japan's post-fukushima energy policy: a nuclear past or a non-nuclear future? 2015
TRANSCRIPT
Japan’s Post-Fukushima Energy
Policy
Eric JohnstonDeputy Editor, The Japan Times
A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future?
Japan’s Energy Situation
1. Japan imports 90 percent of energy needs.
2. Due to geopolitical problems, little Russian oil or LNG comes to Japan.
3. Oil and LNG is transported from Africa, Middle East, Southeast Asia, and coal from Australia. Huge transportation costs and in the case of oil, political uncertainties add to price.
4. U.S. is exporting shale gas in small quantities to Japan, which will increase in coming years. But political issues in US Congress creating uncertainty of guaranteed supply. Alaska wants Japan to help build an LNG pipeline.
Japan’s Energy Mix
2010 2011 2012 20130
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
28.6
10.7
1.7 1
24.9 2527.6
30.329.3
39.542.5 43.2
7.1
14.418.3
14.9
8.3 9 8.4 8.5
1.1 1.4 1.6 2.2
Percentages
Nuclear Coal LNG Oil Hydro Renewables
Nuclear Pre 3/11 Before March 11, 2011, there were 54
commercial nuclear reactors in Japan supplying about 1/3 of Japan’s electricity.
Each reactor generated between 540 megawatts electricity (MWe) and 1.3 gigawatts (GWe). 1,000 megawatts = 1 gigawatt.
There had also been plans to ramp up the share of nuclear power to as much as 40 percent by mid-century by building new plants to replace aging ones.
Why Did Japan
Go Nuclear in the first place?
A Brief (very brief) History
The End of WWII and the Occupation
Japan went to war at least partially to secure oil and gas reserves for its growing domestic industries. The dream of becoming ``self-sufficient’’ in energy production had haunted the country since the late 1800s, after Japan opened to the outside world after two and a half centuries of isolation.
The postwar U.S.-led Occupation of Japan made the country a U.S. ally in the Pacific against communism. Japan got access to fossil fuel sources from U.S. allies, but the independent energy dream never died.
1953: A Chance Meeting At Harvard
Yasuhiro Nakasone Henry Kissinger
Dec. 1953: Atoms For Peace
Concerned about other nations, allied or otherwise, pursuing their own nuclear technology programs, President Dwight Eisenhower announces in the United Nations the ``Atoms for Peace’’ program, the practical result being that the U.S. supplies nuclear knowhow and technology to friendly nations like Japan wanting it for ``peaceful purposes.’’
In March 1954, Nakasone manages to get the first-ever budget for nuclear research passed in parliament, thus beginning Japan’s road to nuclear power.
Selling Nuclear To A Skeptical Nation
SHORIKI MATSUTAROYomiuri Shimbun owner, friend of Nakasone, convicted war criminal, CIA agent, and The Godfather of Japanese Pro Baseball and the Japanese Nuclear Power Industry
ZENSAKU AZUMAJapan’s Charles Lindbergh’’, extremely
popular with the public, promoted eating uranium-laced food, extolled nuclear power
(and cigarettes), and died of cancer.
The Three Electricity Laws: Payoffs to the Provinces
By the early 1970s, Japan had built its first commercial nuclear reactors using American, British, and French technology and knowhow. But as the dangers of nuclear power, and concerns about nuclear weapons, grew, and following the 1973 oil shock, Japan’s leaders realized that in order to overcome antinuclear sentiment and build more plants, local governments where the power plants were located needed to be financially compensated.In the mid-1970s, Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka’s government passed three new laws that provided funding to any locality that agreed to host a nuclear power plant. Thus was born the ``nuclear power village’’ of national government officials, utilities, and local governments and businesses that we know today.
How Much Official Funding Do Local Governments Get?
Model Case: Construction of a 1.35GW nuclear power
plant.Assumptions (1) Environmental Impact Study takes three years(2) Construction takes seven years(3) Plant Operates for 40 yearsOver a 45 year period, from beginning of environmental assessment to the 35 th year of the plant’s operation, local governments hosting the plant can receive 121.5 billion yen, or almost 1.2 billion dollars under the Electricity Laws. This does not include additional donations from the utility or other unofficial forms of assistance.
