japan's post-fukushima energy policy: a nuclear past or a non-nuclear future? 2015

72
Japan’s Post- Fukushima Energy Policy Eric Johnston Deputy Editor, The Japan Times A Nuclear Past or a Non- Nuclear Future?

Upload: eric-johnston

Post on 15-Apr-2017

879 views

Category:

News & Politics


1 download

TRANSCRIPT

Page 1: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

Japan’s Post-Fukushima Energy

Policy

Eric JohnstonDeputy Editor, The Japan Times

A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future?

Page 2: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

Japan’s Energy Situation

1. Japan imports 90 percent of energy needs.

2. Due to geopolitical problems, little Russian oil or LNG comes to Japan.

3. Oil and LNG is transported from Africa, Middle East, Southeast Asia, and coal from Australia. Huge transportation costs and in the case of oil, political uncertainties add to price.

4. U.S. is exporting shale gas in small quantities to Japan, which will increase in coming years. But political issues in US Congress creating uncertainty of guaranteed supply. Alaska wants Japan to help build an LNG pipeline.

Page 3: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

Japan’s Energy Mix

2010 2011 2012 20130

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

28.6

10.7

1.7 1

24.9 2527.6

30.329.3

39.542.5 43.2

7.1

14.418.3

14.9

8.3 9 8.4 8.5

1.1 1.4 1.6 2.2

Percentages

Nuclear Coal LNG Oil Hydro Renewables

Page 4: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

Nuclear Pre 3/11 Before March 11, 2011, there were 54

commercial nuclear reactors in Japan supplying about 1/3 of Japan’s electricity.

Each reactor generated between 540 megawatts electricity (MWe) and 1.3 gigawatts (GWe). 1,000 megawatts = 1 gigawatt.

There had also been plans to ramp up the share of nuclear power to as much as 40 percent by mid-century by building new plants to replace aging ones.

Page 5: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

Why Did Japan

Go Nuclear in the first place?

A Brief (very brief) History

Page 6: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

The End of WWII and the Occupation

Japan went to war at least partially to secure oil and gas reserves for its growing domestic industries. The dream of becoming ``self-sufficient’’ in energy production had haunted the country since the late 1800s, after Japan opened to the outside world after two and a half centuries of isolation.

The postwar U.S.-led Occupation of Japan made the country a U.S. ally in the Pacific against communism. Japan got access to fossil fuel sources from U.S. allies, but the independent energy dream never died.

Page 7: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

1953: A Chance Meeting At Harvard

Yasuhiro Nakasone Henry Kissinger

Page 8: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

Dec. 1953: Atoms For Peace

Concerned about other nations, allied or otherwise, pursuing their own nuclear technology programs, President Dwight Eisenhower announces in the United Nations the ``Atoms for Peace’’ program, the practical result being that the U.S. supplies nuclear knowhow and technology to friendly nations like Japan wanting it for ``peaceful purposes.’’

In March 1954, Nakasone manages to get the first-ever budget for nuclear research passed in parliament, thus beginning Japan’s road to nuclear power.

Page 9: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

Selling Nuclear To A Skeptical Nation

SHORIKI MATSUTAROYomiuri Shimbun owner, friend of Nakasone, convicted war criminal, CIA agent, and The Godfather of Japanese Pro Baseball and the Japanese Nuclear Power Industry

ZENSAKU AZUMAJapan’s Charles Lindbergh’’, extremely

popular with the public, promoted eating uranium-laced food, extolled nuclear power

(and cigarettes), and died of cancer.

Page 10: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

The Three Electricity Laws: Payoffs to the Provinces

By the early 1970s, Japan had built its first commercial nuclear reactors using American, British, and French technology and knowhow. But as the dangers of nuclear power, and concerns about nuclear weapons, grew, and following the 1973 oil shock, Japan’s leaders realized that in order to overcome antinuclear sentiment and build more plants, local governments where the power plants were located needed to be financially compensated.In the mid-1970s, Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka’s government passed three new laws that provided funding to any locality that agreed to host a nuclear power plant. Thus was born the ``nuclear power village’’ of national government officials, utilities, and local governments and businesses that we know today.

Page 11: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

How Much Official Funding Do Local Governments Get?

