jurisdicitionalmemo dec14 2010 ordernumber10-3457 final

8/8/2019 JurisdicitionalMemo Dec14 2010 OrderNumber10-3457 FINAL

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

for the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois

CIVIL DOCKETING STATEMENT

STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT HARMONY, LLC, )SUSAN HINDS, individually and as CEO, )

Strategic Management Harmony, LLC, )

) APPEAL from the UNITED STATES

Plaintiffs- Appellants, ) DISTRICT COURT for the Southern

) District of Indiana, New Albany Division

Vs. ) No. 4:05 cv 0180

) Current Judge: Richard L. Young

ENHANCED BUSINESS REPORTING, ) 2nd Judge: David F. Hamilton appointed 7th Cir.

CONSORTIUM, INC., GRANT THORNTON, LLP, ) 1st Judge: John D. Tinder appointed 7th Cir.

PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS, LLP, )

AMERICAN INSTITUTE of CERTIFIED PUBLIC ) 1st Appeal: 07-3191 September 10, 2007

ACCOUNTANTS, INC, ) (Not final judgment- appeal held in abeyance)MICROSOFT, CORPORATION ) 2nd Appeal 10-2098 May 5, 2010 (consolidated)

) 3rd Appeal 10-2118 May 6, 2010 (dismissed, 1 day late)

Defendants-Appellees. ) 4th Appeal 10-2555 June 28, 2010 (consolidated)

) 5th Appeal 10-3457 October 22, 2010 pending

PRO SE APPELLANTS RESPONSE SEVENTH CIRCUIT ORDER APPEAL 10-3457

Plaintiff-Appellant, Susan M. Hinds, by way of Susan M. Hinds (Hinds or Appellant

interchangeably), Pro Se, former Enhanced Business Reporting Consortium (EBRC) Chief Executive Officer

& President (CEO), respectfully and prayerfully submit for entry Pro Se Appellants Response Seventh

Circuit Order Appeal 10-3457 (Appellants Response) in an oversize brief as previously requested of Seventh

Circuit of forty-seven pages. As directed and in response to Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals (Seventh

Circuit) Order entered on November 30, 2010, requesting Appellant to show cause for her Appeal No. 10-3457.

To show why 10-3457 is not identical to Appeal Nos. 10-2098 and 10-2555 and is not subject to sanctions for

engaging in frivolous litigation, as it appears [based on a preliminary review and no evidence to form this

opinion] to be identical to Appeal Nos. 10-2098 and 10-2555 that was summarily affirmed on September 17,

2010. Pending before the Court is Appellants and Appellees Jurisdictional Memorandum (JM) pleadings

related to 10-3457, which is to be considered, in addition to Pro Se Appellants Response, when making

rendering final judgment.

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The Defendants, including Grant Thornton, LLP (Thornton), failed to file a legally sufficient

Disclosure Statement pursuant to Cir. Rule 26.1; Fed.A.Cir.P. Rule 26.1, if any filed at all. Defendant EBRC

filed an untimely, legally insufficient Disclosure Statement (see Exhibit A attached), which is sanctionable

behavior, which Appellant filed sanctions relief repeatedly, due to Defendants failure to fully disclose pursuant

to Cir. Rule 26.1, and Fed.A.Cir.P. Rule 26.1. Appellant Hinds, Pro Se, has followed the procedures, to the best

of her ability, is not untimely nor relitigating and should not be threatened with sanctions, but Appellees

should be sanctioned for their collective disrespect and disrepute of Courts procedures: network firm. The

Seventh Circuit should grant Appellants right to appeal, order briefing with forty (40) days for Appellant to fully

brief 10-3457. In support of Appellants Response, submits as follows:

I. BACKGROUND, HISTORY & PROCEDURAL POSTURING

1. The original parties to this litigation are as follows, Appellants, represented by legal

counsel, Montgomery, Elsner & Pardieck, LLP (MEP Legal) until January 2008, included, Strategic

Management Harmony, LLC (Harmony) and Susan M. Hinds, individually and as CEO of Strategic

Management Harmony, LLC, and BFC Solutions, Inc. (BFC)(collectively Original Plaintiffs) and

Defendants-Appellees included, Grant Thornton, LLP (Thornton), Pricewaterhouse Coopers, LLP (PwC),

Microsoft Corporation (Microsoft), American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Inc. (AICPA), and

Enhanced Business Reporting Consortium, Inc. (EBRC) (collectively Defendants), and named Defendants

were voluntarily dismissed due to jurisdictional reach.

2. The jurisdiction is in United States District Court Southern District of Indiana- New Albany

Division (Southern District of Indiana) established on August 10, 2007 (Doc. No. 116), by subject matter

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 13311 and supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1367.

3. On August 10, 2007 (dkt 116), Judge ruled on Defendants Motion To Dismiss (dkts. 88, 91), by

1 MEP Legal, LLP, Former Plaintiffs Counsel of Record, incorrectly cited in the original appeal, that jurisdiction wasestablished by diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1332 filed as Plaintiffs first Notice of Appeal datedSeptember 10, 2007; with substantial prejudicial effects to Plaintiffs. On August 10, 2007, Judge John D. Tinder ruled

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331 federal subject matter, and 28 U.S.C. 1367 supplemental jurisdiction for State claimsbecause they form part of the same case or controversy. (dkt. 116 p. 11) (Footnote 8: Lest there be any confusion, the courthas subject matter jurisdiction over the claims regardless of what it later decides about Defendants statuses as Hindsemployer. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006)).

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highly prejudicial deposition that the Defendant Thornton based its Motion for Summary Judgment on.

Appellant Hinds repeatedly requested from the courts and Defendants for an appointed attorney,

including in her first Pro Se filing on January 28, 2008 (dkts. 147-150; dkt. 161 denied Plaintiff Hinds request

for indemnity and an attorney, and denied Microsofts request for attorney fees (who filed this request 3 more

timesto harass, embarrass, humiliate Plaintiff Hinds for her complaints and prejudice the tribunal through

perception partners)), a request for a Hearing under LR 7.5 (dkt 251) was denied. This is an act of discrimination

itself, to deny indemnity is to deny adequate legal counsel and an enforceable term, condition, or privilege of

employment and/or membership status, and a not-for-profit officer [Hinds] is provided indemnity under

Delaware Law 145. (see Exhibit C).

Importantly, this is an enforceable term and/or condition of employment and/or membership status,

and a not-for-profit officer [Hinds] is provided mandatory indemnity under Delaware Law 145 (see Exhibit C)

nor can a not-for-profit officer be held personally liable and provided indemnity, in matters of public interest,

and underEBRC bylaws (see Exhibit D) or AICPA Professional Standards BL Section 440 Indemnification (See

Exhibit D-1) as an AICPA committee member and CPA Ambassador (see Exhibit D-2). Additionally, AICPA

Independence Standards is defined ET100.01.06 Definitions: Independence a. Independence in mind; b.

Independence in appearance (see Exhibit D-3), PwC is Toyotas auditors with a financial interest as defined in

ET 100.18 Financial Self-Interest threat (Id.) in government and private contacts arising out of EBRC/XBRL

(dkt 270-80) in the hundreds of millions of dollars, of which PwC Defendants are financial beneficiaries of by

having a direct financial interest or material indirect financial interest in the client [Toyotawho appointed

Hinds to SCEBR then EBRC CEO when under EEOC/Toyota Mediated Settlement, Consulting, and General

Release Agreement], and ET 100.19 Management Participation Threat (see Exhibit D-4) that states, Taking

on the role of client management or otherwise performing management functions on behalf of an attest client.

(a) Serving as an officer or director of the client [EBRC sponsored Mike Willis as board member and officer

and PwC is Toyotas auditors, Mike Willis, PwC was involved in the hiring, supervising, or terminating of the

clients [Toyota- Hinds was under EEOC/Toyota contract that was violated by Willis, PwC} employees [Hinds

was a Toyota employee when appointed to SCEBR and under EEOC/Toyota contract when Willis terminated

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Hinds employment and a violation of AICPA Independence standards. Additionally,AICPA Independence

Standards are violated, ET101.06 101-4Honorary directorships and trusteeships of not-for-profit [EBRC

and XBRL are not-for-profits] organization, states, he or she cannot vote or otherwise participate in board

or management functions: Defendants violated this provision in their administration of EBRC/XBRL as they

participated in board or management functions while portraying to the public that they are serving honorary

roles: Independence violation.

6. In January 2008, Appellant Hinds entered an appearance, in Pro Se capacity, thus under Seventh

Circuit standards, her pleadings should be liberally construed, especially technical errors "The essence of liberal

construction is to give a pro se plaintiff a break when, although he stumbles on a technicality, his pleading is

otherwise understandable. "Hudson v. McHugh, 148 F.3d 859, 864 (7th Cir. 1998).

7. On March 22, 2010, the Southern District of Indiana entered in favor of Defendant Thornton on

Motion for Summary Judgment (dkt 371, 372). However, Judge Young did the legal research, analysis, and

writing, on behalf of Defendants (dkts. 362-363; 366-67 were never answered by Defendants thus should be

ruled in Plaintiffs favor), then Judge Young ruled in Defendants favor, with Toyota perceived to have exparte

communications with Defendants and the tribunal, thus Judge Young and Magistrate Hussmann are perceived

as biased, prejudiced, non-neutral, partial and favors male Defendants and their law firms.