TOTAL AMOUNT A LOCAL TOWN OR VILLAGE RECEIVES FOR HOSTING A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT: Nobody Really Knows.
Ye Olde Nuclear Village
For over four decades, the ``nuclear power village’’ has kept opposition to nuclear power at bay. Four years after 3/11, though, a powerful struggle between the powerful village and renewable energy proponents threatens the village as never before.
RENEWABLE ENERGY: Talkin’ `bout a
Revolution!
Post-3/11 Developments
X
The Nuclear Village Under Attack
In the months after 3/11, polls showed that up to 90 percent of Japanese wanted out of nuclear power.
Seizing the opportunity, renewable energy advocates pushed hard to win political and financial support. For months, the nuclear village was under attack by the media, politicians, and the public at large as the nation asked itself fundamental questions about why it had embraced nuclear to begin with and how it could move out of nuclear power and into renewables.
Renewable Energy advocates pushed hard for a Feed-In Tariff after 3/11. The (then) ruling
Democratic Party of Japan favored the FIT, especially Prime Minister Naoto Kan. It was strongly opposed by the Nuclear Power Village but passed at the end of August, 2011– the sam day Kan resigned over his
handling of 3/11. The new tariff went into effect on July 1st, 2012:
The New Tariff means businesses in five renewable energy sectors can sell their power at a guaranteed fixed rate over a
fixed period of time. Utilities are required to purchase renewable energy at that price, but can refuse if they judge, for reasons not always clear, that to do so
would create distribution problems.
THE FEED-IN TARIFFS
SOLAR POWER
Output Range ABOVE 10 KW BELOW 10KW
Basic Tariff (per
kilowatt/hour)(as of July 1, 2015)
27 yen/kWh 33-35yen/kWh
PERIOD 20 years 10 years
THE FEED-IN TARIFFSWIND POWER
TYPE BELOW 20kW ABOVE 20 kW OFFSHORE
BASIC TARIFF
55 yen/kWh
22 yen/kWh
36 yen/kWh
PERIOD 20 years
THE NEW FEED-IN TARIFFS
GEOTHERMAL POWER
Output Range ABOVE 15,000 KW
BELOW 15,000 KW
Basic Tariff (per
kilowatt/hour)
26 yen/kWh 40 yen/kWh
PERIOD 15 years
THE NEW FEED-IN TARIFFS (for NEW facilities)
MINI-HYDRO
Output Range
1mW-30mW
200kW-1mW
Under 200kW
Basic Tariff(per kilowatt
hour)24 yen/kWh 29 yen/kWh 34 yen/kWh
PERIOD 20 years
THE NEW FEED-IN TARIFFSBIOMASS
Sector Wood (unused) Wood (general)
Building Waste Wood
Construction waste-related
Biomass
Methane
Type 2,000 kW or more
Under 2,000 kW
Unused Wood
Products
General Wood
Various Sewer sludge,
etc.
BasicTariff(per kwH)
32 40 yen/kW yen/kW
24 yen/kWh
13 yen/kW
h
17 yen/kWh 39 yen/kW
h
Period 20 years
The Current Situation as of FEBRUARY 2015
TYPE OF RENEWABLE ENERGY CUMULATIVE CERTIFIEDCAPACITY
PV (under 10 kW) 3.633 GWPV (over 10 kw) 70.9 GW
Wind 1.986 GWMini-Hydro 0.567 GWGeothermal 0.069 GWBiomass 1.529 GWTOTAL 78.684 GW
BUT, the actual amount in operation
as of JANUARY 2015 TYPE OF RENEWABLE
ENERGY CUMULATIVE OPERATIONAL CAPACITY
PV (under 10 kW) 2.95 GWPV (over 10 kw) 13.3 GW
Wind 0.255 GWMini-Hydro 0.044 GWGeothermal 0.002 GWBiomass 0.151 GWTOTAL 16.71 GW
The Good News: Photovoltaic (Solar) SystemsAccording to the Yano Research Institute, thanks to the 2012 Feed In Tariff, Japan was ranked first in the world in terms of installed Solar PV power generation in 2014.
