january–february 2011 of pth e rofession y aign · making training development processes more...

Preparing the Iraqi Federal Police Sustainment BrigadeTelemaintenance in the German ArmyAvalanche Response in Afghanistan

Natural Fire 10: U.S. Army Africa’s First Major Exercise

Approvedforpublicrelease;distributionisunlimited.PB700–11–1Headquarters,DepartmentoftheArmy

JANUARy–FEBRUARy 2011

WWW.ALU.ARMy.MIL/ALOG

ThE ARMy

PROFESSION

OF ARMS CAMPAIGN

ALetterFromMajorGeneralJamesL.Hodge

TheArmyProfessionofArmsCampaign:AYearofDialog AfteraDecadeofConflict

PreparingtheIraqiFederalPoliceSustainment BrigadefortheFuture —MajorHenryS.Groulx

Telemaintenance:TransferringKnowledgetotheField —Colonel(Ret.)ErichPokorny,GermanArmy

TrainingaCombatSustainmentSupportBattalion —Dr.JohnM.Menter

The377thTheaterSustainmentCommandDeployment/ RedeploymentCoordinationCellinHaiti —LieutenantColonelMichaelJ.Perez

SustainmentSRM:WhytheArmyIsUniquelyPositioned toBenefit —JamesD.McIntoshandJonathanSelter

TestingtheCapabilitiesoftheHEMTTWrecker —FirstLieutenantJeffreyTeplis

TerrainAnalysisforNon-Engineers —MajorDamienA.Green

ArmySoldierEnhancementProgram —ThomasB.HouseIIandRaymondE.Strunk

ABattalioninItalySupportsHumanitarian DisasterReliefAroundtheWorld —CaptainMichaelKistler,USAR,FredWittmer,andJenniferKing

MedicalLogisticsattheSalangPassAvalanche —CaptainJerryD.VanVactor,CaptainJasonDonovant,USAF, andFirstLieutenantMichaelDinh-Truong,USAR

OMMSAdvancedRifleMarksmanshipTraining —CaptainMatthewC.Miller

SustainmentTechnologiesforBCTModernization —ThomasHosmer

PB700–11–01VOLUME43ISSUE1JANUARY–FEBRUARY2011www.alu.army.mil/alog

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Cover:NaturalFire10wasthefirstmajorexerciseforU.S.ArmyAfrica(USARAF),theArmyservicecomponentcommandoftheU.S.AfricaCommand,anditwasthelargestdeploymentofU.S.forcesinAfricasinceWorldWarII.Africapresentsphysical,administrative,andculturalchallengestodeployingU.S.forces.Asdescribedinthearticlebeginningonpage34,USARAFovercamethesechallengesbyusingtheadaptivelogisticsnetworkconcept,whichmaximizedtheuseofexistingsystemsonthecontinent.Inthecoverphoto,aCH–47ChinookhelicopterapproachesKitgum,Uganda.Kitgumistheheadquartersofthe401stBrigadeoftheUgandanPeoplesDefenseForceandthesiteoftheexercise.(Photo by SSG Horace Murray)

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LINES OF COMMUNICATION

SPECTRUMREADING & REVIEWS

HEADLINES

WRITING FOR ARMY SUSTAINMENT

COMMENTARY

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IntoAfrica:NaturalFire10 —ToddL.Johnston

DefenseFreightCarOperationsYesterday,Today,andTomorrow —GeorgeGounley

TheArmyBandOfficerLifecycle —LieutenantColonelJimR.Keene

MakingTrainingDevelopmentProcessesMoreEfficient ThroughLeanSixSigma —DonaldD.Copley,Jr.

FromtheSwamptotheHighGroundandBack —Dr.ChristopherR.PaparoneandGeorgeL.Topic

AdvicetoaNewSustainmentPlannerattheBrigade CommandPost —KennethLong

IndexofArmy Sustainment Articles—2010

WritingforArmy Sustainment

JOYCE E. MORROWAdministrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army

1033607

BOARD OF DIRECTORSChairman

Major General James L. HodgeCommander

ArmyCombinedArmsSupportCommand

MembersLieutenant General Mitchell H. Stevenson

DeputyChiefofStaff,G-4DepartmentoftheArmy

Lieutenant General William N. PhillipsPrincipalMilitaryDeputy

totheAssistantSecretaryoftheArmyAcquisition,Logistics,andTechnology

Lieutenant General James H. PillsburyDeputyCommandingGeneral

ArmyMaterielCommand

Lieutenant General Edgar E. Stanton IIIMilitaryDeputyforBudget

AssistantSecretaryoftheArmyFinancialManagementandComptroller

Lieutenant General Eric B. SchoomakerTheSurgeonGeneral

Ex OfficioColonel Gwendolyn Bingham

TheQuartermasterGeneral

Colonel Clark W. LeMasters, Jr.ChiefofOrdnance

Brigadier General Edward F. Dorman IIIChiefofTransportation

Brigadier General Mark A. McAlisterCommander

ArmySoldierSupportInstitute

Brigadier General Joseph L. BassCommandingGeneral

ArmyExpeditionaryContractingCommand

Major General James K. GilmanCommandingGeneral

ArmyMedicalResearchandMaterielCommand

ARMY LOGISTICS UNIVERSITY

Colonel Mark A. McCormickPresident

STAFFRobert D. Paulus,Editor

Kari J. Chenault,AssociateEditorApril K. Morgan,AssistantEditor

Julianne E. Cochran,AssistantEditorLouanne E. Birkner,AdministrativeAssistant

GraphicsartsandlayoutbyRCW Communication Design, Inc.

ThismediumisapprovedfortheofficialdisseminationofmaterialdesignedtokeepindividualswithintheArmyknowledgeableofcurrentandemergingdevelop-mentswithintheirareasofexpertiseforthepurposeofenhancingtheirprofessionaldevelopment.

ByOrderoftheSecretaryoftheArmy:

GEORGEW.CASEY,JRGeneral,UnitedStatesArmy

ChiefofStaff

Official:

Army Sustainment(ISSN2153–5973)isabimonthlyprofessionalbulletinpublishedbytheArmyLogisticsUniversity,2401QuartersRoad,FortLee,Virginia23801–1705.Periodicalspost-ageispaidatPetersburg,VA23804–9998,andatadditionalmailingoffices.

Mission:Army SustainmentistheDepart-mentoftheArmy’sofficialprofessionalbulletinonsustainment.Itsmissionistopublishtimely,authoritativeinformationonArmyandDefensesustainmentplans,programs,policies,opera-tions,procedures,anddoctrineforthebenefitofallsustainmentpersonnel.Itspurposeistoprovideaforumfortheexchangeofinformationandexpressionoforiginal,creative,innovativethoughtonsustainmentfunctions.

Disclaimer:Articlesexpressopinionsofauthors,nottheDepartmentofDefenseoranyofitsagencies,anddonotchangeorsupersede

officialArmypublications.Themasculinepro-nounmayrefertoeithergender.

Reprints:ArticlesmaybereprintedwithcredittoArmy Sustainmentandtheauthor(s),exceptwhencopyrightisindicated.

Distribution:Unitsmayobtaincopiesthroughtheinitialdistributionsystem(DAForm12series).Privatedomesticsubscriptionsareavailableat$23.00peryearbywritingtotheSuperintendentofDocuments,P.O.Box371954,Pittsburgh,PA15250–7954,orbyvisitinghttp://bookstore.gpo.govontheWeb.Forcreditcardorders,call(866)512–1800.SubscribersshouldsubmitaddresschangesdirectlytoArmy Sustain-ment(seeaddressbelow).Army SustainmentalsoisavailableontheWorldWideWebathttp://www.alu.army.mil/alog.

Postmaster:Sendaddresschangesto:EDITORARMYSUSTAINMENT/ALU/2401QUARTERSRD/FTLEEVA23801–1705.

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JANUARY–FEBRUARY 2011 3

heArmyhasbeenatwarinAfghanistanand Iraqformorethan9years.Whileprosecuting theseconflicts,theArmyhasalsobeenengagedinamajortransformation,reorganizingasamodularforceandaligningoperationstotheArmyForceGeneration(ARFORGEN)process.TheArmy’sseniorleadersrecognizethat,afterthisperiodofchangesandchallenges,thetimeisripeforinstitu-tionalreflectionandself-examination.SotheArmyChiefofStaff,GeneralGeorgeW.Casey,Jr.,hasdirectedGeneralMartinE.Dempsey,thecommanderoftheArmyTrainingandDoctrineCommand,toleadastudyandfosteradialogtoanswerthreeatfunda-mentalquestions:oWhatdoesitmeanfortheArmytobeaprofession

ofarms?oWhatdoesitmeantobeaprofessionalSoldier?oAfter9yearsofwar,howareweasindividual

professionalsandasaprofessionmeetingtheseaspirations?TheresultingArmyProfessionofArmsCampaign,

announcedattheannualmeetingoftheAssociationoftheUnitedStatesArmy(AUSA)inWashington,D.C.,lastOctober,seekstoinvolvepersonnelinallArmycohorts—officers,warrantofficers,noncommissionedofficers,enlistedSoldiers,andcivilians—inanexami-nationoftheArmy’sprofessionalidentity.

WhenintroducingthecampaignattheAUSAmeet-ing,LieutenantGeneralRobertL.Caslen,Jr.,com-manderoftheArmyCombinedArmsCenteratFortLeavenworth,Kansas,noted—

Thereactuallyhavebeenanumberofstudiesontheprofessionofarmsovertheyears.Manyofthemwereofficer-centric.Oneofthemorefamousstudies[was]in1970,whentheChiefofStaffoftheArmy,[GeneralWilliam]Westmo-reland,wentaheadandhaddoneastudy.ThatparticularstudywasinreactiontoaproblemthatwasoccurringwithintheofficercorpsattheendofVietnam.AndGeneralCaseywouldbeeagertosaythatourstudytodayisnotbecauseofaproblem,toaddressaproblem.Ourstudytodayistounderstandwhatourprofessionis.Wehaveatremendousopportunitywiththeall-volunteerArmytounderstandthisprofes-sionandthen,asanotheroutcome,topreventaproblem.

Thecampaignwillbeconductedoverthenextyearalongthreelinesofoperation:assess,dialog,andreview.

Assess.AccordingtoGeneralCaslen,theinitialstepofassessmentwillallowtheArmy“tounder-standwhereourforceisandtosurveyandaskthetoughquestions.”

Dialog.Assessmentwillbefollowedbydiscus-sioninvolvingalllevelsoftheArmy.Thecampaignisintendedtobeabottom-up,notatop-down,process.AsGeneralCaslenobserved,“ThisdiscussionreallyneedstotakeplaceatallechelonsinourArmyandtoreallyembracealllevelsoftheArmy.”

Review.Thisfinalstepinthecampaignwilltakestockoftheassessmentsanddiscussions,allowingtheArmy,inGeneralCaslen’swords,to“understandhowallofwhatwehavelearnedaffectsourdoctrine,howitaffectsourorganizations,howitaffectsourleaderdevelopment,[and]howitaffectsourtraining.”

Thefirsthalfof2011willlargelybedevotedtoassessment,withfindingspresentedinconjunctionwiththeArmy’sbirthdayinJune.Thesecondhalfoftheyearwillfocusondiscussions,withfindingsandrecommendationspresentedtoaconferenceoffour-stargeneralsattheendoftheyear.“Theproductofthisstudy,”accordingtoGeneralCaslen,“isgoingtobetodevelop…thedoctrine,theorganization,theleaderdevelopmentofwhatreallyneedstotakeplaceinordertodevelopaprofessionalforce.”

AspartoftheArmyProfessionofArmsCampaign,Army Sustainmentreadersareencouragedtosubmitarticlesonthecampaign’stwofundamentalquestions.Ifyouwouldliketowriteanarticleforthediscus-sion,[email protected].

TheArmyProfessionofArmsCampaign:AYearofDialogAfteraDecadeofConflict

T TheProfessionofArmsThe Army is an American Profession of Arms, a vocation comprised of experts certified in the ethical application of land combat power, serving under civilian authority, entrusted to defend the Constitution and the rights and interests of the American people.

TheProfessionalSoldierAn American Professional Soldier is an expert, a volunteer certified in the Profession of Arms, bonded with comrades in a shared identity and culture of sacrifice and service to the nation and the Constitution, who adheres to the highest ethical standards and is a steward of the future of the Army profession.

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herewewere,sittinginasmoke-filled conferenceroomonanIraqiFederalPolice (FP)compoundincentralBaghdad.Our12-persontransitionteamwasinthemiddleofthereliefinplace/transferofauthoritywiththeoutgo-ingteam,andweweregettingourin-brieffromtheunitwewouldbeadvising.“Theprevioustransitionteamhelpedustoprogresstoahighlyfunctioningunit;wehopetheincomingteamwillhelpusgettothenextlevel,”saidBrigadierGeneralAla’aNorriYassen,theIraqiFederalPoliceSustainmentBrigade(FPSB)commander.

Withthatinmind,wequicklycametotheconclu-sionthattogettheFPSBtothenextlevel,wewouldfocusoureffortsonprogramsandsystemsthatwouldultimatelyleadtooneoverarchinggoal—tomaketheFPSBaself-sustainingorganization.

DuringitstimeinIraq,thetransitionteamhelpedtheFPSBbecomeamoreself-sufficientorganization

PreparingtheIraqiFederalPoliceSustainmentBrigadefortheFuture

by Major Henry S. Groulx

T byestablishingcertifiedschoolhousesandtrain-the-trainerprograms,establishingfix-forwardmaintenancesupport,conductingregularleaderdevelopmenttrain-ingandlogisticsconferences,anddevelopingsustain-mentbattalions.

FPSBOrganizationTheFPSBisalogisticsunitstaffedwithpolice-

men(shurta)whohavenoformallogisticstraining.ItresemblesaU.S.Armybrigadesupportbattalion,withaheadquarterssectionandfourfunctionalbattalions(maintenance,logistics,transportationandfuel,andmedical).

TheFPSBprovideslogisticssupporttoFPunits(theFPheadquartersandfourdivisions)comprisingnearly43,000personnel.ThebrigadeworksdirectlywiththeMinistryofInterior(MoI)torequestandreceivelogis-ticssupportandsuppliesfortheFPunitsandcoordi-natethedistributionofmaterials.

The transition team working with the Iraqi Federal Police Sustainment Brigade had an interesting challenge: to teach police officers who were not logisticians how to execute a logistics operation.

Federal Police students graduate from the Basic High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle Maintenance Training Course that was taught by U.S. subject-matter experts.


SchoolhousesandTrain-the-TrainerProgramsThefirstself-sustainingcoursewastheInstructor

DriversTrainerCourse.Ourtransitionteaminitiallydeveloped,resourced,andexecutedthiscourse.Afterafewmonthsofdatacollecting,wefoundthatmanyoftheFPhigh-mobilitymultipurposewheeledvehicle(HMMWV)mechanicalproblemscouldbepreventedattheoperatorlevel.

Toaddressthis,weconvincedtheFPleaderstopart-nerwithusinatrain-the-trainerprogramforHMMWVoperators.Thecoursewasdesignedtoeducate50shurtaonthebasicprinciplesofHMMWVoperations,suchaspreventivemaintenancechecksandservices,drivingoperations,andsafety.ThecoursealsocertifiedtheseshurtaasinstructorssotheycouldconducttheclassforothersintheFPforce.ThisprogramwasagreatsuccessfortheFPtrainers.Theynowconductsessionsontheirown,certifyingadditionalshurtaaslicensedHMMWVoperators.TheFPleadersalsohavedevelopedtheirowndoctrinebasedonthetrainingcourse.

TheFPSBdevelopedtheBasicMedicCourse,whichisbasedontheU.S.Army’sBasicMedicCoursetaughtatFortSamHouston,Texas.Inacombinedeffort,ourtransitionteam,theIraqiTransitionandAssistanceMis-sionSurgeon’sOffice,andtheFPleadersandmedicalstafftransformedapreviouslyunusedbuildingintoamedicaltrainingfacilitywithafullspectrumoftrainingaids(frombandagestocomputerizedmannequins).

The6-weektrainingcourseaccommodatesupto40studentspersession.Aftercompletingthecourse,studentsarecertified(undertheauthorizationoftheMoI)asfullyqualifiedmedics.TheMoIfullysupportsthefacilityandtheinstructionitprovides.Thisensuresthatlong-termsupportandstabilitywillbeprovidedforyearstocome.

ThethirdsignificanttrainingprogramthattheFPSBestablishedisthemaintenancetrainingandrepairschool.ThetransitionteamassistedinprocuringaU.S.-fundedcontractthatestablishedatrainingfacilityattheoldMuthanaAirfieldincentralBaghdad.Overthenextyear,150mechanicsand50mechanicinstruc-torstrainedandreturnedtotheirFPunitstosuperviseandinstructtheirunits’maintenanceoperations.Thetrainedmechanicshavetheskillstoconductmostofthe–10-and–20-leveltasksthatwereperformedbytheFPmaintenancebattalion.Thisallowsthemain-tenancebattaliontofocusonmajorrepairsand,inturn,createamoreproductivemaintenanceprogramthroughouttheFP.

Fix-ForwardMaintenanceProgramThesecondmajorachievementenablingtheFPSB

tobecomeaself-sufficientorganizationwastheestab-lishmentofafix-forwardmaintenanceprogram.Inthemaintenancebattalion,weinitiallyfoundanorga-nizationthatwasfunctioningadequatelyandhadvery

capableandskilledmechanicsbutwasnotsupportingitscustomersinthemosteffectivemanner.

TheFPSBleadershadimplementedamaintenanceprograminwhichallmaintenance,nomatterhowtriv-ial,wasconductedbythemaintenancebattaliononlyatthebattalion’slocation.Thisincludedproceduressuchaschangingtiresandbatteries,fixingheadlights,andothertasksthatnormallywouldbeconsideredoperator-leveltasks.

WepresentedtheFPSBwiththeconceptofcon-ductingmorefix-forwardmaintenanceworkbysend-ingoutmaintenancesupportteamstotheunitsratherthanhavingeveryvehicleevacuatedbacktothemain-tenancebattalion.TheFPSBleadersinitiallyresistedtheconcept,buttheyeventuallygaveitatry.

TheFP3dDivision,locatedinMosul,wasthefirsttoexecutethisconcept.WeconvincedtheFPleadersthatfixingthevehiclesforwardinMosulwouldallowthoseunitstoremaininthefightandnothavetobepulledbacktoconductsustainmentmissions.Afteragreeing,theFPmaintenancebattalionputtogetheraninspectionteamthatwenttoMosultoidentifythemaintenancerequirementsforthefleetthereanddevelopalistofthepartsneededtobringupdeadlinedvehicles.Oncetheinspectionswerecomplete,theteamreturnedtoBaghdad,gottheneededpartsandmechan-ics,andreturnedtoMosultofixthevehicles.All33ofthedeadlinedvehicleswererepaired.

TheFPSBembracedthissystemandfinishedrepairsonallofthe3dDivision’sHMMWVs.Oncethiswascomplete,theFPSBbeganwithmaintenanceofthe1stDivision’svehiclesandworkeditswaythroughthoseofthe2dand4thDivisions.

ProfessionalLogisticsConferencesThethirdmajormilestoneachievedbytheFPSBwas

theestablishmentofprofessionallogisticsconferences.IntheFPSBlogisticsbattalion,wefoundthatwhat

appearedonthesurfacetobeaverysimplisticlogis-ticssystemwasactuallyasophisticatedanddetailedsupplyprocess.Foraunitthatprovidesgeneralsupplysupporttoanorganizationof43,000personnel,every-thingseemedverysmall.Storagecapacitywaslimitedtoabout20shippingandstoragecontainersandahandfulofbuildings.Theofficeswerecleanandtidy,despitethevolumeofpaperworkthatcrossedeachdeskdaily.Aswebecamemorefamiliarwiththeoper-ation,wesawthatunitswerenotreceivingsuppliesfortworeasons:alackofunderstandingofthesystemandalackofsuppliescomingfromtheMoIlevel.

TheFPisstillarelativelyneworganization,anditssupplysystemhasonlybeenfunctionalforafewyears,sotheprocesseswerestillunfamiliartosomeunits.Aswewatchedandlearnedtheprocessforrequestingandreceivingsupplies,wesharedthatinformationwiththetransitionteamsthroughoutIraq

6 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

toguidetheirFPcounterpartsinthedirectionthattheFPSBwasmoving.AsthewaysinwhichcoalitionforcescouldprovidedirectsupporttotheirIraqicoun-terpartsbecameincreasinglyrestricted,thisknowledgeprovidedtransitionteamswiththetoolstohelptheirFPcounterpartsrelyontheirownsupplysystemforsupport.

TheFPSBalsoembracedtheideaofamonthlylogisticsconferenceasaforumforansweringunits’questionsandsharinginformation.TheFPSBdecidedtohavetwomonthlyconferences—oneforlogisticsandoneformaintenanceandtransportation.Thecon-ferencesbeganasacombinedeffortbetweenU.S.transitionteamsandtheirFPcounterparts,butbythesecondmonthofconferences,theFPshadmadetheeventstheirown.TheFPSBnowhoststheseconfer-encesmonthly,andalthoughattendancebytheFPlogisticsofficersishigh,theU.S.presencethereisverylimited.ThelackofU.S.forces’involvementisaprominentindicatorofthesuccessandsustainabilityoftheseconferences.

SustainmentBattalionsOnereasonunitswerenotreceivingsupplieswas

thelackofpredictableresupplyfromtheMoI.Asanorganizationthatisnotconstitutionallyrecognized,everyrequestforsuppliesthattheFPsubmitstotheMoIistreatedasanunfundedrequirement.ThismeansthattheMoIdoesnotestablishastandardallotmentofsuppliesforFPs.Instead,everythingmustbeaskedforandissuedattheMoI’sdiscretion.

Althoughthelogisticsbattalionisaneffectiveorgani-zation,thelimitedavailabilityofsuppliescannotsupport

thequantityofsuppliesneededtokeeptheFPrunning,especiallyasitcontinuestogrow.FPlead-ersrealizedthisandbegandevelopingsustainmentbattalionsateachdivision.ThroughnumerousvisitsandphonecallsbyboththeU.S.transitionteamsandtheFPSBleaders,theFPshaveestablishedthesenewbattalionstomirrorthesustainmentbrigadeonasmallerlevel.

Thetransitionteam’seffortsinassistingandadvis-ingtheFPSBhavehelpeditbecomeamuchmoreeffectiveandself-sufficientorganization.TheFP’spotentialisunlimited.Ithasasystemthatworksandwillexpandtosupportanyneedsthatarise.TheFPleadersaredevotedtosupportingthepolicemenatthelowestlevelsandhaveintentionallybuiltchecksandbalancesintotheirsupplysystemtodiscouragecorrup-tion.Theyarefocusedonaccountability.Thefounda-tionfortheirfuturesuccessrestsintheircommitmenttoteachandtrainsothatpersonnelatalllevelsunder-standtheprocess.

Asmyteamdeparted,weaskedourselveshowweaccomplishedthethingswedid.Welistenedtoourcounterpartsanddidnotwastetimeonthingswe“thought”wouldbegoodforthembutinsteadrecom-mendedcoursesofactionbasedonwhattheywanted(withinreasonandespeciallywithinbudget).WhatmightmakesenseandbeafeasiblecourseofactionforU.S.forcesmayactuallybemoretroublethanitisworthtoourIraqicounterparts.Theyhavetolivewiththegreatideasandtheirsecondandthirdordereffectswhilewegohomeinayear.Howdidwedeterminewhatwasreallybestforthem?Wejustasked!

Major Henry S. Groulx iS attendinG tHe arMy CoMMand and General Staff ColleGe. He deployed to iraq aS tHe teaM CHief of a Military tranSition teaM aSSiGned to Mentor and adviSe tHe iraqi federal poliCe SuStainMent BriGade and iraqi federal poliCe exploSive ordnanCe diSpoSal direCtorate. He HoldS a BaCHelor’S deGree froM tHe univerSity of nortH Carolina at CHarlotte and iS a Graduate of tHe arMor offiCer BaSiC CourSe, SCout platoon leaderS CourSe, and tank CoMManderS CertifiCation CourSe.

Iraqi Federal Police trainers conduct their first Iraqi-led Combat Lifesaver Course. These trainers were certified by U.S. instructors using the train-the-trainer technique.


heGermanarmedforces,whenconducting internationalmissions,requirefast-actingand efficientlogisticssupportatalllocations—evenduringcrisissituations—andthepresenceofmilitarylogisticscommandersatthefrontline.Logisticssup-portmustalsobeaccomplishedunderdifficultenvi-ronmentalconditionsacrosstheentirespectrumofmodernwarfareoperations.

Approximately80percentofcurrentoperationsaregroundbased.Thisdoesnotmeanthattheseoperationsaresolelyarmyoperations,althoughgroundforcesusuallyperformmostoftheworkinthesesituations.TheFederalDefenseForce—theBundeswehr—cur-rentlyconductsmanyoperationsinremoteandout-lyingareasfarfromGermanyunderconditionsthatresembleexpeditionarymissions.

Theenvironmentoftheseoperationsisusually“asymmetric”andisnotseparatedintoforwardandrearareas,butonlyoperationalareas.Missionslikethesedemandacomprehensivepresenceandthusanappro-priatedeploymentofforcesintotheoperationalarea.Theenvironmentalconditionsfacingtheseforcescanbeharshanddemandingforbothpersonnelandmateriel.Itthereforemaybenecessarytouseweaponsystemsandequipmentinwaysforwhichtheywerenotdesigned.

BasicOperationalConditionsInoperations,troopsaresometimesconfrontedwith

weaponsystemsandequipmentthatcomedirectlyfromthemanufacturers,whichmeansthattherepair-erssometimesarenotsufficientlyfamiliarwiththem.Thesesystemsareusuallycomplexandareusedalongwithagedsystemsthathavedifferentdesigns.

Thetroopscanbeconfrontedwithweaponsystemsandequipmentthatdonotcorrespondtotheirorganicequipment.Dependingonthesituation,thetroopsmayalsohavetoworkwithcommercialoff-the-shelfequipment.

Thevarietyofmateriel,alongwiththeintroductionofnewproducts,cancauseasignificantincreasein

Telemaintenance:TransferringKnowledgetotheField

by Colonel (ret.) eriCH Pokorny, GerMan arMy

T technicalcomplexity.Increasedcomplexitydemandsincreasedspecializationandqualificationsonthepartofthemaintenanceforces,betterrepairequipment,andbettermaintenanceprocedures.Effectivesupportofforceswhileconservingresourcesrequiresaccesstotechnicalexperience,whichmaybeavailableonlyfromciviliansources.Insuchcases,theuseofcivilianlogisticssupportisindispensable.

