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PARTICIPATION

UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES in thein the

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PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS Lieutenant General ROBERT C. RICHARDSON, IR.

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS. <KS-.<

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HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, MIDDLE PACIFIC OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL

APO 95&

In reply refer to: 3 August 1946KPXMS 052.05/19 (3 Aug 46 )

SUBJECT: Iwo Jima Participation Report

TO Commanding General Command and General Staff School

*

Fort Leayenworth, Kansas

1; So much of Part 1, Section VII, paragraph 2a, page 33 > Iwo Jima Participation Report, as reads "162 d Antiaircraft Artillery Operations Detachment" is amended to read "163dAntiaircraft Artillery Operations Detachment,

2. It is requested that copies of subject report on file in your headquarters be amended accordingly.

E. P.. CRANDELL Colonel, AG-D Adjutant General

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HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AEMY FORCES, KIDDLE PACIFIC OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL

APO 958

In reply refer to: 3 August 1946 KPXMS 052.05/19 (3Aug 46 )

SUBJECT: Iwo Jima Participation Report

TO Commanding General Command and General Staff School Fort/Leavenworth, Kansas

a*< 1; So much of Part 1, Section VII, paragraph 2a,

page 33 > Iwo Jima Participation Report, as reads <f162.d Antiaircraft Artillery Operations Detachment" is amended to read "163dAntiaircraft Artillery Operations Detachment*"

2. It is requested that copies of subject report on file in your headquarters be amended accordingly.

E. P* CRANDELL Colonel, AGD Adjutant General

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HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, kIDDLE PACIFICOFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL

APO 953

In reply refer to: 3 August 1946 UEQBS 052.05/19 (3Aug 46 )

SUBJECT: Iwo Jima Participation Report

TO OMRnuUtlim t—llUtOtMlllBUff BtlMWfl r«rt I*»Twn»rtk, Uuu

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1; So much of Part 1, Section VII, paragraph 2a, page 33, Iwo Jima Participation Report, as reads <f162.d Antiaircraft Artillery Operations Detachment" is amended to read 51163dAntiaircraft Artillery Operations Detachment,

2, It is requested that copies of subject report on file in your headquarters be amended accordingly.

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E. P* CRAmELL Colonel, AGD Adjutant General

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HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES. MIDDLE PACIFICOFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL

APO 958

Inreply refer to:

4 February 1946

SUBJECT: Iwo Jima Operation "Detachment 11. TO The Chief of Staff, United States Army, War Depart­

ment, Washington 25, D. C.

1. At the conclusion of the capture of Iwo Jima, Volcano Islands, the various commanders of the Army forces which par­ticipated in the battle submitted reports of their operations to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, in accordance with his directive. Copies of these operational reports have no doubt been furnished the War Department through Navy chan­nels.

2. The report which is herewith submitted was drawn up to supplement the operational reports referred to supra, and to make of record the duties and responsibilities that were assigned to the Commanding General, United States Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, in connection with the operation. It gives in detail the administrative, training, and logistic responsibilities, and the preparations incident to the plan of operation. It presents an accurate record of the part played by the Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, in support of the Iwo Jima operation.

ROBERT C. RICHARDSON, Jr., <qLieutenant General, U.S. Army, Commanding.

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PARTICIPATION

IN THE

IWO JIMA OPERATION

BY /

THE UNITED STATES ARMY FORGES

PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS

-FEBRUARY MARCH 1945

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERT C. RICHARDSON, JR. , U. 3. ARKY COMMANDING

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Sv;wLr ftdull ILU INDEX

PART SUBJECT PAGE

Introduction. 1

1 Headquarters, United States Army Forces,Pacific Ocean Areas. 3

2 Army Air Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas 65

I 3 Central Pacific Base Command. 145

4 South Pacific Base Command. 239

5 Replacement Training Command. 247

6 ComG-enPOA Representative in the Marianas, 251

7 Army Garrison Force, Iwo Jima. 263

8 Assistance Rendered to the Navy and Marines. 315

9 Summary and Conclusions. 329

)

Annex 1 List of Participating Army Forces. 335

Annex 2 Selections from Observers 1 Reports. 341

Annex 3 Organization Diagram of Task Forces. 351

Annex 4 Map of Western Pacific Area. 355

Annex 5 Map of Iwo Jima 359

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INTRODUCTION

A, SUBJECT AND PURPOSE OF REPORT.

1. The subject of this report is the participation by the United States Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas (USAFPOA) in the operation against Japanese-held Iwo Jima, covering the period from the beginning of planning for the operation to 16 March 1945, the date the island was declared secure*

2. Although the assault phase of the Iwo Jima campaign was entirely a Marine Corps operation under the control of the V Amphibious Corps, the ultimate success of this operation re­sulted in no small degree from the cooperation and support of the Army headquarters and commands of the Pacific Ocean Areas.

[ 3. It is not intended herein to present an operational report or to treat of the activities of Naval or Marine forces, but rather to discuss the logistical support of the operation

( accomplished by Army agencies, and the mounting and training of Army troops. Observers 1 comments are included only when they pertain to the planning, organizing, training, equipping, or logistical support rendered by Army forces. Although this report is being published after the termination of the war, it has been written as if it had been prepared on 16 March 1945,

4. The chief value of this report is to make possible a clearer understanding of the scope of effort required to sup­port offensive operations in the Pacific Ocean Areas,

5. Similar reports will be rendered to show the extent of participation by United States Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, in operations which took place subsequent to the Iwo Jima operation.

B. PLAN OF REPORT.

1* In order to facilitate analysis, the activities and responsibilities of HUSAFPOa and of each of its major echelons of command are presented in a separate part of this report. Each part presents a factual summary of the activities of the command concerned, insofar as those activities relate to prep­arations prior to the Iwo Jima operation, and support and re­habilitation during the operation.

2. One part is devoted to assistance rendered to Naval and Marine units by USAFPOA agencies.

3. The final part of this report (Summary and Conclusions) includes the principal lessons learned by Army units partici­pating in the operation.

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HEADQUARTERSUNITED STATESARMY FORCES

PACIFIC OCEANAREAS

PART I

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SECTION

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UNCIASSraPART ONE - HUSAFPOA

-INDEX

SUBJECT

PERSONNEL (G-l) AND RELATED STAFF

COMBAT INTELLIGENCE AND CENSORSHIP

ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING (G-3)

PAGE

SECTIONS 7

(G-2) 11

1?

SUPPLY (G-4) INCLUDING EXCHANGE OFFICER, TRANSPORTATION OFFICER AND FISCAL OFFICER 21

LONG RANGE PLANNING FOR OPERATIONS 25

ADJUTANT GENERAL 31

ARTILLERY OFFICER 33

CHEMICAL WARFARE OFFICER 3?

ENGINEER 39

ORDNANCE OFFICER 47

QUARTERMASTER 49

SIGNAL OFFICER 55

SURGEON 59

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-S£CTIU% I Pfoi3QM&L (S-l) AfrD HjSLAT&D STAFF SaJTIOI^S

A. ORGANIZATION* On 9 Qctooer 1344, tne Commander-in-Chief , Pacific Ocean Areas (CinCPOA), directed tne Commanding General, United States Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas (ComGenPOA) to provide a garrison force for I?*o Jima. CinCPOA further requested the nomination of a general officer of tne Army air forces as garrison force commander. Major General James £. Chancy was nominated by tne Commanding General, USAFPOA. On 18 November 1944, after acceptance by CinCPOA, Major General Ghaney was designated as commanding general of the I^o Jima garrison force. On 2 December 1944, HUSAFPOA activated Head­quarters and Headquarters Company, Army Garrison Force, Iwo Jima (APO 86) with tne following overhead:

Officers 98Warrant officers 10Enlisted men 354

Total 45 3

3. PxiQCUrli£ji£NT» Prior to departure from the continental United States, Major General Chancy had selected certain key staff personnel. In order to fulfilladditional requirements for the garrison force headquarters, the hUSAFPOA replacement officer submitted to the Vi'ar Department a requisition for en­listed and officer personnel. On 13 November 1944, 'the War Department advised HUSAFPOA that the bulk of personnel for this garrison force was scheduled for overseas shipment in mid-December 1944. In view of the late scheduled snipment of garrison force personnel and the resulting shortage of screen­ing and training time, HUSAFPOA secured approximately 80 per cent of tne required personnel from local sources. The re­maining personnel requirements of the Iwo Jima garrison force were obtained from personnel arriving from the continental United States. By 19 January 1945, Headquarters and Headquar­ters Company, Army Garrison Forces, Iwo Jima, had been filled to authorized strength. Thereafter, only certain minor ad­justments were necessary in order to permit as ignment of the best qualified personnel to corresponding vacancies within the headquarters.

C. CHAPLAIN.

!• Planning. The HUSAFPOA chaplain section was respon­sible for adequate planning and proper training of chaplain personnel for their duties with the Iwo Jima Army garrison force.

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2. Organization.

a. Tne table of organization for tne chaplain section at tne Army garrison force was prepared by tne HUSAFPOA chaplain section. Tne assignment of three chaplains, one Catholic, one Protestant, and one Jewish, to the garrison force headquarters was made after consultation with supervisory chaplains of CPBC and AAFPOA.

b. Conferences were held with the fleet chaplain to arrange for assignment of a Protestant and a Catholic chaplain to each hospital 'ship and troop ship. The limited number of Jewish chaplains made it necessary to select competent officers and enlisted men of the Jewish faith to conduct religious ser­vices for each ship and for each unit that went ashore. These men were given adequate supplies to enable them to carry out their religious activities.

3. Supply and equipment. Religious supplies were issued hy OPBJ, as indicated in the CP3O section of this report.

4. Trainini

a. The administrative chaplains of tne Iwo Jima Army garrison force were given access to all reports of previous operations filed in the HUSAFPQA chaplain's office. They were briefed on the various, regulations concerning chaplains 1 activi­ties.

b. A school was conducted, with combat-wise chaplains as instructors.

c. Chaplains of tne Iwo Jima Army garrison force were given instructions regarding the problems of grave registration, maintaining records, map reading, and liaison with the American National Red Cross representative, the special service ofiicer, and the information-education officer.

d. Chaplain's assistants were schooled in clerical duties.

c. Prior to departure, a final review of all plans and training was conducted.

5. Inspect ions. Several inspections were conducted by

HUSAFPOA chaplains in an effort -to insure that adequate sup­plies had procured for shipment.

* D, IH3P£JTQR Crififr&ifrL* n preparation for the activation of the Iwo Jima garrison force, KU3AFPOA requisitioned a lieuten­ant colonel from the "War Department to serve as garrison force inspector general. Tne HUSAFPOA Inspector General offered and

iurnisned assistance to all echelons of the garrison force in solving administrative problems.