Unofficial estimate of how
much power solar energy could ``feasibly’’ generate:
100-150GW
The Good News: Offshore Wind PowerA 2 megawatt offshore wind power facility was built off the coast of Fukushima prefecture, almost within site of the crippled nuclear power plant.
Operation commenced in November 2013. This will be followed by two 7 MW offshore wind turbines installed in March.
Studies show Fukushima and Japanese coastal areas are ideal for offshore wind farms. No concerns about noise complaints, and wider area of potential establishment than land-based wind farms, which means they can be located closer to the grid.
Japan’s potential offshore
wind power capacity: 1,600GW
Local Governments, NOT Tokyo are leading the way to a renewable
futureOPERATING CAPACITY (Dec. 2014,
kW)Rank Prefecture SOLAR WIND HYDRO
GEOTHERMAL
BIOMASS TOTAL
1 FUKUOKA 831,653
1 23 0 190 831,867
2 MIYAGI 783,305
16,000
1,600
0 16,740 817,645
3 AICHI 767,075
12,000
0 0 0 779,075
4 HYOGO 728,185
12,000
6 0 7,457 747,648
5 CHIBA 694,784
0 330 0 1,770 696,884
6 KAGOSHIMA 628,203
33,602
1,676
0 0 663,481
7 SHIZUOKA 585,572
0 1,043
0 95 586,710
8 TOCHIGI 557,111
0 690 0 2,815 560,616
9 GUNMA 522,158
0 73 0 400 522,631
10
SAITAMA 492,850
0 326 0 1,813 494,989
NATIONWIDE (as of Dec.31st, 2014)
15,408,838 226,922 43,701 906 136,016 15,816,382
But It’s Not All Good News
PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES TO REALIZING A RENEWABLE FUTURE
1 TECHINCAL/LOGISTICAL CHALLENGS
CHALLENGE A: The Grid System
Grids to Major Urban Centers (electricity users): locations best suited for renewable energy projects, particularly large-scale solar farms and wind farms, often located in rural areas far away from urban users.
Japan is divided into 60 Hz grids (for western Japan) and 50 Hz (for eastern and northern Japan), meaning a nationwide renewable grid is not commercially feasible.
CHALLENGE A: The Grid System
CHALLENGE B: Regional Utility Monopoly
System 10 major utilities largely control the generation,
distribution, and sale of electric power in Japan. They set prices in general agreement with each other, and new players to the energy market have to deal with them if they want to get connected to a piece of the national grid.
Utilities have nearly total control over which electricity generation sources they send down to the grid to customers, and their motto is always the same, ``Safe, Stable, and Secure’’ electricity supply, at a fixed price.
CHALLENGE B: Regional Utility Monopoly System
PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES: SOLAR POWER
Rapidly improving solar technologies makes Japan’s highly conservative electricity industry cautious about installing solar power technology now that will be out of date in one or two years.
Worries about securing a ``safe and stable’’ electricity supply during cloudy nights, at night, etc., and insufficent battery storage technologies.
Battle between Large Solar Farm proponents and Small Solar Products/Residential Area proponents over direction of industry.
Nuclear lobby’s anti-solar campaign (``nobody wants solar farms in their backyard’’, ``it’s still too expensive’’) is working.
PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES: WIND POWER
FIT needs to be based on wind conditions of location, not a fixed amount of power generation for all locations.Noise: Local communities complain about loud windmillsBirds: Bird strikes and migratory patterns mean strict environmental regulations on wind farm development. Remoteness: Best Locations for On-Shore windmills often located far from urban centers, necessitating expensive grid connections.
PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES: GEOTHERAL POWER
1) Vast majority of Japan’s geothermal resources in National Park areas: Strict environmental regulations.2) Many ideal geothermal locations on, or beside, onsens (hot spring resorts) whose politically-connected owners oppose geothermal development for business reasons.3) Geothermal requires heavy initial investment. High cost to maintain and repair plants. 4) Public fears, aided by pro-nuclear propagandists, that geothermal drilling causes earthquakes.
PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES: MINI- HYDRO POWER
Requires rivers and streams with regular flows of water at ideal speeds, and those can be hard to find.
Strict gradation requirements often means construction work is needed, creating further environmental damage.
Remote areas of many ideal mini-hydro spots means increased costs to deliver generated electricity.
PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES:
BIOMASS1) Bureaucratic turf wars in Japan means a regulatory nightmare, little cooperation between ministries (Environment, Forestry, Trade and Industry) to promote different biomass forms.
2) Opposition from both the pro-nuclear business lobby and from environmentalists who warn burning biomass for fuel will simply increase greenhouse gas emissions.
3) Lack of government and major corporate interest in biomass, compared to solar and wind.
GENERAL CHALLENGES TO GETTING OUT OF NUCLEAR AND INTO
RENEWABLE ENERGY:
1) Outdated Structure of Established Anti-Nuclear Groups.
a) Traditional anti-nuclear NGO leaders now well into their 60s, 70s, and 80s, and have been protesting for over four decades.
b) Often have limited understanding of, or interest in, modern NGO leadership techniques, media and public outreach strategies, or broad-based public education of the issues.
2) Provincialism Because anti-nuclear groups have traditionally been local community-based, they can be extremely provincial and suspicious of outsiders. Town A’s anti-nuclear groups don’t talk or care much about Town B’s anti-nuclear groups.
When cooperation occurs, it’s often at the ``let’s exchange information’’ level only, not at the political action level.
3) Group-ismSeniority, deferring to one’s elders, and group consensus cultural traits mean young people (i.e. those under 50 years of age) feel shut out by traditional anti-nuclear groups.
As a result, such groups played something of a secondary role in the mass public demonstrations against nuclear power after March 11, 2011.
4) Divisions Within Anti-Nuke Movement
Factionalism Within Anti-Nuclear Organizations Themselves: For decades, many of the groups in Japan seeking the abolishment of nuclear weapons were actually pro-nuclear power.
Even today, most of the main groups that organize the yearly protests against nuclear weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki are often reluctant to come out strongly against nuclear power because their members work at utilities.
Problems With Renewable Energy Groups
Bottom Up Versus Top Down: Major NGOs and other organizations promoting renewable energy are Tokyo-based, and generally favor a top-down approach whereby the central government leads and local governments follow.
Local governments and businesses often favor a more decentralized, bottom-up approach (localized small-scale renewable energy projects with revised local ordinances to make them happen)
Problems With Renewable Energy
GroupsThe Big Guys versus the New Players: Toshiba, Mitsubishi, Hitachi, Sharp, Sanyo, Toyota, Kyocera. . . these are just some of the huge Japanese firms making heavy investments in renewable energy technologies and massive projects. Clearly, the new FIT is tilted in their favor.
But the kind of innovation from small and medium-sized firms like we see in the U.S., as well as Canada, China, South Korea, India, and parts of Europe is not as high-profile. It’s all occurring (mostly) under the radar.
Problems with Renewable Energy Groups
``Solar? Wind? Geothermal’’?
Competition And Factionalism Within The Renewable Energy Movement Creates Public Confusion and Doubt: Solar, wind, mini-hydro, biomass and geothermal advocates lobby hard for their chosen energy source. Policy makers at the local and national level want the ``best energy mix’’ that offers ``safe, stable, and secure’’ electricity generation.
But WHICH combination of renewables meets the goal in the short and medium-term? Depends on who you talk to.
Problems with Renewable Energy
GroupsWeakness in Addressing
Specific Public Concerns about
Higher Electricity Bills for
Individuals and Possible
Negative Effects on Industries Using Lots of
Electricity
HOWEVER. . .FOR ALL OF THE
PROBLEMS WITH RENEWABLE ENERGY, THE
PROBLEMS WITH A RETURN TO NUCLEAR ARE
MUCH GREATER
Problem 1:AGING REACTORS
12 out of the 50 reactors are now over 36 years old.
SEVEN are now over 40 years old.
The life-span of Japan’s nuclear reactors is officially considered 40 years.
At the end of the 40 year cycle, the operator can apply for a 20 year extension, theoretically extending the life of a plant to 60 years.
