jason luckasevic on concussions nfl research and litigation

WHO STARTED THE RETIRED NFL CONCUSSION LITIGATION?

Jason E.

Luckasevic

Jason E. Luckasevic

Education Received a bachelor’s degree in 1997

from Washington & Jefferson College Received a J.D. from Duquesne

University School of Law, in 2000

Bar Admissions (state/federal): Pennsylvania, 2000 Arizona, 2010 Michigan, 2010 Supreme Court of the United States,

2010 Admitted in Federal Court in

Pennsylvania and Nevada.

Jason E. Luckasevic

Legal Practice Areas Toxic Torts involving asbestos

exposures Personal Injury Medical Malpractice Discrimination Cases

Membership in Legal Associations American Association for Justice American Bar Association Pennsylvania Association for

Justice Western Pennsylvania Association

for Justice State and County Bar Associations ACLU Trial Lawyers for Public Justice

Super Lawyer In 2011 and 2012, Jason

Luckasevic was named a Pennsylvania Super Lawyer Rising Star. Awarded to less than 5% of lawyers in the State under the age of 40.

Jason also was named to The National Trial Lawyers Association Top 40 Under 40. Membership is "by invitation only and is extended exclusively to those individuals who exemplify superior qualifications, trial results, and leadership as a young lawyer under the age of 40."

Football Concussion Litigation

On July 19, 2011, seventy-five plaintiffs filed a mass action lawsuit in the Superior Court of California in Los Angeles for cognitive Injury from multiple concussions

received during play in the NFL.

In 2002, Dr. Bennett Omalu, found CTE in the brain of Mike Webster.

By 2007, Dr. Omalu found four cases linking CTE to the death of former NFL players.

By 2011, neuroanatomists had conducted thirteen autopsies on thirteen former NFL players who showed signs of degenerative brain disease.

Twelve of those thirteen deceased players suffered from CTE.

Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy (CTE)

Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy (CTE)

CTE is a type of neurodegenerative disease or dementia caused by repeated concussive of sub-concussive blows (hits just below the force required to cause concussion).

Also known as Punch-Drunk Syndrome, Dr. Harrison Stanford Martland stated in the October 13, 1928 issue of the Journal of the American Medical Association: “[S]ome time fight fans and

promoters have recognized a peculiar condition occurring among prize fighters which, in ring parlance, they speak of as "punch drunk." Fighters in whom the early symptoms are well recognized are said by the fans to be "cuckoo," "goofy," "cutting paper dolls," or "slug nutty." Frequently it takes a fighter from one to two hours to recover from a severe blow to the head or jaw.”

Law firm information


Made Famous from the PG&E toxic tort personal injury cases made famous in the movie ERIN BROKOVICH


Leaders in Asbestos Litigation for more than 30 years.


11.5 million dollar verdict for OJ McDuffie in a medical malpractice suit against the Miami Dolphins and their team physicians.

Lawsuits and the NFL

From 1976 to 2012 the NFL has been sued many times, but thirty-five of those cases have judicial decisions.

Of those Thirty-five times, there are three lawsuits which were helpful to this case.

The great majority of lawsuits against the NFL are Anti-trust actions.

Stringer v. NFL

Moreover, the Court refused to grant Riddell summary judgment on the failure to warn claim, because Riddell failed to adequately warn players of the risk of heat-related illnesses.

On August 1, 2001 Korey Stringer died of heatstroke during a Minnesota Vikings’ training camp. His widow, Kelci Stringer, filed a wrongful death action on July 28, 2003 against the NFL, NFLP, Riddell and the Minnesota Vikings.

The Court refused to grant summary judgment to the NFL regarding their “duty to ensure that the equipment and materials it required players such as Korey Stringer to wear was of the highest possible quality and sufficient to protect players from the risk of injury.”

Stringer v. NFL

In Plaintiff’s complaint she argued that “the NFL had and has the duty to use ordinary care in overseeing, controlling, and regulating the member clubs’ practices, policies, procedures, equipment, working conditions, and culture, insofar as they pertain to and subject players to heat-related illness, including, but not limited to, the duty to institute acclimatization requirements and to regulate training camp practices, other practices, games, equipment, and medical care so as to minimize the risk of heat-related illness.” (Complaint, pp. 14.)

