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7/28/2019 Jason Sharp Appeals Court Ruling

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ALABAMA COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OCTOBER TERM, 2012-2013

CR-05-2371

Jason Michael Sharp

v.

State of Alabama

Appeal from Madison C i r c u i t Court

(CC-99-2473)

On Remand from th e Ala bam a Supreme Court and on A p p l i c a t i o n

f o r Rehearing on Return t o Second Remand

PER CURIAM.

The o p i n i o n i s s u e d on March 23, 2012, on a p p l i c a t i o nf o r

r e h e a r i n g on r e t u r n t o second remand, 1 i s withdrawn, and th e

1On October 18, 2012, the Alabama Supreme Court v a c a t e d

t h i s C o u r t ' s judgment of March 23, 2012, and remanded th e case

f o r us t o " a l l o w the p a r t i e s t o b r i e f the i s s u e s r a i s e d by the


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f o l l o w i n g o p i n i o n i s s u b s t i t u t e d t h e r e f o r .

Jas on Mi ch ae l Sharp was c o n v i c t e d of c a p i t a l murder

because i t was comm itte d d u r i n g the cou rs e of a rape or an

atte mpte d rape, see 13A -5- 40( a)( 3), A l a . Code 1975. By a

vote of 11 to 1, the j u r y recommended t h a t Sharp be sen ten ced

t o death. The t r i a l co ur t acc epte d the j u r y ' s recommendation

and sentenced Sharp to death.

On appeal, t h i s Court remanded t h i s case f o r the t r i a l

c o u r t to amend i t s se nt en ci ng ord er. Sharp v. S t a t e , [Ms. CR-

05-2371, Aug. 29, 2008] ___ So. 3d ___ ( A l a . Cri m. App. 2008)

("Sharp I") . On r e t u r n to remand, we a f f i r m e d Sharp's

c o n v i c t i o n and se nt en ce . Sharp v. S t a t e , [Ms. CR-05-2371,

Dec. 19, 2008] So. 3d , ( A l a . Cr im . App. 2008)

("Sharp I I " ) . The Alabama Supreme Court, a f t e r g r a n t i n g

c e r t i o r a r i review of Sharp's p e t i t i o n , r e v e r s e d t h i s Court's

judgment. The C our t, a p p l y i n g the p l a i n - e r r o r standard of

review, held t h a t "the re co rd cr ea te s an in fe re nc e of

t r i a l c o u r t ' s Ba ts on [v. Ke nt uc ky , 476 U.S. 79 (1986),] or der

and ... address those i s s u e s by f u r t h e r o p i n i o n . " For the

most p a r t , our March 23, 2012, o p i n i o n ad dr es se d the i s s u e s

Sharp r a i s e s i n h i s most recent b r i e f s to t h i s Co ur t, and our

o p i n i o n today i s l a r g e l y a restatement of our March 23, 2012,

o p i n i o n , w i t h a d d i t i o n a l d i s c u s s i o n n e c e s s i t a t e d by the

Supreme Court's order.

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d i s c r i m i n a t i o n on the p a r t of the S t a t e " i n i t s use o f i t s

peremptory s t r i k e s . Ex p a r t e Sharp, [Ms. 1080959, Dec. 4,

2009] So. 3d , (A la . 2009) . See a l s o Rule 45A,

A l a . R. App. P. Because the S tat e had no t been r e q u i r e d to

a r t i c u l a t e on the r e c o r d i t s reasons f o r the use of i t s

peremptory s t r i k e s and because th e r e c o r d before the Supreme

Co ur t was not adequate f o r t h a t Co ur t to de te rmi ne whether a

v i o l a t i o n of Ba ts on v. Ke nt uc ky , 476 U.S. 79 (19 86) , had

occurred, the Court remanded the case for t h i s Court to order

f u r t h e r pr oc ee di ng s. Ex p a r t e Sharp, So. 3d at . Th is

Court then remanded the case f o r the t r i a l co ur t to conduct a

Batso n hea ri ng at which the St at e was to pr ov id e i t s reasons

f o r i t s peremptory s t r i k e s a g a i n s t A f r i c a n - A m e r i c a n

veniremembers and the t r i a l c o u r t was to de ter mi ne whether the

p r o s e c u t i o n had used i t s s t r i k e s i n a r a c i a l l y d i s c r i m i n a t o r y

manner. See Sharp v. S t a t e , [Ms. CR-05-2371, Mar. 5, 2010]

So. 3d ( A la . Cr im . App. 2010) ("Sharp I I I " ) .

On remand, the t r i a l cour t complied w i t h our i n s t r u c t i o n s

and, on A p r i l 27, 2010, cond ucte d a Bat son h ea r i n g. Du ri ng

t h a t hea rin g, the State pr ov id ed i t s reasons f o r s t r i k i n g

African-American veniremembers. The t r i a l co ur t al lo we d Sharp

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t o f i l e a w r i t t e n response t o t h e p r o s e c u t i o n ' s reasons f o r

s t r i k i n g A f r i c a n - A m e r i c a n veniremembers. In his response,

Sharp argued th at the Sta te' s reasons f o r s t r i k i n g A f r i c a n -

American veniremembers were p r e t e x t u a l . T h e r e a f t e r , t he S t a t e

f i l e d a w r i t t e n r e p l y t o Sharp's response. On J u l y 16, 2010,

the t r i a l c o u r t e n t e r e d an o r d e r f i n d i n g t h a t t he p r o s e c u t i o n

had o f f e r e d r a c e - n e u t r a l reasons f o r i t s peremptory s t r i k e s

a g a i n s t A f r i c a n - A m e r i c a n veniremembers and that those reasons

were n ot p r e t e x t u a l . The t r i a l c o u r t found f u r t h e r t h a t t he

S t a t e t h e r e f o r e h ad n ot v i o l a t e d Batson i n t h e e x e r c i s e o f i t s

peremptory s t r i k e s . T h i s Court a f f i r m e d . Sharp v. State,

[Ms. CR-05-2371, Mar. 23, 2012] So. 3d ( A l a . Crim.

App. 2010) (op ini on on a p p l i c a t i o n fo r re he ar in g and re tu rn to

second remand) ("Sharp I V " ) .

The Alabama Supreme Court, i n an or de r dated October 18,

2012, summarily vacated our judgment i n Sharp IV and remanded

the case " w i t h i n s t r u c t i o n s t h a t [th e Court o f C r i m i n a l

Appeals] a l l o w t h e p a r t i e s t o b r i e f the is su es r a i s e d by the

t r i a l c o u r t ' s Batson order and th at i t then add res s those

is su es by f u rt h er op in io n. " (No. 1111489). In compliance

with the Supreme Court's i n s t r u c t i o n s , we ordered b r i e f i n g on

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the issues r a i s e d by the t r i a l co ur t' s Batso n or de r. The

p a r t i e s completed b r i e f i n g on December 17, 2012. We now have

again reviewed the t r i a l co ur t' s Bats on or de r, and we aga in

a f f i r m .2

The ve n i r e i n Sharp's case co n si s te d of 80 p o t e n t i a l

j u r o r s . The t r i a l court excused nine of the veniremembers f o r

cause. Of the re ma in in g j u r y panel of 71 members, 14 were

African-American and 57 were Caucasian. The pr os ec ut io n

s t r u c k 30 p o t e n t i a l j u r o r s , and the def ens e s t r u c k 29

p o t e n t i a l j u r o r s , w i t h each p a r t y ' s l a s t s t r i k e s er vi ng as an

a l t e r n a t e j u r o r . The State used 11 of i t s 30 s t r i k e s to

remove African-American veniremembers, removing a l l but 3

African-Americans from the v e n i r e . The defense st r u c k two

African-American veniremembers. One African-American sat on

2

I n i t s b r i e f f i l e d a f t e r the Alabama Supreme Court's

October 18, 2012, or de r, the Sta te argue s, among other things,

t h a t Sharp's Batson cl ai m i s not pr op er ly befo re t h i s Court

because i t was not r a i s e d at t r i a l . The State made

e s s e n t i a l l y the same argument to the Alabama Supreme Court

when i t was i n the pr oce ss of d e c i d i n g Ex pa rt e Sharp, but the

c o u r t nonetheless addressed Sharp's p l a i n - e r r o r Batson claim.

Consequently, we agree with Sharp th at the law-of -the- case

d o c t r i n e precludes us from co ns id er in g the me ri ts of the

S t a t e ' s argument that Sharp's Batson c la im i s not pr op er ly

before t h i s Co urt . See, e.g., Clemons v. State, [Ms. CR-10-

0772, June 29, 2012] So. 3d , (Ala. Crim. App.

2012).

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Sharp's j u r y . 3

A t t h e Batson h e a r i n g , th e S t a t e a r t i c u l a t e d i t s reasons

f o r s t r i k i n g the 11 A f r i c a n - A m e r i c a n veniremembers. 4

Regarding J u r o r no. 55, th e S t a t e p r o v i d e d as f o l l o w s :

"[T]he S t a t e would then s t a r t w i t h J u r o r Number 55.

And t he S t a t e would p u t f o r t h as the reasons t h a t

J u r o r Number 55 was s t r u c k by the S t a t e , f i r s t and

f o r e m o s t , t h a t t he j u r o r was opposed t o the death

p e n a l t y . And t h a t was e v i d e n c e d i n the j u r o r ' s

q u e s t i o n n a i r e , s p e c i f i c a l l y Q u e s t i o n Number 53, an d

then i n t h a t th e j u r o r had responded t h a t t h e y woulda u t o m a t i c a l l y v o te a g a i n s t t he death p e n a l t y . A l s o

i n 53 the j u r o r wrote opposed w i t h r e s p e c t t o the

death p e n a l t y .

"And then i n t h e g e n e r a l v o i r d i r e of th e p a n e l ,

t he j u r o r e x p re s s ed o p p o s i t i o n to th e death p e n a l t y .

And i n i n d i v i d u a l v o i r d i r e , th e j u r o r s a i d t h a t she

c o u l d o n l y impose t he death p e n a l t y i f she had t o .

" F u r t h e r , th e p r o s e c u t i o n noted t h a t i n the

j u r o r ' s work t h a t she d e a l t e x t e n s i v e l y w i t h v i c t i m s

o f abuse i n h e r work and t h a t she was a w i t n e s s i n

many c a s e s . She was i n , s p e c i f i c a l l y -

"Do you have h e r q u e s t i o n n a i r e ?

3Sharp i s C a u c a s i a n . In B a t s o n , t he U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme

Court h e l d t h a t b l a c k veniremembers c o u l d no t be s t r u c k froma b l a c k defendant's j u r y because o f t h e i r r a c e , and i n Powers

v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991), t he c o u r t extended i t s d e c i s i o n

i n Batson t o w h i t e d e f e n d a n t s . See G r i m s l e y v. S t a t e , 678 So.

2d 1194, 1195 ( A l a . Crim. App. 1995).

4We s e t ou t th e S t a t e ' s reasons i n the o r d e r i n which t he

S t a t e p r o v i d e d them at th e h e a r i n g .

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"She was a s o c i a l s e r v i c e case worker,

And t h a t was of some concern t o the S t a t e i n t h a t

case, as I have noted. She had been a w i t n e s s i n

many cases because of he r work.

