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PHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSJuly-September 2006July-September 2006July-September 2006July-September 2006July-September 2006July-September 2006July-September 2006July-September 2006July-September 2006July-September 2006

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(Continued on page 10)

True to its mandate to deliver, without fail, judicial education and training to officialsand personnel of the judiciary, PHILJA carried on dauntlessly, with invaluable helpfrom its international development partners-friends, despite the sudden unavailabilityof funding particularly for its core programs.

We managed to hold, from the remaining allocations, two (2) Orientation Seminar-Workshops for Newly Appointed Clerks of Court and one for Newly Appointed Judges;the 11th Pre-Judicature Program for aspirants to judge positions; and the Level 4 phaseof the 13th RJCEP for the NCJR. Also included were seven (7) Special Focus programsand the Career Enhancement Program (Continuing Legal Education) for a total of 537Court Attorneys of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan and theCourt of Tax Appeals. The sustaining support of the USAID and The Asia Foundationmade possible for PHILJA to carry out the use for the first time of the Court’s ownvideo conferencing equipment for the live multiple site video conferencing seminar onthe features of the new law, the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A. No. 9344).Although handicapped by technical glitches, this event underscored the benefits andadvantages of video conferencing in the simultaneous dissemination of informationthrough video conference linking different sites.

What lifted our spirits was the presentation of the Judicial Reform Index for thePhilippines Report to the Supreme Court by the American Bar Association – Asia LawInitiative (ABA-Asia). We were glad to know that PHILJA played a major role ingarnering for the Philippine Judiciary the Positive ratings in three (3) of the thirty-one(31) Factor Correlations – Judicial Qualification and Preparation, Continuing Legal Education,and Code of Ethics – and for its felt contribution to the Neutral ratings in twelve (12)other factors.

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July to September 2006 Volume VIII, Issue No. 31

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PHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWS2

ORIENTATION SEMINAR-WORKSHOP FORNEWLY APPOINTED CLERKS OF COURT

This quarter, PHILJA conducted the 2nd and3rd Orientation Seminar-Workshops for Newly AppointedClerks of Court, on July 12 to 14, 2006, at the PHILJADevelopment Center, Tagaytay City, and August15 to 17, 2006, at the Cebu Grand Hotel, Cebu City,respectively.

Twenty-nine (29) newly appointed clerks ofcourt of Regions I to V received their certificate ofcompletion at Tagaytay City.

REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS

REGION ILinda B. GumabolRTC Br. 9, La Trinidad, Benguet

REGION IIMarvin P. AnicetoRTC Br. 15, Alfonso Lista, IfugaoRemelyn A. Dalafu-TagaoRTC Br. 1, Tuguegarao CityVoltaire B. GarciaRTC Br. 30, Bambang, Nueva VizcayaMaria Vida M. GuillermoRTC Br. 25, Tabuk, Kalinga

REGION IIIEsmeralda D. Balderas-DavidRTC Br. 71, Iba, ZambalesMaricar P. Dela CruzRTC Br. 35, Gapan, Nueva EcijaMaria Belinda C. RamaRTC Br. 79, Malolos, Bulacan

REGION IVRussel B. DalisayRTC Br. 84, Batangas CityMa. Rosenne Flores-AvilaRTC Br. 73, Antipolo, RizalErwin M. FortunatoRTC Br. 82, Odiongan, RomblonVenus I. GapuzRTC Br. 47, Puerto Princesa CityJoan C. MosatallaRTC Br. 71, Antipolo, RizalLita M. TenorioRTC Br. 11, Balayan, Batangas

REGION VCamilo A. OlivaRTC Br. 48, Masbate CityAlexander A. TordillaRTC Br. 33, Pili, Camarines Sur

MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS

REGION IIRonald L. MamauagMTC Rizal, Cagayan

REGION IVNathaniel A. AdapMTC Roxas, Oriental MindoroRuben B. AlbaytarMTC OCC, San Pedro, LagunaAsuncion G. FabellaMTC Bongabon, Oriental MindoroSocorro G. GorospeMTC San Jose, Occidental MindoroVenus R. PandoMTC San Pedro, LagunaSusana B. VillenaMTC Dasmariñas, Cavite

MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES

REGION IJowel J. VecinoMTCC Br. 1, San Fernando City, La Union

OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT

REGION IDiosdado L. DoctoleroOCC, Agoo, La Union

REGION IIEdelweiss Feliza G. GardonOCC, Tuguegarao CityJane S. PagaOCC, Aparri, Cagayan

REGION IVBernadette P. PlatonOCC, Sta. Cruz, Laguna

REGION VCandice Guada Cresilda C. AlmodovarOCC, Ligao, Albay

On the other hand, thirty-one (31) newlyappointed clerks of court of Regions VI to XIIreceived their certificate of completion at Cebu City.

PHILJAACADEMIC PROGRAMS

PHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSJuly-September 2006July-September 2006July-September 2006July-September 2006July-September 2006July-September 2006July-September 2006July-September 2006July-September 2006July-September 2006 3


REGION VITisha Diane A. AlipaoRTC Br. 35, Iloilo City

REGION VIIDenis D. PacasRTC Br. 54, Lapu-Lapu CityChevin VasquesRTC Br. 9, Cebu CityMaila L. MaisogRTC Br. 51, Carmen, Bohol

REGION VIIIEsterlita D. Cupat-DemiaoMTC Br. 26, San Juan, Southern LeyteMa. Janice B. Latoja-IrasgaRTC Br. 4, Dolores, Eastern SamarJosephine A. Mejia-RomeroRTC OCC, Ormoc City, Leyte

REGION IXBriethner G. AmeldaRTC Br. 16, Zamboanga CityEva Aireen N. MontezaRTC Br. 15, Zamboanga City

REGION XNoweh Meca E. PacamalanRTC Br. 1, Butuan City, Agusan del Norte

REGION XIAbdul S. BuayanRTC OCC, Cotabato CityRucel C. CayetanoRTC Br. 31, Tagum CityMarivic E. FillalanRTC Br. 22, General Santos City, South CotabatoJoynalyn A. Nemenzo-AgnoRTC Br. 3, Compostela Valley, Davao del Norte

REGION XIIRakimah B. MacarayaRTC Br. 1, Iligan City, Lanao del Norte


REGION VIMa. Lorda M. SantizoMTC San Joaquin, Iloilo City

REGION VIIRyan S. PlazaMTC Argao, Cebu

REGION IXIvy May E. CarpioMTC Alicia, Zamboanga Sibugay

REGION XEmma Flor O. OrillanedaMTC Tandag, Surigao del NorteAnita C. PuposMTC Medina, Misamis Oriental


REGION VIEvelyn C. CoronelMTCC, La Carlota City, Negros Occidental

REGION VIIRogelio C. CubeloMTCC Br. 1, Tagbilaran City, Bohol

REGION VIIIEdwin S. VilbarMTCC Maasin City, Southern Leyte

REGION XJovelyn J. PatocMTCC Br. 1, Oroquieta City

REGION XIMelchor A. BorresMTCC Br. 2, Island Garden City of SamalRestituto A. MadrazoMTCC Br. 7, Davao City

METROPOLITAN CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS

REGION VIMary Rose A. Miclat9th MCTC Zariaga-New Lucena-Leganes,Zariaga, Iloilo

REGION VIIYolanda A. Aton7th MCTC, Alicia-Mabini, Bohol

REGION IXChinita V. ElcamelMCTC, Rizal-Sibutad, Zamboanga del Norte

REGION XGlenda A. Santos3rd MCTC, Kinoguitan-Sugbungcongon,Misamis OrientalNeil S. LegaspiMCTC Tubod-Alegria, Surigao del Norte


42ND ORIENTATION SEMINAR-WORKSHOPFOR NEWLY APPOINTED JUDGES

PHILJA conducted the 42nd Orientation Seminar-Workshop for Newly Appointed Judges at the PHILJADevelopment Center Tagaytay City, on August 21to September 1, 2006. Among the thirty-three (33)judges who completed this two-week orientationprogram, twenty-six (26) judges were newlyappointed while seven (7) judges were promotedfrom the first level court to the second level court.

The two-week orientation program wasdesigned to clarify between acceptable andunacceptable behavior and conduct of judges incourt and out of court; to apply the skills ofresearch, reasoning, and decision writing to thedischarge of their duties; and to resolve normallyexpected issues of substantive and procedural law,which may come before them in the first two (2) orthree (3) years of their tenure on the Bench.