£. JUD&S ADVOCATE. The HUSAFPOA judge advocate participatedin the determination of garrison force judge advocate person­nel requirements. He also prepared those portions of letters of instruction to the garrison force commander wnich were pertinent to the administration of military justice and the settlement of claims.

1. Court-martial jurisdiction. General court-martial jurisdiction was secured from the War Department for tne Ifo Jima garrison force.

2, Le^al assistance. Tne garrison force stafi judge ad­vocate was designated legal assistance officer to assist military personnel in connection with their personal affairs.

3. Briefing, Tne xiU3A*'POA judge advocate neld conferences *ith personnel of tne garrison force judge advocate section relative to problems concerned witn military justice, domestic and foreign claims, civilian aiiairs, general prisoners, and legal assistance. Information gained from previous operations was imparted to the garrison force judge advocate.

4. Inspection. An inspection was made of the garrison force judge advocate section for tne purpose of determining the readiness status of tne section, and any assistance required.

F. PROVOST MARSHAL. On 13 October 1944, the HUSAFPOA provost marshal ?as directed to determine military police troop re­quirements for internal security of Iwo Jima, to include the handling of enemy civilian internees and prisoners of war. The HUSAFPOA provost marshal assisted in planning to secure necessary troops; to estimate their shipping requirements; to provide equipment, facilities and supplies needed to execute their mission; and to arrange for subsequent support. Lessons learned in previous operations were furnished to tne garrison force provost marshal through the medium of informal confer­ences.

1. Organization. With tne knowledge that only military police units then on the U3AFPOA troop basis would be avail­able, troop requirements were determined after a study of the target area. Consideration was given to tne last avail­able census figures which indicated that less tiian 1,300 civilians were on Iwo Jima in 1940. Statistics relative to the number of prisoners of war captured in previous Central Pacific operations were utilized in making estimates of prooable needs. After requirements had been determined, they

were furnished to tne Central Pacific Baj^ Command (CPBC) for ..^

• •

2. Equipment and supply. In conjunction with the HUSAFPOA engineer, the provost marshal made plans to provide a suitable prisoner of war compound on the target.

G. SPECIAL SERVICES OFFICER. The Iwo Jima garrison force commander was given authority to take final action, within HUSAFPOA policies, on all special service activities. •

1. Organization. Two officers and 13 enlisted men were procured directly by the HUSAFPOA special service section for the garrison force headquarters.

2*2 * Facilities. The following recreational facilities for Army enlisted personnel were Included In the base development plan:

a. Five outdoor theaters, each complete with screen, projection booth, stage, dressing rooms, and benches.

b. Eight softball and two hardball diamonds. •

for use c. as

Ten hard-surfaced combination tennis,

areas, paved, basketball,

each 60 x 120 •, volley-ball, and

handball courts.

d. Two recreation buildings, equipped with tables and chairs, each with a total floor area of 4,000 square feet, containing lounge, canteen, game room, writing room, and ad­ministrative office.

c. One quonset hut or prefabricated building, 40' x 48 1 , furnished with shelving, tables and benches, to house a basic central library of 1,000 volumes.

f. One quonset hut or prefabricated building, 20' x 24', per isolated unit of 50-200 men, for use as a day room.

g. One T/O-type 20 x 100 building, as described in TM 5-280, for each battalion or equivalent area.

h. Locker rooms, showers, and latrines to be install­ed where swimming locations were established.

3#3# Equipment and supply. The HUSAFPOA special services office recommended to the garrison force commander, throughG-4, that a three-months 1 allotment of special service credits be requisitioned to equip the facilities included in base development plan.

1:

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PART 1 HUSAFPOA-SECTION II COMBAT INTELLIGENCE AND CENSORSHIP (G-2

A. ORIENTATION, During November and December 1944, the HUSAFPOA G-2 section devoted approximately 10 man-hours to the orientation of personnel of the Iwo Jima garrison force G-2 section. A detailed picture was given of the then-current situation, including a summary of air, ground, and Naval activities (friendly and enemy) in the Pacific Ocean Areas, with specific data on estimated enemy strength and dispositions. The situation in the Southwest Pacific Area, the China Theater, and the India-Burma Theater was also covered. Assistance was

i given the garrison force G-2 section in making overlays and plotting the significant information. At a conference held 23 November 1944, an estimate of the enemy ground, sea, and air[ strength and capabilities on Iwo Jima, was presented to the garrison force commander and his staff.

X.

i B. INTELLIGENCE PUBLICATIONS,

JT 1, Maps and terrain bulletins. Arrangements were made for { the printing by the 64th Engineer Topographic Battalion of maps

and various terrain bulletins and studies required by Army, r Navy, Marine, and Air Force components of the task force. An

original objective study of Iwo Jima was prepared by the HUSAFPOA G-2, of which 350 copies were distributed to Army, Navy,

r\ Marine, and Air Force units participating in the operation* i At the request of the Commander, Amphibious Group One, 500

additional copies of maps included in the study were printed for further distribution within his command. During the plan­ning phase of the operation the HUSAFPOA G-2 terrain and ob­jective files were made available to the V Amphibious Corps and the Iwo Jima garrison force. Such terrain studies as were

I desired by these organizations were issued to them.

f 2. Intelligence bulletins and periodic reports. The 3d, 4th, and sth Marine Divisions, the V Amphibious Corps, and other Marine units, at their request, were made recipients of

t all HUSAFPOA G-2 Intelligence Bulletins. Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force Pacific, received all HUSAFPOA G-2 Periodic Reports, The Iwo Jima garrison force received both the bulletins and the reports.

3, Technical manuals, A few weeks prior to embarking for Iwo Jima, technical manuals covering the installation and opera­tion of the Japanese 20-llne, model one, cordless switchboard and the Japanese model 92 telephone were published by the ASFEEIST detachment, A total of 300 copies of each were fur­nished V Amphibious Corps for distribution to Marine units. It was intended that this information would permit exploitation of standard Japanese communication equipment captured by the assault forces.

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C, COUNTERINTEIIKreENCE CORPS, As a result of a thorough re­view of available information concerning the Japanese popula­tion on Iwo Jima, it was determined that a small counter­intelligence corps detachment of four agents would be suffi­cient to support the garrison force. Accordingly, on 5 Dec­ember 1944, this personnel was secured from sources available to the Central Pacific Base Command (CPBC) and attached to the garrison force*

D. CENSORSHIP.

1. Organization. Since censorship functions were con­centrated in the CPBC chief censors office, censorship per­sonnel was provided by that headquarters* Policies were established by a liaison between the CPBC chief censor, the CinCPac-CinCPOA chief censor, and HU3AFPOA 0-2. Activities of the base censorship personnel and policies established for the Iwo Jlma operation are further discussed in Part 3, Sec­tionIIof this report.

£• Supply and equipment. In compliance with directives from HU3AFPOA, the CPBC chief censor provided all necessary base censorship supplies and equipment required by the garri­son force censorship detachment.

E. JAPANESE INTERROGATOR-INTSRPRETER-TRAN3LATOR TEAM. On 18 December 1944, one Japanese interrogator-interpreter-translator team (Japanese lIT team) , consisting of one officer and 10 en­listed men, was attached to the Army garrison force 0-2 section. Arrangements were made for this Japanese lIT team to perform practice Interrogations at the Army prisoner of war camp on Oahu. In addition, captured documents were made available to this team for translation practice. The team was provided with the equipment authorized by T/0 and E 30-600 T.

F. ARMY SERVICE FORCES ENEMY EQUIPMENT INTELLIGENCE SERVICE EAM.

1. Organization. In order to insure that the maximum intelligence was obtained from captured enemy materiel, author- «<

ization was secured from CinCPOA to attach to Headquarters, V Amphibious Corps, a detachment (three officers and six enlisted men) of the Army Service Forces Enemy Equipment Intelligence Service Team (ASFEEIST). This detachment was augmented by personnel (one officer, 26 enlisted men) obtained from the 239th Quartermaster Salvage and Collecting Company, which was stationed at Saipan. The above personnel was combined with personnel from the Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas (JICPOA) , to form a JICPOA Salvage Unit,

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a. The ASFESI3T detachment constituted the enemy equipment section of this JIGPOA Salvage Unit. Ordnance, signal, medical, quartermaster, chemical, and engineer sub­sections were organized. The senior officer of this detach­ment was designated as the officer-in-charge of the JIGPOA Salvage Unit.

b. Detachment, 239th Quartermaster Salvage and Collecting Company, provided drivers and mechanics for the

r assigned transportation. It assisted in the physical collec­tion, transporting, packing, and crating of captured materiel.

2. Training* Upon request of the V Amphibious Corps, the V ASFEEIST detachment conducted a course of instruction, on the

island of Hawaii in the use of Japanese communications equip*r

ment. Six lectures and demonstrations, each of approximately I two hours 1 duration, were presented. Approximately 1,200

officers and enlisted men of the sth Marine Division attended.

3. Processing of enemy equipment. In performance of its primary mission, the ASFEEIST detachment supervised the collec­

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tion, packing, and shipment to JICPOA of captured enemy equip­ment which appeared to have intelligence value, which was need­ed to fillmilitary requirements, or which could be used for training purposes. The detachment also furnished considerable quantities of enemy equipment to assault troops for use in combat. It assisted troops in the repair and maintenance of such equipment. Prisoners of war* who appeared to be potential sources of information concerning enemy materiel were interro­gated by ASFEEIST personnel. Personnel of this detachment re­covered many enemy documents and delivered them to the proper intelligence agencies.

G» LIAISON. One officer was attached to the V Amphibious Corps G-2 section, on 5 December 1944. Close liaison was established between the V Amphibious Corps and HUSAFPOA G-2. Direct liaison was maintained between the ASFEEIST detach­ment and staff officers of the V Amphibious Corps. Several conferences were held during which details concerning the employment of the ASFEEI3T detachment and the procedure for

V handling captured materiel were agreed upon. In addition, a HUSAFPOA G-2 officer maintained personal liaison with CinCPAC

r headquarters during the operation in order to obtain informa­¦<. tion required by HUSAFPOA and the War Department.

i H» REPORTS ? Information from task force commanders was col­i lected and transmitted by radio daily to War Department and

other interested commands. A HUSAFPOA G-2 weekly periodicf

report was also distributed.

I. LESSONS LEARNED AND CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN. Independent censorship detachments should be activated in advance of an

operation and attached to the various organizations with which they are to serve. This would preclude the practice of draw­ing on local censorship stations for personnel. Such a policy has since been adopted with the result that six independent censorship detachments have been activated by HUSAFPOA and then attached to organizations either currently engaged in, or ear­marked for, operations.