" J u r o r f u r t h e r acknowledged t h a t she knew t r i a l

c o u n s e l

"And then l a t e r of l e s s e r importance t o the

S t a t e was the f a c t t h a t she knew Your Honor i n the

case.

"We a l s o noted i n her q u e s t i o n n a i r e t h a t he r son

had been a v i c t i m of an attempted murder case and

t h a t t h e r e had never been any c o n v i c t i o n orp r o s e c u t i o n i n t h a t attempted murder case.

"And, Judge, those are b a s i c a l l y

t h e S t a t e s t r u c k J u r o r Number 55."

the reasons

t h a t the S t a t e s t r u c k J u r o r Number 55."

(Record on Return t o Remand ("RTR"), R. 5-6.)

The S t a t e gave the f o l l o w i n g reasons f o r s t r i k i n g J u r o r

no. 37:

"[T]he reasons t h a t we s t r u c k J u r o r Number 37,

g e n e r a l l y speaking, i s he was opposed t o th e death

p e n a l t y . On h i s q u e s t i o n n a i r e , on Question Number

53 t h a t asked about p e r s o n a l , e t h i c a l , or moral

b e l i e f s a g a i n s t the death p e n a l t y t h a t you'd

a u t o m a t i c a l l y vote a ga in st i t . He l e f t i t b l a n k .

He d i d not answer t h a t . And then i t was h i s

f e e l i n g s on the death p e n a l t y were uncovered d u r i n g

the v o i r d i r e p o r t i o n of th e t r i a l i n t h a t he s a i d

he had a r e l i g i o u s or moral o b j e c t i o n t o th e death

p e n a l t y .

"And then a l s o i n i n d i v i d u a l v o i r d i r e he s a i d

t h a t the B i b l e teaches t h a t vengeance i s t h e L o r d ' s .

" A d d i t i o n a l l y i n i n d i v i d u a l v o i r d i r e he s a i d he

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would not be a b l e t o l i v e w i t h h i m s e l f i f he hada n y t h i n g to do w i t h the defendant r e c e i v i n g the

death p e n a l t y . That was the main reason t h a t he was

s t r u c k .

"And f u r t h e r t h e r e was h i s q u e s t i o n n a i r e t h e r e

was j u s t - - t h e r e were so many q u e s t i o n s t h a t were

l e f t b l a n k by t h i s p a r t i c u l a r p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r , and

i n c l u d e d i n t h o s e , I've a l r e a d y mentioned Q u e s t i o n

Number 53, as w e l l as 54. He l e f t b l a n k Q u e s t i o n

55. He l e f t b l a n k Q u e s t i o n 56 h a v i n g t o do w i t h

s h o u l d a defendant have e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of

c o u n s e l . Q u e s t i o n 60 about whether the death

p e n a l t y was used to o o f t e n or not .

"We a d d i t i o n a l l y noted h i s o c c u p a t i o n , Judge, asb e i n g a c u s t o d i a n , and t h a t was o f some importance

t o us, b e s i d e s the death p e n a l t y i s s u e s , i n t h a t as

t he Court i s w e l l aware t h a t t h i s was a

c i r c u m s t a n t i a l case t h a t r e a l l y the t h r u s t of th e

S t a t e ' s evidence was DNA e v i d e n c e , as the Court

knows i s somewhat s o p h i s t i c a t e d and t e c h n i c a l

e v i d e n c e . So h i s s o p h i s t i c a t i o n s o c i a l l y or

p r o f e s s i o n a l l y was noted by the S t a t e .

"And those ar e th e reasons t h a t the S t a t e s t r u c kJ u r o r Number 37."

(RTR, R. 8-10.)

As t o J u r o r no. 65, the S t a t e gave the f o l l o w i n g r e as o ns :

" J u r o r Number 65, Q u e s t i o n 53 i n h i s

q u e s t i o n n a i r e , a g a i n h a v i n g to do w i t h the death

p e n a l t y , he answered i n the a f f i r m a t i v e t h a t he

would a u t o m a t i c a l l y v o te a g a i n s t the death p e n a l t y .

A d d i t i o n a l l y i n Q u e s t i o n 54 when the q u e s t i o n askedi f you have some f e e l i n g s a g a i n s t the death p e n a l t y

which f a l l s h o r t of the p r e v i o u s q u e s t i o n , t h i s

p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r wrote, 'Vengeance i s mine s a i t h

the Lord, no man.' I t s a y s , ' b e l i e v e l i f e i n p r i s o n

i n s t e a d . ' That was Q u e s t i o n 54.

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"And then a l s o i n Question 62 he a l s o answered

i n t he a f f i r m a t i v e t h a t you would a u t o m a t i c a l l y vote

f o r i t s i m p o s i t i o n . And then i n v o i r d i r e of th e

e n t i r e group, th e g e n e r a l v o i r d i r e , he r a i s e d h i shand as having a r e l i g i o u s o r moral o b j e c t i o n to the


" In i n d i v i d u a l v o i r d i r e he s a i d , 'I am no t i n

f a v o r of th e death p e n a l t y . ' He a d d i t i o n a l l y s a i d

t h e r e might be some i n s t a n c e s where maybe a j u r o r

c o u l d impose t he death p e n a l t y . When asked i n

i n d i v i d u a l v o i r d i r e , c o u l d you impose t he death

p e n a l t y , he s a i d , 'I don't t h i n k s o . '

"He a l s o noted i n v o i r d i r e t h a t he had somef a m i l y o b l i g a t i o n s t h a t might prevent him from j u r y

s e r v i c e .

"And those were t he main f a c t o r s o f why J u r o r

Number 65 was s t r u c k . "

(RTR, R. 10-11.)

Regarding J u r o r no. 39, t he S t a t e e x p l a i n e d :

"The ne xt wo ul d be J u r o r Number 39. The f i r s tt h i n g o f note t o the p r o s e c u t i o n i n t h i s case was

the f a c t t h a t t h i s j u r o r was Seventh Day A d v e n t i s t ,

h i s r e l i g i o n , t h a t t he Court had engaged th e e n t i r e

panel i n g e n e r a l v o i r d i r e about p o s s i b l e s e r v i c e on

Saturday and t h a t t h i s would c o n f l i c t w i t h h i s

r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s . That was our primary reason f o r

s t r i k i n g him, t h a t was he noted he was Seventh Day

A d v e n t i s t i n h i s q u e s t i o n n a i r e i n Question Number 8

and then a l s o acknowledged t h a t i n v o i r d i r e .

"We a l s o n o t i c e d from his q u e s t i o n n a i r e t h a t hewas unemployed and t h e r e was s c a n t i n f o r m a t i o n from

him about h i s employment. That was another f a c t o r

i n t h a t .

"And then i n Question Number 44, i t says

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something about him or f a m i l y i n the m i n i s t r y , andhe i n d i c a t e d i n t h e r e - - i t was not c o m p l e t e l y c l e a r ,

I b e l i e v e , judge. I t says do you o r any r e l a t i v e o r

c l o s e p e r s o n a lf r i e n d

belong to any group oro r g a n i z a t i o n which [A.] m i n i s t e r s t o p r i s o n e r s or

inmates, B. P r o v i d e s l e g a l , s o c i a l , o r o t h e r

a s s i s t a n c e t o p r i s o n e r s , inmates, or ex-cons? He

answered yes. And i t says p l e a s e e x p l a i n . He s a i d

p r i s o n m i n i s t r i e s . That, t o o , was a f a c t o r i n our

e l i m i n a t i n g him from the j u r y .

"We a l s o note i n Question 26 t h a t a f r i e n d of

h i s was a p a s t o r .

"Then i n Question Number 79 a t the end of theq u e s t i o n n a i r e , h a v i ng t o do w i t h media and whether

a p a r t i c u l a r j u r o r c o u l d be f a i r , t h i s j u r o r

answered, J u r o r Number 39 answered t h a t he c o u l d

not, no t be f a i r .

" A l s o t h e r e was some--on Question Number 24, he

d i d n ' t f u l l y answer, have you, f a m i l y , f r i e n d been

accused of a c r i m e . But t h e r e was no more

i n f o r m a t i o n on t h a t o t h e r than yes.

"And those are th e reasons t h a t the S t a t e s t r u c kJ u r o r Number 39."

(RTR, R. 11-12.)

The St ate s a i d as f o l l o w s f o r s t r i k i n g J u r o r no. 52:

"Next woul d be J u r o r Number 52. The f i r s t t h i n g

we noted i n r e v i e w i n g the q u e s t i o n n a i r e s was t h a t

t h i s j u r o r ' s r e l i g i o u s denomination was t h a t of a

Sabbath Keeper, which i s n e a r l y i d e n t i c a l t o Seventh

D a y A d v e n t i s t , which brought up the p o s s i b i l i t y ofa c o n f l i c t as f u r t h e r d i s c u s s e d about the e a r l i e r

j u r o r and the p o s s i b i l i t y of the Court h a v i n g t o

work through Saturday on t h i s case.

"We a l s o n o t i c e d i n Question Number 26 t h a t t h i s

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j u r o r had s t u d i e d or was s t u d y i n g t o become a

m i n i s t e r . And i t was determined t h a t t h a t was not

the kind of j u r o r we were l o o k i n g f o r . We

a d d i t i o n a l l y noted t h a t t h i s j u r o r ' s work h i s t o r yand present employment was t h a t of somewhat manual

l a b o r , f o r k l i f t o p e r a t o r . And a g a i n , w i t h t h e

r e a l i t i e s of th e case we had b e f o r e us, Judge, w i t h

t e c h n i c a l , s o p h i s t i c a t e d DNA evidence, t h a t was not

the kind o f j u r o r we were l o o k i n g f o r .

"We a l s o noted i n Questions 22 an d 23 t h a t t h i s

j u r o r was a c t u a l l y a witness t o a murder and t h a t

h e r b r o t h e r was, i n f a c t , murdered and he ha d been

c o n v i c t e d s e v e r a l times of v a r y i n g o f f e n s e s b e f o r e

he was murdered.

" I t was j u s t our f e e l i n g t h i s j u r o r was a l i t t l e

too connected to the p r o c e s s , i n t h e r o l e of a

witness or i n the r o l e o f a f a m i l y member having t o

do with a murder.

"And those were the--those were t he reasons t h a t

we s t r u c k J u r o r Number 52."

(RTR, R. 12-13.)

As t o J u r o r no. 27, the S t a t e s e t out the f o l l o w i n g

reasons:

"Next, Judge, would be J u r o r Number 27. Andf i r s t and foremost t h a t o c c u r r e d to us was her

employment, t h a t b e i n g a packer on an assembly l i n e

a t Target D i s t r i b u t i o n Center. Her p r e v i o u s

employment was a t Burger K i n g [ f a s t - f o o d

r e s t a u r a n t ] . And t h a t was something o b v i o u s l y t h a t

the State i n i t s quest f o r j u r o r s t h a t possessed al i t t l e more s o p h i s t i c a t i o n e i t h e r i n a p r o f e s s i o n a l

or a s o c i a l s o p h i s t i c a t i o n , t ha t was o f some concern

t o us , as the k i n d o f employment she had .