A. NEW APPOINTMENTS


REGION IIHon. Joseph P. BaguilatRTC Br. 14, Lagawe, Ifugao

REGION IVHon. Matias M. Garcia IIRTC Br. 19, Bacoor, CaviteHon. Marino E. RubiaRTC Br. 24, Biñan, Laguna

REGION VIIHon. Estela Alma A. SingcoRTC Br. 12, Cebu City

REGION XIHon. Panambulan M. MimbisaRTC Br. 37, General Santos City

METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS

NATIONAL JUDICIAL CAPITAL REGION

Hon. Josephus Joannes H. AsisMeTC Br. 40, Quezon CityHon. Caridad M. Walse-LuteroMeTC Br. 34, Quezon CityHon. Ramsey Domingo G. PichayMeTC Br. 78, Parañaque City


REGION IIHon. Eufren F. ChangaleMTC Cabarroquis, QuirinoHon. Cresencio I. MaliwatMTC Cordon, Isabela

REGION IIIHon. Rixon M. GarongMTC San Leonardo, Nueva EcijaHon. Sheila Marie Geronimo-OrquillasMTC Plaridel, BulacanHon. Liza Marie R. Picardal-TecsonMTC Hagonoy, Bulacan

REGION IVHon. Rosalie Ang LuiMTC Pinamalayan, Mindoro Oriental

REGION VIIHon. Jaena T. LagudaMTC Sibulan, Negros Oriental

REGION VIIIHon. Wenifredo C. CuatonMTC Pastrana, Leyte

PHILJAACADEMIC PROGRAMS

Participants to the 42nd

Orientation Seminar-Workshop for NewlyAppointed Judges withSandiganbayan JusticesEdilberto G. Sandoval andDiosdado M. Peralta andPHILJA’s Atty. Amelia T.Guillamun.


RJCEP

The Academy conducted the 13th Regional JudicialCareer Enhancement Program (Level 4) for Judges, Clerksof Court, and Branch Clerks of Court of the RegionalTrial Courts and First Level Trial Courts of the NationalCapital Judicial Region (NCJR) (Batch 2) last July 4 to6, 2006, at the Hyatt Regency Hotel RoxasBoulevard, Pasay City. Ninety-two (92) RTC judgesand twenty-three (23) First Level Trial Court judgesattended the program from July 4 to 6, while onehundred forty-four (144) clerks of court attendedon July 5 to 6, 2006. The participants were fromthe Regional Trial Courts and First Level Courtsof Quezon City, Marikina, Pasig, San Juan, Taguig,Pateros, Caloocan, Mandaluyong, Malabon,Navotas and Valenzuela.

The discussion on the New Judicial Code ofConduct and International Covenants in DomesticCases elicited the active participation of the judges.Just as interesting to the judges was thepresentation of jurisprudence illustrating theCourt’s interpretation of related concepts, such asthe difference between gross, simple andunbecoming conduct.

REGION IXHon. Jimmynador J. Mijares, Jr.MTC Alicia, Zamboanga Sibugay

REGION XHon. Rainelda H. Estacio-MontesaMTC Alubijid, Misamis Oriental


REGION XHon. Nora B. MontejoMTCC Br. 2, Oroquieta City, Misamis Occidental

MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS

REGION IIHon. Bill D. Bucuyan1st MCTC Bagabag-Diadi, Nueva VizcayaHon. Ferdinand E. DalpigMCTC Naguillan-Reina, IsabelaHon. Andrew P. Dulnuan2nd MCTC Madella-Nagtipunan, Quirino

REGION IIIHon. Antonio M. Pangan2nd MCTC Capas-Bamban-Concepcion, Tarlac

REGION VIIIHon. Ethel V. Mercado-Gutay8th MCTC Victoria-San Antonio, Northern SamarHon. Chona Apostol-Octa13th MCTC MacArthur-Mayorga, Leyte

REGION IXHon. Vittorio Dante D. Dalman1st MCTC Riza-Sibutad, Zamboanga del Norte

B. PROMOTIONS


NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION

Hon. Paz Esperanza Martelino-CortesRTC Br. 271, Pasig CityHon. Reynaldo M. LaigoRTC Br. 56, Makati CityHon. Nicanor A. Manalo, Jr.RTC Br. 161, Pasig CityHon. Cesar Pabel D. SulitRTC Br. 162, Pasig CityHon. Dina P. TevesRTC Br. 142, Makati City

REGION IIIHon. Belen B. OrtizRTC Br. 25, Cabanatuan City, Nueva EcijaHon. Maria Concepcion Yumang-PanganRTC Br. 53, Guagua, Pampanga

11TH PRE-JUDICATURE PROGRAM

The Academy conducted the 11th Pre-JudicatureProgram (PJP) last July 7 to 9 (1st Week), 14 to 16(2nd week), 21 to 23 (3rd Week), and 28 to 30 (4th

week), 2006, at the Training Rooms 1 to 3,Centennial Building, Supreme Court, Manila. Atotal of thirty (30) lawyers completed the program.

The Pre-Judicature Program is a pre-requisitefor appointment to the Bench as well as to theposition of justice in the Court of Appeals,Sandiganbayan, and Court of Tax Appeals.Likewise the completion of the program also fulfillsthe Mandatory Continuing Legal Education(MCLE) requirements for one (1) complianceperiod.

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SPECIAL FOCUS

PROGRAMS

MULTI-SECTORAL SEMINAR-WORKSHOPON AGRARIAN JUSTICE FOR

NEGROS OCCIDENTAL

PHILJA, in partnership with the AgrarianJustice Foundation, Inc. (AJFI), the Department ofAgrarian Reform (DAR), the Department of Justice(DOJ), Philippine Ecumenical Action forCommunity Empowerment (Peace Foundation) andthe Silliman University, conducted the 8th Multi-Sectoral Seminar-Workshop on Agrarian Justice, on July9 to 12, 2006, at Siliman University Campus,Dumaguete City. A total of seventy (70)participants, comprising judges, prosecutors, PAOlawyers, officers of the Philippine National Police,and representatives from the Department ofAgrarian Reform (DAR), Commission on HumanRights (CHR), Silliman University and Civil Society,attended the seminar-workshop.

Undersecretary Renato F. Herrera of theDepartment of Agrarian Reform discussed theprocedural implementation of the ComprehensiveAgrarian Reform Program (CARP) and the currentstatus of the legal disputes which arise in the courseof its implementation.

The seminar-workshop is part of the continuingjudicial education program of the Academy underthe Department of Special Areas of Concern chairedby Professor Sedfrey M. Candelaria.

NATIONAL ACADEMIC FORUM ON LIBERTYAND PROSPERITY : A PROGRAM FOR THE

PHILIPPINE JUDICIARY

The Supreme Court through PHILJA,conducted the National Academic Forum on Liberty andProsperity: A Program for the Philippine Judiciary, onJuly 20, 2006, at San Beda College, Manila. Thisforum brought together a total of one hundredseventy-seven (177) attendees – incumbent andretired Supreme Court justices; deans, professorsand students of the different graduate schools oflaw, governance and business, nationwide; andlawyers of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals,Court of Tax Appeals and Sandiganbayan.

In his keynote address, Chief JusticePanganiban related the concepts of liberty andprosperity to the functioning of Philippine courts,in the hope of igniting and inspiring discussionson issues that may need to be addressed inespousing the judicial philosophy in the courts.

ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION ONGREEN BENCHES

PHILJA, in support of the United StatesAgency for International Development (USAID),Asian Environmental Compliance andEnforcement Network (AECEN), United NationsDevelopment Programme-Global EnvironmentFacility-Small Grants Programme (UNDP-GEF-SGP), and the Haribon Foundation, conducted theRoundtable Discussion on Green Benches, on July 21,2006, at the 7th Floor, New Building, SupremeCourt, Manila.

Participants to the Multi-Sectoral Seminar-Workshopon Agrarian Justice for Negros Occidental.


Participants to the Roundtable Discussion on Green Benches.

Participants to the Strengthening the Implementationof the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.

A total of twenty-five (25) participantsattended the activity comprising representativesfrom Supreme Court, PHILJA, Office of the CourtAdministrator, Regional Trial Courts, AlternativeLaw Groups (ALG), Asian EnvironmentalCompliance and Enforcement Network (AECEN),Ateneo School of Government, Batas Kalikasan,Department of Justice (DOJ), Environmental LegalAssistance Center-Palawan (ELAC), HaribonFoundation, Paglilingkod Batas PangkapatiranFoundation, Philippine Tropical ForestConservation Network, Tanggol Kalikasan and theUnited Nations Development Programme-GlobalEnvironment Facility-Small Grants Programme(UNDP-GEF-SGP).

Current issues and options to improveenvironmental adjudication, including thepossibility of establishing or designating “greenbenches;” and developing a continuing trainingprogram for judges on handling environmentalcases, were among the topics discussed.

Judge Gabriel T. Ingles reported on theWorkshop on Environment which he attendedalong with Supreme Court Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario and PHILJA Chancellor AmeurfinaMelencio Herrera, on April 26 to 27, 2006 inBangkok, Thailand.

STRENGTHENING THE IMPLEMENTATIONOF THE CODE OF MUSLIM PERSONAL LAWS

OF THE PHILIPPINES

PHILJA, in cooperation with The AsiaFoundation (TAF) and United States Agency forInternational Development (USAID), conductedthe Strengthening the Implementation of the Code ofMuslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, on July 24to 27, 2006, at the Garden Orchid Hotel,Zamboanga City. A total of forty-two (42)participants attended the program.

Dr. Steven Rood, Country Representative ofThe Asia Foundation, in his Opening Remarks,addressed the need for drafting new rules and codesfor Shari’a Courts. He emphasized the need forpeace, justice, prosperity and democracy not onlyin Muslim Mindanao but for the country as a wholeand that the need for justice to be accessible to allis paramount. He capsulized his speech in a phrasehe quoted from the Qu’ran, saying “All are obligedto seek justice.”