Model Case: Construction of a 1.35GW nuclear power

plant.Assumptions (1) Environmental Impact Study takes three years(2) Construction takes seven years(3) Plant Operates for 40 yearsOver a 45 year period, from beginning of environmental assessment to the 35 th year of the plant’s operation, local governments hosting the plant can receive 121.5 billion yen, or almost 1.2 billion dollars under the Electricity Laws. This does not include additional donations from the utility or other unofficial forms of assistance.

TOTAL AMOUNT A LOCAL TOWN OR VILLAGE RECEIVES FOR HOSTING A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT: Nobody Really Knows.

Page 12: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

Ye Olde Nuclear Village

For over four decades, the ``nuclear power village’’ has kept opposition to nuclear power at bay. Four years after 3/11, though, a powerful struggle between the powerful village and renewable energy proponents threatens the village as never before.

Page 13: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

RENEWABLE ENERGY: Talkin’ `bout a

Revolution!

Post-3/11 Developments

X

Page 14: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

The Nuclear Village Under Attack

In the months after 3/11, polls showed that up to 90 percent of Japanese wanted out of nuclear power.

Seizing the opportunity, renewable energy advocates pushed hard to win political and financial support. For months, the nuclear village was under attack by the media, politicians, and the public at large as the nation asked itself fundamental questions about why it had embraced nuclear to begin with and how it could move out of nuclear power and into renewables.

Page 15: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

Renewable Energy advocates pushed hard for a Feed-In Tariff after 3/11. The (then) ruling

Democratic Party of Japan favored the FIT, especially Prime Minister Naoto Kan. It was strongly opposed by the Nuclear Power Village but passed at the end of August, 2011– the sam day Kan resigned over his

handling of 3/11. The new tariff went into effect on July 1st, 2012:

The New Tariff means businesses in five renewable energy sectors can sell their power at a guaranteed fixed rate over a

fixed period of time. Utilities are required to purchase renewable energy at that price, but can refuse if they judge, for reasons not always clear, that to do so

would create distribution problems.

Page 16: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

THE FEED-IN TARIFFS

SOLAR POWER

Output Range ABOVE 10 KW BELOW 10KW

Basic Tariff (per

kilowatt/hour)(as of July 1, 2015)

27 yen/kWh 33-35yen/kWh

PERIOD 20 years 10 years

Page 17: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

THE FEED-IN TARIFFSWIND POWER

TYPE BELOW 20kW ABOVE 20 kW OFFSHORE

BASIC TARIFF

55 yen/kWh

22 yen/kWh

36 yen/kWh

PERIOD 20 years

Page 18: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

THE NEW FEED-IN TARIFFS

GEOTHERMAL POWER

Output Range ABOVE 15,000 KW

BELOW 15,000 KW

Basic Tariff (per

kilowatt/hour)

26 yen/kWh 40 yen/kWh

PERIOD 15 years

Page 19: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

THE NEW FEED-IN TARIFFS (for NEW facilities)

MINI-HYDRO

Output Range

1mW-30mW

200kW-1mW

Under 200kW

Basic Tariff(per kilowatt

hour)24 yen/kWh 29 yen/kWh 34 yen/kWh

PERIOD 20 years

Page 20: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

THE NEW FEED-IN TARIFFSBIOMASS

Sector Wood (unused) Wood (general)

Building Waste Wood

Construction waste-related

Biomass

Methane

Type 2,000 kW or more

Under 2,000 kW

Unused Wood

Products

General Wood

Various Sewer sludge,

etc.

BasicTariff(per kwH)

32 40 yen/kW yen/kW

24 yen/kWh

13 yen/kW

h

17 yen/kWh 39 yen/kW

h

Period 20 years

Page 21: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

The Current Situation as of FEBRUARY 2015

TYPE OF RENEWABLE ENERGY CUMULATIVE CERTIFIEDCAPACITY

PV (under 10 kW) 3.633 GWPV (over 10 kw) 70.9 GW

Wind 1.986 GWMini-Hydro 0.567 GWGeothermal 0.069 GWBiomass 1.529 GWTOTAL 78.684 GW

Page 22: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

BUT, the actual amount in operation

as of JANUARY 2015 TYPE OF RENEWABLE

ENERGY CUMULATIVE OPERATIONAL CAPACITY

PV (under 10 kW) 2.95 GWPV (over 10 kw) 13.3 GW

Wind 0.255 GWMini-Hydro 0.044 GWGeothermal 0.002 GWBiomass 0.151 GWTOTAL 16.71 GW

Page 23: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

The Good News: Photovoltaic (Solar) SystemsAccording to the Yano Research Institute, thanks to the 2012 Feed In Tariff, Japan was ranked first in the world in terms of installed Solar PV power generation in 2014.