Industrypersonnelcansubstituteformilitaryper-sonnelbecauseoftheirconnectiontotheproduct,inparticularwithmaterielthatisnotyetcompletelyopera-tional.However,theemploymentofciviliancontractorshasitslimitssince,inanacutethreatsituation,militaryoperationscanchangerapidlybetweenescalationandde-escalation.Duringanescalationphase,civiliantechni-ciansoftenwillnotbeavailableonlocation.Asafallbackinsuchsituations,logisticssupportmustbeprovidedbymilitaryforces.Sincemilitarypersonnelgenerallyarenotexpertsontheequipment,theymustbesupportedbyknowledgeableexpertsfromtheoutsideasneeded.

BattleDamageRepairTheGermanmaintenanceconceptforoperations

abroadiscalledthe“materielrescuechain.”Inthischain,asystemmaintenancesergeantineachunitistheinitialrepairspecialistinthefield.Heevaluatesdamage,assessestheextentoftherepairmeasuresrequired,andsuggeststhebestplaceforexecutingtheremedyinviewoftacticalrequirements.Heleadsabattledamagerepair(BDR)crew,whichisqualifiedtoquicklyrestoreavehicleorsystem’sbasicfunctionssothatitcancontinuethecurrentmission.

Stabilizationoperations,suchastheInternationalSecurityAssistanceForce(ISAF)inAfghanistan,arenottiedtoacertainplace.Forcesdeploy,reconnoiter,andoperatejointlyacrosstheentireoperationalspec-trum.Opposingforcesposeaconstantthreat,andthethreatsituationdiffersbyregion.

Atpresent,inoperationalareas,mostconvoysleavetheirfieldcampswithaBDRcrew.Ifrequiredbythe

In the current operational environment, the German Army needs a way to exchange maintenance information and provide expertise to soldiers in the field, regardless of time or geographical distance. Its solution is a system known as “telemaintenance.”

8 ARMY SUSTAINMENT8 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

situation,logisticsbattalionscansupportcombatunitswiththeirmaintenancepersonnel.Repairofsignificantdamageisconductedatforwardsupportbases,wherespecializedciviliancontractorsarealsoavailable.

Vehicledamageandlossesarepartofdailybusi-ness.Itisnotpossibletoleaveabroken-downvehiclebehindandsendbackmobilerepairforceswithoutprovidingprotectionfortherecoveryeffort.Thevehi-cleoperatorisresponsiblefortheinitialmanagementofaloss.However,hewillusuallyneedexpertsup-port,whichwilloftennotbeavailablequicklybecauseofthewidedispersionofdeployedforces.

Asaresult,repairsquadsfromtheforwardlogis-ticsbaseorevenfromGermanysometimesmustbedeployedtorepairdamagedvehicles.Thatcausesadditionalresource-consumingflowsofmaterielandpersonnelintotheoperationalareaandoftenleadstoextendeddowntimesbeforethevehicleorsystemcanbereturnedtoservice.

TelemaintenanceBecausesuchawidevarietyofequipment,vehicles,

andotheritemsexistintoday’soperationalareas,specialistscannotbedeployedforeachofthem.Therefore,theprimaryrepairmaninthefieldisasuf-ficientlytrainedoperationalsoldierwhohasimmedi-atesupportthatenableshimtoperformhiscomplexmission.AnexchangeofinformationandknowledgetransferamongdeployedtaskforcesandBundeswehrandindustryexpertsmustbepossible—regardlessoftimeorgeographicaldistance.

TheGermanArmySchoolofLandSystemsEngi-neeringandArmySchoolofEngineering(TSL/FSHT)hasdevelopedasolutioncalled“telemaintenance”thatallowsatransferofexpertknowledgetothetroopsabroad.

Thetermtelemaintenanceisvagueandnotyetdefined.Someuseittorefersolelytoremotemain-tenanceandrepair,whileothersincludeotheraspectsofmaintenanceunderthesameterm.Theapproachof

theTSL/FSHTincludesmuchmorethanjustremotetechnicalsupport.Italsoreferstoasystemthatusesexistingcapabilitiesandseekstoimproveandauto-matetheperformanceofthosecapabilities.Thistelemaintenancesystemischaracterizedbytheterms“prognosis,”“diagnosis,”and“monitoringandrepair.”(Seedefinitionsinthechartbelow.)

WhatTelemaintenanceDoesBDRandroutinemaintenancebothbeginwiththe

operatorandcontinuewithextendedandspecificexpertassessmentusingthematerielrescuechainthatincludesthesystemmaintenancesergeantandhistechnicalsquad.

Attheoperatorlevel—thefirstlinkintherepairchain—diagnosticdatafromtheinternaltestsystemmustbemadeaccessibletotheoperator,thelocaltech-nicians,andtheremoteexpertsasneeded.Thesedataprovideanexacttechnicalsituationreportandsupporteffortstoeliminatefailuresorrepairdamageovertheremotesystemifnecessary.

Anotheroptionisconsultationwiththeoperatorafterasystemfailsorisdamagedtodescribethelimi-tationsofthesystemorpointoutnecessaryactions.Thus,theoperatorwillnotbeleftaloneinacriticalsituation.

Thesystemmaintenancesergeantandhisteamatamaintenancefacilityintheoperationalareaarethenextlinkintherepairchain.Thesergeantmustexamineamultitudeofsystemsandrepairdamagesonshortnotice.Especiallyinthecaseofcommercialoff-the-shelfproducts,theknowledgeofthelocallogisticsspecialistsislimitedandrequiresaccesstoinformationanddatafromsourcesoutsideoftheoperationalarea.Thisrequiresasupportcenter,intheformofa“Bundeswehr TechnicalHelpdesk,”asasinglepointofcontactforexternalsupport.Thiselementmusthaveaccesstoknowledge-baseddata-bases.Contactwithindustry,forexampleintheformofmanufacturerhotlinesandmanufacturerdatabases,mustalsobeavailable.

Prognosis refers to the ability to predict the failure probability of assemblies in order to ensure the highest possible operational readiness in the context of a dynamic, condition-based maintenance.

Diagnosis refers to the ability to clearly locate failure causes in a system. The screening must ensure that the results are so substantial that the necessary spare parts and the place and the echelon of repair can be determined based on the estimated repair time.

Monitoring refers to the ability to know the actual condition of devices and systems and the possibility of including this information in tactical and operational planning and the materiel flow process.

Repair refers to the ability to quickly repair and maintain all land systems at any location.


TelemaintenanceModulesThetelemaintenancesystemworksthroughseveral

modules.Module1A,“MonitoringandPrognosis,”consistsofabuilt-indisplayandcontrolunitinthevehiclethatmonitorsanddisplaysthecurrentoperat-ingconditionofthevehicle.Indicatorsforpreven-tivemaintenancemeasuresareavailableandinternaltestsarepossible,enablingpredictiveandreliability-orientedmaintenancethatresultsinincreasedsystemavailability.

Theoperatorcanalsoobtainfurtherinformation,suchasfluidlevels,fuelranges,andtechnicalreadi-nessstatus.Thisinformation,whichisalsoimportantfromatacticalviewpoint,canbeusedbythetacti-calnetworkifrequired.Thesystemisbasedonanonboarddiagnosticunitinthevehicle.

Module1B,whichalsoreliesoninformationinthevehicle’sdiagnosticunit,enablestheoperatorstorequestdirecttelemetricsupportfromthesystemmaintenancesergeant.Thedataarestoredandareusedasthebasisforanelectronicequipmentlife-cyclefile.

Module2enablesremotesupportbythesystemmaintenancesergeantthroughonsitefaultdiagnosisandremotesupport,includingtechnicalexpertise,pro-videdbyrepairpersonnelinthemaintenancefacility.Thisprovidesaquickdamageassessmentandrepairtimeestimate,expeditesadecisiononthelocationofrepair,andcontributeseffectivelytothedevelopmentofequipment-relatedexpertise.

Module3linkstheusersofthetelemaintenancesystemfromthetacticalleveluptotheleveloftheBundeswehrTechnicalHelpdesk.Dependingonthesituation,voiceanddatacommunicationmaybenecessary.Suchcommunicationrequiresanetworkofsuitablecommunicationssystemsthatprovidethenecessaryredundancy,flexibility,security,andmobility.

Module4allowsthelogisticsinlandbasetomakealogisticsknowledgedatabaseavailabletousers.Itprovidesacentralinterfacefunctionfortheoperator,regionalrepairpersonnel,andindustry.TheBundeswehrTechnicalHelpdesk-LandSystemsshouldactasasinglepointofcontactandshouldbeabletoassistwiththetechnicalproblemsthatcanoccurinthematerielrescuechain.

Module5isanintegrateddemonstratorthatcon-nectstoalltheothermodules.Thisdemonstratorisdesignedtofacilitatefurtherinsightsintotheprimaryfundamentalfunctionalrequirementsforafuturetele-maintenancesystem.

CurrentStatusThetelemaintenanceinitiativehasbeenaccepted“in

principle”bytheIntegratedWorkingGroupforCapa-bilityAnalysiswithintheFederalMinistryofDefense.Thedevelopmentofaphasedocumentthatdescribesthefunctionalrequirementsforremotesupportofmaintenancehasbeeninitiated.Thecomponentsareoutlinedinthetelemaintenancemanual,militaryrequirementsareaddressed,andfurtherdevelopmentstepsaredepicted.

Thisdevelopmentprocessallowsforconnectingfac-torsforthemilitaryanditspartnerstobeidentified.Thesystemdemonstratorcouldbesuccessfullypresentedduringfieldexercises.Threenontechnicalstudiesalsohavebeeninitiated.WithintheISAFdeployment,acommunicationssystemtechniqueisbeingtestedtogaininitialexperiencesfromoperations.

Integrationofthecapabilitiesoftheconditionmoni-toringandprognosissystemsintothecombat-essentialrequirementsforvehiclesandotherequipmentislike-ly.Questionsaboutknowledgemanagementcontinuetobeexamined,issuesabouttheproprietorshipofdataneedtobeclarified,andatelemaintenanceconceptmustbedeveloped.

Logisticssupportforcesinoperationalsituationsrequireextensivemaintenanceandrepaircapabili-ties.Thetelemaintenancesystemisthelogisticssystem’sresponsetocurrentandfuturechallenges.Thetelemaintenanceapproachdiscussedhereanditsconceptualbasicstructurecanensurethatinno-vationsthataretechnicallyfeasible,logisticallyinevitable,tacticallynecessary,andeconomicallydesirablecanbeintroducedwithminimaldevelop-mentalrisk.

Colonel eriCH pokorny waS tHe Head of tHe forCe developMent diviSion of arMy operational loGiStiCS and land SySteMS enGineer-inG at tHe SCHool of land SySteMS enGineerinG and arMy SCHool of enGineerinG in aaCHen, GerMany, until HiS retireMent laSt auGuSt.

Logistics support forces in operational situations require extensive maintenance and repair capabilities. The telemaintenance system is the logistics system’s

response to current and future challenges.

10 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

nJuly2008,the529thCombatSustainmentSupport Battalion(CSSB),VirginiaArmyNationalGuard, beganitsjourneytowardmobilizationbyattendingthe1stArmyJointAssessmentConference(JAC).Atthattime,theunitwasundertheassumptionthatitwoulddeployinsupportofOperationIraqiFreedom(OIF).Thiswasconfirmedshortlythereafterwhenthebattalioncom-mander,LieutenantColonelMichelleRose,wasinformedthatinearly2010the529thwouldreplacethe515thCSSB,anArmyNationalGuardunitfromNewMexico,atForwardOperatingBase(FOB)Marez.

DeployinginsupportofoperationsinIraqandAfghanistanisquitecommon,butthe529thCSSBhadanadditionalchallenge:Itwasafairlynewunit.NotonlywasitanewunitfortheVirginiaNationalGuard(formedinDecember2006)butalso,asaCSSB,itwasaratherneworganizationfortheArmy.Ofthe84CSSBsformedin2006withintheArmyforcestructure,48areArmyNationalGuardunits.Asanewunit,the529thneededtounderstandtherecentlydevelopedsus-tainmentdoctrineandtheconceptofmodularsustain-mentformationsandfunctions.

DistributiveBattleSimulationProgramInDecember2008,LieutenantColonelRosecon-

tactedacommander’soperationsandtrainingassistant(COTA)fromtheArmyNationalGuard’sBattleCom-mandTrainingCapabilityProgram’s(BCTCP’s)Dis-tributiveBattleSimulationProgram(DBSP).DBSPoperatesunderacontractestablishedwithGeneralDynamicsInformationTechnology.

COTAsareformerArmyofficers(ActiveorReservecomponent)whoworkwithselectedunitstoadviseunitcommandersandstaffsintrainingstrategiesandtactics,techniques,andprocedures.COTAstypicallyworkwithmaneuverunits.Atpresent,morethan120COTAslocat-edthroughouttheUnitedStatesareavailabletoprovideadvisoryandtrainingsupporttoArmyNationalGuardunits,withaspecificfocusonthosewhoareenteringthefourthorfifthyearofArmyForceGeneration.

DBSPalsoprovidestrainingaids,devices,simula-tors,andsimulationstotrainsoldiersonthesimula-tiondevicesentrustedtoArmyNationalGuardunitsthroughoutthecountry.Roundingoutthisprofessionaltrainingteamaretechnicalsupportteamscomprising

systemsadministratorsanddatabasemanagers.Theseteamssetupandsynchronizethevariousdigitalandconstructivewargamingdevicesusedtosimulatetheconditionsinwhichtheunitdesirestotrain.

Underthedirectionofthebattalioncommander,thefull-timebattalionexecutiveofficerdevelopedthefollow-ingthree-prongedapproachtopreparethebattalion:oUnderstandmodularsustainmentdoctrine.oOrganizeanddevelopthebattlestaffandtactical

operationscenter(TOC).oTrainkeypersonnelintheuseofcriticallogistics

automationsystemsrequiredforbattalioncommandandcontrol.Thesecriticaltasksweretobeaccomplishedinaddi-

tiontothemanyVirginiaNationalGuardand1stArmyindividualandcollectivetasksSoldiersarerequiredtocompletebeforearrivingatthemobilizationstation.

CriticalTasksThefirstcriticaltask,understandingmodularsustain-

mentdoctrine,wasaccomplishedinJanuary2009underthedirectionoftheDBSPwarfightingfunctionalareateamchief,whoinstructedthebattalioncommandandstaffinthemethodsofmodernsustainmentfromthenationallevels,throughthetheatersustainmentcom-mandandexpeditionarysustainmentcommand,downtothesustainmentbrigade—theunitthattypicallyservesasaCSSB’shigherheadquarters.Additionalclasseswereconductedtofocusontheintricaciesofsupportopera-tions(providingconceptsforstaffrolesandresponsibili-ties),movement,anddistributionoperations.

Withafirmunderstandingofmodularsustainmentdoctrine,theunitwasreadyforitssecondchallenge:theorganizationofitsbattlestaffandTOC.SeveralCSSBtacticalstandingoperatingprocedures(TACSOPs)wereprovidedtothe529thCSSBtouseasexamples.Thebattalionsettledononedevelopedbythe751stCSSB,aSouthCarolina-basedunitservingatthetimeinAnbarProvince,Iraq.

InApril2009,the529thdeployedtotheNationalMaintenanceTrainingCenter(NMTC)atCampDodge,Iowa,fora2-weekbattalionstafftrainingrotation.Thefirstweekoftrainingwasdevotedtoteachingthebattalionstaffthefineartofthesustainmentmilitarydecisionmakingprocess(MDMP)andtrainingSoldiers

TrainingaCombatSustainmentSupportBattalion

I

by Dr. joHn M. Menter

The Distributive Battle Simulation Program helped a Virginia Army National Guard sustainment unit go from home station to the battlefield.


onvarioussimulators(suchastheEngagementSkillsTrainerandVirtualConvoyOperations).Thestafftrainedinaworkshopenvironmentandranoperationorder(OPORD)scenariosthroughtheMDMP’ssevensteps.Thetrainingculminatedinthestaff’spresentationofabattalionOPORD.

Tomaketheprocessevenmoreinteresting,the190thCSSB(aMontanaArmyNationalGuardunit)participat-edinthebriefings.Staffpersonnelfromthe190thCSSBservedascompanycommandersduringthe529thCSSB’sOPORDbriefingandsubsequentcommanderbackbriefs,and529thCSSBpersonnellikewiseparticipatedinthe190thCSSB’sOPORDbriefing.Duringthesecondweek,bothbattalionsexecutedtheirOPORDsthroughacom-mandpostexerciseusingJanus,acombatsimulationsys-tem,andwrappedupwithanafter-actionreview.

AlthoughtheNMTCrotationhelpedthebattalionachievethecommander’sfirsttwoobjectivesforprepar-ingfordeployment,theenvironmentwaslargelyanalogandreminiscentofTOCoperationsduringtheArmyofExcellenceofthe1980sand1990s,whichfeaturedpapermaps,acetateoverlays,andalcoholmarkingpensinsteadofcomputers.CampDodgewassimplyunabletoprovideexperienceindigitallogisticscommandandcontrol.Present-daysustainmentunits—especiallythosepreparingforoperationsoutsidethecontinentalUnitedStates—mustbeabletomanagesustainmentoperationsdigitally.

So,toaccomplishthethirdcriticaltask,battalionper-sonnelweresentofftoschoolstolearntheircraftsonthedigitalcommandandcontrolsystems,suchastheBattleCommandSustainmentSupportSystem,CommandPostoftheFuture(CPOF),andManeuverControlSystem.

FinalTrainingExerciseInNovember2009,thecommanduseditsfinal

annualtrainingperiodtocompletethefinal1stArmyvalidationfordeploymentrequirementsatFortPickett,Virginia.Here,everythingthecommandhadtrainedonforthelast18monthswasbroughttogetherinonefinaldressrehearsalexercise.Thistrainingeventpreparedthebattalionforitsfinalpremobilizationcommandpostexercise(CPX).

ByJanuary2010,theunitwasreadyforitsCPXattheStateMilitaryReservationinVirginiaBeach,Virgin-ia.Duringthepreviousweek,ateamfromtheBCTCP-CampDodge(whichwasresponsiblefortheunit’spriorCPOFtraining)setupaCPOFsuiteconsistingof15systems.WorkingsidebysidewiththeDBSPtechnicalsupportteam,theCampDodgeteamsetupcompanymailworkstationsandloadedtheBattleCommandStaffTrainer,whichisusedtomanageconvoymovementsandenemyinsurgentactions.

TheBattleCommandStaffTrainerrecordseventsthathaveaffectedCSSBsandtransportationbattalionstodateinOIF.Theseeventsdrovethescenariosthatthebattalionfacedoverthenext3days.Twobattlestaff

trainersassistedwithTOCinformationflow,resolvedissuesconcerningrolesandresponsibilities,andpro-videdtrackingchartsordevicesasneeded.Afterpartici-patinginover300exercises,ifatrackingcharthadbeencreatedandwasrequiredfortheexercise,thetwotrain-erscertainlyhaditavailableforuse.

Inamodifiedclassroom,thebattalionsetuptheTOCasitwouldfunctioninOIF,andanotherroomwasarrangedtosupporthigher,adjacent,andlowerunitsandhousethedigitalsystemsexpertsintheeventofanytechnicaldifficulties.

Duringthenext72hoursoftheexercise,thebattalionwasexposedtoscenariositcouldexpectoncedeployed,includingimprovisedexplosivedeviceattacks,trafficaccidents,contaminatedfuel,andhazardousmaterialspills.Asustainmentbrigadefragmentaryorderwasissueddailysothatthebattalionplanssectionandbattlestaffhadtodevelopnewplansoralterexistingplans.

“Pushmatrices”thatreplicatedthesustainmentbri-gade’sdistributionboardwerepasseddowntoensurethatthebattalion’ssupportoperationsshopwasawareofanychangestoscheduledmovementsandcouldantici-patefuturemissions.Finally,battlefieldupdatebriefs(BUAs)wereconductedtwicedailyusingtheBCTCPCPOFsuite.EventhebattalioncommanderparticipatedinamocksustainmentbrigadeBUAwithhercommand-er,whowassittinginanadjacentroom.Bythecloseofday3,thebattalionhadexperienced“adayinthelifeofaCSSB.”Itwasahecticday,butoneinwhichthehead-quarterspersonneldealtwitheverythingthrownatthemandperformedadmirably.

The529thCSSBconductedanhonestandforthrightafter-actionreviewthathelpeditusethe60remainingdaystomakefinalTACSOPadjustmentsbeforereport-ingtoitsmobilizationstationatFortHood,Texas.TheentirecommandandtheDBSPobserver/trainerstafffeltthattheunitwaspreparedtoperformitsmissionupondeployment.However,theCSSBhadnotyetreceiveditsmobilizationorderfromthe1stArmy.

Becauseoftheinitialdeploymentnotificationfrom1stArmy,theunitcontinuedtoprepareforitsroleinOIFthroughouttheexercise.Interestingly,whentheunit’sfor-malmobilizationorderarrived,the529thCSSBlearnedthatitwouldnotdeploytoIraqasexpectedbutinsteadtoAfghanistaninsupportofOperationEnduringFreedom.

dr. joHn M. Menter iS a retired arMy Colonel and tHe teaM CHief of tHe warfiGHtinG funCtional area teaM, diStriButive Battle SiMulation proGraM, Battle CoMMand traininG CapaBility proGraM, General dynaMiCS inforMation teCHnoloGy. He HoldS a doCtoral deGree in HiStory, a MaSter’S deGree in loGiStiCS, and a MaSter of BuSineSS adMiniStration deGree froM tHe univerSity of la verne. in 2005, He qualified aS a Certified profeSSional loGiStiCian tHrouGH tHe inStitute of loGiStiCS ManaGeMent. He iS alSo tHe autHor of The SuSTainmenT BaTTle STaff and miliTary deciSion making ProceSS guide.

12 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

ollowingthe12January2010earthquakein Haiti,U.S.forcesdeployedthereaspartofOper- ationUnifiedResponsetohelpmeettheneedsoftheHaitianpeople.TheJointLogisticsCommand-Haiti(JLC–H),mannedbySoldiersofthe377thThe-aterSustainmentCommandfromBelleChasse,Loui-siana,wastaskedwithoverseeingthe“right-sizing”ofthemilitaryforcesservinginHaitiinsupportoftheoperation.Thismissionwasaccomplishedbythedeployment/redeploymentcoordinationcell(DRCC).

TherecoveryplanforHaitiinvolvestheUnitedNations,theU.S.AgencyforInternationalDevelop-ment,andnumerousmultilateral,nongovernmentalorganizations.ThisconglomerateofaidgiversworkswiththegovernmentsofHaitiandothercountriestoassistthepeopleofHaiti.U.S.militaryforcesareservinginasupportroletotheseorganizations.Theysupplycapabilitiesthattheaidorganizationsdidnothaveinplace.Asthesituationchangesandtheseorga-nizationsbringtheircapabilitiesonline,thematchingmilitarycapabilitiesarenolongerneeded.

Right-sizingtheforceinvolvessendingunitsbacktotheirhomestationswhentheircapabilitiesarenolongerneededintheHaititheater.Thismayseemlikeasimpletask:puttheunitonaplaneanditsequipmentonaship,andsendthemnorthwest.However,inreality,aunitcannotjustpickupandgo.TheprocessinvolvesmanytasksthatmustbeaccomplishedthroughanintricatenetworkofmilitaryofficesstretchingfromHaititothecontinentalUnitedStates(CONUS).

ReleaseProceduresFirstaunitneedsanofficialrelease.JointTask

Force-Haiti(JTF–H)istheorganizationthattheU.S.SouthernCommandhasputinchargeofmilitaryopera-tionsinHaiti.Thistaskforcecoordinateswiththeaidorganizationstodeterminewhenaparticularmilitarycapabilitycanbedecreasedoreliminated.Basedonthisinformation,JTF–Hissuesafragmentaryorderreleas-ingunitswithcapabilitiesthatarenolongerneeded.

TheDRCChasanorderssectionthatwatchesforthesereleasestobeissued.TheunitcanthencometotheJLC–HDRCCinthejointoperationscentertomeetwithaliaisonofficerfortheTransportationCoordinationAutomatedInformationforMovementSystemII(TC–AIMSII)tobegintheredeploymentprocess.[TC–AIMSIIisatoolforestablishingandtrackingmovementsofmilitarydeploymenttransportationbyland,air,andsea.]

Theredeployingunit’smovementofficermustcre-ateaunitdeploymentlist(UDL)inTC–AIMSII.TheUDLdetailsallpersonnelandequipmentbeingrede-ployed.OncetheUDLiscreated,theDRCC’smobil-itysectionapprovesitandforwardsittoU.S.ArmySouth,whereitisusedtoestablishunitlinenumbers.ThelistofunitlinenumbersisforwardedtotheU.S.SouthernCommandforvalidationandthensenttotheU.S.TransportationCommandforallocationofthenecessarytransportation.

Thetypeofmovementuseddependsonwhatisbeingmovedandwhereitisgoing.Forexample,mostequipmentleavesHaitibyship,butpersonnelandlight-erequipmentleavebyair.OncebackinCONUS,equip-mentmayneedgroundtransporttoinlanddestinations,whilepersonnelwilltravelbydomesticairorbus.

TheU.S.TransportationCommandwillissueanavailable-to-loaddate(ALD)fortheunittomoveandforitsequipmenttobeshipped.ThesedatesareusedbytheunitandtheDRCCtoprepareaplantogettheunitreadyformovementbytheALD.WiththeUDL,accuracyisthekeytonothavingsomethingleftbehindbecauseifsome-thingdoesnothaveaunitlinenumber,itdoesnotship.

groundTransportationThenextstepisforunitplannerstomeetwiththe

groundtransportationcell.Theredeployingunit,withtheaidoftheDRCC,willdetermineitstransportationneeds,includingthenumberofcontainersneededforshippingitsequipment.Howtheunitwilltransportitsequipmenttotheseaportanditspeopleandbaggagetotheairportisalsoaddressed.

The377thTheaterSustainmentCommandDeployment/RedeploymentCoordinationCellinHaiti

by lieutenant Colonel MiCHael j. Perez

F

Transporting military units from Haiti once their services are no longer needed requires careful coordination. The 377th Theater Sustainment Command is responsible for ensuring that all U.S. military units that deploy to Haiti return quickly and safely.