The NFL denied these claims and filed a motion to dismiss on the basis that Plaintiff’s claims were preempted by Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 because in order to resolve this claim the CBA would need to be interpreted.

Stringer v. NFL

Plaintiff answered the NFL’s motion by explaining that the CBA would not have to be interpreted, and the duty breached was a duty that arose from state tort law.

The Sixth Circuit explained that “if the plaintiff can prove all of the elements of his claim without the necessity of contract interpretation, then his claim is independent of the labor agreement.” Decoe v. General Motors Corp., 32 F.3 212, 216 (6th Cir. 1994) citing Dougherty v. Parsec, Inc., 872 F. 2d 766, 770 (6th Cir. 1989).

Plaintiff contended that she would not use the CBA because the duty that the NFL breached was a “common-law duty of care [and] is that degree of care which an ordinarily reasonable and prudent person exercises, or is accustomed to exercising, under the same or similar circumstances.” (Plaintiff’s Memorandum, pp. 23).

Stringer v. NFL

Plaintiff also argued in the complaint that “Riddell had a duty to exercise ordinary and reasonable care in the design, manufacture, testing, sale, quality assurance, conveyance and/or distribution of its helmet and shoulder pads into the stream of commerce, including a duty to assure that the products did not pose a significantly increased risk of personal injury and death.” (Complaint, pp. 18).

Plaintiff continued arguing that “Riddell also failed to exercise ordinary and reasonable care in that it failed to issue adequate warnings of the risk of serious bodily injury or death due to the use of its helmets and shoulder pads.” (Complaint, pp.18).

Stringer v. NFL

Riddell denied these allegations and requested a judgment on the pleadings based on the argument that in order to prove Plaintiff’s allegations that Riddell’s equipment was league mandated, the CBA would have to be interpreted. (Judgment on the Pleadings, pp. 2).

Plaintiff answered this by stating that none of the claims against Riddell would need to be resolved by interpretation of the CBA. Plaintiff relied on the 1988 Supreme Court decision, which held that, “[E]ven if dispute resolution pursuant to a collective-bargaining agreement, on the one hand, and state law, on the other, would require addressing precisely the same set of facts, as long as the state-law claim can be resolved without interpreting the agreement itself, the claim is ‘independent’ of the agreement for § 301 pre-emption purposes.” See Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 409-410 (1988).

Stringer v. NFL

On February 1, 2007 the Court issued it’s opinion. Regarding Plaintiff’s fourth claim, the negligence claim against NFL and NFL Properties, the Court held that:

“Plaintiff’s claim does not arise out of the CBA. Neither the NFL nor NFL Properties is a party to the CBA. While both Defendants are mentioned in the CBA, the CBA imposes no duty on either of them to ensure that the equipment used by NFL players adequately protects from risk of injury or illness. And such duty, if it exists, clearly has its course in the common law.” (Opinion, pp. 28).

Stringer v. NFL

On July 1, 2009, the Court denied summary judgment to Riddell for Plaintiff’s failure to warn claim. The Court explained that:

“There is no evidence in the record that Stringer had any knowledge of the heightened risk of developing heat stroke, as opposed to the general risk of becoming hotter, associated with wearing Defendants’ helmet and shoulder pads in the extremely hot and humid conditions of the Vikings’ training camp. Additionally, the question of whether a user’s knowledge of the risks posed by a product will excuse the manufacturer’s duty to warn is generally a question of fact that is not properly resolved on summary judgment. The Court concludes that the risk was not obvious.” (Opinion 2, pp. 12).

The parties reached an undisclosed settlement in August 2011.

Brown v. NFL

On December 19, 1999, Orlando Brown was playing for the Cleveland Browns against the Jacksonville Jaguars when a referee threw a flag that struck Brown in the eye, temporarily blinding him.

In 2001, Brown filed suit against the NFL seeking damages for the NFL’s negligence. The NFL claimed that Brown’s claim was governed by the CBA and should be sent to arbitration. The Court disagreed.

“In this case, however, the duty asserted by Brown is based on state tort law, and would protect any member of the public. The NFL owes no greater duty to Brown than to any bystander (and Brown does not claim that it does) to train its employees in the safe use of their equipment or to respond in damages if one of its employees in the course of his work carelessly throws something into someone's eye.” Brown v. NFL, 219 F. Supp. 2d 372,

382 (SDNY 2002). The case was settled and the NFL

paid Brown between $15-25 million.