Unofficial estimate of how

much power solar energy could ``feasibly’’ generate:

100-150GW

Page 24: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

The Good News: Offshore Wind PowerA 2 megawatt offshore wind power facility was built off the coast of Fukushima prefecture, almost within site of the crippled nuclear power plant.

Operation commenced in November 2013. This will be followed by two 7 MW offshore wind turbines installed in March.

Studies show Fukushima and Japanese coastal areas are ideal for offshore wind farms. No concerns about noise complaints, and wider area of potential establishment than land-based wind farms, which means they can be located closer to the grid.

Japan’s potential offshore

wind power capacity: 1,600GW

Page 25: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

Local Governments, NOT Tokyo are leading the way to a renewable

futureOPERATING CAPACITY (Dec. 2014,

kW)Rank Prefecture SOLAR WIND HYDRO

GEOTHERMAL

BIOMASS TOTAL

1 FUKUOKA 831,653

1 23 0 190 831,867

2 MIYAGI 783,305

16,000

1,600

0 16,740 817,645

3 AICHI 767,075

12,000

0 0 0 779,075

4 HYOGO 728,185

12,000

6 0 7,457 747,648

5 CHIBA 694,784

0 330 0 1,770 696,884

6 KAGOSHIMA 628,203

33,602

1,676

0 0 663,481

7 SHIZUOKA 585,572

0 1,043

0 95 586,710

8 TOCHIGI 557,111

0 690 0 2,815 560,616

9 GUNMA 522,158

0 73 0 400 522,631

10

SAITAMA 492,850

0 326 0 1,813 494,989

NATIONWIDE (as of Dec.31st, 2014)

15,408,838 226,922 43,701 906 136,016 15,816,382

Page 26: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

But It’s Not All Good News

PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES TO REALIZING A RENEWABLE FUTURE

Page 27: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

1 TECHINCAL/LOGISTICAL CHALLENGS

Page 28: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

CHALLENGE A: The Grid System

Grids to Major Urban Centers (electricity users): locations best suited for renewable energy projects, particularly large-scale solar farms and wind farms, often located in rural areas far away from urban users.

Japan is divided into 60 Hz grids (for western Japan) and 50 Hz (for eastern and northern Japan), meaning a nationwide renewable grid is not commercially feasible.

Page 29: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

CHALLENGE A: The Grid System

Page 30: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

CHALLENGE B: Regional Utility Monopoly

System 10 major utilities largely control the generation,

distribution, and sale of electric power in Japan. They set prices in general agreement with each other, and new players to the energy market have to deal with them if they want to get connected to a piece of the national grid.

Utilities have nearly total control over which electricity generation sources they send down to the grid to customers, and their motto is always the same, ``Safe, Stable, and Secure’’ electricity supply, at a fixed price.

Page 31: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

CHALLENGE B: Regional Utility Monopoly System

Page 32: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES: SOLAR POWER

Rapidly improving solar technologies makes Japan’s highly conservative electricity industry cautious about installing solar power technology now that will be out of date in one or two years.

Worries about securing a ``safe and stable’’ electricity supply during cloudy nights, at night, etc., and insufficent battery storage technologies.

Battle between Large Solar Farm proponents and Small Solar Products/Residential Area proponents over direction of industry.

Nuclear lobby’s anti-solar campaign (``nobody wants solar farms in their backyard’’, ``it’s still too expensive’’) is working.

Page 33: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES: WIND POWER

FIT needs to be based on wind conditions of location, not a fixed amount of power generation for all locations.Noise: Local communities complain about loud windmillsBirds: Bird strikes and migratory patterns mean strict environmental regulations on wind farm development. Remoteness: Best Locations for On-Shore windmills often located far from urban centers, necessitating expensive grid connections.

Page 34: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES: GEOTHERAL POWER

1) Vast majority of Japan’s geothermal resources in National Park areas: Strict environmental regulations.2) Many ideal geothermal locations on, or beside, onsens (hot spring resorts) whose politically-connected owners oppose geothermal development for business reasons.3) Geothermal requires heavy initial investment. High cost to maintain and repair plants. 4) Public fears, aided by pro-nuclear propagandists, that geothermal drilling causes earthquakes.

Page 35: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES: MINI- HYDRO POWER

Requires rivers and streams with regular flows of water at ideal speeds, and those can be hard to find.