Emptycontainersmustthenbedeliveredtotheunit’slocation.Theunitisresponsibleforthepackingprocess.Thefinalpackingmustbedoneincoordinationwithcustoms(theDRCChasembeddedcustomsliaisonoffi-cers),whichwillhavearepresentativepresenttoinspectpackeditemsandsealthecontaineroncethepackingiscomplete.Theunitisnowreadytomove.

SeaTransportationPreparationsWhileattheDRCC,theunitmovementofficeralso

coordinateswiththewashrackoperationscell.Oncetheamountoftimeneededtocompletethepackingpro-cessisdetermined,aschedulecanbesetforgettingtheunit’sequipmenttotheseaport,whereitwillgothroughwashrackprocedurestocleanitbeforeitisreturnedtoCONUS.Sevento10daysbeforetheunit’sdeparturedate,groundtransportationwillarrangeforthemove-mentoftheequipmenttotheseaportandarrangeforthematerials-handlingequipmentneededtodownloadit.

Oncetheequipmentiscleanandclearedbycustoms,itwillbesecuredintheholdingyard.TheDRCC’sseamobilitycelltracksinboundandoutboundships.Thiscellwillarrangeforthetransportoftheunit’sequip-mentbyship.WhentheshiparrivesinHaiti(2to4daysbeforetheALD),theDRCCwillissuea“callforward”messagefortheequipment,whichwillthenbebroughtfromtheholdingareaandloadedontheship.

AirTransportationPreparationsTwodaysbeforetheALD,thegroundtransportation

cellensuresthatbusesandcargotrucksareavailablefortheunit’spersonnelandpersonalequipment.Twenty-fourhoursout,theDRCCissuesthecall-forwardmessagefor

theunitpersonnelandarrangesforcustomstoinspectthepersonalequipmentbeingflownbackwiththepersonnel.

Theairmobilitycelltracksinboundandoutboundairplanesandidentifiestheaircraftonwhichtheunitwilldepart.Ninehoursout,thegroundtransportationcellsendsthebusesandcargotruckstopickuptheunitandgetittotheairportnolaterthan6hoursbeforetheflight.Theunitwillhaveamanifestofpersonnelandgearflyingandacertificationofthecustomscheck.

TheDRCChasanairportliaisonofficerwhoensuresthattheairplanearrives,theunitboards,andtheairplanedeparts.Whenitreceivestheairportliai-sonofficer’sreportthattheplanehastakenoff,theDRCCwillissueawheels-upreportthoughtheJLC–HJ–3toJTF–H.TheDRCCwilltracktheairplaneandissueawheels-downreportafterreceivingconfirma-tionthattheplanehaslanded.

Thismayseemlikearelativelysimpleprocess.Whenyouconsiderthatmanyofthesetasksaretak-ingplacesimultaneously,thatmultiplevariablesaffectseaandairtravel(thebiggestbeingweather),andthatseveralunitsareexitingduringthesametimeperiod,itisapparenttheDRCCmustgotheextramiletoensurethatservicemembersinHaitiarereturnedhomesafely.

lieutenant Colonel MiCHael j. perez iS tHe puBliC affairS offiCer for tHe 377tH tHeater SuStainMent CoMMand. He HoldS a BaCHelor’S deGree in BuSineSS adMiniStration froM loyola uni-verSity of new orleanS and iS a Graduate of tHe SiGnal offiCer BaSiC CourSe, tHe quarterMaSter offiCer advanCed CourSe, tHe CoMBined arMS and ServiCeS Staff SCHool, and tHe interMediate level eduCation CourSe.

After the devastating earthquake in Haiti in January 2010, the United States sent military units to provide assistance. As units were replaced by civilian organizations, the 377th Theater Sustainment Command Deployment/Redeployment Coordination Cell arranged for the transport of the military members and their equipment.

14 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

n early 2002, a major insurance company that we will call “Acme” faced a challenge common to many large enterprises. Although the insurance giant procured over $13 billion worth of goods and services from many ven-dors, it managed supplier relationships through disparate organizations scattered across the company. Moreover, various business units, often with competing or conflicting interests, each managed different pieces of the relationship with a single major supplier. To improve procurement ac-tivities throughout the organization, Acme initiated an am-bitious supplier relationship management (SRM) program.

Acme began with a pilot program involving 10 suppli-ers to demonstrate proof of concept. After analyzing the 10 initial candidates, Acme selected the 3 most strategically valuable vendors. The results were quickly visible. Acme began to see improved performance resulting from the use of agreed-upon performance metrics. It developed a deeper understanding of the internal operations of each supplier in the pilot program, and its supplier relationships became more productive with substantially improved and more honest communication channels.

Acme’sexperienceisnotunique.LargecompaniesfromawidevarietyofindustriesareincreasinglyrecognizingthebenefitsofSRM,butcommercialorganizationsarenottheonlypotentialbeneficiaries.Weaponsystemsustain-mentisaprimecandidateforSRM.TheArmyalonepro-curesnearly$6billionofclassIX(repairparts)annually,butitssupplierrelationshipsaremanagedbyavarietyofprojectmanagementoffices(PMOs),programmanage-mentoffices,andproductmanagementofficesthatgener-allydonotcoordinatetheirprocurementactivities.

Furthermore,thecomplexityofweaponsystempartsmeansthatmostsustainmentsuppliersarestrategicallyvaluabletotheArmy.Assuch,theyareworthincorporat-ingintoawell-designedSRMprogram.JustlikeAcmeandotherenterprises,theArmysustainmentcommunitycanbenefitbyapproachingitssupplierrelationshipsmorestra-tegicallythroughanenterprise-wideSRMprogram.

ChoosingSRMSRMprogramsofferthreeprimarybenefits:improved

supplierperformance,riskassessmentandmitigationtools,andmorevaluablesupplierrelationshipsfacilitatedbyopenexchangesofinformation.

TheArmysustainmentcommunityhasalreadymadeeffortstoaddresssupplierperformanceissuesandtoregu-

larlyassesssupplierperformance,butriskanalysisandrelationshipvaluehavenotreceivedthesameattention.Asaresult,suppliermanagementhasfocusedmoreonthepastthanongaininginsightintofuturesupplychainper-formance.Byemphasizingriskmitigationandrelationshipvalue,theArmycanpredictfuturesupplychainchallengesandtakecorrectiveactionbeforeproblemsescalate.

Improved supplier performance.Supplierperformanceiscrucialtothehealthofanycomplexsupplychain,includingweaponsystemsupplychains.Supplierperfor-mancehasseveraldimensions,includingcost,deliverytimeliness,andincomingitemquality,amongothers.Dif-ferentstakeholderswithinanorganizationtypicallyhavedifferentneedsandwillaccordinglyvaluethevariousper-formancedimensionsdifferently.

IntheArmy,forexample,theAviationandMissileCommand(AMCOM)andtheTACOMLifeCycleMan-agementCommand(LCMC)shareseveralsuppliers.Suppose,however,thatAMCOMisprimarilyconcernedwithcostwhileTACOMvaluesdeliverytimeliness.Awell-craftedsustainmentSRMprogramwillselectperfor-mancemetricscarefullyandcollaboratively.TheprogramcanthereforemediateamongthecompetingdemandsofAMCOMandTACOMstakeholdersandensurethatthecorrectdimensionsofsupplierperformanceareempha-sizedandaddressed.

Risk assessment and mitigation tools. InterruptionsinthesupplyofcrucialitemscanposeseriouschallengesforlargeenterprisesandfortheArmy’ssustainmentsupplychain.However,despitetheimportanceofanuninterruptedweaponsystemsustainmentsupplychain,theriskprofileofweaponsystemsuppliersisoftenoverlooked.

Tworisksareparticularlyproblematic:theriskofacriticalsupplierbecominginsolventandtheriskofadis-ruptioninthesupplyofessentialitems.AnSRMprogramwouldfillthegapbysupplementingassessmentsofpastperformancewithforward-lookingriskprofilesthatcanhelpthesustainmentcommunityanticipatefuturesupply-chainproblemsinvolvingbothtypesofrisk.

More valuable supplier relationships.Largeenterprisesandsuppliersoftenhaveclosedrelationshipsinwhichlittleinformationissharedandcollaborationisrare.Suchclosedrelationshipsprovidelimitedvaluetoboththecus-tomerandthesupplier.

Forexample,supposethatHoneywellInternational,themanufacturerofseveralUH–60BlackHawkhelicopterre-pairpartsandacriticalsustainmentsupplier,faceddifficul-

SustainmentSRM:WhytheArmyIsUniquelyPositionedtoBenefit

by jaMeS D. MCintoSH anD jonatHan Selter

I

©James D. McIntosh and Jonathan Selter 2010. Reproduction for personal and educational purposes is authorized.


tieswithoneofitsownfirst-tiersuppliers.Withatypicalclosedrelationship,theArmywouldnotknowaboutthepo-tentialsupplychaindisruptionsthatcouldcascadefromHon-eywell’sownupstreamsupplychain.Moreover,theArmywouldbeunabletohelpHoneywelldealwithaproblematicsupplier.

WithanSRMprogram,ontheotherhand,theArmyandHoneywellwouldhaveacollaborativerelationshipwithmoreinformationsharing.ThroughSRM,theArmywouldgaininsightintoasupplier’sownsupplychainandcouldbegintopursuesolutionstosharedsupplychainproblems.

DoingtheHomeworkAnSRMprogramisastrategicapproachtomanaging

suppliers,andenterprisesmustdotheirhomeworkbeforelaunchingintooutreach.Theirtaskistocreateadetailedportraitofcustomer-supplierrelationshipsbythoroughlyanalyzingbothquantitativedata(suchasinternalspendingdata)andqualitativedata(suchasinternalorexternalinter-views).TopursueSRM,organizationsneedtogroupsuppli-ersaccordingtotheirstrategicimportanceandidentifyeachstakeholderthathasaninterestineachsupplierrelationship.

Segmenting suppliers. WhichsupplierswillbeincludedintheSRMprogram,andhowshouldweapproachthem?

InAcme’scase,itanalyzed10suppliersbutpursuedSRMwithonlythe3thatwerestrategicallyimportanttoitssupplychain.Whileorganizationscanusevariousap-proachestosegmentsuppliers,Acmeevaluateditsownplanninghorizonfortheitemsprovidedbyeachsupplier,existingspendingvolume,productinfluencewithinthesupplymarket,andtheexistinghealthofthecustomer-supplierrelationship,amongmanyotherfactors.Theendproductofsegmentationshouldbeagroupingofsuppliersalongacontinuumfromleaststrategicallyimportanttomoststrategicallyimportant.Thesesegmentswillhelpin-dicatetheappropriateformofoutreach(ifany).

Inexcluding70percentoftheinitialcandidatesforSRM,Acmemirroredtheexperienceofmostlargeorganizationswhosevendorbaseisdominatedbysupplierswithrelativelylowstrategicvalue.Theweaponsystemsustainmentsupplychain,however,isdifferent.Becauseofthetypicalcharac-teristicsofweaponsystemitems,suchasextremetechnicalcomplexity,longprocurementleadtimes,andhighunitcosts,sustainmentsuppliershavemorestrategicvalue.Indeed,suppliersegmentationwillprobablyshowthatmostsustain-mentsupplierscanbeincludedinanSRMprogram.

Identifying and profiling stakeholders.Whichinternalstakeholdersshouldhavethegreatestinfluence?

Aspreviouslynoted,anSRMprogramcanhelprecon-cilecompetingdemandswithinacustomerorganization.Itisnotuncommonfordifferentbusinessunitswithinanenterprisetohavedifferingperformanceneedsorunequalriskthresholds,butwithoutfirstidentifyingthesestake-holdersanddeterminingtheirrelativeimportancetothecustomer-supplierrelationship,theenterprisewillbeun-abletomediateamongthedifferentbusinessunits.

Severalpiecesofinformationmakeupastakeholderprofile,includinginternalspendingdata,thestrategicvalueofthestakeholder’sbusinessunittotheenterprise’ssupplychain,andthebusinessunit’spositionwithinthe

organization’scorporatestructure.Allotherthingsbeingequal,stakeholdersthataccount

formorespending,thataremorecentraltotheenterprise’scorebusiness,andthataremoreseniorintheorganiza-tion’shierarchyshouldbegivenmoreofavoiceinanSRMprogram.Thebusinessunitthatismostimportanttoacustomer-supplierrelationshipshouldbegivenultimateresponsibilityforowningandmanagingthatsupplierrela-tionship.Evenso,allinterestedstakeholdersshouldpar-ticipatesothattheSRMprogramistrulyrepresentativeofthefullbreadthofinterestswithintheenterprise.

InanArmysustainmentcontext,itisunlikelythatastakeholder’simportancetothesupplychainwillvarysig-nificantly.Asaresult,weaponsystemstakeholderprofileswillbeprimarilyguidedbyspendingandpositionintheArmyenterprise.

Asustainmentsupplierrelationshipcanbemanagedattheitem,weapon-system,platform,cross-platform,LCMC,orArmyMaterielCommand(AMC)level.Cur-rently,weapon-systemsupplierrelationshipstendtobemanagedattheitemorweapon-systemlevel,buttherearebenefitstomanagingasupplierrelationshipatahigherlevelwithinAMC.

Whendealingwithsuppliersthatprovideitemsacrossmultipleweaponsystems,theArmycanincreaseitslever-agebyaggregatingeachweaponsystem’sspendingintoasinglerequirementandasinglesuppliernegotiation.Nevertheless,managingasupplierrelationshipatahigherorganizationallevelisnotalwayswarranted.Byprofil-ingstakeholdersthroughanSRMprogram,theArmycanbalancethebenefitsofelevatingthemanagementofasupplierrelationshipwiththerealitiesofeachsupplier’sspendingprofile.

ManagingSupplierRelationshipsSuppose,forexample,thatAMChasasetofsuppliers

withspendingbreakdownsresemblingthoseinthetableonpage16.Eventhougheachsupplierdoes$500millionworthofbusinesswithAMC,theirspendingbreakdownacrossthedifferentlevelsoftheAMCenterpriseimpliesadifferentrelationshipownerforeachsupplier.

ThecombinedspendingofSupplier1andSupplier2isconcentratedwithinAMCOMand,morespecifically,with-inProgramExecutiveOffice(PEO)Aviation.Ontheotherhand,Supplier1’sspendingisexclusivelyrelatedtotheBlackHawkhelicopter,andSupplier2’sspendingisspreadacrosstheBlackHawkandApacheplatforms.

TheArmycanleverageSupplier1’sspendingbasebymanagingitsrelationshipattheplatformlevel.OwnershipoftheSupplier2relationshipshouldbeelevatedtothePEO(cross-platform)level.

Supplier3’sspendingisconcentratedwithinasingleLCMC.BecauseitisdividedbetweenPEOGroundCom-batSystemsandPEOSoldier,theSupplier3relationshipshouldbemanagedattheLCMClevel.Supplier4’sspend-ingissharedbetweenAMCOMandTACOM,andtheSup-plier4relationshipshouldbemanagedattheAMClevel.

Regardlessofwhoownstherelationship,however,allstakeholderswithaninterestintherelationshipshouldpar-ticipateintheSRMprogram.Evenintheextremecaseof

16 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

Supplier1,inwhichallspendingaccruestoPMOUtilityHelicopter,PEOAviation,AMCOM,andAMCstakehold-ersshouldbeinvolvedinSRMactivities.

TailoringtheSRMProgramWhensuppliersegmentationandstakeholderanalysis

arecomplete,anorganizationcanbegintocreateitsSRMprogram.UnlikeSRMpreparation,whichisasimilarprocessforeachenterprise,thereisnosingleformulaforsupplieroutreach.Outreachcanbeassimpleasmeasuringtheperformanceofasupplieraccordingtoasmallsetofkeymetricsorascomplexasfullsupplychainintegrationthroughaseriesofpartnershipcontracts.Formostsuppli-ers,however,theextentofsupplieroutreachwillliebe-tweenthesetwoextremes.

RegardlessoftheextentofSRMoutreach,tailoringittotheneedsofanindividualsupplierrelationshipiskey.Thefactorsthatguidethedesignofoutreachincludethestrate-gicvalueofasuppliertotheorganization,theanticipateddurationofthecustomer-supplierrelationship,andtheex-istinghealthofthecustomer-supplierrelationship.

Itwouldbeawasteofresourcestopartnerwithashort-termsupplierorasupplierthatisoflittlestrategicvalue,anditwouldbetooriskytopartnerwithasup-plierwhoseexistingrelationshipwiththeorganizationisunhealthy.Similarly,anenterprisewillmissopportunitiestocapturethefullbenefitsofSRMbypursuinghands-offperformancemeasurementwithstrategicallyvaluablesuppliers,long-termsuppliers,orsupplierswithanexist-inghealthyrelationship.

WithintheArmysustainmentcommunity,examplesexistofbothperformancemeasurementandpartnership.Attheperformancemeasurementextreme,metricslike“procurementleadtime”or“acquisitionleadtime”areoftenincludedincontracts.Atthepartnershipextreme,theArmyhasenteredintopartnershipswithcrucialweaponsystemsuppliers,includingGE,Sikorsky,andLockheedMartin.Partnerships,however,generallycoverasinglepart

orweaponsystemanddonotresemblethemorecomplex,enterprise-widepartnershipsenvisionedbySRMprograms.

Similarly,performancemeasurementtypicallyoccursatthecontractoritemlevelanddoesnotprovideanenterprise-widepictureofsupplierperformance.Moreover,formostweaponsystemsuppliers,performancemeasurementisaninappropriateformofsupplieroutreach.Asnotedabove,thesustainmentsupplychaindiffersfromthoseofprivateindus-tryinthatitconsistsprimarilyoflong-termsupplierswithstrategicvaluetotheArmy.InanArmysustainmentcontext,SRMoutreachwillskewtowardmorecomplex,collabora-tiveprogramsaimedatjointsupplychainimprovements.

SRMprogramsareanincreasinglyrecognizedbestprac-ticeamongprivateindustry.AstheArmycontinuestoevolveandimproveitssustainmentsupplychain,itshouldincorpo-rateSRMinordertoimprovemanagement,assessandmiti-gaterisk,andincreasethevalueofitssupplierrelationships.

TheArmy’ssustainmentsupplychainisdominatedbystrategicallyvaluable,long-termsuppliersthatprovidecomplexitemswithlongleadtimes.TheArmywillcon-sequentlygainmorefromSRMthanwillprivateindustry,anditisinauniquepositiontoimplementahighlyeffec-tivesustainmentSRMprogram.

Morebroadly,theprinciplesofSRMapplyequallytoallDepartmentofDefenseservices.Astheservicesexplorejointsourcingofsustainmentitems,SRMcanbeavaluabletoolforreconcilingtheirpotentiallycompetingdemands.

jaMeS d. MCintoSH iS a direCtor at CenSeo ConSultinG Group. He HoldS a B.S. deGree in CoMputer SCienCe froM Harvard univer-Sity and an M.B.a. deGree froM tHe MaSSaCHuSettS inStitute of teCHnoloGy.

jonatHan Selter iS an aSSoCiate at CenSeo ConSultinG Group. He HaS a BaCHelor’S deGree froM weSleyan univerSity and a MaS-ter’S deGree froM Harvard univerSity.

Supplier1 Supplier2 Supplier3 Supplier4AMC $ 500 $ 500 $ 500 $ 500

AMCOM $ 500 $ 500 $ 0 $ 300PEO Aviation $ 500 $ 500 $ 0 $ 300

PMO Utility Helicopter (Black Hawk) $ 500 $ 300 $ 0 $ 300PMO Apache Helicopter $ 0 $ 200 $ 0 $ 0

TACOM LCMC $ 0 $ 0 $ 500 $ 200PEO Ground Combat Systems $ 0 $ 0 $ 300 $ 200

PMO Heavy Brigade Combat Team $ 0 $ 0 $ 300 $ 200PMO Stryker Bridge Combat Team $ 0 $ 0 $ 0 $ 0

PEO Soldier $ 0 $ 0 $ 200 $ 0PMO Soldier Weapons $ 0 $ 0 $ 200 $ 0PMO Soldier Warrior $ 0 $ 0 $ 0 $ 0

This table shows the dollars (in millions) spent by the various suppliers in the scenario. Although each supplier’s total spending with the Army Materiel Command is the same, their different spending profiles imply different relationship owners.

AMC =ArmyMaterielCommandAMCOM=AviationandMissileCommandLCMC =LifeCycleManagementCommand

PEO =ProgramExecutiveOfficePMO =ProjectManagementOffice

Legend


sthemaintenanceplatoonleaderinaforwardsup- portcompany(FSC),Iamresponsibleforpersonnel management,paperwork,andmissionplanning.Inonemission,theFSCassistedinclosingajointsecuritysta-tionmannedbyU.S.SoldiersandtheIraqiPolice.Beforethisoperation,theFSC’sSoldiersknewtheirequipment’sbasiccapabilities.However,aftertheoperation,myFSCknewthelimitationsandfullcapabilitiesofitssystems.

FindingtheWeightLimitThemostvaluabletoolusedthroughouttheentireopera-

tionwastheFSCsM984wrecker-recoveryheavyexpanded-mobilitytacticaltrucks(HEMTTs).Beforethismission,theFSCconsultedtheM984technicalmanualforinformationontheliftcapabilitiesofthewrecker’scrane.Theoperatorsfoundthatthecrane’sliftcapabilitywasadequateforthemis-sionthattheFSCwouldbeattemptingtoperform.Althoughliftcapacityinformationisconsideredcommonknowledge,operatorsandsupervisorsregularlycheckthetechnicalmanu-alforavehicle’sweightliftinglimit.Aslongasaplancanbemadeonhowtoliftanobjectandtheobjectweighslessthantheweightlimit,theobjectcanbesafelylifted.

TheFirstTest:TheWeightLimitDuringtheoperationtoclosethejointsecuritystation,

thecraneswerepushedtothelimit.Ourfirstmissionwastolowerandremovean85-foot-tallrapidaerostatinitialdeploymenttower.Thistowerhadbeendamagedwhileitwasbeingloweredwhenasupportcablebecamestuck,bendingthetowerinsuchawaythatitcouldnolongerlowerintoitself.

Themaintenanceplatoon’sserviceandrecoverynoncom-missionedofficer-in-chargeandIdevelopedaplanforsafe-lyloweringanddismantlingthetower.Thisplanconsistedofbackingawreckeruptothebaseofthetowertosupportthetower’sweightasitwaslowered.Thenthehydraulicsthatnormallylaythetowerdownonitstrailerwereusedtolowerthetowerwhileasecondwreckerassistedintheoperation.Thissecondwreckerraiseditsboomouttoitsfulllength,andthenaSoldiertookthecablefromit,climbed60feetupthetower,andattachedthecabletothetower.Thewreckerandhydraulicsthenloweredthetowerdownwithnodamagetovehicles,personnel,orthetower.

TheSecondTest:MovingMILVANsDuringasecond“drawdown,”twowreckersweretaken

outtothejointsecuritystationandusedtomove20-foot

TestingtheCapabilitiesoftheHEMTTWrecker

by FirSt lieutenant jeFFrey tePliS

A MILVANs[military-owneddemountablecontainers].Fouroftheselargecontainers,whichwerealmostaslongastractor-trailercontainers,neededtobeliftedandplacedonflatracksfortransport.Toaccomplishthis,thewreck-ersbackeduptooppositesidesofaMILVANandattachedtheircablestothetop.ThentheyliftedtheMILVANwhileapalletizedloadsystem(PLS)pushedtheflatrackunderneathit.Thiswasveryimpressive,aseachMILVANweighedmorethan6,000pounds.OncetheMILVANswereinplaceontheflatracks,thewreckerswereusedtomoveseveralsmalleritems,suchasgeneratorsandtrailers.

TheFinalTest:ATightSqueezeTheFSC’sfinalmissionrequiredthewreckersto

removeaflatrackfromunderneathaverylargeciviliangeneratorthatwaspoweringadozendifferentbuildings.Thegeneratorweighedabout250,000poundsandwasinaverysmallareawithlittlemaneuverroom.Thetwowreckersbackeduptothegeneratorfromoppositesidesandliftedit,andaPLStruckapproachedandpulledouttheflatrackonwhichthegeneratorhadbeensitting.Thisoperationwasverydemandingandrequiredsomeingenu-itybecausethewreckershadobjectsintheirwayrequir-ingthemtoextendtheirboomsandliftthegeneratorfromabout15feetaway.

Littlerecognitionisgiventoserviceandrecoverysec-tionsacrosstheArmy,buttheyservevariedandvitalrolesinFSCs.Withouttheirvastknowledgeoftheirequipmentandingenuityinusingit,manymissionscouldnotbecom-pleted.TheM984HEMTTwreckerisaverycapablepieceofequipmentthat,inthehandsoftherightoperators,canaccomplishmanymissionsthatpreviouslywerebelievedtobeimpossible.Oneshouldneverunderestimatewhatthesevehiclescando.Asleaders,knowingthevehiclesfullcapabilitiesandusingthemtotheirsafestmaximumpoten-tialisessential.

firSt lieutenant jeffrey tepliS waS tHe MaintenanCe platoon leader of G CoMpany, a forward Support CoMpany of tHe 26tH BriGade Support Battalion, 2d Heavy BriGade CoMBat teaM, 3d infantry diviSion, durinG itS reCent deployMent to iraq. He HoldS a BaCHelor’S deGree in SoCial SCienCe witH MinorS in politiCal SCienCe and Military leaderSHip froM nortH GeorGia ColleGe and State univerSity, and He iS a Graduate of tHe ordnanCe offiCer BaSiC CourSe.

An FSC in Iraq tested the capabilities of its wreckers through a variety of heavy-duty missions.

18 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

oureceiveacallfromyourcommandersaying, “Staff,missionanalysisin30minutes—wejust receivedanout-of-sectormission.”Overthecourseofthenextcoupleofhoursordays,youworktounderstandthenewareaofoperationsforwhichyouhadnotplanned.Youhavenoknowledgeoftheterrainandnomapsofthearea,soyoulookontheInternetforanyinformationthatcanhelpyourorganizationbetterprepareforthisnewmission.Doesthissoundfamiliar?

Doctrinally,theArmyCorpsofEngineersshouldassistyouinconductingterrainanalysisforfuturemissions.FieldManual3–34.170,EngineerReconnaissance,rein-forcesthefactthatgeospatialengineeringisanengineercapabilityinadditiontocombat(mobility,countermobil-ity,andsurvivability)andgeneralengineeringskills.

