kosovo-the balkan dilemma

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KOSOVO:THE BALKAN DILEMMA

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MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACYIN NATION-MAKING

ERMIRA NEKI BABAMUSTA

Submitted for the 2009 NPSA Conference

Philladelphia, PennsylvaniaNov. 19-22, 2009


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2009

Ermira Neki Babamusta

All Rights Reserved


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Source: Van Christo. May 21, 2007. Albania and the Albanians.Frosina InformationCenter Network. Boston: MA.

This Map shows Albanian lands in the nineteenth century in the Vilayets of Shkodr,Kosova, Manastir and Janin. The Albanian ethnic line starts from Novi-Pazar to Ni; itcomes down to Vranje in the NE, continues south to Manastir, and includes Presheva,Kumanova, Shkup, Tetova, Gostivar and Krova. In the NW, it includes Rozhaja,

Tutin, Istog, Peja, Plava, Gucia, Podgorica, Hot, Gruda and Ulqin. [KIC, Expulsions of


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Albanians and Colonization of Kosovo, (Prishtin, Kosovo:The Institute of History,1997)].

Source: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency


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AUTHORS NOTE

In April 2007, at the age of twenty-six, I undertook a field researchproject in the nascent nation of Kosovo under the auspices of UNMIK(UN Mission in Kosovo) and UNHCR (UN High Commissioner forRefugees). The purpose of the trip was to examine the effectiveness of

the status negotiation talks and to research the role of theinternational community in aiding the establishment of the politicalinstitutions in Kosovo. As a researcher of the U.N. Diplomacy Programand Political Science at Long Island University (LIU) in New York, Iworked with Dr. John Ehrenberg (Chair of Political ScienceDepartment), Dr. Lester Wilson (Director of the U.N. DiplomacyGraduate Program), Dr. Caroleen Sayez (Advisor) and Professor NancyWright (Mentor). I am grateful for their guidance and advice throughoutmy academic career at LIU. I was fortunate to personally witness thepolitical movement in Kosovo that accomplished independencesubsequently on 17 February, 2008. I am pleased that the finality of

my research predicting the unilateral declaration occurred asanticipated.I am grateful to all the helpful people I have had the pleasure of

meeting during my work in Kosovo and New York. Accommodation forthe entire stay during my field research in Prishtina (Kosovo) wasprovided by the wonderful Hajredini family. The hosts were marvelous;they organized trips to historical cities, arranged my scheduling forinterviews, and provided transportation and much needed security. Toname a few special people who assisted my wonderful host and tourguide Valbona Hajredini and UNHRC: the magnificent team of ATRC(Advocacy Training & Resource Center), namely Emine Emini, Gzim

Kunoviku, Hysen Hamzaj and Zahid Kulinxha. To name a few peoplewho deserve special mention: my family (Neki, Suzana, Eda, Russ); theDakaj family, Stanley Kusz, Vigan Jashari, Driton Shala, Fatmir Limaj,Melvudin Krasniqi, Wolfgang Koeth, Naser Rrugova, Lieutenant-ColonelEnver Dugolli, Shpend Halili, Dr. Zymer Neziri, Dr. Muhamet Ternavaand Dr. Emin Kabashi.

This book is intended as a scientific contribution to the scholarlywork in the disciplines of political science, diplomacy and international


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relations. It also serves as a testimony to the centuries long Albanianstruggle for justice in its ethnic lands and of its indigenous people. Asignificant percentage from the book sales will be donated to theInstitute of the Albanology in Prishtina (Kosovo) and to the Kunovikufamily who suffered tremendous loss during the war.

ONE

SELF-DETERMINATION: THE ALBANIANQUEST FOR NATIONAL IDENTITY!

THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS acknowledges self-determination as the right of all people. U.N. Resolution 1514 (1960)states that all peoples have the right to self-determination;inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparednessshould never serve as a pretext for delaying independence.iTheAlbanian quest for self-determination and national identity duringYugoslavian hegemony commenced in July 1990, when ethnic Albanian

legislators declared Kosovo independent, followed by two referendumsin September 1991 and May 1992 approving the creation of anindependent Republika e Kosovs [Republic of Kosovo], electingIbrahim Rrugova as president. Serbian President Slobodan Milosevicdid not recognize the action. Kosovos Prime Minister Hashim Thaiconveyed to the international community intentions of a unilateraldeclaration in December 2007, after the United Nations negotiatedsolution deadline.ii European Union foreign ministers advised Kosovoagainst a declaration of independence without prior consultations withthe EU and the U.N. Security Council.

Since 1999 Kosovo had been administered by the United NationsInterim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Following the failedattempts of the U.N. Security Council to pass a new resolution in 2007(replacing Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999), US leadership hadbecome crucial in shifting international diplomacy toward multilateralnegotiations. The fourteen months of UN-led talks deadlocked in April2007 with no agreement being reached between Kosovo and Serbiaregarding the final status. Then in July 2007 Russian rejection of the


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U.N. plan of supervised independence and the fresh round of talksinitiated in August 2007 ended with no agreement in December 2007.

The international mediators of the final status talks reported toU.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon on the set deadline of 10December 2007; however, no acceptable alternative was reached

between Prishtina (Kosovo) and Belgrade (Serbia). During Kosovosstatus talks, President Fatmir Sejdiu unilaterally declaredindependence from Serbia on 17 February 2008. Serbian PresidentBoris Tadi did not recognize the independence and urged the UnitedNations to not recognize its legitimacy.

The initiative of former U.S. President George Bush Jr., followedby that of President Barack Obama, subsequently gathered the supportof most E.U. and U.N. Member States to recognize Kosovosindependence. According to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 60out of 192 United Nations Member States have formally recognizedKosovo as of May 2009, including three U.N. Security Council

Permanent Member States: the United States, France and the UnitedKingdom. Additionally, 22 out of 27 European Union Member Statesand 35 OSCE Member States fully support Kosovos independence.iii

Today the issue of recognition remains to be determined by countriessuch as Spain, Greece, Cyprus, Vietnam, Russia, China, etc, many ofwhich struggle with domestic ethnic unrest.

The international community consisting of the European Unionand the United Nations, have promised European integration providedboth Kosovo and Serbia respect cultural differences, reexamineinterethnic relations and thereby embrace multiculturalism. Ifmulticulturalism is to be the objective of sociopolitical manifestation in

Kosovo, it must be acknowledged this framework is successful in asociety where in diverse groups demonstrate varied social and ethnicidentities. However, Kosovo is not a genuine multicultural society. Theethnic composition of Kosovo is 92% Albanian and a few minorities,specifically 5.3% Serbs and 2.7% other, according to the OSCEestimates.iv This illustrates a perfect example where the socialstructure is predominantly one ethnic group, with a smallrepresentation of another.

In principle, ethnic constituents should be granted rights in ademocratic society. Thus Kosovo, in respecting its minority groupsmust consider characteristics that contribute to their social character.

Variables such as culture, politics, history and economics representperspectives that ethnic minority groups must freely participate inorder to enjoy their rights in Kosovo. For instance, a Serb or a Bosnianwould enjoy Kosovan citizenship, and regardless of their respectiveethnicities, each would enjoy equal career possibilities, economicprosperity, political expression and cultural individuality providedwithin the social realm of Kosovo. In this framework, the individualwould identify as a Kosovan first, and then relate with the country of


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origin second. A similar approach to racial identities applies to genderdifferences. Here the equal social experiences of both men and womenin Kosovo are illustrated in voting rights, property ownership, politicalexpressionism and economic welfare.

In the case of Kosovo, attenuation of identity is a threat to

democracy and an encouragement to the Kosovo-Serbia conflict. In ademocratic society the symbols of the statehood are exhibited in thecountrys flag, emblem, cultural motifs and other national symbols.Kosovos new flag does not contain any representation of the Albanianidentity such as the two-headed black eagle or the red background,commonly referred by ethnic Albanians as Kuq e Zi [Red and Black].Instead of nationalistic depiction, the flag contains the EUs yellow andblue colors and Kosovos map, reflecting Kosovos desire for Europeanassimilation and integration. The symbols of statehood of the newKosovo were imposed by the international community as a neutralitybargain, to avoid favoring one ethnic group over another, threatens the

very core of Albanian national identity, afflicting democratic ideals. Thenew symbols displayed on the flag take away the historical significanceof the ancient ethnic Albanian identity, reflected in a 1000-year-oldIllyrian language and 300-year-old Albanian flag. Should Kosovo settlefor supervised independence via international key players at the risk oflosing its own identity? If historicity of the region can be used as aguide, it was the ineptness of the diplomatic powers of the day at theCongress of Berlin in 1878, which unfortunately configuredinappropriate geographic borders within the Balkans.

