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JUDICIAL IMMUNITY FROM SUIT

BY JUDGE ELIZA B. YU, LLM, DCL

Incumbent Supreme Court Justices are immune from disbarment suits before their impeachment and subsequent conviction by the Senate in Article XI, Section 3 (6) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. The grounds for their removal are culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust (Article XI, Section 2 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution).

In Cuenco v. Justice Fernan, A.M. No. 3135, February 17, 1988, the Supreme Court held that there is another reason why the complaint for disbarment here must be dismissed. Members of the Supreme Court must, under Article VIII (7) (1) of the Constitution, be members of the Philippine Bar and may be removed from office only by impeachment (Article XI [2], Constitution). To grant a complaint for disbarment of a Member of the Court during the Member's incumbency, would in effect be to circumvent and hence to ran afoul of the constitutional mandate that Members of the Court may be removed from office only by impeachment for and conviction of certain offenses listed in Article XI (2) of the Constitution. Precisely the same situation exists in respect of the Ombudsman and his deputies (Article XI [8] in relation to Article XI [2] of the Constitution), a majority of the members of the Commission on Elections (Article IX [C] [1] [1] in relation to Article XI [2] of the Constitution), and the members of the Commission on audit who are not certified public accountants (Article XI [D] [1] [1] of the Constitution), all of whom are constitutionally required to be members of the Philippine Bar. In Re First Indorsement from Honorable Raul M. Gonzalez dated March 16, 1988 Requesting Honorable Justice Marcelo B. Fernan to Comment on an Anonymous Letter Complaint, A.M. No. 88-4-5433, April 15, 1988 citing Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, the Supreme Court said: The broad power of the New Constitution vests the respondent court with jurisdiction over "public officers and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations." There are exceptions, however, like constitutional officers, particularly those declared to be removed by impeachment. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution provides: Sec. 2 The President, the Members of the Supreme Court, and the Members of the Constitutional Commissions shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, other high crimes, or graft and corruption." Thus, the above provision proscribes removal from office of the aforementioned constitutional officers by any other method; otherwise, to allow a public officer who may be removed solely by impeachment to be charged criminally while holding his office, would be violative of the clear mandate of the fundamental law. Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, in his authoritative dissertation on the New Constitution, states that "judgement in cases of impeachment shall be limited to removal from office and

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disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust, or profit under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution trial, and punishment, in accordance with law. The above provision is a reproduction of what was found in the 1935 Constitution. It is quite apparent from the explicit character of the above provision that the effect of impeachment is limited to the loss of position and disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust or profit under the Republic. It is equally manifest that the party this convicted may be proceeded against, tried and thereafter punished in accordance with law. There can be no clearer expression of the constitutional intent as to the scope of the impeachment process (The Constitution f the Philippines, pp. 465-466)." The clear implication is, the party convicted in the impeachment proceeding shall nevertheless be liable and subject of prosecution, trial and punishment according to law; and that if the same does not result in a conviction and the official is not thereby removed, the filing of a criminal action "in accordance with law" may not prosper. The provisions of the 1973 Constitution we referred to above in Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan are substantially reproduced in Article XI of the 1987 Constitution: Sec. 2 The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. Sec. 3 xxx xxx xxx (7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial and punishment according to law. It is important to make clear that the Court is not here saying that it Members or the other constitutional officers we referred to above are entitled to immunity from liability for possibly criminal acts or for alleged violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics or other supposed misbehavior. What the Court is saying is that there is a fundamental procedural requirements that must be observed before such liability may be determined and enforced. A Member of the Supreme Court must first be removed from office via the constitutional route of impeachment under Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Should the tenure of the Supreme Court Justice be thus terminated by impeachment, he may then be held to answer either criminally or administratively (by disbarment proceedings) for any wrong or misbehavior that may be proven against him in appropriate proceedings. The above rule rests on the fundamental principles of judicial independence and separation of powers. The rule is important because judicial independence is important. Without the protection of this rule, Members of the Supreme Court would be brought against them by unsuccessful litigants or their lawyers or by other parties who, for any number of reasons might seek to affect the exercise of judicial authority by the Court. It follows from the foregoing that a fiscal or other prosecuting officer should forthwith and motu proprio dismiss any

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charges brought against a Member of this Court. The remedy of a person with a legitimate grievance is to file impeachment proceedings.

Generally, Supreme Court Justices are immune from administrative and criminal suits pertaining to their official acts without bad faith or malice.

In Maylas Jr. v. Sese, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2012, August 4, 2006, The filing of an administrative complaint is not the proper remedy for the correction of actions of a judge perceived to have gone beyond the norms of propriety, where a sufficient judicial remedy exists, thus: [T]he law provides ample judicial remedies against errors or irregularities being committed by a Trial Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The ordinary remedies against errors or irregularities which may be regarded as normal in nature (i.e., error in appreciation or admission of evidence, or in construction or application of procedural or substantive law or legal principle) include a motion for reconsideration (or after rendition of a judgment or final order, a motion for new trial), and appeal. The extraordinary remedies against error or irregularities which may be deemed extraordinary in character (i.e., whimsical, capricious, despotic exercise of power or neglect of duty, etc.) are inter alia the special civil actions of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or a motion for inhibition, a petition for change of venue, as the case may be. Now, the established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions against Judges are not complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for, these judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding, are pre-requisites for the taking of other measures against the persons of the judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative, or criminal nature. It is only after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality, that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil or administrative liability may be said to have opened, or closed. Even granting that respondent judge erred in the issuance of the assailed Order, he could not be held administratively liable considering that there is no proof that such error of judgment was tainted with bias or partiality, fraud, dishonesty, bad faith, deliberate intent to do an injustice, or gross ignorance. To merit disciplinary action, the error or mistake must be gross or patent, malicious, deliberate or in bad faith. In the absence of a showing to the contrary, defective or erroneous decision or order is presumed to have been issued in good faith.