Brown v. NFL

Brown v. NFL

Plaintiffs, Orlando and Mira Brown, filed a complaint against the NFL alleging that the “NFL was liable for his injuries, both in its own right for negligent hiring and training of Triplette, and vicariously, as Triplette's employer, for his negligence in throwing the flag.” Brown v. NFL, 219 F. Supp. 2d 372, 376 (SDNY 2002).

Mira Brown also brought two claims against the NFL “for loss of services, society, companionship and consortium resulting from her husband's injuries.” Brown v. NFL, 219 F. Supp. 2d 372, 376 (SDNY 2002).

Brown v. NFL

“Plaintiffs' theory of the case is that this is a garden-variety tort action invoking a general duty to avoid negligently causing harm, owed by the NFL not only to its players but also to any other person in society who could possibly have been threatened by Triplette's weighted projectile. They contend that a fan, member of the press, or other bystander could equally bring such a claim had he or she been injured in the same manner. On this view, whether Triplette or the NFL was negligent, or whether the NFL has a valid defense that Brown assumed the risk of such an injury by playing professional football (or any other defense to the action), are simply ordinary issues of state tort law that, in the absence of diversity of citizenship, should be adjudicated in state court.”

Brown v. NFL, 219 F. Supp. 2d 372, 376-377 (SDNY 2002).

Brown v. NFL

The NFL responded to the claim by asserting that Brown’s claims are preempted by § 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) because the CBA would have to be interpreted.

The Court disagreed.

Brown v. NFL

The Court explained that:“It does not follow, however, that any state tort suit brought by an employee covered by a CBA is preempted by the LMRA. Federal preemption is driven by the need to ensure "that the meaning given a contract phrase or term be subject to uniform federal interpretation. Thus, questions relating to what the parties to a labor agreement agreed, and what legal consequences were intended to flow from breaches of that agreement, must be resolved by reference to uniform federal law, whether such questions arise in the context of a suit for breach of contract or in a suit alleging liability in tort." Brown v. NFL, 219 F. Supp. 2d 372, 376-377 (SDNY 2002) quoting, Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 211.

Brown v. NFL

Furthermore, the Court explained that: “Tort claims that do not implicate these federal

interests are not preempted. The test is whether the tort claim is "inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract." Brown v. NFL, 219 F. Supp. 2d 372, 376-377 (SDNY 2002) quoting Allis-Chalmers 213, 220.

The LMRA does not preempt a claim that merely "relates in some way to a provision in a collective-bargaining agreement." Brown v. NFL, 219 F. Supp. 2d 372, 376-377 (SDNY 2002) quoting Allis-Chalmers 213,

220.

Brown v. NFL

The Court found that the NFL rules are not part of the CBA,

and in fact are not even mentioned within the agreement. Brown v. NFL, 219 F. Supp. 2d 372, 386 (SDNY 2002).

Moreover the Court explained that:

“Accordingly, even if the references in Plaintiffs' complaint to the content of specific NFL Rules, or to the various instruction manuals for referees, are seen not merely as evidence of professional standards, but as sources that define the ordinary nature and risks of football and thus define the duties of care owed to Plaintiffs, these documents are not part of the CBA.” Brown v. NFL, 219 F. Supp. 2d 372, 387 (SDNY 2002).

Therefore, the Court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss and compel arbitration. The Court granted Plaintiff’s cross-motion to remand to state court.

Williams v. NFL

NFL players are "employed by a member club of the National Football League[.]" CBA, Preamble. Appendix C to the CBA contains the "NFL Player Contract,"[11] which provides that the contract "is between ... [the] `Player,' and ... `Club,' ... as a member of the National Football League." Id. App. C at 248. The contract further states: "Club employs Player as a skilled football player. Player accepts such employment."Id. None of these references require interpretation, only mere consultation, which is insufficient to warrant preemption of an otherwise independent state law claim. See Livadas, 512 U.S. at 124-25, 114 S.Ct. 2068; Trustees, 450 F.3d at 330. Furthermore, the Players' contracts, likely dispositive in determining who their employer is, are actually separate documents from the CBA such that there is no need to reference the form contract contained in Appendix C of the CBA to examine them.[12]

