Summary: Three problems with the connectivist conception of learning (Clarà

& Barberà 2013)

Connectivism has emerged as a possible learning theory (Clarà & Barberà, 2013), garnering

attention from the prevalence of e-learning, particularly MOOCs. Connectivism suggests

learning happens through internal connections and observance of outside connections. These

connections (nodes) form the basis of associative neuronal activity that create a pattern of

connections or knowledge. One could argue that connectivism was influenced by constructivism

or that it is constructivism adapted for the digital age. Both suggest learning takes place through

experiences and social interactions. That said, the authors contend that connectivism does not

meet the scientific criteria of a learning theory. Their article analyzes connectivism from an

epistemological and psychological perspective and discusses its ability to answer three questions

that scientific learning theories must address: the learning paradox, the occurrence of interaction,

and the role of concept development.

The learning paradox explains how an individual comes to know something. Solutions to the

paradox argue that knowledge is innate and each individual has everything they will ever know

or that knowledge is developed outside through interactions with others. The authors suggest that

connectivism fails to meet a solution to the learning paradox based on its definition of knowing

and knowledge. “If connectivism maintains that knowledge comes from outside the brain then it

needs to explain how the individual accesses that knowledge… if connectivism maintains it

current explanation of knowing... then it needs to explain the innate mechanism…” (Clarà &

Barberà, 2013, p. 201).

Clarà and Barberà argue that connectivism is not a learning theory because it fails, in three ways,

to fully explain the interaction between nodes and the network. First, the theory lacks details

about how human nodes interact with other aspects of the network (including other humans).

Secondly, connectivists oversimplify node interactions as being binomial, meaning a connection

is either active or inactive. This does not adequately explain the complexity that exists within the

network and the simultaneous interaction of multiple nodes. Finally, connectivism labels

interaction as a state. Research suggests that interactions are fluid and procedural; thus,

interactions cannot be considered a state.

Another deficiency of connectivism, suggested by the article, is that it fails to explain the

psychological development of concepts or create a relationship between learning and concept

development, which is necessary to account for learning. Research shows the psychological

concept development occurs in one of three ways; through biological maturity, through

simultaneous biological maturity and education, (Piaget & Vygotzky) or, that learning

causesconcept development (ZPD). Connectivism does not provide an explanation of concept

development except it occurs through association between connections, a position in direct

conflict to evidence against associationism. The question then remains, how does learning or

concept development take place in connectivism without taking into account psychological

maturity?

Epistemological and psychological deficiencies of connectivism inhibit its ability to be an

independent learning theory, and the challenges experienced by learners in MOOCs can be

attributed to those deficiencies. Further development is needed to explain the learning that

happens in MOOCs and for connectivism to stand as a separate learning theory.

Richard Jones, Chad Kuhlman, and Doug Larson

References:

Clarà, M., & Barberà, E. (2014). Three problems with the connectivist conception of learning.

Journal of Computer Assisted Learning (30): 197-206. doi: 10.1111/jcal.12040