In Re: Subpoena Duces Tecum dated January 11, 2010 of Acting Director Aleu Amante, PIAB-C, Office of the Ombudsman, A.M. No. 10-1-13-SC, March 2, 2010,

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the subpoena duces tecum (dated January 11, 2010 and received by the Supreme Court on January 18, 2010), issued by the Office of the Ombudsman on the Chief, Office of the Administrative Services or AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE, Supreme Court, Manila, for the submission to the Office of the Ombudsman of the latest Personal Data Sheets and last known forwarding address of former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. and former Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez. The subpoena duces tecum was issued in relation to a criminal complaint under (b) below, pursuant to Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution and Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6770. The Office of the Administrative Services (OAS) referred the matter to us on January 21, 2010 with a request for clearance to release the specified documents and information; a copy of the criminal complaint entitled Oliver O. Lozano and Evangeline Lozano-Endriano v. Hilario G. Davide, Jr., et al., OMB-C-C-09-0527-J, cited by the Ombudsman as basis for the subpoena duces tecum it issued. We secured a copy of this criminal complaint from the Ombudsman to determine the legality and propriety of the subpoena duces tecum sought; and Order dated February 4, 2010 (which the Court received on February 9, 2010), signed by Acting Director Maribeth Taytaon-Padios of the Office of the Ombudsman (with the approval of Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas Navarro-Gutierrez), dismissing the Lozano complaint and referring it to the Supreme Court for appropriate action. The order was premised on the Memorandum issued on July 31, 2003 by Ombudsman Simeon Marcelo who directed that all complaints against judges and other members of the Judiciary be immediately dismissed and referred to the Supreme Court for appropriate action. In light of the Ombudsmans dismissal order of February 4, 2010, any question relating to the legality and propriety of the subpoena duces tecum the Ombudsman issued has been rendered moot and academic. The subpoena duces tecum merely drew its life and continued viability from the underlying criminal complaint, and the complaints dismissal belated though it may be cannot but have the effect of rendering the need for the subpoena duces tecum academic. As guide in the issuance of compulsory processes to Members of this Court, past and present, in relation to complaints touching on the exercise of our judicial functions, we deem it appropriate to discuss for the record the extent of the Ombudsmans authority in these types of complaints. In the appropriate case, the Office of the Ombudsman has full authority to issue subpoenas, including subpoena duces tecum, for compulsory attendance of witnesses and the production of documents and information relating to matters under its investigation. The grant of this authority, however, is not unlimited, as the Ombudsman must necessarily observe and abide by the terms of the Constitution and our laws, the Rules of Court and the applicable jurisprudence on the issuance, service, validity and efficacy of subpoenas. Under the Rules of Court, the issuance of subpoenas, including a subpoena duces tecum, operates under the requirements of reasonableness and relevance. For the production of documents to be reasonable and for the documents themselves to be relevant, the matter under inquiry should, in the first place, be one that the Ombudsman can legitimately entertain, investigate and rule upon. In the present case, the matter that gave rise to the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum was a

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criminal complaint filed by the complainants Lozano for the alleged violation by retired Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. and retired Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). A first step in considering whether a criminal complaint (and its attendant compulsory processes) is within the authority of the Ombudsman to entertain (and to issue), is to consider the nature of the powers of the Supreme Court. This Court, by constitutional design, is supreme in its task of adjudication; judicial power is vested solely in the Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts, not only to settle actual controversies, but also to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction has been committed in any branch or instrumentality of government. As a rule, all decisions and determinations in the exercise of judicial power ultimately go to and stop at the Supreme Court whose judgment is final. This constitutional scheme cannot be thwarted or subverted through a criminal complaint that, under the guise of imputing a misdeed to the Court and its Members, seeks to revive and re-litigate matters that have long been laid to rest by the Court. Effectively, such criminal complaint is a collateral attack on a judgment of this Court that, by constitutional mandate, is final and already beyond question. A simple jurisprudential research would easily reveal that this Court has had the occasion to rule on the liability of Justices of the Supreme Court for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019the very same provision that the complainants Lozano invoke in this case. In In re Wenceslao Laureta, the client of Atty. Laureta filed a complaint with the Tanodbayan charging Members of the Supreme Court with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 for having knowingly, deliberately and with bad faith rendered an unjust resolution in a land dispute. The Court unequivocally ruled that insofar as this Court and its Divisions are concerned, a charge of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that such collective decision is unjust should not prosper; the parties cannot relitigate in another forum the final judgment of the Court, as to do so is to subordinate the Court, in the exercise of its judicial functions, to another body. In re Joaquin T. Borromeo reiterates the Laureta ruling, particularly that (1) judgments of the Supreme Court are not reviewable; (2) administrative, civil and criminal complaints against a judge should not be turned into substitutes for appeal; (3) only courts may declare a judgment unjust; and (4) a situation where the Ombudsman is made to determine whether or not a judgment of the Court is unjust is an absurdity. The Court further discussed the requisites for the prosecution of judges, as follows: That is not to say that it is not possible at all to prosecute judges for this impropriety, of rendering an unjust judgment or interlocutory order; but, taking account of all the foregoing considerations, the indispensable requisites are that there be a final declaration by a competent court in some appropriate proceeding of the manifestly unjust character of the challenged judgment or order, and there be also evidence of malice and bad faith, ignorance or inexcusable negligence on the part of the judge in rendering said judgment or order. Thus, consistent with the nature of the power of this Court under our constitutional