LearningAboutTerrainAnalysisManeuverbrigadecombatteamshaveatopographi-

calsectionthatcanprovidethisanalysiswiththesamedatathatareavailabletotherestoftheArmyifyouknowwhotoaskandwhattoaskfor.Havingproactive,technicallyinclinedindividualsonthebat-talionstaffenablesyoutogathertheinformationyouwantonyourownscheduleandmakethenecessarychanges—allwithoutgoingoutsideofyourunit.Anumberofsources,bothunclassifiedandclassified,canprovideyouwiththeinformationyouneedto

requestaccesstosomewebsitesandtorequesttrainingforyourownunit.

Untilyoucangetatrainingteamonsitetoincreaseyourlevelofcompetency,youcanvisitthefollowingfiveNon-SecureInternetProtocolRouterNetwork(NIPRNET)websitesforterrainanalysisassistance:ohttps://www.extranet.nga.milohttps://warp.nga.milohttps://www1.nga.milohttp://www.agc.army.milohttp://www.intelink.gov

Youwillneedtorequestaccesstothesewebsitesandhaveacommonaccesscardreadertogainthefullbenefits.

Nationalgeospatial-IntelligenceAgencyTheNationalGeospatial-IntelligenceAgency(NGA)

isaDepartmentofDefenseagencythatdevelopsimageryandprovidestimelymap-basedintelligencesolutionsforU.S.nationaldefense,homelandsecurity,andnavigationsafety.NGAprovidesdeployableteamsthroughouttheworldtosupportthewarfighter.IfyoudonotknowwheretofindNGA,askyourdivisionorcorpsengineercellorcheckatoneofthelargerforwardoperatingbasesinyourareaofoperations.

YoushouldrequestamobiletrainingteamfromNGA’sGeospatialAnalysisBranch([email protected]).Theteam

TerrainAnalysisforNon-Engineersby Major DaMian a. Green

Y

Knowledge of the terrain of an upcoming operation is critical to planning. The author suggests several websites and agencies that can help sustainers to gain this knowledge.

At left, this elevation shaded-relief 3-dimensional perspective of Babylon, Iraq, was made using the Buckeye Program, which consists of an airborne platform that collects unclassified high-resolution geospatial data for tactical missions.At right is an elevation shaded-relief map providing a 3-dimensional perspective of Tikrit, Iraq. Light detection and rang-ing is used to remotely sense elevation data. (Images courtesy of the School of Geospacial Intelligence)


willbringupto15laptopcomputersandaprojector,ifneeded.Therequestoronlyhastoprovidethestudents,Internetdrops,andaclass-room.TheteamprovidestrainingonboththeSecretInternetProtocolRouterNetworkandNIPRNETandcantailorinstructiontotheneedsofthecustomer.

OneproductthatIfoundusefulwasFalcon-view.Originallydesignedforaviatorstoplantheirroutes,itcanbeagreattoolforgroundunits.Recently,NGAcreatedavariationofFalconviewcalledTalonview,whichisfornonaviators.Usingtheabovewebsites,youcandeterminethemapdatathatyouneed,andNGAwillsendyoutheelectronicfiles(in2daysto2weeks).Iftherequestrequiresmorethanacoupleofgigabytesofmemory,youwillreceiveasmanyfirewireterabitharddrivesasarerequiredtostoretheinformation—allatnocosttotheunit.

AnothertoolthatNGAcanprovideisa3-dimen-sionalmap(20inchesby24inchesby16inches)ofanylocationintheworld.Thisdurable,solidmodelvisuallyportraysdigitalgeospatialinformationthatcanbeusedinvariousfunctions.Ifyourroutestraveloverthesameroads,themapcouldbeyourterrainmodelforconvoybriefings.Allyouhavetoprovideareacoupleofscalemodelsofyourvehicles.Thismapalsocanbeusedforcourse-of-actiondevelopment,wargaming,andterrainvisualization.

ArmygeospatialCenterTheArmyGeospatialCenter(AGC),runbythe

ArmyCorpsofEngineers,providesanextremelyuser-friendlysiteforproductsandservicesthatenabletheaverageSoldiertobecomeamoreknowledgeableplanner.TheAGCdevelopsandfieldsgeospatialenter-prise-enabledsystemsandcapabilitiesacrosstheArmyandtheDepartmentofDefense.

TheUrbanTacticalPlanner(UTP)providesanincred-ibleunclassifiedcapabilityforthewarfightertobettervisualizehisenvironment.UTPtapsintoNGA’stopo-graphicproductsandotherdatasourcestoshowtheurbanenvironment,suchasbuildingheights,verticalobstructions,bridges,linesofcommunication,key

culturalfeatures,andlandmarks.DesignedbyAGCinpartnershipwithGeneralDynamics,UTPisagreatplan-ningtoolthatcanbeaccesseddowntothesquadlevel.

Intelink—UnclassifiedYouhaveprobablyusedWikipediatogatherinfor-

mationontheInternet.Intelink,whichwasstartedin1994topromoteintelligencedissemination,isnothingmorethanWikipediaonasecuredInternetsite.WithIntelink,youtypeyourrequestintothesearchengineandyouwillgethitsfromvarioussources.SomeoftheWikipediainformationispresentinthedatabase(vetted,ofcourse).

Havinga“passport”allowstheusertobecomeacontributorandpostdocumentsandproductstothesite.Theaccuracyoftheinformationisamatterofopinion,butmostcontributorsaregoingtopostonlytheirbestproducts.Thesiteappearstobeself-policing.

Inthisarticle,Ihavementionedvariouswebsitesthatcanbeaccessedinordertoimproveoperationalplanning.Ifyouarenothandsonandelectronicallyfocused,providethisarticletoyourG/S–3,G–5,sup-portoperationsoffice,andengineercellsotheycanprovideyouwithabetterqualityproduct.

Major daMian a. Green iS a Student at tHe arMy’S SCHool of advanCed Military StudieS. He HoldS a BaCHelor’S deGree in SCi-enCe froM providenCe ColleGe and a MaSter’S deGree in BuSineSS froM tHe univerSity of kanSaS. He attended tHe infantry offiCer BaSiC CourSe, ordnanCe tranSition CourSe, CoMBined loGiStiCS CaptainS Career CourSe, and interMediate level eduCation at tHe arMy CoMMand and General Staff ColleGe.

This image of the Urban Tac-tical Planner shows the level of detail that can be obtained

through this site.

20 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

ormorethan20years,theArmy’sSoldier EnhancementProgram(SEP)hasbeenproviding Soldierswithcommercialoff-the-shelf(COTS)itemsthathelpthemeffectivelycompletetheirmis-sions.AndyetmanypeoplehaveneverheardofSEP.

SEP’spastsuccessesincludetheM110semi-automaticsnipersystem,clip-onsnipernightsight,aviationlaserpointer,parachuteelectronicactivationdevice,fuelhandlerscoverallsandgloves,modularghilliesuitandghilliesuitaccessorykitupgrade,AN/PEQ–4integratedlaserwhitelightpointer,parachut-istsdropbag,improvedcombatshelter,andtacticalassaultladder.

SEPwasestablishedbyCongressin1989topur-chaseitemsthatimprovelethality,survivability,com-mandandcontrol,mobility,andsustainabilityforallSoldiers.SEPpioneeredacquisitionreformandwasaforerunneroftheProgramExecutiveOffice(PEO)Sol-dierRapidFieldingInitiative,whichalsodeliversstate-of-thearttechnologyandgeartoSoldiersonfast-trackschedules.Today,PEOSoldier,alongwiththeArmyTrainingandDoctrineCommand,managesSEPfortheArmy.WhatisgreataboutSEPisthatanyonecansub-mitaproposalforanewitemandSEPcanprovidethatcapabilityforourSoldiersinlessthan3years.

EnhanceWhatIsAlreadyAvailableUnlikemanymilitaryacquisitionprograms,SEP

reliesoncommerciallyavailabletechnologiesthatareadaptedtomeetSoldiers’specificrequirements.IdeasfortheprogramcomefromSoldiers,commanders,unitswithspecificneeds,andindustryleadersworldwide.Therangeofitemsincludesindividualweapons,ammu-nition,optics,combatclothing,individualequipment,watersupplies,shelters,andnavigationalaids.TheCOTSstartingpointmustlenditselftobeingadaptedandprovidedtoSoldiersinnomorethan3years.

SustainmentSoldiers’RequirementsManeuverSoldiersrelyonequipmenttheywear

orcarry.SustainmentandsupportSoldiersfrequentlyreceiveclothingandequipmentthatwasdevelopedforthemaneuvercommunity.

Fuelhandlercoveralls(FHC)andgloves,however,areprimeexamplesofSEPcapabilityenhancements

thatbenefitthoseworkinginthelogisticsrealm.TheFHCandglovesprogramswereinitiatedasSEPpro-gramsin2004todevelopaprotectiveensemblethatmeetsindustrialstandardsforrepellingfuelanddis-sipatingstatic.FHCprovideexcellentliquidresistancenotfoundinothermilitary-issuecoveralls.

TheArmyrecentlymodifiedtheCommonTableofAllowance50–900toauthorizewatercraftoperatorstodrawandmaintainFHC,andtheProgramManagerforClothingandIndividualEquipmentrecentlypublished

asources-soughtnoticeforfire-resistantFHC.Whenacandidateisselectedandfielded,logisticsSoldierswillhaveatailoredoptionavailabletoprotectthemfromflameaswellasfuel,lubricants,solvents,andothertoxicindustrialchemicalsandmaterials.TheSustain-mentCenterofExcellencehasproposedSEPsupportforflotationarmortoaddresscombinedprotectionandsurvivaldeficienciesforsustainmentandsupportSoldierswhoroutinelyoperatearoundlittoralwatersorengageinwater-crossingoperations.However,nootherSEPcandidatesspecificallyintendedforsustainmentSoldiershavebeenapprovedsincetheFHC.

IdentifyingSustainmentSoldiers’NeedsDosustainmentSoldiersperformspecifictasks

orencounterspecifichazardsthattheSEPprogramcanaddress?TheArmyisnowaugmentingunitsinAfghanistanwith“platecarriers”andacceptingbodyarmorprotectionriskforbettermobilityduringspe-cificmissions.

Meanwhile,jointtraumaanalysis,combatinjuryprevention,andDepartmentofDefenseblastinjury

ArmySoldierEnhancementProgramby tHoMaS b. HouSe ii anD rayMonD e. Strunk

F

The Army’s Soldier Enhancement Program evaluates commercially available items that meet Soldiers’ needs.

With the Army immersed in conflicts around the world, Soldiers need

equipment that reflects the best technology, and

they need it fast.


researchprogramsindicateaneedforincreasedmaxillofacialandextremitycoverage.Theaterfeed-backindicatesaneedtousetheimprovedoutertacticalvestwithdeltoidandgroinprotectiononcon-voystomaximizeprotection.COTSsolutionscouldprovidepersonnelinstationaryguardpositionsorridingintacticalwheeledvehicleswithadditionalprotectionfromshrapnelandspall,buttheArmyconsidersthemtooencumberingtobeuseful.AreweignoringtypicalsustainmentSoldiertasksforwhichpersonalmobilityisnotimperative?

Rifleman’sRadioandGroundSoldierIncrement1areemergingcommandandcontrolsystemsthatpro-videposition-locationcapabilityfortheindividualSol-dier.Thesesystemswillcertainlymatureandincreaseinnumbertoaidtacticalmaneuver,butaretheythebestfitforsustainmentunits?Sustainmentformationstendtorelyheavilyoncommunicationssystemsinorganicvehiclesforcommandandcontrol.Whataboutexpandingin-transitvisibilityorStandardArmyMan-agementInformationSystemstoencompassindividualSoldierstatus?Canradiofrequencyidentificationtech-nologyprovideacheaperalternativeforsustainmentformationleaderstotrackteamsorindividualSoldiersinthevicinityofconvoysandoperatingbases?

TherequirementforanewpieceofequipmentforsustainmentSoldierscouldbeassimpleasanindividualhandtooloraBluetoothhand-heldelectronicorganizerthatiscapableofpassinglogisticsdata.PEOSoldierSystemsIntegration,incoordinationwiththeArmyTrainingandDoctrineCommandCapabilityManager-Soldier,reviewssubmissionsanddecideswhethertoevaluateanitemfurther,buyorproduceit,conductfieldtesting,orstandardizeandissueittoSoldiersinthefield.TheSEPexecutivecouncilmeetseachFebruaryandAugusttoapproveinitiativesforthenextfiscalyear.

SEPNowWiththeArmyimmersedinconflictsaroundthe

world,Soldiersneedequipmentthatreflectsthebesttechnology,andtheyneeditfast.BeforetransformationwasapartoftheArmylexicon,SEPwaspromotingtransformationoftheSoldiersystemwithanacceleratedacquisitionprocessthatgetsbetterweaponsandgearintoSoldiers’hands.SEPcontinuestoplayakeyrolein

theefforttomeetSoldiers’requirements.Currentpro-gramsincludetheaircrewlaserpointer,advancedsniperaccessorykit,grenadierlaserrangefinder,XM–111612-gaugeextended-rangenonlethalcartridge,sniperquickfiresight,andsniperweapontripod.

Anyonecansubmitaproposal.Nearly100propos-alsarereceivedandreviewedevery6months.PEOSoldierwillconsiderproposalsforitemsthat—oCurrentlyareavailableasCOTS.oWillenhancetheeffectivenessofindividualSoldiers

inatacticalenvironment.oCanbeworn,carried,orconsumedbySoldiersina

tacticalenvironment.Proposalscanbesubmittedonlineatwww.

peosoldier.army.mil,byfaxto(706)545–1377,[email protected],orbymailtoTomHouse,7010MorrisonAvenue,Building128,Room209,FortBenning,Georgia31905.

FormoreinformationaboutSEP,theprocess,ormeetingdates,call(706)545–[email protected].

tHoMaS B. HouSe ii iS tHe Soldier enHanCeMent proGraM ManaGer for proGraM exeCutive offiCe Soldier at fort BenninG, GeorGia. He iS a Graduate of tHe priMary, BaSiC, and advanCed nonCoMMiSSioned offiCer CourSeS, tHe Battle Staff CourSe, tHe firSt SerGeant CourSe, and tHe arMy SerGeantS Major CourSe.

rayMond e. Strunk, an enGility Corporation ContraCtor, iS a Soldier SySteMS repreSentative for tHe Materiel SySteMS direCtorate of tHe SuStainMent Center of exCellenCe. He HoldS a B.S. deGree in eleCtroniCS teCHnoloGy froM tHe univerSity of Central florida.

This photo is an example of the Sniper Quick Fire Site, which is a commercial off-the-shelf capability that the Soldier Enhancement Program has approved

for solicitation for procurement.

22 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

lbertoChidiniknowsalltoowellthesurprise ofbeingjarredawakeinthemiddleofthe nightbyaringingtelephone.Asthemanagerofhumanitarianassistancelogisticsoperationsforthe3dBattalion,405thArmyFieldSupportBrigade,hisschedulecanchangethemomentanaturaldisasterhitsanywhereintheworld.

The3dBattalionisasmallArmypre-positionedstocks(APS)unitheadquarteredatLeghornArmyDepot,Italy,thatdoesmorethanmaintainsuppliesfortheAPSmissionandexecuteresetandleft-behind-equipmentoperations.IthasaworldwidereachthroughauniqueinteragencyagreementwiththeU.S.AgencyforInternationalDevelopment(USAID).

“Westoreandmaintainhumanitariansuppliesforthem[USAID],andwhenaninternationalemergencyarises,theycontactusdirectly,”explainedLieutenantColonelRichardPierce,thebattalion’scommander.“Wepackthematerialsaccordingtothelistthattheyprovideandmakesurethatthesuppliesgetwheretheyareneededasquicklyaspossible.”

AnAdvantageousLocationRobertDemeranville,aseniorlogisticianwith

USAID,notedthatUSAIDoperationsactuallybeginlongbeforethecalltothebattalion.“Ifsomethinghappens,adisasterisdeclared,”heexplained.“Wesendateamin,andoncetheteamisontheground,theysurveythesituationandthensendacallforcommoditiesbasedonwhatisneededinthedisasterarea.Whenwegetthatcallfromtheteamontheground,wecallthebattalionandgetthesuppliesmoving.”

The3dBattalionissingularlyqualifiedtosupportdisasterlogisticsoperations.“OurlocationinItalygivesusauniquelogisticscapability,”Piercesaid.“Becausewehaveaccesstobothwaterandairtransportcapabilitieswithin30minutesofthedepot,wecanexecuteloadingandtransportationmissions

quicklyandefficiently,ensuringthattheaidreachesthedisasterareaasquicklyaspossible.”

Theabilitytomovematerialsusingavarietyoftransportationoptionsisakeycomponenttothesuccessoftherelationship.“Wefrequentlyneedquickaccesstoairtransportation,”Demeranvillesaid.“Themultiplelogisticscapabilitiesofthebattalionmakeiteasyforustomovecommoditiesaroundoutofthebaseandtothedesignatedairportofdeparture.Ifwecan’tgetanairplanetoPisaquicklyenough,USAIDwillcontracttohavethesuppliespickedupatourPisawarehouseandtruckedbythebattaliontoothercommercialairportlocationsinEurope.Thatsortofflexibilityisagreatassetformissionssuchasthese.”

SupportforOver40YearsTheagreementbetweenUSAIDandthebattalion

beganin1973duringatimewhentheagencystoredallofitsmaterialsonmilitaryinstallations.“Inthepast,welargelyutilizedmilitaryinstallationsforourwarehousingoperations,”Demeranvillesaid.“However,thatisnolongerthecase.Allofourwarehousingoperationshavebeenmovedtocommerciallocations,withtheexceptionofthematerialsatthebattalioninItaly.Theyaretheonlymilitaryunitthathandlesthissortofworkforusnow.”

Overthedecades,thebattalionhassupportedcountlessmissionsacrosstheglobe.“Inthelast10yearsalone,we’veshippedhumanitarianassistancesuppliestomorethan45countriesatUSAID’srequest,”Chidinisaid.

RespondingFastThebattalionstoresandmaintainsawidevarietyof

humanitarianassistancesuppliesforUSAID,includingwaterpurificationsystems,blankets,tents,personalhygienekits,medicalkits,andplasticsheeting.Thismissionisnotwithoutitschallenges.

ABattalioninItalySupportsHumanitarianDisasterReliefAroundtheWorld

by CaPtain MiCHael kiStler, uSar, FreD WittMer, anD jenniFer kinG

A

An Army pre-positioned stocks unit has a unique additional mission: supporting the U.S. Agency for International Development with supplies for disaster relief operations.


“Thehumanitarianaidmissionisalwaysanemergency,”explainedMaurizioFrascarelli,ageneralsupplyspecialistwhofrequentlyassistswiththeurgentreliefUSAIDmissions.“Themostchallengingpartistounderstandtherequest,matchtherequesttoourinventory,andfindpeopletodothejob,evenifit’sinthemiddleofthenight.Itisimperativethatweloadthetruckstosendthematerialsintheshortesttimeframepossible.”

DemeranvillecommentedthattheItaliancustomslawsareextremelystrict,butthebattalioneasilyovercomesthechallengespresentedbythenation’sregulations.“DespitethedetailedproceduresforItaliancustoms,theydoagreatjob,”hesaid.“Theyhaveaverystrongrelationshipwithlocalcustomsofficials.That’swhatmakesthisagreementsosuccessful—that,andthecareanddedicationtooperationsfromthecrew.Youcantellthattheytakethejobveryseriously.Thebattalionknowseverythingthatisrequiredtomakeoperationsworkatthepacethatweneedtoexecute.WerepositionlotsofcargoinandoutofLeghornArmyDepot,andtheteamthereistimelyandtalented.”

ARewardingMissionOfallthemissionsthatthebattalionexecutes,the

USAIDmissionisnearanddeartotheheartsoftheemployees.“WeconsiderourselvesapartnertoUSAID

intheirhumanitarianreliefefforts,”Piercesaid.“Wetakegreatprideinbeingabletodeliverthematerialstheyneedinaspeedyandefficientmanner,doingourparttoalleviatethesufferingofpeopleasquicklyaspossible.”

Frascarelliagreesthathelpingpeopleinneedgalvanizestheeffort.“OftenbeforethecallcomesinfromUSAID,wehaveseenthedramaticimagesofsomecatastrophiceventonthetelevision,andthismakesusextremelymotivated.”

Oneofthebattalion’smostrecenteffortsonbehalfofUSAIDsupportedreliefoperationsinHaiti,whereadevastating7.0earthquakedecimatedmuchofthecountryinJanuary2010.Over3months,thebattalionsentthousandsofpoundsofhumanitariansuppliestoHaitiin5differentshipments,includingfour10,000-literwaterbladders,8waterpurificationunits,morethan58,00010-literwatercontainers,morethan30,000personalhygienekits,andmorethan6,500rollsofplasticsheeting.

Thebattalion’sabilitytoexecutemissionsrapidlymakesitsrelationshipwithUSAIDideal.USAIDfrequentlyneedsmaterialsmovedonveryshortnotice,andthebattalioniswell-equippedtoquicklyanswerthoserequests.“USAIDdoesagreatjobofkeepingourwarehousesstockedwithemergencyreliefsupplies,”Chidiniexplained.“Theyalwaysmakesurethatwehaveeverythingweneedtosupportthemintheirrequests.”

Warehouse workers prepare to transport a water buffalo from the 3d Battalion, 405th Army Field Support Brigade, to Pisa International Airport for shipment to Port-au-Prince, Haiti. (Photo by Chiara Mattirolo)

24 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

LieutenantColonelPiercealsocreditshisstaffforthesuccessthebattalionenjoyswiththeUSAIDmissions.“Wehaveatremendouslytalentedworkforce,”hesaid.“Ourhostnationemployeesareincred-iblyefficientandextremelyexperi-encedintheseoperations,andtheirabilitytoperformwithsuchshortnoticeisaninvaluableassettoourorganization.Theirdedicationtoourmissionisaprimaryreasonforoursuccess.”

Theagreementbetweenthebat-talionandUSAIDisviewedbybothpartiesasawin-winsituation.“WetakeagreatdealofprideinourworkforUSAID,”Pierceexplained.“Thisisamissionthathelpsallevi-atethesufferingofpeoplethrough-outtheworld,andwearehumbledthatwegettohavetheopportunitytoassistinthoseefforts.”

USAIDplanstocontinuetherela-tionshipwiththebattalionfortheforeseeablefuture.“Thebattalionisagreatassetforus,andtheydoanexcellentjobofkeepingcargocleanandreadytodeploy,”Demeranvillesaid.“Wehaveafantasticrela-tionshipwiththebattalion,andwecouldn’tbehappierwiththeworktheydoforus.”

Captain MiCHael kiStler, uSar, iS proGraM ManaGer for left-BeHind equipMent SoutH of tHe alpS at livorno, italy. He HoldS two B.a. deGreeS froM tHe univerSity of pittSBurGH and an M.a. deGree froM indiana univerSity of pennSylvania and iS purSuinG a doCtorate in adMiniStration and leaderSHip StudieS froM indiana univerSity of pennSylvania. He iS a Graduate of tHe arMy CaptainS Career CourSe, MediCal ServiCeS CorpS.

fred wittMer iS tHe direCtor of Supply for tHe 3d Battalion, 405tH arMy field Support BriGade, in kaiSerSlautern, GerMany. He iS a Graduate of louiSiana State univerSity and Served 21 yearS in tHe arMy aS a quarterMaSter offiCer. He HaS CoMpleted tHe orGanizational leaderSHip for exeCutiveS CourSe.

jennifer kinG iS tHe puBliC affairS offiCer for tHe 405tH arMy field Support BriGade in kaiSerSlautern, GerMany. SHe HoldS a B.a. deGree in journaliSM/puBliC relationS froM tHe univerSity of louiSiana at Monroe. in Her Current aSSiGnMent, SHe ManaGeS arMy Materiel CoMMand puBliC affairS aCtivitieS witHin tHe euro-pean tHeater of operationS.

At right, the lead warehouse worker for the 3d Battalion, 405th Army Field Support Brigade, uses

a forklift to transport humanitarian aid supplies from the battalion’s

warehouse to a truck for transit to the Pisa Military Airport.

(Photo by Alberto Chidini)

At bottom right, two warehouse workers unload humanitarian aid

supplies from a forklift and palletize the items for transport at the 3d

Battalion, 405th Army Field Support Brigade, at Leghorn Army Depot,

Italy. (Photo by Alberto Chidini)


heninthdayofFebruary2010beganlikeany otherdayatBagramAirfield,Afghanistan,but initialreportsofanincidentcamefilteringintothejointoperationscenter(JOC)around0900.AnavalanchehadoccurredintheSalangPass(justnorthofKabul),andaround30peoplewereeitherinjuredorinneedofassistance.U.S.AirForceparajumpershadalreadybeendispatchedandwereintheareahelping.

Around1100,callswerereceivedinvarioustacticaloperationscenters(TOCs)indicatingadditionalpeoplewereaffectedbytheavalancheandalargerresponsewouldlikelyberequired.Witheachsubsequentreport,thesituationonlygrewworseandmoreagenciesbegantoreceiverequestsforassistance.Around1230,theJOCnotifiedmultipleagenciesthata5-kilometerwideavalanchehadcarvedaswaththroughtheSalangPass,injuringhundreds,potentiallytrappingthousands,andkillinganestimated165(thiswasnotknowndefini-tivelyuntilaftertheevent).

TheU.S.militaryhadhelicoptersintheareaandwasevacuatingpeoplewithanunknownarrayofinjuriestoBagram.Medicalpersonnelfrommultiplebranchesofserviceandcivilianagencieswereprepar-ingtotriageandtreatvictims.Immediately,medicalresponsepersonnelbeganrallyingcrisisresponseteamsintowhathadjustbecomeanunexpectednaturaldisasterreliefeffort.

Thebase’shospital,undertheleadershipofthesupportingheadquarters,announcedamasscasualty(MASCAL)incident,anddecisionsweremadetoemploythebase’sairportterminalasthecentralpatienttriagepointforthedisasterevacuees.Militarypoliceassistancewasrequested,andmuchtothechagrinoftravelersawaitingflights,theairportwasclosedtoper-sonneltransitingthetheaterofoperations.ThosepeopleflyingtootherlocationswereaskedtowaitoutsidetheterminalfortheirflightsorwereaskedtomoveintotheUSO[UnitedServiceOrganizations]building,wheretheywouldbenotifiedofboardingtimesandflightdepartureinformation.Acriticalincidentresponsewas

underway,andthe30thMedicalCommand(MED-COM)andthe484thMedicalLogistics(MEDLOG)CompanyatBagramAirfieldwereamongthemanyagenciesthatresponded.Immediately,theSoldierswenttoworkinsupportofthedisaster.