Japan’s Aging Nuclear Reactors (as of 2015)
Name of Utility Name of Reactor Age
KANSAI ELECTRIC
Mihama No. 1 reactor 45 years old
Mihama No. 2 reactor 43 years old
Mihama No. 3 reactor 39 years old
Oi No. 1 reactor 36 years old
Oi No. 2 reactor 36 years old
Takahama No. 1 reactor 41 years old
Takahama No. 2 reactor 40 years old
CHUGOKU ELECTRIC Shimane No. 1 reactor 41 years old
SHIKOKU ELECTRIC Ikata No. 1 reactor 38 years old
KYUSHU ELECTRIC Genkai No. 1 reactor 40 years old
NIHON GENDEN Higashiumi Dai Ni 37 years old
Tsuruga No. 1 reactor 45 years old
PROBLEM NUMBER TWO:
SPENT FUEL POOLS ALMOST FULL:
``Building a nuclear power plant is like building a house without a toilet.’’
Once nuclear fuel is burned, the resulting spent fuel waste is removed from the reactor and stored in cooling pools.
But. ..
NUMBER OF YEARS AFTER RESTART UNTIL SPENT FUEL
POOLS ARE FULL
NAME OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS AND REACTORS
LESS THAN SIX YEARS REMAINING UNTIL
FULL
(33 of 50 reactors)
Tomari No. 1, 2 (Hokkaido); Onogawa No. 1, 2 (Miyagi)
Fukushima Daichi 1 No. 5, 6; Fukushima Daini, No. 1-4Kashiwazaki-Karuiwa No. 1-7 (Tepco)
Hamaoka No. 3,4 (Chubu),Mihama No. 1, 2; Oi 1, 2; Takahama 1, 2 (Kepco)
Shimane No. 1, Ikata No. 1,2 (Shikoku)Genkai No. 1-4 (Kyushu)
BETWEEN SIX AND TWELVE YEARS
REMAINING UNTIL FULL
(14 of 50 reactors)
Higashidori (Aomori)Onogawa No. 3 (Miyagi)Tsuruga No. 1,2 (Fukui)
Hamaoka No. 5 (Shizuoka)Shiga No. 1,2 (Ishikawa)
Mihama No. 3 (Fukui)Oi No. 3, 4 (Fukui)
Takahama No. 3, 4 (Fukui)Shimane No. 2 (Shimane)Sendai No. 2 (Kagoshima)
MORE THAN 12 YEARS (3 reactors)
Tomari No. 3 (Hokkaido)Ikata No. 3 (Ehime)
Sendai No. 1 (Kagoshima)
SO, NOW WHAT?Currently, 14,200 tons of spent nuclear fuel sits in storage at
Japan’s nuclear power plants. Spent fuel pools are now 70 percent full, on
average
What Are The Options Each Plant Has For Dealing With Spent Fuel?
OPTION 1: Ship it the Rokkasho
Reprocesssing Plant
in Aomori Prefecture
OPTION 2: Move it to specially designed mid-term storage
containers
OPTION 3:Reprocess the
spent fuel overseas
OPTION 1: Ship it to Rokkasho
PROBLEMSThe Rokkasho reprocessing plant :1) Has suffered numerous technical problems, delaying the projected start-up
numerous times.2) Is opposed by not only traditional antinuclear activists but also international
nonproliferation experts.3) Is not expected to go into operation anytime soon.
4) Is already storing 2,945 tons of spent fuel –98 percent of its storage capacity
Rokkasho plant, when it goes into operation, is supposed to take spent nuclear fuel from Japan’s reactors, reprocess it, and send it back to plants to be used again and again.
OPTION 2: Mid-term Storage: (spent fuel spends 50 years in offsite facility
before ``final’’ disposal at Rokkasho) PROBLEMS:1) Costs involved with transporting spent fuel by truck or ship from current
location to new facility and costs of storage: Who pays? 2) Safety concerns in any locality the waste passes through: What happens if
towns and villages or fisherman’s unions oppose shipments, forcing transportation routes to be altered? Will town demand financial compensation from government or utilities for allowing waste to pass through? How does that affect the ultimate cost of ``cheap’’ nuclear power?
3) THE BIGGEST PROBLEM: Local governments around Japan have ignored pleas from Tokyo to host facilities, which would mean nuclear waste in their backyard for at least a half century.
