftranscendentalphilosophy.

ThefollowingkeystatementinthebeginningoftheTranscendentalAnalytic,however,atteststhat

thisunderstandingofthescopeofthetranscendentalprovestoominimal:

The conditions of the possibility of experience in general are at the same time conditions of thepossibility of the objects of experience, and on this account have objective validity in a syntheticjudgmentapriori.(A158/B197)

Here,Kant is clear that the transcendental conditionsdeterminenotonlyourknowledgeofobjectsbut

alsotheobjectsofourknowledge.Moreover,thisshouldnotbetakenasindicativeofaninconsistencyon

Kant’spart.Rather,theseclaimssuggestthat,whenoneconsidersthefullimplicationsoftranscendental

inquiry,ithassignificantramificationsonthenatureofobjects.

Tobeginwith,insofarasthetranscendentalisaninquiryintotheconditionsforthepossibilityof

ourknowledgeofobjects, it is simply false that ithasnobearingonobjects.Admittedly, transcendental

inquirydoesnotinquireintoobjectsinthesamewayasfirst-orderinquiriesdo.Aswehavestressed,the

second-orderstatusof thetranscendentalensuresthat it isessentiallydistinguishedfromall first-order

inquiries of the empirical sciences as well as metaphysical inquiries that similarly thematize objects

(empirical or metaphysical) with a view to determining their first-order properties. But this does not

entailthattranscendentalinquiryisnotconcernedwithobjectsthemselves.WeshouldinfacttakeKant’s

wordingatfacevaluewhenhesaysthattranscendentalknowledgeisconcerned“notsomuchwithobjects

aswiththemodeofourknowledgeofobjectsinsofarasthismodeofknowledgeistobepossibleapriori.”

Kantisnotdenyingthatthetranscendentalisconcernedwithobjects;heisonlyassertingthattheconcern

ismorewithourknowledgeofobjectsthanwithobjects.Whilethisstillleavesopentheexactrelationthat

pertains between our knowledge of objects and objects themselves, it does nevertheless suggest their

closerelationintranscendentaldiscourse.

Indeed,animportantpointtotakefromthisisthattranscendentalinquiryintotheconditionsfor

thepossibilityofourknowledgeofobjectsisnotcutofffrominquiryintoobjectsinawaythatmakesthe

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latterinquiryirrelevanttotheformerandviceversa.Thisisindeedoneofthemisunderstandingsofthe

exclusively epistemological reading. According to this interpretation, the transcendental is a realm

independentoftherealmofobjects(bothempiricalandmetaphysical).20Whatisfatalaboutthiskindof

understandingisthatitlimitsthescopeofthetranscendentalinawaythatunderminesthecoreofKant’s

discovery.Aswehave seen, the transcendental questionwas introducedbyKant inorder to tackle the

problem of knowledge in a way that evades the skeptics’ charge. If we delimit the scope of the

transcendental to our knowledge of objects, leaving the realm of objects unaffected by our question,

transcendental knowledgedeflates into subjectiveknowledge thathasnoobjectivevalidity.Thiswould

allowCartesianskepticismto loomagain. In fact,speakingofdifferent“realms” isaltogethermisleading

sincethedistinctionbetweenthetranscendentalandtheempirical(aswellasthemetaphysical)doesnot

implytwoontologicalrealmsbutismerelyadifferenceinthelevelsofdiscourse.Transcendentalinquiry

isdifferentfrommetaphysicalinquiryinthissensesincethedefiningtraitofthelatteristothematizea

distinctontologicalrealmfromtheempirical.Ratherthanspeakingofrealms,itmaybehelpfultospeak

metaphoricallyof“dimensions”asIhavedoneearlier.Infact,Husserlalsospeaksofthetranscendentalas

a“newdimension.”21Ananalogymaybehelpfultoclarifythispoint.Whenweputon3Dglassestowatch

athree-dimensionalfilm,wedonotbelievethattheglasseshavesomehowintroducedadifferentreality

from the two-dimensional reality. The third dimension enables us to see the film with depth and so

perhapswith“morereality,”butitisontologicallythesamerealityastheonedepictedtwo-dimensionally.

Likewise, thetranscendentaldimensionarticulatesthenatureofreality inadifferentwayfromhowwe

observeobjectsempirically,butitdoesnottherebyintroduceanewreality.Accordingly,transcendental

inquiryintroducesnotadistinctrealmbutanotherdimensionthatshedslightonthewayobjectsare,not

justhowtheyappeartousbuthowtheyareinthemselves.