" I a l s o n o t i c e d , Judge, i n Question Number 79 a t

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the very end o f th e q u e s t i o n n a i r e , when the q u e s t i o n

a s k s , ' I f you've heard a n y t h i n g i n t h e media

r e g a r d i n g t h i s c a s e , do you f e e l you c o u l d s t i l l be

f a i rand i m p a r t i a l ? ' And she c i r c l e d no. Thatcaused us c o n c e r n .

"And o f e q u a l concern was the f a c t t h a t

a c c o r d i n g t o our r e c o r d s she ha d been charged w i t h

what appears to be s i x counts o f p o s s e s s i o n of

m a r i j u a n a i n t h e second degree. I t appeared t h a t

she had been c o n v i c t e d on at l e a s t one of t h e s e

c o u n t s . These cases a r o s e back i n 1990. Of some

i n t e r e s t t o me was t he f a c t I was e x c l u s i v e l y a drug

p r o s e c u t o r from '88 u n t i l '94, so I would have been

i n t he o f f i c e . She appeared t o have l i v e d here i nMadison County, t h e s e charges came o ut of Madison

County.

"And a l l of t h o s e were o f concern t o th e S t a t e

a n d t h a t ' s th e reasons we s t r u c k J u r o r Number 27."

(RTR, R. 14-15.)

Regarding J u r o r no. 11, t he S t a t e e x p l a i n e d :

"Judge, th e next one would be p r o s p e c t i v e J u r o rNumber 11. And t he reasons t h a t the S t a t e s t r u c k

h e r , f i r s t , we noted she t o o was Seventh Day

A d v e n t i s t . For the reasons e a r l i e r s t a t e d , she was

n ot d e s i r a b l e t o us.

"We a l s o n o t i c e d i n her employment q u e s t i o n s ,

s p e c i f i c a l l y Number 6, t h a t she had been--she was

unemployed. And when asked p r e v i o u s work e x p e r i e n c e

f o r the l a s t 10 y e a r s , she ha d none. I t asked what

her husband's work was. A p p a r e n t l y she had an

ex-husband. And when asked what work he d i d shes a i d unknown.

"And again, i n the employment a r e a , i n l i g h t of

t h e evidence we were p r e s e n t i n g t h a t was n ot a

d e s i r a b l e j u r o r t o us.

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" I n Question Number 79, she d i d n ' t g i v e an

answer i n Question Number 79 about media and whether

she could be f a i r and i m p a r t i a l .

"We had noted t h a t she d i d have a c o n v i c t i o nf o r

i s s u i n g a w o r t h l e s s check through our r e c o r d s .

"

" W e l l , she d i d n ' t f u l l y answer Number 74. And,

Judge, those were th e reasons t h a t th e S t a t e s t r u c k

J u r o r Number 11 ."

(RTR, R. 15-16.)

The State noted t h a t i t s t r u c k J u r o r no. 64 f o r t h e

f o l l o w i n g reasons:

"The next, Judge, would be J u r o r Number 64. The

f i r s t t h i n g we noted was t h a t t h i s j u r o r had s e r v e d

on three j u r i e s i n t h e p r e v i o u s s i x years b e f o r e th e

t r i a l i n the i n c i d e n t case. One of those cases had

r e s u l t e d i n a no t g u i l t y v e r d i c t . We noted when

t h i s j u r o r f i l l e d out he r q u e s t i o n n a i r e , when some

of the p r i n c i p [ l e s ] of the c r i m i n a l law wasd i s c u s s e d t h a t she ha d c i r c l e d r e a s o n a b l e doubt i nQuestion 50. And on Question 55 a l s o asked i f t h e re

was any o t h e r i n f o r m a t i o n . And she s a i d , 'I'm a

g r e a t person.' And i n g e n e r a l , Judge, our f e e l i n g

was--our f e e l i n g was t h a t she was, f o r l a c k of a

b e t t e r term, a l i t t l e b i t t o o much of a somewhat

a r ro g an t , p r o f e s s i o n a l j u r o r . Because i n g e n e r a l

v o i r d i r e she was f a i r l y v e r b a l i n t h a t process

a s k i n g about whether t he death p e n a l t y has a p p e a l s .

She was j u s t - - s h e was p r e t t y v o c a l . And the f a c t

t h a t she had had p r i o r s e r v i c e seemed t o be, a g a i n ,f o r t he l a c k o f a b e t t e r word, seemed t o be somewhat

of a p r o f e s s i o n a l j u r o r . One of those p r i o r j u r i e s

she had r e t u r n e d a no t g u i l t y .

"We a l s o noted t h a t t h i s j u r o r was a nurse. As

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t he Court w e l l remembers, the v i c t i m i n t h i s case

was a n u r s e , as was one o f ou r key w i t n e s s e s . And

we were of th e o p i n i o n t h a t t o r i s k a j u r o r second

g u e s s i n g what a key w i t n e s s i n our case, Nurse KimHellums had done i n the h o s p i t a l , was something t o

be a v o i d e d .

"And J u r o r Number 64 was s t r u c k f o r t h o s e

r e a s o n s . "

(RTR, R. 16-17.)

Regarding J u r o r no. 38, the S t a t e p r o v i d e d :

"The next one, Judge, would be J u r o r Number 38.One o f the f i r s t t h i n g s we n o t i c e d on t h i s was t h i s

p a r t i c u l a r j u r o r ' s checkered employment h i s t o r y ,

t h a t she was p r e s e n t l y working as a ca r r e n t a l agent

and had o n l y been on t he j o b f o r two weeks. And

from her employment h i s t o r y s e c t i o n , Q u es ti o n 17,

she had never been at any employer f o r more than

t h r e e months. So i t appeared t o t o t a l r o u g h l y seven

months of work i n t h e l a s t 10 y e a r s . She d i d not

appear t o be s o p h i s t i c a t e d t o us i n f i l l i n g out he r

q u e s t i o n n a i r e , i n t h a t she m i s s p e l l e d Wal-Mart as

one of he r p r e v i o u s employers as Wal-Marts.

"There was some q u e s t i o n s she d i d not answer

such as Q u e s t i o n Number 50. She s a i d she knew some

a t t o r n e y i n M i c h i g a n , but not much--in Q u e s t i o n

Number 26, bu t not much more i n f o r m a t i o n than t h a t .

And what was noted from my s e a t i n g c h a r t , Judge, i s

t h a t t h i s p a r t i c u l a r j u r o r appeared t o me t o be

somewhat i n a t t e n t i v e and d i s i n t e r e s t e d d u ri n g the

v o i r d i r e p r o c e s s .

"And f o r t h o s e reasons we s t r u c k J u r o r Number38."

(RTR, R. 17-18.)

As t o J u r o r no. 47, the S t a t e e x p l a i n e d :

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"Judge, our next one would be Juror Number 47.

And the f i r s t thing we noted was ag ai n i n the ar ea

p r o f e s s i o n a l or s o c i a l s o p h i s t i c a t i o n , t h a t t h i s

l a d y was a c a f e t e r i a manager, that her husband wasa s e c u r i t y guard, that she had answered some

questions, and I'm not t r y i n g to lead the Court t o

b e l i e v e she's the only one who messed up these

answers, because t h e r e were a number of people on

the pa ne l, and some t h a t remained on the j u r y th at ,

t o o , h ad t r o u b l e w i t h some q u e s t i o n s such as

Question Number 50, i f the burden should be beyond

a l l doubt f o r the St at e and she s a i d yes. That the

d e f e n d a n t - - i n Question 58, th a t the defendant s h o u l d

be r e q u i r e d t o t e s t i f y .

"And then we go t t o th e ar ea of media exposure

and she was--she was in--we noted i n her

q u e s t i o n n a i r e t h a t she s a i d she never watched TV.

And then i n t h e g e n e r a l v o i r d i r e she had s a i d th at

she had seen some media exposure of t h i s case. And

then w e f u r t h e r v o i r d i r e d h e r i n i n d i v i d u a l v o i r

d i r e , and I made a note on my s e a t i n g ch ar t th at as

a r e s u l t of th at she s a i d she c ou ld be f a i r , but as

a r e s u l t o f t h a t q u e s t i o n i n g , I don't know i f i t was

s p e c i f i c a l l y th at qu es ti on , but I de te ct ed a

h o s t i l i t y on her pa rt j u s t i n ge ne ra l. Didn 't knowi f she wanted to be here.

"But between t h a t , t h a t I noted about her, the

f a c t t h a t h er s o p h i s t i c a t i o n l e v e l was somewhat

su sp ec t i n our op i n i o n and we had uncovered she had

a l s o h ad an i s s u i n g a w o r t h l e s s check, i t was f o r

those reasons, Judge, th at we s tr uc k Ju ro r Number

47."

(RTR, R. 19-20.)

F i n a l l y , re ga rd in g Ju ro r no. 74, the St ate pr ov id ed :

"Judge, the next one would be J u r o r 74. In

r e v i e w i n g h e r q u e s t i o n n a i r e we noted a t Question 20

th at she had had pr ev io us j u r y s e r v i c e , one

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i n v o l v i n g a c a p i t a l murder charge where the

defendant r e c e i v e d a sentence of l i f e w i t h o u t

p a r o l e . That was of some i n t e r e s t t o us and we were

n o t - - o b v i o u s l y we were s e e k i n g thedeath

p e n a l t y i n

t h i s case, we were not l o o k i n g f o r any e x p e r t j u r o r s

or seasoned j u r o r s i n t h i s c a s e .

" I n f a c t , when you l o o k at the t w e l v e t h a t

remained on the j u r y o n l y one j u r o r had ever served

on a j u r y and i t was 45 [ s i c ] y e a r s b e f o r e t h i s

c a s e , r o u g h l y , back i n th e '70s a c c o r d i n g t o him.

"We a l s o n o t i c e d here on J u r o r Number 74 t h a t

h e r o c c u p a t i o n was a s e c r e t a r y . That i n the

q u e s t i o n n a i r e on Q u e s t i o n Number 67 i t s a y s , 'Do youagree t h a t the i n d i c t m e n t c h a r g i n g c a p i t a l murder i s

o n l y a f o r m a l charge and has n o t h i n g t o do w i t h

g u i l t or i n n o c e n c e ? ' She s a y s , 'No.'

" Q u e s t i o n 74 we noted t h a t she d i d n ' t - - s h e

d i d n ' t e x p l a i n her answer. We a l s o noted t h a t her

son i n Q u e s t i o n 23 was the v i c t i m of two r o b b e r i e s ,

both b e i n g o b v i o u s l y a v i o l e n t c ri me , and t h a t no

a r r e s t or c o n v i c t i o n s were had i n t h a t c a s e .

"And, Judge, i t ' s f o r t h o s e reasons t h a t wes t r u c k J u r o r Number 74."

(RTR, R. 21-22.)