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PHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWS

SPECIAL FOCUS

PROGRAMS

VIDEO CONFERENCE ON THE JUVENILE JUSTICEAND WELFARE ACT OF 2006 (R.A. NO. 9344)

The Academy, in partnership with The AsiaFoundation, conducted the Video Conference on theJuvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A. No. 9344)in cooperation with the Supreme Court-Management Information Systems Office (SC-MISO), on July 27, 2006, held in Pan Pacific Hotel,Manila, Oasis Hotel, Clark, Pampanga, CrownRegency Suites, Mactan, Cebu, and in RoyalMandaya Hotel, Davao. The video conferencingseminar was attended by a total of seventy-eight(78) participants from all the sites. Senator andMajority Floor Leader Francis N. Pangilinan,delivered the Closing Remarks at Pan Pacific Hotel,Manila.

This activity marked a historic event for theSupreme Court. It was the first time that theCourt’s own video conferencing equipment wasused for the live multiple site video conferencing.

It was likewise very fitting that such equipmentbe first used in the landmark legislation of 2006,that is, R.A. No. 9344. This legislation wasexpected to have a tremendous impact in our justicesystem, particularly in cases involving juvenilesin conflict with the law.

TRAINING ON COURTROOM ISSUES

The Philippine Judicial Academy conducted theTraining in Courtroom Issues last September 22, 2006,at the Pan Pacific Hotel, Manila. Twenty-nine (29)judges from the first and second level courts ofManila, Las Piñas, Caloocan City, Pasig City, PasayCity, Makati City, Quezon City, Parañaque City,Mandaluyong City and Muntinlupa City attendedthe said training.

Justice Justo P. Torres, Jr., in his OpeningRemarks, emphasized the need to perpetuate therule of law for a stable and peaceful society. Theguest speaker of the training was Hon. EvelynLance, Advisory Board Member (ABA-Asia) and aRetired Family Circuit Court Judge in Hawaii, whodelved on Special Issues for Trial Judges,particularly on Effective Case and CourtroomManagement and Handling the Ex ParteCommunications.

Participants of the 9th Regional Multi-SectoralSeminar-Workshop on Juvenile and DomesticRelations Justice (Advanced Level) with Justice AliciaV. Sempio Diy and Professor Sedfrey M. Candelaria.

9TH REGIONAL MULTI-SECTORAL SEMINAR-WORKSHOP ON JUVENILE AND DOMESTICRELATIONS JUSTICE (ADVANCED LEVEL)

The Academy, in partnership with the UnitedNations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), conducted the9th Regional Multi-Sectoral Seminar-Workshop on Juvenileand Domestic Relations Justice (Advanced Level), on July26 to 28, 2006, at the Oasis Hotel, ClarkvilleCompound, Clark Perimeter Road, Angeles City.The three-day seminar-workshop was attended bya total of seventy-five (75) participants comprisingjudges, branch clerks ofcourt, court socialworkers, prosecutors,Public Attorney’s Officelawyers, and PhilippineNational Police Officersand representatives fromBureau of JailManagement andPenology handlingjuvenile and domesticrelations cases.

Part of the activity was devoted to a half-dayVideo Conference on the Juvenile Justice andWelfare Act of 2006 (Republic Act No. 9344), whichwas held simultaneously in Manila, Cebu, andDavao.

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DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

FOR JUDICIAL PERSONNEL

CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATIONPROGRAM FOR COURT ATTORNEYS OF THE

SUPREME COURT, COURT OF APPEALS,SANDIGANBAYAN, AND COURT OF TAX

APPEALS (BATCHES 1-4)

PHILJA conducted the Continuing Legal EducationProgram for Court Attorneys of the Supreme Court, Courtof Appeals, Sandiganbayan and Court of Tax Appeals(Batches 1 to 4), held at the Ballroom of Pearl ManilaHotel, Taft Avenue, Manila, on the following dates:1st Batch – August 3 to 4, 2006; 2nd Batch – August10 to 11, 2006; 3rd Batch – August 17 to 18, 2006;and 4th Batch – August 24 to 25, 2006. The 1st, 2nd,3rd, and 4th batches were attended by one hundredthirty-four (134), one hundred thirty-six (136), onehundred thirty-seven (137) and one hundred forty-nine (149) lawyer-participants, respectively.

Pursuant to Section 7(c), Bar Matter No. 850or the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education(MCLE), incumbent court lawyers are exemptedfrom the MCLE compliance requirement, however,they are mandated to participate in the continuingjudicial education program of PHILJA.

SEMINAR-WORKSHOP ON DOCKET ANDCASEFLOW MANAGEMENT

PHILJA, in partnership with the United StatesAgency for International Development (USAID)and the Rule of Law Effectiveness (ROLE),conducted the Seminar-Workshop on Docket andCaseflow Management from August 8 to 11, 2006, atthe Apo View Hotel, Davao City.

Twenty-three (23) judges and thirteen (13)clerks of court of the Autonomous Region inMuslim Mindanao (ARMM) attended the program.

The seminar-workshop aimed in training thejudges and clerks of court on case managementskills and the adoption of the enhanced caseflowmanagement system.

ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM FOR COURTSTENOGRAPHERS AND INTERPRETERS

The Academy conducted the EnhancementProgram for the Court Stenographers and Interpreters lastAugust 11, 2006 in Bacolod City. The program wasattended by a total of two hundred eight (208)participants comprising one hundred sixty (160)stenographers and forty-eight (48) interpreters.

Bacolod City’s Regional Trial Court ExecutiveJudge Roberto S. Chiongson and Municipal TrialCourts in Cities Executive Judge Lorna P.Demonteverde, were the ones who initiated theconduct of the program with the aim of enhancingthe English proficiency and communication skillsof their interpreters and stenographers.

CONVENTIONS

8TH METCJAP

The Supreme Court, through PHILJA, andthe Metropolitan and City Judges Association ofthe Philippines (MeTCJAP) conducted the 8th

National Convention-Seminar of the Metropolitan and CityJudges Association of the Philippines, on September 5to 8, 2006, at the East Asia Royale Hotel, GeneralSantos City. A total of one hundred eight (108)participants attended the convention-seminar.

With the theme “Justice Secured, Justice Assured,”it was aimed that the judges be encouraged toremain and appear strong and committed to thepublic good by instilling democratic values as wellas to uphold their role as front liners in theadministration of justice.

Lectures delivered were on Judicial Ethics,Ejectment, Summary Procedure, Batas PambansaBlg. 22 Cases, Criminal Procedure, JudicialPersonality Development, GSIS benefits, andJudicial Security. As an added activity to the sessionon Judicial Security, the participants were made toexperience actual target shooting.

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FACULTY DEVELOPMENT WORKSHOPFOR JUDGES-TRAINERS

PHILJA conducted the Faculty DevelopmentWorkshop for Judges-Trainers for Judges Training &Course on Court-Annexed Mediation (CAM) and JudicialSettlement Conference on Judicial Dispute Resolution, onJuly 24 to 27, 2006, at San Fernando, Pampanga.Thirty (30) judges from the courts of Pampangawere trained.

ON MEDIATION

BASIC MEDIATION COURSE

This quarter, the Philippine Mediation Center(PMC), conducted two (2) Basic Mediation Courses.The first was conducted in coordination withUnited States Agency for InternationalDevelopment (USAID) and The Asia Foundation(TAF), held at the Pongos Hotel, Ormoc City, Leyte,on July 31 to August 3, 2006 and attended by thirty-five (35) participants. The second was conductedat the Sea and Sky Hotel & Restaurant, SanFernando City, La Union, on August 22 to 25, 2006and attended by forty-nine (49) participants.

We consider also significant the Academy’s leadership in the conduct of the Academic and NationalForums on liberty and prosperity which were borne out of Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban’sarticulation of his judicial philosophy to “safeguard liberty and nurture prosperity.”

The National Forum, in particular, featured representative “voices” from different sectors of the society(Affected Constituencies, Branches of Government) and the presentation of the Experiences of theBench, Bar, Business Sector, Cultural Minorities, and the Disadvantaged Sector. Most remarkable, andcommendable, were the panel resolutions capping the sessions that emphasized the importance of thenexus between liberty and prosperity and how each individual could help in making it happen. Theresolutions called for collaborative efforts between the different sectors to achieve and sustain the sharedvision of prosperity.

We likewise find good reason to share the courses of action advocated after the discussion of the topicAccess to Justice to Implement Liberty and Prosperity by the Third Panel chaired by Justice Leonardo A.Quisumbing. These courses of action are: the initiation of a national campaign to inform the marginalizedsector and cultural minorities of their fundamental rights and liberties; the restructuring of the formaljustice system to interface with informal and indigenous justice systems; the sponsorship of a lawmandating lawyers’ acceptance of pro bono cases and a bigger appropriation for the judiciary so as toreduce filing fees; and the adaptation of the language of the law to the common people through translationof court decisions and proceedings into Filipino to enhance greater access to justice.

PHILJA continues to be in the thick of the action for the implementation of judicial reforms. Indeed,this quarter tested our resources and resolve and yet found us standing up to the challenge. This isPHILJA’s manifest commitment to the judiciary that we serve.