The NFL does not point to a specific provision of either the CBA or the Policy which must be interpreted. The CBA's Preamble provides that

Williams v. NFL

Finally, the NFL argues that denying preemption and subjecting the Policy to divergent state regulations would render the uniform enforcement of its drug testing policy, on which it relies as a national organization for the integrity of its business, nearly impossible. The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, has rejected a similar argument. See Cramer v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 255 F.3d 683, 695 n. 9 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc). In Cramer, the employer, a large trucking company, "argue[d] that the terms of CBAs affecting employees in multiple states should supersede inconsistent state laws." Id. at 688, 695 n. 9. The Ninth Circuit observed, "This contention overreaches, however, because *878 the LMRA certainly did not give employers and unions the power to displace any state regulatory law they found inconvenient." Id. at 695 n. 9. We think this is the proper result in light of the Supreme Court‘s observation that:

[T]here [is not] any suggestion that Congress, in adopting § 301, wished to give the substantive provisions of private agreements the force of federal law, ousting any inconsistent state regulation. Such a rule of law would delegate to unions and unionized employers the power to exempt themselves from whatever state labor standards they disfavored. Clearly, § 301 does not grant the parties to a [CBA] the ability to contract for what is illegal under state law. In extending the pre-emptive effect of § 301 beyond suits for breach of contract, it would be inconsistent with congressional intent under that section to preempt state rules that proscribe conduct, or establish rights and obligations, independent of a labor contract.

Williams v. NFL

Lueck, 471 U.S. at 211-12, 105 S.Ct. 1904 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added); see Livadas,512 U.S. at 123, 114 S.Ct. 2068 (cautioning that section 301 "cannot be read broadly to pre-empt nonnegotiable rights conferred on individual employees as a matter of state law"); see also Karnes, 335 F.3d at 1194 (noting that "the fact that the CBA incorporated Boeing's anti-drug policy is irrelevant because `§ 301does not grant the parties to a [CBA] the ability to contract for what is illegal under state law'" (quoting Lueck, 471 U.S. at 212, 105 S.Ct. 1904)). Therefore, the NFL's national uniformity argument fails.In sum, the Players' DATWA claim is predicated on Minnesota law, not the CBA or the Policy, and the claim is not dependent upon an interpretation of the CBA or the Policy. Thus, the Players' DATWA claim is not preempted by section 301.

The Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) governs disputes concerning working conditions. If a player’s claim falls under the CBA, then the claim is preempted by Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185.

However, if the claim arises from a state-law claim, and the CBA does not have to be interpreted, then federal law does not preempt the claim.

The NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement

The NFL’s Negligence: Publications that the NFL failed to acknowledge. To name a few…

1890 Admiral Joseph Mason “Bull” Reeves, played football for the Naval

Academy. He suffered so many blows to the head that the Navy doctor warned him if he suffered another hit he was at risk for death or insanity

1913 Glenn “Pop” Warner stated that he had “many times seen cases when

hard bumps on the head so dazed the player receiving them that he lost his memory for a time and had to be removed from the game.”

1928 The first case of “Punch Drunk” syndrome in boxers was published in the

American Association Journal by Dr. Harrison Stanford Martland.

1937 The U.S. Navy published an article on “Dementia puglisistica” in the U.S.

Navy Medical Bulletin.

1952 The American Medical Association Journal published an article on

“Electroencephalographic changes in professional boxers.”

1952 The New England Journal of Medicine Article Vol. 246, pp. 554-556

suggested a three strike rule for concussions in 1945. They suggested that after three concussions you should retire from football.

1959 An article was published in the Journal of Mental Science on the

“Observations of the pathology of insidious dementia following head injury.”

1973 A disabling condition occurring when someone suffers a concussion shortly

after the first concussion would termed the Second Impact Syndrome. 1974

And article about delayed recovery after mild head injury was published in the Lancet.

1975 An article on the cumulative effect on concussions was published in the

Lancet.

The NFL’s Negligence: Publications that the NFL failed to acknowledge. To name a few…

NFL’s Knowledge of the Risk of Concussions

The NFL’s Actions?