DisasterManagement:AnOverviewDisastermanagementordinarilyoccursinfour

phases:preparedness,response,recovery,andmitiga-tion.Currentpracticefavorsanall-hazardsapproach,andliteratureindicatesthatfirst-responseagenciesshoulddevelopresponseplansformultiplescenarios.CombatunitsinAfghanistannormallyprepareonlyforbattlefieldscenarios.Preconfiguredmedical“pushpacks”involvesurgicalandtrauma-relatedequipment.Naturaldisastersarenotamongthecommonmis-sionsforaMEDLOGcompanysupportingatheaterofoperations.

BagramAirfield,likemostotherlargermilitaryinstallations,hasaMASCALresponseplaninplace.Theplanisexercisedatleastonceperquarter,butwiththeattitudethatthiswillneverhappentous.Thebaseemploysaworkinggroupofmedicalprofession-alswhoassistindevelopingtherightstrategyforpro-vidingfortheneedsofapopulaceunderduress.

Beforethisreal-worldevent,theMASCALworkinggrouphadconductedtwotrainingexercisesinvolvingthevarioustaskforcesstationedontheinstallationthathaveresponsibilityforcasualtycollectionpoints.Thescenariosinvolvedcoalitionmedicalteamscaringforcoalitionforceswithintheconfinesofthebase;noonecouldhavepredictedaMASCALoftheavalanche’smagnitudethatrequiredinjuredAfghanpeopletobebroughtthroughthebase’sgates.

Althoughmedicalsupportwasonlyaportionofthelargerresponseeffort,healthcarepractitionerswerethedefiningfactorinensuringthatvictimsreceived,ataminimum,aninitialscreeningandevaluationwhentheyarrivedatBagram.PleasenotethattheeffortsatBagramwereonlyaportionoftheoverallresponse;

MedicalLogisticsattheSalangPassAvalanche

T

by CaPtain jerry D. VanVaCtor, CaPtain jaSon DonoVant, uSaF,anD FirSt lieutenant MiCHael DinH-truonG, uSar

Medical logistics personnel responded quickly to an avalanche that occurred in Afghanistan last winter and used their lessons learned to create plans for responding to future disasters.

26 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

theBagramhealthcareteamswerethefirstreceiversinsupportofthefirstrespondersattheactualsceneofthedisaster.

MEDLOgResponseThe484thMEDLOGCompanywasfirstnotified

oftheincidentaround1330bytheMEDCOMG–4.DirectivesfromMEDCOMincludedhavingtraumasuppliesreadyforanimpendingMASCAL.Blanketsandwarmingpacksalsowererecommended.Becauseofthelargenumberofvictimsexpected,itwascriticaltohaveaMEDLOGcompanyrepresentativestationedattheterminalwithameansofcontactingtheware-houseforadditionalsuppliesastheywererequired.

Logisticsleadersatthecriticalincidentsitebegancommunicatingwithclinicianstodeterminewhatsup-plieswereneededtotreatthetypesofinjuriesbeingseen.Asaresultofthisongoingcommunication,itemssuchaswarmingblankets,varioustypesoffluids,hand-warmingpacks,intravenoustherapyitems,hypo-thermiakits,andbandagingmaterialswererequestedfromthewarehouse.MEDLOGtrucksbeganmovingtoandfromtheflightlinebringingallavailableitemsasquicklyastheycouldbeloadedanddroppedoff.

BothSoldiersandleadersobservedseveralissuesofconcernthataffectedtheMEDLOGcompany’ssup-portofthedisasterreliefefforts.Potentialshortfallsincontinuedoperationswerereportedimmediatelytotheincidentcommander,andheassistedinon-the-spotcorrections.

Aftertheavalancheresponse,Soldiersandleadersdiscussedwhathappened,whatwentwellduringtheevent,whatdidnotgoverywell,andwhatcouldbedonetoimproveoperationsinfuturesituations.Theresultinginformationwaspassedtomultiplehigherheadquartersforinclusioninamacro-levelafter-actionreviewfortheatercommanderstouseinplanningforfuturecommunity-wideresponses.

WhatWentWellTheresponsetimefromtheinitialnotificationto

thearrivalofthefirstloadofsupplieswasnotedasatremendoussuccess.Whatwasnotknown,andwaslaterdiscussedbynoncommissionedofficer(NCO)leadersthroughoutthecompany,wasthatthe484thMEDLOGhadrehearsedaMASCALresponsedur-ingtrainingatFortHood,Texas,beforedeployment.NCOleadersrecalledhowunsuccessfultheSoldierswereintraining;yetwhenthe“realdeal”occurred,theSoldiersrespondedasiftheyhadalwaysbeen

respondingtodisasters.TheSoldiersformedthemselvesintoself-directedteams(suchasdataentry,pullerandpicker,load,andcommuni-cationsteams)andapparentlybeganinstinc-tivelymanagingvariousaspectsofsupportandsustainmentforpro-vidersatthetriagesite.

Byhavingsomepreconfiguredtraumaandsurgicalpushpacks,the484thMEDLOGwasabletopushmanyofthesuppliestothepointofneedbeforetruedemandswereestablished.Thetraumapackswerealreadyfilledwithnecessaryitemsthatclinicianswereaskingfor,sotheydidnothavetoinitiaterequisitionsforcriticalitems.Traumapackswerealreadypackedinatri-wallcontainer,sothe484thMEDLOGwasabletoplacethecontainerinthebackofatruckandsendsuppliestothetriagesitewithoutaskingwhichitemswereactuallyneeded.Workersatthesitesetupasupplypointopera-tionandrequestedthatthewarehousesenditemsneededinadditiontowhatwasalreadyintheboxes.

Approximately20lineitemswereusedconsistentlythroughouttheincident,andover2,000individualitemsweredistributedduringthedisasterresponse.Asaresultofsimplifiedrecord-keepinginitiativesonsite,theSoldierresponsibleformaintainingaccountabilitybegandevelopingacold-weatherinjurypushpackbasedonvolumesofuseandfortheexpresspurposeofbeingreadyshouldthistypeofeventeverpresentitselfagain.(Seechartatright.)

TheNCOsnotedthatplacingaliaisonatthepatienttriagesiteallowedsupplychainmanagementperson-neltoknowdemandsinrealtimewithoutdisruptingthecarebeingprovidedonsite.Thisallowedclinicianstoturntoonepersonandcommunicateneedswithouthavingtousetelephonelinesorothermediatoconveycriticalsupplydemands.ThisenabledtheNCOstohaveresupplyreadytogowhenthetrucksreturnedtoreload.

Atonepoint,becauseofmisunderstandingsrelatedtowhatwasactuallyneededattheincidentcommandsite,amedicandapharmacistwereevensenttothe

A medical Soldier wraps the feet of a child evacuated from the February 2010 Salang Pass avalanche in Afghanistan. The medical logistics company received many requests for pediatric medical supplies, which it normally does not stock,

to care for children injured during the avalanche.


warehouseto“translate”requirementstosupplyperson-nel.Thishelpedtheteamtoprocessdemandsforitemsthattheywereunfamiliarwith.Thepharmacistprovidedinvaluableassistancetologisticspersonnelwhenclini-ciansatthesitewererequestingspecifictypesofmedi-cationsthattheenlistedlogisticiansknewlittleaboutorcouldnotunderstandthroughradiocommunications.

Aseachtruckloadofsupplieswassentoutofthewarehouse,dataentryclerksplacedordersintotheDefenseMedicalLogisticsStandardSupportCustomerAssistanceModule.OrdersweretransmittedtotheU.S.ArmyMedicalMaterielCenter-SouthwestAsia(USAMMC–SWA)wheneachloadleftthewarehouse.Duringtheafter-actionreview,NCOsrelatedhowUSAMMC–SWA,atonepointduringtheturmoil,actuallycalledandaskedwhatwasgoingon.OncethedistributioncenterwasadvisedoftheincidentandunderstoodtheensuingMASCAL,USAMMC–SWArespondedaccordinglyandbegantofillthetheater’sdemandsrelatedtotheMASCALimmediately.

BecauseofthevolumeofpatientsflowingintotheBagramtriagesiteandestimatesaboutwhattoexpectthroughoutthenext24to48hours,itbecameevidentthatanemergencyresupplywouldbeneeded.ThedataentryclerksandcustomerserviceteaminthewarehouseplacedacalltothetheaterdistributioncenterandadvisedUSAMMC–SWAoftheimpend-ingcriticalshortagesofcold-weatherinjurysupplies.

USAMMC–SWArespondedbyfillingcriticalshortag-esandpushingsuppliesintoAfghanistanimmediately.By1000thenextmorning,theMEDLOGwarehousewasrestockedandoperatingatfullcapacityagain.

Asaresultofthisexperience,theMEDLOGcom-pany’sleadersdrafteda48-hourcontinuityofopera-tionplanthatemphasizedconservingmanpower.Duringtheincident,theincidentcommanderadvisedstaffmemberstoexpecttheoperationstocontinueovera24-to48-hourperiod.SincetheMEDLOGcompanystillhadtosupportitsorganic,theater-widemission—sustainingtheentiretheaterofoperations—itsleadersdevelopedawork-restcyclefortheSoldiers.Leaderswereconcernedaboutdepletingthecompany’sman-powerduringtheinitialresponse,soNCOsdividedthecompanyintoteamsandsentsomehomeforrestwhileotherscontinuedtosupportthereliefefforts.

WhatDidn’tgoWellMedicallogisticssupportcouldhavebeenexecuted

betterinthreeareas:communications,preconfiguredloadsrelatedtocold-weatherinjuries,andbasicsupplychainmanagementresponsibilities.

Communications.AlthoughaSoldierwaspositionedontheflightlinetocommunicatedemandsbetweenthetriagesiteandthewarehouse,noothermeansofcommunicationwasavailable.Aseachresupplyorderwasloadedintotrucksanddispatchedtothescene,no

Cold-WeatherInjuryPushPack

Blankets (variety of types)Patient warming padsThermal angels (battery packs and tubing)Patient warming devices (Bair Huggers)Hypothermia kitsBandaging material

o Gauze (variety of sizes)o Kerlix wrapo Ace wraps (4 inch and 6 inch)o Tape (variety of types and sizes)

Ring cuttersBandage scissors (variety)Distilled/sterile waterIV fluids 500 milliliter bags (sodium chloride, lactated ringers, D5W)

o IV starter kitso Tubingo Anglo catheterso Sharps containerso Alcohol prep padso Tourniquets

Epinephrine pensAtropine injectorsPortable oxygen cylinders

o Adult and pediatric face maskso Nasal cannulaso Regulatorso Christmas tree connectorso Ambu-bags (adult and pediatric)o Oxygen wrenches

DefibrillatorsPulse-oximeter devicesDisposable hospital slippersTriage tagsWarming cabinetHuman remains pouches

Note: ALL fluids should be brought out of the warehouse and warmed to at least room temperature immediately upon notification of a cold-weather mass casualty incident.

28 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

knowledgeofitsarrivalwasavailabletotheincidentcommandteam.Theonlywaythelogisticsteamatthesiteknewtheresupplywascomingwaswhentheysawthetrucksarrivingonscene.Tocorrectthis,the484thMEDLOGwasadvisedtopurchasetwo-wayradiosforcommunicatingthevariousstagesoftheongoingresup-plyduringcriticalincidents.

Anotherelementofcommunicationthatcouldhaveresultedinsignificantshortfallswastheuseofclini-calvernacularwhenrequestingsupplies.Cliniciansareaccustomedtoaskingforthingsbytheir“streetnames”insidetheclinics,wheretimeisavailabletofindoutexactlywhatisneededorwhenaresupplycanhappenbeforeanincidentoccurs.Inacriticalincident,MEDLOGprofessionalsmaynotknoworunderstandthisvocabularyandmaybeunabletorespondappro-priatelytoclinicalneeds.

Forexample,clinicianswereaskingforpulse-oximeters(devicesformeasuringthelevelsofoxygensaturationinavictim’sblood).OneSoldierthoughtinsteadthattheclinicianswererequesting“poleboxes”(pulse-oxisoftenwhatthedeviceiscalled)andwasunclearaboutwhatwasneeded.AbiomedicalmaintenanceNCOrealizedquicklywhatwasneed-ed—SpO2monitors—afteramedicwasbroughttothewarehousetodescribewhatwasbeingrequested.

Inanotherinstance,cliniciansattheincidentsitewereaskingfor“Christmastrees,”whichcausedsever-alminutesofconfusionaboutwhatwasactuallybeingrequested.Theconfusionthiscausedforinexperiencedpersonnelisobvious.TheChristmastreeissmallgreentriangularconnectorusedtoconnecttubingbetweenanoxygencylinderandpatientmask.

Preconfigured loads for cold-weather injuries.Aspreviouslynoted,theavalancheinspiredMEDLOGSoldierstodevelopacold-weatherinjurypushpack.Thisneedhadnotbeenidentifiedasevenaremotepossibilitybeforethisincident.Avarietyoffluidsforintravenous(IV)therapyandmedicationmanagement,woundcare,anddrinkingshouldbeincludedinthepushofmaterialstoacriticalincidentsite.

Simplethings,suchaswarmfluids,arerequiredwhenrespondingtoacold-weatherincident.WarmfluidsarelesstraumaticforpatientsduringIVtherapyandwhilerewarmingthebody.Stepssuchasplacingvarioustypesofmedicalfluids,includingdrinkingwater,inaheatedareaimmediatelyuponnotificationofacold-weatherincidentarecriticalwhenmanag-ingpatientswhohavebeenexposedtohoursofcoldweatherandfreezingtemperatures.

Simpleandimpromptustepssuchasturningonaheaterinsidethetransportvehicleandplacingfluidsinsidethecabofthetruckcouldalsohelpinwarmingfluidswhileenroutetothescene.Finally,ifavailable,awarmingcabinetshouldbetakentothetriagesitetomaintainwarmfluidsonscene.

Basic supply chain management responsibilities.The484thMEDLOGcompanyNCOssaidthatthebiggestlessonlearnedwastohavemultipleskillsetsatacriticalincidentsite.Duringtheavalancheresponseeffort,onlyonejuniormedicallogisticstechnicianwassenttothesitetorelaysupplydemandstotheware-houseteam.Insomeinstances,thisresultedinmis-communicationofwhatwasneeded.TheNCOleadersaskedthatinthefuturetheybepermittedtodispatchaself-developedcrisisresponseteamthatincludesamedicallogisticstechnician,abiomedicalrepairtech-nician,andapharmacytechnician.

Anotherkeydiscussionpointduringtheafter-actionreviewinvolvedtheavailabilityofsuppliesoutsideofwhatwouldordinarilyberequired.PediatricsupplieswerebeingrequestedatthesitebutarenotcommonlystockedintheMEDLOGwarehousesincemostofitssuppliesareforadultSoldiersinvolvedincombat.NCOsrecommendedthatforfutureincidents,theMEDLOGwarehousebepermittedtomaintainminimalstocksofpediatricsuppliessincethoseitemsarecom-monlyneededduringMASCALeventsinAfghanistan.

AstheincidentclosedandnomorepatientswerebeingreceivedatBagram,excesssupplieswerebroughtbacktothewarehouseforreintegrationintoroutineoperations.Thisresultedinoverstockingofsomeitemsthroughoutthewarehouse.Althoughthiscannotbecompletelyavoided,havingapackinglistorpushpackforfutureincidentsofthisnaturecouldpreventover-stockingduringpost-incidentrecoveryoperations.

Anotherissuethatresultedinoverstockingwashav-ingmultipleagenciesrequestingandreceivingsuppliesthroughouttheincident.TheMEDLOGcompany’sleadersrecommendedthatincidentcommandteamsstaywithonesourceofsupplysothatwhatbelongstothewarehousereturnstothewarehouseafterthesceneiscleared.Inthisincident,muchoftheoverstockwastheresultofmultipleagenciesbringingsuppliestothetriagesiteandleavingthembehindaftertheincidentresponseeffortsconcluded.

WhatCouldBeImprovedforNextTimeTheMEDLOGcompany’sleadersidentifiedactions

thatcouldbetakentoimproveoperationsshouldtheybefacedwithafutureincidentofthiskind.Primarily,areasidentifiedforimprovementweredirectedtowardcommunicationandsupplychaincontrol.

This device, which is used to connect tubing between an oxygen cylinder and

patient mask, is called a “Christmas tree” by clinicians. Using this term to

request the device caused confusion at the warehouse.


Communication.Communicationisavariablethatroutinelycausesthemostconsternationinacriticalincident.Althoughitcanneverbecompletelyperfected,elementsofmoreeffective,efficientcommunicationcanbeadoptedtomitigateshortfallsduringfutureevents.TheMEDLOGcompany’sSoldiersidentifiedaneedforadditionalcommunicationsassets.Thetworadiostheyhadatthetimeofthisincidentwerenotconfiguredforshort-rangecommunicationsorpreparedfortheresponse.(Thebatterieswerenotfullycharged.)Asaresult,thecompanyleadersevaluatedthecostofbuyingdifferentstylesoftwo-wayradioswithchargingstationstohavemoreresourcesavailableatatimeofneed.

Anotherelementofcommunicationinvolvedper-sonalcommunicationandtheexchangeofrequire-mentsbetweenthetriagesiteandthewarehouse.Toaddresstheissueofthewarehousepersonnelnotrec-ognizingthetermsusedbymedicalclinicianswhenrequestingsuppliesandequipment,theMEDLOGSoldiersrecommendhavingamedicpositionedatthewarehousetoprovideimmediatetranslations.Themedicwouldserveasthemedicalliaison,muchliketheMEDLOGSoldieratthecriticalincidentsite.Byestablishingthistypeofrelationshipattheinitialonsetoftheresponse,suppliescanflowintoacriticalinci-dentsitemoreefficientlyandwithlessdisruption.

Supply chain control.Agenciesinvolvedinadisas-tersituationhavelittleregardforwhatisbeingusedorhowoftenitisneeded.Therefore,onepersonshouldbeidentifiedfromtheoutsettobeastorekeeperatthesite.Foottrafficintoandthroughthesupplydistributionpointshouldbecontrolled,andeachrequestshouldbedocumentedsothatreorderscanbefilledaccordingtoneed.TheSoldiershouldknowwhichitemsarebeingusedmostandwhichsuppliesarenotneededatall;resupplyshouldbebasedonthevolumeofuse.

Forexample,Proventil(aninhalerdeviceforsome-oneexperiencingbronchialdistress)wasavailable—sev-eral100-countboxesofinhalerdevices—andwasneverusedthroughouttheincident,butblanketscouldnotbekeptonhandbecausetheywerebeingusedsofrequent-ly.Thistypeofmistakeresultsinspacebeingusedtostoreitemsthatarenotneededthroughouttheincidentwhileothermore-neededitemsarenotstocked.

Themedicallogisticssupplypointshouldbethesinglesourceofmedicalsupplythroughoutacriticalincidentresponse.Whileagenciesshouldneverbepreventedfrombringingadditionalmedicalsuppliestothesite,allmaterielshouldbeconsolidatedatoneissuepointtopreventcliniciansfromhavingtosearchforsupplies.Itemscanbestoredincontain-erslabeledtoidentifytheagencythatbroughtthemtoensurethatagenciesgettheirsuppliesbackoncetheeventconcludes.TheSoldierassignedthedutiesofaccountingformaterielcanbeusedtoassistinthiseffort.

Anelementthatisoftenoverlookedinacriti-calincidentiswarehousesecurityandcontrol.InmanyMASCALincidents,everycustomermaynotbeawareofthecircumstances.Havingapersonatthewarehouseentrancetoexplainthesituationgivescustomerstheopportunitytoreturnlatertoobtainsup-pliesthatarenotneededimmediately.TheSoldierattheentrancecantakerequestsofcustomersinvolvedwiththeincidentsothattheydonothavetosearchforsomeonetomanagetheirorders.Thewarehousepersonnelalsocanservemultipleagenciestryingtorespondtothesamesituationwithoutinundatingthewarehouseteamwithduplicaterequests.

SecurityandcontrolareessentialduringaMAS-CALincident.Peoplewillcontinuetoneedroutinesupplies.Whilecustomersshouldnotbedissuadedfromgettingwhatisrequired,withoutcontrolinplaceduringacriticalincident,shelvescanbequicklyexhaustedwithouttheknowledgeofthewarehousepersonneliftheflowisnotmonitoredandregulated.Obviously,thiscanresultinsignificantshortfallsformultipleagenciesinvolvedinavarietyofoperations—someunrelatedtotheincidentitself.

AttheconclusionoftheMASCALincident,themedicalteamsthatrespondedtotheavalanchehadtreated,processed,andassisted276patientsinapproxi-mately6hours.Ofthe276patientswhoweretreatedatthetriagesite,2diedand11weresenttothebasehospital,leavingmorethan250peoplewhowereabletobetreatedonsceneatthetriagesiteandreleased.

Adirectcontributingfactorinthissuccesswastheabilityofmedicallogisticsprofessionalstorespondtotheimmediateneedsofcliniciansatthetriagesite.Inthisinstance,medicallogisticscompetence,adeptness,andprofessionalismassistedinthetremendouslysuccessfuloutcomeofwhatcouldhavebeenagreatertragedy.

Captain jerry d. vanvaCtor waS tHe deputy G–4 for tHe 30tH MediCal CoMMand durinG tHe SalanG paSS avalanCHe. He HoldS a B.S. deGree froM atHenS State univerSity, an M.S. deGree froM touro univerSity international, and a doCtor of HealtH adMiniStra-tion deGree froM tHe univerSity of pHoenix.

Captain jaSon donovant, uSaf, iS tHe CHief of MediCal loGiS-tiCS for tHe CoMBined joint taSk forCe-82 SurGeon’S Cell. He HoldS a B.S. deGree froM Colorado CHriStian univerSity and an M.B.a. deGree froM nortH Central univerSity. He waS reCently SeleCted aS tHe air forCe’S outStandinG MediCal loGiStiCS CoM-pany Grade offiCer of tHe year.

firSt lieutenant MiCHael dinH-truonG, uSar, iS an aCtive Guard/reServe offiCer. He waS tHe MediCal loGiStiCS offiCer for tHe 484tH MediCal loGiStiCS CoMpany wHen He wrote tHiS artiCle. He HoldS a BaCHelor’S deGree froM edinBoro univerSity of penn-Sylvania and a doCtoral deGree froM texaS CHiropraCtiC ColleGe.

30 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

nearly2010,LieutenantGeneralMarkHertling, thedeputycommandinggeneralforinitialmilitary training(IMT)oftheArmyTrainingandDoc-trineCommand,addressedIMTcommandersinanefforttoidentifythestrengthsandweaknessesoftheadvancedindividualtraining(AIT)currentlyprovidedateachsite.OneofthekeyareasthatGeneralHertlingaddressedwastheneedtodevelopandimplementamoreattainablesetofwarriortasksandbattledrillswhilecontinuingtoensurethatthestandardsremainedconsistentforallSoldiersreceivingtrainingatthevari-ousAITsites.

Trainingcommandshavehadadifficulttimekeep-ingpacewiththehighoperatingtempoandconstantchangesinenemytactics,techniquesandproceduresinIraqandAfghanistan.Theintroductionofnewequip-mentlikethemineresistantambushprotectedvehicles(MRAPs)hasalsocreatedatraininggapbecauseMRAPswerebeingproducedandshippeddirectlytotheSoldiersinthetheaterandtheequipmentwasnotavailablefortrainingstateside.

AllAITprogramsshouldbecapableofmain-tainingtheproficiencyofSoldiers’basicandadvancedriflemarksmanship,andthatiswherethe

OrdnanceMechanicalMaintenanceSchool(OMMS)atAberdeenProvingGround,Maryland,decidedtoconcentrateitsefforts.

DevelopingMarksmanshipInstructorsOneprimarycollectivetaskthatwasnotcon-

sistentacrossallAITprogramswastheconvoylive-fireexercise.Inlieuoftheconvoylive-fireexercise,OMMSdecidedtosetupanadvancedriflemarksmanship(ARM)range.Beforebuildingtherange,the61stOrdnanceTrainingBrigadeatAber-deenProvingGround[nowreflaggedasthe59thOrdnanceTrainingBrigadeatFortLee,Virginia]selectedanumberofcadretoattendtrainingcon-ductedbytheArmyMarksmanshipUnit(AMU)atFortBenning,Georgia.

TheAMUtrainedthecadreontheskillsneededtobuild,setup,andinstructAITSoldiersontheARMrange.Theinstructortrainingwasconductedovera5-dayperiodandfocusedonsixareas:basicriflemarksmanshipsafety,principles,positions,ballisticsandzeroing,windandweather,andshooter-targetanalysis.FollowingtheAMUtraining,thecadrewerecertifiedasinstructors.

I

OMMSAdvancedRifleMarksmanshipTraining

by CaPtain MattHeW C. Miller

The Ordnance Mechanical Maintenance School developed a program to improve Soldiers’ marksmanship skills.


The advanced rifle marksmanship range at the Ord nance Mechani-cal Maintenance School refreshes advanced individual training Soldiers on marksmanship skills learned in basic combat train ing.

ThecadrethenreturnedtoAberdeenProvingGround,wheretheybuiltafullyfunctionallive-firerangeanddevelopedthepro-gramofinstructionforARM.

ImplementingtheARMRangeThegoalfortheARMrangeis

toprovideordnanceSoldierswithastrongrefresheroftheARMpro-gramthattheyreceiveduringbasiccombattraining.DuringtheinitialtrainingstageoftheARMtrain-ing,thestudentsreceive2hoursofprimarymarksmanshipinstructionbeforeattendingtherange.Heretheinstructorsreinforcethefunda-mentalsofproperstance,weaponmagazinechange,andmovementtechniquesfromvaryingcoverandconcealmentpositions.

ThenextstageofARMtrainingisanintense8-hourstep-by-stepphasedblockofinstructionontheexecutionoflive-firetraining.Dur-

ingthisphasedinstruction,thecadreprovidetheSoldierswithalivedemonstrationtoshowthemwhat“rightlookslike.”EachSoldierthenreceiveshands-oncoachingfromthecadrewhileengaginginablank-fireiterationoftheshort-rangemarksmanshiplaneandthebarricadetransi-tionlane.ThisportionofthetrainingrequiresthemosttimebecauseitallowstheSoldierstoreceiveimmediatefeedbackandmakecorrectionsidentifiedbythecadre.