FFFFFrom the Chance l l o r’rom the Chance l l o r’rom the Chance l l o r’rom the Chance l l o r’rom the Chance l l o r’s Desks Desks Desks Desks Desk (Continued from page 1)

ORIENTATION FOR LAWYERS ON MEDIATION

PHILJA’s Philippine Mediation Center (PMC)and Justice Reforms Initiatives Support (JURIS)Project, in partnership with the CanadianInternational Development Agency (CIDA) andNational Judicial Institute (NJI) – Canada,conducted three (3) Orientations for Lawyers onMediation this quarter.

The first Orientation for Lawyers on Mediation wasconducted on August 23 to 24, 2006, at the VIPHotel, Don Apolinar Velez St., Cagayan de Oro City.A total of forty-six (46) court personnel and lawyersof the Public Attorney’s Office attended theprogram.

The second Orientation for Lawyers on Mediationwas conducted on August 29 to 30, 2006 at the Seaand Sky Hotel, Pagdaraoan, San Fernando City,La Union. Forty-seven (47) litigation lawyersattended the program.

The third Orientation for Lawyers on Mediation heldon August 31 to September 1, 2006, at the Multi-Purpose Hall, Hall of Justice, Baguio City wasattended by a total of thirty (30) lawyer-participants.

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PHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSNEW RULINGS OF THE SUPREME COURNEW RULINGS OF THE SUPREME COURNEW RULINGS OF THE SUPREME COURNEW RULINGS OF THE SUPREME COURNEW RULINGS OF THE SUPREME COURTTTTTJuly-September 2006July-September 2006July-September 2006July-September 2006July-September 2006July-September 2006July-September 2006July-September 2006July-September 2006July-September 2006

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Dual citizens may vote as absentee voters underR.A. No. 9189. There is no need to actuallyestablish residence and physical stay in thePhilippines before they can exercise their rightto vote.

As may be noted, there is no provision in thedual citizenship law - R.A. No. 9225 - requiring“duals” to actually establish residence andphysically stay in the Philippines first before theycan exercise their right to vote. On the contrary,R.A. No. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that“duals” are most likely non-residents, grants underits Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as thatgranted an absentee voter under R.A. No. 9189. Itcannot be overemphasized that R.A. No. 9189 aims,in essence, to enfranchise as much as possible alloverseas Filipinos who, save for the residencyrequirements exacted of an ordinary voter underordinary conditions, are qualified to vote. x x x

x x x

Lest it be overlooked, no less than theCOMELEC itself admits that the Citizenship Retentionand Re Acquisition Act expanded the coverage ofoverseas absentee voting. According to the pollbody:

1.05 With the passage of R.A. No. 9225 thescope of overseas absentee voting hasbeen consequently expanded so as toinclude Filipinos who are also citizensof other countries, subject, however,to the strict prerequisites indicated inthe pertinent provisions of R.A. No.9225;

Considering the unison intent of theConstitution and R.A. No. 9189 and the expansionof the scope of that law with the passage of R.A.No. 9225, the irresistible conclusion is that “duals”may now exercise the right of suffrage thru theabsentee voting scheme and as overseas absentee voters.R.A. No. 9189 defines the terms adverted to in thefollowing wise:

“Absentee Voting” refers to the process bywhich qualified citizens of the Philippinesabroad exercise their right to vote;

“Overseas Absentee Voter” refers to a citizenof the Philippines who is qualified to registerand vote under this Act, not otherwise

disqualified by law, who is abroad on theday of elections;

While perhaps not determinative of the issuetendered herein, we note that the expanded thrustof R.A. No. 9189 extends also to what might betagged as the next generation of “duals”. This maybe deduced from the inclusion of the provision onderivative citizenship in R.A. No. 9225 which reads:

SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. – Theunmarried child, whether legitimate,illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18)years of age, of those who re-acquirePhilippine citizenship upon effectivity ofthis Act shall be deemed citizens of thePhilippines.

It is very likely that a considerable numberof those unmarried children below eighteen (18)years of age had never set foot in the Philippines.Now then, if the next generation of “duals” maynonetheless avail themselves the right to enjoy fullcivil and political rights under Section 5 of the Act,then there is neither rhyme nor reason why thepetitioners and other present day “duals,” providedthey meet the requirements under Section 1, ArticleV of the Constitution in relation to R.A. No. 9189,be denied the right of suffrage as an overseasabsentee voter. Congress could not have plausiblyintended such absurd situation.

(Garcia, J., Loida Nicolas-Lewis, et al., v.Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 162759, August4, 2006)

The President, as the Commander-in-Chief hasthe power to prevent a member of the ArmedForces from testifying before a legislativeinquiry.

The refusal of the President to allow members ofthe military to appear before Congress is stillsubject to judicial relief.

Thus, we have to consider the question: maythe President prevent a member of the armed forcesfrom testifying before a legislative inquiry? We holdthat the President has constitutional authority todo so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officerwho defies such injunction is liable under militaryjustice. At the same time, we also hold that any

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chamber of Congress which seeks the appearancebefore it of a military officer against the consent ofthe President has adequate remedies under law tocompel such attendance. Any military officialwhom Congress summons to testify before it maybe compelled to do so by the President. If thePresident is not so inclined, the President may becommanded by judicial order to compel theattendance of the military officer. Finaljudicial orders have the force of the law of the landwhich the President has the duty to faithfullyexecute.

Explication of these principles is in order.

As earlier noted, we ruled in Senate [Senate v.Ermita, 488 SCRA 3] that the President may notissue a blanket requirement of prior consent onexecutive officials summoned by the legislature toattend a congressional hearing. In doing so, theCourt recognized the considerable limitations onexecutive privilege, and affirmed that the privilegemust be formally invoked on specified grounds.However, the ability of the President toprevent military officers from testifying beforeCongress does not turn on executive privilege,but on the Chief Executive’s power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech ofmembers of the armed forces. The President’sprerogatives as commander-in-chief are nothampered by the same limitations as in executiveprivilege.

Our ruling that the President could, as ageneral rule, require military officers to seekpresidential approval before appearing beforeCongress is based foremost on the notion that acontrary rule unduly diminishes the prerogativesof the President as commander-in-chief. Congressholds significant control over the armed forces inmatters such as budget appropriations and theapproval of higher-rank promotions, yet it is onthe President that the Constitution vests the titleas commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives andfunctions appertaining to the position. Again, theexigencies of military discipline and the chain ofcommand mandate that the President’s ability tocontrol the individual members of the armed forcesbe accorded the utmost respect. Where a militaryofficer is torn between obeying the President andobeying the Senate, the Court will withouthesitation affirm that the officer has to choose thePresident. After all, the Constitution prescribes thatit is the President, and not the Senate, who is thecommander-in-chief of all the armed forces.

CIVIL LAWPsychological Incapacity as a ground for thenullity of marriage under Article 36 of the FamilyCode.

The term “psychological incapacity” to be aground for the nullity of marriage under Article36 of the Family Code, refers to a seriouspsychological illness afflicting a party even beforethe celebration of the marriage. It is a malady sograve and so permanent as to deprive one ofawareness of the duties and responsibilities of thematrimonial bond one is about to assume. As allpeople may have certain quirks and idiosyncracies,or isolated characteristics associated with certainpersonality disorders, there is hardly any doubtthat the intendment of the law has been to confinethe meaning of “psychological incapacity” to themost serious cases of personality disorders clearlydemonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inabilityto give meaning and significance to the marriage.It is for this reason that the court relies heavily onpsychological experts for its understanding of the

The Constitution itself recognizes as one of thelegislature’s functions the conduct of inquiries inaid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised forCongress to interfere with the President’s poweras commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimentalfor the President to unduly interfere withCongress’s right to conduct legislative inquiries.The impasse did not come to pass in this petition,since petitioners testified anyway despite thepresidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware thatwith its pronouncement today that the Presidenthas the right to require prior consent from membersof the armed forces, the clash may soon loom oractualize.

We believe and hold that our constitutionaland legal order sanctions a modality by whichmembers of the military may be compelled toattend legislative inquiries even if the Presidentdesires otherwise, a modality which does notoffend the Chief Executive’s prerogatives ascommander-in-chief. The remedy lies with thecourts.

(Tinga, J., Gen. (Ret.) Francisco V. Gudani andLt. Col. Alexander F. Balutan v. Lt./Gen. GenerosoS. Senga, et. al., G.R. No. 170165, August 15,2006)

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A patient cannot be detained in a hospital for non-payment of the hospital bill. Hospital’s remedyis to file the necessary suit in court for therecovery of such bill.

Instances when hospital may legally detain apatient against his will.

Authorities, including those of common laworigin, explicitly declare that a patient cannot bedetained in a hospital for non-payment of thehospital bill. If the patient cannot pay the hospitalor physician’s bill, the law provides a remedy forthem to pursue, that is, by filing the necessary suitin court for the recovery of such fee or bill. If thepatient is prevented from leaving the hospital forhis inability to pay the bill, any person who canact on his behalf can apply in court for the issuanceof the writ of habeas corpus.