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A» PLANNING. Initial planning for the Iwo Jima operation began upon receipt of CinCPOA Joint Staff Study, dated ? October 1944. Final planning and preparations were begun upon receipt of CinCPOA Operation Plan 11-44, dated 25 November 1944. Immediate action was taken to determine the units available and to organize the garrison force. Con­ferences were held with representatives force being formed, and with CinCPOA,

of the garrison to determine garrison

troop requirements.

B. ORGANIZATION.

1. Formation of Iwo Jima. Army garrison force. Head-quart ers~luiiTTfeirdquli^^ Artil­lery Group, was used as the nucleus for the formation of Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Army Garrison Force, Iwo Jima, which was activated on 2 November 1944. As soon as the garrison force headquarters was capable. of functioning administratively, certain units were released to its control. The remaining garrison force units were released to the con­trol of that headquarters as requested by the garrison force commander. A list of units comprising the Army garrison force is shown in Annex No. 1 to this report.

2. Operational control of Iwo Jima. Army garrison force On 8 December 1944, the two Jima garrison force was attached to the V Amphibious Corps for operational control.

C. TRAINING. In order to keep advised of training needs as they developed during the preparatory phase, the HUSAFPOA G-3 maintained liaison with the Iwo Jima garrison force. This liaison, and occasional direct call made upon appropri­ate agencies, expedited the solution of training problems.Arrangements were also made through CPBC, for the use of Army training facilities in the Hawaiian area by Naval and Marine agencies.

1. Naval and Marine personnel. Selected Naval construc­tion and Marine personnel were trained In mine warfare tech­nique at the CPBC Mine Warfare School. The facilities of the Unit Combat (Jungle) Training Center on Oahu were utilized by Naval and Marine personnel. In conjunction with the chemical officer, the HUSAFPOA G-3 coordinated the training of Naval mortar-boat crews and flame thrower tank crews. Arrangements were made, through CPBC, for the use of Army training area in the Hawaiian group to facilitate air support training of Navy and Marine personnel.

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2. Arming of replacements. The policy was adopted whereby Army replacements would be armed and trained while in the replacement depot.

3. Mine training. It was directed that Army engineer troops be trained In preparation for removal of the types of shells expected to be used as land mines by the enemy.

4# Aircraft identification. Improved aircraft identi­flcation training techniques were adopted during the prep­aration of the staging organizations.

5. DUKW training. The training of DUKW units earmarked for this operation was expedited.

D. INFORMATION-EDUCATION OFFICER.

1. Planning.

a. Subsequent to a templated base development,

study of Iwo the personnel

Jima and

and the con-organization

of the garrison force information-education section were determined.

b. A 50-watt Armed Forces Radio Station (AFRS) was included in the Iwo Jima base development plan.

2. Organization. Personnel requirements for the garri­son force information-education section totaled 3 officers and 4 enlisted men.

3. Supply and equipment. Assistance was provided the garrison force information- education section in adoptingrecommended equipment lists for the operation.

4. Briefing. Conferences and briefing sessions were held with garrison force information-education officers to familiarize them with existing policies and procedures in regard to the. information-education program. Inspections of supplies, equipment, and materials were made during preparation for the operation.

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A. PREPARATION.

1* Planning. Planning by the HUSAFPOA G-4 .for the Iwo Jima operation began in May 1944. Overall decisions on sup­plies, materials, and service personnel were obtained as a result of joint study by CinCPOA, Marine Corps agencies, and HUSAFPOA. Necessary supply levels for both landing and support were established. Inasmuch as this was primarily a Marine assault operation, the final requirements were decided by Naval and Marine Corps agencies.

a. The HUSAFPOA G-4 section prepared and issued anadministrative order to the Commanding General, Iwo Jimagarrison force, which set forth supply, evacuation, construc­tion, and administrative details. In addition, the G-4 section submitted material to G-5 for Inclusion in the letter of instructions that was Issued to the CommandingGeneral, Iwo Jima garrison force.

b. Logistic requirements were general in scope. Levels of supply for established requirements were indicated by HUSAFPOA. CPBC took necessary action to Implement the G-4 directives.

o. Base development planning, a responsibility of G-4, was subject to revision as the changing concepts and situations dictated. These revisions were effected in con­junction with the HUSAFPOA engineer, who was charged with the preparation and execution of detailed plans covering base development.

2. Organization.

It was decided that the 471st, 473d, 475th, and 476th Amphibian Truck Companies and the 442dand 592dPort Companies, stationed on Oahu, would be employed and would arrive at the target in the assault echelon. These units were committed for the operation because of their advanced training status. The Headquarters and Headquarters Detach­ment, 43d Amphibian Truck Battalion, arrived at Iwo Jima In the seoond echelon. To replace the 442dand 592dPort Companies, the 439th and 441st Port Companies were brought to Oahu from Kwajaleln and Makln Island.

b. After consideration of the number of troops com­prising the assault and garrison forces, the tonnage requirements for supply and for base development, and the condition

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of the beaches, It was determined that the following trans­portation corps units were required: one amphibian truck battalion headquarters, four amphibian truck companies and two port companies.

3. Supply and equipment. Inasmuch as this was primarily a Marine operation, the HUSAFPOA 0-4 section had a relatively minor role with respect to supply coordination and super­vision during the assault phase. The garrison force was composed primarily of Army units, however, and the G-4 section was responsible for equipping and supplying these garrison force units. Except for the garrison force headquar­ters, special T/0 and E's were not required for this operation, as had been the case in previous operations. Since the major­ity of the unite had their full allowances of equipment and were properly equipped to perform their primary missions, no special problems were involved in the outfitting of these units. In general, the procurement of supplies and equip­ment was handled by CPBC.

The necessary facilities required on Iwo Jlma for Army units were determined, and requirements were submitted to the HUSAFPOA engineer. The facilities consisted of housing and administration buildings, storage sheds, and sorting areas.

b« Emergency reserve stocks left over from previous operations were used for this campaign.

c. Supply and equipment programs were not affected by the overall changes in operational plans which developed prior to commitment of the forces in assault.

d. Initial supplies and equipment for the finance section of the Army garrison force were obtained by requisi­tions submitted by the garrison force finance officer through normal supply channels to CPBC. The exchange officer received exchange supplies in a similar manner.

Property accounting and policy relative to the maintenance of records was accomplished in accordance with existing Instructions and directives.

f. Gw4 personnel made periodic visits to the Army Garrison Force headquarters and units on Oahu in order to assist in mounting the garrison force and to insure that supply requirements were fulfilled.

4» Training. The training of service units and other elements of the Iwo Jima garrison force was conducted under the general supervision of the appropriate major echelons of CPBC. G-4 exercised staff supervision to the extent of receiving and checking, all training status reports submitted

22

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by partlciFMln^J*unBxs. Corrective measures were instituted as required.

B. SUPPORT, The mission of the HUSAFPOA 0-4 section was to provide logistical support for Army units and to furnish Class 1 supplies for the Marine forces embarking for the tar­get. In general, the support for this operation was limited initially to providing routine maintenance and assuring that maintenance supplies and equipment were delivered to the tar­get on schedule. Liaison was maintained with CPBC to insure that the proper support was given. Having gained experience from problems encountered in mounting previous operations, normal precautions were taken, and no major difficulties were encountered in providing the required support.

!• Re supply. The supply program for Iwo Jlma was predi­cated on shipments of successive echelons. By this means, a steady Inflow of supplies was maintained. The emergencyreplacement supply program was based on a system of receiv­ing and storing supplies at Salpan for movement to the tar­get as required. Inasmuch as it was contemplated that the assault forces would remain on the target for but a very limited time, no special provisions were made to furnish supply requirements other than the' usual normal mounting-out requirements. Requisitions were submitted to CPBC by garrison force elements, prior to mounting out, for dell-very of supplies at a subsequent period. It was antici­pated that the supplies on these requisitions would be delivered to the target on or about D plus 120 and not later than D plus 150. The small area of the target made it necessary to handle the loading of supplies in regular Increments and in limited quantities.

2* Evacuation. Evacuation of personnel primarily Navy function.

3. Salvage. The salvage, repair, and re-issue of equip­ment on the target was primarily a Marine Corps function.

C. LESSONS LEARNED AND CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN. During the period of loading and embarkation of troops, some confusion was caused by the fact that tonnage requirements had been underestimated. Approximately 1,000 measurement tons of supplies could not be loaded due to a lack of shipping space. It was necessary to make special plans to forward these supplies at the earliest possible date in order to insure their arrival in sufficient time to be of use to the organ­izations concerned. Estimates on tonnage requirements will receive special study in planning for future, operations in order to avoid a recurrence of this problem.

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PART 1 HUSAFPOA -SECTION V LONG RANGE PLANNING FOR OPERATIONS (G-5

A, PLANNING.

1. Initialover-all planning.

a. The basic planning for the Iwo Jima operation was prepared and forwarded to HUSAFPOA as CinCPOA Joint Staff-Study DETACHMENT, dated 7 October 1944. This staff study outlined the mission of the Iwo Jima operation as follows: to seize the Iwo Jima air base for support of operations

v against Japan, to protect the Marianas from enemy aircraft, and to provide a base for fighters escorting B-29 aircraft to targets in Japan. The staff study further Indicated a scheme of maneuver which might be employed, and provided a temporary list of Army garrison requirements totaling 12,565 troops.

b. After considering two tentative earlier dates,(20 January and 3 February 1945) , a final target date of 19 February 1945 was set and confirmed by CinCPOA.

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2. Garrison force requirements.

-a. Upon receipt of CinCPOA Joint Staff Study DE~ TACHMENT, recommendations of the general and special staff sections were obtained as to number and type of units re­quired, together with the designations and availability of these units. A CinCPOA warning order for the Iwo Jima op­eration was released on 9 October 1944 which Indicated the principal forces involved. These included the followingArmy supporting troops:

3 amphibian truck companies 3 antiaircraft artillery gun battalions 2 155mm coast artillery battalions 1 regimental combat team for garrison 3 fighter groups 2 squadrons of night fightersV

1 heavy bombardment group 1 signal air warning company

It was stated that the island commander would be a generalofficer of the Army Air Forces, to be nominated by ComGenPOA.

b. As a result of HUSAFPOA staff conferences, a r radio was transmitted to CinCPOA on 14 October 1944, propos­

25

SOJing the employment of the following artillery troops for gar­rison at Iwo Jima:

1antiaircraft artillery group 3 antiaircraft artillery gun battalions 1 automatic weapons battalion (plus 2 batteries) 1 antiaircraft artillery searchlight battery 1 seacoast artillery battalion

It was further recommended at this time that, in view of the large amount of artillery planned above, the garrison require ments for a regimental combat team be reduced to one infantry regiment.

c. In addition to the artillery units listed above, a request was forwarded to. HUSAFPOA from the Iwo Jima island commander for an antiaircraft artillery operations detachment to coordinate and operate the air defense command post.

d. In anticipation of a relatively high casualty rate among antiaircraft personnel because of enemy air opera­tions, it was recommended to CinCPOA that a combat reserve be established before D-day consisting of two antiaircraft gun battalions and two antiaircraft automatic weapons battalions which could be shipped as unit replacements to the target any time subsequent to D-day.