How have the current ethnic groups in Kosovo progressed totheir present position? In discussing this question a historical approach

best explains the differences between these social identities. To give afair representation of the involved groups, it is important to examinethem from five historical paradigms: (1) Ethnic Albania under theOttoman political rule (Kosovo was within the Albanian demarcation atthis time); (2) Autonomous Kosovo under Yugoslav influence (Kosovowas annexed by Yugoslavia); (3) Serbias control and ethnic Albanianminority; (4) United Nations Administration of Kosovo (Kosovo was aneutral territory); and (5) Independent Kosovo and other minorities (Asovereign nation, separated from its motherland, Albania). If one wereto draw a spectrum of the Kosovo problem, one would imagine theAlbanians claiming the problem is part of the Greater Serbia ideal;

the Serbs, blaming the Greater Albania ideal; and the internationalcommunity in the middle, realizing the Kosovo problem is part of alarger quandary theAlbanian Question.

The issue of Kosovos statehood is part of a bigger problem, theAlbanian problem. The Albanian problem also known as the AlbanianQuestion refers to the national identity of Albanians in Kosovo,Western Macedonia, Southern Montenegro, Southern Serbia (Presheva)and Northern Greece (ameria). The international community


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recognizes that it has a vested interest to protect the welfare ofindividuals and their right to exist, granting the protection ofinternational human rights. Incidents in Kosovo in both 1998 and in2004 were characterized by armed internecine violence. Sporadicviolent instances still occur in Northern Kosovo by Serbian inhabitants.

In May 2009 Kosovo Serbs attacked Kosovo Police officers in ademonstration protesting the need for Serbs to institute payment fordomestic electric usage. The Serbs demanded Belgrade supply theirelectrical needs as oppose to Kosovan private companies.

This book takes a closer look at the obstacles that theinternational community faced in reaching an agreement between thenegotiating parties during Kosovos final status talks. It examinessurvey data and empirical literature on the negotiating process, inparticular the interests of the political leaders of Kosovo and Serbia, aswell as the mediating third parties, namely the delegations from theU.N. and EU. The results suggest that the effectiveness of multilateral

diplomacy depends on the method of negotiation utilized during thediplomatic talks. Specifically, the use ofprincipled negotiation mighthave been the ideal answer to Kosovos dilemma. The change inbargaining over positions would shift the focus to efforts of creatingoptions for mutual gain for the involved parties.

The key to overcoming cooperative barriers in the negotiationprocess is to employ the technique termedprincipled negotiation.Thismethodology was developed by the Harvard Negotiation Project andthis concept has led to the development of negotiation workshops atHarvard Law School.v This technique has proven successful in disputeresolution and in multiparty negotiations. The principled negotiation

model has become increasingly popular as a negotiating tool inmanaging difficult business dialogues and in dealing with internationalconflict. These tools have been used broadly by companies andinternational diplomats to study underlying interests of the involvedparties as well as the legitimacy of the parameters of the case. Forexample, this model was employed in the 1998-2000 Ecuador borderissue; in the Iran Hostage situation; and in many instances of legalnegotiations.vi This book uses the principled negotiation model asopposed to thepositional bargaining model, because unlike the latter,it allows for compromise to be reached through cooperation regardlessof any fixed ideas or positions. More importantly it uses a mutual gain

approach to reach win-win outcomes, rather than win-lose ones inpositional bargaining.

Principled negotiation combines softnegotiation (avoid personalconflict) and hard negotiation (taking extreme positions). The newmethod discourages activities focused on analyzing what each side willor will not do; it encourages shifting focus on a win-win context wherethere are no losers at the end of the agreement.vii This kind ofendeavor emphasizes the importance of cooperation for the express


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purpose of manifesting options and proposals that serve mutual gain.Therefore, it is a win-win negotiation with no loser. In this book, thetechnique ofprincipled negotiations is applied to the Kosovo finalstatus dispute as a case study, the purpose of which is to illustratesuggested resolution of a confrontation evincing no mutual agreement.

The Kosovo case provides a good illustration to apply the win-wincooperative modality since the positional bargaining method used bythe involved parties proved fruitless.

The ethnic cleansing of ethnic Albanians by the Serb andYugoslav government sparked the engagement of the internationalcommunity in preventive diplomacy (the U.S. and NATO). Thoughlegally part of Serbia, the province of Kosovo came under UNadministration in 1999, when NATOs intervention put a halt to theSerbian and Yugoslav genocide of ethnic Albanians.

For eight years the international community attempted to usepositional bargaining techniques to solve the issue; however, this

proved unsuccessful when Ahtisaaris proposed resolution failed adefinitive U.N. Security Council agreement in 2006. The subsequentrounds of talks initiated in the summer of 2007 employed cooperationand mutual interest (too late in the game however) as the basis of thenegotiation principles, but were unsuccessful. The Kosovo casedemonstrates that soft and hard negotiated agreement methods arenot effective in obtaining an agreement. The best alternative in thiscase is principled agreement through a three-level tier approach toaccount for local, national and international interaction andcollaboration with the participants. Had this approach been employedin the first stages of the international involvement in 1999, Kosovan

leaders would not have resorted to unilateral actions.

THE UNIQUENESS OF THE KOSOVO CONFLICT

The Kosovo crisis is considered to be an extraordinary case of thefrozen conflictphenomenon. The frozen conflict concept also knownas the unacknowledged countries refers to the areas of what wasformerly the Soviet Union, namely: the Trans-Dniester in Moldova,South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh.viii Eachof these de-facto countries for years has been struggling with

unresolved territorial claims and has been denied full independence. ixHowever, Kosovo is not grouped with the other frozen conflicts and istreated as a unique case by the international community to avoid thedomino effect on the other conflicts.

According to western diplomats, the uniqueness of the Kosovocase is due to the principled differences between the post-Soviet andall other conflicts, a claim rejected by Russia which urges theinternational community to solve older statehood problems such as the


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collaboration to resolve the status issue via the U.N. Security Council;however such course proved to be futile:

Independence of Kosovo should happen without any delay.Kosovo would prefer to get it from the U.N. Security

Council,but more and more we see this will not happen [due toRussia].

Kosovos unilateral independence declaration on 17 February2008 highlights the intricacy of the international community acting inunison. There is a cogent need for the international community toutilize coordinated multilateral efforts. Further progress on Kosovoseconomy, property rights and the rights of minorities depend on thefull support of Kosovos independence by all members of theinternational community.

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THREE

RESEARCH DESIGN

MANY SCHOLARS have focused their interest in understanding theKosovo conflict via root causes of the war; aftermath of the war;involvement of the international community, particularly NATO, theUSA, the U.N. and the EU; performance of the internationalorganizations in solving the problem; and the use of international law.Little attention has been given to the diplomatic process and itsefficacy. There is lack of scholarly work on the role of the internationalcommunity in the realm of diplomacy. This book examines the role ofthe international community, but differs from previous works as itanalyzes its effectiveness in multilateral negotiations.

The Kosovo crisis, when analyzed as a case study, will help tobetter understand the core issues that have been a challenge tosuccessful negotiations. In addition it will provide a better perspective

for understanding the Albanian Question at large, concerning thewell-being of Albanians in Greece, Macedonia, Montenegro (Alb.Mali iZi) and other areas which the international community will have toconfront. Lessons learned from this case can be applied in thenegotiation phase of the multilateral diplomatic process in instanceswhere negotiations have proven very difficult almost impossible inthe Kosovo case.

This research will contribute to the current debate regarding theeffectiveness of the international community in three areas. First, it willadd new definitions to the limited existing body of literature. Secondly,it will push the debate regarding the notion of international

community arguing that it is not an ephemeral concept but a decisiveinfluence in problem-solving. Finally, it will offer a critical analysis ofsuccessful techniques of negotiations that further enhance diplomacyand strengthen multilateral cooperation.

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY


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This research was conducted to critically evaluate and examine theinterests and the needs of the involved parties in Kosovos final statusdispute. This book explores how the use of international diplomacy canidentify the different behaviors of the key parties, Kosovo and Serbia,

as well as the behaviors of the third party, the internationalcommunity. For the purpose of this case study, the internationalcommunity will include OSCE, the U.N., NATO and the EU as mainplayers. The role, the efficiency and the challenges of the internationalcommunity are also discussed in this study. The publishing of thisresearch is likely to benefit the primary actors, Kosovo and Serbia, aswell as the international community players. Specifically this studyhelps the reader obtain a clearer understanding on manifestingsolutions that will give the best outcome to all sides through theprincipled negotiation strategy based on mutual interests.