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scheme, only this Court not the Ombudsman can declare a Supreme Court judgment to be unjust. In Alzua v. Arnalot, the Court ruled that judges of superior and general jurisdiction are not liable to respond in civil action for damages, and provided this rationale for this ruling: Liability to answer to everyone who might feel himself aggrieved by the action of the judge would be inconsistent with the possession of this freedom and would destroy that independence without which no judiciary can be either respectable or useful. The same rationale applies to the indiscriminate attribution of criminal liability to judicial officials. Plainly, under these rulings, a criminal complaint for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, based on the legal correctness of the official acts of Justices of the Supreme Court, cannot prosper and should not be entertained. This is not to say that Members of the Court are absolutely immune from suit during their term, for they are not. The Constitution provides that the appropriate recourse against them is to seek their removal from office if they are guilty of culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. Only after removal can they be criminally proceeded against for their transgressions. While in office and thereafter, and for their official acts that do not constitute impeachable offenses, recourses against them and their liabilities therefor are as defined in the above rulings. Section 22 of Republic Act No. 6770, in fact, specifically grants the Ombudsman the authority to investigate impeachable officers, but only when such investigation is warranted: Section 22. Investigatory Power. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the power to investigate any serious misconduct in office allegedly committed by officials removable by impeachment, for the purpose of filing a verified complaint for impeachment, if warranted. Conversely, if a complaint against an impeachable officer is unwarranted for lack of legal basis and for clear misapplication of law and jurisprudence, the Ombudsman should spare these officers from the harassment of an unjustified investigation. The present criminal complaint against the retired Justices is one such case where an investigation is not warranted, based as it is on the legal correctness of their official acts, and the Ombudsman should have immediately recognized the criminal complaint for what it is, instead of initially proceeding with its investigation and issuing a subpoena duces tecum. As the Ombudsmans dismissal of the criminal complaint (Oliver O. Lozano and Evangeline Lozano-Endriano v. Hilario G. Davide, Jr., et al., OMB-C-C-09-0527-J) clearly implied, no complete dismissal took place as the matter was simply referred to the Supreme Court for appropriate action. Although it was belatedly made, we cannot fault this Ombudsman action for the reasons we have already discussed above. While both accused are now retired from the service, the complaint against them still qualifies for exclusive consideration by this Court as the acts complained of spring from their judicial actions while they were with the Court. From this perspective, we therefore pass upon the prima facie merits of the complainants Lozanos criminal complaint. By its express terms, the criminal complaint stemmed from the participation of the accused in the Resolution the First Division of this Court issued in Heirs of Antonio Pael v. Court of Appeals, docketed as G.R. Nos. 133547 and 133843. The retired Chief Justice and

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retired Associate Justice allegedly committed the following unlawful acts: (1) Overturning the findings of fact of the CA; (2) Stating in the Resolution that the Chin-Mallari property overlaps the UP property, when the DENR Survey Report stated that the UP title/property overlaps the Chin-Mallari property; (3) Issuing a Resolution, for which three Justices voted, to set aside a Decision for which five Justices voted. By these acts, the retired Members of this Court are being held criminally accountable on the theory that they violated the Constitution and the law in their ruling in the cited cases, thereby causing undue injury to the parties to these cases. After due consideration, we dismiss the criminal complaint against retired Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. and retired Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez under Section 3(e) of RA 3019. We fully expound on the reasons for this conclusion in the discussions below. The Supreme Court is the highest court of the land with the power to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of the lower courts. It has the authority to promulgate rules on practice, pleadings and admission to the bar, and suspend the operation of these rules in the interest of justice. Jurisprudence holds, too, that the Supreme Court may exercise these powers over the factual findings of the lower courts, among other prerogatives, in the following instances: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd of impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when, in making its findings, the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. Thus, contrary to the complainants Lozano assertions in their complaint, the Supreme Court, in the proper cases, can and does rule on factual submissions before it, and even reverses the lower courts factual findings when the circumstances call for this action. The complainants Lozano appear to us to have brazenly misquoted and misused applicable constitutional provisions to justify their case against the retired Justices. We refer particularly to their use (or strictly, misuse) of Article X, Section 2(3) of the 1973 Constitution which they claim to be the governing rule that the retired Justices should have followed in acting on Pael. This constitutional provision states: Cases heard by a division shall be decided with the concurrence of at least five Members, but if such required number is not obtained the case shall be decided en banc; Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the Court sitting en banc. For failure of the retired Justices to act according to these terms, the complainants claim that the former subverted the Constitution by reversing, by a vote of a majority of only three members, the decision of the First Division unanimously

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approved by its full membership of five members. Had the complainants bothered to carefully consider the facts and developments in Pael and accordingly related these to the applicable constitutional provision, they would have discovered that Pael was decided in 2003 when the 1987 Constitution, not the 1973 Constitution, was the prevailing Charter. They then would have easily learned of the manner cases are heard and decided by Division before the Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution. Section 4(3), Article VIII of this Constitution provides: Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case, without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc; Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc. This was the provision that governed in 2003 and still governs to this day. Thus, the complainants argument and basis for their criminal complaint that in ruling on a motion for reconsideration, all five members of the Division should concur is totally wrong. A public official can violate Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019[14] in two ways: (1) by causing undue injury to any party, including the Government; or (2) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference; in either case, these acts must be committed with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross and inexcusable negligence. Partiality is defined as a bias or disposition to see and report matters as wished for, rather than as they are. Bad faith connotes not only bad judgment or negligence, but also a dishonest purpose, a conscious wrongdoing, or a breach of duty amounting to fraud. Gross negligence, on the other hand, is characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences as far as other persons are concerned. The criminal complaint in this case failed to allege the facts and circumstances showing that the retired Justices acted with partiality, bad faith or negligence. A judicial officers act in reviewing the findings of fact in a decision and voting for its reversal cannot by itself constitute a violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 in the absence of facts, alleged and proven, demonstrating a dishonest purpose, conscious partiality, extrinsic fraud, or any wrongdoing on his or her part. A complainants mere disagreement with the magistrates own conclusions, to be sure, does not justify a criminal charge under Section 3(e) against the latter. In the absence of alleged and proven particular acts of manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, good faith and regularity are generally presumed in the performance of official duties by public officers. For the criminal complaints fatal omissions and resultant failure to allege a prima facie case, it rightfully deserves immediate dismissal.

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In A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC (THE INTERNAL RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT), it provides:

Section 13. Ethics Committee. In addition to the above, a permanent Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards shall be established and chaired by the Chief Justice, with the following membership: (a) a working Vice-Chair appointed by the Chief Justice; (b) three (3) members chosen among themselves by the en banc by secret vote; and (c) a retired Supreme Court Justice chosen by the Chief Justice as a non-voting observer-consultant.

The Vice-Chair, the Members and the retired Supreme Court Justice shall serve for a term of one (1) year, with the election in the case of elected Members to be held at the call of the Chief Justice. The Committee shall have the task of preliminarily investigating all complaints involving graft and corruption and violations of ethical standards, including anonymous complaints, filed against Members of the Court, and of submitting findings and recommendations to the en banc. All proceedings shall be completely confidential. The Committee shall also monitor and report to the Court the progress of the investigation of similar complaints against Supreme Court officials and employees, and handle the annual update of the Courts ethical rules and standards for submission to the en banc.