The form of restraint must be total; movementmust be restrained in all directions. If restraint ispartial, e.g., in a particular direction with freedomto proceed in another, the restraint on the person’sliberty is not total. However, the hospital maylegally detain a patient against his will when he isa detained or convicted prisoner, or when the patientis suffering from a very contagious disease wherehis release will be prejudicial to public health, orwhen the patient is mentally ill such that his releasewill endanger public safety, or in other exigent casesas may be provided by law. Moreover, under thecommon law doctrines on tort, it does notconstitute a trespass to the person to momentarilyprevent him from leaving the premises or any partthereof because he refuses to comply with somereasonable condition subject to which he enteredthem. In all cases, the condition of this kind ofrestraint must be reasonable in the light of thecircumstances. At any rate, as stated above, thepatient is free to live the premises, even in theostensible violation of these conditions, after beingmomentarily interrupted by the hospital staff forpurposes of informing him of those reasonableconditions, such as the assessment of whether thepatient is fit to leave, insane, or suffering from acontagious disease, etc., or simply for purposes ofmaking a demand to settle the bill. If the patientchooses to abscond or leave without the consentof the hospital in violation of any of the conditionsdeemed to be reasonable under the circumstances,the hospital may nonetheless register its protest andmay choose to pursue the legal remedies availableunder law, provided that the the hospital may notphysically detain the patient, unless the case fallsunder the exceptions abovestated.

(Austria-Martinez, J., Manila Doctors Hospital v. SoUn Chua and Vicky Ty, G.R. No. 150355, July 31,2006)

human personality. However, the root cause mustbe identified as a psychological illness and itsincapacitating nature must be fully explained,which petitioner failed to convincinglydemonstrate.

x x x

We find respondent’s alleged mixed personalitydisorder, the “leaving the house” attitude wheneverthey quarreled, the violent tendencies duringepileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, theabandonment and lack of support, and hispreference to spend more time with his band matesthan his family, are not rooted on some debilitatingpsychological condition but a mere refusal orunwillingness to assume the essential obligationsof marriage.

x x x

While petitioner ’s marriage with therespondent failed and appears to be without hopeof reconciliation, the remedy however is not alwaysto have it declared void ab initio on the ground ofpsychological incapacity. An unsatisfactorymarriage, however, is not a null and void marriage.No less than the Constitution recognizes thesanctity of marriage and the unity of the family; itdecrees marriage as legally “inviolable” and protectsit from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Boththe family and marriage are to be “protected” by thestate.

Thus, in determining the import of“psychological incapacity” under Article 36, it mustread in conjunction with, although to be taken asdistinct from, Articles 35, 37, 38, and 41 that wouldlikewise, but for different reasons, render themarriage void ab initio, or Article 45 that would makethe marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 thatcould justify a petition for legal separation.Care must be observed so that these variouscircumstances are not applied so indiscriminatelyas if the law were indifferent on the matter.Article 36 should not be confused with a divorcelaw that cuts the marital bond at the time the causestherefor manifest themselves. Neither it is to beequated with legal separation, in which thegrounds need not be rooted in psychologicalincapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure,moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction,habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonmentand the like.

(Ynares-Santiago, J., Ma. Armida Perez-Ferraris v.Brix Ferraris, G.R. No. 162368, July 17, 2006)

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

There is no right test to determine whetherparticular information is a matter of publicconcern. It is for the courts to determine on a caseto case basis whether the matter at issue is ofinterest or importance as it relates or affect thepublic.

In determining whether a particularinformation is of public concern, there is no righttest. In the final analysis, it is for the courts todetermine on a case to case basis whether thematter at issue is of interest or importance as itrelates to or affect the public.

It bears emphasis that the interest of the publichinges on its right to transparency in theadministration of justice, to the end that will serveto enhance the basic fairness of the judicialproceedings, safeguard the integrity of the fact-finding process, and foster an informed publicdiscussion of governmental affairs. x x x

Decisions and opinions of a court are of coursematters of public concern or interest for these arethe authorized expositions and interpretations ofthe laws, binding upon all citizens, of which everycitizen is charged with knowledge. Justice thusrequires that all should have free access to theopinions of judges and justices, and it would beagainst sound public policy to prevent, suppressor keep the earliest knowledge of these from thepublic. Thus, in Lantaco Sr. et. al., v. Judge Llamas(195 Phil. 325), this Court found a judge to havecommitted grave abuse of discretion in refusing tofurnish Lantaco et. al., a copy of his decision in acriminal case of which they were even the thereinprivate complainants, the decision being “alreadypart of the public record which the citizen has aright to scrutinize.”

Unlike court orders and decisions, however,pleadings and other documents filed by the partiesto a case need not be matters of public concern orinterest. For they are filed for the purpose ofestablishing the basis upon which the court mayissue an order or a judgment affecting their rightsand interests.

In thus determining which part of the recordsof a case may be accessed to, the purpose for whichthe parties filed them is to be considered.

(Carpio-Morales, J., Alfredo Hilado, et. al., v. JudgeAmor A. Reyes, et. al., G.R. No. 163155, July 21,2006)

LABOR LAW

To warrant dismissal of an employee, themisconduct must be serious and must have beenperformed with wrongful intent.

Misconduct is defined as improper or wrongconduct. It is the transgression of some establishedand definite rule of action, a forbidden act, adereliction of duty, willful in character and implieswrongful intent and not mere error of judgment.The misconduct to be serious within the meaningof the act must be of such a grave and aggravatedcharacter and not merely trivial or unimportant.Such misconduct, however serious, mustnevertheless be in connection with the work of theemployee to constitute just cause from hisseparation.

In order to constitute serious misconductwhich will warrant the dismissal of an employeeunder paragraph (a) of Article 282 of the LaborCode, it is not sufficient that the act or conductcomplained of has violated some established rulesor policies. It is equally important and requiredthat the act or conduct must have been performedwith wrongful intent.

(Chico-Nazario, J., National Labor RelationsCommission, et. al., v. Ma. Bernadette S. Salgarino,G.R. No. 164376, July 31, 2006)

CRIMINAL LAWEntrapment and Instigation, distinguished.

There is entrapment when law officers employruses and schemes to ensure the apprehension ofthe criminal while in the actual commission of thecrime. There is instigation when the accused isinduced to commit the crime. The difference in thenature of the two lies in the origin of the criminalintent. In entrapment, the mens rea originates fromthe mind of the criminal. The idea and the resolveto commit the crime comes from him. In instigation,the law officer conceives the commission of thecrime and suggests to the accused who adopts theidea and carries it into execution.

(Carpio-Morales, J., Roberto E. Chang and PacificoD. San Mateo v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.165111, July 21, 2006)

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CIVIL LAW

Certificate of Title cannot be subject to collateralattack.

Settled is the rule that a certificate of title cannotbe subject to collateral attack and can be altered,modified, or cancelled only in a direct proceedingin accordance with law. In Malilin, Jr. v. Castillo (389Phil. 153), the Court held that the action isconsidered as an attack on the title when the objectof the action or proceeding is to nullify the title,and thus challenge the judgment pursuant to whichthe title was decreed. The attack is direct when theobject of an action or proceeding is to annul, or setaside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. Onthe other hand, the attack is indirect or collateralwhen, in an action to obtain a different relief, anattack on the judgment is nevertheless made as anincident thereof. In the present case, the attack onrespondent’s title is definitely merely collateral asthe relief sought by respondent in his action wasrecovery of ownership and possession. Petitioners’attack on the validity of respondent’s certificate oftitle was merely raised as a defense in their Answerfiled with the trial court.

(Austria-Martinez, J., Pedro Tagabi and DemetrioTabaniag v. Margarito Tanque, G.R. No. 144024,July 27, 2006)

REMEDIAL LAW

The party has fresh period of fifteen (15) daysfrom denial of a motion for reconsideration withinwhich to appeal.

Fortunately, however, for petitioners, the Courtrecently modified the rule on the counting of the15-day period within which to appeal. In theprecedent-setting case of Neypes v. Court of Appeals,469 SCRA 633 (2005), the Court categorically set afresh period of 15 days from a denial of a motionfor reconsideration within which to appeal, thus:

The Supreme Court may promulgateprocedural rules in all courts. It has the soleprerogative to amend, repeal or even establishnew rules for a more simplified andinexpensive process, and the speedy dispositionof cases. In the rules governing appeals to itand to the Court of Appeals, particularly Rules42, 43 and 45, the Court allows extensions oftime, based on justifiable and compelling

reasons, for parties to file their appeals. Theseextensions may consist of 15 days or more.

To standardize the appeal periodsprovided in the Rules and to afford litigantsfair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Courtdeems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15days within which to file the notice of appealin the Regional Trial Court, counted fromreceipt of the order dismissing a motion for anew trial or motion for reconsideration.

Henceforth, this “fresh period rule” shallalso apply to Rule 40 governing appeals fromthe Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional TrialCourts; Rule 42 on petitions for review fromthe Regional Trial Courts to the Court ofAppeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicialagencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45governing appeals by certiorari to the SupremeCourt. The new rule aims to regiment or makethe appeal period uniform, to be counted fromreceipt of the order denying the motion for newtrial, motion for reconsideration (whether fullor partial) or any final order or resolution.(Emphasis supplied)

The Court also reiterated its ruling that it isthe denial of the motion for reconsideration whichconstituted the final order which finally disposedof the issues involved in the case.