The NFL did not start their own Mild Traumatic Brain Injury Committee until 1994, and appointed a rheumatologist as the committee chair with no certification regarding brain injuries or concussions.

In 2004 this Committee published their findings that showed “no evidence of worsening injury of chronic cumulative effects” from multiple concussions.

In fact, the Committee concluded that “many NFL players can be safely allowed to return to play” on the same day they sustain a concussion if a doctor clears them.


In the October 2004 edition of Neurosurgery, the Multiple Traumatic Brain Injury published a paper stating that the Committee found that there was not a risk of repeated concussions in players with previous concussions.

They also concluded that there was not a “7-10 day window of increased susceptibility to sustaining another concussion.”

In response to this article a doctor wrote that “the article sends a message that it is acceptable to return players while still symptomatic, which contradicts literature published over the past twenty years suggesting that athletes be returned to play only after they are asymptomatic and in some cases for seven days.”

Between 2002 and 2005 many studies performed by independent scientists found that multiple NFL induced concussions cause cognitive problems such as depression, early on-set dementia and CTE and its related symptoms.


In 2006 this committee concluded that the “mild TBIs in professional football are not serious injuries,” because many players returned to play within a week.

The NFL told players who suffered concussions not to be overly concerned.

In 2007 Rodger Goodell admitted that the Committee had been studying the effects of traumatic brain injury for “close to 14 years.”

Not until 2010 did the NFL acknowledge that concussions can lead to dementia, memory loss, Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy (CTE), and other symptoms.

NFL Fraud

In 2002 through 2007, Dr. Omalu examined players including Mike Webster, Terry Long, Andrew Waters and Justin Strzelcyk. He concluded in Neurosurgery that CTE was triggered by multiple NFL concussions and was partially responsible for their deaths

The NFL responded to this by writing a letter to Neurosurgery asking that the article be retracted.

Dr. Julian Bailes a WVU neurosurgeon explained Dr. Omalu’s findings to the NFL Committee. The Committee refused the findings and Dr. Bailes explained “the Committee got mad…we got into it. And I’m thinking, ‘This is a …disease in America’s most [popular sport and how are its leaders responding? Alienate the scientist who found it? Refuse to accept the science coming from him?”

NFL Fraud

In 2006, ESPN The Magazine had an article which described how the MTBI Committee failed to include hundreds of neuropsychological tests done on NFL players when studying the effects of concussions.

Furthermore, the article disclosed that a neuropsychologist for the New York Jets, Dr. William Barr, was fired after bringing attention to the fact that the Committee’s research only included results that would downplay the effects of concussions.

NFL and Congressional Hearings

At the October 2009 Congressional hearings of the House Judiciary Committee, Linda Sanchez, a committee member, said that the NFL denying the connection between concussions and cognitive decline is similar to the Tobacco industry’s denial of the link between cigarette consumption and ill health effects.

At the same hearing Rep. Maxine Walters stated, “I believe you are an $8 billion organization that has failed in your responsibility to the players. We all know it’s a dangerous sport. Players are always going to get injured. The only quesiton is, are you going to pay for it? I know that you dearly want to hold on to your profits. I think it’s the responsibility of Congress to look at your antitrust exemption and take it away.”

January 2010 The House Judiciary Committee also held

hearings on football player head injuries. The chairman of the committee, Rep. John Conyers, Jr., said that “until recently, the NFL minimized and disputed evidence linking head injuries to mental impairment in the future.”

NFL and The House Judiciary Committee

A Must Read for NFL Players

In the summer of 2010 the NFL produced a poster that alerts its players to the long-term effects of concussions, using words like “depression” and “early onset of dementia”

April 16, 2012 Pittsburgh Post Gazette:

RiddellThe official helmet manufacturer of the NFL

In 2002, Riddell introduced the “Revolution” helmet, which they claimed reduced concussions by 31%.

However, the study Riddell conducted with UPMC to get the 31% figure was highly criticized because new Riddell Revolution helmets were compared to used helmets.

Also, the study was co-written by Thad Ide, Riddell’s Vice President of Research & Product Development.

Furthermore, the neurosurgeon who co-wrote the study, Joe Maroon, stated that he disagreed with Riddell’s marketing that the Revolution could reduce concussions by 31%.