In Re: Undated Letter of Mr. Louis C. Biraogo, petitioner in Biraogo Nograles and Limkaichong, G.R. No. 179120, February 24, 2009, the Supreme Court found Justice Ruben T. Reyes (Ret.) liable for Grave Misconduct for leaking a confidential internal document of the Court and he was fined P500,000.00, to be charged against his retirement benefits, and disqualified to hold any office or employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government including government-owned or controlled corporations; furthermore, Justice Ruben T. Reyes was directed to show cause within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of this Decision why he should not be disciplined as a member of the Bar in light of the aforementioned findings. The subsequent retirement of a judge or any judicial officer from the service does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which he is answerable (Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Dolores, Eastern Samar, A.M. No. 06-6-340-RTC, October 17, 2007, 536 SCRA 313, 339 citing Concerned Trial Lawyers of Manila v. Veneracion, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1920, April 26, 2006, 488 SCRA 285, 298-299). A case becomes moot and academic only when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits of the case. The instant case is not moot and academic, despite Justice Reyess retirement. Even if the most severe of administrative sanctions may no longer be imposed, there are other penalties which may be imposed if one is later found guilty of the administrative offenses charged, including the disqualification to hold any government office and the forfeiture of benefits (Pagano v. Nazarro, Jr., G.R. No.

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149072, September 21, 2007, 533 SCRA 622, 628). The Court retains jurisdiction either to pronounce a respondent official innocent of the charges or declare him/her guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications. For, what remedy would the people have against a civil servant who resorts to wrongful and illegal conduct during his/her last days in office? What would prevent a corrupt and unscrupulous government employee from committing abuses and other condemnable acts knowing fully well that he/she would soon be beyond the pale of the law and immune from all administrative penalties? If only for reasons of public policy, this Court must assert and maintain its jurisdiction over members of the judiciary and other officials under its supervision and control for acts performed in office which are inimical to the service and prejudicial to the interests of litigants and the general public. If innocent, a respondent official merits vindication of his/her name and integrity as he leaves the government which he/she served well and faithfully; if guilty, he/she deserves to receive the corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the situation (Largo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 177244, November 20, 2007, 537 SCRA 721, 729 citing Perez v. Abiera, Adm. Case No. 223-J, June 11, 1975, 64 SCRA 302, 307; Gallo v. Judge Cordero, 315 Phil. 210, 220).

In Dissenting Opinion by Justice Antonio Carpio, A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC In the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism Etc. against Associate Justice Mariano Del Castillo, February 8, 2011, he opined:

Under the Constitution, the sole disciplining authority of all impeachable officers, including Justices of this Court, is Congress. Section 3(1), Article XI of the Constitution provides that, The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment. Likewise, Section 3(6) of the same Article provides that, The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide cases of impeachment. These provisions constitute Congress as the exclusive authority to discipline all impeachable officers for any impeachable offense, including betrayal of public trust, a catchall phrase to cover any misconduct involving breach of public trust by an impeachable officer. While impeachment is often described as a political process, it also functions as the equivalent of administrative disciplinary proceedings against impeachable officers. Impeachable officers are not subject to administrative disciplinary proceedings either by the Executive or Judicial branch, in the same manner that non-impeachable officers are subject. Thus, impeachment by Congress takes the place of administrative disciplinary proceedings against impeachable officers as there is no other authority that can administratively discipline impeachable officers. Removal from office and disqualification to hold public office, which is the penalty for an impeachable offense, is also the most severe penalty that can be imposed in administrative disciplinary proceedings. Impeachment is not a criminal proceeding because conviction in an impeachment complaint is not a bar to criminal prosecution for the same act. An impeachable offense, like betrayal of public trust, may not even constitute a criminal act. Like in an administrative proceeding, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required for conviction

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in impeachment. If an impeachable officer is charged of a crime, as distinguished from an administrative charge, the proper court has jurisdiction to try such impeachable officer because the proceeding is criminal, not administrative. However, neither the conviction nor acquittal of such impeachable officer in the criminal case constitutes a bar to his subsequent impeachment by Congress. There is no double jeopardy because impeachment is not a criminal proceeding. Only Congress, as the exclusive disciplining authority of all impeachable officers, can decide in a non-criminal, non-civil proceeding whether a sitting Justice of this Court has committed plagiarism. Plagiarism is a betrayal of public trust because, as the majority puts it, to plagiarize is to steal and pass off as ones own the ideas of another. However, in writing judicial decisions a judge is liable for plagiarism only if the copying violates the moral rights of the author under the Law on Copyright. This Court may conduct an investigation of an administrative complaint against a sitting Justice to determine if there is basis in recommending to the House of Representatives the initiation of an impeachment complaint against the sitting Justice. This Court may also conduct an investigation of an administrative complaint against a sitting Justice to determine if the complaint constitutes contempt of this Court. However, this Court has no power to decide on the guilt or innocence of a sitting Justice in the administrative complaint because such act is a usurpation of the exclusive disciplinary power of Congress over impeachable officers under the Constitution. Any decision by this Court in an administrative case clearing a sitting Justice of an impeachable offense is void for want of jurisdiction and for violation of an express provision of the Constitution. Such a decision will put this Court on a collision course with Congress if subsequently an impeachment complaint for plagiarism is filed with Congress against the sitting Justice. Incidentally, an impeachment complaint has already been filed in the House of Representatives involving the same complaint subject of this administrative case. If the House of Representatives decides to take cognizance of the complaint and initiates an impeachment based on the same administrative complaint that this Court had already dismissed as baseless, then this Court would have created a constitutional crisis that could only weaken the publics faith in the primacy of the Constitution. The Supreme Court cannot assume jurisdiction over an administrative complaint against a sitting Justice of this Court by invoking Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution. This provision states that the Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. This provision refers to the administrative supervision that the Department of Justice used to exercise over the courts and their personnel, as shown by the following exchange during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:

MR. GUINGONA: xxx. The second question has reference to Section 9, about the administrative supervision over all courts to be retained in the Supreme Court. I was wondering if the Committee had taken into consideration the proposed resolution for the transfer of the administrative supervision from the Supreme Court to the Ministry of Justice. But as far as I know, none of the proponents had been invited to explain or defend the proposed resolution. Also, I wonder if the Committee also took into consideration the fact that the UP Law Constitution Project in its Volume I, entitled: Annotated Provision had, in fact, made this an alternative proposal, the transfer of

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administrative supervision from the Supreme Court to the Ministry of Justice. Thank you.