This fresh 15-day period within which to filenotice of appeal counted from notice of the denialof the motion for reconsideration may be appliedto petitioners’ case inasmuch as rules of proceduremay be given retroactive effect to actions pendingand undetermined at the time of their passage.Thus, in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,399 SCRA 277, 282 (2003) involving A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC, which provided for the rule that the 60-day period within which to file a petition forcertiorari shall be reckoned from receipt of the orderdenying the motion for reconsideration, the Courtstated that rules of procedure “may be givenretroactive effect to actions pending andundetermined at the time of their passage and thiswill not violate any right of a person who may feelthat he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there isno vested rights in rules of procedure.”

(Austria-Martinez, J., Donato Sumaway, et. al., v.Urban Bank, Inc., et. al., G.R. No. 142534, June 27,2006)

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Presentation of the check in evidence is not acondition sine qua non for conviction underB.P. 22.

Best Evidence Rule applies only where thecontent of the document is the subject of theinquiry.

Petitioner’s insistence on the presentation ofthe check in evidence as a condition sine qua nonfor conviction under B.P. 22 is wrong. Petitioneranchors his argument on Rule 130, Section 3, ofthe Rules of Court, otherwise known as the bestevidence rule. However, the rule applies only wherethe content of the document is the subject of theinquiry. Where the issue is the execution orexistence of the document or the circumstancessurrounding its execution, the best evidence ruledoes not apply and testimonial evidence isadmissible.

The gravamen of the offense is the act ofdrawing and issuing a worthless check. Hence, thesubject of the inquiry is the fact of issuance orexecution of the check, not its content.

(Corona, J., Pacifico B. Arceo, Jr. v. People of thePhilippines, G.R. No. 142641, July 17, 2006)

An injunction or restraining order which is notvoid must be obeyed while it remains in full forceand effect, and has not been overturned.

The willful disobedience of an injunction ordermay constitute a criminal, as well as a civil,contempt. However, it has been held that theviolation of an injunction is not direct criminalcontempt within the contemplation of a statutepertaining to conduct summarily punishable asdirect criminal contempt. Such violation is anindirect contempt where it does not occur in theimmediate presence of the court or so close as tointerrupt or disturb court proceedings.

An injunction or restraining order which isnot void must be obeyed while it remains in fullforce and effect, and has not been overturned, thatis, in general, until the injunction or restrainingorder has been set aside, vacated, or modified bythe court which granted it, or until the order ordecree awarding it has been reversed on appeal orerror. The injunction must be obeyed irrespectiveof the ultimate validity of the order, and no matterhow unreasonable and unjust the injunction maybe in its terms. Defendant cannot avoid compliance

with the commands, or excuse his violation, of theinjunction by simply moving to dissolve it, or bythe pendency of a motion to modify it. The factthat an injunction or restraining order has beendissolved or terminated, or has expired, does notnecessarily protect a person in a proceeding againsthim for a violation of the injunction or order whileit was in force, as by acts between granting of theinjunction and its termination, at least where theproceeding is one to punish for a criminalcontempt.

x x x

Courts, however, have a limited inherentpower to void acts done in violation of aninjunction. Transfers in violation of an injunctionare invalid as to the person seeking the injunctionor those claiming under that person, and may beset aside if attacked in a proper manner.

However, because an injunction operates inpersonam, an act done in violation of an injunctionis not a nullity as to third persons. If an injunctionprohibits the defendant from transferring property,but the defendant transfers the property to aninnocent third person, the transferee obtains goodtitle and the injunction does not affect thetransferee’s right.

(Chico-Nazario, J., Spouses Manuel and Luisa TanLee, Renwick Warren Lee and Janssen ThaddeusLee v. Hon. Court of Appeals and China BankingCorporation, G.R. No. 147191, July 27, 2006)

In questioning the validity or constitutionalityof a rule or regulation issued by an administrativeagency, a party need not exhaust administrativeremedies before going to court, if the act of theadministrative agency concerned was performedpursuant to its quasi-judicial function.

Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers.Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is thepower to make rules and regulations which resultsin delegated legislation that is within the confinesof the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers.

In questioning the validity or constitutionalityof a rule or regulation issued by an administrativeagency, a party need not exhaust administrativeremedies before going to court. This principle,

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however, applies only where the act of theadministrative agency concerned was performedpursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and notwhen the assailed act pertained to its rule-makingor quasi-legislative power.

The assailed IRR was issued pursuant to thequasi-legislative power of the Committee expresslyauthorized by R.A. No. 9207. The petition restsmainly on the theory that the assailed IRR issuedby the Committee is invalid on the ground that itis not germane to the object and purpose of thestatute it seeks to implement. Where what is assailedis the validity or constitutionality of a rule orregulation issued by the administrative agency inthe performance of its quasi-legislative function, theregular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon thesame.

(Tinga, J., Holy Spirit Homeowners Association,Inc. et. al., v. Secretary Michael Defensor et. al., G.R.NO. 163980, August 3, 2006)

Petition for Prohibition, when proper.

A petition for prohibition is also not the properremedy to assail an IRR issued in the exercise of aquasi-legislative function. Prohibition is anextraordinary writ directed against any tribunal,corporation, board, officer or person, whetherexercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerialfunctions, ordering said entity or person to desistfrom further proceedings when said proceedingsare without or in excess of said entity’s or person’sjurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuseof discretion, and there is no appeal or any otherplain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinarycourse of law. Prohibition lies against judicial orministerial functions, but not against legislative orquasi-legislative functions. Generally, the purposeof a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower courtwithin the limits of its jurisdiction in order tomaintain the administration of justice in orderlychannels. Prohibition is the proper remedy to affordrelief against usurpation of jurisdiction or powerby an inferior court, or when, in the exercise ofjurisdiction in handling matters clearly within itscognizance the inferior court transgresses thebounds prescribed to it by the law, or where thereis no adequate remedy available in the ordinarycourse of law by which such relief can be obtained.Where the principal relief sought is to invalidate

an IRR, petitioners’ remedy is an ordinary actionfor its nullification, an action which properly fallsunder the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.In any case, petitioners’ allegation that“respondents are performing or threatening toperform functions without or in excess of theirjurisdiction” may appropriately be enjoined by thetrial court through a writ of injunction or atemporary restraining order.

(Tinga, J., Holy Spirit Homeowners Association,Inc. et. al., v. Secretary Michael Defensor et. al.,G.R. NO. 163980, August 3, 2006)

Preliminary Investigation distinguished fromInquest.

A preliminary investigation should have beenconducted before the filing of the AmendedInformation. A preliminary investigation is aproceeding distinct from an inquest. A preliminaryinvestigation is “an inquiry or proceeding todetermine whether there is sufficient ground toengender a well-founded belief that a crime hasbeen committed and the respondent is probablyguilty thereof and should be held for trial. Aninquest is “a summary inquiry conducted by aprosecutor for the purpose of determining whetherthe warrantless arrest of a person was based onprobable cause.”

Where the penalty prescribed by law for anoffense is at least four (4) years, two (2) monthsand one (1) day of imprisonment without regardto the fine, a preliminary investigation must beconducted before the filing of a complaint orinformation for such offense. The conduct of aninquest investigation does not fulfill therequirement for the conduct of a preliminaryinvestigation before the filing of an informationor complaint involving any such offenses, exceptwhen the accused was lawfully arrested without awarrant.

In the case at bar, the accused was not evenarrested. He reported to the CIDGU on itsinvitation. He should thus have been subjected toa preliminary investigation, not a mere inquestinvestigation.

(Carpio-Morales, J., Imelda S. Enriquez v. JudgeOlegario Sarmiento, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-06-2011,August 7, 2006)

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Formal Amendments and SubstantialAmendments, distinguished.

We find, however, that the Court of Appealserred in not allowing the amendments in theinformation regarding the aggravatingcircumstances of dwelling and insult or disregardof the respect due to rank, age or sex. Section 14,Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, provides that anamendment after the plea of the accused is permittedonly as to matters of form, provided leave of courtis obtained and such amendment is not prejudicialto the rights of the accused. A substantialamendment is not permitted after the accused hadalready been arraigned.

In Teehankee, Jr. v. Madayag, (G.R. No. 103102,March 6, 1992), we had the occasion to distinguishbetween substantial and formal amendments:

A substantial amendment consists of therecital of facts constituting the offense chargedand determinative of the jurisdiction of thecourt. All other matters are merely of form.Thus, the following have been held to be merelyformal amendments, viz.: (1) new allegationswhich relate only to the range of the penaltythat the court might impose in the event ofconviction; (2) an amendment which does notcharge another offense different or distinct fromthat charged in the original one; (3) additionalallegations which do not alter the prosecution’stheory of the case so as to cause surprise to theaccused and affect the form of defense he has orwill assume; and (4) an amendment which doesnot adversely affect any substantial right ofthe accused, such as his right to invokeprescription.

The test as to whether an amendment is onlyof form and an accused is not prejudiced by suchamendment is whether or not a defense under theinformation as it originally stood would be equallyavailable after the amendment is made, and whetheror not any evidence which the accused might havewould be equally applicable to the information inone form as in the other; if the answer is in theaffirmative, the amendment is one of form and notof substance.