8. On April 5, 2010, the Southern District of Indiana entered (dkt. 377) Entry Discussing

Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment that denied (dkt. 373which was to alter/amend dkts. 371-72). Judge

Young ruled under 59(e), stating in part,

three valid grounds for a Rule 59(e) motionnewly discovered evidence, an intervening change inthe law, and manifest error in law. See Cosgrove v. Bartolotta, 150 F.3d 729, 732, (7th Cir. 1998). It is[this sentence is incomplete therefore incomprehensible for a pro se].

On April 5, 2010, District Court Entry (see Exhibit E-dkt 377 paragraph 3 stops sentence with It is

fails to finish this sentence) is an incomplete, incomprehensible ruling, simply because the Entry stops in mid-

sentence, leaving Pro Se Plaintiff unable to make legal arguments due to this substantial, material mistake,

inadvertence, excusable neglect, which is clearly erroneous, and is therefore voidable judgment. Worse, it fails

to address the legal issues raised, like newly discovered evidence, in Plaintiffs Motion to Alter or Amend the

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Final Judgment (see Exhibit F attached- dkt 373). The tolling for Appeal 10-2098 begins with dkt 377, which

must be voided as this critical judgment is incomplete by mistake, inadvertence, excusable neglect, and is

clearly erroneous, and establishes the beginning of a pattern of bias, prejudice, non-neutrality, and favor shown

to Defendants and their law firm. Both the Defendants and Judge Young failed to address the critical questions

regarding the Motion for Summary Judgment, which was ruled in Defendants favor (dkts. 371-72), and

perceived as biased, prejudiced, non-neutral, and fraud on the court as the evidence is disputed, not

authenticated, nor subject to the rigor of an evidentiary hearing, which has been and continues to be requested

by Appellant who has a right to be heard3: this judgment must be voided. The District Court Entry (dkt 377)

must be voided due to error, mistake, inadvertence, excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, and/or fraud

on the court. The record is incomplete, which affects the substantive rights of Appellant, who cannot

understand the Entry to alter/amend judgments (dkts. 371-73), without the reasoning or case laws behind it ( dkt.

377- this judgment must be voided as it is incomplete and incomprehensible). This is not relitigating but rather

a Constitutional Right XIV Amendment (due process, equal protection) to due process, that includes the right of

Appellant to recuse or remove a Judge and/or Magistrate when a clear pattern has emerged, and evidence to

support the inference that a reasonable person would perceive judicial bias, prejudice, non-neutrality, favor,

and partiality shown to the Defendants and their law firms: violation of the Judicial Cannons as outlined below.

3After five years of burdensome litigation, subjecting Appellant Hinds to indigent status (i.e. Appellees, withknowledge, are withholding fair compensation, breaching contacts, and discriminatorily denying access to thecontracts that are estimated to be in the hundreds of millions of dollars: Appellant is due 3% of all government andprivate contracts arising out of EBRC business plan, a subject of this litigation) has not been heard at the district

level, in violation of Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon Rule 2.09, Ensure The Right To Be Heard, which states;RULE 2.09: ENSURING THE RIGHT TO BE HEARD

(A) A judge shall accord to every person who has a legal interest in a proceeding, or that persons lawyer, the right to be heardaccording to law.*(B) A judge may encourage parties to a proceeding and their lawyers to settle matters in dispute, but shall not act in a manner thatcoerces any party into settlement.[3] Judges must be mindful of the effect settlement discussions can have, not only on their objectivity and impartiality, but alsoon the appearance of their objectivity and impartiality. Despite a judge's best efforts, there may be instances where informationobtained during settlement discussions could influence a judge's decision-making during trial.

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Clearly in violation of Judicial Canons, Rule 2.024: Bias, Prejudice, and Harassment; Rule 2.06

Impartiality and Fairness5, Judge Young and/or Magistrate Hussmann, Jr. directed and controlled the legal

research, analysis, and writing, on behalf of Defendants (dkts. 362-63 Amended Request for Leave of Court to

File Plaintiffs Surreply- this in part, establishes a fraud on the court (see Exhibit G- dkt 363- Defendant-

Appellees failed to timely respond L.R. 7.1); (dkts. 366-67 Amended Request for Admissions (see Exhibit H-

dkt 367) which Appellant is due these responses without court approval, Defendants failed to provide

Admissions under Fed.R.Civ.P. 36: Defendants must be ordered to answer), the Appellants pleadings were

never answered by Defendants, by motion or responsive pleadings, thus should be ruled in Pro Se Plaintiffs

favor, in consideration of the Judicial Cannon Rules 2.02; 206; ; 2.09; 2.10. Yet, Judge Young ruled in

Defendants favor, with Toyota perceived to haveEx Parte Communications, in violation of Judicial Canons,

4RULE 2.02: BIAS, PREJUDICE, AND HARASSMENT

(A)A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice, and shall not engage in harassment.(B) A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words orconduct manifest bias, prejudice, or harassment,including but not limited to bias, prejudice, or harassment based upon race, sex, gender, religion, national origin, ethnicity,disability, age, sexual orientation, marital status, or socioeconomic status, and shall not permit staff, court officials, andothers subject to the judges direction and control to do so. This does not preclude legitimate references to those factorswhen relevant to an issue in the proceeding.

(C) A judge shall require lawyers in proceedings before the judge to refrain from manifesting bias, prejudice, orharassment based upon race, sex, gender, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, maritalstatus, or socioeconomic status, against parties, witnesses, counsel, or others. This does not preclude legitimate advocacywhen these or other similar factors are issues in the proceeding.COMMENTS[1] A judge who manifests bias in a proceeding impairs the fairness of the proceeding and brings the judiciary intodisrepute. Even facial expression and body language can convey to parties or lawyers in the proceeding, jurors, the media,and others an appearance of bias. A judge must avoid conduct that may reasonably be perceived as prejudiced or biased.[2] Examples of manifestations of bias include but are not limited to epithets; slurs; demeaning nicknames [serial-litigator]; negative stereotyping[autocrat- but is acceptable in the accounting profession if a male autocratic accountant

but not females ]; attempted humor based upon stereotypes; threatening, intimidating, or hostile acts; suggesting aconnection between race, ethnicity, or nationality and crime; and irrelevant references to personal characteristics.[3] Harassment is verbal or physical conduct that denigrates or shows hostility or aversion toward an individual on basessuch as race, sex, gender, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, marital status, orsocioeconomic status.5 RULE 2.06: IMPARTIALITY* AND FAIRNESS

A judge shall uphold and apply the law,* and decide all cases with impartiality and fairness.COMMENT[3] To ensure impartiality and fairness to all parties, a judge must be objective and open-minded, and must not show

favoritism toward anyone. It is not a violation of this Rule, however, for a judge to make reasonable accommodations toensure pro se litigants the opportunity to have their matters fairly heard.

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Rule 2.10 Ex Parte Communications6with Defendants and tribunal, thus Judge Young and Magistrate

Hussmann are perceived as biased, prejudiced, non-neutral, partial and favors male Defendants and law firms.

Judge Young goes on to say, decided on the record as it stands, not on litigants visions of what the

facts might some day reveal. Maldonado-Denis v. Castillio-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir. 1994)(quoting

Dow v. United Bhd. Of Carpenters, 1 F.3d 56, 58 (1st Cir. 1993). Appellant perceives that what the facts might

some day reveal is an indication that the Judges chambers were waiting for something to come in the form of

new facts [Hinds called an attorney regarding Toyota] and is perceived ex-parte communications.

9. On March 22, 2010, Judgment (dkt 372) was entered in favor of Defendant Thornton with Entry

(dkt 371 pg. 1) stating in part, Other claims and claims against other defendants were dismissed in the Entry on

Defendants MTD (dkt 116). For the reasons explained in this Entry, the court findsundisputed evidence shows

that it was not Hinds employer and did not direct or control the acts of which she complains. (Id.). This

conclusion is at odds with Judge Tinders ruling (dkt 116- pg. 24-25 defendants ran the Consortium as a

defacto corporationdirected the specific personal actionsparent corporations that direct discriminatory

acts may be liable under Title VII.). Even defendant Microsoft used the single-employer test in MTD Reply

6RULE 2.10 : EX PARTE COMMUNICATIONS(A) A judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications, or consider other communications made to the

judge outside the presence of the parties concerning a pending* or impending* matter, except as follows:(1) Where circumstances require, ex parte communications for scheduling, administrative purposes, or emergencies that donot deal with substantive matters are permitted, provided:(a) the judge reasonably believes that no party will gain a procedural, substantive, or tactical advantage as a result of the ex

parte communication, and(b) the judge makes provision by delegation or otherwise promptly to notify all other parties of the substance of the ex

parte communication, and allows them an opportunity to respond.(2) A judge may consult with court personnel whose function is to aid the judge in carrying out the judges adjudicativeresponsibilities, or with other judges, provided that the judge does not abrogate the responsibility personally to decide thecase and takes reasonable steps to avoid receiving factual information that is not part of the record.(3) A judge may, with the consent of the parties, confer separately with the parties and their lawyers in an effort to settlematters pending before the judge.(4) A judge may initiate, permit, or consider any ex parte communications when expressly authorized by law* to do so.(B) A judge shall not independently investigate facts in a case, and shall consider only the evidence presented.(C) If a judge inadvertently receives an unauthorized ex parte communication bearing on the substance of a matter, the

judge shall make provision by delegation or otherwise promptly to notify all other parties of the substance of thecommunication and give the parties an opportunity to respond.(D) A judge shall make reasonable efforts, including the provision of appropriate supervision, to ensure that this Rule is notviolated through law clerks or other personnel on the judges staff.