B. ORGANIZATION.

1. Availabilityof units.

a. Of approximately 25,000 Army troops needed for the Iwo Jima operation, all but 9,000 could be provided from theater sources. However, 1,100 additional troops were need­ed to replace units deployed forward from CPBC.

b. On 20 October 1944 a radiogram listing troop re­quirements for Iwo Jima which could not be met from the cur­rent USAFPOA troop basis was forwarded to Chief of Staff of the Army. The War. Department replied on 3 November 1944, forwarding a list of those units which could be made avail­able to meet the operational requirements and another list of units which were not then in existence, but which could be activated in the continental United States to meet further requirements.

c. Since the time element precluded the activation of units in the continental United States and subsequent shipment to the forward areas for employment, War Department authority for local activation was requested on 23 November

26

UNOLASS'FfEB"""""*"**and received on 26 November 1944. CPBC was thereupon di­rected to furnish certain designated units. In Instances where it was stated by the Commanding General, CPBC, that the loss of particular units would work hardships on CPBC, or would result in curtailing the functions of that. command, the retention of the unit in the Hawaiian area, as against the requirements of the operation, was reviewed by the staff sections concerned and presented to ComGenPOA for decision.

2. Infantry. After reviewing the Infantry units avail­able to ComGenPOA for duty with the Iwo Jima garrison force, it was recommended to CInCPOA that the 147th Infantry Regi­ment, then in New Caledonia, be employed. This recommenda­tion was concurred in by CinCPOA on 2 November 1944.

r 3. Artiller

v. a. Of the two 155mm coast artillery battalions re­quired, only one was available in POA for employment. A re-r quest was therefore forwarded to the War Department 14 Octo­ber 1944 for one 155mm coast artillery battalion to be made available for shipment no later than December 1944. When the War Department indicated that none was available, CinC-POA directed the Commander, Forward Areas, to designate a

? battalion to meet this requirement. The 44th Coast Artil­lery Battalion then on Salpan, was so designated*

b. On 18 October 1944, CInCPOA proposed the employ­ment in garrison duty of the 483dAntiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion, then on Ulithi. HUSAFPOA con-

r curred in the proposal. i

c. As a result of the request by the Iwo Jima is-r land commander for a 120mm antiaircraft artillery gun batta­

lion, it was recommended to CinCPOA on 2 November 1944 that V such a battalion be employed on Iwo Jima in lieu of a 90mm r battalion. It was further recommended that the 752dAnti­

aircraft Artillery Gun Battalion (120mm), then .scheduled for employment at Guam, be diverted to Iwo Jima and that its em-

r ployment at Guam be filledby a 90mm battalion. CInCPOA concurred in this proposal. On 29 December 1944, the 752 d Gun Battalion was ordered to Salpan for movement therefrom to Iwo Jima, upon call of the garrison force commander. Its Interim duty at Saipan would provide additional protec­tion at that base against enemy aircraft.

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d. In view of the anticipated enemy air reaction to the landing on Iwo Jima and to the development of air bases, the island commander's request for an antiaircraft artillery operations detachment was approved. The 163 dAntiaircraft Artillery Operations Detachment was made

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available to the garrison force.

c. To the recommendation that a combat reserve of two antiaircraft gun battalions and two antiaircraft auto­matic weapons battalions be established before D-day, CinC-POA replied that further action would be taken on this plan, if necessary, about D-day. In view of the light enemy air opposition offered, however, antiaircraft personnel casualties did not require the formation or employment of such a reserve.

4. Army forces in the assault. Of t^e units to be utilized as garrison troops, the amphibian truck companies and the port companies were employed by the V Amphibious Corps in the assault. These units were attached to the Mar­ine force prior to mounting from Hawaii.

a. It has been recommended and approved by GinCPO A that representatives of the Army Service Force Enemy Equip­ment Intelligence Service Team accompany the assault troops for the purpose of obtaining intelligence Information on ene­my equipment. In order to support this agency properly, a detachment of a quartermaster salvage collecting company was temporarily furnished from Saipan.

5. Base development.

a. The original base development directive, issued by CinCPOA on 11 October 1944, charged ComGenPOA with provid­ing the service troops to support the base at. lwo Jima. The engineer troops required for construction, however, were to be provided by Naval construction battalions. It was further indicated that airfield construction would be for light, med­ium, and heavy aircraft. ComGenPOA's portion of the base de­velopment plan, amplifying responsibilities and the facili­ties required to accomplish them, was prepared and forwarded on 10 November 1944.

b. On 26 December 1944, as a result of a recommenda­tion by the Commanding General, AAFPOA, for the development on Iwo Jima of an airfield suitable for B-29 aircraft, the base development plan was modified by CinCPOA to indicate that air field #2 would be so constructed as to enable stag­ing of B-29 aircraft. One engineer aviation battalion was made available to augment the construction force.

6. Echelon shipping schedule.

a. At Iwo Jima, as in the Marianas, beach capacities and unloading facilities were so restricted as to permit the unloading of only a limited amount of cargo during any givenperiod of all units and materiels into an echelon schedule.

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The relative echelon of Army units was established and for­warded to CinCPOA for integration into an overall shipping schedule. It was necessary to echelon units, equipment, and materiel until D plus 90.

b. Constant alteration of the echelon schedule was necessitated by changes in availability dates of units or the substitution of units which required different mounting points. All units mounting from the continental United States and moving by water to Iwo Jima were required to have water shipment priority established for such movement. These priorities were coordinated between the garrison ship­ping echelon and the overall Pacific Ocean Areas troop move­ment schedule.

29

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Ceremony At sth Marine Division Cemetery

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?- *-j If *¦«-PART 1 HUSAFPOA -SECTION VI ADJUTANT GENERAL.

A. POSTAL FACILITIES,

!• Planning. Although there were relatively few Army-troops in the assault, ComGenPOA was charged with the over­all postal responsibility for the Iwo Jima operation. It was necessary, therefore, to provide in the first echelon of shipping, an Army postal unit of sufficient size to regulate mail for all services. Frequent conferences were held with representatives of the Marine divisions, the V Amphibious Corps, CoraServPac, and CinCPOA. In addition, close liaison was maintained with the participating organ­izations throughout the operation. Because of the excellent cooperation and support of the other services, it was pos­sible to utilize to the maximum extent the postal facilities of all three services.

2. Operation.

a. An LST was provided by the Navy to serve as a floating post office from D plus one until the establishment of postal facilities on Iwo Jima. The routing mail to all troops on Iwo Jima was accomplished jointly by Army and Naval personnel aboard the LST. A reserve stock of $25,000 in stamps and stamped envelopes, was maintained, from which stamp stocks of all services were replenished. An adequate stock of V-mail forms, for use by all fbrces, was also maintained. Incoming mail was initially receiv­ed from sea planes and distributed through the post office aboard the LST. Transportation of mall was diverted to land based craft when this service became available. Outgoing mail was processed on the floating post office and dispatched through the same channels. The Army postal unit went ashore 7 March 1945 and formally activated the Army postal unit on 13 March 1945.

b. In order to shorten the time Interval during which personnel would be without mail, delivery of mail was accomplish ed at every possible opportunity. Delivery of mail was effect­ed to boat side prior to departure. Thereafter, all mail was diverted to the Navy, which service effected delivery at Eniwetok and Saipan. As the successive echelons of shipping cleared Saipan, mail was sent directly to the target, where mall for the various services reverted to the normal trans­portation agencies. The common use by both services of all transportation agencies worked smoothly and effectively. As each successive echelsn of Army troops arrived at Iwo Jima, mail was diverted from the continental United States-Honolulu channel and sent directly to Saipan, where it was re-routed to

31

$the proper destination, w

3. Supply and equipment* Postal supplies carried by the postal unit consisted of T/0 and E supplies listed for an "M" type unit, and in addition, supplies for two sub-units. Total supplies roughly approximated the requirements of the T/0 and E for an HF" type unit.

4. Training, Prior to the departure of the 86th Army Postal Unit from the Hawaiian area, a thorough course in on-the-Job training was conducted at the 15th Base Post Office and other Army post offices on Oahu. This training was under the active supervision of the HUSAFPOA postal officer, and the Commanding Officer, 15th Base Post Office.

5. Inspections, Prior to the departure of the 86th Army Postal Unit all unit equipment was Officer, 15th Base Post Office.

inspected by the Commanding

6. Re supply. V-Mail facilities were made available at both Saipan and Guam. A reserve stock of stamps, stamped envelopes, and postal supplies was maintained at Saipan. Mail transfer facilities for all classes of mail were maintained at Saipan.

B. CASUALTY REPORTING The HUSAFPOA casualty officer was placed -on duty as an observer with the garrison force in order to assist in the organization of casualty reporting procedures. In this capacity, he was able to render specialized assistance in the organization and planning of the entire adjutant general section, as well as to develop the casualty reporting procedures.

C. MACHINE RECORDS PROCEDURES, HUSAFPOA maintained close li­aison with the Army garrison force headquarters to plan the details of strength accounting procedures and to Insure pro­vision of an adequate supply of machine records forms prior to departure. Locator cards were furnished in duplicate to the Army garrison force headquarters. One set was used by the post office and the other by the adjutant general section.

D. PERSONNEL» Several specialists in personnel matters were obtained to complete the adjutant general section of the garri­son force. Assistance was given to the garrison force head­quarters in effecting last minute replacements for hospitals ized individuals and those unqualified for service in the for­ward area. In addition, the HUSAFPOA adjutant general fur­nished detailed information relative to personnel administra­tive procedures.

E. LESSONS LEARNED. AND CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN, The use of an LST as a floating post office during the assault phase proved to be very practicable. In_£uture operations it is plan­ned to continue the employ mlftt?ll n/Ifft#1FWPWiFi installation,

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32

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PART 1 - HIJsAFPOA*' SECTION VII- ARTILLERY OFFICER

A. ORGANIZATION.

1. Assault forces. The following forces participated in the assault and remained as part of the garrison force:

r Headquarters and Headquarters Battery. 138th Antiaircraft Artillery Group sO6th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion, 90 mm

/r (Semimobile) 483dAntiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons

V

Bat talion ( Semimobll e ) r

2. Garrison forces. The following additional antiair­\.

craft and coast artillery units were assigned to the garrison r force:

ifesd Antiaircraft Artillery Operations Detachment. 947th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion, 90mm

(Semimobile) . i.

752dAntiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion, 120mm r (Semimobile) .