Tested against these guidelines, the insertionof the aggravating circumstances of dwelling andinsult or disregard of the respect due to rank, age,or sex of the victim is clearly a formal, not a

substantial, amendment. These amendments donot have the effect of charging another offensedifferent or distinct from the charge of murder ascontained in the original information. They relateonly to the range of the penalty that the courtmight impose in the event of conviction. Theamendment did not adversely affect any substantialright of appellant. Besides, appellant never objectedto the presentation of evidence to prove theaggravating circumstances of dwelling and insultor in disregard of the respect due to the offendedparty on account of rank, age or sex. Without anyobjection by the defense, the defect is deemedwaived

(Ynares-Santiago, J., People of the Philippines v.Elberto Tubongbanua y Pahilanga, G.R. No.171271, August 31, 2006)

Summary Judgment, when proper.

Thus, it has been held that a summaryjudgment is proper where, upon a motion filed afterthe issues had been joined and on the basis of thepleadings and papers filed, the court finds that thereis no genuine issue as to any material fact, exceptas to the amount of damages. A genuine issue hasbeen defined as an issue of fact which calls for thepresentation of evidence, as distinguished from anissue which is sham, fictitious, contrived andpatently unsubstantial so as not to constitute agenuine issue for trial.

A court may grant summary judgment to settleexpeditiously a case if, on motion of either party,there appears from the pleadings, depositions,admissions, and affidavits that no important issuesof fact are involved, except the amount of damages.Rule 35, Section 3, of the Rules of Court providestwo (2) requisites for summary judgment to beproper: (1) there must be no genuine issues as toany material fact, except for the amount of damages;and (2) the party presenting the motion forsummary judgment must be entitled to a judgmentas a matter of law.

Certainly, when the facts as pleaded appearuncontested or undisputed, then there’s no realgenuine issue or question as to the facts, andsummary judgment is called for.

(Chico-Nazario, J., Equitable PCI Bank v. RowenaOng, G.R. No. 156207, September 15, 2006)

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PHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSRESOLUTIONS, ORDERS AND CIRCULARSRESOLUTIONS, ORDERS AND CIRCULARSRESOLUTIONS, ORDERS AND CIRCULARSRESOLUTIONS, ORDERS AND CIRCULARSRESOLUTIONS, ORDERS AND CIRCULARSJuly-September 2006July-September 2006July-September 2006July-September 2006July-September 2006July-September 2006July-September 2006July-September 2006July-September 2006July-September 2006

SUPREME COURT

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ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR 71-2006

DESIGNATION OF A FOCAL PERSON AND ANASSISTANT FOCAL PERSON FOR DESIGNATEDFAMILY COURTS AND OTHER REGIONAL TRIALCOURTS HANDLING FAMILY AND YOUTH CASES

WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 8369, otherwiseknown as the Family Courts Act of 1997, requires theSupreme Court to establish Family Courts in thePhilippines and provide the necessary mechanismsfor the effective and efficient operation of such courts;

WHEREAS, pursuant to this mandate and thetransitory provisions of the Family Courts Act of 1997,the Supreme Court, in A.M. No. 99-11-07-SC,designated certain Regional Trial Courts in thePhilippines as special courts to exclusively try anddecide family and youth cases enumerated anddescribed in Section 5 of the said Act, pending theestablishment of regular Family Courts;

WHEREAS, the number of these temporarilydesignated Family Courts has steadily increased fromsixty-nine (69) in 2000 to ninety-four (94) in May 2006,with an average docket of 444 per month; in addition,there are approximately one hundred thirty four (134)Regional Trial Courts handling family and youth casesin areas where no courts have been designated asFamily Courts;

WHEREAS, the current docket overload indesignated Family Courts can be traced primarily totwo principal causes, namely: a) The increase in rights,duties and obligations due to the enactment of newlaws such as Republic Act No. 8552 or the newDomestic Adoption Act of 1998; Republic Act No. 9262,otherwise known as Anti-Violence Against Womenand Children Act of 2004; and Republic Act No. 9344or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006; and thepromulgation by the Supreme Court of Rules ofProcedure before the Family Courts such as the Ruleson Examination of a Child Witness, Juveniles in ConflictWith the Law, Nullity of Void Marriages, Annulmentof Voidable Marriages, Legal Separation, Adoption,Voluntary and Involuntary Commitment of Children,Custody and Habeas Corpus in relation to Minors,Guardianship of Minors, and Anti-Violence AgainstWomen and Children; and, b) The lack of a specificspecialized philosophy and policy in the managementand supervision of Family Courts.

WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 9344 or the JuvenileJustice and Welfare Act which took effect on May 20,2006 established a comprehensive Juvenile Justice andWelfare System to be implemented by a Juvenile Justiceand Welfare Council (JJWC) which shall ensure fullimplementation of the law and oversee thecoordination among different government agenciesand non-government child institution. Significantly,the law requires the JJWC to coordinate with the Officeof the Court Administrator and the Philippine JudicialAcademy to ensure the realization of its mandate andthe proper discharge of its duties and functions;

WHEREAS, to respond to the legal mandate of theFamily Courts Act of 1997 and the Juvenile Justice andWelfare Act and address specifically the increasing

EN BANCBar Matter No. 1645

RE: AMENDMENT OF RULE 139-B

The Court Resolved to AMEND the secondparagraph of Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court,clarified by Circular No. 3-89 dated February 6, 1989,as follows:

xxx

The IBP shall forward to the Supreme Courtfor appropriate disposition all complaints fordisbarment, suspension and discipline filedagainst incumbent Justices of the Court ofAppeals, Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appealsand judges of lower courts, whether or not theyare charged singly or jointly with otherrespondents, and whether or not suchcomplaint deals with acts unrelated to thedischarge of their official functions. The sameprocedure shall be observed with respect tocomplaints filed against retired justices andjudges. All similar complaints against lawyersstill in the government service, whether fileddirectly with the IBP or transmitted to the IBPby the Office of the Solicitor General, shall firstbe referred to the Court for appropriate action.

xxx

This amendment shall take effect on October 2,2006 following its publication in a newspaper ofgeneral circulation not later than September 15, 2006.

September 5, 2006.

(Sgd.) PANGANIBAN, CJ, PUNO, QUISUMBING,YNARES-SANTIAGO, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA, CARPIO-MORALES, CALLEJO, SR., AZCUNA, TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO, GARCIA, VELASCO, JJ. concur.

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needs and special concerns of our Family Courts inthe effective implementation of all laws and rulesinvolving family and children, it is necessary that aFocal Person for Family Courts be designated to designand develop policies, standards and strategies forthe Family Courts, work for the regularization ofthese courts and assist the Office of the CourtAdministrator in the effective and specializedmanagement and supervision thereof.

The FOCAL PERSON will:

(a) Handle the administrative supervision of allcourts handling family and youth cases incoordination with the Office of the CourtAdministrator;

(b) Propose and, in coordination with andthrough the Office of the Court Administrator,establish definite policies and standards forthe internal operations of Family Courts toensure that these are implemented effectively,efficiently and economically;

(c) Recommend to the Supreme Court, incoordination with and through the Office ofthe Court Administrator, rules andregulations for the management andoperations of Family Courts and direct theimplementation of said rules and regulation;

(d) With the Office of the Court Administrator,assist the Supreme Court in the exercise ofadministrative disciplinary authority overFamily Court judges and personnel inaccordance with existing rules andregulations;

(e) Conduct liaison and coordination activitiesyouth Executive and Legislative Departmentsconcerning Family Courts; and

(f) Exercise such other functions and duties asmay be assigned by the Supreme Court tocarry out the provisions of the Family CourtsAct of 1997.

An Assistant Focal Person shall be designated toassist the Focal Person:

(a) In the development of policies, rules andregulations for Family Courts; and

(b) Whenever necessary, in liaisoning andcoordinating with the Executive andLegislative Departments and othergovernment or non-government agencies inall matters concerning Family Court.

The Focal Person and the Assistant Focal Personshall prepare: (l) an operations manual for FamilyCourt judges and personnel in accordance withRepublic Act No. 8369 incorporating therein,whenever appropriate and feasible, “best practices”of Family Courts in other jurisdictions; and (2) amedium-term plan for the operations andregularization of Family Courts, to be submitted tothe Supreme Court not later than July 25, 2007.

NOW, THEREFORE, in the interest of expeditious,effective and efficient administration of justice inFamily Courts, the Court hereby designates, effectiveimmediately, Deputy Court Administrator ZENAIDAN. ELEPAÑO as Focal Person for Family Courts andJUDGE ROSALINA L. PISON, Presiding Judge,Branch 107, Quezon City as Assistant Focal Person.

Issued this 7th day of September 2006.

(Sgd.) ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN Chief Justice

ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 82-2006

TO: ALL JUSTICES, JUDGES, AND EMPLOYEESOF THE JUDICIARY

Subject : Civil Service Commission MemorandumCircular No. 12, s. 2005 (USE OF NON-SEXIST LANGUAGE IN ALL OFFICIALDOCUMENTS, COMMUNICATIONSAND ISSUANCES)

Quoted hereunder is Memorandum Circular No.12, s. 2005 of the CSC.

“Pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 050433 datedMarch 30, 2005, government officials and employeesare encouraged to use non-sexist language in allofficial documents, communications, and issuances.