Thesis Statement

My aim in this scientific study is to address the following researchquestions:

1. Why is there still no agreement between the leaders of Kosovoand Serbia regarding Kosovos statehood?

2. What is the nature of the relationship between the parties?

3. What role did the international community play in the final statustalks?

4. What are the pros and cons of using principled negotiation as anegotiation strategy in the case of Kosovo?

The Method

The case study of the descriptive research method was used for thisanalysis. Specifically, this research serves as a descriptive and an

interpretive analysis. The descriptive study is used to describe,emphasize and understand the nature of the involvement of the mainplayers and the conditions of the relationships between the conflictingparties and the third parties. The interpretive study is used to interpretthe effectiveness of international diplomacy in an effort toconceptualize the Kosovo status negotiation process and to theorizeabout the strategies used by the main players.


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Gathering and Analyzing Data

I chose to use published documents and interviews. The primary datawere obtained from the published documents and scholarly literature

that were relevant to the Kosovo status diplomatic process. I haveformulated two important timelines: Security Council Actions inKosovo, 1993-2007 and Kosovo Status Talks: 1989-2007. Bothtimelines were established for the express purpose of identifyingimportant historical events and key meeting dates that can help thereader understand what the sequence of events suggest about thenegotiation process for the final status talks of Kosovo.

The secondary data were derived from the answers of theparticipants during the interview process of my research studyconducted in Prishtina, Kosovo from 05-19 April 2007. The purpose ofthe trip was to collect useful information in support of the primary

documents used in this study that would help to better understand therole of the key players and public officials who have an interest in theend result of Kosovos status.

Specifically, the meetings were organized in a face-to-faceinterview format with open-ended questions. To determine theintentions of the agency, questions were asked about purpose andgoals. To determine the objectives, questions were asked aboutactions taken, current plans and future involvements in the statusprocess. To assess the end result, questions were asked about theproposed alternatives regarding the final status. To address theperceived emotions of the main players regarding the influence of the

third party, questions were asked about the nature of the relationshipwith the other participants.

Case Study Participants

A total of 30 individuals were asked to participate. Considerations weregiven to public officials in Kosovo, mainly in the city of Prishtina, wherethe research was conducted. I did not consider choosing a largesample nor integrating the public opinion of the citizens since suchdata is available through two referendums conducted by Kosovo and

Serbia. In addition, photos are included in support of the descriptiveand interpretive method as secondary data.

The Model

This research analyzes the Kosovo status negotiation process. It alsodiscusses various negotiation strategies such as Track I, Track II, Multi-


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Track and positional bargaining process. However, emphasis is given tothe principled negotiation model, developed by Fisher and Ury.xiii Themodel of positional bargaining and principled negotiation was used inthe Kosovo diplomatic negotiations. Positional bargaining was appliedchiefly during U.N. efforts unfortunately culminating in no resolution by

summer 2007. Following this failed method, the negotiators appliedthe model of principled negotiation in a new round of talks of 120 days.However, it too ended in November 2007 with no resolution and withlittle progress made on identifying mutual interests.

I argue that the positional bargaining technique was the wrongmethod for the Kosovo case because it limited the number of optionsand increased the likelihood for the adversaries to disagree. Theprincipled agreement model is the best alternative to the Kosovo caseand should have been applied in the initial phases of the negotiationsin 2005 not as a last resort. I apply the principled negotiation modeldeveloped by Fisher and Ury in the Kosovo case, using the four-step

strategy (people, interests, options and criteria) as the main variablesto analyze the efficiency of the negotiations and the challenges of theinternational community in this process.

I contribute to Fisher and Urys model of principled negotiationby adding two new variables: relationships and collaboration. In thenew model that I propose called The Three-level Principled Negotiation,I employ it under the assumption that both relationships andcollaboration occur on a multi-level scale. The dynamics of my modelare illustrated in Figure 4 and Table 1.2. The new model strengthensFisher and Urys model because it gives answers to crisis managementand cases that are onerous to resolve. By using the four-step strategy

of principled negotiation and by incorporating the two variables that Ioffer, the case study of the status of Kosovo will have a detailedanalysis of all contributing factors important for attaining successfulagreement.

The three-level principled model identifies hidden interactions,influences and pressures that are not clear in Fisher and Urys model,such as those happening within the third party players. The model ofFisher and Ury focuses mainly on the conflict party, assuming that thethird or intermediary part has an influential meditating role. I arguethat the actions of members within the third party can imposedifficulties on the negotiation process unless the issues of collaboration

and interactions are addressed. Therefore, my three-level principledmodel looks at these relationships at the local, national andinternational level, without excluding the behaviors of the conflictingparties.

The Scope of the Book


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Talks involving the international community (in particular the UnitedNations) regarding the status of Kosovo were launched in early 1990.Immediately after the conflict escalated to war in 1998, the U.N.,OSCE, NATO and the U.S.A. initiated the discussion regarding theprotection of ethnic Albanians from ethnic cleansing by the Serb and

Yugoslav forces. Talks involving Kosovo and Serbia regarding thestatus negotiation process were launched in March 2005, after a oneyear hiatus due to the 2004 violence against the Serb minority inKosovo by ethnic Albanians.

Constructing a model a model via multilateral diplomacy, severalnegotiation strategies were examined. However, my focus was themodel ofprincipled negotiation through the three-level game conceptstrategy applicable to final status talks. The trio of mediators, namely,the U.S.A., Russia and the EU reported back to the U.N. SecurityCouncil in 10 December 2007 with no resolution. As many countriesconsider supporting Kosovos unilateral independence declaration of

17 February 2008, the book aims to contribute to the debate byproviding useful arguments on the developments of multilateraldiplomacy.

Chapter Four will describe the Kosovo crisis. In this chapter I willdescribe the Albanian and the Serbian view regarding the conflictgiving a historical overview. In addition, the chapter will identify theconflicting issues that in my judgment formed a difficult relationship,limiting collaboration among participants for the status talks. I will alsodescribe the opening moves of each participant, including the twoadversarial parties, Kosovo and Serbia, as well as the third party actingas the mediator, the international community.

In Chapters Three through Five, I will expand on the definitions ofinternational community and the strategies of diplomatic negotiations,beginning with participation and collaboration during the negotiationphase. In Chapter Four I will present the methods of negotiation,namely Track I, Track II, Multi-track, positional bargaining andprincipled negotiation. I will describe the characteristics of each modelexplaining how international negotiation has developed to incorporateall levels of influence, arguing that principled negotiation is the bestmodel to reach effective win/win outcomes in negotiated agreement.Chapter Five focuses on the principled negotiation model proposed byRoger Fisher and William Ury of the Harvard Negotiation Project,

discussing the advantages and limitations of the model. Afterchallenging the principled negotiation model, I will offer my own modelproposing to use a three-level game concept approach to principlednegotiation, including interactions amongst all levels of collaboration.

Chapter Six is a case study focusing on the negotiation processof the Kosovo status talks. This chapter will examine primary andsecondary data relevant to the negotiation process during all thestages of negotiation. The discussion section will analyze the role of


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the international community and will apply the principles of theproposed three-level system approach. Chapter Seven discusses themulti-level interactions. Chapter Eight describes experiences during mytrip to Kosovo, in April 2007, focusing on the cities of Mitrovica, Prizrenand Prishtina. Finally, Chapter Nine will conclude this research on

multilateral diplomatic negotiations.

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FOUR

THE KOSOVO CONFLICT

THERE ARE TWO OPPOSING VIEWS of history that shape currentAlbanian and Serbian perceptions regarding the Kosovo conflict:

The Albanian view is that Kosovo is the Albanian heartland. Sinceas early as 1300 BC the present day Kosovo (Dardania) belonged toIliria, the most ancient state of Albania. Slavic groups, including Serbs,settled in later, around the sixth century AD. Kosovo was the center ofattraction during the Roman, Byzantine and Ottoman Empires, eachincorporating Kosovo into its realm. During the Turkish rule (1878)Albania was separated into four vilayets: Kosovo, Shkodr, Manastir

and Yanin.

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At the end of World War I, Kosovo became part of theKingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, later forming Yugoslavia.Despite the oppression of foreign occupation, Albanians found pride intheir culture and regard Kosovo as the homeland of ancient Dardania.

The Serbian view is that Kosovo is holy soil and the cradle ofSerbian history. A decisive date in Serbian history is the epic Battle of1389, fought in Kosovo Polje(the plain of Kosovo - field of the blackbirds). Prince Lazar Hrebeljanovic of Serbia joined forces with Albania,Bulgaria, Bosnia, and Montenegro to fight against the Ottomanoppressors. Despite the loss, this date is celebrated in Serbian traditionto remember the nobles who fell at the battlefield. The Balkan wars of

1912-1913 weakened Turkey and it withdrew from the territories. In1918 the rise of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom brought an end to theOttomans. During WWII, the Yugoslav federation was composed of sixrepublics, including: Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina,Macedonia and Montenegro and two autonomous regions, namelySerbia, Vojvodina (northern Serbia) and Kosovo-and-Metohija (Kosovo).