D u r i n g the Batson h e a r i n g , the t r i a l c o u r t i n q u i r e d about

t h e S t a t e ' s s t r i k e of J u r o r no. 38 based on her employment

h i s t o r y , s p e c i f i c a l l y a s k i n g i fthe p r o s e c u t o r knew t h a t J u r o r

no. 38 was r e t i r e d - - t h e p r o s e c ut o r i n d i c a t e d t h a t he d i d not

know t h a t J u r o r no. 38 was r e t i r e d . A d d i t i o n a l l y , the

p r o s e c u t o r e x p l a i n e d the " l a c k - o f - s o p h i s t i c a t i o n " reason he

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had given for s t r i k i n g se ve ra l African -America ns as f o l l o w s :

" [ W ] i t h respect to p r o f e s s i o n a l or s o c i a l

s o p h i s t i c a t i o n ,Judge, I

w i l lnote fo r the Co ur tt h a t when you do look at the j u r o r s who remained on

t h i s case, the Court w i l l f i n d that they were a l l

p r o f e s s i o n a l s or of management l e v e l , with the

exception of one la d y who was a ho use wi fe bu t

married to a guy who worked at Dunlop T i r e who hadappeared i n co ur t as an ex pe rt wi tn es s. And t h i s

l a d y a l s o had two c h i l d r e n who were both educated.

"And i t was the St at e' s i n t e n t , as I s a i d

e a r l i e r , that with the l e v e l of t e c h n i c a l j u r y t h a t

t h i s - - o r t e c h n i c a l evidence that t h i s j u r y was goingt o have to confront t h a t t h a t was one o f the main

conc erns of the St at e i n t h i s case, to , i n f a c t , get

a j u r y that could comprehend DNA ev id enc e. As the

Court remembers the defens e put up a DNA expert i n

t h i s case. And the defense had a c t u a l l y sent the

DNA ev id en ce to two oth er ind epe nde nt l a b s , so we

were not sure e x a c t l y what may be c o n f r o n t i n g us.

Ob vio us ly we had DNA te st im on y from Rodger Morrison

a t [the Department of Forensic Sci enc es] ."

(RTR, R. 20-21.)

F o l l o w i n g the hearing, the t r i a l co ur t ent ere d the

f o l l o w i n g order:

"This matter having come be fo re the Cou rt on

remand from the Alabama Court of Cr im in al Appeals,

t h i s cour t having been d i r e c t e d to conduct a he ar in g

t o determine i f the St at e im pr ope rl y used i t s

peremptory j u r y challenges against African-American

v e n i r e members i n a manner such as to v i o l a t e Batsonv. Kentucky, 476 US 79 (1986), the Co urt havin g

con duct ed such a h ea ri ng on A p r i l 27, 2010, th e

c o u r t hav ing co ns id er ed the reasons of f e r e d by

Madison County D i s t r i c t At t or ne y ... as to the use

of the State's peremptory cha lle nge s, the cou rt

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h a v i n g r e v i e w e d the t r a n s c r i p t of th e v o i r d i r e and

t he j u r y q u e s t i o n n a i r e s , the c o u r t h a v i n g f u r t h e r

r e v i e w e d th e Defendant's R e b u t t a l t o P r o s e c u t o r ' s

Reasons f o r S t r i k i n g B l a c k J u r o r s , th e c o u r t makest he f o l l o w i n g f i n d i n g s o f f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s o f

law:

" J u r o r No. 55

"The S t a t e o f f e r e d the f o l l o w i n g reasons f o r

h a v i n g used a peremptory c h a l l e n g e t o remove t h i s

j u r o r :

" 1. T h i s p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r was opposed t o the


"2. T h i s p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r was a s o c i a l

s e r v i c e s case worker. T h i s p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r d e a l t

w i t h v i c t i m s ' abuse an d was a w i t n e s s i n many c a s e s .

"3. T h i s p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r knew one o f the

defendant's c o u n s e l .

"4. T h i s p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r knew the t r i a l

judge.

"5. T h i s p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r ' s son was the v i c t i m

of an attempted murder f o r which t h e r e had never

been a p r o s e c u t i o n .

"The court has examined the r e c o r d and noted

t h a t J u r o r No. 55 s t a t e d t h a t she 'wouldn't want t o

impose' the death p e n a l t y b ut t h a t she thought she

c o u l d 'go a l o n g w i t h i t ' under c e r t a i n

c i r c u m s t a n c e s . (R. 292.) While t h i s j u r o r d i d n o t

i n i t i a l l y i n d i c a t e t h a t she was a c q u a i n t e d w i t h

defense c o u n s e l ... or the u n d e r s i g n e d judge, shel a t e r a d m i t t e d t o t he se a s s o c i a t i o n s i n response t o

d i r e c t q u e s t i o n i n g . (R. 80; 29; 293.) The r e c o r d

a l s o s u p p o r t s t he S t a t e ' s c o n t e n t i o n t h a t he r son

had been th e v i c t i m of an attempted murder.

Moreover, as a [Department o f Human Resources]

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s o c i a l worker, t h i s p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r acknowledged

that she has 'seen a l o t ' o f abuse over the years.(R. 139.)

"Alabama c o u r t s have p r e v i o u s l y h e l d t h a t a

j u r o r ' s mixed f e e l i n g s o r r e s e r v a t i o n s about

imposing t h e death p e n a l t y i n a c a p i t a l case i s a

v a l i d r a c e - n e u t r a l reason t o e x e r c i s e a peremptory

ch al le ng e. A c k l i n v. St at e, 790 So. 2d 975 ( Al a.

Crim. App. 2000) . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e c o u r t s have

u p h e l d c h a l l e n g e s i n cases where a j u r o r was s t r u c k

because he or she had a f a m i l y member who was t he

v i c t i m o f a v i o l e n t c r i m e . Given the t o t a l i t y of the

c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n t h i s case, the reasons o f f e r e d by

the St at e wi th re ga rd to t h i s j u r o r a re n e u t r a l ,n o n - r a c e - r e l a t e d r e a so n s .

" J u r o r No. 37

"The S t a t e ' s p r o s e c u t i o n o f f e r e d t he f o l l o w i n g

reasons f o r h a v i n g used a peremptory c h a l l e n g e

a g a i n s t t h i s j u r o r :

" 1 . T h i s p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r was opposed to the


"2. T h i s p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r d i d n o t answer

v a r i o u s q u e s t i o n s on t h e q u e s t i o n n a i r e .

" 3. T h i s p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r i s a c u s t o d i a n a nd

t h e r e f o r e may not be s u f f i c i e n t l y s o p h i s t i c a t e d t o

serve on t h i s j u r y .

"Upon re vi ew of the r e c o r d and based on t h i s

C o u r t ' s p e r s o n a l o b s e r v a t i o n s , P r o s p e c t i v e J u r o r No.

37 e x p r e s s e d s t r o n g r e s e r v a t i o n s about h i s a b i l i t y

t o impose t he death p e n a l t y . I n f a c t , t h i s j u r o rwas a r g u a b l y one of th e most impassioned persons

r e g a r d i n g h i s v i e w s , s t a t i n g that he 'would not be

able to l i v e wi th h im s el f i f [he] had something t o

so with someone go in g to the e l e c t r i c c h a i r '

(R. 287.) Given t h e c o l l o q u y which took place and

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t h i s j u r o r ' s o b v i o u s l y mixed f e e l i n g s a t h a v i n g t o

serv e as a j u r o r i n t h i s c a s e , th e c o u r t f i n d s t h a t

t he reason p r o f f e r e d by the St at e was a v a l i d

r a c e - n e u t r a l r e a s o n . A c k l i n v . S t a t e , 790 So. 2d975 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000).

"The c o u r t h as r e v i e w e d t h e j u r y q u e s t i o n n a i r e

and agrees w i t h t h e S t a t e t h a t t h i s j u r o r f a i l e d t o

respond t o s e v e r a l o f t h e q u e s t i o n s asked. These

q u e s t i o n s i n v o l v e d i s s u e s r e g a r d i n g weighty

c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and l e g a l p r i n c i p l e s . Alabama c o u r t s

have p r e v i o u s l y h e l d t h a t a l a c k o f response i s a

v a l i d r a c e - n e u t r a l reason f o r s t r i k i n g a v e n i r e -

member. Hocker v. S t a t e , 840 So. 2d 197 ( A l a . Crim.

App. 2002). The c o u r t f i n d s t h e p r o f f e r e d reason t os e r v e as a f u r t h e r r a c e - n e u t r a l reason i n t h i s case.

"The c ou rt f i n d s i n s u f f i c i e n t evidence was

p r e s e n t e d t o show t h a t t h i s p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r was

t o o u n s o p h i s t i c a t e d t o s e r v e as a j u r o r i n t h i s

case . Al th ou gh he f a i l e d t o respond t o q u e s t i o n s

asked i n t h e q u e s t i o n n a i r e , no evidence was

p r e s e n t e d t h a t t h i s om is si on was a pr od uc t of h i s

i n a b i l i t y t o comprehend t h e q u e s t i o n s posed.

Moreover, h i s o c c u p a t i o n as a c u s t o d i a n , s t a n d i n g

a l o n e , i s i n s u f f i c i e n t t o e s t a b l i s h h i s l a c k o fs o p h i s t i c a t i o n .

"However, given the f a c t t h a t t h i s was not the

s o l e reason upon which t he S t a t e e x e r c i s e d i t s

peremptory c h a l l e n g e , th e c o u r t f i n d s t h a t t h e u se

of the peremptory c h a l l e n g e w i t h r e g a r d t o t h i s

j u r o r no t t o be r a c i a l l y m o t i v a t e d .

" J u r o r No. 65

"The S t a t e ' s p r o s e c u t i o n o f f e r e d t he f o l l o w i n greasons f o r h a v i n g used a peremptory c h a l l e n g e


" 1. T h i s p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r ' s o p i n i o n about t he


20


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"2. T h is p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r ' s f a m i l y o b l i g a t i o n s

i n t e r f e r e d w i t h h i s a b i l i t y t o s e r v e .

"The record r e f l e c t s t h a t t h i s j u r o r wrote

'vengeance i s mine say eth the Lor d' i n response t o

a q u e s t i o n r e g a r d i n g th e death p e n a l t y . He s t a t e d

th at he co ul d con cei ve of no circu mst anc e under

which he could impose th e death p e n a l t y a n d then

e q u i v o c a t e d and s t a t e d '[M]aybe s i r . I'm not a

hundred p er ce nt .' (R. 226.)

"Based on the responses given by t h i s

p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r a nd t h e c o u r t ' s o b s e r v a t i o n , t h e

c o u r t f i n d s t h a t t h e reason gi ve n by the St at e fo rthe use of t h i s peremptory s t r i k e t o be a v a l i d ,

r a c e - n e u t r a l r e a s o n . A c k l i n v . S t a t e , 790 So. 2d

975.

"Of l e s s e r s i g n i f i c a n c e was t he f a c t t h a t t h i s

j u r o r i n d i c a t e d t h a t he h ad a p o t e n t i a l f a m i l y

c o n f l i c t . Such a reason has been h e l d to be a

r a c e - n e u t r a l r e a s o n . Brown v. S t a t e , 623 So. 2d 416

(Ala. Crim. App. 1993).

"The co ur t f i n d s th at i n t h i s ca se , th e use o ft h e peremptory s t r i k e a g a i n s t t h i s j u r o r was not

r a c e - m o t i v a t e d .