Strict gradation requirements often means construction work is needed, creating further environmental damage.

Remote areas of many ideal mini-hydro spots means increased costs to deliver generated electricity.

Page 36: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES:

BIOMASS1) Bureaucratic turf wars in Japan means a regulatory nightmare, little cooperation between ministries (Environment, Forestry, Trade and Industry) to promote different biomass forms.

2) Opposition from both the pro-nuclear business lobby and from environmentalists who warn burning biomass for fuel will simply increase greenhouse gas emissions.

3) Lack of government and major corporate interest in biomass, compared to solar and wind.

Page 37: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

GENERAL CHALLENGES TO GETTING OUT OF NUCLEAR AND INTO

RENEWABLE ENERGY:

Page 38: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

1) Outdated Structure of Established Anti-Nuclear Groups.

a) Traditional anti-nuclear NGO leaders now well into their 60s, 70s, and 80s, and have been protesting for over four decades.

b) Often have limited understanding of, or interest in, modern NGO leadership techniques, media and public outreach strategies, or broad-based public education of the issues.

Page 39: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

2) Provincialism Because anti-nuclear groups have traditionally been local community-based, they can be extremely provincial and suspicious of outsiders. Town A’s anti-nuclear groups don’t talk or care much about Town B’s anti-nuclear groups.

When cooperation occurs, it’s often at the ``let’s exchange information’’ level only, not at the political action level.

Page 40: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

3) Group-ismSeniority, deferring to one’s elders, and group consensus cultural traits mean young people (i.e. those under 50 years of age) feel shut out by traditional anti-nuclear groups.

As a result, such groups played something of a secondary role in the mass public demonstrations against nuclear power after March 11, 2011.

Page 41: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

4) Divisions Within Anti-Nuke Movement

Factionalism Within Anti-Nuclear Organizations Themselves: For decades, many of the groups in Japan seeking the abolishment of nuclear weapons were actually pro-nuclear power.

Even today, most of the main groups that organize the yearly protests against nuclear weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki are often reluctant to come out strongly against nuclear power because their members work at utilities.

Page 42: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

Problems With Renewable Energy Groups

Bottom Up Versus Top Down: Major NGOs and other organizations promoting renewable energy are Tokyo-based, and generally favor a top-down approach whereby the central government leads and local governments follow.

Local governments and businesses often favor a more decentralized, bottom-up approach (localized small-scale renewable energy projects with revised local ordinances to make them happen)

Page 43: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

Problems With Renewable Energy

GroupsThe Big Guys versus the New Players: Toshiba, Mitsubishi, Hitachi, Sharp, Sanyo, Toyota, Kyocera. . . these are just some of the huge Japanese firms making heavy investments in renewable energy technologies and massive projects. Clearly, the new FIT is tilted in their favor.

But the kind of innovation from small and medium-sized firms like we see in the U.S., as well as Canada, China, South Korea, India, and parts of Europe is not as high-profile. It’s all occurring (mostly) under the radar.

Page 44: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

Problems with Renewable Energy Groups

``Solar? Wind? Geothermal’’?

Competition And Factionalism Within The Renewable Energy Movement Creates Public Confusion and Doubt: Solar, wind, mini-hydro, biomass and geothermal advocates lobby hard for their chosen energy source. Policy makers at the local and national level want the ``best energy mix’’ that offers ``safe, stable, and secure’’ electricity generation.

But WHICH combination of renewables meets the goal in the short and medium-term? Depends on who you talk to.

Page 45: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

Problems with Renewable Energy

GroupsWeakness in Addressing

Specific Public Concerns about

Higher Electricity Bills for

Individuals and Possible

Negative Effects on Industries Using Lots of

Electricity

Page 46: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

HOWEVER. . .FOR ALL OF THE

PROBLEMS WITH RENEWABLE ENERGY, THE

PROBLEMS WITH A RETURN TO NUCLEAR ARE

MUCH GREATER

Page 47: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

Problem 1:AGING REACTORS

12 out of the 50 reactors are now over 36 years old.

SEVEN are now over 40 years old.

The life-span of Japan’s nuclear reactors is officially considered 40 years.

At the end of the 40 year cycle, the operator can apply for a 20 year extension, theoretically extending the life of a plant to 60 years.

