john ericsson, uss monitor, and union naval strategy

8/3/2019 John Ericsson, USS Monitor, and Union Naval Strategy

1/8

United States History OneScott Abel

Nov. 28, 2006

Honor code:

Fuller, Howard. John Ericsson, the Monitors, and Union Naval Strategy.

International Journal of Naval History. Vol. 2. No. 3. (2004): 1-21

Weddle, Kevin. The Blockade Board of 1861 and Union Naval Strategy. Civil

War History. Vol. 48, No. 2. (2002): 123-142


2/8

The United States Navy played an important role in the victory of Union forces

during the American Civil War through strategy and technology. Howard Fullers article

stresses the importance of the trinity of the naval architect John Ericsson, the Union

Naval Strategy, and the U.S.S. Monitor. Fuller places emphasis on the importance of the

U.S.S. Monitorand John Ericsson in the American Civil War. Kevin Weddle writes on

how the establishment of the critical Union Blockade came to be and how a few brilliant

men helped transform an unprepared navy into an excellent weapon against the rebels.

Howard Fuller and Kevin Weddle agree that the Union Navy gained victory over the

Confederacy, because of naval strategy, superiority in material, and brilliant leadership.

Both authors write about the same time period and locations. They study the

years of the American Civil War between 1861 and 1865. The locations of the blockades

and naval action include the 3,500 miles of coastline from Virginia to Texas. Also, the

Mississippi River and the many rivers diverting from it play an important role towards

the Union victory. However, there are also locations that are important in the North, such

as Washington D.C. and the many Navy Yards where the Union Navy was being

developed.

Howard Fuller focuses most of his effort on the development of the Monitor and

the Union ironclads. The US Navy Yards laid down eighty two armored warships and of

that, sixty-one had turrets during the Civil War. The U.S.S. Monitorwas the prototype of

a new generation of steam-powered warships that were clad in iron and had its cannons in

a rotating turret. New classes of ironclads would be built in the image of the U.S.S.

Monitor. Fuller explains how the blockade of Southern ports was the centerpiece to

Union Naval Strategy and how closing their ports would prevent them from exploiting

2


3/8

their lucrative cotton trade with nations like Great Britain. Fuller also writes about the

Confederate Secretary of the Navy, Stephen Mallory, who believed the ironclads were the

only way to beat the Union Navy.

For the Union, the ironclads were costly and time consuming to make. It was

initially estimated that the cost of twenty ironclads would be $16,530,000, but it was later

revised to cost $10 million. Ericssons design is acknowledged as superior to anything

any other contractor could produce, despite its expensiveness. For example, it provided

not only more armor, but for an upgrade from 11-inch guns to 15-inch guns. These

ironclads were needed for the assault on New Orleans to suppress fire from forts guarding

the city. These ironclads futuristic design struck fear into the hearts of the defenders of

New Orleans and improved the Navys Public Relations. Fuller surprisingly only briefly

mentions the duel at Hampton Roads and puts more emphasis on the fact that the U.S.S.

Monitorwas on patrol duty at least a month before the engagement.

Fuller concluded that the amphibious assaults along the eastern coast were

generally a waste of resources. Instead, priority was placed on the Armys progress on

land. Fuller also concluded the blockade was the main theme surrounding Union Naval

Strategy and that many ironclad assaults were just distractions for the Navy and helped

with the nations morale. He states the main purposes of the ironclads were to deter, and

if necessary, act as coastal defense against foreigners, use against Confederate ships, and

assault Confederate coastal defenses. Fuller goes into detail about the Union assaults on

Confederate fortresses in Mobile Bay, around Charleston, and in North Carolina. His

main sources include issues of period Scientific American, Ericssons letters, and books

3


4/8

by James Tertius DeKay and John Niven. He came to his conclusion by looking at the

ultimate results of each attack on major Confederate ports on the East Coast.

Kevin Weddle starts his article off with the bombardment of Ft. Sumter and

Lincolns Proclamation of Blockade against the enemies of the Union. He explains how

overwhelming the task was to establish a blockade and how the Blockade Board came

about. The Blockade Boards task was to purchase, commandeer, build, and move

almost any suitable vessel to maintain the blockade. Of course, the Navy still kept some

vessels to guard American commercial interests abroad. Weddle explains how the Navy

needed small, maneuverable, shallow draft, and fast vessels to stop blockade runners, so

the Navy commandeered some vessels from the U.S. Coastal Survey. Weddle places

great significance on the superintendent of the U.S. Coastal Survey, Alexander Bache,

who was also member of the Blockade Board. Bache and his organization gave critical

information on the details of the American Coastline during this time, such as

information on depth of the water and the tides. Weddle believed it was Bache who came

up with idea to form a Blockade Board.