MR. CONCEPCION: May I refer the question to Commissioner Regalado?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Sarmiento): Commissioner Regalado is recognized.

MR. REGALADO: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer. We did invite Minister Neptali Gonzales, who was the proponent for the transfer of supervision of the lower courts to the Ministry of Justice. I even personally called up and sent a letter or a short note inviting him, but the good Minister unfortunately was enmeshed in a lot of official commitments. We wanted to hear him because the Solicitor General of his office, Sedfrey Ordoez, appeared before us, and asked for the maintenance of the present arrangement wherein the supervision over lower courts is with the Supreme Court. But aside from that, although there were no resource persons, we did further studies on the feasibility of transferring the supervision over the lower courts to the Ministry of Justice. All those things were taken into consideration motu proprio.

For sure, the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court over judges is expressly governed by another provision, that is, Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution. Section 11 provides: Section 11. xxx The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon. Clearly, the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court over judges is found in Section 11 of Article VIII. However, this disciplinary authority is expressly limited to lower court judges, and does not include Supreme Court Justices, precisely because the Constitution expressly vests exclusively on Congress the power to discipline Supreme Court Justices. By excluding Supreme Court Justices, Section 11 withholds from the Supreme Court en banc the power to discipline its own members. The Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 of the United States, which gives judicial councils composed of federal judges the power to discipline federal judges short of removal from office, does not apply to Justices of the United States Supreme Court who are subject to discipline only by the United States Congress. Moreover, a similar law cannot be enacted in the Philippines because all lower court judges are subject to discipline by the Supreme Court en banc under Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution. Thus, reference to the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 is inappropriate in this jurisdiction. I submit that this Court recall the Resolution of 12 October 2010 subject of the present motion for reconsideration for lack of jurisdiction to decide the administrative complaint against Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo.

In the impeachment of Chief Justice Renato Corona on December 12, 2011, among the charges against him involve Supreme Court Decisions, to quote the Articles of Impeachment ( Prosecution and Defense sides sourced from Wikipedia):

Article I

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Respondent betrayed the public trust through his track record marked by partiality and subservience in cases involving the Arroyo administration from the time of his appointment as Supreme Court Justice which continued to his dubious appointment as a midnight Chief Justice and up to the present.

1. Coronas partiality

Prosecution: The First Article of Impeachment alleges that Corona betrayed public trust by his track record marked by partiality and subservience in cases involving the Arroyo Administration, which is traced to his history as President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyos chief of staff, spokesman, and acting Executive Secretary. In relation to this, a press release by Senator Franklin Drilon enumerated some 19 cases where Corona allegedly voted in favor of the Arroyo Administration.

Defense: Refuting the ground of partiality, Corona stressed in his Answer that by mentioning decisions and actions of the Supreme Court in the impeachment complaint, the prosecutors demonstrate their lack of understanding of the concept of a collegial body like the Supreme Court, where each member has a single vote, and that whether he be the Chief Justice or the most junior associate, his vote is of equal weight with that of the others. Corona also emphasized that he cannot be held accountable for the outcome of cases before the Supreme Court which acts as a collegial tribunal. As to the allegation that his previous association with the Arroyo Administration was the cause of his alleged partiality, Corona highlighted the fact that it is not uncommon for Justices to have previously worked as professionals in close association with the President. The Chief Justice also observed how the complaint in effect asks the Senate to review certain decisions of the Supreme Court. This, according to him, cannot be done in line with the essential feature of checks and balances in a republican form of government that no other department may pass upon judgments of the Supreme Court. Coronas Answer cites the 1990 case of Maglasang vs. People, where the Court declared that the Supreme Court is supremethe third great department of government entrusted exclusively with the judicial power to adjudicate with finality all justiciable disputes, public and private. In that landmark case, the High Court stressed that No other department or agency may pass upon its judgments or declare them unjust. Consequently, and owing to the foregoing, not even the President of the Philippines as Chief Executive may pass judgment on any of the Court's acts.

2. Midnight appointment

Prosecution: Despite the overwhelming majority decision of the Supreme Court in De Castro vs. Judicial and Bar Council (JBC), the complainants also insist that Corona is a midnight appointee under a persistent belief that his appointment violated section 15, Article VII of the Constitution. The oft-quoted provision reads, Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to

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executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

Defense: Corona points out that the Court already categorically held in De Castro that section 15 confined the prohibition to appointments made in the Executive Department, which means that the bar on midnight appointments applies only to executive positions. The decision penned by Justice Lucas Bersamin reasoned that The framers [of the Constitution] did not need to extend the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary, because their establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and screening of candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured that there would no longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary. The insistence of the complainants that Corona is a midnight appointee contrary to the abovementioned ruling leads to the conclusion that the First Article is also an attack on the Supreme Courts ruling in the De Castro case. This is, of course, beyond the Senates power as an impeachment court.

Article II

Respondent committed culpable violation of the Constitution and/or betrayed the public trust when he failed to disclose to the public his Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net worth as required under Sec. 17, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution.

Prosecution: The Second Article alleges that Corona failed to disclose to the public his statement of assets, liabilities, and net worth in violation of section 17, Article XI of the Constitution as well as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019). Section 17, Article XI provides that, A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional offices, and officers of the armed forces with general or flag rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the manner provided by law. The complaint also alleges that Corona and his wife acquired a 300-sq.m. apartment in the Fort, Taguig worth beyond his income as a public official and this was not reported this in his SALN.