" J u r o r No. 39

"The S t a t e ' s p r o s e c u t i o n o f f e r e d t he f o l l o w i n g

reasons f o r h a v i n g used a peremptory c h a l l e n g e


" 1 . T h i s p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r was a Seventh Day

A d v e n t i s t a n d t h i s t r i a l was p o t e n t i a l l y s c h e d u l e dt o tak e pl ac e on a Sat urd ay.

" 2. T h i s p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r was unemployed.

" 3. T h i s p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r h as a r e l a t i v e

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i n v o l v e d i n p r i s o n m i n i s t r i e s .

"4. T h i s p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r ' s q u e s t i o n n a i r e was

i n c o m p l e t e .

"5. T h i s p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r i n d i c a t e d t h a t he

c o u l d no t be f a i r .

" T h is j u r o r i n d i c a t e d t h a t he c o u l d not engage

i n any a c t i v i t i e s o t h e r than r e l i g i o u s a c t i v i t i e s on

Saturdays because o f h i s r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f . (R.209). As noted p r e v i o u s l y , o u t si d e o b l i g a t i o n s of

a p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r , e s p e c i a l l y one of a r e l i g i o u s

n a t u r e , ar e a s u f f i c i e n t l y n e u t r a l n o n - r a c e - r e l a t e d

reason to use a peremptory c h a l l e n g e . Brown[,] 623So. 2d at 416. S i m i l a r l y , r e l i g i o u s - b a s e d s t r i k e s

have a l s o been deemed t o be r a c e - n e u t r a l , H a r r i s v.

S t a t e , 2 So. 39 880 ( A l a . Crim. App. 2007) . The

c o u r t f i n d s t h a t s u f f i c i e n t evidence e x i s t e d t o

s u p p o r t the use o f a peremptory c h a l l e n g e w i t h

r e g a r d t o t h i s j u r o r .

"The f a c t t h a t t h i s j u r o r was unemployed,

s t a n d i n g a l o n e , may not c o n s t i t u t e a s u f f i c i e n t

reason f o r s t r i k i n g t h i s j u r o r . However, g i v e n the

v a l i d i t y of the o t h e r s t a t e d r e a s o n s , the c o u r tf i n d s no r a c i a l l y m o t i v a t e d animus i n th e use of

t h i s peremptory c h a l l e n g e .

" J u r o r No. 52


h a v i n g used a peremptory c h a l l e n g e a g a i n s t t h i s

j u r o r :

" 1. T h i s p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r was a Sabbath

Keeper.

"2. T h i s p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r was s t u d y i n g t o

become a m i n i s t e r .

"3. T h i s p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r ' s b r o t h e r was

22


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murdered and p r i o r t o h i s murder, he had engaged i n

c r i m i n a l conduct.

"4. T h i s p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r had wi tn es se d amurder and was 'too connected wi th the proce ss. '

"5. This j u r o r l a c k e d s o p h i s t i c a t i o n i n l i g h t

of the t e c h n i c a l evidence to be pres ente d.

" J u r o r No. 52 asked t o speak to the c o u r t and

c o u n s e l p r i v a t e l y . She r ev ea l ed th at she had been

v i c t i m of an 'almost rape.' (R. 211-212.) She

w i t n e s s e d a murder. (R. 212.) Her b r o t h e r had a

c r i m i n a l h i s t o r y and was murdered. No one was ever

pr os ec ut ed f o r th at crime . (R. 212-213.)

"The f a c t that a j u r o r o r a j u r o r ' s f a m i l y

member was the v i c t i m of a cr ime i s a s u f f i c i e n t

r a c e - n e u t r a l rea son . Ti nk er v. S t a t e , 932 So. 2d

168 ( A l a . Cr im . App. 2005).

" T hi s j u r o r ' s r e l i g i o u s a f f i l i a t i o n was also

c i t e d as a re as on f o r th e use o f a peremptory

ch all en ge and the cou rt fi nd s t h i s reason to be

r a c e - n e u t r a l .

"The stated reasons t h a t t h i s j u r o r ' s work

h i s t o r y was n ot co ndu ci ve to s e r v i n g as a j u r o r i n

t h i s case i s not supporte d by the in fo rm at io n

conveyed at t r i a l . Nonetheless, the t o t a l i t y of the

reasons gi ve n supp orts the f i n d i n g th at the St ate

d i d not improperly s t r i k e t h i s j u r o r .

" J u r o r No. 27

"The S t a t e p r o f f e r e d t h e f o l l o w i n g reasons f o r

h a v i n g used a peremptory c h a l l e n g e a g a i n s t t h i sj u r o r :

" 1. T h i s p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r ' s employment h i s t o r y

i n d i c a t e d a lack of s o p h i s t i c a t i o n .

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"2. T h i s p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r had been charged and

c o n v i c t e d of drug p o s s e s s i o n .

"3. The D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y had a b e l i e f t h a t hemay have s e r v e d as the p r o s e c u t o r on her c a s e .

"A s t r i k e based on i n f o r m a t i o n on a p r o s p e c t i v e

j u r o r ' s c r i m i n a l h i s t o r y has been h e l d to be

r a c e - n e u t r a l . Ex p a r t e Brown, 686 So. 2d 409 ( A l a .

1996) . In t h i s case, the D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y a l s o

noted t h a t he l i k e l y s e r v e d as the p r o s e c u t o r on the

case but t h i s j u r o r never i n d i c a t e d t h a t she

r e c o g n i z e d him. These reasons s u p p o r t e d her removal

as a j u r o r .

"The D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y a l s o i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h i s

j u r o r was not s o p h i s t i c a t e d . Based on the c o u r t ' s

o b s e r v a t i o n s and the responses g i v e n on t h i s case,

t he t r i a l c o u r t f i n d s t h i s t o be a r a c e - n e u t r a l

r e a s o n .

" J u r o r No. 11


h a v i n g used a peremptory c h a l l e n g e a g a i n s t t h i s

j u r o r :

" 1. T h i s p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r was a Seventh Day

A d v e n t i s t .

"2. T hi s p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r ' s c u r r e n t work s t a t u s

a n d p r e v i o u s employment.

"3. T h i s p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r p r o v i d e d i n s u f f i c i e n t

responses to the q u e s t i o n s asked.

"4. T h i s p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r has a w o r t h l e s s checkc o n v i c t i o n .

"As s t a t e d p r e v i o u s l y i n t h i s o r d e r , a j u r o r ' s

c r i m i n a l c o n v i c t i o n , r e l i g i o u s a f f i l i a t i o n , and

e v a s i v e n e s s are a l l r a c e - n e u t r a l reasons f o r the use

24


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o f a peremptory s t r i k e . Moreover, t h i s j u r o r

i n d i c a t e d t h a t she had not been employed i n t e n

y e a r s . While her c u r r e n t unemployment, s t a n d i n g

a l o n e , may not have been a s u f f i c i e n t l y r a c e - n e u t r a lr e a s o n , when c o m p i l e d w i t h th e o t h e r f a c t o r s

e n u n c i a t e d by the D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y , the reasons

s t a t e d were s u f f i c i e n t .

" J u r o r No. 64

"At the h e a r i n g i n t h i s case, the S t a t e

i n d i c a t e d t h a t J u r o r No. 64 was s t r u c k because:

" 1. T h i s p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r s e r v e d on t h r e e

j u r i e s i n s i x y e a r s and i n a t l e a s t one of t h o s ec a s e s , the j u r y reached a 'not g u i l t y ' v e r d i c t .

"2. T h i s p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r appeared a r r o g a n t

and v o c a l , g i v i n g the appearance of b e i n g a

' p r o f e s s i o n a l j u r o r . '

" 3. T h i s p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r was a n u r s e , the

same p r o f e s s i o n as th e v i c t i m i n t h i s case and a key

w i t n e s s .

"4. T h i s p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r made a q u e s t i o n a b l en o t a t i o n i n her q u e s t i o n n a i r e answer.

"The f a c t t h a t a j u r o r has s e r v e d on a p r i o r

case i n which a 'hung j u r y ' r e s u l t e d has been h e l d

t o be a r a c e - n e u t r a l re a so n . Trawick v. S t a t e , 698

So. 2d 151 ( A l a . Crim. App. 1995). Moreover, t h i s

c o u r t had th e o p p o r t u n i t y t o observe the demeanor of

t h i s j u r o r . The f a c t t h a t the j u r o r was employed asa nurse and t h a t the S t a t e was concerned t h a t she

may be c r i t i c a l of steps taken by o t h e r h e a l t h c a r e

p r o v i d e r s i n c o l l e c t i n g evidence i n t h i s case a l s oa p p a r e n t l y f a c t o r e d i n t o the S t a t e' s d e c i s i o n t o

s t r i k e t h i s j u r o r . These s t a t e d reasons were

r a c e - n e u t r a l .

" J u r o r No. 38

25


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"The reasons c i t e d f o r th e use o f a peremptory

s t r i k e t o remove t h i s p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r from th e

j u r y v e n i r e i n c l u d e :

" 1. T h i s p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r ' s employment

h i s t o r y .

"2. T h i s p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r ' s l a c k o f

s o p h i s t i c a t i o n .

"3. T h i s p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r ' s l a c k o f responses.

"4. T h i s p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r ' s i n a t t e n t i v e n e s s .

" T h i s c o u r t had the a b i l i t y t o observe t h i s

p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r ' s demeanor and p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n

t he v o i r d i r e process. Based on t h i s c o u r t ' s

r e c o l l e c t i o n , t he S t a t e' s p r o f f e r e d reason f o r

s t r i k i n g t h i s j u r o r f o r ' i n a t t e n t i v e n e s s ' was

j u s t i f i e d . See Woods v. S t a t e , 724 So. 2d 40 ( A l a .

Crim. App. 1997) . I n a d d i t i o n , th e f a c t t h a t she

f a i l e d t o complete h er j u r y q u e s t i o n n a i r e was a

r a c e - n e u t r a l reason f o r s t r i k i n g t h i s j u r o r .

"With r e g a r d to the S t a t e ' s c l a i m t h a t t h i sj u r o r l a ck e d s o p h i s t i c a t i o n i n f i l l i n g out he r

q u e s t i o n n a i r e , t h i s c o u r t f i n d s t h a t t he f a c t t h a t

she m i s s p e l l e d a word does not n e c e s s a r i l y i n d i c a t e

a l a c k of s o p h i s t i c a t i o n . However, when coupled

w i t h he r employment h i s t o r y and he r demeanor, th e

c o u r t f i n d s t h a t th e use o f peremptory s t r i k e by th e

S t a t e was r a c e - n e u t r a l .

" J u r o r No. 47

"The reasons g i v e n by the S t a t e f o r th e use ofi t s peremptory c h a l l e n g e w i t h r e g a r d t o t h i s j u r o r

i n c l u d e :

" 1. T h i s p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r ' s l a c k o f

s o p h i s t i c a t i o n .

26


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"2. Concerns about t h i s p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r ' s

v e r a c i t y .

"3. T h i s p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r ' s d i s p l a y of

h o s t i l i t y .

"4. T h i s p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r ' s c r i m i n a l h i s t o r y

f o r i s s u i n g w o r t h l e s s c h ec k s.