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pleadings (dkt 103 pg. 3), which is the proper legal standard. This is further evidence of prejudice and biased

pattern that has taken precedent over Constitutional rights, Supreme Court, and Seventh Circuit holdings.

10. On May 5, 2010, Appellant filed and Seventh Circuit docketed Appeal No. 10-2098,

amended on May 6, 2010 and docketed Appeal No. 10-2118 (dismissed, one day late). On May 6, 2010, the

Southern District of Indiana Entry (dkt 388) denied the Plaintiffs Notice of Appeal to proceed in forma

pauperis (dkt. 383). On May 18, 2010, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment pursuant to

Fed.R.Civ.P 59(e) (dkt. 392), arguing filed good faith, with merit, and was not frivolous, but was denied

(dkt. 397). Once again, Judge Young, Magistrate Hussmann, or support staff, did the legal research,

analysis, and writing, on behalf of Defendants (dkts. 383, 388, 392 were never answered by Defendants

thus should be ruled in Plaintiffs favor), then Judge Young ruled in Defendants favor, thus Judge Young

and Magistrate Hussmann are perceived as biased, prejudiced, non-neutral, partial and favors the male

Defendants and their law firms. Likewise, May 17, 2010, Appellant filed Motion to Stay Judgment Pending

Appeal (dkt. 391), which was denied (dkt. 397). Again, Judge Young, Magistrate Hussmann, or support

staff, did the legal research, analysis, and writing, on behalf of Defendants (dkt 391 was never answered

by Defendants thus should be ruled in Plaintiffs favor), then Judge Young ruled in Defendants favor, thus

Judge Young and Magistrate Hussmann are perceived as biased, prejudiced, non-neutral, partial and

favors the male Defendants and their law firms.

11. On June 4, 2010, Appellant entered (dkt. 400) a Motion to Amend/Alter Judgment (dkt. 397),

which addressed the Defendants request for attorney fees7, including the over $600,000 purported fees and

costs that were shocking to Appellant Hinds, but was denied (dkt. 401), denied the very next day without

Defendants receiving mailed copies or filing a responsive pleading? Ex Parte Communications are

7 Plaintiff perceives ongoing harassment by Defendants, who have made false statements under oath, usedshocking methods to force Plaintiff to settle (including the Judge changing the legal standard from plausible to frivolousto award Defendants fees that are excessive, duplicative, and questionable when run through a not-for-profit whose

purported liabilities exceed their assets (raising the piercing the corporate veil jurisdictional issue), failed to produceevidence, the evidence was not tested for admissibility with subjective character assessments based on hearsay, witnessswith credibility problems, and declaration statements that are false, misleading, mischaracterizing, or misciting the facts orcircumstances.

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perceived to have driven this rush judgment and in violation orJudicial Canon Rule 2.10 Ex Parte

Communication. Once again, Judge Young, Magistrate Hussmann, and/or support staff, did the legal

research, analysis, and writing, on behalf of Defendants (neither dkt 400 nor 397 was answered by

Defendants, thus should be ruled in Plaintiffs favor), then Judge Young ruled in Defendants favor, thus

Judge Young and Magistrate Hussmann are perceived as biased, prejudiced, non-neutral, partial and

favors the male Defendants and their law firms.

12. On June 25, 2010, Appellant filed Notice of Appeal with Southern District of Indiana and on

June 28, 2010 the Seventh Circuit docketed Appeal No. 10-2555, which was later consolidated with 10-2098

for briefing purposes. The district court Order (dkt 410) Entry Directing Further Proceedings requesting

Appellant to supplement her notice of appeal by July 1, 2010. Appellant filed a Motion for Time Extension to

respond to dkt 410 Entry (dkt 416), which was granted (dkt 418) with a time extension of July 8, 2010.

13. On June 28, 2010, the Southern District of Indiana entered Order (dkt 411) stating,

as to 383 Notice of Appeal filed by Susan Hinds. It is ordered that plaintiff Strategic ManagementHarmony, LLC is voluntarily dismissed as an appellant in this appeal pursuant to Fed.R. App.P. 42(b). This

case shall proceed with Susan Hinds as the only appellant

It is this transaction that generated the series of responsive pleadings, Appellant Hinds, Pro Se is being

denied her rights to indemnity at the Appellate level to represent Harmony, as Hinds represented Harmonys

interests for almost two years with no such disclaimer. This is an act of discrimination itself, to deny indemnity

is to deny adequate legal counsel, an enforceable term, condition, or privilege of employment and/or

membership status, and a not-for-profit officer [Hinds] is provided indemnity under Delaware Law 145 (see

Exhibit C), which mandates that Officer Hinds be provided legal counsel for her representation or her firm,

Harmony, and the AICPA committee membership bylaws and/or EBRC/XBRL bylaws (see Exhibit D to D-4).

Importantly, this is an enforceable term and/or condition of employment and/or membership status, and

mandatory provisions for a not-for-profit officer [former EBRC CEO Hinds] is provided mandatory indemnity

under Delaware Law 145 (see Exhibit C) nor can a not-for-profit officer be held personally liable, in matters

of public interest, under EBRC bylaws, or AICPA bylaws, AICPA committee member and CPA Ambassador (see

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Exhibit D to D-4). Appellant Hinds judgment must be voided or remanded for further proceedings.

14. On July 7, 2010, Appellant filed an Amended Motion On Order 410 (dkt. 419) a responsive

motion to the Judges request to supplement Appeal No. 10-2555.

15. On July 9, 2010, Appellant filed in response to Southern District of Indiana Order (dkt 411 entered

June 28, 2010), Plaintiffs Motion For Leave To Alter Or Amend Judgment; Alternatively Relief From

Judgment (dkt 420-25)(see Exhibit L)filed within ten days plus three day mail rule, therefore 59(e) deadline

met. Plaintiff filed this motion, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P Rule 59(e) and/or Rule 60(b), to prevent substantial

prejudice and injustice, with very limited time to prepare, which is why Plaintiff requested a leave from the

court, to be provided ample time to brief this legally complex but significant development of newly discovered

evidence, which would allow Plaintiff to make it legally discernable. Simply put: Plaintiff requested the

Southern District of Indiana to grant Plaintiff a leave from court, to brief thenewly admissible evidence(dkts.

420-25; 433 ex. B- for example of newly discovered evidence; 436; 438; 439 relevant orders),which has a

material impact on various court judgments and/or orders, including not limited to, dkts 116, 371-72, 377, 388,

397, and 411.On August 12, 2010 the Court dismissed (dkt 436)(see Exhibit M), however, on August 23, 2010,

Appellant filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment for dkt 436 (dkt 438) (see Exhibit N), pursuant to

Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e), which was denied (dkt 439)(see Exhibit O) on August 26, 2010. The Judge stated in Entry,

(dkt 438) only touches tangentially on the claims resolved in this lawsuit and in doing so presents no basis

for relief(dkt 438) is denied. Judge Young ruling is contrary to the parties intentions, as both parties agree

that these claims arise out of this litigation (dkts. 445-46; 453; 455; 456; 459-64- pending motions before the

district court, including Defendants violating the protective order by leaking confidential and privileged

communications). Defendants want to bar Hinds from future filings in spite of her credentials as a Public

Arbitrator that would be substantially, severely impact her ability to earn a professional livelihood, against

AICPA Professional Standards as a licensed CPA, and against sound public policy as Appellant was EBRC

CEO, not-for-profit officer who is to be provided mandatory indemnity, adequate legal counsel, and no personal

liability.

This is further evidence of newly discovered evidence that needs to be reflected in the complaint, as

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Ongoing Harassment which allows exceptions to the general rules under Title VII EEOC (see Exhibit P);

Ongoing Harassment allows the EEOC to reach-back for facts, reported incidents, and patterns of

discrimination or retaliation. But more importantly, the pattern of bias, prejudice, non-neutral, favoring, and

showing partialityto the male Defendants and their law firms, who again failed to timely file a responsive

pleading, under L.R. 7.1 as Judge Young and/or Magistrate Hussmann performed the Defendants legal research,

case analysis, and legal writings and then decides in their favor, in spite of the Defendants failure to file a

responsive pleading.

16. On July 12, 2010, Court Entry (dkt 428), which denied Plaintiffs Motion to Amend (dkts.

419), even though the Defendants had not yet responded nor was a response due until July 19, 2010, calling

into question the impartiality, neutrality, and bias in judicial decision-making, violation of Judicial Canon

Rule 2.06, which has been prejudiced against Plaintiffs, two women licensed CPAs from the beginning (BFC

Solutions, Inc. was dismissed from case with no relief provided for breach of her services contract), with

comments like your case is on life support by Magistrate Hussmann, with a room full of witnesses, and these

comments were made before discovery began. Entry (dkt 428) denied Plaintiffs amended motion (dkt 419) with

Judge Young stating,

The reason for this ruling is that the relief sought in such motion is so hidden from understanding as to be

indiscernible. The plaintiff should endeavor to respond to directions issued by a court with more clarity thanhas been demonstrated in her many filings in recent months.

Appellant received this in the mail around July 15, 2010. Plaintiff Hinds finds it astonishing that

whenever Toyota is involved (i.e. newly discovered evidence) that things are decided in lightning speed.