Defense: Corona notes that what the Constitution requires from every public official is the submission of their SALNs. Disclosure to the public, on the other hand, shall be in the manner provided by law. The implementing law is section 8 of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (R.A. 6713) which, while recognizing the public's right to know the SALNs of public officials, prohibits any person to obtain or use SALNs for (1) any purpose contrary to morals or public policy; or (2) any commercial purpose other than by news and communications media for

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dissemination to the general public. After an official submits his SALN, the disclosure is no longer up to him. While failure to file his SALN can render Corona liable, failure to disclose such SALN would not. Corona has stated in his Answer that he has faithfully complied with this requirement every year, and that this may be verified upon a proper request with the Office of the Clerk of Court. The Answer also states that Corona has not prevented the public disclosure of his declarations of assets, liabilities, and net worth. Firstly, it is not for the Chief Justice to unilaterally decide whether to disclose or not to disclose them. Secondly, the release of the SALNs of Justices is regulated by law and the Court's various Resolutions cited above. Thirdly, CJ Corona never issued an order that forbids the public disclosure of his above declarations. As to the Taguig property, Corona admitted in the Answer that he and his wife indeed purchased the apartment on installment and declared it in his SALN. Again, this may be verified upon a proper request with the Office of the Clerk of Court.

Additional points: Attention was brought to Supreme Court circular A.M. No. 92-9-851-RTC which regulates the publics access to the SALNs of justices and judges to protect them from circumstances which may endanger, diminish or destroy their independence and objectivity in the performance of their judicial functions or expose them to revenge for adverse decisions, kidnapping, extortion, blackmail, or other untoward consequences. In a way, this circular may be considered as a prohibition on the disclosure of the SALNs of justices. But this circular, a collegial action of the Court, was issued in 1992; Corona was appointed to the Supreme Court in 2001.

Article III

Respondent committed culpable violations of the Constitution and betrayed the public trust by failing to meet and observe the stringent standards under Art. VIII, section 7 (3) of the Constitution that provides that [a] member of the judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence in allowing the Supreme Court to act on mere letters filed by a counsel which caused the issuance of flip-flopping decisions in final and executory cases; in creating an excessive entanglement with Mrs. Arroyo through her appointment of his wife to office; and in discussing with litigants regarding cases pending before the Supreme Court. The Third Article alleges that Corona betrayed public trust in three specific instances. The first involves a labor case against Philippine Airlines; the second concerns the Vizconde Massacre case; and lastly, the appointment of Coronas wife in government.

1. Recall of the flight attendants case

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Prosecution: The impeachment complaint alleges that Corona allowed the Supreme Court to act on mere letters from counsel in Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP) vs. Philippine Airlines (PAL), which resulted in flip-flopping decisions in that case. It was also alleged that the Court did not even require FASAP to comment on those letters of PALs counsel, Atty. Estelito Mendoza, betraying Coronas lack of ethical principles and disdain for fairness.

What happened: In FASAP vs. PAL, a Special Division of the Supreme Court found PAL guilty of illegal dismissal and ordered the reinstatement of 1,423 employees. Later on, in a September 7 resolution, the Courts Second Division denied with finality PALs motion for reconsideration and ordered that no further pleadings will be entertained. However, on October 4, 2011, the Court en banc issued A.M. No. 11-10-1-SC recalling the September 7 resolution. This was in response to a letter sent by PAL lawyer Estelito Mendoza pointing out a procedural lapse because the September 7 resolution was issued by the Second Division, when it should have been resolved by the Special Division that rendered the original decision. The recall of the resolution caught media attention and was portrayed to be a reversal of the original ruling in favor of the employees.

Defense: According to Coronas Answer, Lawyers and litigants often write the Supreme Court or the Chief Justice regarding their cases. The Supreme Court uniformly treats all such letters as official communications that it must act on when warranted. It also pointed out that the practice is that all letters are endorsed to the proper division or the Supreme Court en banc in which their subject matters are pending. No letter to the Supreme Court is treated in secret. The Answer also explained that A.M. 11-10-1, in response to such letter, did not reverse the ruling to favor PAL. Instead, it merely recalled the original decision so that it can be heard by the proper division of the Court. That proper division has yet to decide the case, so there really is no decision yet reversing anything.

Additional points: Whether Corona can be held liable for this collegial act of the Court is for the Senate to determine. One thing is certain though: That Corona had never participated in this FASAP vs. PAL case, having inhibited since 2008.

Discussing the Vizconde Massacre Case with Lauro Vizconde

Prosecution: The second instance of betrayal of public trust involves the Vizconde massacre case. In Lejano vs. People, Corona voted to affirm the conviction of Hubert

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Webb et al., but lost by a slim majority to his colleagues who went on to acquit the accused. Corona was said to have accused Senior Justice Antonio Carpio of lobbying with the other Justices to secure Webbs acquittal. This was allegedly discussed by Corona with complainant Lauro Vizconde while Webbs appeal was pending in the Supreme Court. It should be recalled that before Carpio was appointed to the Supreme Court, he was one of the witnesses who claimed to have seen Webb in the United States at the time the crime was committed.

Defense: Corona does not deny the meeting with Vizconde. However, he stressed that only Dante Jimenez, as head of the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption (VACC) was cleared to make a courtesy call on the newly appointed Chief Justice, and that he was thus surprised to see Lauro Vizconde come into his chambers with Jimenez. While the Answer admits that Vizconde remained during that meeting as a result of etiquette and manners, Corona denied having told Vizconde that Carpio lobbied with the other Justices for Webbs acquittal.

2. Appointment of Coronas wife in John Hay Corp.

Prosecution: The third instance under Article III involves Coronas wife Cristina. The complainants attack the Chief Justice for having compromised his independence when his wife accepted an appointment from Mrs. Arroyo to the Board of John Hay Management Corporation (JHMC). They also claim that complaints have been filed against Mrs. Corona by disgruntled members of the Board of JHMC and certain officers and employees.

Defense: Pointing out that No law prohibits the wife of a Chief Justice from pursuing her own career in the government, Coronas Answer stressed that Mrs. Corona was already part of JHMC even before her husband was appointed to the Supreme Court. Regarding the alleged complaints against Mrs. Corona, the Answer simply shrugged them aside because Corona is not being impeached for alleged offenses of his wife.

Article IV

Respondent betrayed the public trust and/or committed culpable violation of the Constitution when it blatantly disregarded the principle of separation of powers by issuing a status quo ante order against the House of Representatives in the case concerning the impeachment of then Ombudsman Merceditas Navarro-Gutierrez.