THIS IS WHY TOKYO RECENTLY SAID IT WILL DETERMINE LOCATION OF STORAGE FACILITIES RATHER THAN ASK LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO
VOLUNTEER TO TAKE THEM
OPTION 3: Reprocess it Overseas
This has been done on a limited scale. Reprocessing Japanese fuel, which is then returned to Japan and reused, has taken place in England and France.
PROBLEMS: 1) Huge Expense, drives up cost/kWh.2) International Proliferation Risks3) Refusal of many countries to allow nuclear-laden ships to
pass through their waters.4) Risk of an Accident or Terrorist Attack, sinking or damaging
ships transporting nuclear cargo.
So what’s the plan for the remaining reactors?
(as of April) Fukushima Dai-Ichi reactors 5 and 6 (the ones not
damaged by the quake) will be scrapped. Fukushima Dai-Ni’s four plants will have to be
scrapped as it’s politically impossible to restart them.
Five reactors nationwide at least 40 years old will be decommissioned.
24 reactors are under review for possible restart, including two over 40 years old.
Two reactors in Fukui Prefecture that power Kyoto, originally approved by Tokyo for restart, have a provisional injunction against their restart.
Two reactors in Kyushu are thought likely to restart this year, but recent volcano creating concerns.
A reactor in Ehime (Shikoku) could be first to restart
``So, just extend the older plants’ lives past 40 years.’’
Questions about Safety Would a plant that is 40
years old pass the stricter safety standards that went into effect in 2013?
Would the operating utility be required to beef up safety measures before government permission for extension past 40 years is granted?
Would local governments
hosting the plant need to implement any additional safety measures?
Questions about Money Though not a legal requirement, would local authorities grant permission for plant’s life to be extended past 40 years?
How much money would they demand (in the form of, for example, ``stronger safety measures’’) from either Tokyo or the operating utility before granting permission?
How long would these negotiations over money take, and, ultimately, would they cost the taxpayers money in the form of higher utility bills?
Would a nuclear reactor more than 40 years old generate electricity at an economically competitive price?
By The Way. . . National Energy Policy requires
planning for the mid and long-
term –decades, not years.
Obviously, the most basic
question is, how big will
your domestic electricity
market be by, say, 2030 or
2040?
Future Electricity Demand: Supplying Power to a Smaller,
Older JapanJapan’s Population faces a steep decline between now and 2040
2010populatio
n
2015populatio
n
2020populatio
n
2025populatio
n
2030 populatio
n
2035 populatio
n
2040 populatio
n
128.057
million
126.597
million
124.100
million
120.659
million
116.618
million
112.124
million
107.276
million
The Working Age Population (15-64) was 81 million in 2010
By 2040, it will be 57 million – a decline of 30 percent
Who is Going to Need Electricity?
In Tokyo, the overall population is expected to decline by just seven percent by 2040, compared to 2010.
However, one-third of Tokyoites (34%) will be over 65 years old (20% in 2010) and 17% (9% in 2010) will be over 75 years old by 2040.
In Osaka, the overall population will decline by 16% by 2040 compared to 2010.
36% of Osakans will be over 65 years old in 2040 (22% in 2010). 20% will be over 75 years old (10% in 2010).
Nationwide, 36% of the population, on average, will be over 65 years old by 2040.
Over one-fifth, 21% ,of Japan will be over 75 years old in 2040.
And What If. . .?20% of the world’s earthquakes 5.0 and above on the Richter Scale occur in Japan.
According the Japanese government, the number aftershocks (not earthquakes) that measured 5.0 and above on the different scale Japan uses between March 11, 2013 and March 10, 2014 was ``only’’ 56. That’s down from 653 between March 11, 2011 and March 10, 2012.
Do you really want build more nuclear reactors given this seismic reality?
So, To Sum Up. . . In 2040, Japan’s electricity demand will be for a country that
has 16% less people than it had in 2010 (128 million down to 107 million).
In 2040, Japan’s electricity demand will be for a country where, overall, more than one-third of the population (36%) has reached retirement age and, presumably, will be consuming less electricity in the workplace than at present.
In 2040, Japan’s domestic electricity market will include the needs of the one-fifth of the country (20%) who are 75 years and above.
In 2040, Japan’s domestic electricity market will provide power to consumer products and businesses that are likely to be far more energy-efficient than is the case today, as technological innovation continues.