In line with the government’s efforts to integratewomen’s concerns in its plans and programs throughthe years, the Civil Service Commission continuouslyundertakes gender mainstreaming activities, takingextra efforts in promoting gender-sensitivity in thebureaucracy. Beginning June 2000, gender anddevelopment (GAD) perspectives have been integratedin the conduct of civil service examinations partlythrough the use of non-sexist language in the testitems. This has led to the Commission’s activecampaign on the use of gender-fair language.

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e. using the passive voice

TRADITIONAL: The manager must submithis proposal today.

SUGGESTED: The proposal must besubmitted by the managertoday.

2. Eliminate the generic use of MAN. Instead, usepeople, person(s), human(s), human being(s),humankind, humanity, the human race.

TRADITIONAL: ordinary man, mankind, thebrotherhood of man

SUGGESTED: ordinary people, humanity,the human family

3. Eliminate sexism in symbolic representations ofgender in words, sentences, and texts by:

a. taking the context of the word, analyzing itsmeaning, and eliminating sexism in theconcept

TRADITIONAL: feelings of brotherhood,feelings of fraternity

SUGGESTED: feelings of kinship,solidarity

TRADITIONAL: the founding fathersSUGGESTED: the founders, the founding

leaders

TRADITIONAL: the Father of relativitytheory

SUGGESTED: the founder of relativitytheory, the initiator ofrelativity theory

b. finding precise words to delineate the thingitself from supposedly sex-linkedcharacteristics

TRADITIONAL: Titanic was a great ship, butshe now rests at the bottomof the sea.

SUGGESTED: Titanic was a great ship, butit now rests at the bottom ofthe sea.

TRADITIONAL: “Don’t let Mother Nature ripyou off! She’s out to kill yourcar’s new finish... Stop her...”

SUGGESTED: “Don’t let Nature rip youoff” It’s out to kill your car’sfinish... Stop it...”

Language is a very essential tool incommunication. It articulates consciousness, reflectsculture, and affects socialization. Hence, the need torecognize the importance of transforming languagefrom traditional usage to a more liberating one, thatwhich is gender-sensitive.

Since government employees and officialsencounter gender issues everyday, the use of non-sexistlanguage in preparing letters, memoranda, and otherissuances, will encourage them to make a consciouseffort to avoid implicit and explicit discriminatorylanguage against women or men. This, in turn, willhelp promote gender-sensitivity in the bureaucracy.

Attached are some suggestions on how to use non-sexist language.

Please be guided accordingly.

(Sgd.) KATRINA CONSTANTINO-DAVID Chairperson”

31 March 2005.

SOME SUGGESTIONS ON HOW TOUSE NON-SEXIST LANGUAGE

1. Eliminate the generic use of he, his, or him unlessthe antecedent is obviously male by:

a. using plural nouns

TRADITIONAL: The lawyer uses his brief toguide him.

SUGGESTED: The lawyers use their briefto guide them.

b. deleting he, his, and him altogether,rewording if necessary

TRADITIONAL: The architect uses hisblueprint to guide him.

SUGGESTED: The architect uses ablueprint as a guide.

c. substituting articles (a, an, the) for his; usingwho instead of he

TRADITIONAL: The writer should know hisreaders well.

SUGGESTED: The writer should know thereaders well.

d. using one, we, or you

TRADITIONAL: As one grows older, hebecomes more reflective.

SUGGESTED: As one grows older, onebecomes more reflective.

A.C. NO. 82-2006 (continued)

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OCA CIRCULAR NO. 96-2006

TO : TO ALL EXECUTIVE/PRESIDING JUDGESAND CLERKS OF COURTS / ACCCOUNTABLEOFFICERS OF THE FIRST AND SECONDLEVEL COURTS

SUBJECT : GUIDELINES ON THE REQUISITION,ISSUANCE AND CONSUMPTION OFOFFICIAL RECEIPTS FOR LANDREGISTRATION AUTHORITYCO LLECTIONS

The Administrator of the Land RegistrationAuthority has requested the Office of the CourtAdministrator to issue the following guidelines on therequisition, issuance and consumption of officialreceipts for collections that will accrue to the saidOffice, to wit:

1) Letter requests for Official Receipts(Accountable Form 51) and/or cash book shallbe submitted, by the Accountable Officeraddressed to the Administrator, LandRegistration Authority (LRA), thru the LRASupply;

2) Official Receipts shall be issued by the LRAProperty and Supply Section using GeneralForm 33 A (Invoice and Receipt of AccountableForm) accompanied by a Requisition andIssuance Voucher (RIV), as attached whichshall be duly acknowledged and promptlyreturned by the Accountable Officer to the LRAProperty and Supply Section within (5) daysfrom receipt thereof;

3) If the Official Receipts and/or cash book are tobe hand-carried by anyone other than theAccountable Officer, the letter request mustbe accompanied by an authorization letter;

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR

4. Eliminate sexual stereotyping of roles by:

a. using the same term for both genders when itcomes to profession or employment

TRADITIONAL: salesman, stewardessSUGGESTED: sales agent, flight attendant

b. using gender fair terms in lexical terms

TRADITIONAL: sportsmanshipSUGGESTED: highest ideals of fair play

c. treating men and women in a parallel manner

TRADITIONAL: I now pronounce you manand wife.

SUGGESTED: I now pronounce youhusband and wife.

d. avoiding language that reinforcesstereotyping images

TRADITIONAL: a man’s job, the director’sgirl Friday

SUGGESTED: a big job, the director ’sassistant

e. avoiding language that catches attention tothe sex role of men and women

TRADITIONAL: working mothers, spinstersor old maids

SUGGESTED: wage-earning mothers,unmarried women

TRADITIONAL: busboys, chauvinist pigsSUGGESTED: waiter ’s assistants, male

chauvinists

5. Eliminate sexism when addressing personsformally by:

a. using Ms. Instead of Mrs.

TRADITIONAL: Mrs. dela CruzSUGGESTED: Ms. dela Cruz

b. using a married woman’s first name insteadof her husband’s

TRADITIONAL: Mrs. Juan dela CruzSUGGESTED: Ms. Maria Santos-dela Cruz

c. using the corresponding titles for females

TRADITIONAL: Dra. Concepcion ReyesSUGGESTED: Dr. Concepcion Reyes

A.C. NO. 82-2006 (continued)

d. using the title of the job or group in letters tounknown persons

TRADITIONAL: Dear SirSUGGESTED: Dear Editor, Dear Credit

Manager, Dear Colleague”

For the information and guidance of all concerned.

September 19, 2006.

(Sgd.) ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN Chief Justice

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TO: ALL JUDGES AND CLERKS OF COURT OFTHE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS,METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS,MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES,MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPALCIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS, SHARI’ADISTRICT COURTS, AND SHARI’A CIRCUITCOURTS.

SUBJECT: GUIDELINES ON THE REDUCTION OFBOND LIABILITY

In line with the policy of the Court to ensure theefficient and effective collection of liabilities undersurety bonds and expedite the administration ofjustice, the Court sets forth hereunder the followingguidelines:

1. REDUCTION OF BOND LIABILITY -Following an Order of Forfeiture, the Courtmay reduce or otherwise mitigate the liabilityof the bondsmen, PROVIDED, the accusedhas been surrendered or is acquitted. Only inthese two instances may Judges reduce ormitigate the liability of the bondsmen. (RULE114, SEC. 2)

2. All Judges shall resolve all motions forreconsideration filed by the bondsmen froman Order of Forfeiture within thirty (30) daysfrom the time it is submitted for resolution.(RULE 37, SEC. 4)


TO : ALL JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS,SANDIGANBAYAN, COURT OF TAXAPPEALS AND JUDGES OF THE FIRST ANDSECOND LEVEL COURTS

SUBJECT: REVISED PROVISION OF CANON 4,SECTION 9 OF THE NEW CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT

The Supreme Court En Banc in its Resolutiondated 6 June 2006 in A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC, Re: NewCode of Judicial Conduct for the PhilippineJudiciary-Resolved, upon the recommendation ofthe Philippine Judicial Academy, to REVISE theprovision of Canon 4, Section 9 of the New Code ofJudicial Conduct, as distributed to judges and courtpersonnel, so as to read as follows:

“Confidential information acquired by judgesin their judicial capacity shall not be used or disclosedfor any other purpose NOT related to their judicialduties. “

For your information and guidance.

28 July 2006.

(Sgd.) CHRISTOPHER O. LOCK Court Administrator

3. An Order granting or denying a motion forreconsideration from an Order of Forfeituremust state clearly the reason for its grant ordenial and specifying therein the facts and thelaw on which it is based.

4. Corollarily, all Judges shall furnish the Officeof the Court Administrator a copy of theirOrder of Forfeiture and the motions forreconsideration submitted by the parties.

Strict compliance is hereby enjoined.

19 July 2006.

(Sgd.) CHRISTOPHER O. LOCK Court Administrator

4) If the Official Receipts and/or cash book are tobe delivered, the same shall be forwarded byLRA thru its cargo forwarding contractor; and

5) Consumption of Official Receipts shall bereported semi-annually to the LandRegistration Authority thru its Property andSupply Section using the attached form, formonitoring and auditing purposes.

For strict compliance.

12 July 2006.

(Sgd.) CHRISTOPHER O. LOCK

Court Administrator

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