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Prosecution: The Fourth Article alleges that the Courts issuance of the status quo ante order against the House of Representatives was a blatant disregard of the principle of separation of powers in order to protect then Ombudsman Gutierrez.

What happened: On July 22, 2010, an impeachment complaint was filed against Gutierrez. On August 10 that same year, another impeachment complaint was filed against her.

Considering that the Constitution prohibits two impeachment proceedings against one official within one year, the Supreme Court issued a status quo ante order until it could decide the case filed by Gutierrez questioning the validity of the second complaint. Being a collegial act, it was majority of the Court that issued the order, not Corona.

Defense: Corona called attention to the landmark case of Francisco vs. House of Representatives to answer the question on whether the Supreme Court disregarded separation of powers by assuming jurisdiction over an impeachment proceeding. In this case, it was Justice Conchita Carpio Morales herself who affirmed the Supreme Courts power to determine whether the House of Representatives committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused its discretion in the exercise of its power of impeachment.

Additional points: Despite the status quo ante order, the Supreme Court eventually ruled in Gutierrez vs. House Committee on Justice that the second impeachment complaint did not violate the Constitution. The Court actually allowed the House to pursue its case against the Ombudsman, which eventually led to her impeachment.

Article V

Respondent committed culpable violations of the constitution through wanton arbitrariness and partiality in consistently disregarding the principle of res judicata and in deciding in favor of gerrymandering in the cases involving the 16 newly-created cities, and the promotion of Dinagat Island into a province.

Prosecution: The Fifth Article specifically attacks the Supreme Courts decisions in League of Cities vs. Comelec regarding 16 new cities created by R.A. 9009, and Navarro vs. Ermita involving the creation of the Province of Dinagat Island by R.A.

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9355. These gerrymandering cases both arose from acts of Congress. Also, FASAP vs. Philippine Airlines once again takes the spotlight in Article V with the allegation that Corona disregarded the principle of res judicata by abandoning a previous ruling in that case.

Defense: Coronas Answer quoted Justice Roberto Abads concurring opinion in Navarro to better explain that there really was no flip-flopping in the League of Cities case: Of 23 Justices who voted in the case at any of its various stages, 20 Justices stood by their original positions. They never reconsidered their views. Only three did so and not on the same occasion, showing no wholesale change of votes at any time.

It was noted that in the League of Cities case, a total of 23 Justices participated because of the seven retirements that occurred during its pendency. Of all these Justices, only three switched votes, and as Justice Abad points out, these three did not flip-flop because they only switched once. As to the Navarro case, the Answer refused to dwell on it considering that it is still subject of a pending motion for reconsideration. Regarding FASAP vs. PAL, as mentioned in our earlier discussion under the Third Article, Corona inhibited in this case, so he never had any participation in the recall of the original decision. Also, the FASAP case has not been decided by the Court yet. It was merely reassigned to the proper divisionwhich has yet to resolve it.

Additional points: In these three cases, the impeachment complaint tries to pin down Corona for collegial actions of the Supreme Court. While Corona may be primus inter pares among the magistrates, he surely has only one vote out of 15.

Article VI

Respondent betrayed the public trust by arrogating unto himself, and to a committee he created, the authority and jurisdiction to improperly investigate an alleged erring member of the Supreme Court for the purpose of exculpating him. Such authority and jurisdiction is properly reposed by the constitution in the House of Representatives via impeachment.

Prosecution: The Sixth Article alleges that Corona betrayed public trust when he created the Supreme Courts Ethics Committee that investigated the allegation that Justice Mariano Del Castillo plagiarized material for the Courts decision in Vinuya vs. Executive Secretary. The Court en banc, voting 102, eventually adopted the Ethics Committees recommendation to absolve Del Castillo of the charge in a resolution titled

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In re Charges of Plagiarism against J. Del Castillo. The impeachment complaint also questions the Supreme Courts power to create the committee for encroaching upon the impeachment power of the House of Representatives.

Defense: Corona refuted the allegation by stressing that The Committees power is only recommendatory. If the offense is impeachable, the Supreme Court en banc will refer the matter to the House of Representatives for investigation. On the other hand, if the offense is non-impeachable, the Supreme Court en banc may decide the case and, if warranted, impose administrative sanctions against the offender. As to the creation the committee, Corona traces it to the power of the Supreme Court to discipline its own members as provided for in section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution, granting the High Court administrative supervision over all the courts and the personnel thereof. Pursuant to this power, the Ethics Committee was created through A.M. 10-4-20-SC under Chief Justice Reynato Punoway before Del Castillo allegedly plagiarized the Vinuya decision, and definitely not under or by Corona. Nonetheless, the creation of the committee was a collegial act of the Court which cannot be attributed to one person alone.

Article VII

Respondent betrayed the public trust through his partiality in granting a temporary restraining order (TRO) in favor of former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and her husband Jose Miguel Arroyo in order to give them an opportunity to escape prosecution and to frustrate the ends of justice, and in distorting the Supreme Court decision on the effectivity of the TRO in view of a clear failure to comply with the conditions of the Supreme Court's own TRO.

Prosecution: The Seventh Article dwells on the temporary restraining order (TRO) issued by the Supreme Court against a Department of Justice Watch List Order (WLO) that prevented Arroyo from leaving the country for medical treatment. The complaint alleges that Corona granted the TRO to provide Arroyo the opportunity to escape prosecution and that the Court was coordinating with the Arroyos who made multiple flight bookings in expectation of the issuance of the TRO. Article VII also alleges that Corona (or the Court) violated the Courts own Internal Rules by disregarding the ponentes recommendation that a hearing be held before they issue the TRO. The impeachment complaint also claims that Corona distorted the Courts decision regarding the effectivity of the TRO in line with Justice Lourdes Serenos opinion that its effectivity was suspended pending Arroyos compliance with all the conditions laid down by the Court, one of which was the amendment of the Special Power of Attorney (SPA) given to Arroyos lawyer.

