kegley chapter 8
TRANSCRIPT
Chapter 8: Military Power and the Use
of Force
Chapter 8: Military Power and the Use
of Force
Copyright 2010 Cengage Learning
Elements of Power (1 of 3)
Power: the factors that enable one state to coerce another
Power potential: the relative capabilities of a state considered essential to asserting influence over others
Military capability Military expenditures Relative size of economy
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How U.S. Military Spending Stacks Up Against Its Primary Competitors
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Two Measures of Military Power Potential: State Wealth and Size of National Armies
4
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Elements of Power (2 of 3)
Population size Territorial size Geographic position Raw materials Dependence on foreign raw
materials Technological level and capacity National character
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Elements of Power (3 of 3)
Ideology Efficiency of government decision
making Industrial productivity Trade volume Savings and investment Education level National morals Internal solidarity
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The Changing Character of World Power
Decreased utility of military power Increased importance of technology,
education, and economic growth Military spending:
• Opportunity costs• Peace dividend• Relative burden of military spending• “Guns versus butter”
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Military Spending as a Percentage of GDP
8
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Defense versus Deterrence
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Defense/Deterrence Continuum
Pure Defense Mixed
Pure Deterrence
walls, land mines
most conventional weapons including ground troops, aircraft, navies, tanks
strategic nuclear weapons
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The Security Dilemma
Prisoner’s Dilemma
2,2 4,1
1,4 3,3
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cooperate defect
cooperate
defect
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Weapons Trade Spurred by Cold War Peaked in 1987 at $82 billion Middle East and Asia are major
recipients Middle East arms race: regional
rivalries United States is leading supplier
• Balance-of-trade deficits • Military-industrial complex
Blowback11
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Arms Deliveries to the Global North and the Global South, 1997–2004
12
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Weapons of Mass Destruction
Shifts emphasis from defense to deterrence
Began with the annihilation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki
13
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Chemical and Biological Weapons
Growing threat Use by terrorists Prohibited by international law
14
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WMD and Crisis Stability
Kenneth Waltz argues that the proliferation of nuclear weapons will likely make the world more safe, not less.
Assumes: • Leaders are rational • Civilian leaders have effective control
over their militaries
15
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High- and Low-Tech Weapons
Precision guided munitions Improvised explosive device (IED)
16
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Arms Transfer Agreements Worldwide
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Nuclear Weapons in 2008
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United States 5521
Russia 5682
China 130
France 348
Great Britain 185
Israel 100–200
Pakistan 60
India 50
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Nuclear Weapons Nuclear proliferation is likely because the
expertise is widespread, export controls are ineffective, and the materials needed are widely available
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Nth country problem Horizontal nuclear proliferation Vertical nuclear proliferation Nuclear winter
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Nuclear-Weapon Armed Countries, Today and Tomorrow
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Technology and Weapons
MIRVs: Multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles
Firebreak Strategic weapons: Weapons of mass
destruction on ICBMs, SLBMs, long-range bombers
Nonlethal weapons: Incapacitate people, vehicles, communications systems
Smart bombs Biological and chemical weapons
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Compellence 1945–1962
Compellence: When U.S. was dominant nuclear power
Brinksmanship: John Foster Dulles threatened adversaries with nuclear war
Massive retaliation Countervalue targeting: Soviet industry
and population (as opposed to counterforce targeting of weapons)
Arms race
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Nuclear Weapons and the Cold War
Crisis Stability “The threat that leaves something to
chance.”
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Deterrence 1962–1991 Cuban Missile Crisis Requires second-strike capability Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) Nuclear Utilization Theory (NUTs):
advocated by some Americans; nuclear weapons could be used in a war
Strategic Defense Initiative: President Reagan’s “Star Wars”
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Preemption 1991–Present
Did nuclear weapons foster peace? The Bush Doctrine and preemptive
strikes• Preemptive war vs. Preventive war
Preemptive war and just war theory Asymmetrical warfare
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Coercive Diplomacy “An approach to bargaining between
states engaged in a crisis in which threats or the use of limited force are made to force an adversary to reach a compromise”
Ultimatums Gunboat diplomacy Military intervention
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Military Intervention Overt or covert use of force by one
or more states inside another state Covert operations: secret activities Can heighten tensions and lead to
war Nonintervention norm Intervention can be for moral for
humanitarian reasons Failed states
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The Changing Incidents Through Unilateral Military Intervention for Coercive Diplomatic Purposes Since 1945
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Conditions that Favor the Effective Use of Coercive Diplomacy
Clarity of user objectives. Asymmetry of motivation favoring
the user. Opponent’s fear of escalation and
belief in the urgency for compliance. Adequate domestic and international
support for the user. Clarity on the precise terms of
settlement.29
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Web Links (1 of 2)
Incore Institute for War and Peace Reportin
g International Crisis Group War, Peace, Security Guide Arms Sales Monitoring Project
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Web Links (2 of 2)
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists The Henry L. Stimson Center SIPRI Military Expenditure Country
Graphs
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