"A p e r c e i v e d l a c k of s o p h i s t i c a t i o n of a

p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r when f a c e d w i t h t e c h n i c a l e x p e r t

evidence i n a case has been h e l d t o c o n s t i t u t e a

r a c e - n e u t r a l reason f o r th e use o f a peremptory

c h a l l e n g e . T.K.S. v. S t a t e , 673 So. 2d 429 ( A l a .C i v . App. 1995) . The c o u r t had an o p p o r t u n i t y t o

observe t h i s j u r o r and her demeanor. The c o u r t

f i n d s t h a t the D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y ' s s t a t e d reason f o r

s t r i k i n g t h i s j u r o r based on her p e r c e p t i o n t h a t she

was h o s t i l e i s a v a l i d , r a c e - n e u t r a l re a so n . See

Brown v. S t a t e , 623 So. 2d 416 ( A l a . Crim. App.

1993). F i n a l l y , as noted p r e v i o u s l y i n t h i s o r d e r ,

t he f a c t t h a t t h i s j u r o r had a c r i m i n a l c o n v i c t i o n

a l s o j u s t i f i e d the S t a t e ' s use of a peremptory

c h a l l e n g e .

" J u r o r No. 74

"The State contended t h a t i t used a peremptory

c h a l l e n g e t o remove t h i s veniremember because of th e

f o l l o w i n g :

" 1. T h i s p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r s e r v e d on a p r i o r

case i n v o l v i n g c a p i t a l murder and the Defendant

r e c e i v e d a l i f e s e n t e n c e .

"2. T h i s p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r ' s son was the v i c t i mof two r o b b e r i e s .

"3. T h i s p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r was employed as a

s e c r e t a r y .

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"4. The S t a t e q u e s t i o n e d the p r o s p e c t i v e

j u r o r ' s response t o th e one of the q u e s t i o n s

c o n t a i n e d i n the q u e s t i o n n a i r e .

"As s t a t e d p r e v i o u s l y i n t h i s o r d e r , the f a c t

t h a t a j u r o r s e r v e d on a p r i o r j u r y which r e t u r n e d

a v e r d i c t which was l e s s than f a v o r a b l e to the

p r o s e c u t i o n i s a r a c e - n e u t r a l r e as o n. Such i s the

case here. Moreover, the f a c t t h a t the j u r o r ' s son

was the v i c t i m of two v i o l e n t crimes a l s o j u s t i f i e d

t h e S t a t e ' s removal of t h i s j u r o r from the j u r y .

"The f a c t t h a t t h i s j u r o r i s employed as a

s e c r e t a r y i s not c l e a r l y a r a c e - n e u t r a l reason but

based upon the o t h e r a r t i c u l a t e d reasons, t h i s j u r o rwas not s t r u c k f o r any improper r e a s o n .

" C o n c l u s i o n

"The co ur t f i n d s th at as set f o r t h i n t h i s

Order, the S t a t e demonstrated v a l i d , r a c e - n e u t r a l

reasons f o r the use of i t s peremptory c h a l l e n g e s

w i t h r e g a r d t o the j u r y v e n i r e i n t h i s case. Those

reasons which the c o u r t found to be v a l i d were nota f u n c t i o n of p r e t e x t or sham and t h i s Court f u r t h e r

f i n d s t h a t no f u r t h e r r e l i e f i s due t o be a f f o r d e d

t o the Defendant i n t h i s case."

(RTR, R. 104-11.)

E v a l u a t i o n of a Batson c l a i m i n v o l v e s the f o l l o w i n g t h r ee

s t e p s :

" ' F i r s t , a defendant must make a prima f a c i e showingt h a t a peremptory c h a l l e n g e has been e x e r c i s e d on

t h e b a s i s of race. [Batson v. Kentucky,] 476 U.S.

[79,] 96-97 [ ( 1 9 8 6 ) ] . Second, i f t h a t showing has

been made, the p r o s e c u t i o n must o f f e r a r a c e - n e u t r a l

b a s i s f o r s t r i k i n g the j u r o r i n q u e s t i o n . I d . , at

28


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97-98. T h i r d , i n l i g h t of the p a r t i e s ' s u b m i s s i o n s ,

t he t r i a l c o u r t must determine whether the defendant

has shown p u r p o s e f u l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . I d . , at 98.'"

McCray v. S t a t e , 88 So. 3d 1, 17 ( A l a . Crim. App. 2010)

( q u o t i n g M i l l e r - E l v. C o c k r e l l , 537 U.S. 322, 328-29 ( 2 0 0 3 ) ) .

In Ex p a r t e Sharp, the Alabama Supreme Court h e l d t h a t

t he r e c o r d r a i s e d an i n f e r e n c e of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . So. 3d

a t . Thus, the f i r s t s t e p of the Batson p r o c e s s - - a prima

f a c i e case of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n - - h a s been e s t a b l i s h e d .

Under the second s t e p of the Batson p r o c e s s , the burden

s h i f t s to the p r o s e c u t i o n to o f f e r a r a c e - n e u t r a l reason for

s t r i k i n g the j u r o r or j u r o r s i n q u e s t i o n . Ex p a r t e Branch,

526 So. 2d 609, 623 ( A l a . 19 87). See, e.g., Ex p a r t e B i r d ,

594 So. 2d 676, 680 ( A l a . 19 91). The p r o s e c u t i o n must p r o v i d e

"a c l e a r , s p e c i f i c , and l e g i t i m a t e reas on f o r the c h a l l e n g e

which r e l a t e s to the p a r t i c u l a r case to be t r i e d , and whi ch i s

n o n d i s c r i m i n a t o r y . " Ex p a r t e Branch , 526 So. 2d at 623. See

a l s o Ex p a r t e B i r d , 594 So. 2d at 680. The re aso n f o r th e

s t r i k e , however, need not r i s e to the l e v e l of a s t r i k e f o r

cause, and the i s s u e i s the f a c i a l v a l i d i t y of the

p r o s e c u t o r ' s e x p l a n a t i o n . Ex p a r t e Branch, 526 So. 2d at 623;

Doster v. S t a t e , 72 So. 3d 50, 73 ( A l a . Cr im . App. 20 10).

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The t r i a l c o u r t here h e l d t h a t the S t a t e met i t s burden

under the second s t a g e of the Batson i n q u i r y t o a r t i c u l a t e a

" f a c i a l l y n e u t r a l " reason f o r e x c l u d i n g p r o s p e c t i v e A f r i c a n -

American j u r o r s .

" ' W i t h i n the c o n t e x t of B a t s o n , a

" r a c e - n e u t r a l " e x p l a n a t i o n "means an

e x p l a n a t i o n based on something o t h e r than

the race of th e j u r o r . A t t h i s s t e p of th e

i n q u i r y , the i s s u e i s the f a c i a l v a l i d i t y

of the p r o s e c u t o r ' s e x p l a n a t i o n . U n l e s s a

d i s c r i m i n a t o r y i n t e n t i s i n h e r e n t i n thep r o s e c u t o r ' s e x p l a n a t i o n , the reason

o f f e r e d w i l l be deemed r ac e n e u t r a l . "

Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360,

111 S. Ct. 1859, 1866, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395

(1991). "I n e v a l u a t i n g the r a c e - n e u t r a l i t y

of an a t t o r n e y ' s e x p l a n a t i o n , a c o u r t must

determine whether, assuming the p r o f f e r e d

reasons f o r the peremptory c h a l l e n g e s are

t r u e , the c h a l l e n g e s v i o l a t e the E q u a l

P r o t e c t i o n C l a u s e as a matter of law. " Id .

" [ E ] v a l u a t i o n of th e p r o s e c u t o r ' s s t a t e ofmind based on demeanor and c r e d i b i l i t y l i e s

' p e c u l i a r l y w i t h i n [a] t r i a l judge's

p r o v i n c e . ' " Hernandez, 500 U.S. a t 365,

111 S. Ct. at 1869.'

" A l l e n v. S t a t e , 659 So. 2d 135, 147 ( A l a . Crim.

App. 1994) (emphasis added). See a l s o Rogers, 819

So. 2d at 649. '"The t r i a l c o u r t i s i n a b e t t e r

p o s i t i o n than the a p p e l l a t e c o u r t t o d i s t i n g u i s h

bona f i d e reasons from sham excuses."' H a r r i s v.

S t a t e , 2 So. 3d 880, 899 ( A l a . Crim. App. 2007)( q u o t i n g Heard v. S t a t e , 584 So. 2d 556, 561 ( A l a .

Crim. App. 1 9 9 1 ) ) . Thus, ' " ' [ o ] n a p p e a l , the t r i a l

c o u r t ' s r u l i n g on the q u e s t i o n whether ther e sp o nd i n g p a r t y o f f e r e d l e g i t i m a t e r a c e - n e u t r a l

reasons w i l l no t be o v e r t u r n e d u n l e s s i t i s c l e a r l y

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erroneous.'"' H a r r i s , 2 So. 3d at 899 ( q u o t i n g

H a r r i s o n v. S t a t e , 879 So. 2d 594, 607 ( A l a . Crim.

App. 2003) ( q u o t i n g i n t u r n Ex p a r t e Brooks, 695 So.

2d [184] at 190 [ ( A l a . 1 9 8 7 ) ] ) ) . '"'A f i n d i n g i s" c l e a r l y erroneous" when although t h e r e i s evidence

t o s up po rt i t , the r e v i e w i n g c o u r t on the e n t i r e

evidence i s l e f t w i t h the d e f i n i t e and f i r m

c o n v i c t i o n t h a t a mistake has been committed.'"'

F l e t c h e r v. S t a t e , 703 So. 2d 432, 436 ( A l a . Crim.

App. 1997) ( q u o t i n g Davis v. S t a t e , 555 So. 2d 309,

312 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989) ( q u o t i n g i n t u r n P o w e l l

v. S t a t e , 548 So. 2d 590, 594 ( A l a . Crim. App.

1988), a f f ' d , 548 So. 2d 605 ( A l a . 1 9 8 9 ) ) ) .

"

"... I t i s w e l l s e t t l e d t h a t ' [ a ] s l o n g as one

reason g i v e n by the p r o s e c u t o r f o r the s t r i k e of a

p o t e n t i a l j u r o r i s s u f f i c i e n t l y r a c e - n e u t r a l , a

d e t e r m i n a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g any o t h e r reason g i v e n need

not be made.' Johnson v. S t a t e , 648 So. 2d 629, 632

(Ala. Crim. App. 1994). See a l s o Jackson v. S t a t e ,

791 So. 2d 979, 1009 n.6 ( A l a . Crim. App. 2000);

Brown v. S t a t e , 705 So. 2d 871, 874 (A la . Crim. App.

1997); and Wood v. S t a t e , 715 So. 2d 812, 816 ( A l a .

Crim. App. 1996), a f f ' d , 715 So. 2d 819 (Ala. 1998).'Where a p r o s e c u t o r g i v e s a reason which may be a

p r e t e x t , ... but a l s o g i v e s v a l i d a d d i t i o n a l grounds

f o r the s t r i k e , the r a c e - n e u t r a l reasons w i l l

support the s t r i k e . ' B a t t l e v. S t a t e , 574 So. 2d

943, 949 (A la . Crim. App. 1990)."