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Map 3: The Ethnic Composition of Kosovo (2005)xv

Country: KosovoArea: 10,908 km2 Capital: PrishtinaPopulation: 2.1 million (est. 2007) Language: Albanian,Serbian, EnglishEthnic Composition: 92% Albanian, 5.3% Serbs, 2.7% other (est.

2007).President: Fatmir Sejdiu (2006 - present).Prime Minister: Hashim Thaci (January 2008 - present).Political status: Prior to Kosovos unilateral declaration ofindependence on 17 February 2008, Kosovo was administered byUNMIK (1999-2008) and the Provisional Institutions of Self Government(PISG), the government and an assembly of 120 members (2002-currently), established by UNSCR 1244 (1999).xvi


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THE CONFLICT PARTIES AND THE ISSUES

The backing of the U.N. to ameliorate extant conditions, particularly

the efforts of Hans Haekkurup, the Special Representative of theSecretary-General and head of the U.N. Interim Administration Missionin Kosovo in 2001, accelerated the interests of both Kosovo and Serbiato collaborate in creating a multi-ethnic society in Kosovo. However,the violent events that usurped the legitimacy of the internationalcommunity in 2004 and 2009 caught NATO and UNMIK by surprise; inreality they reflected the hostile relationship between the ethnicAlbanians and the Serbs.

Kosovo:

Ancient regional ethnic and religious differences increaseddramatically in the late nineteenth century concomitant with thespreading influence of nascent nationalistic and independencemovements. When Milosevic revoked Kosovos autonomy in 1989ethnic Albanians had already desired complete independence. The keyissue is that ninety-two percent of the ethnic Albanian majority of theprovince claim that they have been an oppressed minority withinSerbia and desire self-determination.xvii In the spring of 1998 seriousfighting broke out in Kosovo involving Serbian troops and Yugoslavforces against ethnic Albanians. Kosovo opposed provincial autonomy

fearing Serbian oppression. Albanian leaders believe this wouldundermine Kosovos territorial integrity as an Albanian land, repletewith a rich history and culture and vital to ethnic Albanians. They alsocharge the Serbs with committing ethnic cleansing in the disputedterritory, which led to bitter feelings between the two sides. The ethnicAlbanians in Kosovo felt poorly represented and unprotected and thuswanted independence. The U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244 in1999 granted authority to UNMIK to administer Kosovo. Though underthe U.N. protectorate, Kosovo legally remained part of Serbia.Following the unsuccessful December 2007 U.N. Security Council finalstatus deadline, Kosovo unilaterally declared independence.

Serbia:

According to a 2007 OSCE estimate, the minorities in Kosovo accountfor eight percent of the total population including only about fivepercent Kosovo Serbs and three percent other minorities such asRoma, Bosniaks, Turks, etc. The Kosovo Serbs claim that they are an


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oppressed minority within Kosovo and want protection from theAlbanians.xviii Serbs consider Kosovo, particularly the northern part, ashaving great historical importance to the motherland because ofcenturies old religious sites. The Serbians felt that Kosovo wasculturally important within Serbia, and wanted to preserve Yugoslavia

as a whole. They felt that Yugoslavia was part of an historic empirethat needed to be preserved.xix Serbia refuses independence forKosovo and claims that it will not recognize the unilateral declarationof independence of 17 February 2008.

At its heart, the Kosovo-Serbia conflict is a struggle betweenAlbanian and Serbian nationalism. Since WWI both sides have foughtover two major issues: ethnic and religious identity. The ethnicdifferences that fueled the conflict involve ethnic Albanians who are ofIllyrian origin and Serbs of Slavic origin. The religious frictions involvethe Serbs who are followers of the Serbian Orthodox Church and ethnicAlbanians who are mainly followers of Islam.xx These two aspects have

been the dominant identifying differences, emphasized by the mediaand the outside players. However, many fail to realize that economicgain and power expansion are predominant subliminal causes of mostinternational conflicts, including that of Kosovo. For instance, theintentions of the Ottoman Empire for territorial gain and control inEurope resulted in the initial partition of Ethnic Albania. The BigPowers aim for power and economic advancement in Europe splitAlbania in 1912 amongst Greece, former Yugoslavia, Macedonia andMontenegro. This found Albania the only country in the worldsurrounded by ethnic territory and its own indigenous people, excludedby the current formation of the Albanian border. Had the international

community left the Albanian borders to its original ethnic demarcation,today there would not be crisis of Albanians in Kosovo, Serbia, Greece,Macedonia and Montenegro.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CONFLICT PARTIES

In medieval times ethnic Albanians and Serbs fought together as alliesin the Battles of Kosovo of 1389, 1448 and 1689 against the commonenemy, the Ottomans. In fact, their relationship was amicable, unitingto stop the advancements of the Ottoman armies. Prince Lazar, ruler

of northern Serbia and Gjergj Kastriot Sknderbeu, leader of theAlbanians formed alliances together with other Balkan allies. Duringthe late nineteenth century the relationship between Albanians andSerbs was strained with the rise of tensions between the twocommunities, due to the birth of nationalistic and independencemovements.

The period from 1945 through 1966 witnessed Albanians subjectto both Serb aggression and Titos Yugoslav regime countering


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Albanian nationalistic movements. Throughout the twentieth centurytensions between the Albanian and Serb communities worsened. Inparticular, Albanians were concerned with the mistreatment of theirpopulation, including hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians beingarrested, interrogated and expelled from educational institutions and

their jobs. Milosevic, former president of Serbia, continued repressionagainst ethnic Albanians, leaving behind a legacy of genocidal ethniccleansing. The relationship between Kosovo and Serbia escalated towar in 1998-1999 with the mass-expulsion strategy of Serbian andYugoslav forces using terror to drive ethnic Albanians out of theirhomeland.

Security problems present another parameter in the relationshipbetween Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo. The Albanians expressinsecurity due to their experience of misconduct; the Serbs feelvulnerable following the violent events of 2004. The security issue is amajor concern in areas where there are mixed Albanian and Serbian

communities. For instance, in Mitrovica, the city is divided with theSerbian community in North Mitrovica and the Albanian community inSouth Mitrovica. Mitrovica is an example of ethnic division and ethnicclashes highlighting the tensions between the two communities.

Albanians find it difficult to trust the Serbian government. AfterMilosevic retracted the special autonomous status of Kosovo withinSerbia, ethnic Albanians boycotted the Serbian political institutions. Inlieu, they formed a parallel state to the Serbian one and declaredKosovo independent on 2 July 1990. Later, in 1992 Kosovosparliament held an unofficial referendum observed by internationalorganizations. However the ninety-eight percent vote to pro-

independence for Kosovo (out of an eighty percent voter turnout) wasnot recognized by the international community, with the exception ofAlbania.

The Serbs, for their part cannot trust the government of a statethey believe does not exist, recognizing Serbia, not Kosovo as theirprimary authority. They perceive Kosovos government as corrupt andintolerant of minorities. In the elections of 17 November 2007 lessthan one percent of the Serbs voted, marking a successful Serbboycott of the parliamentary and local elections.xxi The Serbiancommunity is dissatisfied with Kosovos declaration of unilateraldeclaration of independence in February 2008 as well as the poor

economic and security conditions in the area. In the referendum ofOctober 2006 Serbia approved a new constitution, reinforcing Serbiasclaim over Kosovo with a narrow margin of approval: 51.4 percentapproval out of the 53.66 percent voter turnout.xxii Even though Serbiacelebrated this law as a victory, ethnic Albanians did not participate inthe elections and saw such measures as an act of aggression.xxiii


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THE GLOBAL PLAYERS

The main global players in the mediation between Kosovo and Serbiaare: the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE),the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United Nations(U.N.) and the European Union (EU). For the purpose of this book, theglobal players will be considered as one entity forming theinternational community. The key issue of the international

community is the legitimacy of the independence declaration ofKosovo. The international community did not recognize Kosovos self-declared independence in 1990. During the UNMIK administration(1999-2008), the international community legally recognized Serbiassovereignty; however Kosovo remained under the U.N. umbrella due tothe political and territorial dispute between Kosovo and Serbia. Duringthis time frame, the international community showed commitment toprovide support to the diplomatic negotiation process. Thenegotiations failed, resulting in the unilateral declaration ofindependence by the Albanian leaders in February 2008. Thelegitimacy of Kosovos independence depends on the full support of all

the Member States of the international community.