For these reasons, Senator Tom Udall of New Mexico formally requested that the FTC investigate these “misleading safety claims and deceptive practices” by helmet manufacturers, specifically Riddell.

In May 2011 Virginia Tech released the findings of their helmet study.

Riddell’s VSR-4 was given the second lowest rating of reducing the risk of concussions.

However, nearly 40% of NFL players wore this helmet in the 2010-2011 season.



The warning on Riddell helmets mentioned nothing about concussions throughout the 1980s and 1990s.

In fact, it was not until Riddell introduced the Riddell Revolution in 2002 that inadequate concussion warnings started to appear on helmets.

Prior to 2002 the warning said:

“Do not use this helmet to butt, ram or spear an opposing player. This is in violation of the football rules and such use can result in severe head or neck injuries, paralysis or death to you and possible injury to your opponent. No helmet can prevent all head or neck injuries a player might receive while participating in football.”


According to Thad Ide, Riddell’s vice president of Research & Product Development, Riddell did not begin using their HITS system, which is used to study concussions, until around 2004.

This system monitors the severity and incidence of impacts that the player endures. The system uses a small sensor which is placed inside the helmet.


When Richard Lester, Vice President and General Counsel for Riddell, was asked how many lawsuits Riddell has been involved in in the past 30 years, Lester explained that he had dealt with over 100 cases.

“The head injuries range from mild concussions to subdural hematomas that require surgery. There is also a head injury that’s described as a second impact syndrome, which, basically, is two separate head injuries, one concussion followed by a second impact later that causes swelling in the brain and permanent injury.”

-Stringer v. NFL, 749 F.Supp. 2d 680 (East. Dist. Ohio 2010) (Deposition of Richard Lester, pp 17-19).

Lawsuits against Riddell Included in these lawsuits:


Richard Lester noted cases where Riddell failed to put warnings on helmets, resulting in serious injuries to the players, and lawsuits for Riddell. He recalled three cases in particular: “There was a Florida case, the Strange case. Eldredge

was another one. Jaramillo. All three cases involved quadriplegic injuries. Players were paralyzed. In the Eldredge case, the young man subsequently died. And each of them contained the allegation that the helmet in question did not have a warning label warning the player that he could be seriously injured playing football even though he is wearing a helmet.” Stringer v. NFL, 749 F.Supp. 2d 680 (East. Dist. Ohio 2010) (Deposition of

Richard Lester, pp 20-22).

Riddell

A Product Liability claim against Riddell: Arnold v. Riddell, 882 F. Supp. 979 (Dist. Kansas

1995). In 1988, James R. Arnold was a junior at a high school in

Texas. During a football game he collided head first with an opponent and fractured his spine at the C4-C5 level, rendering him quadriplegic. Arnold and his parents brought a product liability action against Riddell.

In this case, the jury found that the Riddell PAC-3 helmet was defective and assessed Riddell’s fault at 63%. The jury found Arnold 21% at fault and his parents 16% at fault. The Arnolds were awarded 12 million dollars in damages. A remittitur of Arnold’s parents’ damages was ordered subsequently for out-of-pocket loss to $437,000.

Riddell Sues Insurers For Failing To Pay Concussion Damages

Published: Friday, 13 Apr 2012 | 12:23 PM ET

By: Darren RovellCNBC Sports Business Reporter

The dollar figure on concussion-based lawsuits continues to mount by the day. On Thursday, the NFL’s official helmet maker Riddell, filed suit in California against those that had insured its business with the league and are failing to indemnify the company against these claims.

More than 1,000 former NFL players have been part of concussion-based lawsuits against the league.

Riddell says it is included in seven of those suits.

http://www.cnbc.com/id/15837548/cid/97537

Play Hard, Die Young By Bennet Omalu, M.D.

WHY?

1. Educate future generations on concussions;

2. Need for medical care for retirees; and

3. Compensation for personal injuries, care, suffering, loss of spousal services and future needs.

What’s Next?

Establishing NFL, NFL Properties and Riddell’s Legal Responsibility

And, personally…

Sportsbraininjurylawyers.com Sportsheadinjurylawyers.com Athletebraininjury.com Sportsbrainlaywers.com

For more information:

JASON LUCKASEVIC [email protected] 412-338-9460 412-400-6570

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