M a r t i n v. S t a t e , 62 So. 3d 1050, 1058-60 (Ala. Crim. App.

2010).

We agree w i t h the t r i a l c o u r t ' s c o n c l u s i o n t h a t the S t a t e

p r o v i d e d f a c i a l l y r a c e - n e u t r a l reasons f o r s t r i k i n g the 11

A f r i c a n - A m e r i c a n j u r o r s and t h a t i t t h e r e f o r e s a t i s f i e d i t s

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burden under st e p two of th e Batson p r o c e s s . Both the Alabama

Supreme Court and t h i s Court have s p e c i f i c a l l y recognized as

r a c e - n e u t r a l th e reasons asserted by the State here, such as

o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e death p e n a l t y ; th e f a c t t h a t t h e p r o s p e c t i v e

j u r o r had been the v i c t i m of a crime or had a r e l a t i v e who had

been the v i c t i m of a crime; the f a i l u r e t o answer questions on

a j u r o r q u e s t i o n n a i r e ; r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s o r p r a c t i c e s ; p r i o r

c o n v i c t i o n s ; lack of mental a c u i t y ; evasiveness or

i n a t t e n t i v e n e s s t o q u e s t i o n i n g ; s e r v i c e on a p r i o r case i n

which the outcome had been l e s s than f a v o r a b l e f o r t h e S t a t e ;

demeanor; bias; and unemployment. 5

5See, e.g., Whatley v. State,[Ms. CR-08-0696, Dec. 16,

2011] So. 3d ( A l a . Crim. App. 2010) (o pi n io n on r e t u r n

t o remand), and the cases c i t e d t h e r e i n (mixed views on or

r e s e r v a t i o n s concerning c a p i t a l punishment, p r e vi o u s c r i m i n a l

charges, p r o s e c u t i o n s o r c o n v i c t i o n s o f p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r o r

f a m i l y member, acquaintance w i t h a t t o r n e y s i n v o l v e d i n t h e

case, demeanor, and employment are a l l v a l i d r a c e - n e u t r a l

reasons f o r peremptory s t r i k e ) ; St an le y v. St at e, [Ms. CR-06-

2236, A p r i l 29, 2011] So. 3d ( A l a . Crim. App. 2011),

and the cases c i t e d t h e r e i n ( p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r ' s c r i m i n a l

h i s t o r y o r r e l a t i v e s who have p r i o r a r r e s t s o r c o n v i c t i o n s a re

v a l i d r a c e - n e u t r a l reasons f o r peremptory s t r i k e s ) ; Martin v.

S t a t e , 62 So. 3d 1050, 1063 ( A l a . Crim. App. 2010) ( "F a il u re

t o answer q u e s t i o n s on a j u r o r q u e s t i o n n a i r e i s a r a c e - n e u t r a l

reason for a peremptory s t r i k e . " ) ; H a r r i s v. St at e, 2 So. 3d

880, 900 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007) ( r e l i g i o u s - b a s e d reasons are

r a c e - n e u t r a l reasons f o r peremptory s t r i k e s ) ; Johnson v.

State, 43 So. 3d 7, 12 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009) (the fact that

a p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r " l a c k e d mental a c u i t y " or p r e v i o u s l y

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In the t h i r d s t e p of the p r o c e s s , the defendant has the

o p p o r t u n i t y t o o f f e r evidence i n d i c a t i n g t h a t the reason or

e x p l a n a t i o n o f f e r e d by th e S t a t e f o r c h a l l e n g i n g the j u r o r i n

q u e s t i o n i s merely a sham or p r e t e x t . Ex p a r t e Branch, 526

So. 2d at 624. Throughout the Batson p r o c e s s , " [ t ] h e

defendant m a i n t a i n s a t a l l ti mes ... th e u l t i m a t e burden of

p r o v i n g i n t e n t i o n a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . " U n it e d S ta t es v.

Houston, 456 F.3d 1328, 1335 (1 1th C i r . 2006)( c i t i n g

Batson,

476 U.S. a t 94 n.18).

In l i g h t of b o t h p a r t i e s ' s u b m i s s i o n s , the t r i a l c o u r t

must determine whether the defendant has c a r r i e d h i s or her

burden of showing p u r p os e f u l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . See Ex p a r t e

Brooks, 695 So. 2d 184, 190 ( A l a . 1997); Ex p a r t e Branch, 526

So. 2d a t 624. See a l s o F l e t c h e r v. S t a t e , 703 So. 2d 432,

435 (A la . Crim. App. 1997) ("When the defendant c h a l l e n g e s as

p r e t e x t u a l the p r o s e c u t o r ' s e x p l a n a t i o n s as t o a p a r t i c u l a r

v e n i r e p e r s o n , the i n q u i r y becomes f a c t u a l i n n a t u r e and moves

t o s t e p t h r e e . At t h i s s t e p the t r i a l c o u r t must r e s o l v e the

s e r v e d on a j u r y t h a t r e t u r n e d a n o t - g u i l t y v e r d i c t i s a r a c e -

n e u t r a l reason f o r a peremptory s t r i k e ) ; and Rogers v. S t a t e ,

819 So. 2d 643, 649-50 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001), and the cases

c i t e d t h e r e i n (the i n a t t e n t i v e n e s s or b i a s of a veniremember

i s a r a c e - n e u t r a l r e a s o n f o r a s t r i k e ) .

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f a c t u a l d i s p u t e , and whether the p r o s e c u t o r i n t e n d e d t o

d i s c r i m i n a t e i s a q u e s t i o n of f a c t . Hernandez v. New York,

500 U.S. 352, 364-65, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1868-69, 114 L. Ed. 2d

395 (1991)."). In making t h a t d e t e r m i n a t i o n , the t r i a l c o u r t

must c o n f r o n t the " d e c i s i v e q u e s t i o n " and e v a l u a t e the

c r e d i b i l i t y of the p r o s e c u t i o n ' s e x p l a n a t i o n , Hernandez v. New

York, 500 U.S. 352, 365 (1991), " i n l i g h t of a l l evidence w i t h

a b e a r i n g on i t , " M i l l e r - E l v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 252

(2005). See a l s o M i l l e r - E l v. C o c k r e l l , 537 U.S. a t 338-39;

Batson, 476 U.S. a t 98. Cf. Greene v. Upton, 644 F.3d 1145,

1155 (11th C i r . 2011) ("Batson does not r e q u i r e e l a b o r a t e

f a c t u a l f i n d i n g s . See M i l l e r - E l v. C o c k r e l l , 537 U.S. 322,

328-29, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1035, 154 L. Ed. 2d 931 (2003); see

a l s o Hightower v. T e r r y , 459 F.3d 1067, 1072 n.9 ( 1 1 t h C i r .

2006) ('We may t h e r e f o r e make "the common sense judgment"--in

l i g h t of defense c o u n s e l ' s f a i l u r e to r e b u t the p r o s e c u t o r ' s

e x p l a n a t i o n s and th e t r i a l c o u r t ' s u l t i m a t e r u l i n g - - t h a t the

t r i a l c o u r t i m p l i c i t l y found the p r o s e c u t o r ' s r a c e - n e u t r a l

e x p l a n a t i o n s t o be c r e d i b l e , thereby comple ting ste p thre e of

the Batson i n q u i r y . ' ) " ) . In a d d i t i o n , " ' [ t ] h e e x p l a n a t i o n

o f f e r e d f o r s t r i k i n g each b l a c k j u r o r must be e v a l u a t e d i n

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l i g h t of the ex pl an at io ns o ff e r e d fo r the pro sec ut or' s other

peremptory s t r i k e s , and as w e l l , i n l i g h t of the strength of

the prima f a c i e case .'" Ex pa rt e B i r d , 594 So. 2d 676, 683

( A l a . 1991) (quoting Gamble v. State, 257 Ga. 325, 327, 357

S.E.2d 792, 795 (1987)). In other words, a l l r el e va nt

circumstances must be con sid ere d i n det erm ini ng whether

p u r p o s e f u l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n has been shown. See, e.g., Snyder

v. L o u i s i a n a , 552 U.S. 472, 478 (2008) ("[I]n rev iew ing a

r u l i n g cl ai me d to be a Bat son e r r o r , a l l of the circumstances

t h a t bear upon the issue of r a c i a l animosity must be

c o n s u l t e d . " ) .

"Under Alabama law, the t r i a l judge must

' e v a l u a t [ e ] the eviden ce and ex pl an at io ns prese nte d'

and 'determine whether the ex pl an at io ns are

s u f f i c i e n t to overcome the pres umpt ion of b i a s . 'Branch, 526 So. 2d at 624. 'The t r i a l judge cannot

merely accept the s p e c i f i c reasons given ... at face

v a l u e ; the judge must consider whether the f a c i a l l y

n e u t r a l exp lan ati ons are co nt ri ve d to avoid

a d m i t t i n g the acts of group d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . ' I d . "

Smith v. Jackson, 770 So. 2d 1068, 1072-73 (Ala. 2000).

The Alabama Supreme Court i n Ex pa rt e Branch provided the

f o l l o w i n g i l l u s t r a t i v e examples of the typ es of ev idence the

defendant could o f f e r to demonstrate th at the s t a t e d reason

f o r chal len gin g the j u r o r i n qu es ti on i s a sham or pretext:

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"1. The reasons g i v e n ar e not r e l a t e d t o the

f a c t s of th e case.

"2. There was a l a c k of q u e s t i o n i n g t o thec h a l l e n g e d j u r o r , or a l a c k of m e a n i n g f u l q u e s t i o n s .

"3. Di spa rat e treatmen t--person s wi th the same

or s i m i l a r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s as the c h a l l e n g e d j u r o r

were not s t r u c k .

"4. Disparate examination of members of the

v e n i r e ; e.g., a q u e s t i o n d e s i g n e d t o provoke a

c e r t a i n response t h a t i s l i k e l y t o d i s q u a l i f y the

j u r o r was asked t o b l a c k j u r o r s , bu t no t t o w h i t e

j u r o r s .

"5. The p r o s e c u t o r , h a v i n g 6 peremptory

c h a l l e n g e s , used 2 t o remove the o n l y 2 b l a c k s

r e m a i n i n g on th e v e n i r e .

"6. 'An e x p l a n a t i o n based on a group b i a s where

the group t r a i t i s n o t shown t o a p p l y to the

c h a l l e n g e d j u r o r s p e c i f i c a l l y . ' Slappy [v. S t a t e ] ,

503 So. 2d [350] a t 355 [ ( F l a . D i s t . Ct. App.

1987)]. For i n s t a n c e , an assumption t h a t t e a c h e r s as

a c l a s s are too l i b e r a l , w i t h o u t any s p e c i f i cq u e s t i o n s h a v i n g been d i r e c t e d t o the p a n e l or th e

i n d i v i d u a l j u r o r showing the p o t e n t i a l l y l i b e r a l

n a t u r e of th e c h a l l e n g e d j u r o r . "

Ex parte Branch, 526 So. 2d at 624 ( c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ) .