Plaintiff Hinds perceives Ex Parte Communications with Judges, Magistrates, legal staff, law professors or

affiliates (i.e. cronyism and rampant Conflicts of Interest in academics, which includes Defendant PwC,

Thornton, AICPA, Microsoft, EBRC (dkt 420-25 ex.c; dkt 433 1-10 exs. a-h)), or ex parte communications have

occurred within the network of the many law firms or defendants. For example, Judge Young and IU Maurer

School of Law (IU Law)[Hinds attended IU Law during this litigation to start in a new profession and

reported threatening notes in her locker (dkt 352) and other acts of intimidation or bullying due to Hinds

involvement in protected activity or political/religious/social beliefs]are networkingor their legal staff, which is

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a violation of the EEOC/Toyota Mediated Settlement Agreement or Tower Mediated Agreement. Likewise, in

conflict with Appellant Hinds, FINRA Public Arbitrator8 quasi-judicial powers, including the power to issue

subpoenas in RICO or securities fraud cases as part of her public duties] but a simple motion to dismiss took

almost two years to resolve (i.e. Original Complaint filed November 2005). The overt judicial bias, prejudice,

non-neutrality, partiality and favor shown to Defendants and their law firms and not a Pro Se Appellant.

17. On July 22, 2010, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment (dkt 433- see Exhibit I),

within ten (10) days of dkt 428 Entry, pursuant to 59(e) which allows relief and a reconsideration due to a

manifest error of law or fact or newly admissible evidence and/or 60(b), requesting a leave of court to prepare a

legally complex brief for admissibility of new evidence. In the present case, newly admissible evidence, which

is of the same subject matter, same parties, same or similar set of facts, and arises out of this litigation, and as

filed Ongoing Harassment as defined by the EEOC (see Exhibit P) and is subject to this appeal 10-3457,

which includes but not limited to:

a) Defamation of Character: Hinds is a public arbitrator not a serial litigator, Hinds is challengingDefendants under professional defamation under Indiana Law, as there is no credible evidence to supportthese patently false allegations. Defendants reckless and malicious mischaracterization, misrepresentation,miscite, and misquote of authorities, by making any inference, that Plaintiff Hinds is a serial litigator whois in fact a public arbitrator with highly recommended character and integrity. In fact, the Defendants arethe real serial litigators. Likewise, Defendants recklessly label others with intent to harm, discriminatoryuse of autocratic, which Plaintiff Hinds flatly denies ever having ever been labeled as such nor have any

written communication allegedly addressing Plaintiff Hinds autocratic attribute. In fact, with muchrelevance, the accounting profession is characterized as male dominated and autocratic leadership styles yetwomen are not employable if they have such attributes? These defamatory labels have substantialprofessional reputational harm, materially adverse negative impacts to Hinds employment, benefits, termsand conditions, her contracts (past, present, and future), appointments, and other harms;

b) Unauthorized Access, Copying, And Distribution (Across State Lines) Hinds Medical Records

(Including Highly Sensitive and Confidential Records) And Denied That They Possessed Such

Records When Requested On Record. On January 13, 2010, parties had a Telephonic Status Conferencewith Judge Young (dkts 358-360)(dkt 442 ex. C), whereby David Ritter, Defendants legal counsel, deniedhaving access or possession of Plaintiff Hinds medical records, and has repeatedly denied that they havethese records. Contrarily, Plaintiff Hinds has hard evidence that in fact Defendant Thornton has in theirpossession, confidential, sensitive medical records and Hinds rights to privacy and others have been severelyviolated- this is newly discovered evidence.

8 On January 22, 2010, Plaintiff Hinds, former Indiana University Law Business Law Society Co-President, became a Public arbitrator (dkt

433- Exhibit A). Hinds, quasi-judicial officer with special protections under law and securities industry regulations, invested months of study,testing, and certification to become a public arbitrator for the Financial Industries Regulatory Authority (FINRA)(Id.)(dkt 420-25, Exhibit B-securities fraud, RICO, and business law cases), with defendants and their law firms, agents, and others have obstructed Hinds professionaldevelopment, career advancement, board appointments, and other harmful actions, all but for this litigation that was orchestrated(Employee/Employer relationship and Integrated Enterprisedkt 433 pg 7 footnote 2) by EBRC Founders, like Mike Starr, Grant Thornton,LLP Chief Operating Officer, former chairperson of Special Committee on Enhanced Business Reporting, former EBRC President, XBRL USchairperson, aided by his sprawling commercial litigation enterprise, perception partners, and networks.

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c) Newly Discovered Evidence (Highly Confidential- due to fear of retribution this will be provided

in future- ex. B): On Marcy 22, 2010, Plaintiff Hinds contacted an attorney related to Hinds employmentwith Toyota (see letter dated March 22, 2010) of which Hinds is a credible witness of pending litigation, andother newly discovered evidence that is relevant to this litigation, including an unauthorized deduction ofaround $5,000 from plaintiff Hinds pension account under Toyotas administration. This is highlyconfidential and will be submitted directly to the investigator, once named and made available at that time:due to fear of continued retaliation and/or retribution to me and my familys health, safety, and welfare;

d) Continuing Loss of Employment, Contracts, Appointments, And Committees: One example, of

many, in May 2010, plaintiff Hinds was denied contracts for $393,000, with FINRA (Mike Starr NASDAQboard member)(Harmony and/or Hindssight2020, competitor of EBRC & the founding partners, and theirlaw firms) and/or cases as arbitrator which is odd considering the amount of securities fraud cases currentlypending;

e) Potential breach of EEOC Settlement contracts, indemnity agreements, and other contractual orbylaw provisions;

f) Glass Ceiling: For all named employers, potential employers, former employers, law firms, and co-conspirators, there remains one commonality: a glass ceiling is firmly in place, (maybe a crack here or there)and women are still compensated under 80% of male counterparts, in spite of new Equal Pay Act or LillyLedbetter Act. The glass ceiling is defined as positions that are in executive management, board of directors,partners, equity stake owners, and key leadership roles;

g) Public Policy, Political and/or Religious Beliefs: Hinds has been targeted due to her public policy,political, and/or religious beliefs and/or affiliations- this will be outlined with the investigator due to thecontinued retaliation and/or retribution;

h) Harms: Hinds has experienced emotional distress due to these intentional and malicious actions (i.e.intentional demeaning, degrading, unethical, humiliating, embarrassing, harassing (which trigger healthissues) and other emotions evoked), professional and personal defamation of character, invasion of privacy,psychological torture, legal bullying & breach of fiduciary duty, involuntary conversion of assets, loss ofemployment compensation, terms/conditions of employment and benefits, denied opportunities to berecruited, interviewed, or employed, loss of committee appointments, network opportunities, speakingengagements, and other damage, and;

i) Other: Other evidence to be outlined in brief (dkt 433- ex.b for examples of newly discovered evidence;not all).

18. On September 23, 2010, Judge Young entered, albeit Defendants failed to file a responsive

pleading under Fed.R.Civ.P. Rules 5-7, 12 (dkt 440)(see Exhibit K) Entry Discussing Selected Matters and

denied Appellants Motion to Alter/Amend (dkt 433)(see Exhibit I), or L.R. 7.1 (Id. At 10) considering it as a

motion under 60(b), and denied the 59(e) request, stating it was four months after judgment. This is perceived as

prejudice, bias, and non-neutral, favoring, and partial to the male Defendants and their law firms. Hence the

reasons for filing a Motion to Recuse (dkts. 441-42)(see Exhibit Q).This motion is pending, brings to issue a

Constitutional right XIV Amendment that allows Appellant the right to remove the Judge. The prejudice

continued, as the Judge, failing to disqualify himself when placing Order (dkt. 443) (see Exhibit R), which

Appellant Hinds argues this is a fraud on the court that will be briefed as the evidence is disputed and

unauthenticated, Appellants indemnity provisions void this judgment, and a gross violation of EEOC/Toyota

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contact (see Exhibit S). Appellant Hinds has disputed these unaudited costs submitted by Defendants that

contains $7,400 attorney fees, which is a clear misrepresentation on the court, is sanctionable behavior, and is

pending request for a hearing under L.R. 7.5).

On October 26, 2010, Appellant filed a Motion to Remove (dkts. 451-52)(see Exhibit T) in

response to the Order #443, Judge Young and Magistrate Hussmann showed clear bias and prejudice by not

disqualifying themselves, taking additional actions that are contrary to the Appellants Constitutional rights XIV

Amendment, Summary Judgment was entered in March 22, 2010 (i.e. without an evidence hearing, evidence is

in dispute, and not authenticated), and no costs were assessed. Appellant assumed that her well-pled Hardship

case, including indigent status, due to this protracted litigation that has been oppressive to Appellant. The

Defendants, who did not file a motion in response to the Motion to Remove, failed to timely file any response

at all, has no standing in this court and this should Motion to Remove should be ruled in Appellants favor.

Yet, Appellants Motion is incorrectly ruled, untimely, stating it is four months old, tolling from March 22,

2010, which is incorrect, the Order (dkt 410) is dated June 28, 2010, with a specific request to take a leave of

court to brief the newly discovered evidence, which is factually distinct from the case cited, Talana v.