OnceSoldiersareproficientonthisportionofthetraining,instructorsbeginthepracticeportionofthedry-firerange.WhenthecadreisconfidentthattheSoldiersunderstandanddemonstratetheskillsonthedry-firerange,thestudentsaremovedtothenextphaseoftrain-ing—thelive-fireexercise.

TheLive-FireExerciseThelive-fireexerciseistheculminatingeventthat

incorporatesallofthetechniqueslearnedduringARMinstructionintoasingletrainingevent.EachSoldieris

providedatraditionalsilhouettewithasmallertargetingareainsideofitthatisshapedlikeabowlingpin.(Seephotobelow.)ThistargetforcesSoldierstocontroltheirfireswithinthecriticalzone.Soldiersmusteffectivelyacquirethetargetandcontroltheirweaponswhilemov-ingdownthelane.Duringtheshort-rangefirelane,Sol-diersreceiveordersfromthetowertoengagethetargetfromdifferentdistanceswhilebothonthemoveandatfixedpositions.

Aftersuccessfullycompletingtheshort-rangefirelane,theSoldiersmovetothebarricadetransitionlane.Inthislane,theSoldiersincorporatetheirmarksman-shipandstamina.ThecoachesactassafetiestocloselysupportSoldierswhiletheymaneuverfromonebar-ricadedpositiontoanotherandengagetargetsdown-range.WhenSoldierscompletethelane,allofthetargetsarerecoveredsothatthecadrecanprovidetheSoldierswithfeedbackontheirengagements.

TheOMMSadvancedriflemarksmanshiprangeincreasedSoldiers’confidenceandabilitiestoengagetargetswiththeirassignedweaponandpreparedthemtoentertheforce.Hopefully,thisconceptwillbecarriedforwardastheschoolmovestoFortLeethissummer.

Captain MattHew C. Miller iS attendinG interMediate level eduCa-tion at tHe arMy CoMMand and General Staff ColleGe. He waS tHe CoMMander of w CoMpany, 143d ordnanCe traininG Battalion, at aBerdeen provinG Ground, Maryland, wHen He wrote tHiS artiCle. He HoldS a BaCHelor’S deGree in international affairS and Gov ernMent politiCS and a MaSter’S deGree in ConfliCt reS olution and analySiS froM GeorGe MaSon univerSity. a prior-enliSted loGiStiCS offiCer of tHe quarterMaSter CorpS, He iS a Graduate of tHe infantry offiCer BaSiC CourSe and tHe CoMBined loGiStiCS CaptainS Career CourSe.

The target used for the live-fire exercise contains a bowling-pin shape at its core to get Soldiers focused

on the critical zone of the target. In this photo, this target is to the far left of the shooter.

32 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

ustainmenttechnologiesmanagedbytheProgram ExecutiveOffice(PEO)Integrationunderthe Army’sBrigadeCombatTeamModernization(BCTM)Planoffergreatpotentialbenefitstothesustain-mentcommunityandtheSoldier.Thesenewtechnologiescanprovidesituationalawarenessoflogisticsfromtheenterpriselevel(suchastheArmyMaterielCommand,theDepartmentofDefense[DOD]GlobalInformationGrid,andindustry)tothewarfighterlevel.

TheArmyestablishedPEOIntegrationinOctober2009followingtheSecretaryofDefense’sdecisiontocanceltheFutureCombatSystems(FCS)program.TheSecretaryinstructedtheArmytotransitiontoamod-ernizationprogramconsistingofanumberofintegratedacquisitionprograms.PEOIntegrationmanagesacquisi-tionprogramsthatsupportBCTM.

BCTMofferstwomainchallengestosustainers.Oneistoinsertintocurrentforceplatformsnewsustainmenttechnologiesthatcanassessthereadinessofthoseplat-formsandtheinfantrybrigadecombatteam(IBCT)bytransmittingembeddedsensordatathroughouttheIBCTandbacktotheenterprise.Theotheristoalignnewsus-tainmenttechnologieswiththeongoingdevelopmentoftheArmy’sCommonLogisticsOperatingEnvironment(CLOE)architecturesothatthecurrentforceandBCTMcanworksmoothlywiththeArmy’slogisticsenterprise.

ConditionBasedMaintenancePlusDODInstruction4151.22,ConditionBasedMainte-

nancePlus(CBM+)forMaterielMaintenance,definesCBM+as“theprimaryreliabilitydriverinthetotallife-cyclesystemsmanagement(TLCSM)supportabilitystrat-egyoftheDepartmentofDefense.”

Thecapabilitiesrequiredtoimplementthisinstructionincludeenhanceddiagnosticsandprognostics,failuretrendtracking,electronicmaintenanceaids,serializeditemman-agement,automaticidentificationtechnology,andinterac-tivemaintenancetraining.Programmanagersarerequiredtooptimizeoperationalreadinessthroughaffordable,inte-grated,embeddeddiagnosticsandprognostics.

BCTMSustainmentTechnologiesThemainBCTMsustainmenttechnologiesarethe

PlatformSoldier-MissionReadinessSystem(PS−MRS),LogisticsDecisionSupportSystem(LDSS),andLogis-ticsDataManagementService(LDMS).ThePS−MRS

SustainmentTechnologiesforBCTModernization

by tHoMaS HoSMer

S providesdiagnosticandprognosticcapabilitiesthroughtheVehicleEmbeddedPS−MRS(VE−PS−MRS)andthePS−MRSDecisionAccuracyValidationSystem(PDAVS),respectively.

LDSSprovidesmaintenancemanagementfunctionalitywithintheIBCT.Itsupportstheoverallsustainmentcon-ceptforBCTMbyprovidinglogisticsoperationplanningandexecutioncapabilities.

LDMSprovidesthestatusandlocationofnational-levelassetsofBCTMsparesandrepairpartstoproductsupportintegratorsandenablesaguaranteedlevelofper-formanceandsystemcapability.Itscapabilitiesequatetoperformance-basedlogistics(PBL).

SustainmenttechnologieswillprovidecriticallogisticsdataintwoareasdefinedbythewarfighterascrucialforBCTM.Oneisrunningestimatesofmileage,hoursofoperation,fuelconsumption,healthstatusofplatforms,andcriticalconsumables(fuel,battery,coolant,andpoten-tiallyoil).Thesedatamustbedeliveredinnear-realtime.

Theotherareaisdataonsustainmenttasks.Thetechnologiesprovideallofthedataacrewchiefopera-torneedstoperformmaintenance.Thesedatamustbedeliveredinlessthan15minutestoensurethatoperatingtempoismaintained.ThedatawillallowtheoperatortoopenupajobrequestthroughLDSS,closeoutajob,orderparts,receiveparts,updatethedigitallogbook,andhosttheInteractiveElectronicTechnicalManual(IETM)onthehandheldcontroller.TheIETMallowsthewarf-ightertoreadtheplatform’stechnicalmanualforrepairanddiagnostics.

CurrentForceSustainmentCapabilitiesThecurrentforcehasthesecapabilities:

oManualtroubleshootingandbuilt-intests.oManualdataentryofpartsorders,whichissubjectto

humanerror.oUseoftheCommodityCommandStandardSystem

andStandardArmyMaintenanceSystem.Theseareenhancedsoftwarethatuseautomated,1960s-era80-columncarddataformats.TheyareslowlybeingreplacedbytheLogisticsModernizationProgramandtheGlobalCommandSupportSystem-Army,whichareenterpriseresourceplanningsystems.

oAmanualprocessforenteringrepairpartsrequestedintologisticsStandardArmyManagementInformationSystems.

As the Army undertakes a brigade combat team modernization program,new technologies can improve sustainment of both the current and future forces.


oManualentryoflogisticsstatusreportjointvariable-message-formatmessagesintotheForceXXIBattleCommandBrigadeandBelow(FBCB2)system.ComparedtothecapabilitiesoftheproposedBCTM

sustainmenttechnologies,currentforcesystemsfacethefollowingdeficiencies:oFrequentdowntime,resultinginloweroperationalread-

inessrates.oIncreasedcostsforspares.oAntiquatedautomation,resultinginhigherrorratesand

highercoststopopulatethelogisticspipeline.oExtendeddelaytimeforexecutingadministrativelogis-

ticstasks.oManualentryofdata,resultinginaddeddowntimeand

reducedoperationalreadiness.

TechnologiesfortheCLOEArchitectureSystemdesignwithoutlogisticsinmindisnotsustain-

ableoverthesystem’slifecycle.ReadinessassessmentandthetransferofsustainmentdatawithinthetheaterofoperationstotheDODenterprisecanberealizedwiththeproductsbeingdevelopedbyBCTMandthearchitecturedevelopedbyCLOE.

CLOE’sarchitecture,adesignforCBM+,isnamedtheArmyIntegratedLogisticsArchitecture(AILA).AILAisthetoolusedtoestablishtheoperationalviews,technicalstandards,andintersystemrelationshipsthatwillgovernthedesignandimplementationofArmylogisticsinforma-tionprocessesduringthetransitionfromthecurrenttothefutureforce.

BCTMsustainmenttechnologieswillprovidethecapa-bilitiestorealizetheAILAarchitectureforPEOIntegra-tion.BCTMsustainmenttechnologyproductsPS−MRS(fordiagnosticsandprognostics),IETM(forinteractivedigitaltechnicalmanuals),LDSS(forplanningsustain-mentresupply),andLDMS(forachievingPBL)arenatu-rallylinkedtoAILA.

CurrentForceUpgradeThePS−MRScanbeusedtodeterminethehealth

statusofcurrentforceplatforms.ThatcanbedonebyconnectingtheNetworkIntegrationKit(NIK)tothediagnosticdataportsalreadypresentoncurrentforceplatforms.ThecostofintegratingPS−MRStechnologyshouldbeminimalsincethediagnosticdataportsalreadyexistonthecurrentforceplatforms.

TousethefullcapabilitiesofPS−MRSandLDSStogenerateacommonoperatingpicture(COP)forlogisticsinincrement2ofBCTM,NIKcanbeintegratedwiththecur-rentforceplatforms.Thiswillpermitthehealthconditionofthenetworknode(theIntegratedComputerSystem)andthehealthstatusoftheplatformtobereportedtotheIBCT.

CurrentforceplatformsuseFBCB2inradiocom-municationstootherplatforms.AwaytoextendlogisticsdatabeyondFBCB2forthewarfighterwouldbetocom-municatelogisticsdatathroughtheInstituteofElectri-calandElectronicsEngineerscommunicationprotocol(IEEE802.xxy)insertedontotheNIK.ThisdesignconsiderationisalreadyfieldedwiththeuseoftheIEEE

802.xxyprotocolusedbytheCombatServiceSupportAutomatedInformationSystemsInterfacethatinterfaceswiththeverysmallapertureterminal.

InformationAssuranceBCTMsustainmenttechnologiesmustmeetthechal-

lengeofinformationassurance(IA)compliance.ThePS−MRSinteractswithdataattheplatformlevel,buttheLDSSrollstheseplatformdatauptoprovidereadinessstatusandcapability.Hence,theLDSSisclassifiedwhilePS−MRSdataarenotclassified.

Inthenetworkworld,theLDSStransfersitsinformationusingtheSecureInternetProtocolRouterNetworkandthePS−MRStransfersitsinformationviatheNon-SecureInternetProtocolRouterNetwork(NIPRNET).InorderforthePS−MRS,withtacticalunclassifiedinformation(TUI),tocommunicatewiththeLDSS,withsecretinformation,across-domainsolutionhastobedevelopedtoallowtheclassifiedandTUIproductstocommunicatewitheachotherwithineachplatform’sNIK.

ThePS−MRSdataresidingontheTUIenclaveontheNIKcurrentlydonothaveanetworkedpathuptothelogisticsassetswithintheIBCT.Thisisduetoamismatchofsecurityenclaves.Acontrolledinterface(CI)betweenTUIandNIPRNETneedstobedefinedtoaccommodatethenecessaryprotections.TheCImaybelocatedintheenterprise.ThebenefitofanenterpriselocationisthatitallowsforthemanagementofasingleCIratherthanthemanagementofmultipleembeddedCIsonthebattlefield.

AnotherbenefitofusingasingularCIisthattheveri-ficationofasingularCIinsanctuarymaybelessexpen-sivethanhavingtoverifytheIAformultipleembeddedCIsacrosstheplatforms.

TheDepartmentoftheArmyG−4andCBM+require-mentscanberealizedwithPEOIntegration’sBCTMsustainmenttechnologies.TheseBCTMsustainmenttechnologies(PS−MRS,LDSS,andLDMS),coupledtotheAILAarchitecture,willachievetherequirementsofCBM+,thedesiresoftheArmyG−4,andtheadvantagesofacommonlogisticsdataset.CurrentforceplatformscanbeupgradedtoPEOIntegrationsustainmenttechnolo-giesbyusingtheexistingdiagnosticportsontheplatform.Onceintegrated,logisticsdatacanbedisseminatedacrosstheIBCTandintothelogisticsenterprise,providingthecommandersacommonoperationalpictureforlogistics.

WithBCTMsustainmenttechnologies,Armycommand-ersandlogisticianswillhavelogisticssituationalaware-nessandlogisticstheaterplanningthroughautomation.Thecommanderandlogisticianwillreceiveresupplyplanswhiletheyaddresstheadversary,allowingtheoperatingtempoofthebattletobecontinuous.WithBCTMsustain-menttechnologies,thelogisticsfootprintwillbereducedbecausecommandersandlogisticianswillknowtheloca-tionofallassetsinthetheaterandcanuseautomationtoefficientlyresupplyandrepairweaponsforthewarfighter.

tHoMaS HoSMer iS tHe lead SuStainMent arCHiteCt for loGiStiCS produCtS at tHe proGraM exeCutive offiCe inteGration.

34 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

nfiscalyear2009,theSouthernEuropeanTask Force(Airborne),basedinVicenza,Italy,wasre- designatedfromanairbornejointtaskforcehead-quarterstoU.S.ArmyAfrica(USARAF),theArmyservicecomponentcommandofthenascentU.S.AfricaCommand(AFRICOM).Recently,USARAFhasworkedtorestructureinternallyasitbecomesafullArmyservicecomponentcommand.JointChiefs

ofStaffExerciseNaturalFire10wasthecommand’sfirstmajorexerciseandthelargestdeploymentofU.S.forcesinAfricasinceWorldWarII.

JustmentioningAfricaconjuresromanticimagesofwildanimals,mysteriouspeoples,andpathlessjungles.AlthoughlogisticsservicesinAfricaarenotaswidelyavailableastheyareintheUnitedStatesorWesternEurope,allmanneroflogisticssupportis

I

IntoAfrica:NaturalFire10by toDD l. joHnSton

U.S. Army Africa recently conducted Natural Fire 10, a multinational exercise in Uganda, and successfully overcame logistics problems that were complicated by cultural differences.


nowavailablefromhostnations,theUnitedNations,nongovern-mentalorganizations,andcom-mercialcontractors.Everyday,businessesturnprofits,goodsandpeoplemove,andcellphonecov-erageisavailableandaffordable.

However,operatinginAfricaisnotnecessarilysimpleorstraight-forward;successthererequiresahighlyadaptiveapplicationoflogisticsprinciplesandpractices,asUSARAFfoundwhileconductingNaturalFire10.Thisisthestoryofhowflexibility,experimentation,andinnovationgeneratedsuccessfromthestrategictothetacticallevels.

TheLogisticsChallengesofAfricaAfricaisdisjointedandinter-

nallydisconnectedinawaythatfewotherplacesare.Thisisaresultoftheeffortacenturyagotodefineitsborderswithouttakingintoaccountthenaturalrelationshipsofitspeoples.Africapresentsphysi-cal,administrative,andculturalchallenges.

ThephysicalsizeoftheAfricancontinentishardformanypeopletofathom.Withalandmassmorethanthreetimesthatoftheconti-nentalUnitedStates,Africapresentsdauntingdistances.Forexample,thedistancefromTunis,Tunisia,toPretoria,SouthAfrica,isroughlythesameasthatfromFrankfurt,Ger-many,toChicago,Illinois.

Morethan90percentofthepopulationandservicesarewithin100milesofthecoastlines,andthelimitedNon-SecureInternetProtocolRouterNetworkdisappearsrap-idlytowardthecontinent’sinterior.

Roads,ports,andairfieldsarefrequentlyinadequateforheavymilitaryuse.Fifteencountriesarelandlocked,whichcomplicatestheirinfrastructuresandcausesadministrativehurdles.Automatedin-transitvisibility(ITV)isnonexistent.

Africaisnotacountry,butacontinentcomposedof54nationsand400ethnicgroupsusing2,000languages.Thefactthattherearefewlarge-scale

centralizedagreementsbetweennationsgreatlycom-plicatesdiplomaticclearancesforaircraftaswellascustomsproceduresandborderclearancesforsur-facecargo.Borderstationsforsurfacecargocanberemoteandunsupervisedwithsubjectivestandardsofenforcement.

Whenitcomestocontracts,localprovidersmayhavetroubleaccessingtheDepartmentofDefense’s(DOD’s)web-basedbiddingsystembecausemanyAfricanbusi-nessesdonotyetusetheInternet.Inacasheconomy,paymentsfromDODsystemsarecumbersome.Theseproceduralproblemsaremanifestationsofbroaderculturalissuesthatmustbeconsideredwhenoperat-inginAfrica.Thecontinentcannotbetransitedwithoutdealingwithmultiplecustomsdepartments,difficulthighwayconditions,inadequaterailroads,andsecurityproblems.Andkeepinganoperationwithinthebordersofonecountryisimpossible.

Africansupplyandserviceoperationsareoftenanexercisein“expectationmanagement.”Thesinglelarg-estculturalchallengeforU.S.militarylogisticiansandcommandersistheimportanceoftime.Thingsmoveslower—period.Alloperationsaredirectlyaffectedbytheavailabilityandconditionoftheinfrastructure.Whentheinfrastructureislessdeveloped,logisticiansmustuselighterloadsandsmallerplatforms,whichgreatlyextenddeliverytimes.

WhenconductingcooperativeoperationswithAfri-canforces,U.S.personnelmustplacelessemphasisonclocksandcalendars.Ofgreaterimportance,andperhapsevenmoredifficult,istheneedtodevelopanappreciation,oratleastanunderstanding,ofinformalauthoritystructures.Families,clans,tribes,andlocalleaderscanoftenwieldgreaterinfluenceinspecificareasthananationalgovernment.

NaturalFire10DuringNaturalFire10,USARAFencounteredallof

thesechallengesand,forthemostpart,overcamethembyusingtheadaptivelogisticsnetworkconcept,whichmaximizedtheuseofexistingsystemsontheconti-nent.USARAFadheredtoanefficiency-drivenbusi-nessmodelthatemphasizedasmallmilitaryfootprint,clearlyunderstoodobjectives,andminimalcontroloverthedistributionprocess.

NaturalFire10wasplannedasacooperativeexer-ciseamongfiveEastAfricannations(Uganda,Tan-zania,Rwanda,Burundi,andKenya)andtheUnitedStates.Itconsistedofabrief“tabletop”sessioninKampala,Uganda,anda2-weekjointfieldtrainingexerciseandhumanitarianandcivilassistanceopera-tionwith1,500soldiersrepresenting6nations.

At left, a CH–47 Chinook helicopter delivers troops to Kitgum, Uganda. Using the CH–47 allowed the direct delivery of personnel and vital equipment so that Soldiers could avoid using the unpaved road from Gulu, Uganda.

36 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

TheexercisewasconductedatthesiteofaremoteUgandanarmypostinKitgum,Uganda,whichisapproximately600kilometersbyroadnorthofEnteb-beandclosetotheDarfur(Sudan)border.TheAfricansoldierssimplydrovetoKitgum,buttheU.S.deploy-mentwassomewhatmorecomplicated.

TheU.S.deploymentinvolvedmoving600passen-gersand300piecesofmajorequipmentbysurfaceandair.Kitgum’sremotelocationwasthemainmobilitychallengesinceitismorethan1,600kilometersinlandfromtheseaportinMombasa,Kenya,andapproxi-mately100kilometersfromthenearestusableairfield,GuluAirportinUganda.Tomakemattersworse,thefinal100kilometersoftheroadtoKitgumareunpaved,

whichwasaproblembecausetheexercisewasheldatthebeginningoftheequatorialrainyseason.

TheOriginalPlanTheoriginaldeploymentplanwastomovesensitive

itemsandpassengersbystrategicairlifttoEntebbeInter-nationalAirportinUganda,thenuseC–130Herculesaircraftfromthe17thAirForcetomovetoGuluAirport,andthenproceedbytruckorbustoKitgum.Busmove-mentfromEntebbetoKitgumwasplannedasbackupbutwasnotfavoredbytheUgandangendarmerie.

SurfacecargowouldmovedoortodoorusingtheMilitarySurfaceDeploymentandDistributionCom-mand’s(SDDC’s)UniversalServicesContractfrommultiplehomestationsintheUnitedStatesandEuropethroughMombasatoKitgum.Thecontractorwouldassumeresponsibilityforallcustomsclearances,bordercrossings,ITV,andsubcontractingofrequiredmaterials-handlingequipment.SDDCwouldpositionanexperi-encedoperationsofficerinMombasatoprovideITVandliaisewiththecontractor.Bysettingupthecontractinthismanner,USARAFcouldavoiddeployingmilitarypersonneltotheMombasaportortootherkeylocationswheremovementcontrolelementsaregenerallyfound.

TheplannedlogisticssupportfortheEntebbeele-mentwasstraightforward.Approximately100passen-gersfromtheUSARAFcommandandcontrolelementwouldstayintwolocalhotelsthatincludedmealsandlaundryaspartofthecontracts.AsmallfleetofrentalvehiclesandminibuseswouldtransportpersonnelfrombilletingtothemilitaryairfieldatEntebbe,wherethecommandpostwouldbelocated.

InKitgum,wecontractedfortheconstructionofatemporarylifesupportareawithshowers,latrines,adin-ingfacility,andsleepingfacilitiesfor500Soldiers.TheDefenseLogisticsAgencywouldprovidemealsandbot-tledwater,andthe21stTheaterSustainmentCommandwouldprovidetworeverseosmosiswaterpurificationunits(ROWPUs)forbulkpotablewater.ThreedaysofreserverationsandwaterwouldbestoredatGulu,whichwouldalsobeusedasanintermediaryairfieldtotransferpassengersandsensitiveitemstoKitgum.

ChangingPlansandMakingItWorkNoplansurvivesfirstcontact,andNaturalFire10

wasnoexception.ThefirsthurdlewastheairfieldatGulu.AlthoughGuluwaslistedascapableofaccom-modatingC–130sandC–17Globemasters,anairfieldsurveydeterminedthatGulu’srunwaystrengthactuallywasunsuitableforC–130s.The17thAirForcehadnofurtherpartintheexerciseandcouldnotprovideaircraftsupport,andtheUgandanspreferredthatwenotbusseveralhundredSoldiersandMarinesthroughKampalaanduptoKitgum.

WecontactedtheReservecomponent11thTacticalAviationCommandabouttheproblem,andaftersome

Soldiers watch a crane in operation at Kitgum, Uganda. All materials-handling equipment was provided under the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command’s Universal Service Contract.


planningandcoordination,theyagreedtobringthreeCH–47ChinookhelicoptersfromtheUnitedStatesintoEntebbebystrategiclift.The21stTheaterSustainmentCommandprovidedanaircraftassemblyteamatEnteb-beandsetupaclassIII(petroleum,oils,andlubri-cants)retailpointatKitgumusingcertifiedfuelfromaDefenseEnergySupportCentercontract.ThisextremelyeffectivesolutionallowedustobypassGuluanddeliverpersonneldirectlyintoKitgum.TheonlyproblemwasthecostofthestrategicliftfromtheUnitedStates.

Whenwestartedthecontract-biddingprocessforconstructionofthelifesupportarea,wewerealreadyworkingonashorttimeline.ExacerbatingthetimecrunchweretherequirementbyAfricancontractorsforupfrontpaymentsandourinternalprocedurestopro-curefundsthroughU.S.ArmyEurope.

Thecontractsolicitationproducedtwobidders,andonlyonewasAfrican.Despitethecontractor’sefforts,thecompletionofthelifesupportareawasdelayedbyseveraldays.Becauseofthedelay,noplaceandnopersonnelwereavailabletodownloadsurfacecargo—muchofwhichwasalreadyontheroadfromMom-basa—onitsprojectedarrivaldate.

AfteracalltotheSDDCrepresentativeinMombasa,thecontractordivertedthetrucksintohisownholdingyardatKampalawiththestipulationthattheycouldbedeliveredtoKitgumin72hoursoncewecalledthemforward.Thiswasaccomplishedwithnodirectinterven-tionbyUSARAForotherexerciseparticipants.

Duringtheexercise,thecontinuedmaintenanceoftheROWPUsystemsusedfordailywaterpurificationatKit-gumwasparticularlychallenging.Duringthepeakwaterusageperiodoftheexercise,whenroughly1,100person-nelwerelocatedatKitgum,theROWPUswerepurifyingupto11,000gallonsofpotablewaterdaily,includingwaterforconsumptioninthediningfacilityandforshow-ers.ROWPUwaterwasalsobeingusedtosupportthesepticsystembecauseawellthatwasdugonsitetosup-porttheportabletoiletsystemwasnotproducingthequantityrequired.

Afterseveraldaysofheavyuse,theROWPUsbegantohavesignificantmaintenanceissues.TokeeptheROWPUsfunctioning,repairpartshadtobeshippedfromGermany.AfterawaterpumpthattransferredpurifiedwaterfromaROWPUtothewatertower(whichsuppliedwatertotheshowersys-tems)failedonseveraloccasions,21stTheaterSustainmentCom-mandSoldiersdecidedtoreplacethepumpwithacivilianswimmingpoolpumpfromalocalSafarihoteluntilareplacementpumparrivedfromGermany.

Anadditionalchallengewasthedifferenceinvolt-agebetweenthemilitarysystemsthatweretransportedfromGermanyandthesystemsthatweresuppliedbycontractors.Allmilitaryequipmentwas110volt,andalllocalequipmentandpowerwas220volt.Thebasecampwasabletoworkaroundthisusingtransformersandmilitarypowergenerationsystemstopowerthefield-feedingsystems.