``Nuclear power will continue to play an important role in Japan’s future energy mix’’.
A Reality Check… In 2040, 45 of the current 50 commercial nuclear power
plants will be at least 40 years old (By 2020, 12 will have already reached 40 years of operation) Assuming their life is extended to 60 years (involving unknown
additional costs), 17 of the 50 reactors would be at least 50 years old in 2040.
12 reactors would be over 60 years old by 2040 and would be undergoing decommissioning – including 8 of 14 reactors in Fukui Pref. which supply power to the Kansai region.
You have decommissioning costs of between 35 and 83 billion yen per reactor that will have to be paid, either after 40 or 60 years of operation, ON TOP OF any other costs. ALL OF THESE ARE GOING TO GET PASSED ON TO CONSUMERS.
What all this means is. . . By 2020, long-term decisions will have to be made on the
first 12 reactors that have reached, or surpassed, 40 years of operation. Continuing their operations means:
1) Getting local permission to operate for another 20 years. This will involve increased use of national tax money for local pet construction projects in return for permission.
2) Making whatever safety and engineering adjustments are needed to get approval for another 20 years. Who pays for such measures? How long will they take to implement?
3) Operating an aging plant, more likely to be in need of increased monitoring and repairs. Will such plants continue to operate at a capacity that keeps the cost per kilowatt hour competitive with LNG or even some renewables?
Oh, and don’t forget about those nearly full spent fuel pools.
Even if you extend the life of a 40 year old reactor for 20 years, you still have the problem of what to do with the spent fuel it generates.
Remember, 33 of the nation’s 50 reactors will see their spent fuel pools filled to the brim within about six years if operations are restarted tomorrow. Another 14 will be full a dozen years after being restarted. AND THERE ARE NO NEW STORAGE FACILITIES BEING BUILT AT PRESENT.
And just who is going to be operating those nuclear plants?
Japan has three undergraduate and nine master’s degree courses with either ``nuclear’’ or ``atomic’’ in their names. Most are under-enrolled.
Majority of nuclear plant workers entered workforce in the 1970s, now facing retirement.
Japan Atomic Industrial Forum reported that 80 percent fewer students participated in annual recruitment events in Tokyo and Osaka in 2012, compared to 2010.
The lack of interest in nuclear power among the younger generations comes as aging plants must be continued or decommissioned after 40 years, requiring a new generation of skilled workers.
BUT HERE IS THE REAL PROBLEM:Japan says it is doing all it can to save energy and electricity and is far more efficient than most nations in using electricity.
Is it?
Not Legally Required to Cut Usage
Despite all of the nuclear power village warnings about possible electricity shortages without nuclear power, there are no mandatory electricity savings measures in place.
What Japan has are ``voluntary’’ reductions on electricity use that carry no legal weight.
``Don’t Worry, Be Happy’’ Urban residents have made very few major changes to
their lifestyles since 3/11. Many cities have not curbed the use of neon lighting, while some retail stores operate with their doors and windows open and their air conditioners on. The utilities run ads on TV encouraging people to use MORE not less electricity.
A Small Example: Vending Machines Few curbs on things like electricity-guzzling vending
machines. (``Vending machines serve as an emergency lifeline in times of natural disaster– a Coca-Cola spokeswoman in Tokyo after the Tohoku quake)
Japan has over 5 million vending machines –in country with a population of 127 million.
The U.S, with a population of 317 million, has about 4.6 million vending machines.
Limits on What Households Can Do
Traditional Japanese Homes: Not Designed with Efficient Use of Electricity In Mind.
Modern Homes: Often lack insulation, central heating, double-glazed windows, and insulation
In Conclusion To continue with nuclear power will be far more
expensive than the Nuclear Power Village claims, carries all sorts of safety risks, and runs the risk of investing in a technology that, like the steam engine, has had its day.
To switch to renewables will take time and huge amounts of money, angers the politically powerful Nuclear Power Village, and involves technologies still being developed.
Japanese are addicted to a hyper-urban, hyper-convenient lifestyle that uses lots of electricity. Getting them to change their habits is the toughest challenge, but demographics may do it anyway.
THANKS FOR LISTENING!