Batteries C and D, 206th Antiaircraft Artillery Auto­matic Weapons Battalion (Semimobile)

r Battery C, 295th Antiaircraft Artillery Searchlight Battalion.I

44th Coast Artillery Battalion r 176th Coast Artillery Battalion

B; TRAINING. r

1. Selection of units. Insofar as possible, the units selected for this operation were those that were best prepared

r from the standpoint of training.

2. Procedure. Further training of units presented no problems not heretofore encountered. The course of training prescribed for these units followed established procedure. Individual and unit training was stressed. This training was augmented by specialized combat training for amphibian operations.

a. Antiaircraft artillery gun battalions fired prac­tice missions with VT-fuzed ammunition; excellent results were achieved. Gun battalions scheduled numerous tactical move­ments and firing exercises, including firing at waterborne targets, firing at water registration points, and landward firing using field artillery methods. The 483dAntiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion had participated in two

r;iF|f -)

33

DHCLASSIFtEnprevious amphibious operations and had fired a target practice at Ulithi immediately prior to mounting, for this operation. Batteries C and D, 206th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion had engaged in more than two months of con­centrated training and firing in preparation for this operation.

b. One seacoast artillery battalion was trained on Oahu, and one was trained on Saipan. Training included tacti­cal movements and firing practices. Service practices were fired using normal, radar, and emergency methods of fire con­trol. Batteries of the 176th Coast~Artillery Battalion fired special practices, using the AN/MPG-1 radar for purposes of 'familiarization with this equipment. Landward firing problems were also included in the training.

C. EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLY.

!• Special equipment. In order to reduce shipoing space, an effort was made to issue units only the minimum essentials of equipment.

a. In addition to the equipment prescribed by T/0 and E, the 483dAntiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion was equipped with seven multiple machine gun motor carriages, M-16. These weapons proved superior, in mobility and ease of handling, to the multiple machine gun carriage, M-51.

b. One tractor, D-7, with dozer, was Issued to each of the four Putomatic weapons batteries and the four gun bat­teries participating in the assault. These dozers were of great help in unloading equipment, preparing positions, pnd in towing wheeled vehicles through the volcanic-ash of Iwo Jima.

c. Prior to mounting out, the two seacoast artillery battalions were equipped with new 155mm guns, MIAI. Each of these battalions was also supplied with two tractors, D-7, with dozer. New radar sets, modified SCR-584, were issued to all firing units, in lieu of Mark XVI sets.

d. In order to procure combs, t information on the new seacoast artillery radar set, AN/&PG-1, a pre-production model of this type was issued to the 176th Coast Artillery Battalion as additional equipment. To provide mobility, this set was in­stalled in vans ment.

and trailers made available from salvaged equip

2. Ammunition supply.

seven a.

units Artillery units in the assault were provided of fire. Only HE shell with mechanical time

with fuze

was issued to gun units during the actual assault. Cavitized shell with VT fuze was furnished antiaircraft gun batteries after the landing.

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"b. Garrison units not participating in: the assault were provided with five units of fire. Approximately one-half of the ammunition provided for antiaircraft gun batteries was cavitized shell with VT fuze.

c. Ammunition for re- supply of artillery units was shipped to the Marianas regulating station, whe<re it was held on call of the force commander.

d. No changes in the HUSAFPOA unit of fire fable have been contemplated as a result of Army antiaircraft firing ex­perience in this operation.

D« REHABILITATION. Necessary rehabilitation of artillery c units was accomplished on Iwo Jima. All artillery units in

the assault remained as part of the garrison force. f

V. E. LESSONS LEARNED AND CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN.

1. Tractor dozers. Tractor dozers proved indispensable. w In addition to facilitating the construction of gun positions

and other field works, they furnished motive jpower for moving wheeled vehicles through the soft, volcanic-ash soil. Special lists of equipment for artillery units participating in future operations will include tractor dozers on the following basis:

L.

One per antiaircraft artillery gun and automatic weapons firing battery

One per field artillery firing battery One per seacoast artillery battalion headquarters One per seacoast artillery firing battery

2. Machine gun carriage M-51, The multiple machine gun carriage, M-51, proved to be unsatisfactory in this operation. Its great weight precluded efficient mobility in the soft soil of Iwo Jima. Action has been initiated to replace the M-51 machine gun carriage, in mobile and semimobile automatic weap­ons units, with the multiple machine gun trailer mount, 11-55, which weighs less than half as much as the M-51"carriage.

3* Sandbags . There was a definite need for sandbags in construction of field fortifications. Without sandbags, revet ments were difficult to build in the soft, volcanic-ash sand. Although the type of sand on Iwo Jima is unusual and probably willnot be encountered in future operations, sufficient quan­tities of sandbags willbe procured on operational projects to satisfy any need.

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-PART 1 HUSAFPOA-SECTION VIII CHEMICAL WARFARE OFFICER

A. PREPARATION,

1* Planning* The HUSAFPOA chemical officer coordinated planning to insure that all Army personnel earmarked for the Iwo Jima garrison force were adequately trained and equipped for defense against chemical attack; that chemical warfare service units were provided for the garrison force and trained in the performance of their missions; that all troops armed with chemical warfare weapons and munitions were familiar with their proper employment, care and maintenance; and that all possible assistance was given to the Navy and Marines.

2* Organization*

r a* Based on the size of the proposed garrison for Iwo Jima, it was determined that a chemical warfare service platoon, consisting of one column AB, one AE, one BA, and one CB, T/0 and E 3-500, would be required to.provide the necessary administrative, maintenance, and depot functions. The Commanding General, CPBC, was directed to activate on a provisional basis, such cellular type organizations from local resources* A request was forwarded to the War Department to secure activation of this unit and to include it in the USAFPOA troop basis* Upon receipt from War Department of authority for such activation, this unit was designated as the 271st Chemical Service Platoon*

b. Numerous conferences and discussions were held with the Iwo Jima garrison force chemical officer to acquaint him with the experiences and lessons learned from previous opera­tions and to render all possible assistance to this officer.

3* Supply and equipment. A plan for automatic supply of chemical warfare munitions and equipment to Army troops was coordinated by the HUSAFPOA chemical officer. Initialmount­ing supplies and the first maintenance supply shipment for the garrison force were provided from theater depot stocks* A special request of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, for the con­struction of eight main-armament medium tank flame throwers was granted, and CPBC was directed to construct the flame thrower tanks for delivery to the Marines* All requests from the Navy for 4*2" mortar ammunition for use by Navy mortar boats were filled from Army stooks*

4. Training* The HUSAFPOA chemical warfare section super­vised chemical warfare schools and demonstrations conducted by CPBC for the garrison force* Specialized training of mortar gunboat crews and flamethrower tank operators was coordinated through this office*

!.

B. 3UPPORT* Automatic resupply by block shipment was continued for this operation. The first block shipment was provided from Oahu. Subsequent shipments were made directly from the conti­nental United States. Based on the detailed composition of the Iwo Jima garrison force and the lessons learned from previous operations, adjustments were made in the composition of the standard chemical warfare block.

C. REHABILITATION* Chemical warfare equipment and supplies lost or rendered unserviceable during the operation were re­placed from automatic resupply shipments and depot stocks of 3PBC and CPBC.

D. LESSONS LEARNED AND CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN,

1. Training of crews for mortar boats* The 4.2 M chemical mortars mounted on LCI boats proved their effectiveness in sup­port of amphibious landing operations. However, it became apparent that more intensive and prolonged training in the use of this weapon should be given mortar crews before committing them to an operation. Navy mortar men should be as familiar with this weapon as are ground force units which employ the 4.2 M chemical mortar. A recommendation to this effect was for­warded through channels.

2. 4.2 W chemical mortar mounts. Although all mounts for the 4.2 M chemical mortars mounted on LCI craft proved satisfac­tory, the reinforced mounts designed and constructed at Pearl Harbor proved to be much more substantial than those manufac­tured from standard design in the continental United States.

3. Flame thrower tank.

a. The flame thrower tank (a medium tank equipped with a large-capacity flame thrower mounted as a principal weapon in place of the 75mm gun) , which was designed and modified on Oahu and furnished the Marines for this operation, proved to be an effective weapon for both assault and mopping-up operations. Flame thrower tanks were used to burn out caves and pillboxes and to attack targets which could not be reduced effectively by other weapons. As a result of the success of the flame thrower tank, production of a large number of an improved model was requested of the Army by Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, The improved model retained the 75mm gun and 40 rounds of 75mm shell* The flame thrower tube was mounted coaxially with the 75mm tube. No sacrifice of flame thrower fuel was required.

b. The Iwo Jima operation demonstrated the necessity for intensive training of chemical warfare operating crews, maintenance and service personnel, and flame thrower tank-infan­try teams. In preparation for future operations, training pro­cedures were designed to give thorough training to flame thrower personnel.

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-PART 1 HUSAFPOA -SECTION IX ENGINEER

A. PREPARATION.

1. Base development. Preparation of plans for the development of Iv/o Jima as an aircraft staging base was an Army responsibility. The HUSAFPOA engineer was responsible for planning all aspects of engineer participation in the development of this base.

a. It was planned that an existing airfield in the southern portion of the Island be developed to consist of one runway 200 1 by 5,000* surfaced by double bituminous as­phalt emulsion surface treatment. Taxiways and parking and servicing areas for 147 fighter planes were to be constructed and surfaced in the same manner.

b. The central airfield was planned as the major de­velopment of the island. The existing central airfield con­sisted of an east-west runway, 200 1 by 4,425', and a north­east-southwest runway 210' by 5,225. It was planned to lengthen the northeast- southwest runway to 8,500* for B-29 use, to pave it with 2" asphaltic concrete. It was contem­plated that the east-west runway be utilized to initial op­erations while work was progressing on the main extension. It was further planned to build an Identical northeast-south­west runway, 200' by 8,500 f, paralleling the first B-29 strip. Upon completion of the B-29 strip, the east-west run­way was to be surfaced and used as a service and parking strip, with aviation gasoline fueling loop facilities incor­porated into the parking strip. Taxiways and hards tan ds were to be constructed, as required, with 2M2M asphaltic concrete paving in conformity with that on the runways. While plan­ning was in progress, and prior to assault of the Island, aerial photographs revealed that the enemy had instituted ex­tensions of the northeast- southwest runway in a manner simi­lar to that proposed by HUSAFPOA.

c. Also planned was the construction of a third air­field north of the central field, with a 200' by 5,000' run­way for fighter operations. Bituminous surface treatment was to be provided.

d. Two main terminal tank farms, one on each side of the island, were planned for aviation gasoline storage. To­tal planned capacity of these farms was 280,000 barrels in 10,000 barrel bolted tanks. Each farm was to have tanker moorings and submarine pipe lines. A double 6M6 M connecting pipe line with pumps was planned for cross-island transfer.