OSCE

OSCE has sent three missions (1992, 1998, 1999) to Kosovo toencourage a peaceful, negotiated resolution to the Kosovo-Serbianconflict. The first mission ever sent by OSCE (then CSCE, theConference on Security and Co-operation in Europe) was the CSCEMission of Long Duration. The mission was established in September1992 covering Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina in the former Federal

Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). The role of OSCE wasto promote stability and to counteract the risk of violence in thethree regions using preventive diplomacy.xxiv

Relationships between the international community and Serbiastrained when Serbia (then Serbia-Montenegro, the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia) denied extending the mandate of the mission (valid for oneyear) and refused to allow CSCE to continue its diplomatic activities.The U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 855 (1993) and called on


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Serbia to recognize the great importance to the work of the CSCEmissions and to the continued ability of the international community tomonitor the situation in Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina.xxv CSCEexpressed concerns regarding human rights, freedom of media, andfree elections particularly in Kosovo and recommended action to be

taken to address the concerns.It wasnt until a few years later when President Milosevic signedthe October Agreement (16 Oct. 1998) in accordance with the OSCE toestablish a second mission, known as the Kosovo Verification Mission(KVM). The U.N. Security Council adopted Resolutions 1160 and 1199in support of the OSCE mission, calling on Serbia and Yugoslavia toverify the cease-fire, monitor movement of forces and promotehuman rights and democracy-building.xxvi According to OSCE, the KVMmission (Oct. 1998 to March 1999) proved to be both the largest andmost challenging endeavor in their history of trying to prevent conflictsand restoring stability.xxvii OSCE was limited due to the increased

violence and instability in Kosovo and was forced to withdraw in March1999.The third OSCE mission authorized by the U.N. was established

on 1 July 1999 led by Ambassador Tim Guldimann of Switzerland. Itserved as one of the pillars of UNMIK (the United Nations InterimAdministration Mission in Kosovo). The mission was established for thepurpose of promoting human rights and assisting in buildingdemocratic institutions in Kosovo, as a supporting element ofUNMIK.xxviii This mission is an example of cooperation and multi-lateralefforts of the international community coming together in the peace-keeping process in Kosovo. OSCE worked closely with the UNHCR, the

UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, EU and KFOR to maintainsecurity, rule of law and to promote human rights.

NATO

US and NATO in 1998 ordered the president of Yugoslavia to completenegotiations within the framework as outlined by the OSCE and theU.N. Concurrently, NATO Air Verification Mission over Kosovo (1998)was established in addition to the OSCE Verification Mission in Kosovourging Yugoslavia, to end the crisis and to come to a negotiated

solution to the Kosovo problem.xxix NATO was successful in reaching anagreement with Yugoslavia in establishing the missions but Yugoslaviafailed to comply with the agreement. NATO engaged in an Air Strikecampaign forcing Serb and Yugoslav forces to withdraw. On June 1999NATO deployed the Kosovo Peace Keeping Force (KFOR).

United Nations


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The United Nations involvement in Kosovo commenced by passing fiveSecurity Council resolutions and by establishing two missions.xxx Thefirst U.N. mission UNMIK was authorized under the Security CouncilResolution 1244 (1999). The Secretary-General granted substantial

autonomy to the province of Kosovo by establishing an interim civilianadministration led by the United Nations. The functions of UNMIK asspecified in SCR 1244 included the following tasks:

(1)to perform basic civilian administrative functions;(2)to promote the establishment of substantial autonomy and

self-government in Kosovo;(3)to facilitate a political process to determine Kosovo's future

status;

(4)to coordinate humanitarian and disaster relief of allinternational agencies;(5)to support the reconstruction of key infrastructure;(6)to maintain civil law and order;(7)to promote human rights; and(8) to assure the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and

displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo.xxxi

The U.N. was successful in the emergency phase and the post-warreconstruction phase in Kosovo in rebuilding the democratic

institutions. However, it was unsuccessful in passing a new resolutionin 2007 to replace the expired mandate of the SCR 1244. Russia, a keypermanent member of U.N,, divided the international community bythreatening to block the new U.N. resolution by using its veto power.Additionally Russia turned down four subsequent proposals drafted bythe U.N. Therefore, the Security Council has failed to pass a newresolution. In this context, the U.N. has a limited influential role, sinceit was unable to resolve the final status issue of Kosovo, failing toreach an agreement between Kosovo and Serbia. The US has stepped inand emerged as a key actor. The U.S. became the driving force of theinternational community, leading its members towards multilateral

diplomacy, in collaboration with the EU, advising both Kosovo andSerbia to compromise.

Another key development of Security Council action includes theapproval of the Fact Finding Mission in Kosovo and Serbia, proposed byRussia. The mission took place from April 25-29, 2007 under theleadership of Ambassador Johan Verbeke of Belgium.xxxii The purpose ofthe mission was to collect first-hand information in Belgrade andKosovo and to determine the progress in Kosovo. Ambassador Verbeke


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visited Belgrade, Prishtina and Mitrovica and stopped in Brussels andVienna to meet with the EU and NATO representatives. The Kosovanssaw the mission as a Russian pretext to stall independence.

The United Nations took the leading role in providing diplomaticsupport during the negotiation status talks. For instance, the U.N.

provided full support to the Troika mediation group. Troika is amediation effort, with representation from the E.U., the RussianFederation and the United States. The U.N. also used the ContactGroup to be involved in the direct talks between the Kosovan andSerbian delegation in preparing the agenda, the venue and thedecisions for the Security Council.xxxiii

In March 2007, UN envoy Marti Ahtisaari proposed the plan forinternationally supervised independence for Kosovo. United Statessupported the proposal, but Russia, Serbias ally, opposed it. The newround of negations brought Kosovans and Serbian political leaders inface-to-face talks for the first time in New York, on September 28,

2007. The meeting was overseen by the Contact Group Troika,comprising Russia, the EU, and the United States for the expresspurpose of initiating shuttle diplomacy between Prishtina (Kosovo) andBelgrade (Serbia). Prior to the talks, Troika met with the Kosovo UnityTeam on 11-12 August 2007, and with the Serbian government on 10August 2007, to obtain their research views. Albanian and Serbiandelegations did not reach a mutually accepted compromise.

The UN imposed a 10 December 2007 deadline for thecompletion of talks. Some Western leaders feared that pressure of theDecember deadline, the unilateral declaration of Kosovo or the threatof Serbian force, could lead to fresh bloodshed in the region. In

addition, Kosovo and Serbia held very serious positions in the solutionto the status question. Kosovo will not discuss anything butindependence; Serbia will discuss anything but independence. Serbiaproposed substantial autonomy or a state within a state solution,following the Hong Kong Model, which offers Kosovo 95% sovereignty,retained borders, human rights protection, but defense and foreignaffairs policymaking are denied. This status would last for severaldecades, and decisive final talks would come later, with the agreementof U.N., Belgrade, and Prishtina. Kosovo rejected this proposal. Noagreement was reached by the UN December deadline. The Kosovanshave unilaterally declared Kosovo independent in 17 February 2008.

European Union

The EU has undertaken the dominant role in providing assistanceand international civilian missions to Kosovo. EU has taken amediating role in status talks with the U.N., US and Russia. During thestatus talks, the EU expressed that, if necessary, a possible Kosovo


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Conference could take place in November or December, in addition tothe diplomatic talks. The conference-style meeting would prove usefulto focus on the status situation, if the negotiation parties have notreached any agreement through the shuttle diplomacy and mediationof the Contact Group. Russia has voiced that it opposes any deadlines

for future status, and is doing everything possible to stall thediplomatic progress headed towards status issue. The US has publiclystated it will recognize Kosovos independence if they declareunilateral independence after the 10 December deadline, which Russiainterprets as an artificial one. There is no indication that the positionsof Kosovo and Belgrade will change. There is obviously a dire need tochange the character of the negotiations.

Table 2.1: UN Security Council Actions in Kosovo Timeline:1993-200925 May 1993 SCR 827 to gather information regarding violence in Kosovo.

23 Sept. 1998 SCR 1199 demanding all parties to seize fire in Kosovo.

31 March 1998: SCR 1160 calls upon open dialogue between Kosovo andSerbia

and offers the Contact Group to facilitate the talks.

24 Oct. 1998: SCR 1203 in support of NATO and OSCE missions.

10 June 1999: Established UN mission UNMIK under Resolution 1244.

1999 to Jan 2001: Dr. Bernard Kouchner (France) served as head of UNMIK.

January 2000: Joint Interim Administrative Departments were created.

October 2000: Local elections took place in 30 municipalities of Kosovo.

Feb 01 to Dec 2001: Mr. Hans Haekkerup(Denmark) served as the secondSRSG.

May 2001: Adoption of the New Constitutional Framework.

June 2000: Marked the end of the Emergency Phase of Reconstructionsince

humanitarian assistance led by the UNHCR was successful.

May 2001: Shift to the next phase ofSubstantial Phase of Reconstruction.New four pillars were established in the operational frameworkof UNMIK in the areas of police, justice, economy, civiladministration and building democracy.

November 2001: Monitored the Kosovos wide Elections that took place.