Inkeepingwithouradaptivelogisticsconceptofusingexistingassetsandproceduresandmakinguseofrelationshipswithotherlogisticsproviders,wehadinitiallycoordinatedwiththeAFRICOMDeploymentDistributionOperationsCenter(ADDOC)tousetheC–17softheHungarianAirliftWing(HAW)torede-ploytheAFRICOMDeployableJointCommandandControl(DJC2)systembacktoEuropefromEntebbe.

Thedaybeforetheflight,ADDOCinformedusthatHAWwouldbeunabletoflythemissionbecauseLibyadeniedthefly-overclearance.ByshiftingsomeoftheDJC2enablers(generatorsandenvironmentalcontrolunits)tosurfacetransport,wereducedtheliftrequirementtotwoC–130loads.Unfortunately,thelackofavailableairframesresultedinadelayofover30daystoretrievethecargo.Despitethesechallenges,NaturalFire10wassuccessfulbyallmeasurablestan-dardsandprovidedtremendouslessonsforcontinuedoperationsontheAfricancontinent.

LessonsLearnedAboutOperatinginAfricaInAfricanoperations,wemustbecomfortablewith

moreuncertaintyandgreaterflexibilitywhenitcomestotimelines.Notbeingabletoseeastatusonacom-puterscreendoesnotmeanthatnothingishappening.Aplanorconceptthatrequiresrigorousadherencetopre-cisetimelinesislikelyunsuitedtoAfricanscenarios.

Mobilityisthekeytosuccess,soinfrastructureanddistancechallengesrequirethoughtful,adaptive,innova-tivesolutions.Theneedforreliable,flexibleintertheater

Kitgum Road, a 100-kilometer unpaved route, steadily deteriorated with increased traffic and became difficult to traverse when the rainy season began near the end of the exercise.

38 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

airliftcannotbeoverstated.U.S.standardsforaircraftoperationsareunlikelytobemodifiedtoaccommodatetheAfricaninfrastructure,andtheAfricaninfrastructurewillnotquicklyimprove.Thesefactsprecludemajorreli-anceonAirForceassets.FutureintertheaterairmobilityonthecontinentislikelytobeacombinationofassetsfromtheUnitedStates,internationalorganizations,non-governmentalorganizations,andcommercialcontractors.

Theculturaldifferencesinthewaybusinessiscon-ductedinAfricaandintheU.S.Armycausedsomenotableproblems.InmanyAfricancultures,businessisaface-to-faceaffairandInternetaccessisnotanimportantpartofcommerce.Furthermore,printedspecificationsofarequestedproductaregood,butactualsamplesofwhatyouneedarefarbetter.

ContractinginAfricaisslightlydifferentaswell.Oneparticularchallengewastheissueofprepaymentuponawardingacontract.ManyAfricanvendorsexpecta50-percentorhigherprepayment,whichisnotfeasible

undercurrentcontractingregula-tions.Manyvendorsalsodonotunderstandthesolicitationandbid-dingprocessforcontractingoppor-tunities.

Topreventthisprobleminupcom-ingmajorJointChiefsofStaffexercises,USARAFwillconductvendorconferencestoteachprospec-tivevendorsaboutU.S.contractingpoliciesandprocedures.Byworkingwithsmallbusinesses,embassies,andpotentiallylocalRotaryclubs,USARAFwillreachthebusinessesthatmaynotbeawareofhowtodobusinesswiththeU.S.Government.

SDDC’sUniversalServiceCon-tractforsurfacemovementsworksphenomenallywell.Theprofession-alsshouldbeallowedtodowhattheydobest.SDDChasthecontactsandtheexperiencetomovecargo,clearcustoms,andcrossbordersbetterthanUSARAFeverwillinAfrica.Throughthecontract,Maerskdivertedshipments,maintainedaccountability,deliveredsuppliesontime,andprovidedITVofcargomovingonfivevesselsandnumer-oustrucksfrommultiplelocations.

Africa,withitschallenginginfrastructure,vastdistances,andvarietyofpoliticsandcultures,pro-videsatremendousprovinggroundforlogisticianssupportingmilitaryoperations.ThelessonslearnedandsolutionsdevelopedtoovercomethechallengesinNaturalFire10arealreadypayingdividendsforUSARAFasitplansfutureoperationsontheconti-nentincollaborationwithAfricanmilitaries,nongov-ernmentalorganizations,andcommercialpartners.Certainly,AfricahasmanymorelessonsinstoreasUSARAFseekstoexpanditscapabilitiesandincreaseitspresencethere.Butbasedonthisexer-cise,ithasanauspiciousbeginning.

todd l. joHnSton iS tHe MoBility diviSion CHief, G–4, for u.S. arMy afriCa in viCenza, italy. He iS an arMy reServe lieutenant Colonel and Currently CoMMandS tHe 772d Civil Support teaM. He iS a Graduate of tHe SuStaininG BaSe leaderSHip ManaGeMent CourSe and tHe arMy interMediate level eduCation CourSe.

A CH–47 Chinook helicopter approaches Kitgum, Uganda. Kitgum is the headquarters of the 401st Brigade, Ugandan Peoples Defense Force.


nthelanguageofrailroading,aprivatecarisone thatisownedbyanindividualororganizationother thanarailroad.Privatefreight-carownerscanbedividedintononshippers(suchasleasingcompanies)andshippers.Becominganowner-shipperisnotaneasydecision.Thecostofpurchasingacarissignificant,andimmersioninthearcaneworldofrailroadingisaneces-sity.Leasingcarsinsteadofowningthemyieldsnearlyallthebenefitsofownershipandreducesthedepthofcommitmenttoshippingbyrailthatownershipentails.

Basedonhistoricalexperience,threefactorsmustbeinplacebeforeprivate-carownershipbecomesaplausibleoptionforarailshipper.First,thepotentialownermustexpectthemovementstocontinuelongenoughtorecoverthecostoftheinvestmentincars—usually15yearsormore.Second,thecargotobemovedshouldrequireaspeciallydesignedcar;morespecifically,itmustbecapableofmovementinbulkorhaveexcessiveweightordimensions.Third,thespeciallydesignedcarsmustnotbeavailablefromtherailroads,atleastnotwithattractivetermsthatencom-passboththecostandthereliabilitywithwhichtherailroadcanprovidethecarswhendemandforthemisatitspeak.

TheArmedForcesavoidedowner-shippersta-tusuntilWorldWarI.However,theyhadextensiveinvolvementinrailroadingbeforethat.U.S.militaryrailroadsoperatedraillinesinthewarzoneduringtheCivilWar,andtherailroad’sdominanceoftransporta-tionintheyearsbetweentheCivilWarandtheU.S.entryintoWorldWarIaffectedtheArmedForcesasitdidnearlyeveryshipper.

WorldWarsIandIIWhenthemilitarydidbecomeowner-shippersdur-

ingWorldWarI,theypurchasedtankcars,whichwereprimarilyusedtotransportthechemicalsusedinmak-ingmunitions.Fromthereportingmarksonthecars,itislikelythatmostofthecarswereboughtused.

ThenumberofcarsowneddroppedbythetimeGermanyinvadedPolandin1939,andtankcarsmadeupessentiallytheentirefleet.However,althoughthe

tankcarsownedattheendofWorldWarIwerealmostallchemicaltanks,thetankcarsownedatthestartofWorldWarIIweremostlyforpetroleum,oils,andlubricants(POL).

BetweenthestartofthewarandtheattackonPearlHarbor,thepurchaseoftankcarsforPOLserviceout-pacedtheadditionofchemicaltanks.However,bytheendofthewar,theservicesownedequalquantitiesofchemicalandPOLtankcars.DuringWorldWarII,theArmy’srailcarfleetremainedcomposedalmostexclu-sivelyoftankcars;theonlyexceptionwas16flatcarsusedforhaulingcanistersofchemicals.Yet,theNavybarelyexpandeditschemicaltankcarfleetandownednoPOLtankcars;itpurchasedmostlyboxcarsandownedmorehoppercarsthantankcars.

KoreanWarTheinventoryatthestartoftheKoreanWarshows

thattheservicesremainedactiveinpurchasingrailcarsevenaftertheendofWorldWarII.Althoughtheover-allnumberofcarsowneddroppedbyabout200andchemicaltankcarsdroppedbyalmost900,ownershipofPOLtankcars,boxcars,andflatcarsincreased.BytheendoftheKoreanWar,withthenumberofcarscarriedoverfromthepreviouswarandthepurchasesbetweenthewars,thenumberofcarsownedbytheservicesincreasedbymorethan3,000.

UntilthestartoftheKoreanWar,theservices’fleetshadbeenlargelycomposedoftankcars.Thatchangedbytheendofthewar,astheservicesincreasedtheirpur-chasesofothercartypes.NoteworthyweretheArmy’spurchaseofflatcars(mostlytomovethenewandheavierPattontank)andtheNavy’spurchaseofDFboxcarstomoveammunition.(DFstandsforDamageFree,thetradenameofaloadsecurementsystemthatconsistedofslottedsteelbarsfastenedtotheinnersidesofthecarandlateralcrosspiecesthatlockedintothoseslots.)

TheArmyhadthelargestowner-shipperfleetonthecontinentwith6,754cars—about1,800carsmorethan

DefenseFreightCarOperationsYesterday,Today,andTomorrow

Iby GeorGe Gounley

In this photo, vehicles and equipment are unloaded from flatcars for movement to Fort Irwin, California, circa 1960.

40 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

thenextlargestfleet,whichbelongedtoanoilcom-pany.TheNavy’s2,538carsmadeitthefourthlargestowner-shipper.

VietnamWarBythetimethefirstgroundcombatunitslandedin

Vietnam,alloftheservices’interchangefreightcarswereconsolidatedundertheownershipandcontrolofapredecessoroftheMilitarySurfaceDeploymentandDistributionCommand(SDDC).ThenumberofcarsinthefleethaddroppedsignificantlytolessthanthenumberownedatthestartoftheKoreanWar.Despitethis,anddespitetheamazinggrowthofthenumberofcarsownedduringtheprecedingwar,bythetimeU.S.involvementinVietnamended,thefleethadshrunkslightlyforthefirsttimeduringwartime.Thiswasmainlycausedbyareductionintankcarownership.TheVietnamWarthereforemanifestedtwotrendsthatcontinuetothisday:theuncouplingofthesizeofthefleetfromwarandthereductionofthetankcarportionofthefleetinbothnumbersandsignificance.Reflect-ingbothofthosetrends,thedeliveryof200chemicaltankcarsin1966wasthelastsignificantwartimepur-chaseofcarsforthefleetandthenexttolastsignifi-cantpurchaseoftankcarsofanykind.

PostVietnamThefirstmajordeliveryofflatcarsaftertheKorean

Wartookplacein1981,andmorecarsofthesamedesignwerepurchasedbetween1983and1987.Thesecarswereorderedforthesamereasonastheirprede-cessors:anewtank,thistimetheM1Abrams,wasbothtoolongandtooheavyforthecarsbuiltfortheM48.Unliketheirwood-deckedpredecessors,thenewcarshadsteeldecksandchaintiedowndevicesforsecuringthetankstothecars.Theyalsohadcollaps-iblepedestalsthat,whenraised,wouldpermitthecarstocarry20-or40-footISO[InternationalOrganizationforStandards]containers.

Finally,becausetheflatcarwasdesignedtocarrythetankbutthetankwasnotequippedtorideonthetrain,thenewcarsalsohadshacklesthatweretobeusedtoattachthechaintiedownstothetank,insteadofusingtheweakershacklesstandardtothetanks.Person-nelunloadingatankweresupposedtoremovethecarshacklesandsecurethemwithoneofthechaintiedownstothedeckofthecarsothattheywouldbeavailableforthenextshipper.Occasionally,thatactuallyhappened.

gulfWarWhiletheGulfWarwasnotmarkedbyanyrailcar

shortages,ithadthreeveryimportanteffectsontheinterchangefleet.First,thelackofdemandfortheolderflatcarsduringthedeploymentkilleddiscussionaboutkeepingthemasasortofreservefleet,sotheyweredis-posedofbecauseoftheirage.Second,dispatchingthe

newflatcarstomeetreturningshiploadsoftanksthatturnedoutnottobetanksafterallledtothecarsbeingloadedwithawidevarietyofequipment,whichinturnpavedthewayfordroppingtherequirementtoleavetheshacklesonthecars.Finally,thelengthoftimethatittooktodeploytheArmy,thoughnotcausedbycarshortages,ledtotheArmyStrategicMobilityProgram(ASMP),apartofwhichwasthepurchaseofcarsforplacementatArmyinstallationswheretheywerenottobeuseduntiltherewasadeployment.

Theresultwasthepurchaseofmorethan1,00068-and89-footflatcars,whichweredeliveredbetween1994and2001.Thiswasthelastsignificantpurchaseofrailcarsofanytypebythemilitary.Likethetank-carryingcarsboughtinthe1980s,twoofthethreenewcarserieshadsteeldecks,chaintiedowndevices,andcollapsiblepedestals,thoughtheyhadonlyfouraxlesinsteadofthesixaxlesoftheM1flatcars.Thethirdseriesofcarswascomposedof89-footflatcarsthatwereboughtusedandequippedwithpedestalsforcar-ryingcontainersofammunition.

1990sThe1990ssawdeletionsandadditionsthatresulted

inhistoricchangesinthesizeandcompositionoftheinterchangefleet.Bytheendof1993,allofthecarsdeliveredduringtheKoreanWarhadbeenremovedfrominterchangeservicebecauseofthethen-currentagerestrictionof40yearsimposedbytherailroads.Thenumberofinterchangecarswascutalmostinhalffromthe2,267carsatthestartoftheGulfWartoapost-WorldWarIIlowof1,181inmid-1994.TheinventorythenstartedtoclimbbecauseoftheASMPpurchases,untilithit2,239atthestartof2001.Tankcars,whichmadeupmostofthefleetaslateasFebruary1985,droppedto37percentofthefleetatthestartoftheGulfWarandto18percentatthebeginningof2001.

Thecurrentsizeofthefleetisslightlyunder2,100railcars,ofwhich87percentareflatcars.TheASMPcarsconstitutemorethanhalfofthecurrentDefenseFreightRailwayInterchangeFleet.TheyarefollowedinsizebythecarsboughtforcarryingtheM1andthenthePOLtankcars.Theremainingcarsareallspecialpurpose—allboughtbytheNavyexceptfor12chemi-caltankcarsboughtbytheAirForce.

OwnershipChangesThechangesovertheyearsinthewaycarswere

ownedandmanagedarealmostasinterestingasthesizeandcompositionofthefleet.Inthebeginning,theArmyandtheNavybothboughtandmanagedtheirowninter-changecars.WiththeArmy,ownershipandmanage-mentwasfurtherdecentralizedbetweentheOrdnanceandtheQuartermasterCorps.Presumably,thisendedwiththeformationoftheTransportationCorpsduringWorldWarII.Afterthewar,theseparationoftheAir


ForcefromtheArmyledtotheAirForcesubsequentlypurchasingandowningaverysmallnumberofrailcars,althoughmanagementofitscarsremainedwiththeArmy.

In1956,aDepartmentofDefense(DOD)directivevestedcontrolandoperationofallinterchangefreightcarsintheArmy’sMilitaryTrafficManagementAgen-cy.TheagencysubsequentlyassumedmanagementoftheArmyandAirForcefleetsin1957andtheNavyfleetin1959.Ownership,however,remainedwiththepurchasingservices.

DTMSBy1964,themilitaryfleetwasunderthemanage-

mentoftheDefenseSupplyAgency’sDefenseTraf-ficManagementService(DTMS).Anauditthatyearfoundthatproperimplementationofthe1956com-monmanagementdirectivewasimpededbyaDODrequirementthatDTMSalsorecognize“thespecificrequirementsofallofthemilitaryservicesforrailwayrollingstock.”Usingthisloophole,theArmyrequiredthatDTMSpre-positionover50percentofitsheavy-capacityArmyflatcarsatcertaininstallations.

DTMSobtainedpermissiontousethesepre-positionedcarsatotherlocationsduringthe1962CubanMissileCrisis,butonlyafteragreeingtoobtainArmypermissionbeforeusinganyArmy-ownedflat-carsonbehalfoftheotherservices.TheNavy,foritspart,requiredthatover90percentoftheboxcarsthatitboughtbepre-positionedatNavyammunitiondepots.There,theDFcars,whichwereboughttosimplifyandaccelerateinterchangeshipments,wereusedmoreforintraplantmovesandstoragethanforinterchange.

DuringtheCubanMissileCrisis,atleastonefacilityshippedusingrailroad-ownedboxcarssothatitcoulduseitspre-positionedinterchangecarsontheinstalla-tion.Inotherfindings,theauditorsreportedthatinstal-lationtransportationofficersoftendidnotbothertorequestcarsfromDTMSbecauseDTMSrarelyfilledtheirrequests,thattheservicespreventedDTMSfromdisposingofunneededcars,andthatin1yearshippersincurred$3.1millioninadditionalblockingandbrac-ingcostsbecausemostammunitionshipmentsweremadeinplainboxcarsratherthaninDFcars.

Asaresult,inApril1964,DODtransferredown-ershipofallinterchangecarstoDTMS.InFebruary1965,ownershipandmanagementwastransferredalongwithotherDTMSfunctionstotheMilitaryTraf-ficManagementandTerminalService,apredecessoroftheSDDC.Inthenextcoupleofyears,theservicereportingmarks(USAX,USNX,andDAFX)wereallchangedtoDODX.Althoughrailroadersrefertothecarsbytheirreportingmarks,theunifiedfleetisformallyknownastheDefenseFreightRailwayInter-changeFleet(DFRIF).

ArmyFundingofgeneral-PurposeRailcarsThe1964DODdirectivealsochargedtheArmywith

fundingthepurchaseofenoughgeneral-purposerailcars(carscapableofbeingusedbymorethanoneservice)tomeetthedemandofalloftheservices.Sincethen,theindividualservicesmustfundthepurchaseofrailcarswhosedesignlimitstheirusefulnesstoasingleservice.Inthecurrentfleet,theArmyhasfundedthepurchaseofPOLtankcarsandchaintiedownorISOcontainerflat-cars.Allothercartypesarefundedbytheusingservice.

The chart lists the military’s

inventory at sig-nificant dates

between the U.S. involvement in

World War I and the departure of the last ground

troops from Vietnam as well

as the current inventory. This information is taken from the

quarterly issues of the Official

Railway Equip-ment Register, which lists all freight cars in

interchange service in North

America.

World War I World War II Korean War Vietnam War Today

April 1917

December1918

July 1939

January 1942

October 1945

July 1950

July 1953

April 1965

July 1972

Tank, Chemical 0 1290 69 355 2129 1256 1410 571 500 17

Tank, POL 0 50 477 1399 2132 2456 2618 2784 2433 197

Box 1 1 1511 1790 3640 999 1008 30

Flat 0 0 4 209 1319 904 899 1675

Flat, Special 0 0 94 21 21 32 44 127

Gondola 20 82

Hopper 0 0 107 28 35 3 0

Caboose 6

Refrigerator 9

Schnabel 2

Totals 0 1340 547 1755 5977 5780 9125 5293 4884 2063

U.S. Forces Railcar Ownership

0

0

42 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

Regardlessofthefunding,onceacarisacceptedfromtheseller,itbelongstoSDDC.

Thepurchaseofgeneral-purposeflatcarsundertheASMPforthespecialpurposeofsupportingtheArmy’srapiddeploymentposedapotentialproblemreminiscentofthesituationduringtheCubanMissileCrisis.BecausetheArmywasresponsibleforbuyinggeneral-purposecarsforalloftheservices,whatjusti-ficationwouldSDDChaveforrefusingarequestfromanotherservicetousetheASMPcars?

AresolutionwasreachedthatthecarswouldbeconsideredspecialpurposeandthereforecouldbeassignedtoArmyinstallationsforpromptresponsetoamobilizationaslongastherewasnomobiliza-tion.Oncetherewasamobilization,thenthepurposeofpre-positioningthecarswasaccomplishedandthecarscouldbeusedbyalloftheservicesuntildeploy-mentsended.Thispolicyisstillineffect,andtheASMPcarshavebeenusedtosupportalloftheser-vicessincethefirstdeploymentinsupportofOpera-tionIraqiFreedom.

OperatingCostThecostofoperatingandmaintainingtheDRIFis

supposedtobecoveredbythemileageallowancestherailroadspayprivatecarownerswhentheircarsmoveloaded.Manyyearsago,thesepaymentswereusuallyenoughtocoverthecapitalaswellasthemaintenancecostsofacar.Now,dependingonthecartype,thepaymentsoftenarenotsufficienttocoverthecostofrepairs.Forexample,thedefaulttariffallowanceforflatcarsandboxcars(theratechargedintheabsenceofanyspecialagreement)is1.2centsperloadedmile.Atthatrate,acarwouldhavetomoveloaded1,503miles—halfwayacrossthecontinent—toearnenoughtopayforreplacingabrakeshoe,themostcommonrepair.

Becausetheallowanceearnedpermiledependsonthecartype,themoreprivatecarsofaparticulartypeownedbyaprivateowner,themoreclouttheownerhasindemandingcompensatorymileageallowances.Sincenearlyalltankcarsareprivatecars,themilitary’sfleetownershipcostswerefairlywellcompensateduntiltheboxcarandflatcarpurchasesduringtheKoreanWar.

Beginninginthemid-1960s,thedeclineoftankcarloadingseventuallyproduceddeficitsinmileageallow-ances.Thiscontinueduntilthelate1980s,whenaspe-cialmileage-allowanceratewaswritteninawaythatonlythenewM1flatcarsqualifiedforit.TheArmyalsoeliminatedKoreanWartankcars,whichwereexpensivetomaintainandrarelyused,creatingmileageallowancesurplusesagain.

ThearrivaloftheASMPflatcarsinthe1990sthreatenedareturntodeficits.TooordinarytojustifyaspecialallowancesimilartotheM1flatcars,ASMPflatcarsqualifiedonlyforthedefaulttariffallowance.ThiswaseventuallyresolvedbymodifyingSDDC’s

railcontractlanguagetospecifythemileageallowancetobepaidonallDODXcartypesotherthantankcars.

TheabilitytospecifymileageallowancesforDFRIFrailcars,ongeneral-purpose(chaintiedownandcontainer)flatcarsatleast,islimitedbyanotherprovi-sionintheSDDCrailcontract.Thisprovisionstatesthatthefreightratemustbethesameforusingagivencartype,regardlessofwhetherthecarissuppliedbySDDCortherailroads.

Thislongstandingprovisionoftreatinglikecarsalike,regardlessofownership,reducesemptycarmile-age,whichinturnreducesoverallcostsandcycletime.Ifthefreightrateistobethesame,thenthecostofcars—whetherDFRIForcommercial—shouldalsobeapproximatelythesame.Otherwise,therailroadswouldshyawayfromusinganowner’scarsandthepracticalcapacityoftherailroadstocarrymilitarytrafficwouldbeartificiallyreduced.Theincreasedmileageallow-ancesforflatcarsnotonlyraisedrevenueforSDDC,buttheyalsoincreasedsystemcapacitybecausetheyreducedvariationsinrailroadnetrevenuesonparticularmovementsbasedonwhattypeofcarswereused.

MaintainingRailroadTransportCapacityTheusefulnessoftherailroadsystemduringmobi-

lizationisanothercurrentproblem.HavingenoughcarsintheDFRIFtoprovideallofthecapacityneededforamobilizationisarequirementonlywithrespecttothetank-carryingflatcars.AlloftheothermaterialsshippedonDFRIFcarseitherdonothaveincreaseddemandduringmobilizationorhavecommercialrailorroadalternativestobeingcarriedonDODXcars.How-ever,around2000,arailroaderpointedoutthatacom-mercialchaintiedownflatcarshortagewasjustoverthehorizonbecausemostofthecarswouldreachtheirmaximuminterchangelifewithinthenext10yearsandtherewasinsufficientdemandtoreplacethemall.ThatcrisiswaspostponedwhenTTXCompany,theownerofnearlyallofthecommercialchaintiedownflatcars,undertookanupgradetoextendtheircars’interchangelife,firstfrom40to50yearsandthen,asthatageapproached,to65years—themaximuminterchangeagepermittedbywaiver.

Meanwhile,ajointSDDC-railroad-TTXstudycon-cludedthattheonlyfeasiblewaytoaddresstheageissuewastohavecarsthatwerenotbuiltforchaintiedownservicemodifiedsothattheycouldberead-ilyusedinthatservice.InresponsetoarequestfromSDDC,TTXagreedtomodifyitsgeneral-purposeflat-cardesigntoincorporateholesforanewtypeofchaintiedownanchorandalsoforinterboxconnectors.Sofar,TTXhashad400carsbuilttothenewdesign.Exceptfortestshipmentstoconfirmthattheconceptworks,noneofthecarshaveeverbeenequippedwithchains.

A2002ArmystudyconcludedthatenoughDFRIFandcommercialrailcarcapacitywasavailabletosup-


porteventhemostextrememobilizationscenario,providedthatrailcarswereloadedorunloadedwithinadayofarrival.ThebeginningofOperationIraqiFree-dom(OIF)in2003broughtanopportunitytotesthowcloselyweapproachedthatlevelofefficiency.BecauseacoupleofinstallationshadprematurelyorderedandloadedcommercialchaintiedownflatsduringtheGulfWar,SDDC,atthestartofOIF,requiredthatinstalla-tionsorderbothcommercialandDFRIFcarsfromtheDFRIFfleetadministrator.

AnanalysisoftheDFRIFandcommercialcarmovementdatafromthefirst3monthsofOIFpro-ducedanefficiencylevelofonly43percent.Whatwasworse,twiceduringthatperiod,over85percentofallthe89-footchaintiedownflatcarsinNorthAmericawereinmilitaryservice.Inotherwords,wewereapproachingthelimitsofourabilitytomobilizebyrailinasituationthatwasnot,fromtheperspectiveoftheplanners,alargemobilization.

Partofourinefficientuseofrailcarswastheresultofthewayforcesweremobilized,butwehadplentyofopportunitytonotethatefficiencyinthedistribu-tionofrailroad-suppliedchaintiedownflatcarswasnotahighpriority.Sincethen,SDDChasbeenworkinginvariouswaystoimprovetheempty-cardistributionprocessandtoacceleratetheloadingandunloadingofchaintiedownflatcars.