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c. A pipe loop fueling system was planned for re­fueling B-29 aircraft at a rate of 30 per hour, each plane receiving approximately 4,ooo ,gallons. Ground reconnaissance indicated the feasibility of a second fueling loop of like capacity. As a result, final plans included facilities for refueling 60 B-29 aircraft per hour.

f. Two 6,000 barrel tank farms and three ready tanksystems all connected to the main 6lf double trans-island pipeline, were planned for field operating storage.

g. One main motor vehicle gasoline storage tank farm of two 10,000 barrel tanks, with connections to the east tanker mooring, was located on the east side of the island. In addition, eight 5,000-gallon ready tanks were provided for di-spersed filling station use.

h. Plans included Diesel fuel storage of five 10,000 barrel tanks to be located in the vicinity of the two 10,000­barrel motor vehicle gasoline storage tanks, with submarine pipe line connection to the east tanker mooring. Four 5,000­gallon tanks were to be provided for dispersed fillingsta-# tions.

2. General construction.

a. Fortification plans provided for installation of 40 miles of barbed wire entanglements and construction of 80 pill boxes, 10 blockhouses, 300 minefield sections, and ap­proximately 270 gun emplacements of various types.

b. Electric power and distribution was provided on a basis of 50 watts per man for 26,500 men.

c. Compounds for prisoners of war and civilian in­ternees, one of 40,000 square feet, and one of 1,000,000square feet, were provided in planning calculations.

d. Miscellaneous construction materials, including 500,000 board feet of lumber, 10,000 feet of nestable culvert * and various small items, were to be stockpiled.

Designs were prepared for construction of 20 miles of new road and construction of 50 miles of existing roads and trails.

f. Water supply distillation units were provided on a basis of an average requirement of five gallons per man per day. In addition, well-drlllirtg equipment and pumps for 15 gallons per man per day were furnished. Hospital require­ments were calculated on a basis of 10 gallons per bed per

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day distillation capacity and 30 gallons per bed per day well capacity.

g. Provision was made for four sets of fire fighting equipment, including crash trucks, pumpers, fire trucks, and air raid sirens.

h. Housing facilities were planned for approximately26,500 men. These included tent floors, showers, latrines of standard T/0 and E type, and quonset huts. In addition, plans were developed for all necessary hops, warehouses, and special type buildings required by both Army air force and Army ground force units and one standard T/0 and E type 500 bed prefabricated hospital.

3. Navy responsibility. The Navy was responsible for planning all harbor development. Planning shipping space for Army and Navy supplies was also a Navy responsibility.

4. Supply and equipment.

a. Since a limited number of engineer troops was scheduled for the operation, supply planning consisted large­ly of providing the necessary engineer equipment, both T/0and E and excess T/0 and E, to the other Army units involved. A composite list of engineer equipment in excess to T/0 and E furnished to the Army units participating is attached, as Addendum No. 1 to this section. This list does not include the equipment furnished for base development.

b. The overall requirements for equipment, mater­ials, and supplies were divided by echelons and submitted to the OPBC engineer for the requisitioning against approved base development authorization of operational project CP-33. This project had been prepared originally for another objec­tive with considerably different characteristics. It was therefore necessary to prepare supplemental projects and an extensive program of line-item diversions from the requisi­tions previously submitted against CP-33.

c. Schedules identifying engineer materials and r

their covering requisitions were prepare^ for each of the, landing echelons. Although these echelon shipping schedules were established more than 60 days in advance of the first direct shipments from the continental United states (about v 100 days before the operation), only one major revision was i necessary. The decision to include a B-29 runway in -the ibas# development plan resulted in changes in echelon plans and i

necessitated rush procurement of an additional shipload of asfchalt, an asphalt plant, and accessory equipment.

f!ff^,

41

5. Organization. After determination by HUSAFPOA of en­gineer troop requirements for base development, the respec­tive major echelon commanders were directed to furnish the re quired units from engineer forces under their commands. A list of troops thus allocated is shown below.

a. AAFPOA furnished the 811th Engineer Aviation,Ba­ttalion, for employment on the base development project.

b. At the direction of HUSAFPOA, CPBC organized a provisional service platoon (water distillation) from person­nel available in that command. This unit was furnished to operate water distillation units until such time as water distillation would no longer be necessary, or until relieved by an engineer service water distillation team scheduled to arrive In September 1945.

c. A HUSAFPOA proposal for assignment of an engineer service battalion (T/0 & E 5-500) composed of cellular typeunits, to this Iwo Jima garrison force was approved by the War Department. Availability dates for the various compo­nents fell in the period June-October 1945. This battalion had an aggregate strength of 25 officers and 498 enlisted men. It included the following:

1headquarters and headquarters company, engineer service battalion

1 engineer service platoon (supply) 1 engineer service platoon (maintenance) 1 engineer service platoon (utilities and

transportation)3 engineer service detachments (fire

fighting)1 engineer service detachment (water

supply)

6. Training.

a. Upon request of HUSAFPOA, training of the engi­neer service detachment (water supply) in the operation of Navy- type distillation units was arranged by the Army Ser­vice Forces Chief of Engineers.

b. The War Department, at the request of HUSAFPOA, provided a specialized training in the operation and main­tenance of aviation gasoline tank farms to a utilities team in the engineer service platoon (utilities and transporta­tion).

c. CPBC was directed to train the provisional ser­vice platoon (water distillation) in the specific type dis­tillation process.

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?. Maps.

a. The majority of the planning and operational maps utilized in this operation were produced by facilities of CPBC from aerial photographs and from existing maps and cap­tured enemy documents furnished ComG-enPOA by the Joint Intel­ligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas (JICPOA). Data from these sources were forwarded to the 64th Snglneer Topographic Battalion for compilation and drafting.

b. Reproduction of maps was accomplished by the CPBC Engineer Map Reproduction Plant at Fort Shafter, the Honolulu Lithograph Company, Ltd., (under the direction of the CPBC engineer), and the 64th Engineer Topographic Battalion.

c. The mapping work for the Iwo Jima operation which was accomplished during the period 1 September 1944 to 1 Jan­uary 1945 by forces available to the HUSAFPOA engineer is summarized in Addendum No. 2 to this section.

B. SUPPORT.

1. Supervision of shipments. The HUSAFPO'A engineer main­tained general supervision over all shipments of engineer sup­plies and equipment. Supervision was accomplished primarily by the HUSAFPOA engineer liaison section at the San Francisco Port of Embarkation (SFPOE) and by the HUSAFPOA supply con­trol section of the engineer staff. A system of records was developed by the engineer liaison section which supplemented the normal port records and enabled selective follow-up and loading of direct shipments of engineer cargo in accordance with the shipping integration schedules prepared by the HUSAFPOA engineer staff.

2. Cargo loading. The cargo loaded in some echelons at the San Francisco Port of Embarkation approached 100 per cent of the materials scheduled. It is estimated that for the en­tire operation the quantity of engineer material by line item actually lifted averaged over 85 per cent of the cargo previ­ously scheduled.

3. Exceptions. Major items not shipped in accordance with shipping integration plans were hospital materials, Navy type quonset magazines, and certain critical items of engi­neer supply such as generators and reefers. Each of these exceptions constituted a special case and the only generali­zation to be drawn is that direct shipment of engineer base development materials from depots in the continental United States is directly dependent on available stocks and a thor­ough system of follow-up.

! 43

C. REHABILITATION, The small number of engineer troops in­volved made a comprehensive plan for rehabilitation unneces­sary.

D. LESSONS LEARNED AND CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN,

!• Planning, Planning should be made for earlier ship­ment of certain supplies. Action has been taken to insure such planning for future operations.

2. Training. In organizing a composite service battalion for operation of a specific base, it is advisable to determine, ac the earliest piossible date, the type of installations which' willbe operated and to make early arrangements for the pro­\ sion of special training whenever necessary. On this opera-t lqu some loss of time in shipping elements of the engineer r apvice battalion resulted from delays in arranging for special t£: i.ing in the operation and maintenance of aviation gasoline t-s

k farms. cialized

In future operations, earlier training will be made with the

arrangements for War Department.

3. Supply . a. Allmaterials for the Iwo Jima aviation gasoline

tank farm assemblages were specially procured from the Navy. They were assembled and shipped by the San Francisco Port of Embarkation under direct supervision of an engineer officer from HUSAFPOA. This unusual procedure proved most effective. It resulted in the first shipments of complete tank farmfas­semblages into this theater ever made by the Army. Action has been taken to arrange for prior routine assemblage of Army tank farms planned for future operations.

b. Arrangements should be made for the earlier ship­ment of nails for use with salvaged lumber and dunnage. Ac­tion has been taken to Insure this supply in future opera­tions.

c. Available intelligence should be carefully studied to determine the amount of beach surfacing which will be re­quired for the rapid development of beach exit roads, as well as for surfacing the beach Itself; adequate quantities should be provided. During the Iwo Jima operation, a need arose for more pierced plank matting than was available. However, sat­isfactory surfacing was obtained by the expedient of mixingclay from the upland with the beach sand*

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ENGINEER EQUIPMENT IN EXCESS OF T/O AND E FURNISHED TO ARMY UNITS PARTICIPATING IN THE IWO JIMA OPERATION

Item Quantity

Pump, 55 GPM 23 Pump, 166 GPM 15 Pump, 200 GPM 4 Reefer box, 125 cubic feet 1 Refrigerator, 26i cubic feet,t GED 1 Reproduction equipment set, ammonia process 1 Saw, chain, 24 H 1Saw, chain, 36" GED 2 Saw, portable, 12" 1 Searchlight, 60 M 20 Shovel, 3/4 cubic yard, crawler mounted 8 Shovel, 2 cubic yard, crawler mounted 1 Siren, air raid 1 Siren, fire vehicle 1 Siren, 7M7 M rotor 5 Siren, vehicle type, electric 3 Sprayer, insect 5 Tractor, GED, MOIGD-187 3 Tractor, 36 CBJP D-4W 1 Tractor, 80-87 DEHP, D-7 4 Tractor, 70-90, DBHP, TD-18 3 Tractor, 113-132, CBHP, D-8 3 Water purification unit 1 Angledozer, frame and blade 3 Breaker, paving 6 Compressor, air, 314 CFM 1 Conveyor, truck loader, GED 1 Distillation unit, 2000 GPD 10 Distillation unit, 2500 GPD 40 Distillation unit, 5000 GPD 7 Floodlights, electric, trailer mounted 7 Floodlights, carbide, 8000 CP 48 Generator, 3KVA 19 Generator, 500 watt 1 Generator, 1-1/2 KW 12 Generator, 3 KW 13 Generator, 5 KW 7 Generator, 15 KW 13 Generator, 25 KW 1 Generator, 30 KW 6 Ice Maker, 2000 lbs 1 Motor Outboard, 22 HP 7 Mower, tractor drawn 1

Addendum No. 1 to SECTION IX, PART 1

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SUMMARY OF MAPPING WORK FOR IWO JIMA

1. General Included in this work were maps and material cov­ering Iwo, Chichi, Haha, and Muko Jlmas, Pagan Island, and several of the smaller islands and groups in the Ryukyus. Drawings at 1:10,000 scale ranged in size from 19" x 21" to 28. 5M x 40 M. Other drawings were from 7117 11 x 20.5" to 33.25" x 43.25".