Jan 02 to July 2003: Mr. Michael Steiner (Germany) served as third SRSG.
http://www.unmikonline.org/srsg/formersrsg.htmhttp://www.unmikonline.org/srsg/formersrsg2.htmhttp://www.unmikonline.org/srsg/formersrsg3.htmhttp://www.unmikonline.org/srsg/formersrsg.htmhttp://www.unmikonline.org/srsg/formersrsg2.htmhttp://www.unmikonline.org/srsg/formersrsg3.htm


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Aug 03 to June 2004: Mr. Harri Holkeri (Finland) served as fourth SRSG

Aug 04 to June 2006: Mr.Sren Jessen-Petersen (Denmark) served as the fifthSRSG

April 13 2006: Security Council approved to send a fact finding missionto

Kosovo and Serbia under the request of Russia.

Aug 2006 - 2007: Mr.Joachim Rcker (Germany) served as the sixth SRSG.

November 2007: Monitoring of the Parliamentary and local elections in Kosovo.

June 2008-present: Mr. Lamberto Zannier (Italy) serves as the current SRSG.Source: Ermira Babamusta, Kosovo Status Talks, A Case Study on InternationalNegotiations, (MA thesis, New York: Long Island University, 2007). This timeline wascreated by using the U.N. Security Council Resolutions and Secretary GeneralStatements.

The answer is principled negotiation where no side looks bad orappears to have a better deal. If employed correctly the outcome willbe a win-win situation. The group dynamics call for a shifting ofnegotiation change from bargaining over positions, to highlightingissues concerning four main principles: people, interest, options andcriteria. This model emphasizes finding options with mutual gains thatwould satisfy both sides. This alternative offers a potential solution tosituations where agreement cannot be reached.

NOTES
http://www.unmikonline.org/srsg/formersrsg4.htmhttp://www.unmikonline.org/srsg/srsg.htmhttp://www.unmikonline.org/srsg/index.htmhttp://www.unmikonline.org/srsg/formersrsg4.htmhttp://www.unmikonline.org/srsg/srsg.htmhttp://www.unmikonline.org/srsg/index.htm


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Principled Negotiation Talks

The negotiation team from the Harvard Negotiation Project,including Roger Fisher, William Ury and later Bruce Patton opposed thefixed-pie approach of the negotiating theory. The group proposed a

new theory in conflict resolution called Getting to Yes theory. TheHarvard Negotiation Project contributed to the theory of negotiationsand conflict resolution methods by developing a new model, called theprincipled negotiation model. The principled negotiations modeloutlined key principles applicable to all levels of individual business orinternational relations. Getting to Yes offered a step-by-step strategyto the negotiation process for the purpose of reaching a mutuallyacceptable agreement where all parties reach win-win negotiation.The four key principles emphasized in the straightforward method ofprincipled negotiations are:

Separate the people from the problem; Focus on interests, not positions; Invent options for mutual gain and Insist on using objective criteria. 1

In understanding the people problem, Fisher and Ury suggestedthat perception, emotion and communication are three key factors thatinfluence the problem. Conflicting interests exist if there are noaccurate perceptions, clear communication or appropriate emotions.2

To avoid misunderstandings, the parties should improvecommunication.

For an astute solution, Fisher and Ury recommend emphasis onthe other parties interests to better identify the full scope of theproblem. In conflicting situations reconciling interests rather thancompromising between the positions maximizes mutual alternatives.3

When considering mutual gain, parties must work together to createoptions that will satisfy both parties and avoid the fixed-pie situationswhere it is either/or either I get what is in dispute or you do.4 Otherobstacles include premature judgment, single answer solutions, andthe view that solving the problem is their problem. In the final talksphase Fisher and Ury recommend using an objective criteria.

In the Kosovo case the negotiators initially employed the

positional bargaining model. Specifically, two years of intensivepositional negotiations ending with Ahtisaaris failed plan in July 2007were unsuccessful due to the hard positional bargaining methods. Hadthe principled negotiations model been introduced from the inception

1 Fisher et al., Getting to Yes, 15.2 Fisher et al., Getting to Yes, 21.3 Fisher et al., Getting to Yes, 42.4 Fisher et al., Getting to Yes, 59.


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perhaps a more compliant outcome would have ensued. A principlednegotiation model was applied in Kosovo only at the so-called last-ditch talks of the trio of mediators from the Troika group. The 120days of intense principled negations focused on interest and mutualgains; it terminated with no compromise at the end of November 2007.

Chapter 5: Principled Negotiation Model in Practice

Principled agreement can be an effective resolution approach ifthe goal is to reach an outcome based on the principle of maintainingpositive relations and fair procedures. Fisher and Ury emphasizedapplying the four principles of Getting to Yes model to attainsuccessful agreement. Separating people from the problem allows forthe negotiators to focus on the people and understand their emotions.

Perception and emotion should be addressed about yourself and notabout them to avoid blaming the other party for your problems forthe sake of maintaining friendly relations.5 Problems are defined bythe manner interests are expressed in the proposed alternatives.Therefore, for better outcomes, Fisher and Ury recommend to focus oninterests, not positions, in asking questions such Why, Why Notand But to understand the concrete concerns, desires and fears ofthe party.

The model developed by Fisher and Ury is ideal not just for theKosovo case but for all cases requiring a conflict resolution. This modelhas been used on domestic, business and international negotiations

and has been successful in reaching mutually acceptable agreements.The fact that the model is based on mutual gain and understands theinterests of the conflicting parties enables the negotiation to proceedmore propitiously. The four steps of the model coincide with reachingdesired outcomes in win-win situations. No other method developedprior to the contribution of Fisher and Ury allowed for a more effectiveway for negotiators to reach a successful agreement. The followingtable outlines the differences between the game of positionalbargaining and principled negotiations. Fisher and Ury concluded thatchoosing the principled negotiation game offers realistic objectives andeffective outcomes.

5 Fisher et al., Getting to Yes, (1991).


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Table 5.1: Contrasts between Positional Bargaining and PrincipledNegotiation

Problem

Positional Bargaining: Which GameShould you Play?

Soft HardParticipants are Participants are

friends. adversaries.

The Goal is The Goal isagreement. victory.

Make concessions to Demand concessionscultivate the as a condition of

relationships. the friendship.Be soft on the Be hard on the

people and the problem and the

problem people.

Trust others. Distrust others.

Change your Dig in to your position

position easily.

Make offers Make threats

Disclose your Mislead as to your

bottom line. bottom line.

Accept one-sided Demand one-sided

losses to reach gains as the priceagreement. of agreement.

Search for single Search for the single

Answer, the one answer, the oneThey will accept you will accept.

Insist on agreement Insist on your position.

Try to avoid a Try to win a contest of

a contest of will. will.

Yield to pressure. Apply pressure.

Solution

Change the Game-Negotiate on the Merits

Principled

Participants are

problem-solvers.

The Goal is a wise outcomereached efficiently and

amicably.

Separate the people from

the problem.

Be soft on the peoplehard on the problem.

Proceed independent of trust.

Focus on interests,not positions.

Explore interests.

avoid having a bottom

line

Invent options for

mutual gain.

Develop multiple options

to choose from; decidelater.

Insist on using objective

criteria.

Try to reach a result

based on standardsindependent of will.

Reason and be open toreason; yield to principle

not pressure.


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Source: Roger Fisher, William Ury, and (2nd ed.), Bruce Patton, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement

Without Giving In. (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1992), p. 13.

Fisher and Ury identified three main phases of the principlednegotiation process the analysis phase, the planning stage and thediscussion stage.6 The analysis phase determines the nature of thesituation. During this phase, the negotiators gather information,consider the problems and think about identifying possible challengessuch as perceptions, emotions, interest and the relationships betweenthe adversarial parties. This will help the negotiators to identify thecriteria that will be the basis for the agreement. According to Fisher,interests are defined in terms of the underlying positions of the party,meaning the needs, concerns, desires hopes and fears. Fisher and Uryrecommended that this is the best scenario as it satisfies the interestsof both parties otherwise referred to as mutual interests.

The planning stage tackles all elements of the problemseparately. This is done for the purpose of generating ideas andmaking decisions on how to best handle the situation. During thisstage, the negotiators invent options according to the priorities of theknown interests and objectives of the parties. Fisher defines optionsas the full range of possibilities which parties might consider whenreaching an agreement.7 The options include the possibilities on thetable and those that might be put on the table for the parties todecide on. Fisher recommended that it is best if all options are on thetable. If there are many options then the party should decide tochoose the best options rather than lesser ones which might causeproblems.