Page 48: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

Japan’s Aging Nuclear Reactors (as of 2015)

Name of Utility Name of Reactor Age

KANSAI ELECTRIC

Mihama No. 1 reactor 45 years old

Mihama No. 2 reactor 43 years old

Mihama No. 3 reactor 39 years old

Oi No. 1 reactor 36 years old

Oi No. 2 reactor 36 years old

Takahama No. 1 reactor 41 years old

Takahama No. 2 reactor 40 years old

CHUGOKU ELECTRIC Shimane No. 1 reactor 41 years old

SHIKOKU ELECTRIC Ikata No. 1 reactor 38 years old

KYUSHU ELECTRIC Genkai No. 1 reactor 40 years old

NIHON GENDEN Higashiumi Dai Ni 37 years old

Tsuruga No. 1 reactor 45 years old

Page 49: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

PROBLEM NUMBER TWO:

SPENT FUEL POOLS ALMOST FULL:

``Building a nuclear power plant is like building a house without a toilet.’’

Once nuclear fuel is burned, the resulting spent fuel waste is removed from the reactor and stored in cooling pools.

But. ..

Page 50: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

NUMBER OF YEARS AFTER RESTART UNTIL SPENT FUEL

POOLS ARE FULL

NAME OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS AND REACTORS

LESS THAN SIX YEARS REMAINING UNTIL

FULL

(33 of 50 reactors)

Tomari No. 1, 2 (Hokkaido); Onogawa No. 1, 2 (Miyagi)

Fukushima Daichi 1 No. 5, 6; Fukushima Daini, No. 1-4Kashiwazaki-Karuiwa No. 1-7 (Tepco)

Hamaoka No. 3,4 (Chubu),Mihama No. 1, 2; Oi 1, 2; Takahama 1, 2 (Kepco)

Shimane No. 1, Ikata No. 1,2 (Shikoku)Genkai No. 1-4 (Kyushu)

BETWEEN SIX AND TWELVE YEARS

REMAINING UNTIL FULL

(14 of 50 reactors)

Higashidori (Aomori)Onogawa No. 3 (Miyagi)Tsuruga No. 1,2 (Fukui)

Hamaoka No. 5 (Shizuoka)Shiga No. 1,2 (Ishikawa)

Mihama No. 3 (Fukui)Oi No. 3, 4 (Fukui)

Takahama No. 3, 4 (Fukui)Shimane No. 2 (Shimane)Sendai No. 2 (Kagoshima)

MORE THAN 12 YEARS (3 reactors)

Tomari No. 3 (Hokkaido)Ikata No. 3 (Ehime)

Sendai No. 1 (Kagoshima)

Page 51: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

SO, NOW WHAT?Currently, 14,200 tons of spent nuclear fuel sits in storage at

Japan’s nuclear power plants. Spent fuel pools are now 70 percent full, on

average

What Are The Options Each Plant Has For Dealing With Spent Fuel?

OPTION 1: Ship it the Rokkasho

Reprocesssing Plant

in Aomori Prefecture

OPTION 2: Move it to specially designed mid-term storage

containers

OPTION 3:Reprocess the

spent fuel overseas

Page 52: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

OPTION 1: Ship it to Rokkasho

PROBLEMSThe Rokkasho reprocessing plant :1) Has suffered numerous technical problems, delaying the projected start-up

numerous times.2) Is opposed by not only traditional antinuclear activists but also international

nonproliferation experts.3) Is not expected to go into operation anytime soon.

4) Is already storing 2,945 tons of spent fuel –98 percent of its storage capacity

Rokkasho plant, when it goes into operation, is supposed to take spent nuclear fuel from Japan’s reactors, reprocess it, and send it back to plants to be used again and again.

Page 53: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

OPTION 2: Mid-term Storage: (spent fuel spends 50 years in offsite facility

before ``final’’ disposal at Rokkasho) PROBLEMS:1) Costs involved with transporting spent fuel by truck or ship from current

location to new facility and costs of storage: Who pays? 2) Safety concerns in any locality the waste passes through: What happens if

towns and villages or fisherman’s unions oppose shipments, forcing transportation routes to be altered? Will town demand financial compensation from government or utilities for allowing waste to pass through? How does that affect the ultimate cost of ``cheap’’ nuclear power?

3) THE BIGGEST PROBLEM: Local governments around Japan have ignored pleas from Tokyo to host facilities, which would mean nuclear waste in their backyard for at least a half century.