Northwestern Medical Facility Foundation, Inc . Appellants Motion was timely filed, pursuant to 59(e), and the

delay was due to the length of time for Judge Young to render judgment (July 12, 2010 entered Order 428;

Appellant timely filed Motion to Alter/Amend July 22, 2010) (dkt 433)(see Exhibit I), to request a leave to brief

for the newly discovered evidence, pursuant to 59(e)), which should have been granted, especially because

Defendants failed to respond at all (see Exhibit I- dkt 433 pg. 5-6, 12), this is clearly erroneous or contrary to

law, and Appellants request for leave to brief newly discovered evidence should be granted.

Even if this is perceived as arising out of Appeal No. 10-2098/10-2555 (consolidated)(dkt 410),

supplemental to the Notice of Appeal filed June 25, 2010 (docketed June 28, 2010) that is irrelevant, as this is

not relitigating, as this is newly discovered evidence (see Exhibit I- dkt 433pgs. 3-9, 11-17), which is

specific and not a blanket request, which entitles Appellant a new trial, amend the complaint to conform to the

evidence, to obtain additional discovery from Defendants that was stayed in error, and to obtain discovery on the

newly discovered evidence. If anyone is late, it is the Defendants as they collectively failed to file a response,

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the Court should have ruled in Appellants favor on Order entered September 23, 2010 (dkt 440), as this is an

abuse of discretion and no reasonable person could agree with the district court, as the Defendants failed to

carry their burden under L.R. 7.1 and failed to timely pursue their defenses that were available to them.

In Order (dkt 440)) Judge Young states,

Given that the motion was filed four months after the entry of judgment on the clerks docket, the motioncannot be treated as a motion pursuant to Rule 59(e). This is true whether the court would apply the 10-daydeadline for filing such a motion in effect prior to December 1, 2009 or the 28-day deadline in effect afterDecember 1, 2009. A district court may not extend the time within which a party may move to alter oramend a judgment under Rule 59(e). Talano v. Northwestern Medical Faculty Foundation, Inc., 273 F.3d757, 761 (7th Cir. 2001)(citations omitted). abuse of discretion[S]uch abuse exists only in situations inwhich no reasonable person could agree with district court.Hope v. US, 43 F.3d 1140, 1144 (7th Cir. 1994).

Unlike Talano (see Exhibit J), Appellants facts are substantially different, an abuse of discretion is believed to

have been committed, and a reasonable person could disagree with the district court, especially since Defendants

failed to respond at all (dkt 433 pg. 5-6, 12). Unlike Talano, Appellants response was timely filed within the

59(e) 28-day deadline. However, Defendant-Appellees failed to file a responsive pleading, Appellant was

specific as to the evidence (dkt 433 pgs. 3-5), which is substantial & relevant to the evidentiary record

underlying the entry of summary judgment, and the reason Appellant requested a leave for further briefing (dkt

433- see Exhibit I) and not a blanket statement as used in Talanos case, who to conform his motion to the

requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) by failing to conform to any of the grounds specified in 60(b).

Order (dkt 440) Judge Young stated,

[R]elief under Rule 60(b) is an extraordinary remedy and is granted only in exceptionalcircumstances.Eskridge v. Cook County, 577 F.3d 806, 809 (7th Cir. 2009)(quoting McCormick v. Cityof Chicago, 230 F.3d 319, 328 (7th Cir. 2000))l such relief is warranted only upon a showing ofextraordinary circumstances that create substantial danger that the underlying judgment was unjust.Margoles v. Johns, 798 F.2d 1069, 1073 (7th Cir. 1986). The motion does not identify suchcircumstancesdenied pursuant to Rule 60(b)(2).

Appellant filed the 60(b)(2), meeting the five prong test as outline in pleadings (dkt 433 pgs. 8-13) including: (1)

the evidence was discovered following trial; (2) due diligence on the part of the movant to discover the new

evidence is shown or may be inferred; (3) the evidence is not merely cumulative or impeaching; (4) the evidence

is material; and (5) the evidence is such that a new trial would probably produce a new result. Harris v. Owens-

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Corning Fiberglass Corp., 102 F.3d 1429, 1434 n. 3 (7th Cir. 1996). Additionally, Appellant needs to conform

the evidence to the complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 15 (dkt 433 pg 10-17) or relation back amendments.

Plaintiff Hinds argues that it has not been four months, as it arises from June 28, 2010 Order (dkt

410), an Amended Motion based on approved time extension (entered July 7, 2010 dkt 419), which the Court

denied (Entry dkt 428 July 12, 2010).On July 22, 2010, Appellants Motion to Amend or Alter Judgment(see

Exhibit I- dkt 433) filed pursuant to 59(e) was timely filed and is not four months late and pursuant to 60(b) as a

fall-back position: meaning that her arguments are substantial and relevant to the evidentiary record underlying

the entry of the summary judgment (see paragraph 16 above and dkt 433- see ex. I attached for arguments),

require an extraordinary remedy and should be granted for these exceptional circumstances. Critical to this

appeal, July 22, 2010 (dkt 433 (see Exhibit I)- allows Pro Se Appellant a new trial based on newly discovered

evidence. Appellant Hinds, who has been denied her right to a jury trial, which is a Constitutional right VII

Amendment, was timely filed as a 59(e), within the ten day plus three day mail rule, and the final Order was

entered on September 23, 2010 (dkt 440 (see Exhibit K). The Appellants Motions were timely filed, is newly

discovered evidence, and again the Defendants failed to respond to the Plaintiffs pleadings failing to meet

their deadlines L.R. 7.1 (see Exhibit I- dkt 433 pg. 10), yet the Court continues to show bias and prejudice by

ruling in their favor, without timely filed responsive pleadings, this is non-neutral, favoring and showing

partiality to Defendants and their law firms. A clear pattern is evident and allows an inference of bias,

prejudice, non-neutrality, favoring, and showing partialityto the male Defendants and their law firms, who

repeatedly failed to timely file a responsive pleading, under L.R. 7.1. Then, in violation of Judicial Cannons

Rules cited above, Judge Young and/or Magistrate Hussmann, and their legal staff, performed, in part, the

Defendants legal research, case analysis, and legal writings and then after jeopardizing their neutrality, makes

judicial decisions that are in Defendants favor, in spite of the Defendants failure to file a responsive pleading

ever. For example:

i. Entry Directing Further Proceedings (dkt 410) entered June 28, 2010 & Order denying Appellants

request for leave (dkt 440) entered September 23, 2010: newly discovered evidence after appeals filed,

which require a new trial with amended complaint, additional discovery, evidence authenticated, and

remand for further proceedings:

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Determination with employment taxes due] that is to be given adequate legal counsel, indemnity, and no

personal liability due to sound public policy reasons. Sanctions against Appellant would violate the laws

and bylaws that are contractual or membership provisions, thus interfering with Appellants rights to

contract. Plaintiff Hinds, Pro Se, represented Harmonys interests at the district court level since January

2008 but was denied Pro Se representation at the appellate level, an involuntary conversion of assets,

property rights, or legal interests, a fraud on the court with additional briefing forthcoming, and abreach of the EEOC/Toyota Contract (i.e. continuing acts and/or newly admissible evidence);

b) On July 9, 2010, timelyfiled [i.e. Appellant filed within 28-day rule supersedes the 10 day rule; plus 3

day mail time] in response to Order dkt. 411, Plaintiffs Motion For Leave To Alter Or Amend

Judgment; Alternatively Relief From Judgment filed pursuant to 59(e) (see Exhibit L- dkts. 420-425;

to avoid substantial prejudice and bias, leave of court to brief newly admissible evidence) and/or 60(b)

for newly discovered evidence that Appellant requested a leave to brief [legally complex for a Pro Se];

denied August 12, 2010 (see Exhibit M- dkt 436). On August 26, 2010, Appellant filed a Motion to

Alter/Amend Judgment, pursuant to 59(e) and/or 60(b) dkt 436 (see Exhibit N- dkt 438). On August 26,

2010, Judge Young and/or Magistrate Hussmann denied the Motion to Alter/Amend without Defendants

responsive pleadings, which was perceived as biased, prejudiced, non-neutral, partial and ruling in favor

of Defendants and their law firms (see Exhibit O- dkt 439).

c) In almost all instances since March 22, 2010, Defendants have repeatedly failed to file a response, Judge

Young and/or Magistrate Hussmann completed the legal research, analysis, and writings, then in a

perceived non-neutral, biased, and prejudiced manner, ruled in favor of Defendants, which has a material

impact on various court judgments and/or orders, including not limited to, dkts 116, 371-72, 377, 388,

397, and 411.

Newly discovered evidence that needs to be reflected in the complaint, as Ongoing Harassment

which allows exceptions to the general rules under Title VII EEOC (see Exhibit P); Ongoing Harassment

allows the EEOC to reach-back for facts, reported incidents, and patterns of discrimination or retaliation. But

more importantly, the pattern of bias, prejudice, non-neutral, favoring, and showing partialityto the male

Defendants and their law firms, who again failed to timely file a responsive pleading, under L.R. 7.1 as Judge

Young and/or Magistrate Hussmann performed the Defendants legal research, case analysis, and legal writings

and then decides in their favor, in spite of the Defendants failure to file a responsive pleading: Appellant must be

granted the right to amend her complaint, brief newly discovered evidence, authenticate the evidence prior to

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final judgments, additional discovery and release of discoverable evidence stayed without reason by Judge

Young, on January 13, 2010 (dkt 354), which substantially biased and prejudiced this litigation in favor of

Defendants.