Finally, the discussion stage involves the communications

between the parties, discussing the same elements. Both parties canjointly generate options that serve their best interests. In cases wherean agreement cannot be reached, each party will develop alternativesthat it is willing to walk-away with, without achieving the completegoals of the party. Roger Fisher refers to this situation as BATNAmeaning the Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement. BATNA isthe course of action taken by the negotiating party which is notsatisfied with the course of diplomatic talks and projected outcome ofthe negotiation process.8

Fisher and Ury recommend that in difficult negotiations wherethere is a deadlock, or no win-win solutions are likely to be achieved,

then the negotiating party would develop its own BATNA. In the caseof Kosova, the BATNA would be the declaration of unilateralindependence shortly after the December 10, 2007 deadline. From arealistic perspective, a party would not accept any solution that is notas good as its own BATNA to protect its interests. In choosing the best6 Fisher et al., Getting to Yes, 127 Fisher et al., Getting to Yes, 128 Fisher et al., Getting to Yes, 105.


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alternative in negotiations, the party has to first evaluate its positionsand the interests, and then choose the best option that satisfies allalternatives of the party.

Advantages of Principled Negotiation talks

The model provides the best negotiation techniques based onthe four principles the people, interests, mutual gain and objectivecriteria to achieve effective win-win situations. To reach anagreement that is mutually acceptable and satisfactory to both parties,parties must not feel they are locked in a win-lose situation. Theprincipled agreement solution is beneficial to both conflicting partiesbecause it provides for win-win solutions (unlike the positionalbargaining method) and amicable relations between the adversaryparties.9

Another advantage to using this model is the use of fair criteria.

According to Fisher and Ury wise and efficient agreements result only ifthere are objective criteria. For example, the mediating party shouldmandate the use of fair procedures and standards. One party willoccasionally use pressure to cause the other to deduce their intentionsfrom fear. However, it is wise to never yield to pressure to avoidvictimization.10 Therefore there should be fairness and objectivity.Having the international community as a third mediating party enabledthe employment of the fair standards in the Kosovo status talks.

Generating additional options increases the chances of theconflicting parties to reach agreements and to move towardcollaborative approaches to a satisfactory conflict resolution. In the

case of Kosovo, during positional bargaining the parties were limitedwith few options, either independence or separation or single answersolutions such as supervised independence. Later, the parties focusedon mutual concerns such as the minority issue.Limitations of Principled Negotiation talks

The fact that principled negotiations applied in the Kosovo casefailed suggests that there are limitations to the model. Among theselimitations are concerns such as cooperation, framework flexibility andthe interest of the intermediate players at the international level.Participants face constraints that make it difficult to accomplish thegoals set out by principled negotiations. One concern is that even after

recognizing and understanding the interests of the involved parties, insensitive cases, the parties tend to hold competing interests. This putsa limit on the cooperation amongst the participants. In Kosovo, ratherthan reaching an end result suitable to both parties, the outcome hasbeen heightened tension and an uncertainty of how the conflictingparties will act after the December 10 deadline. The parties

9 Fisher et al., Getting to Yes, 14.10 Fisher et al., Getting to Yes, 142.


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maintained hard positions, with little flexibility to changing what theywill/ will not accept. Another limitation is not having adequate time forthe negotiators to address the shortcomings of the competinginterests.

More importantly, in principled negotiation talks, the common

goal of reaching reasonable outcomes is often overlooked. Having aunified vision is an ideal characteristic that drives mutual solutions andstrengthens collaboration among participants in solving a toughproblem. However, the unified vision overlooks the objectives and theinterests of the intermediaries at the international level. For instance,in the Kosovo case, during the negotiation when the SC was overseeingthe process, the UN was considered to be the international community.Therefore all members of the UN organization compromised thiscommunity. Particularly, the five permanent voting members of the SChave greater significance in the decision-making process due to theveto power, thus failing any proposed resolution if rejected by one of

the members. While the UN would be impartial to the mediationprocess, one cannot overlook the interests of the five members holdingthe vote. In this case, Russia was the only member that threatened tofail the resolution if it mentioned independence of Kosovo in support ofSerbias position. Even though Russia is not one of the conflictingparties it does represent the international community. The principlednegotiation suggests that the negotiator should look for mutualinterests where conflicting parties can find a common ground.However, the model lacks clarification on cases where negotiation hasbecome deadlocked, especially when the negotiation party (the UN)may step out of role of the negotiator (figuratively speaking) when

interests of the third party play a role in final outcome (like Russia).Therefore, the focus is no longer trying to find mutual gains betweenthe conflicting parties, but trying to find unity between the manyvoices of the UN, who should come to an agreement for the proposedresolution, before finding agreement between Kosovo and Serbia.

The model provides good information regarding the interests ofthe conflicting parties, but leaves out the third party assuming that itwill stay impartial. This might be the case if the mediating party is oneindividual, one country or one organization. But when dealing with theUN or the EU, in principle these organizations should act collectively, inpractice, however members look for their own singular interests and

relations with other states before taking any drastic decisions thatcould alter these relations. In the Kosovo case, the interests of thevarious governments involved differed.In this case the process becomes a multi-system negotiation:negotiations between the conflicting parties, negotiations between theconflicting parties and the international community and negotiationsinside the international community.


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My proposed Three-Level Principled Negotiation Model

Since principled negotiation occurs between (1) two parties or (2)the two conflicting parties plus the third party acting at the

intermediary, it is the responsibility of all players to collaborate eitherin bilateral or multilateral relations. The principled negotiation modeloffers excellent guidance in the four-step strategy in bilateral cases.However, it lacks steps for multilateral level talks, where the objectivesand interests of the third party should be evaluated in addition to thoseof the conflicting parties. The principled negotiation model does offeran insight to the collaborations that occur at the intermediary level. Inorder to illustrate such relationships, I have proposed to use thethree-level game approach for best desired negotiated outcomes.

To study the relationship between the diplomatic processes andthe international community I propose to use a multi-scale system

approach, to best measure the efficiency of the international talks.The advantage of this type of approach is in the ability to analyzeinteractions at all levels that affect the ultimate behavior of the keyactors. While the system-level approach analyzes the behavior ofstates, the relationship between each and interaction at theinternational level, the individual-level focuses on the behavior ofindividual players such as political parties or influentialrepresentatives. In addition, the domestic-level approach isconsidered when analyzing the interests and objectives of theconcerned parties, to better understand the motivations and actions ofthe states. A combination of system level, domestic level and

individual level best fits the needs of this research in providing acomplete qualitative and quantitative methodology that allows theparticipants to best address the negotiation phase.

To conceptualize the negotiation strategies, in Figure 3, I havedivided the negotiation process in two categories: (1) Getting to Yes orThe Principled Negotiation category and (2) Getting to No or ThePositional Bargaining category. In this model, principled negotiation isconsidered to be the desired strategy to reach successful negotiatedagreements. Positional bargaining category incorporates principlesthat allow for the failure of reaching agreement. The method ofprincipled negotiations is contrasted with positional bargaining using

the three-level game approach, in the international, domestic andindividual level. These efforts include practical attempts to improvecollaboration among key actors and to advance results of thenegotiation talks.

The multiple relationships that exist among actors at all levelsare vital elements that complement the model of Fisher and Uryprincipled negotiation. Often the starting point of negotiation is thecollaboration between the two conflicting parties. However, there are


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expectations on behalf of both sides, from the third mediating party, incases when bilateral diplomacy fails. Multiple relationships amongstates and international organizations are seen through realist orliberal perspectives, in terms of interests and objectives of theparticular parties. However, the functions of collaboration and

cooperation in such multilateral relations in diplomatic negotiations arebest explained through the three-level games. If collaboration withinthe third party is difficult to reach (if the third party has more than oneactor, i.e. UN), then low expectations from the conflicting parties (i.e.Kosovo and Serbia) may lead to further disputes and unrealisticexpectations. The multi-scale system approach helps the developmentof an effective model, based on the examination of issues at a fullspectrum.

As shown on Figure 3, the elements of successful negotiation areoutlined on the Getting to Yes section. The unsuccessful or Gettingto NO method is outlined in the red section. Many agreements fail

because the real issues are not clearly understood and the vision isbased on a fixed-pie solution. Only significant proposals thatenhance mutual interests and mutual gains, such as principlednegotiations, will allow for successful agreements. Negotiationexperts regularly encounter many problems during the diplomaticprocess. However, it is crucial to identify such barriers at the initialphase of negotiations, for any successful progress or to achievedesired outcomes. Problems such as to clearly understand the realissues as the root cause and basis for the negotiation and insufficienttime to clearly identify and frame the problem or issues to be resolvedand negotiatedare the biggest errors negotiators make.11

Since all members of the negotiation parties can be divided intothe Getting to Yes or Getting to No sections as illustrated in Figure 3,the determining factors in my proposed approach are interaction andcollaboration. I look at the relationship of each party at the multilaterallevel, not excluding the interactions that happen between bilateralprocesses or the pressures within the domestic level. Figure 4illustrates the interactions between each party. Each participant isillustrated as Player A, Player B, Player C and so on. Each player actson influences and pressures on three main levels: individual, domesticand international. The direction of the errors explains the direction ofinteraction and collaboration between the players. For example, each

player has the three influences/pressures based on the three-levelgame. Each player interacts with the conflicting party, outside thedomestic level, and with the third intermediary party, at theinternational level. In addition, each player has to consider theindividual forces that put pressure at local level, as well as theindividual forces within the intermediary.