The important members that belonged to the Blockade Board or were involved in

its creation engaged in strategic planning for the war. These men included Assistant

Secretary of the Navy Gustavus Vasa Fox, Alexander Bache, Secretary of the Navy

Gideon Welles, Samuel DuPont, Henry Davis, John Barnard, and General Joseph Trotten.

Weddle gives a short biography of DuPont, Henry Davis, Major John Barnard, and

Bache. The board had to consider things such as how to supply the fleet, how to follow

international law, and how to divide the command responsibilities.

4


5/8

Weddle concludes with the legacy of the Blockade Boards recommendations.

His first comment on its legacy is the success in dividing the two fleets into a Northern

Squadron and Southern Squadron. Another piece of the boards legacy was requesting

the captured islands to act as supply bases for the Union Navy. These actions include the

capture of Cape Hatteras in August, 1861, the capture of Port Royal and Ship Island in

November 1861, and the capture of Fernandina in March of 1862. He concludes that the

boards recommendations lead to the creation of other organizations such as the Board of

Naval Examiners, the Board for Purchase of Vessels, the Board on Ironclad Vessels, and

the Board on Claims, which all greatly contributed to the war effort. Weddle writes that

the greatest legacy of the Blockade Board was the development of the blockade, which

gave the Union a decisive strategic advantage over the Confederates. Weddle comments

on how the Navy took three weeks to create a solid strategy that was kept throughout the

war, while the Army took three years to develop an effective strategy, despite its superior

resources.

Weddle reaches these conclusions through much research and work. He was

thorough his research of the blockade and the men surrounding it. Weddle especially

looked through letters that were written by men like DuPont, Bache, and Welles. He also

searched through official government documents, such as statements to the Senate and

official Coastal Survey reports. He even had access to the dairy of the Secretary of the

Navy Gideon Welles. Other sources include books that had been written before him

about the Union Navy, Union strategy, and people involved with the Union Navy such as

DuPont and Welles from various authors. He comes to his conclusions by looking at the

boards recommendations and checked how vital each one was to the war effort.

5


6/8


7/8

the Confederacys coastline. The need for coaling stations and supply bases resulted in

the seizure of islands such as Ship Island, Fernandina, and Port Royal. Both authors

write on the attacks on key coastal locations, such as Ship Island on the Gulf Coast and

how these assaults relied on the Union Army to take and hold land with the Navys

assistance. Fuller and Weddle write about the fall of New Orleans in April 1862, because

it was the largest city in the Confederacy and a strategically important location.

However, both acknowledge the limits of the Navys capabilities in large part due

to the underwater mine or torpedo which played a role at Mobile Bay and Charleston.

DuPonts and the Navys limits were reached when they failed to capture the city that

started the rebellion, Charleston, South Carolina. Despite this failure, both authors

remind the reader that the Army of the Potomac failed for years to make progress against

the Confederacy. These writers agree that certain organizations such as the Board on

Ironclad Vessels played an important role in Union Navy. The authors and I agree fully

on the concept that there has not been enough writing and research on the significance of

the Union Navy and the blockade that played an important role in the American Civil

War. We also agree that the Union Navy played a critical and often under valued role

during this turbulent time in American History.

Fuller differs from Weddle in that Fuller focused more on the mechanics of the

ironclads and individual actions. Fuller briefly mentions the duel between the two

ironclads U.S.S.Monitorand the C.S.S. Virginia and mentions the actions of the four

ironclads at Mobile Bay. In this engagement, three ironclads steamed towards the enemy,

resulting the lead ironclad sinking due hitting a mine and forcing the surrender of the

C.S.S. Tennessee. Weddle more fully examines the personalities and the relationships

7


8/8

between the members of the Blockade Board and Fuller writes about John Ericsson.

Furthermore, Fuller writes more on the construction in the Navy Yards, but Weddle just

mentions the need for the construction of more vessels. Fuller writes more about foreign

politics and the need to deter the empires of Great Britain and France from getting too

involved in the American Civil War, whereas Weddle wrote little about external political

pressures of the war. Fuller also writes significantly more about the Confederate Navy

than Weddle does, because Fuller focused part of his article on the necessity of the

ironclad to fight Confederate warships. Fuller writes about how Confederate Secretary of

the Navy Stephen Mallory ordered the salvaging of the U.S.S. Merrimac and how it was

converted into the ironclad, C.S.S. Virginia.

While Howard Fuller focuses more on John Ericsson, the U.S.S. Monitor, and

Union Naval Strategy, Kevin Weddle focuses on the Blockade Board of 1861. Neither

forgets to mention the importance of the blockade, but both focus on different details

involving Union Naval Strategy. Both authors wrote about a critical subject in American

that too often goes unnoticed by historians.

8

john ericsson, uss monitor, and union naval strategy

Documents