19. On October 6, 2010, Appellant filed (see Exhibit Q- dkts 441-42) a Motion to Recuse Judge

Richard L.Young and Magistrate G. Hussmann, Jr. (see Exhibit R) that is pending before the court.

Appellant Hinds seeks disqualification (Judicial Canon Rule 2.12 Disqualification) and/or remove Judge

Young, Magistrate Hussmann, and/or their staff, due to irreparable bias, prejudice, non-neutrality, unfair,

partial to and favoring of male Defendants and their law firms, who have participated, directly or indirectly

in the credible trial threat target program. Plaintiff Hinds is a licensed CPA, JD, Public Arbitrator,

specializing in securities fraud, RICO, and business law cases and is a credible witness in multiple class-

action lawsuits (involving product liability, securities fraud, RICO, employment discrimination, etc.) that

are currently pending in litigation9. This harassing litigation is attempting to ruin Plaintiff Hinds credibility,

based off hearsay, untested/ unauthenticated evidence that has not been subject to an evidence hearing,

witness credibility and/or subjective character assessments that can only be judged by a fact-finding jury.

Plaintiff Hinds requested a hearing, who has not been heard in this case, and a violation of the Judicial

Canon Rule 2.09 Right to Be Heard10 .

20. On October 13, 2010, Order Granting Grant Thorntons Bill of Costs (see Exhibit R- dkt 443)

9RULE 2.11: JUDICIAL STATEMENTS ON PENDING* AND FUTURE CASES(A) A judge shall not make any statement that might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome or impair the fairness of amatter pending or impending* in any court.(B) The judge shall require similar abstention on the part of staff, court officers, and others subject to the judges direction andcontrol.

(C) A judge shall not, with respect to cases, controversies, or issues that are likely to come before the court, make pledges,promises, or commitments that are inconsistent with the impartial* performance of the adjudicative duties of judicial office.(D) This Rule does not prohibit public statements made in the course of a judges official duties or an explanation of courtprocedures, nor does it preclude a judge from commenting on proceedings in which the judge is a litigant in a personal capacity.10RULE 2.09: ENSURING THE RIGHT TO BE HEARD(A) A judge shall accord to every person who has a legal interest in a proceeding, or that persons lawyer, the right to be heardaccording to law.*(B) A judge may encourage parties to a proceeding and their lawyers to settle matters in dispute, but shall not act in a manner thatcoerces any party into settlement.

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which is disputed currently, with Motion to Stay Judgment Pending Appeal (dkt 445, ex. F pg 5 Microsoft, as

well as their law firm, Bose, McKinney & Evans, LLP [all defendants and their law firms] are now named

defendants in a continuing actions claim filed in July 2010 with the EEOC and OSHA and are before the

court, government agency, and/or Seventh Circuit filings), Motions in Opposition filed (dkt 452-464) and

pending, due in part to, the perceived fraud on the court under the Toyota credible trial threat target program,

which is a violation of the EEOC/Toyota Mediated Settlement Agreement (see Exhibit S), and with disputed

claims of costs [that are to be indemnified by the same individuals under Delaware State Law 145] of

$19,426.29 that includes $7,434 in attorney fees represented as costs, $320 Toyota subpoena costs (breach of

Toyota contract under the credible trial threat target program as these lawyers worked in secret. This is a

violation of the EEOC/Toyota Mediated Agreement, breach of contract anti-retaliation provisions (see Exhibit

S, pg. 1 paragraph 4), and is perceived as Ongoing Harassment and this agreement can be used as evidence

(Id. Paragraph 6). Appellant perceived this as evidence of prejudice, bias, and harassing conduct.

21. On October 18, 2010 (dkt 444) Motion for Summary Ruling Microsofts Bill of Costs and

Petition for Attorney Fees, is pending before the court. Appellant Hinds views this as harassment as Defendant

Microsoft and Plaintiff Hinds have filed over a dozen pleadings, and based on Judge David Hamiltons orders,

Microsofts request for fees and costs have been denied, not once, but twice (dkts 193-195 denied all post-

judgment motions that denied Microsofts request; not only was Microsoft denied costs and attorney fees, but

Plaintiff Hinds request for legal counsel was denied (dkt 147-49- seeking by invoking her indemnity

agreements and an advance for attorney fees, which has substantially prejudiced this litigation); dkt 251). The

denial of Hinds indemnity provisions and rights to adequate legal counsel are pending before the court and

agency reviews for Ongoing Harassment. This is a violation of the EEOC/Toyota Mediated Agreement,

breach of contract anti-retaliation provisions (see Exhibit S, pg. 1 paragraph 4), and is perceived as Ongoing

Harassment and this agreement can be used as evidence (Id. Paragraph 6): Microsofts no-notice

administrative defect was cured, EEOC has served notice, and prejudicing the tribunal and investigators with

this demand that was denied by Judge Hamilton years ago.

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22. On October 20, Defendant Thornton filed Motion for Sanctions (dkt 445-46), violating

protective orders by releasing confidential and privileged communications within the District Court who has no

jurisdiction in these privileged communications, raising substantial Constitutional rights, civil rights, new

jurisdictional issues, line-drawing questions for a licensed CPA duties under Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,

threatening a Public Arbitrator quasi-judicial officer by targeted harassment/intimidation/bullying, and others

that affect the substantive rights of Appellant. Appellant filed sanctions against Defendants for violating the

protective order, (dkt 455-56; 459-464) with sanctions requested, and pending before the District Court.

23. On October 22, 2010, Appellant filed Notice of Appeal and Seventh Circuit docketed Appeal

No. 10-3457. Judge Young did not find this appeal to be frivolous nor did Judge Young raise any objection to

this appeal. Appellant Hinds relied on this judicial opinion when proceeding with her appeal for 10-3457 and

was never under any belief that this was frivolous but rather is plausible and arguable, in light of Pro Se status

afford liberal interpretations. Appellant was directed by the Seventh Circuit to complete Jurisdiction

Memorandums related to timely filing, which Appellant has timely filed within the 28-day deadline for 59(e),

and for appealable points of law. Not to mention, the Motion to Recuse (dkts. 441-42), the subsequent decision

to grant Defendant Thornton Costs (dkt 443) rather than disqualify themselves was an act of bias, perception of

bias, prejudice, non-neutrality, favor, and partial to Defendants. This pattern of bias and prejudice that has

emerged during this litigation, became painfully obvious in 2010 judicial decisions, law firm collusion, and is

attributable, in part, to the credible trial threat target program contained in the newly discovered evidence:

these bias and prejudicial decisions became blatantly obvious, after the Notice of Appeals 10-2098/10-2555

were filed, as Defendants repeatedly failed to respond to any post-judgment motions.

24. On October 25, 2010 (see Exhibit T- dkts. 451-52), Appellant filed a Petition to Remove Judge

Young and Magistrate Hussmann, due to reasons argued in pleadings, and pending decision. This is a result of

the perceived pattern of bias, prejudice, non-neutrality, favor, and partiality shown to Defendants and their law

firms. A triggering act was Order (dkt 443) Granting Thornton costs, after Appellant had filed a Motion to

Recuse (dkts. 441-42) that was pending [Defendants failed to answer], raised fraud on the court issues,

disputed costs with a request for a hearing, breach of EEOC/Toyota contract, a new action requiring indemnity

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provisions to be invoked under Delaware Law 145, EBRC/AICPA bylaws, and/or EEOC/Toyota contract.

25. On October 27, 2010, Appellant filed a Motion to Stay Judgment Pending Appeal

for dkts. 443, 444, 445-46, in part due to the fraud on the court, prejudice, bias, and harassing conduct

exhibited pre and post-judgment for reasons outlined in such motion or to be motioned. The motion for fraud

on the court is pending motion submission.

26. On November 1, 2010, Appellant was ordered to file a brief memorandum stating why this

appeal should not be LIMITED to a review of the orders entered on September 23, 2010, and October 13, 2010,

noted in the previous paragraph [this appeal appears timely only as to the orders entered on September 23, 2010,

and October 13, 2010, denying appellant Susan Hindss motion to alter or amend judgment and awarding Grant

Thornton costs]. The orders to be briefed, include entries after June 28, 2010, that were timely filed under a

59(e) or otherwise, including but not limited to, September 23 and October 13, 2010 Orders, and the pattern of

bias, prejudice, non-neutrality, favor, or partiality toward Defendants that has materially prejudiced this

litigation, justice not served, and Constitutional rights violated including I Amend. freedom of speech (two

unilateral protective orders), XIV Amend. (due process, equal protection), and VII Amend. (right to a jury trial).

II. ARGUMENTS

On November 30, 2010, Appellant was ordered by the Seventh Circuit, to show cause by December

14, 2010, why she should not be sanctioned for engaging in frivolous litigation by relitigating issues

already decided by this court. Importantly, district Judge Young did not find Appellants Notice of

Appeal filed October 22, 2010 (dkt 447) frivolous nor relitigating issues. Appellant is focused on

newly discovered evidence, credible trial threat target program administration, orders granting costs

when a fraud on the court exists as the evidence is not authenticated therefore no final judgment

should be rendered, and the pattern of bias, prejudice, non-neutrality, favor, and partial to Defendants.