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What happened: Pursuant to DOJ Circular 41, the Secretary of Justice issued a WLO against Arroyo after the former president expressed her desire to leave the country to seek medical treatment for a rare bone disease. Arroyo filed a petition for the issuance of a TRO against the Justice Secretary so she can leave the country. Note that a TRO is a provisional remedy under Rule 58 of the Rules of Court which is resorted to by a litigant against acts which would probably work injustice or would be in violation of the rights of the applicant. In applying for the TRO, Arroyo invoked her constitutional right to travel under section 6, Article III of the Constitution. She claimed that the WLO violated her right to travel considering that only those who have pending cases in court may be validly prevented by a judge to leave the country. At the time of the issuance of the TRO, not a single case was pending in any court in the country against Arroyo. It was only after the TRO was issued that all of a sudden, a case was filed in court and a warrant for her arrest issued.

Defense: Corona denied the allegations that there was coordination between the Court and Arroyo in the issuance of the TRO by pointing to the fact that Information that the Supreme Court en banc would be taking up those TRO applications on the morning of 15 November 2011 was widely known since crews of all major television stations and print reporters had been camping at the gates of the Supreme Court that very morning. Thus, it was logically not surprising that the Arroyos and their lawyers apparently prepared for the chance that the Supreme Court might favorably act on their applications for TRO and so, had their plans in place. Coronas answer also denied the allegation that the Chief Justice (or the Court) violated the Courts Internal Rules by disregarding the ponentes recommendation that a hearing be held before a TRO is issued. Attention was brought to the fact that the Supreme Court en banc is not bound by the Member-in-Charges recommendation. As in any collegial body, the decision of the majority prevails. Note also that it is not unusual for the Court to grant TROs without conducting prior hearing. This is the reason why after the deliberations, the Court, voting 85, decided to grant the TRO and set oral arguments to be conducted seven days later. As to Serenos claim that Corona distorted the Courts decision on the effectivity of the TRO, the Answer pointed out that it was majority of the Courtand not Corona alonethat decided that the TRO was not suspended. By a vote of 76 (the answer wrongly stated it to be 9-4), the Court ruled that the TRO was immediately executory and was not suspended by Arroyos failure to comply with the SPA requirement. In any case, Arroyo was able to comply with this condition within the 5-day period.

Article VIII

Respondent betrayed the public trust and/or committed graft and corruption when he failed and refused to account for the judiciary development fund (JDF) and special allowance for the judiciary (SAJ) collections.

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Prosecution: The last Article deals with Coronas failure and refusal to (1) report the status of the Judiciary Development Fund and the Special Allowance for the Judiciary; (2) remit to the Bureau of Treasury SAJ collections; (3) account for funds released and spent for unfilled positions in the Judiciary; (4) remit fiduciary funds in the amount of P5.38 Billion; and, (5) correctly state the balance of the SAJ in the amount of P559.5 Million.

Defense: To debunk the allegations in the Eighth Article, the Answer cites the following official records: (1) Statement of Allotment, Obligation and Balances for 2010 submitted to the Department of Budget and Management (DBM); (2) Reports of Collections and Disbursements on the JDF and the SAJ Fund submitted to the Commission on Audit (COA), the DBM, the House of Representatives, and the Senate; (3) Report of Collections and Disbursements on the Fiduciary Fund for 2008 and 2009 submitted to the Senate; and (4) Report on the Utilization of Savings for 2008 and 2009 submitted to the Senate.

1. Report on the JDF

The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Coronas Answer invokes this mandate of section 3, Article VIII of the Constitution. In line with this fiscal autonomy, the accounts of the Judiciary may only be examined, audited, and settled on a post-audit basis, i.e., only after disbursement.

The Answer stressed that the question on whether the disbursement vouchers for the JDF and SAJ in 2010 (the year Corona became Chief Justice) were reported to the resident COA auditor for post-audit is a matter that can easily be determined by checking with the records of the COA. Corona then stated categorically that all disbursement vouchers for the funds of the JDF and SAJ are submitted to the resident COA auditor.

2. Remittance of SAJ collections

Coronas Answer calls attention to R.A. 9227 to better understand whether Coronas failure to remit the SAJ collections constitutes an impeachable offense. Note that R.A. 9227 gives the Chief Justice the power to use the SAJ surplus to grant additional allowances to other court personnel. The Answer cites this as the reason why on January 13, 2011, the Supreme Court and the DBM executed Joint Circular No. 2004-1 providing that collection of the Judiciary from funds enumerated under items 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 above shall no longer be remitted to the National Treasury. Instead, these shall be

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deposited in an authorized government depository bank as may be determined by the Supreme Court.

3. Funds for unfilled positions in the judiciary

Corona highlights the power of the Chief Justice to realign savings from appropriations for the Judiciary as a constitutionally-recognized fact.

Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution provides that the President, the President of the Senate, The Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

How Corona realigned savings from regular appropriations, including those for unfilled positions in the Judiciary, may be evaluated by looking into the Supreme Courts Statement of Allotment, Obligation and Balances (SAOB) for 2010 submitted to the DBM. The savings for 2008 and 2009, though not accumulated under Coronas term as Chief Justice, had also been submitted to Congress during the 2011 budget hearing. In connection with unremitted fiduciary funds, A.M. No. 10-8-3-SC was also cited to clarify that the Chief Justice may not remit such fiduciary funds to the Bureau of Treasury without authorization from Congress. It would be illegal for Corona to remit such funds because these are private property, and a law is necessary to authorize the escheat or forfeiture of such private unclaimed funds in favor of the State. Nonetheless, the Answer noted that these amounts accumulated way back in 2009. Corona became Chief Justice in May 2010.

On May 29, 2012, the Senate voted to convict Chief Justice Renato Corona on the 2nd Article of Impeachment for failure to disclose to the public his statement of assets, liabilities, and net worth as required under the constitution that constitute for betrayal of public trust and / or culpable violation of the Constitution. Those who voted for his conviction were Senators Edgardo Angara, Alan Peter Cayetano, Pia Cayetano, Franklin Drilon, Jinggoy Estrada, Teofisto Guingona III, Gringo Honasan, Panfilo Lacson, Lito Lapid, Loren Legarda, Sergio Osmea III, Francis Pangilinan, Koko Pimentel, Ralph Recto, Bong Revilla, Tito Sotto, Antonio Trillanes IV, Manny Villar and Juan Ponce Enrile while Senators Joker Arroyo, Miriam Defensor Santiago and Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. voted for his acquittal.