2. Photomapplng work:

a Scale 1:10,000, a total of 13 sheets in from two to seven colors each, for a total of 68 plates.

b Scale 1:10,000 reduced to 1:20,000, a total of 11 sheets in from one to seven colors each, for a total of 70 plates.

c Scale 1: 10,000 enlarged to 1:5,000, a total of seven sheets in from six to seven colors each, for a total of 43 plates.

d Scale 1:20,000, one sheet in six colors, for a total of six plates.

c At various odd scales, reproduced at the same scales, a total of 16 sheets in from four to five colors each, for a total of 74 plates.

f Summary of work

Map sheets. 48Plates 261

3. Reproduction work:

Sets or Impres­copies Sheet 8 sions

Maps and charts 172,059 260,199 955,705 Bulletins and other data 6,000 6,000 16,700 Mosaics 8.500 28.000 54,000

TOTAL 186,559 294,199 1,026,405

Addendum No. 2 to SECTION IX, PART 1

46

L

-PART 1 HUSAFPOA-SECTION X ORDNANCE OFFICER

A. PREPARATION.

1. Organization. The Army Garrison Force, Iwo Jima, ord­nance section was charged with planning and preparation of the ordnance support for the garrison force units. Ordnance re-r quirements were forwarded to CPBC after approval of the HUSAFPOA planning staff* After consultation with the CPBC ordnance of­ficer, the following units were scheduled for the Iwo Jlma

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garrison force*

Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 16th r Ordnance Battalion.

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3606 th Ordnance Heavy Automotive Maintenance Company. r

102dOrdnance Medium Maintenance Company.

362dOrdnance Maintenance Company (Antiaircraft).

845th Ordnance Depot Company.

1914th Ordnance Ammunition Company.

156 th Ordnance Bomb Disposal Squad.

207th Ordnance Bomb Disposal Squad.

2. Supply and equipment. (Supply planning and functioning are discussed in full in the CPBC section of this report). There were no unusual matters of supply; responsibility for supply was vested with AGF units.

3. Training. Allordnance units were given Intensive training in rifle marksmanship, first aid, defense against chemical warfare, Jungle training and such specific tech­nical training as was needed for the mission assigned to the particular unit. Approximately one month 1s time was allotted for this training, which proved to be invaluable.

4. Special preparatory activities.

a. In preparation for the Iwo Jima operation all vehicles and self-propelled weapons were processed to mini­mize salt water corrosion and rust.

b. Deep water fording kits were made available to all authorized units.

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B. SUPPORT,

!• Re supply ? Ordnance^T'esupply was automatic for an initial 150-day period. It consisted of successive block shipments, each containing a 30-day supply. After this period, resupply was to be effected by requisition. The first resupply shipment was loaded at Oahu and was scheduled to arrive in the Marianas by D minus five. The second resupply shipment was loaded in the continental United States and was scheduled to arrive in the Marianas by D plus five. The third and subsequent resupply ship­ments were loaded in the continental United States. They were to arrive at Eniwetok at 10-day intervals beginning on D plus 20.

a. The minimum level for Class IIand Class IV supplywas set at 60 days. A 30-day operating level was establishedfor these two classes of supplies.

b. The following levels of supply of aircraft ammuni­tion, bombs and pyrotechnics were established:

Quantity in missionsType Aircraft Initial supply Operating level

Fighter 20 40Search Bomber 5 10Heavy strike bomber VBH 10 20Marine torpedo bomber VBTV 17 34

c. The following ammunition levels of supply wereestablished for garrison force ground units:

luantity (in units of fireType weapons Carried with unit Minimum level

-PART 1 HUSAFPOA-SECTION XI QUARTERMASTER

A, PREPARATION.

!• Planning. Plans for the quartermaster section of the Iwo Jima garrison force, and for service units were based on the following factors:

a. The garrison force would consist of approximately 30,000 Army personnel.

b. Quartermaster responsibilities would include the receipt, storage and issue of Class Isupplies to all shore-based organizations (Army, Navy, and Marine).

o. After D plus 120, the following levels of r quartermaster supply were to be maintained:

CLASSCLASS II MinimumMinimum levellevel 00 eratlneratln levellevel

Type BType rationB ration 6060 3030Type 0 or X ration, or bothType 0 or X ration, or both 1010Type DType rationD ration 22PerishablesPerishables Limit ofLimit avail­of avail-

able storageable storage

CLASS IICLASS II 6060 3030

CLASS IV (less constructionCLASS IV (less constructionand fortificationand fortificationmateriel)materiel) 6060 3030

2. Organization.2. Organization.

A study of troop requirements for the garrison forceforce was initiated on 9 October 1944, at which time the HUSAFPOA quartermaster was presented with the followingpresented with the followingestimate of troop requirements, as prepared by CinCPOA:

2 quartermaster truck companies 1 headquarters and headquarters detachment,

quartermaster battalion 1 quartermaster depot company (less detachment)-1quartermaster laundry company less one

platoon 4 quartermaster service companies 1quartermaster bakery company 1graves registration platoon

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49

b. Based upon a preliminary study of the target area, the type of units recommended for the garrison force, and the overall garrison force strength, the following quartermaster units were recommended:

*? 2 quartermaster truck companies 1 headquarters and headquarters detachment,

quartermaster battalion, with attached medical troops and chaplain

1 quartermaster depot company 1 quartermaster laundry company & quartermaster service companies 1 quartermaster bakery company 1 graves registration platoon 1quartermaster laundry detachment, type £1 1 platoon, quartermaster gasoline supply

company # 1 quartermaster salvage repair company (less

one platoon)

? These units were known to be available from sources under the control of Commanding General, CPBC.

c. The balance of troop requirements was to be pro­vided from the continental United States. Subsequent study and troop availability information from the continental United States revealed that the following units would be available:

Type unit Number Readiness Date

quartermaster truck companies 2 January 1945 quartermaster service companies 2 April 1945 quartermaster laundry company 1 March 1945 quartermaster depot company 1 May 1945

d. It was contemplated that the quartermaster laundry company should move directly to Iwo Jima from the continental United States, and that the two quartermaster service companies, the two quartermaster truck companies,and the quartermaster depot company should move to Oahu to replace similar companies made available by the Command­ing General, CPBC.

c. In November 1944, a company headquarters and one platoon of a quartermaster gasoline supply company were stationed at Saipan. It was determined that one platoon, plus10 enlisted men from the company headquarters, could be made available to the Iwo Jima garrison force without adverselyaffecting the class 111 supply functions of the Saipan island commander. The concurrence of the Saipan island commander and ComFwdArea (Naval) were obtained for this^ifckdaawal.

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f. By War Department directive the HUSAFPOA G-2 was charged with the responsibility of collecting Japanese weapon b and equipment for shipment to the continental United States for study and training purposes. No quartermaster salvage collecting company was Immediately available for this task from CPBC or from the continental United States; therefore, in order to meet this requirement, one platoon of a quarter­master salvage collecting company was withdrawn from Saipan. An officer and one section was scheduled to land in the assault; the second section was to land in the 7th echelon. This platoon was employed under the supervision of the Army Service Forces Enemy Equipment Intelligence Service Team (ASFEEIST).

g. The Iwo Jima garrison force quartermaster section consisted of three officers and eight enlisted men. With the exception of one officer, this personnel was furnished by CPBC.

r 3. Supply and equipment

a. In accordance with CinCPOA directive, the follow ing levels of quartermaster supply accompanied all troops:

DAYS OF SUPPLY CLASS I Assault echelons Later echelons

Type B ration 10 10 ?10-in-l ration 10 10

Type C ration 5 7 Type X ration 5 3 Type D ration 2 2

??Army quartermaster rationaccessories pack, orequivalent ' post exchangeand ships service storesupplies 20 20

Water in cans or drums with two gallons per man per day for five days for all units land­ing between D-day and D plus 30

CLASS II

Essential maintenance, items ofclothing, equipment andgeneral supplies *•30 30

CLASS 111

Fuels and lubricants (less aviationand vehicle gasoline) 30 30

51

DAYS OF SUPPLY CLASS 111 Assault echelons Later echelons

Vehicle gasoline 18 30

Substitution of B ration for all or part authorized after2d Echelon.Authorized for units arriving at objective prior to D plus60 only.

b. Inasmuch as the majority of the Army troops destin­ed for shipment to Iwo Jima were charged with garrison respon­sibilities, no changes were made in current T/0 and E's. How­ever, the following engineer equipment was provided from sources available to the Commanding General, CPBC, for use in quartermaster beach and dump areas:

jpberjpbererer ItemItem

11 SKW floodlight unit perSKW floodlight unit per quartermaster depotquartermaster companydepot company--total 1total 1

11 SKW floodlightSKW -floodlight- unit perunit per quartermaster servicequartermaster serviceoompany totaloompany 2total 2

1616 Carbide floodlightCarbide unitsfloodlight unitsi per quartermaster depoti per quartermaster depot--company totalcompany 16total 161616 Carbide floodlightCarbide unitsfloodlight unitsi per quartermaster servicei per quartermaster service

company * total 32company * total 32

c. Such items of excess equipment as were considered necessary for Army units participating in an amphibious opera­tion were requisitioned from the War Department as projects CP-33 and CP-33A by the Commanding General, CPBC. Because items did not arrive in sufficient time to meet loading dates* available items were supplied by Commanding General, CPBC. Local stocks were replenished upon receipt of the project items.

d. Quartermaster base development requirements for refrigeration were incorporated in project CP-33. The following unit refrigeration was provided:

Item Volume Number

refrigerators 125 cubio feet 58 refrigerators 26* oubio feet 157

The soheduled late arrival of the quartermaster laundry company at Iwo Jima and the Imperative necessity for providing laundry service for the hospital facilities made it necessary for the Commanding General, CPBC, to make available one semi- trailer laundry to be landed in the first eohelon with the quartermaster laundry detachment. The merit of this

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action was proved by the efficient manner in which laundry-service was rendered to the hospitals. Without this service the hospitals would have been seriously handicapped from the standpoint of field sanitation and patient morale.

f. The Commanding General, CPBC, was directed to ship 2,500 pounds of DDT powder to Saipan where it was to be held until the tactical situation would permit the spraying of Iwo Jima. This action contributed materially to the early and efficient control of flies and other insects on the island.

r B. SUPPORT. The three Marine divisions which participated in the assault established their respective cemeteries, burled their dead, and maintained necessary records. A quartermaster graves registration platoon was offered to the Commander,Expeditionary Troops, but its services were not utilized.The platoon reverted to the control of Commanding General,AG-F, Iwo Jiraa, and was utilized to bury enemy dead. The opera­tion of all cemeteries on Iwo Jima was assumed on 1 April 1945by the graves registration platoon.