A. APPEAL IS NOT FRIVILOUS ACCORDING TO SEVENTH CIRCUIT STANDARDS, BASED

ON MERITS, AND PERCEIVED BIAS, NON-NEUTRALITY, FAVOR TOWARD

DEFENDANTS REQUIRE JUDCIAL DISQUALIFICATION, DUE TO PREJUDICE

Pro Se Appellant is inferring the Seventh Circuit reference to sanctions for frivolous litigation to be

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pursuant to Cir. Rule 38 and/or Fed.R.App.P. Rule 38: Damages and Costs for Frivolous Appeals, stating,

If a court of appeals determines that an appeal is frivolous, it may, after a separately filed motion or

notice from the court and reasonable opportunity to respond, award just damages and single or doublecosts to the appellee.printed in 28 U.S.C. R. 38 (1988) (amended 1994).

To apply Rule 38, the federal courts make two determinations. Spiegel v. Continental Illinois National

Bank, 790 F. 2d 638 (7th Cir. 1986). First, to establish that the appeal was frivolous, the court must determine

whether the result of the appeal was obvious or the appellant's argument is wholly without merit. Spiegel, 790

F.2d at 650. Second, the court must determine whether sanctions are appropriate by looking for "an 'indication

of the appellant's bad faith suggesting that the appeal was prosecuted with no reasonable expectation of altering

the district court's judgment and for purposes of delay or harassment or out of sheer obstinacy.'" Spiegel, 790

F.2d at 650, quoting Reid v. United States, 715 F.2d 1148, 1155 (7th Cir. 1983). See Szabo Food Service, Inc. v.

Canteen Corp.,823 F.2d 1073, 1081 (7th Cir.1987). If the decision is reasoned, and the reasoning at least

colorable, an argument based on its reasoning is unlikely to be frivolous. (Id.)

In the present case, the first determination fails as the District Judge did not find Appeal No. 10-3457 as

frivolous as the result is not obvious nor are appellants arguments wholly without merit. Appellant has not filed

her appeal brief, therefore the merit of the appeal cannot be measured until in fact the appeal brief has been

submitted for court review. The basis of 10-3457 has merit related to newly discovered evidence (dkts. 419,

420-25, 433, 438- see Exhibit I, L, N; Judgments/Orders/Entries 410, 411, 428, 436, 439, 440- see Exhibit K, M,

O, U, V) , the credible trial threat target program that violates the EEOC/Toyota Mediated agreement (Id. See

Exhibit S), Motion to Recuse Judge Young and Magistrate Hussmann (i.e. bias, prejudice, non-neutral,

partiality, and favor shown to Defendants)(dkts. 441-42), and Orders for Costs that is based on fraud on the

court (dkt 443- see Exhibit R)(see Exhibits F, G, H for some examples of fraud on the court, disputed and

unauthenticated evidence.

The second determination is one of bad faith with no reasonable expectation of altering the district

courts judgment. Appellant Hinds, Pro Se, Public Arbitrator, a licensed Certified Public Accountant, filed her

Notice of Appeal, in good faith, and based on her appealable points have a reasonable expectation of altering the

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courts judgment by briefing newly admissible evidence, like the credible trial threat target program, Recusing

the Judge and/or Removing the Judge. Appeal 10-3457 cannot be relitigating issues because it is based on

Orders, Entries, or Judgments entered after the Appeal Nos. 10-2098/10-2555. The newly discovered evidence is

related to the subject matter and the underlying summary judgment but are Ongoing Harassment as defined by

EEOC (see Exhibit P).

Additionally, Appellant detected a new pattern emerging of judicial bias, prejudice, non-neutrality,

partiality, and favor shown toward Defendants and their law firms and is therefore not relitigating issues

already decided by the court. Appellant filed a Motion to Recuse (see Exhibit Q) based on the fact that the

Judge, Magistrate, and their legal staff was performing legal research, legal analysis, and writings, on behalf of

Defendants who failed to file their responsive pleadings since March 2010, and then ruled in favor of the

Defendants: this a non-neutral decision, biased, prejudiced, and partial to Defendants.

In the alternative, Plaintiff believes that an exception applies, as established by Thompson v.

Immigration and Naturalization Service, 375 U.S. 384, 84 S.Ct. 397, 11 L.Ed.2d 404 (1964) (per curiam). In

Thompson, post-trial motions under Rule 59 were filed untimely, after the entry of judgment. The moving party

alleged that he relied upon opposing counsel's failure to raise a claim of untimeliness when the motions were

filed and the district court's explicit statement that the Rule 59 motion was made "in ample time." The Court said

that under these "unique circumstances" the case should be remanded to be heard on its merits. Id. at 387, 84

S.Ct. at 399.

In the present case, Pro Se Appellant Hinds, who believes that she is being denied her indemnity

provisions discriminatorily that has left her underrepresented, pleading significant hardships such as in

indigent status, clearly disadvantaged, not to mention, perceived as overlawyering a Pro Se Plaintiff, whereby

zealous advocacy is displaced with aggressive lawyering. In spite of this overlawyering, the Defendants

failed to respond to any Plaintiff pleadings since March 22, 2010 and the credible trial threat target program

was requiring answers from them: Defendants did not timely file responses to any of Hinds pleadings since

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March 22, 2010, under the Thompson Rule, the opposing counsels failure to raise a claim of untimeliness when

the motions were filed and failing to file an answer at all, with the Judge acting as both Defense counsel and

Judge, has lost his objectivity, neutrality, and the judicial role is perceived as one of judicial activism. Appellant

Hinds relies on the matter of fact, that the Defendants have not filed many of their responsive pleadings, and the

matter of law, that Judge Young should not perform the legal research, analysis, writing for Defendants

[perceived as bias, prejudiced, non-neutral, favoritism, partial, and show favor to Defendants; Judge Young has

not shown favor to Pro Se, in spite of, Judicial Canon Rule 2.06 comment 3 that allows favoring Pro Se

Plaintiff] and then make a judicial decision on the same writings.

Importantly, should a judge not disqualify himself, then the judge is violation of the Due Process Clause

of the U.S. Constitution. United States v. Sciuto, 521 F.2d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 1996) ("The right to a tribunal

free from bias or prejudice is based, not on section 144, but on the Due Process Clause."). Should a judge

issue any order after he has been disqualified by law, and if the party has been denied of any of his / her

property, then the judge may have been engaged in the Federal Crime of "interference with interstate

commerce". The judge has acted in the judge's personal capacity and not in the judge's judicial capacity. It has

been said that this judge, acting in this manner, has no more lawful authority than someone's next-door neighbor

(provided that he is not a judge). Notice that it states "disqualification is required" and that a judge "must be

disqualified" under certain circumstances. The Supreme Court has also held that if a judge wars against the

Constitution, or if he acts without jurisdiction, he has engaged in treason to the Constitution. If a judge acts after

he has been automatically disqualified by law, then he is acting without jurisdiction, and that suggest that he

may be biased, engaging in criminal acts of treason, extortion and/or the interference with interstate commerce.

In the present case, after Appellant filed a Motion to Recuse (see Exhibit Q; dkts. 441-42), which the

Defendants failed to respond. The next action of not disqualifying themselves, but rather issued an Order for

Appellant to pay Costs (dkt 443- with no motion filed, unaudited, disputed $7,400 in attorney fees, disputed

evidence with a request for a hearing pending, evidence of EEOC/Toyota Mediated settlement agreement

breach), rather than disqualify themselves as requested was an act of bias or prejudice. Appellants

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Constitutional right XIV Amendment (due process, equal protection) have been violated by attempting to

fraudently convey assets or interfering with interstate commerce as it relates to Hinds rights in the

EBRC/XBRL/ERM contracts (i.e. Appellant Hinds believes she is due 3% of all contracts arising out of Hinds

original expressions contained in the EBRC business plan). On October 26, 2010, Appellant filed a Motion to

Remove (see Exhibit T) after this ruling, deciding without disqualifying oneself, is an act of bias, favor, and

partiality, in furtherance of the prejudice against Appellant.

Under Rule 38, a court of appeals may award sanctions against an appellant if the appeal is "frivolous,"

meaning that "the result is foreordained by the lack of substance to the appellant's arguments." Independent Lift

Truck Builders Union v. NACCO Materials Handling Group, Inc., 202 F.3d 965, 969 (7th Cir. 2000).

SeeBerwick Grain Co. v. Illinois Dep't of Agric., 217 F.3d 502 (7th Cir. 2000). Nevertheless, because the

imposition of sanctions underRule 38 is permissive, we may decline to award sanctions even when an appeal is

frivolous.Independent Lift Truck Builders Union, 202 F.3d at 969. Owens has already been sanctioned in the

district court, and considering the harshness of the sanctions relative to her income, along with the lack of merit

of B & S' cross-appeal, we believe further sanctions would serve no purpose. SeeLibby v. Illinois High Sch.

Ass'n, 921 F.2d 96, 98 (7th Cir. 1990) ("the balancing of equities . . . is an integral part of the proceeding for an

award of fees"); Munson v. Friske, 754 F.2d 683, 697 (7th Cir. 1985) ("fee awards are an equitable matter,

thereby permitting the district court to consider the relative wealth of the parties").

Appellant relied upon the Southern District of Indiana who did not find her Appeal No. 10-3457 to be

frivolous, Appellant paid the docketing fees of $455, and was directed by the Seventh Circuit to brief

Jurisdictional Memorandums. Appellant has pled a Hardship case, due to the protracted litigation, and

abandoned by MEP during complex litigation due to undisclosed medical problems. In May 2010, since the

filing of theIn forma Pauperis, which was withdrawn but plead indigent status, the employment blacklisting has

continued, hence Ongoing Harassment, and the inability to pay sanctions that serves no purpose but to punish

Appellant when the standard is one of deterrence not punishment. Microsoft, No good deed goes unpunished.