Itisduetothesereasonsthattranscendentalinquiryintotheconditionsforthepossibilityofour

knowledge of objects must also be an inquiry into the conditions for the possibility of objects of our

knowledge.Theepistemologicalreading,therefore,canonlybeendorsedbybeingblindtothefullimport

ofthetranscendental.Transcendentalinquirynotonlyreconfigureswhatknowledgeconsistsofbutitalso

fundamentallyredefineswhatobjectsareinthemselves.Thisisalsowhytranscendentalidealismispart

20Forexample,ErnstCassirersays:“TheessentialcharacteristicofKant’stranscendentalmethodconsistsinthefactthatitoperatesnotintherealmofempiricallyrealthingsorevents,butpurelyandexclusivelyintherealmoftruthsandtheiridealmodeofvalidity.”(1923,pp.427-428[quotedinGardner2015,p.9;translationbyGardner])21HuaVI,§32.AllcitationsfromHusserlarefromtheHusserliana(abbreviatedasHua),followedbyvolumenumber(Romannumerals)andpagenumber(orsectionnumber).IhavegiventhepaginationfromtheoriginalGermanfirstfollowedbyaslashandpaginationfromtheEnglishtranslation,whereverthisisavailable.IhavefollowedtheavailableEnglishtranslationsinmycitations.

24

andparcel ofKant’s transcendental project.One simply cannot avoid transcendental idealism ifwe see

thatthetranscendentalessentiallyhasontologicalimplications.22

Having delineated Kant’s idea of transcendental philosophy, let us now turn to Husserl’s

transcendentalphenomenology.

2 Husserl’stranscendentalphenomenology

2.1 Husserl’sevaluationofKantiantranscendentalphilosophy

HowdoesHusserl’stranscendentalphenomenologydifferfromKant’stranscendentalphilosophy?

WhatwasHusserl’srelationshiptoKant?Unlikehisneo-Kantiancontemporaries,Husserldidnotdevelop

his thought through an internal development of Kantian philosophy. Owing much to the fact that his

mentor,FranzBrentano,wasananti-Kantian,hewasrathercriticaltothewholeKantianenterpriseinhis

earlier years. It was only after his turn to transcendental phenomenology around 1913, when Ideas

Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy (Ideen zu einer reinen

Phänomenologie und phänomenologischenPhilosophie, hereafter Ideas I) was published that he became

moreandmoreexpressiveabouthisdebttothegreatphilosopherandphenomenology’srelationshipto

Kant’stranscendentalphilosophy.Inthefollowing,letustakeasourstartingpointthepublishedversion

ofafamouslectureheldon1March1924inFreiburgincelebrationofthebicentenaryofKant’sbirth.In

this lecture titled, “Kant and the Idea of Transcendental Philosophy,” Husserl articulates Kant’s

significanceasheunderstandsitaswellasthereasonswhyhebelievestranscendentalphilosophymust

necessarilytaketheshapeofatranscendentalphenomenology.Thislecturewillguideusinunderstanding

the crux of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, specifically as it relates to Kant’s transcendental

philosophy.

Husserl’s basic attitude towards transcendental philosophy is stated in the beginning of the

lecture:

[A]ny philosophy whatsoever, taken as a systematic whole, can assume the form of an ultimatelyrigorous science only as a universal transcendental philosophy, but also only on the basis ofphenomenologyandinthespecificallyphenomenologicalmethod.23

22Furthermore,onceweseethatthescopeofthetranscendentalreacheswellintothedomainoftheontological,wecanseethatHeidegger’sontologicalinterpretationofKant’sCritiqueisnotascontroversialasitmayseem.SinceHeidegger’sinterpretationofKantisacontroversialtopicthatdeservesattentiononitsown,however,Iwillnotgointoanydetailhere.23HuaVII,pp.230-231/10.

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Acoupleof importantpoints canbe immediatelyextracted from thisquotation: (1)Husserl seeksafter

philosophy as a rigorous science, (2) such philosophy is possible only as a universal transcendental

philosophy, and (3) such universal transcendental philosophy is possible only on the basis of

phenomenology.Withregard to the firstpoint,one shouldrecallHusserl’sessay titled “Philosophyasa

RigorousScience”publishedin1910-11.Inthisessay,hearguesthatitisessentialforphilosophytofind

itsownfirmfoundationanddistanceitself frombothnaturalismandhistoricisminordertoacquirethe

status of a strict and rigorous science. Not surprisingly, such a firm foundation was to be sought in

phenomenology. In the 1924 lecture, Husserl explains how phenomenology as an eidetic descriptive

science delineated in the Logical Investigations (Logische Untersuchungen) soon blossomed into

transcendentalphenomenologicalphilosophyaroundthetimeofIdeasI.Cuttingalongstoryshort,itwas

Husserl’sstrongaspirationforafirstphilosophy(i.e.theaprioriscienceofallsciences)thatenactedthe

turn to pure transcendental consciousness as the fundamental source of all knowledge and, thereby,

allowedthepurelydescriptivedisciplinetodevelopintoatranscendentalone.Whatthismeansandhow

thiswaspossiblewillbecomeclearerinthefollowingpages.Butmyconcernherewillnotbetotracethe

trajectory of Husserl’s thought. Rather, the aim is to articulate the way in which transcendental

phenomenologyisacriticaldevelopmentofKantiantranscendentalphilosophy.Forthispurpose,Iwillbe

focusingonHusserl’sevaluati