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-PART 1 HUSAFPOA

-3£jTIOI\t XII SIGNAL OFFIG2W.

A. PREPARATION.

1. Planning*

a. The HUSAFPOA signal officer formulated over- all plans for the procurement of signal personnel and equipment for the design, engineering, installation, operation and main­tenance of those communication facilities for which ComOenPOA had been assigned responsibility*. They included:

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(1) Mooile communications for use daring the consolidation phase, including tactical, administrative and air tactical circuit

r requirements (Army, ftavy and Marine).

(2) Permanent communications facilities, includ­ing tne major portion of tne mobile communica­tions circuits and in addition, a radio tele­type linking Iwo Jima and Guam.

r

' (3) Assault and semi-permanent telephone, teletype

and control cable installations.

(4) Semi-permanent systems­

(b) Fixed wire plant facilities.

b. Plans were also developed for a photographic study of gariison force activities from D-day to completion of base development.

2. Organization.

a. Study of tne oase development proposed for this island and of tue special assault requirements set up by trie V Amphibious Corps indicated a definite need for special signal units. In addition to the standard T/0 and £ units, it was necessary to iorrn a special signal service organization which included a mocile communications section and a permanent garri­son section.

b. It was determined that tne following signal units would be necessary for the accomplishment of tne assault and base develooment mission:

V

1 signal heavy construction company 1 signal operations service company 1 mobile communications unit

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1 permanent garri so n unit 1 photo assignment team, type FA 1 signal radio construction detachment 1 radar maintenance unit, type A 1 radar maintenance unit, type B 1 radar maintenance unit, type 0 1 radar maintenance unit, type D

c. The strength and composition of the Iwo Jimagarrison force signal section was constituted as recommendedby the HUSAFPOA signal officer.

d. Upon the recommendation of the AaFPQA director of communi cat ions, the administration of the signal operations service company was handled by attaching the unit to Headquarters,VIIFighter Command,

3. Equipment and supplies.

a. All equipment over and above T/0 and E for assault and garrison signal units was reviewed by the HUSAFPOA signalofficer, who submitted recommendations to the HUSAFPOA general staff.

b. Originally, an operational project for the base development of Iwo Jima was submitted to the War Department. However, the War Department cancelled this project and ordered that all materials necessary for Iwo Jima be charged against the operational" project for Okinawa (CP-33). Immediate restudy was made of the project requirements. Requisitions were prepared and furnished to OPBO for procurement of the project material. Expansion of the Iwo Jima base development necessitated the preparation of a supplement to OP-33.

c. Plans for ground signal supply and maintenance for the garrison force were integrated with the supply plans for the amphibious and air forces. The completed plan was submitted to OinOPOA.

d. The short period of time between the date of place­ment of requisitions at the port and the delivery date necessi­tated an adjustment of the requirements of the project to local stocks. OPBO was directed to furnish only such equipment as was deemed necessary for the successful accomplishment of the mission.

c. Heavy construction equipment was requisitioned through the HUSAFPOA engineer for issue to signal construction elements of the garrison force. This heavy construction equip­ment was essential for the proper operation of these units.

4. Training, General training principles, covering joint training of the air, ground, and service elements of the joint

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communications center, were coordinated with the various ser­vice echelons of CinCPOA by tne riUSAFPOA signal officer. Ar­rangements were made to integrate the training of all Army personnel with the Naval components at tne Advanced Base Combat Communications Training Course conducted by CinCPOA.

S. Inspections* A general inspection of training and equipment was conducted by representatives of the HUSAFPOA signal office prior to departure of troops.-B SUPPORT * formal logistical support was furnished the Army garrison force.

C. LESSONS LEARMED AND CORriECTIVS ACTIOK TAKES* All wire and cable used in the assault and consolidation phases of an operation must be placed beyond the reach of heavy engineer and tactical equipment, either by burying it sufficiently deep or elevating it beyond the reach of cranes and shovels.

r This fact was stressed to all new base communications offi­cers.

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l-PART 1 HUSAFPOA-SECTION XIII SURGEON

A, PREPARATION.

1. Planning* The HUSAFPOA surgeon developed plans for medical support of the V Amphibious Corps in the assault and prepared the medical section of the base development plan. A list of special equipment and supplies required in excess of T/0 and E was prepared by the HUSAFPOA surgeon and included in the special project for this operation.

2. Organization*

a. The following medical units were assigned to the Iwo Jima garrison force:

232dGeneral Hospital (1,000 bed) 41st Station Hospital (250 bed)38th Field Hospital717th Medical Sanitary Company (less one platoon)Veterinary Food Inspection Detachment (DD),

113th Medical Service Company 372dMedical Supply Detachment (BC) 279th Quartermaster Laundry Detachment (Hospital) Detachment, 18th Medical General Laboratory

b. The 38th Field Hospital and the 279th Quartermaster Laundry Detachment (Hospital) participated in the assault phase. The 38th Field Hospital was scheduled to remain with the gar­rison force after the termination of the assault phase.

c. The requirements for garrison force hospitalizatlon were estimated on the basis of four per cent of the total gar­rison strength. One general hospital (1,000 bed), one station hospital (250 bed), and one field hospital (4,000 bed) were assigned, making a total of 1,650 hospital beds.

d. To cope with bacteriological problems of threaten­ed epidemics and to augment the hospital laboratory service, an officer bacteriologist-serologist and an enlisted laboratory technician from the 18th Medical General Laboratory were attach­ed to the 38th Field Hospital until the 232 dGeneral Hospital was in operation.

3» Supply and equipment* An initial 30-day supply was authorized. Allequipment and supplies were combat loaded. The platoons, with equipment, were dispersed on three ships.A list of principal items of medical equipment and supplies inexcess of T/0 and E used in this operation is shown In AddendumNo. 1 to this section.

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I*"^™™*^JSfi 4» Training* In addition to routine combat training, the

38th Field Hospital received special training at local hospi­tals. This consisted principally of short courses in anesthe­sia, operating room nurse duty, first aid, ward work for en­listed men, and surgical technique for medical officers.

5, Inspections. A pre- employment inspection was conduct­ed by the HUSA^POA surgeon to ascertain the status of training, personnel, equipment, and supplies. The units inspected were found capable of performing their mission in the field.

B. SUPPORT.

!• Resupply* Resupply was accomplished by means of auto­matic block shipments. The blocks used were the 3,000-man 30-day maintenance type. They were modified from time to time as requested by the Iwo Jima garrison force commander. Emer­gency resupply was effected by air shipment upon emergency requisition.

2» Evacuation. The surgeons responsibilities were limit­ed to assistance in planning and coordination with the Air Transport Command and the Navy. Initial casualty evacuation was by hospital ships and assault transports (APAs). Air evacuation began on D plus 13. Total casualties evacuated by air between D plus 12 and D plus 35 numbered 2,449; by water between D plus 2 and D plus 36, 13,737.

3. Laundry facilities. The attachment of the 279th Quartermaster Laundry Platoon (Hospital) and a portable quartermaster laundry unit (22-foot trailer) proved to be of invaluable assistance to the proper functioning of the hos­pital. The laundering of surgical material, sheets, towels, and blankets was prompt and eliminated delays in satisfying the large and steady demand from surgery and wards. Some difficulty was encountered in procuring sufficient water for operation of the laundry. This problem was solved by repair­ing a Japanese 10,000-gallon cistern and carting water from a sulphur water spring near the laundry in a 1,000-gallon pontoon (Navy "Miracle Cube")»

4. Sanitary surve

a. Medical intelligence waa procured from the HUSAFPOA 0-2 and disseminated to medical personnel of partici­pating Army units.

b. Inasmuch as malaria appeared to be absent from this island, no Army malarial detachments were assigned tothis operation.

o. There was no problem of caring fop civilian

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"^^•^*^%#§J iL,Ucasualties because all civillanl^nad been evacuated from the island prior to June 1944.

d. Aircraft spraying of DDT between D plus two and D plus five successfully combatted flies and other insects.

C. LESSONS LEARNED AND CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN.

!• Laundry* The attachment of a quartermaster laundryplatoon (hospital) with a portable quartermaster laundry unit was found invaluable in the functioning of a field hospital in the assault phase. The War Department was re­quested to include laundry personnel and equipment in the T/0 and E of all general, station, field, and evacuation hospitals,

2« Air evacuation. Establishment of early air evacua­tion alleviates some of the difficult problems of evacuation peculiar to surface ships, resulting from turbulent surf and slow movement to the hospitals in rear areas. Plans for future operations tiow include early evacuation of patients by air to rear area hospitals.

3. Public address system. The public address system is invaluable in the operation of the hospital and in boosting morale of patients. Action has been taken to include this item in special lists of equipment for all hospitals moved to forward areas.

4» Security » A security guard, furnished from sources outside the medical department, is definitely needed for hospitals during the assault phase. To detail medical de­partment personnel constitutes improper employment of medi­cal troops and results in a shortage of personnel at a time when the patient load is extremely heavy. The War Department was requested to increase the theater troop basis to provide for service teams Including military police detachments for hospitals.

5. Hospital augmentation. This operation demonstrated the necessity of reinforcing a field hospital with personnel and equipment when it is employed as an evacuation hospital. Planning for future operations will provide for additional personnel and equipment*

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PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF MEDIGAL EQUIPMENT _AND SUPPLIES IN EXCESS OF a: se: IN IWO JIMA OPERATIONT/O AND. E USED p

ITEM AMOUNT

Unit medical equipment pack 2 Straight aluminum litter 45 Splint, litter bar 20 Blanket set, large, complete 18 Splint set 10 Sterilizer, dressing and utensil 1 Washing machine, electric, avenger type 3 X-ray, field unit, generator 2 X-ray, field unit, processing unit for darkroom 1 X-ray, field unit, darkroom tent 1 Suction apparatus, portable 2 Box, amphibious, waterproof 777 Carrier, litter, for i-ton Jeep 4 Table, orthopedic, portable, complete 2 Ration, supplement, hospital (days) 15 Loading bin and X-ray drier 1 Public address system (PA 6C205) 1 Insect inserts for surgical tents 6 24-ton trucks 2 Field baking unit and dough mixer 1 Switchboard (8D72-12 drop-4C9972 with 12

telephones, field, EEB (48-5008 A) 1 Jungle kit (per individual) 1

Addendum No* 1- to SECTION XIII PART 1