THIS IS WHY TOKYO RECENTLY SAID IT WILL DETERMINE LOCATION OF STORAGE FACILITIES RATHER THAN ASK LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO

VOLUNTEER TO TAKE THEM

Page 54: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

OPTION 3: Reprocess it Overseas

This has been done on a limited scale. Reprocessing Japanese fuel, which is then returned to Japan and reused, has taken place in England and France.

PROBLEMS: 1) Huge Expense, drives up cost/kWh.2) International Proliferation Risks3) Refusal of many countries to allow nuclear-laden ships to

pass through their waters.4) Risk of an Accident or Terrorist Attack, sinking or damaging

ships transporting nuclear cargo.

Page 55: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

So what’s the plan for the remaining reactors?

(as of April) Fukushima Dai-Ichi reactors 5 and 6 (the ones not

damaged by the quake) will be scrapped. Fukushima Dai-Ni’s four plants will have to be

scrapped as it’s politically impossible to restart them.

Five reactors nationwide at least 40 years old will be decommissioned.

24 reactors are under review for possible restart, including two over 40 years old.

Two reactors in Fukui Prefecture that power Kyoto, originally approved by Tokyo for restart, have a provisional injunction against their restart.

Two reactors in Kyushu are thought likely to restart this year, but recent volcano creating concerns.

A reactor in Ehime (Shikoku) could be first to restart

Page 56: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

``So, just extend the older plants’ lives past 40 years.’’

Questions about Safety Would a plant that is 40

years old pass the stricter safety standards that went into effect in 2013?

Would the operating utility be required to beef up safety measures before government permission for extension past 40 years is granted?

Would local governments

hosting the plant need to implement any additional safety measures?

Questions about Money Though not a legal requirement, would local authorities grant permission for plant’s life to be extended past 40 years?

How much money would they demand (in the form of, for example, ``stronger safety measures’’) from either Tokyo or the operating utility before granting permission?

How long would these negotiations over money take, and, ultimately, would they cost the taxpayers money in the form of higher utility bills?

Would a nuclear reactor more than 40 years old generate electricity at an economically competitive price?

Page 57: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

By The Way. . . National Energy Policy requires

planning for the mid and long-

term –decades, not years.

Obviously, the most basic

question is, how big will

your domestic electricity

market be by, say, 2030 or

2040?

Page 58: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

Future Electricity Demand: Supplying Power to a Smaller,

Older JapanJapan’s Population faces a steep decline between now and 2040

2010populatio

n

2015populatio

n

2020populatio

n

2025populatio

n

2030 populatio

n

2035 populatio

n

2040 populatio

n

128.057

million

126.597

million

124.100

million

120.659

million

116.618

million

112.124

million

107.276

million

The Working Age Population (15-64) was 81 million in 2010

By 2040, it will be 57 million – a decline of 30 percent

Page 59: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

Who is Going to Need Electricity?

In Tokyo, the overall population is expected to decline by just seven percent by 2040, compared to 2010.

However, one-third of Tokyoites (34%) will be over 65 years old (20% in 2010) and 17% (9% in 2010) will be over 75 years old by 2040.

In Osaka, the overall population will decline by 16% by 2040 compared to 2010.

36% of Osakans will be over 65 years old in 2040 (22% in 2010). 20% will be over 75 years old (10% in 2010).

Nationwide, 36% of the population, on average, will be over 65 years old by 2040.

Over one-fifth, 21% ,of Japan will be over 75 years old in 2040.

Page 60: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

And What If. . .?20% of the world’s earthquakes 5.0 and above on the Richter Scale occur in Japan.

According the Japanese government, the number aftershocks (not earthquakes) that measured 5.0 and above on the different scale Japan uses between March 11, 2013 and March 10, 2014 was ``only’’ 56. That’s down from 653 between March 11, 2011 and March 10, 2012.

Do you really want build more nuclear reactors given this seismic reality?

Page 61: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

So, To Sum Up. . . In 2040, Japan’s electricity demand will be for a country that

has 16% less people than it had in 2010 (128 million down to 107 million).

In 2040, Japan’s electricity demand will be for a country where, overall, more than one-third of the population (36%) has reached retirement age and, presumably, will be consuming less electricity in the workplace than at present.

In 2040, Japan’s domestic electricity market will include the needs of the one-fifth of the country (20%) who are 75 years and above.

In 2040, Japan’s domestic electricity market will provide power to consumer products and businesses that are likely to be far more energy-efficient than is the case today, as technological innovation continues.