11The Negotiating Problem..


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Table 5.2 illustrates the specific interactions that exist among allparties. The three-level game is applied to Fisher and Urys principlednegotiation model. I have identified the four-step strategy ofprincipled negation in the three-level game, by applying the variablesof people, interest, option and criteria to the individual, national and

international level to each participant of the negotiation.


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Table 5.2: The Dynamics of the Three-Level Principled Negotiations

The Problem

Principled Negotiation

at multi-level .

THE PARTICIPANTS

The Conflict Parties:

Player A + Player B

(ie. Kosovo, Serbia)

People -->

Interest -->

Option -->

Criteria -->

Third Party/Intermediary:

(multiplayer: Player C, D,

E+: ie. UN, EU)

People -->

Interest -->

Option -->

Criteria -->

Solution

Modify the Game-

Consider Collaboration and Interaction at the three-level game

THREE-LEVEL GAME

INDIVIDUAL NATIONAL INTERNATIONAL

Local groups, Thegovernment Thestatepolitical parties

coalitions

Personal Community Globalexperience concerns significance

Empathy Managing Co-operative

emotions power

Influence/ Willingness Broaden

pressure to resolve perspectives

INDIVIDUAL NATIONAL INTERNATIONAL

Member State Organization/

mediation efforts

Negotiation Negotiation Negotiation/Mediation

Co-operative Co-operative Mapping conflict

power power Designing options

Assertiveness Response Win/win

Source: Ermira Babamusta, Kosovo Status Talks, A Case Study on International Negotiations, (MA

thesis, Long Island University at New York, 2007).

The participants are the two conflicting parties and the third party who has therole of the intermediary or the mediator. It is important to understandwho the players are and who they represent. In addition, it isimportant to understand the different interactions and thecollaborations that occur among all participants. As illustrated inFigure 3 and on Table 5.2, Conflict Party A and Conflict Party Brepresent the country at the international level, the state at thenational level, and the various individuals at the local level. However,at the negotiation table, Conflict party A, and Conflict party B are


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individually one member or one delegation representing the interestand objectives of all the concerned groups. The third importantparticipant is the third party. In business relations, a third party mayconsist of an individual or agency. In international relations, andinternational diplomacy, in order to maintain fair criteria, power and

trust is vested in the international community. The members of theinternational community may vary depending on the internationalconflict. However, key players in previous conflicts and in the currentKosovo conflict have been the UN, the EU, NATO and OSCE.

Participant Conflict party A or B views the third party as oneentity in the process of the mediation efforts. However, the third partyin the case of UN and EU are actually composed of many members thatrepresent the interests of organization at large. It is important toanalyze the relations within the members of the internationalcommunity as well as interactions with the conflict party. Ideally, theinternational community, acting as third party, should maintain a

unified vision expressing a singular voice. However, the fact is thatthere are many other members within the third party. It is importantto analyze their interests and objectives in the representation of thevision of the organization. Frequently, depending on the complexity ofthe conflict, it is hard to maintain a unified vision within theinternational community (the intermediary) because each member ofthe intermediary has subjective interests that could possibly influencethe relationship with Conflict party A or B. So the question thenbecomes, how should the international community behave? What roledoes it have? Is the international community effective?

During the negotiation phase all parties should follow the four-

step strategy as proposed by Fisher and Ury, because it maximizesmutual gains for all parties. However, in considering the possiblecollaborations and interactions among all participants, it is importantto view the principled negotiation model through the three-level gameapproach. This approach identifies possible challenges and limitationsthat place a strain on the collaboration and interactions among theparties that occur at multi-lateral levels. Therefore, the final outcomeshould still remain win/win solution as Fisher and Ury have suggested.However, in reaching a consensus within the third party consisting ofmany members (like the UN), the participants should be aware of .themulti-level interactions. Consensus within the third party is necessary

to support the outcome; consensus between the two conflicting partiesis necessary to reach an agreement. The response and theassertiveness of the members of the third party will influence theoutcome of the negotiation.


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CHAPTER 6: KOSOVO STATUS NEGOTIATIONS: A CASE STUDY

Primary and secondary data are analyzed in this chapter; the

former is employed to assess the role of international community inthe negotiation process while the later, in the format of interviews, isused to support items raised in the discussion.

Kosovos Status Negotiation Process

The long negotiation process of the final status of Kosovo can bebest approached by analyzing the phases of the negotiations. Figure 5& 6 illustrate the phases of negotiations covering a time span from1989 to 2007.12 For the purpose of this study the initial negotiationprocess starts with the landmark year of 1989 with Milosevic

revocation of Kosovos autonomy; it ends with the significant year of2007 with the UN Security Council December deadline for a negotiatedsolution. I have divided the negotiation process into three phasesbecause of the role of the international community and the nature ofthe talks. Initially, the international community expressed concernsabout the endangered state of justice in Kosovo. Therefore, the role ofthe international community in Phase I was to settle the disputebetween Kosovo and Serbia by promoting peaceful dialogue betweenthe adversarial parties. Subsequently, the role of the internationalcommunity shifted from a peace settlement to a political settlement.In Phase II the international community addressed the post-war

reconstruction process and in Phase III it addressed the final statusresolution process in several rounds of talks. Each phase is dividedinto three stages analysis, planning and discussion.13

12 Please refer to theKosovo Status Talks Timeline, 1989-2007in Appendix M to learn about each action

taken in the respective calendar year, 227.13 I have adopted Fisher and Urys basic stages of negotiations. See Fisher and Ury, Getting to Yes, 12.


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Phase I (1989-1999): Interim Peace Settlement

The initial negotiation process of the peaceful dispute settlementstarted in March 1989. However, due to the engagement of theinternational community in solving the Bosnian situation, no significant

effort in the Kosovo diplomatic talks occurred from 1989 to 1998.Additionally, the peaceful Albanian struggle led by President IbrahimRrugova did not attract the attention of the international community.Albanians were disappointed when the Kosovo issue was excludedfrom the Dayton Peace Accords agenda. Throughout 1996 and 1997Albanians continued massive peaceful demonstrations. The escalationof the crisis in December 1997 prompted the international communityto dedicate serious efforts to the Kosovo issue.

The Analysis Stage(March 1989 - March 1998): This stageis known as the pre-negotiation phase where the third party gathers

information to establish the nature of the situation. Immediately afterthe rescinding of Kosovos autonomy in 1989, Germany and Franceemerged as key players concerned with the Serbian repression of theethnic Albanians. The United States, disappointed with the violentactivities of the Serbians and Yugoslav government, issued warnings toMilosevic in 1992 and 1998. Priority was given to the Kosovo crisiswhen the international community became deeply concerned overextant tensions in Kosovo in 1998. The Contact Group emerged as themediator focusing at initiating a dialogue between the Kosovar andSerbian leadership. The Contact Group met in New York (September1997), in Washington (January 1998) and in Moscow (February 1998) to

address the problem, to consider the perceptions of the populace andto identify the interests of the Group and of the parties. The Grouprepeatedly called for dialogue between the two parties to solve theissue. In addition, the US envoy to the Balkans, Robert Gelbard andthe EU representative Robin Cook (the British Foreign Secretary),played a crucial role in the mediation process by pressing both partiesfor dialogue and calling on Milosevic to terminate the political unrest inKosovo.

The Planning Stage (March 1998 - May 1998): During thisstage, the third party generates ideas and considers appropriate

measures to alleviate the situation. The European Union becamegravely concerned with Serbian actions and called for greaterautonomy as an option for the ethnic Albanians. Foreign ministers ofthe six-nation Contact Group held emergency talks to discuss theKosovo crisis. The killing of the 58 members of the Adem Jashari (theKLA leader) family in the Donje Prekaz massacre of March 1998,galvanized the international community. Switzerland immediatelycalled for an international conference on Kosovo and the US Secretary


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of State Madeleine Albright and the British foreign secretary RobinCook put pressure on Milosevic to restore Kosovos autonomy.

During the planning process, the Contact Group met in London (9March 1998) and in Brussels (20 March 1998). The group discussedpossible economic sanctions but remained divided on how much

pressure to apply on Milovevics government. The Group demandedthe following actions to be taken by Milosevic:

to withdraw his troops within 10 days to cooperate with ICTY to allow the return of the OSCE mission in Kosovo,

Sandzak,Vojvodina.14

To follow up on the decisions the Contact Group met in Bonn (25 March1998), in London (6 April 1998) and in Rome (29 April 1998). TheContact Group assessed Belgrades response and agreed that Milosev

kosovo-the balkan dilemma

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