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B. APPELLANT NOT RELITIGATING ISSUES, RATHER NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE,

INCLUDINGCREDIBLE TRIAL THREAT TARGET PROGRAM DISCRIMINATORY ON

ITS FACE, ONGOING HARASSMENTEXCEPTION

The Order requested if Appellant was engaging in frivolous litigation by relitigating issues already

decided by this court. Appellant is arguing new motions and orders that were filed after Appeals 10-2098

and 10-2555 were filed (consolidated appeal), thus a factual impossibility. In the first consolidated appeal 10-

2098/10-2555, the dispositive question posed by Judge Young, whether or not Grant Thornton was Hinds

employer, then stayed Hinds request for pending discoverable evidence that was being withheld (i.e. evasive

discovery Defendant Thornton), and the arguments focused on this threshold question.

InRobinson, the Court interpreted the anti-retaliation provision ofTitle VII broadly, specifically stating

that individuals who engage in EEO activity rely on the anti-retaliation provisions in order to maintain

unfettered access to the EEO process.Robinson v. Shell Oil Co. , 519 U.S. 337 (1997). See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-

2(a), 3(a) (2000); See Burlington, S. Ct. at 2414 ([The] purpose of the anti-retaliation provision is to ensure that

employees are completely free from coercion against reporting unlawful practices [The employers]

contrary view of the statuteemployer free to retaliate with impunity. EEOC Amicus Curiae,Passantino v.

Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods. Inc., 212 F.3d 493 (9th Cir. 2000) (Nos. 97-36191, 98-35036). In 10-3457,

the subject matter is categorized as Title VII, involving the same parties, but is newly discovered evidence

(dkts. 419, 420-25, 433, 438- see Exhibit I, L, N; Judgments/Orders/Entries 410, 411, 428, 436, 439, 440-

see Ex. K, M, O, U, V), including the credible trial threat target program (pink-listed: but-for Hinds

involvement in protected activity, she would not have been placed in target program) that violates the

EEOC/Toyota Mediated agreement (Id.)(See Exhibit S), EEOC anti-retaliation provisions, which is not

reflected in the current complaint nor has any decision been rendered on this evidence.

These actions are taken in good faith, are reasonable, and are not frivolous that are subject to

sanctions. Under Title VII, Appellant was given the Right To Sue Determination Letters by the EEOC, in

2005; 2008; and 2010 (jurisdiction not at issue) as an Ongoing Harassment complaint (see Exhibit P).

Under Title VII, the rare award of Defendant attorney fees must be based on frivolous, unreasonable

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complaints, however Appellants complaint has been ruled as plausible by Honorable Judge Daniel Tinder

(dkt 116 pg. ) which is a higher threshold then frivolous, therefore this cannot be frivolous.

Importantly, Appellant is acting reasonable, with newly issued Right to Sue Determination Letters

issued by the EEOC on October 26, 2010 (see Exhibit N), jurisdiction is not an issue, and is pending a letter

of reconsideration due to an EEOC administrative mistake or oversight. A Right to Sue would be evidence

that Appellant is acting reasonable, with an Ongoing Harassment complaint, with res adjudicate

concerns, and any sanctions would be viewed as punishment, which is contra to the Title VII standard of

deterrence, not one of sanctioning Plaintiffs as a punitive measure to chill her rights to petition. Under

Brown, then, Solomen cannot be liable for Redwoods attorneys fees unless she knew or should have known

that her claim was frivolous. Solomen v. Redwood Advisory Company, 183 F.Supp.2d 748 (E.D. Pa 2002). The

decision to award attorneys fees in these circumstances could lead to a chilling effect on future civil rights

plaintiffs, a result that would contravene Congress intent in enacting the very civil rights statutes at issue here.

See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 419-20. I find plaintiffs claim neither frivolous, nor

unreasonable, nor without foundation. Accordingly, I will deny defendants request for attorneys fees and costs

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(k). (Id.)(attorney's fees may not be assessed against a plaintiff who fails to state

a claim under 42 U.S.C. 1988 or under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 unless his complaint is

frivolous). (Id at 422). Unless there is "indisputably absent any factual or legal basis'" for the wrong

asserted in the complaint, the trial court, "[i]n a close case," should permit the claim to proceed at least to

the point where responsive pleadings are required. Williams v. Faulkner, 837 F.2d 304 (1988).

C. Plaintiff Hinds Request For Relief Are Extraordinary Circumstances That Create Substantial

Danger That The Underlying Judgment Was Unjust Points To Fraud On The Court and ToyotasCredible Trial Threat Program Affects This Litigation As Hinds, Public Arbitrator, Credible

Witness As A Former Toyota Manager, Is A Target Under Such Program

Appellant Hinds, former Toyota sr. manager, a credible witness with personal and professional

knowledge of securities fraud, product liability, RICO, employment discrimination and/or retaliation, and other class

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action litigation that is currently pending or past or future litigation or evidence attestation. Appellant Hinds argues

that extraordinary circumstances that create substantial danger that the underlying judgment was unjust due to the

administration of the credible trial threat target program that has targeted Hinds and labeled her a serial litigator

but it is really serial retaliation. Appellant Hinds points to fraud on the court, which will be further briefed in

future pleadings, in light of the credible trial threat target program that the Defendants, law firms, perception

partners, agents, and others, that were paid and conspired together, to conceal evidence, obstruct justice, and

professionally mob Plaintiff Hinds of her character, integrity, and livelihood.

Additionally, this is newly discovered evidence which was previously protected information, until

around September 15, 2010, the press announced the court released discoverable evidence in the case involving

Dimitrious Biller, Toyotas former legal counsel, who is suing Toyota for RICO, wrongful discharge, emotional

distress, and just won court approval to release protected documents to the public. Biller v. Toyota, cv09-5429-cas

(filed July 24, 2009 Los Angeles CA)11. Plaintiff Hinds is seeking this evidence for this litigation and pending claims,

as Toyota sued Biller and his firm LDT Consulting. Similarly, Harmony being dismissed is akin to an involuntary

conversion of property rights attributed to Plaintiff Hinds, while in the capacity of EBRC CEO, a not-for-profit

under Delaware State Law 145 (see Exhibit C) Plaintiff Hinds is provided mandatory indemnity and assures no

personal liability (Id.; Exhibit D to D-4). All of which arises out of EBRC agents materially harmful adverse

11 Jim Halbrooks [Mike Willis, PwC Toyotas auditors/EBRC board member in spite of SEC 102(e) violation involving

securities fraud and presentment of contractsdominating individual, in present case] has been allowed to tarnish my reputation.In the process, he has exposed Toyota to harms way because I am a representative of Toyota.Biller v. Toyota, Case 2:09 cv-05429-GHK-RZ filed July 24, 2009) at pg. 81. There is an inherent conflict of interests between outside counsel and Toyota; themore work outside counsel performs on cases, the more money outside counsel generates.Id. at pg. 84. Furthermore, I amresponsible for managing some of the most high exposure cases, I have taken cases to trial against Repeat Offenders todiscourage them from filing more complaints against Toyota and I have taken more rollover cases to trial than anybody. I

have done so to firmly establish the cornerstone of Toyotas litigation management philosophy (Credible Trial Threat).

Defendants, and each of them, are employed by, associated with, and/or comprise, an enterprise engaged in, or the activities ofwhich affect, interstate and foreign commerceenterprises affairs through a pattern of racketeering activityall in violation of18 U.S.C. Sec 1962(c).Id. at 63. Defendants, and each of them, have conspired, and continue to conspire, to violate theprovisions of 18 U.S.C. Secs. (a), (b), and (c).Id. taking actions to compel BILLERs [Hinds] silence regarding the crimescommitted by defendantscoercing BILLER [Hinds] to enter into and execute a Severance Agreementusing theConfidentiality Clause contained in the Severance Agreement as a sword to compel BILLERs [Hinds- including a no

investigation clause that is against good public policy as Hinds, licensed CPA, Public Arbitrator] silencefiling misleading andfraudulent declarations and evidencedestroyinginterfering with BILLERs [Hinds] attempt to assert his [her] rights inBillerv. LADAs Office [Hinds v. EBRC, et. al.- the committee that Toyota appointed Hinds to SCEBR to EBRC CEO & President:both Biller and Hinds became Labor Day Martyrs]the Severance Agreement [EBRC Settlement Agreement valued at$150,000, rising to $600,000 based on last offer; Toyota Settlement Agreement valued at $600,000 including payment to SusanSparks, former counsel MEP Legal; Breach of Contract March 2005 paid $15,000 for minor breach, liquidated damages and$100,000 final installment under Toyota consulting agreement] is being used by defendants in furtherance of conspiracyracketeeringto conceal, withhold, and destroy evidence and information, obstruct justice, and deceive the judicial system,litigants, NHTSA, and public at large.Id. at 64-66.

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employment actions, orchestrated under Toyotas credible trial threat program.

On August 12, 2010, Judge Young Entry (dkt 436) denied Plaintiffs motion (dkt 420-25) stating that Rule

60(b) grants relief in an extrao

jurisdicitionalmemo dec14 2010 ordernumber10-3457 final

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