Page 62: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

``Nuclear power will continue to play an important role in Japan’s future energy mix’’.

A Reality Check… In 2040, 45 of the current 50 commercial nuclear power

plants will be at least 40 years old (By 2020, 12 will have already reached 40 years of operation) Assuming their life is extended to 60 years (involving unknown

additional costs), 17 of the 50 reactors would be at least 50 years old in 2040.

12 reactors would be over 60 years old by 2040 and would be undergoing decommissioning – including 8 of 14 reactors in Fukui Pref. which supply power to the Kansai region.

You have decommissioning costs of between 35 and 83 billion yen per reactor that will have to be paid, either after 40 or 60 years of operation, ON TOP OF any other costs. ALL OF THESE ARE GOING TO GET PASSED ON TO CONSUMERS.

Page 63: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

What all this means is. . . By 2020, long-term decisions will have to be made on the

first 12 reactors that have reached, or surpassed, 40 years of operation. Continuing their operations means:

1) Getting local permission to operate for another 20 years. This will involve increased use of national tax money for local pet construction projects in return for permission.

2) Making whatever safety and engineering adjustments are needed to get approval for another 20 years. Who pays for such measures? How long will they take to implement?

3) Operating an aging plant, more likely to be in need of increased monitoring and repairs. Will such plants continue to operate at a capacity that keeps the cost per kilowatt hour competitive with LNG or even some renewables?

Page 64: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

Oh, and don’t forget about those nearly full spent fuel pools.

Even if you extend the life of a 40 year old reactor for 20 years, you still have the problem of what to do with the spent fuel it generates.

Remember, 33 of the nation’s 50 reactors will see their spent fuel pools filled to the brim within about six years if operations are restarted tomorrow. Another 14 will be full a dozen years after being restarted. AND THERE ARE NO NEW STORAGE FACILITIES BEING BUILT AT PRESENT.

Page 65: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

And just who is going to be operating those nuclear plants?

Japan has three undergraduate and nine master’s degree courses with either ``nuclear’’ or ``atomic’’ in their names. Most are under-enrolled.

Majority of nuclear plant workers entered workforce in the 1970s, now facing retirement.

Japan Atomic Industrial Forum reported that 80 percent fewer students participated in annual recruitment events in Tokyo and Osaka in 2012, compared to 2010.

The lack of interest in nuclear power among the younger generations comes as aging plants must be continued or decommissioned after 40 years, requiring a new generation of skilled workers.

Page 66: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

BUT HERE IS THE REAL PROBLEM:Japan says it is doing all it can to save energy and electricity and is far more efficient than most nations in using electricity.

Is it?

Page 67: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

Not Legally Required to Cut Usage

Despite all of the nuclear power village warnings about possible electricity shortages without nuclear power, there are no mandatory electricity savings measures in place.

What Japan has are ``voluntary’’ reductions on electricity use that carry no legal weight.

Page 68: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

``Don’t Worry, Be Happy’’ Urban residents have made very few major changes to

their lifestyles since 3/11. Many cities have not curbed the use of neon lighting, while some retail stores operate with their doors and windows open and their air conditioners on. The utilities run ads on TV encouraging people to use MORE not less electricity.

Page 69: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

A Small Example: Vending Machines Few curbs on things like electricity-guzzling vending

machines. (``Vending machines serve as an emergency lifeline in times of natural disaster– a Coca-Cola spokeswoman in Tokyo after the Tohoku quake)

Japan has over 5 million vending machines –in country with a population of 127 million.

The U.S, with a population of 317 million, has about 4.6 million vending machines.

Page 70: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

Limits on What Households Can Do

Traditional Japanese Homes: Not Designed with Efficient Use of Electricity In Mind.

Modern Homes: Often lack insulation, central heating, double-glazed windows, and insulation

Page 71: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

In Conclusion To continue with nuclear power will be far more

expensive than the Nuclear Power Village claims, carries all sorts of safety risks, and runs the risk of investing in a technology that, like the steam engine, has had its day.

To switch to renewables will take time and huge amounts of money, angers the politically powerful Nuclear Power Village, and involves technologies still being developed.

Japanese are addicted to a hyper-urban, hyper-convenient lifestyle that uses lots of electricity. Getting them to change their habits is the toughest challenge, but demographics may do it anyway.

Page 72: Japan's Post-Fukushima Energy Policy: A Nuclear Past or a Non-Nuclear Future? 2015

THANKS FOR LISTENING!