In r e v i e w i n g the t r i a l c o u r t ' s u l t i m a t e c o n c l u s i o n on

d i s c r i m i n a t o r y i n t e n t , we a p p l y the " c l e a r l y erroneous"

s t a n d a r d of r e v i e w . Hernandez, 500 U.S. a t 364; Yancey v.

S t a t e , 813 So. 2d 1, 3 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001) . See a l s o

Greene, 644 F.3d a t 1155. T h i s d e f e r e n t i a l s t a n d a r d of review

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i s a p p l i c a b l e because i n t e n t t o d i s c r i m i n a t e i s a q u e s t i o n o f

f a c t . Hernandez, 500 U.S. a t 366-67. In Snyder, 552 U.S. a t

477, the Un it ed St at es Supreme C o u rt s t a t e d t he f o l l o w i n g

r e g a r d i n g t h e d e f e r e n t i a l stan dard of revie w ap p li e d to a

t r i a l c o u r t ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n r e g a r d i n g d i s c r i m i n a t o r y i n t e n t :

"On appeal, a t r i a l c o u r t ' s r u l i n g on the issue

of d i s c r i m i n a t o r y i n t e n t must be s u s t a i n e d u n l e s s i t

i s c l e a r l y erroneous. See Hernandez v. New York,

500 U.S. 352, 369, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 114 L. Ed. 2d

395, (1991) ( p l u r a l i t y o p i n i o n ) ; i d ^ , at 372, 111 S.Ct. 1859, (O'Connor, J . , j o i n e d by S c a l i a , J . ,

c o n c u r r i n g i n judgment). The t r i a l c ou rt has a

p i v o t a l r o l e i n e v a l u a t i n g Batson c l a i m s . Step

three of the Batson i n q u i r y i n v o l v e s an e v a l u a t i o n

of the prosecutor's c r e d i b i l i t y , see 476 U.S. a t 98,

n. 21, 106 S. Ct. 1712 and 'th e b e s t evi de nc e [o f

d i s c r i m i n a t o r y i n t e n t ] o f t e n w i l l be the demeanor of

the at to rn ey who ex er ci se s the ch al le ng e, '

Hernandez, 500 U.S. a t 365, 111 S. Ct. 1859( p l u r a l i t y o p i n i o n ) . I n a d d i t i o n , r a c e - n e u t r a l

reasons f o r peremptory cha lle nge s of te n invoke aj u r o r ' s demeanor (e.g., nervousness, i n a t t e n t i o n ) ,

making the t r i a l c o u r t ' s f i r s t - h a n d o b s e r v a t i o n s o feven gr ea te r importance. In t h i s s i t u a t i o n , the

t r i a l c o u r t must evaluate not only whether the

p r o s e c u t o r ' s demeanor b e l i e s a d i s c r i m i n a t o r y

i n t e n t , but also whether t h e j u r o r ' s demeanor can

c r e d i b l y be s a i d t o have e x h i b i t e d t h e b a s i s f o r th e

s t r i k e a t t r i b u t e d to the j u r o r by the pr os ec ut or .

We have re cog niz ed th at these det erm ina tio ns of

c r e d i b i l i t y and demeanor l i e ' " p e c u l i a r l y w i t h i n a

t r i a l judge's p r o v i n c e , " ' i b i d . ( q u o t i n g Wainwrightv. W i t t , 469 U.S. 412, 428, 105 S. Ct. 844, 83 L.

Ed. 2d 841, (1 98 5) ), and we have s t a t e d t h a t ' i n t h e

absence o f e x c e p t i o n a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s , we would d e f e r

to [the t r i a l c o u r t ] . ' 500 U.S. at 366, 111 S. Ct .

1859."

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552 U.S. a t 477. S i m i l a r l y , t h i s Court h a s s t a t e d :

"'When r e v i e w i n g a t r i a l c o u r t ' s r u l i n g on a Batson

motion,t h i s co ur t gi ve s defe ren ce to the t r i a l

court and w i l l r e v e r s e a t r i a l c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n o n l y

i f the r u l i n g i s c l e a r l y erroneous.' Yancey v.

State, 813 So. 2d 1, 3 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001). 'A

t r i a l c o u r t i s i n a f a r b e t t e r p o s i t i o n than a

r e v i e w i n g c o u r t t o r u l e on i s s u e s o f c r e d i b i l i t y . [ ' ]

Woods v. S t a t e , 789 So. 2d 896, 915 ( A l a . Crim. App.

1999). 'Great c o n f i d e n c e i s p l a c e d i n o ur t r i a l

judges i n t he s e l e c t i o n o f j u r i e s . Because t h e y d e a l

on a d a i l y b a s i s w i t h t h e a t t o r n e y s i n t h e i r

r e s p e c t i v e c o u n t i e s , t h e y a r e b e t t e r a b l e t o

determine whether d i s c r i m i n a t o r y p a t t e r ns e x i s t i nt he s e l e c t i o n o f j u r i e s . ' Pa rk er v. S t a t e , 571 So.

2d 381, 384 ( A l a . Crim. App. 1990).

"'Deference t o t r i a l c o u r t f i n d i n g s on

t he i s s u e o f d i s c r i m i n a t o r y i n t e n t makes

p a r t i c u l a r sense i n t h i s c o n t e x t because,

as we noted i n Batso n, the f i n d i n g w i l l

" l a r g e l y t u r n on e v a l u a t i o n o f c r e d i b i l i t y "

476 U.S., a t 98, n.21. In t he t y p i c a l

c h a l l e n g e i n q u i r y , t he d e c i s i v e q u e s t i o n

w i l l be whether c o u ns e l 's r a c e - n e u t r a le x p l a n a t i o n f o r a peremptory c h a l l e n g e

s h o u l d be b e l i e v e d . There w i l l seldom be

much evidence b e a r i n g on t h a t i s s u e , a nd

the best evidence o f t e n w i l l be the

demeanor of the at to rn ey who e xe r c i se s the

c h a l l e n g e . As w i t h t h e s t a t e o f mind of a

j u r o r , e v a l u a t i o n o f t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s s t a t e

of mind based on demeanor and c r e d i b i l i t y

l i e " p e c u l i a r l y w i t h i n a t r i a l judge's

p r o v i n c e . " Wainwright v. W i t t , 469 U.S.

412, 428, 105 S. C t . 844, 83 L. Ed . 2d 841(1985), c i t i n g Patton v. Young, 467 U.S.

1025 , 1038, 104 S. Ct . 2885, 81 L. Ed . 2d

847 (1984).'

"Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 35 2, 365, 111 S.

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CR-05-2371

C t . 1859, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395 (1 99 1) ."

D o st e r , 72 So. 3d at 73-74 (emphasis added). See a l s o Br ya nt

v. S t a t e , 951 So. 2d 732, 740 ( A l a . Crim. App. 2003).

The t h i r d step of the Batson a n a l y s i s has been f u r t h e r

e x p l a i n e d :

"The reasons s t a t e d b y t h e p r o s e c u t o r p r o v i d e

the only reasons on which t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s

c r e d i b i l i t y i s to be judged. U n i t e d S t a t e s v.

Houston, 456 F.3d 1328, 1335 (11 th C i r . 2006). The

c r e d i b i l i t y o f t h e p r o s e c u t i o n ' s e x p l a n a t i o n i s t obe e v a l u a t e d c o n s i d e r i n g t h e ' t o t a l i t y of the

r e l e v a n t f a c t s , ' i n c l u d i n g whether members of a ra ce

were d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y ex cl ud ed . Hernandez [v. New

York] , 500 U.S. [352] a t 363 , 111 S. C t . a t 1868

[ ( 1 9 9 1 ) ] ( q u o t a t i o n marks and c i t a t i o n o m i t t e d ) .

Questions a r i s e r e g a r d i n g t h e c r e d i b i l i t y of the

e x p l a n a t i o n a nd th e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t he e x p l a n a t i o n

i s p r e t e x t u a l (1) when t he p r o s e c u t o r ' s e x p l a n a t i o n

f o r a s t r i k e i s e q u a l l y a p p l i c a b l e t o j u r o r s o f a

d i f f e r e n t race who have not been s t r i c k e n , C a l d w e l l

v. Maloney, 159 F.3d 639, 651 (1 st C i r . 1998); (2)upon a comparative a n a l y s i s o f t h e j u r o r s s t r u c k a nd

those who remained, Turner v. M a r s h a l l , 121 F.3d

1248, 1251-52 ( 9t h C i r . 1997), i n c l u d i n g t he

a t t r i b u t e s of the whi te and bl ac k ve ni re members,

Houston, 456 F.3d a t 1338; (3) or when t he

p r o s e c u t i o n f a i l s t o engage i n a meaningful v o i r

d i r e e x a m i n a t i o n on a s u b j e c t t h a t i t a l l e g e s i t i s

concerned, M i l l e r - E l [v. D r e t k e ] , 545 U.S. [231] a t

246, 125 S. C t . a t 2328 [ ( 2 0 0 5 ) ] . Evidence o f

p u r p o s e f u l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n may be shown through

s i d e - b y - s i d e comparisons c o n f i r m i n g t h a t t h e reasonsf o r s t r i k i n g a b l a c k p a n e l i s t a l s o a p p l y t o s i m i l a r

non-black p a n e l i s t s who were p e r m i t t e d t o s e r v e .

See i d . a t 241, 125 S. Ct . a t 2325. A p r o s e c u t o r ' s

r e a s o n ab l e e x p l a n a t i o n f o r o b j e c t i n g t o a b l a c k

p a n e l i s t based on h i s or her op in io ns or comments

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may be undercut b y t h e p r o s e c u t i o n ' s f a i l u r e t o

o b j e c t t o o t h e r w h i t e p a n e l i s t s who e x p r e s s e d

s i m i l a r v ie w s , and may be evidence o f p r e t e x t . I d .

a t 248, 125 S. C t . a t 2329-30. T h e p r o s e c u t o r ' sf a i l u r e t o s t r i k e s i m i l a r l y s i t u a t e d j u r o r s i s no t

p r e t e x t u a l , however, 'where t h e r e a r e r e l e v a n t

d i f f e r e n c e s between t h e s t r u c k j u r o r s a nd t h e

comparator j u r o r s . ' U n i t e d S t a t e s v . Novaton, 271

F.3d 968, 1004 (11t h C i r . 2001). T h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s

e x p l a n a t i o n 'does not demand an e x p l a n a t i o n t h a t i s

p e r s u a s i v e , o r even p l a u s i b l e ; so l o n g as th e reason

i s not i n h e r e n t l y d i s c r i m i n a t o r y , i t s u f f i c e s . '

Rice v. C o l l i n s , 546 U.S. 333 , 338, 126 S. C t . 969,

973-74, 163 L. Ed. 2d 824 (2006) ( q u o t a t i o n marks

and c i t a t i o n o m i t t e d ) . N e i t h e r a p r o s e c u t o r ' smistaken b e l i e f about a j u r o r n o r f a i l u r e t o ask a

v o i r d i r e q u e s t i o n p r o v i d e s ' c l e a r an d c o n v i n c i n g '

evidence o f p r e t e x t . McNair [

jason sharp appeals court ruling

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