RailcarFutureWhatisinthefutureforthemilitaryastheoperator

ofanowner-shipperprivatecarline?NothinginthehistoryoftheDFRIForitscurrentsituationindicatesthattheneedforthefleetwilldisappearintheforesee-ablefuture.ButhistoryhasshownthattheneedfortheDFRIFcanchangeradicallyinarelativelyshorttime.

Attimes,theimpetusforchangewillcomefromoutsidethemilitaryandtherailroadindustry.Forexample,theneareliminationofchemicaltankcarsfromthefleetisdueinparttochangesintheregula-tionofhazardousmaterials.Thosechangesreducedthenumberoftank-carcleaningfacilitieslicensedtohandlecertaincommoditiestothepointthatthemanu-facturershadtobuildtheirowncleaningfacilitiestobeabletocontinuetoshipthechemicals.

Havingundertakenthatrisk,themanufacturers,forcompetitiveandrisk-avoidancereasons,limitedaccesstotheirfacilitiestoonlythecarsthattheyownedorleased.Asaresult,theonlychemicaltankcarsintheDFRIFareforspecialtychemicalswhosemarketissolimitedandsporadicthatmanufacturerscouldnotaffordtoinvestinbuyingorleasingtheirowncars.

ThemilitaryhasbenefitedgreatlyfromthechaintiedownflatcarpurchasesmadebyTTXCompanyinthe1960sand1970stocarryfarmimplementsandtrucktractors—twomarketsthatarenowmuchsmallerthanwhenthecarswerepurchased.Althoughtheneed

toreplacethemhasbeenpushedbackbylifeextensionprograms,whenreplacementdoestakeplace,veryfewcarswillbebought.Puttinganchorholesingeneral-purposeflatcarsboughttoservemarketsthatdonotusechaintiedownflatcarscouldbeaneconomicalwaytobridgethetransition,butmuchcouldchangeinthenext20years.

TheArmyhasneverroutinelyreplacedorexpandedtheDFRIF’sgeneral-purposeflatcarfleet.Itsfirstpur-chasewastiedtothefieldingoftheM48,thesecondtothedevelopmentoftheM1,andthethirdtothedesiretogettowarfaster.TheM1flatcarswillneedtobewithdrawnfromuseorundergoaveryexpensiverebuildbeginningin2029.Whetherornotanother“important”programwillcomealongtofundthatreplacementorrebuildisquestionable.

Eventssince2000haveledSDDCtobecomemoreinvolvedwiththemilitary’suseofcommercialchaintiedownflatcars.Since2003,SDDChasactedasanintermediarybetweenshippinginstallationsandtherailroadsinrequestingcommercialcars.Initially,SDDCsimplyactedasagatekeepertorestricttheprematurecommitmentofthecars.Overtime,however,SDDCandtherailroadshavegottenusedtoworkingtogethertoprovidethecarsthatmakethemostsensetouse.

In2004,SDDCtestifiedforthefirsttimeinsupportoftheantitrustexemptionthatpermitsTTXCompanytooperateapooledchaintiedownflatcarfleetonbehalfoftherailroadsthatownit.Since2005,SDDCandTTXhavebeenworkingonwaystoimprovetheefficiencyofemptyTTXflatcardistributionthroughcentralmanagementofthecarsbyTTX,ratherthanthroughdispersedmanagementbytheindividualrail-roads.Withtheobjectiveofspeedinguploadingandunloadingofcommercialchaincars,in2009SDDCrequestedthattheFederalRailroadAdministrationrec-ognizetherightofcommercialownersofcarscapableofcarryingchaintiedownloadstoeliminatehand-holdsthatprojectabovethecars’deckssothattheycanbeloadedandunloadedasfastasDODXchaintiedownflatcars.

Railroadshavebeenessentialtotransportingmili-tarymaterielsincetheCivilWarandwillcontinuetobeimportantintheforeseeablefuture.MaintaininganinventoryofavailablerailcarsformovingmilitaryweaponsystemsandequipmentisanongoingconcernforSDDC.Determiningwhattypesofcarsareneeded,whoownsthem,andhowtofundtheirpurchaseandmaintenancerequiresacommunicationnetworkamongSDDC,theservices,therailroads,andTTXCompanyinordertoensurethattheycanprovidetherailroadsupporttheservicesneedwhentheyneedit.

GeorGe Gounley HaS ManaGed tHe defenSe freiGHt railway interCHanGe fleet SinCe 1985.

44 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

rmybandoffi- cers,specialtycode (SC)42C,areindeedrareintheArmy’sofficercorps.Infact,therearefewerArmybandoffi-cersthanArmyastronauts.Withonly22authorizedand23assignedArmywide,theyrepresentatinybutimportantportionofofficersintheAdju-tantGeneral’sCorpsandanevensmallerpercentageofallArmyoffi-cers.OfficerswhoholdSC42Cmusthaveahighdegreeofsubject-matterexpertiseinleadingandconductingmusicians.Theyarecommissionedinasingle-trackspecialtyspecificallytoleadtheArmy’sfinestmusiciansinsup-portofechelonsabovethecorpslevel.

MostSoldiersaremorefamiliarwithArmybandcommanderswhoarewarrantofficersinmilitaryoccupationalspecialty(MOS)420C.Thisisbecausewar-rantofficerslead27oftheActiveArmy’s33bands,all17ArmyReservebands,and53ArmyNationalGuardbands.Warrantofficerbandcommanderstypicallyserveinthebandsassignedtotheheadquartersofcorps,divi-sions,andtheArmyTrainingandDoctrineCommand,andotherinstallations.

AlthoughtypicallyassignedtothemostseniorheadquartersofourArmyandNationassingle-trackbandofficers,theyareAdjutantGeneral’sCorpsoffi-cersandcompeteforpromotionintheArmy’s

TheArmyBandOfficerLifecycleby lieutenant Colonel jiM r. keene

A

A small contingent of commissioned Army band officers lead elite units that use music to support the Army’s mission.

An Army band officer conducts the U.S. Army Hearld Trum-pets at a free concert in Atlanta, Georgia. (Photo by SPC Brian Bohannon)


competitivecategory.Althoughcompetingforpromo-tionwiththerestoftheArmy,allbandpositionsmustbefilledbyanofficerholdingtheSC42C,andeach“spe-cialband”commanderpositionisanappointedpost.

SpecialbandsincludetheU.S.ArmyBand(“Persh-ing’sOwn”),theU.S.ArmyFieldBand(theFieldBand),andtheU.S.MilitaryAcademyBand(theWestPointBand).[TheU.S.FifeandDrumCorpsisalsoaSpecialBandbutiscommandedbyawarrantofficer.]LikeotherArmyassignments,commanderstypicallyholdthesepositionsfor2to3years.Ideally,eachassignmentpro-videstheofficeropportunitiesforincreasinglevelsofresponsibility,whichresultingeneralandspecificprepa-rationastheyascendthroughtheranks.

ARecentHistoryofBandOfficerAssignmentsSincetheearly1970s,thetotalnumberofArmy

bandofficershasnotexceeded26,butthetypesofassignmentsavailabletothemhavechanged.Throughtheearly1990s,Armybandofficersalsoservedas“staffbandsofficers”attheheadquartersofU.S.ArmyEurope,theArmyForcesCommand(FORSCOM),TRADOC,andineachofthesixcontinentalU.S.Armyheadquarters’staffs.Asof2009,onlyonestaffbandsofficerpositionremains,atFORSCOMheadquarters.

ThenewestSC42Cassignment,theentertainmentprogramsofficertoMulti-NationalCorps-Iraq(MNC–I)wasestablishedto—o MonitorthenumberofArmybandsarrivingintheater.o Coordinatebandactivitieswithbroadertheater-level

Armyinitiatives,includingmorale,welfare,andrec-reationandUnitedServiceOrganizationsevents.

o Assistthebandsinsolvinglogistics,communication,andadministrativeproblemsintheater.ManyArmybandsthathaveservedsincethebegin-

ningsofOperationEnduringFreedom(OEF)andOper-ationIraqiFreedom(OIF)haveprovidedceremonial,morale,andfunerarysupporttounitsandheadquartersofotherArmyformations,U.S.andinternationalagen-cies,andtheirowndivisionorcorpsactivities.Asaresult,officersinthisassignmentarealsoprovidingasteadystreamoflessonslearnedonhowbesttomanageArmybands’missionsinamultinationalenvironment.

TheBandOfficerLifecycleTypically,onlyoneortwonewofficersareneeded

peryeartomaintainthebandofficercorps.Com-missionedofficersareexpectedtohavesubstantiveexperienceleadingmusiciansbeforetheirauditionandselectionasArmybandofficers.Amaster’sdegreeinmusicisstandard,butnotnecessarilyrequiredaslongasthecandidatedisplaysahighlevelofcompetenceandpracticalexperienceinleadingprofessionalmusicians.

The audition. Armybandofficerauditionsarerig-orousandcompetitiveandincludeanauditionontheapplicant’smaininstrument,amusictheoryexam,a

personalinterview,andaliveauditiontoevaluatetheapplicant’sabilitytoconductanensemble.Duringtheliveaudition,theapplicantdirectsbothaconcertbandandachorusfromPershing’sOwnortheFieldBand.

Officer Candidate School.AftertheArmybandoffi-cerboard(staffedbyseniorArmybandofficers)selectsacandidate,theapplicantalsoappearsbeforeanOfficerCandidateSchool(OCS)selectionboard. Bandofficers’accessionscomeprimarilybyOCS.This14-weekcourseatFortBenning,Georgia,isdesignedtotrainindividu-alswithcollegedegreestobeArmyofficers.ThosewhoareselectedasciviliansmustsuccessfullycompletebasiccombattrainingbeforeattendingOCS.

Lieutenants.MostArmybandofficersareolder(onaverage,27yearsold)thantypicalnewArmyofficers(23yearsold)becauseoftheexpectedlevelofcivilianeduca-tionandexperienceneededtobeacceptedasArmybandofficers.Generally,thecareerpathbeginsasasecondlieutenant.AttheU.S.ArmySchoolofMusic(USA-SOM),officersaretrainedinArmycommonskillstasks,keybranchskills,leadership,publicspeaking,ceremo-nies,anduniqueArmymusicskills.Lieutenantsarepro-videdmaximumpracticalexperiencethroughassignmentstoArmybands.Althoughthisperiodisdevelopmentalinnature,ayoungbandofficerroutinelymaybetaskedtointeractwithseniorleadersandleadensemblesconsistingofworld-classmusiciansforlargeaudiencesandhigh-leveldignitariesatnationalandinternationalevents.

Captains.Ideally,priortocommand,captainsattendacaptainscareercourseatUSASOM,wheretheystudytheArmy’scoretraining,musicprogramming,publicspeaking,briefingtoinfluence,audiencedemographics,andadvancedmusicandperformanceconcepts.Captainisthefirstrankatwhichofficershavetheopportunitytocommandaband,teachatUSASOM,orserveasanassociateconductororbandmasterinchargeofacho-rus,popensemble,orceremonialunitfromPershing’sOwnortheFieldBand.

AcaptainmayserveascommanderoftheTRA-DOCorFORSCOMbandorSchoolCompanyatUSASOM.KeystaffexperiencesareavailableattheFORSCOMStaffBandOffice,atUSASOMasaninstructor,andthroughtherecentlydevelopeddeployedpositioninBaghdadastheEntertainmentProgramsOfficerforMNC–I.

Officersgainadvancedleadershipexperienceduringthisphaseoftheircareers.Theirratingschemescanbeasuniqueastheirprofessionalexperiences.Often,acaptaincommandingabandwillhavearaterwhoisacolonelandaseniorraterwhoisalieutenantgeneral.Asacap-tain,abandofficerwillhavemultipleopportunitiestoleadworld-classmusiciansforaudiencesinauditoriumsfromsmall-townAmericatotheWhiteHouse.

Majors. AmajormayserveascommanderoftheU.S.ArmyEuropeBandandChorusinGermany,asthedeputycommanderoftheWestPointBand,oras

46 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

thedeputycommandantanddirectoroftrainingatUSASOM.HealsomayserveastheexecutiveofficerofPershing’sOwn.

Asamajor,bandofficersmustcompleteIntermediateLevelEducationeitherinresidenceattheArmyCom-mandandGeneralStaffCollegeatFortLeavenworth,Kansas,orthrougha13-weeksatellitecourseandnon-residentadvanceddistributedlearningprogramatFortBelvoir,Virginia;FortLee,Virginia;orFortGordon,Georgia.MajorsmayalsocompletetheAdvancedOpera-tionsWarfightingCourse.

Lieutenant colonels. Asalieutenantcolonel,abandofficermayserveasthecommandantofUSASOM,commanderoftheWestPointBand,ordeputycom-manderofPershing’sOwnortheFieldBand.Armybandofficerswiththerankoflieutenantcolonelcom-peteforseniorservicecollegeeducationandtrainingonthesamebasisasallothercompetitivecategoryofficers.

Colonels.Thepositionsavailabletobandofficersincludetwocolonelslots:commanderofPershing’sOwnandcommanderofTheFieldBand.Inadditiontoservingascommandersoftheseeliteorganizations,colonelsprovideleadershipandsubject-matterexper-tisetotheChief,ArmyBands(theAdjutantGeneralSchoolcommandant),regardingofficerassignmentsandpoliciesandproceduresrelatingtoArmybands.

FutureConsiderationsforBandOfficerCareersTheinactivationofthesixcontinentalU.S.Army

headquarters,theeliminationofstaffbandofficerpositionsattheArmyHumanResourcesCommand,U.S.ArmyEuropeheadquarters,andArmyTrainingandDoctrineCommandheadquarterslimitedprogram-maticopportunitiesforcompany-gradeandfield-gradeArmybandofficerstoexperienceeffectivemanage-mentofpolicyandlogisticsissuesaffectingArmybands.TheonlypurestaffpositionsforbandofficersexistatFORSCOMheadquarters,wherethestaffband’sofficermonitorsandassistsintheoperationsofbandsassignedtodivisionsandcorps,includingmobi-lizationandReservecomponentissues.

AssignmenttoUSASOMalsorequirescompany-andfield-gradeofficerswhoarefamiliarwithArmytrainingandresourcemanagementaswellastraininganddoctrinedevelopment.Seniorofficers,specificallythecommandantofUSASOM,areexpectedtoprovidevisionandleadershipinconstructingtraininganddoc-trineforallArmybands.

GiventhenatureoftheexpeditionaryArmy,Armybandofficersmayneedtopursuegraduateeducationandtraining-with-industryopportunitiesinrelatedfieldslikeinternationalrelations,musicmarketing,entertain-mentproduction,andmultimediacommunications.ThenewSC42CassignmenttoMNC–IisoneimportantsteptowardfillinganimmediateArmyrequirementthatofferscommissionedbandofficerstheironlyopportu-

nitytoserveinaforward-deployedenvironment.

Leadersanddevelop-ersinArmybandsareconsideringotherdevel-opmentalexperiencesandtrainingdesignedtorebuildtheskillsandunderstand-ingneededtofunctioneffectivelyinstrategic-levelassignments.

AsapartoftheworkingforcedesignupdateforArmybands,theremaybeaneedtorebalancewarrantofficerandcommissionedofficerpositionstoprovideanimprovedofficercareerprogressionmodelandtolendbalanceandstandardizationtotheoperationalforce.

AstheArmycontinuesinaneraofpersistentcon-flict,unitslikeArmybandsneedskilledleaderswhogrowinandrelatetotheArmy’scultureandsystem.Theseleaderswillcontinuetoprovideworld-classmusi-calorganizationsthatareuniquelyabletocommunicatethroughmusiconbothnationalandinternationalstagestostrengthenboththewillandreputationofAmerica’sArmy.Thesespecializedofficers,fromsecondlieuten-antthroughcolonel,willcontinuetoseekthewidestpossiblerangeofskillsandexperiencestoleadArmybandsastheycontinuetotransforminthefuture.

lieutenant Colonel jiM r. keene waS tHe CoMMandant of tHe u.S. arMy SCHool of MuSiC wHen He wrote tHiS artiCle. He iS now tHe CoMMander of tHe u.S. Military aCadeMy Band at weSt point, new york. He HoldS deGreeS in piano perforManCe and orCHeStral ConduCtinG.

Army band officers today are limited to assignments

in one of only nine units.

O3−O5U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR) Band and Chorus, Germany

O3−O4Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Band, Fort Monroe, Virginia

O3−O4Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) BandFort McPherson, Georgia

Army Band (Large)

O1−O5U.S. Army School of Music (USASOM)Virginia Beach, Virginia

O3−O4Entertainment Programs OfficerMul�-Na�onal Corps-Iraq

O3−O4Staff Bands Officer, Headquarters, FORSCOMFort McPherson, Georgia

Staff

Grades

O2−O6The U.S. Army Band (TUSAB)Fort Myer, Virginia

O2−O6The U.S. Army Field Band (TUSAFB)Fort Meade, Maryland

O3−O5The U.S. Military Academy BandWest Point, New York

Special Bands


nJuly2009,theArmySoldierSupportInstitute (SSI)hostedanArmyTrainingandDoctrineCom- mand(TRADOC)accreditationteam.TheRecruit-ingandRetentionSchool(RRS)hadjustcompletedaLeanSixSigmaprojectontrainingdevelopmentandidentifiedanewprocessfordevelopingtrainingmaterialsandlessonplans.TheTRADOCaccredita-tionteamidentifiedRRS’sinnovative,streamlinedprocessasabestpracticeduringitsvisittoSSI.ThisarticledescribeshowRRSusedtechnologytodeveloptrainingforageographicallydispersedcommandwhileminimizingtheimpactontrainingdeliveryinarapidlychangingenvironment.

AsSSIstrategicallyplansforArmyForceGenera-tion(ARFORGEN),RRShasdevelopedinnovative,creative,andadaptivemethodstogeneratecoursematerials,processchangerequests,andmaintainaudittrailsforaccreditationpurposes.RRShasbeenverysuccessfulinstreamliningthetrainingdevelopmentprocessesandenhancingtheARFORGENrelationshipamonginstitutional,organizational,andself-develop-menttrainingdomains.RRSoffersadynamic,stream-linedtrainingdevelopmentprocess,innovativetrainingsolutions,andtheintegrationofmultiplatformsystemsforsingle-sourcedocumentationmanagement.

Inrecentyears,RRShasstruggledwithdecreas-ingresourcesandasmallerworkforce.So,inFebru-ary2008,theschool’scommandantsentthedirectoroftrainingtotheArmyLeanSixSigmacourseatFortJackson,SouthCarolina.Theinstructionsfromthecommandantweresimple:gettrainedandlaunchastudyonhowtostreamlinethetrainingdevelop-mentprocesses.Withatrainingdevelopmentteam(TDshop)of10people,including8civiliansand2Soldiers,RRSdevelopedthetrainingmaterialsfor16functionalcoursesthathadtoberelevanttotheever-changingrecruitingenvironment.

TheprojectwaslaunchedinMarch2008andwascompletedjustbeforetheTRADOCaccreditationvisitinJuly2009.Duringthefinalaccreditationbriefing,theaccreditationteamrecognizedtheRRSTDshopasthemostinnovative,motivated,anddedicatedtrainingdevelopmentteamtheyhadseeninover30years.ThelessonslearnedfromtheRRSLeanSixSigmaprojectcanbesharedbyallArmyschools.

ApplyingLeanSixSigmatoTrainingDevelopmentTheRRSTDshopestablishedacharterandimmedi-

atelydesignedaSIPOC[supplier,input,process,output,andcustomer]modelofthecurrenttrainingdevelop-mentprocess.Oncetheprocesswasdefinedandprop-erlyscoped,thedirectoroftrainingbroughtinfiveoftheTDshop’scustomers,theRRScadreinstructors.

Theinstructorsweregivenaquickbriefingontheprocessandwereaskedwhatwasimportanttothem.Allfiveagreedthatatrainingdeveloper’smostimportanttasksarelessonplans,multimediaproducts,examinations,andanyhomeworkorpracticalexer-cisesusedinclass.Whenaskedwhythesetasksaresoimportant,theinstructorssharedthattheycannotstandtobeembarrassedontheplatformwithbadtestquestions,outdatedtrainingmaterials,andgrammati-callyincorrectdocuments.Theydidnotknowwhataudittrails,criticaltasksiteselectionboards,TrainingRequirementsAnalysisSystem(TRAS)documents,andqualityassuranceprocedureswere.Theysimplywantedquality,relevantproducts.

Oncethecadreclearlydefinedthevoiceofthecustomer(thecriticalcustomerrequirements),theTDshopdocumentedthevoiceofthebusiness(businessrequirements,regulatoryguidance,organizationalleaders’desires,andTRADOCmandates).TheteambriefedtheRRScommandantanddeputycomman-dant,ColonelJamesComishandLieutenantColonelAlfonsoMandujano,Jr.ThebriefingrevealedthatthecommandantexpectedtheTDshoptoupdateall16coursesandmakesurethematerialwasasrelevantaspossible—anddosowithonlythe10personnelalreadyassignedtotheTDshop.

Theteamwasgivencompleteautonomytocreateaprocessthatwouldsatisfyboththecustomerandthebusinessrequirements.Astheteammovedforward,theyhadtocapturethecurrentprocessesanddeter-minehowwelltheywereperforming.

Togaugecurrentprocessefficiency,theTDshopdesignedanevaluationsheetfortheproductsdevel-opedbytheprocess.Thefiveproductstheteamreviewedwerecriticaltasks,lessonplans,multimedia,practicalexercisesandhomework,andexaminations.Foreachofthe5products,theteamtookasampleof30piecesofcoursematerialandgradedeachofthem

MakingTrainingDevelopmentProcessesMoreEfficientThroughLeanSixSigma

by DonalD D. CoPley, jr.

I

48 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

againsttheevaluationsheet.Theteamfoundthatthecurrentprocesseswereproducingproductsfulloferrors,keytrainingmanagementitemsweremissing,andcriticaltaskswerenotlinkedtotesting.

TheTDshoppersonnelinvestigatedeachstepintheprocessanddiscussedthemallthoroughly.Theysoonrealizedtheyhadtoomanyredundantsystemsmanag-ingthetrainingmaterialdevelopmentprocesses.Theywereattemptingtomanageallthetrainingmaterialsinseveraldifferentsoftwarepackages,includingtheAutomatedSystemsApproachtoTraining(ASAT)anditsreplacement,TrainingDevelopmentCapability(TDC),DigitalTrainingManagementSystem,Micro-softOffice,SharePoint,andBlackboard.Theteamdecideditwastimetostreamline,standardize,andletthesoftwarepackagesdowhattheydobest.

TheNewTrainingDevelopmentProcessTheTDshopbrainstormedandhadweeklySix

Sigmameetingsformorethan2monthsand,aftersev-eralpilotsandnewlydevelopedsoftwarecapabilities,soondevelopedanewtrainingdevelopmentprocess.

Thenewprocessrequiressixsteps.Step1istoidentifychangerequirements.Step2istoupdateles-sonmaterials.Step3istoupdateexaminationmateri-als,asneeded.Step4istoupdateorvalidateTRASdocumentchanges,asneeded.Step5istocompleteaqualitycontrolandapprovalprocess.Finally,Step6istonotifypersonnelofthechangeorconductinstructorandkeypersonneltraining(IKPT).

Identify change requirements.Noformalorinfor-malmethodshadbeenestablishedtoidentifytheneed-edchangestocoursematerials.Previously,instructorswouldmaketheirownchangesandnotsharethosechangeswithotherinstructorsorthetrainingdevelop-ers.ThechangerequirementsforRRStrainingmateri-alscamefromalonglistofcontributors,andatrainingdevelopercouldspendhisentireworkdayresearchingandlookingfornecessarychangesandoftennotfindthereferencetodocumentadesiredchange.

Toaddressthemanychangerequirements,theTDshopaskedthecadre,staff,anddoctrinewriterstosub-mitchangerequests.Initially,theTDshophadadiffi-cultworkloadbecauseofallthenecessarychanges,butafter2years,theworkloadisnowverymanageable.

TheTDshoppersonneldevelopedaSharePoint-basedworkflowsystemtoaccommodatechangerequests.Thissystemallowsfieldusers,cadre,andArmyRecruitingCommandstaffmemberstoreviewtrainingmaterialsandsubmitchangerequeststohelpkeeptrainingmaterialcurrentandrelevant.Becauseofthissystem,trainingmaterialchangesnolongerlagbehinddoctrinechanges.

Update lesson materials.Thebiggestgapamongthelessonplans,multimedia,andpracticalexercisesandhomeworkwascausedbythesystemsthatwere

beingused.LessonplanswerewrittenonaMicrosoftWorddocumentgeneratedfromASAT/TDC,andaseparateMicrosoftPowerPointpresentationwasusedforthemultimedia,andyetanothertypeofdocu-mentwasusedforpracticalexercises.Opportunitiesforerrorwerescatteredthroughouttheprocess.Ifadevelopermadeonechangetothelesson,hehadtoremembertomakethechangeinalloftheseparatedocuments.

TheentiretrainingpackageforalessonplanisnowdevelopedandcontainedinonePowerPointdocument.TheteamdiscoveredthatallbusinessrequirementscouldbeaddedtothedocumenttoeliminatetheneedforcopyingandpastingfilesfromMicrosoftWordintoASAT/TDC.Ifachangeoccurs,thetrainingdevel-opersimplyeditsonedocumentandallchangesarecapturedinthelessonplan,multimedia,andpracticalexercisesandhomework,thuseliminatingopportuni-tiesforerror.

Again,theTDshopusedSharePoint,thistimetocontrolversioning,makethefilesreadilyaccessibletoallcadreandfieldusers,andmaintaintheaudittrailofthechanges.SharePointallowsformaximumcontrol,excellentaudittrails,andcompletesharingofcoursematerial.

TheTDshopalsochoseBlackboardforresidentinstructorstousewhenteachingstudentsinternal(resi-dent)orexternaltotheinstitution.AlllessonsremainonSharePointwhileinstructorsusetheBlackboardplatformforexaminations,check-on-learningexer-cises,surveys,andhomework.

Update examination materials.Aftercreatingcoursetestplans(throughSharePoint)foreachofthecourses,anaudittrailwasformedtotrackchangestocriticaltasks,knowledge,andskills.Anaudittrailallowsadevelopertohaveavisualrepresentationofthetestplantoensurethatallcriticaltestinghurdlesaredesignedandimplemented.

SharePointservesastheprimarylocationforalltestplans,audittrails,andskill-to-knowledgetaskmatri-ces.Thisaudittrailpreviouslywasnotcapturedbyanysystemandwasoftenmaintainedonalocalserverortrainingdeveloper’sharddrive,whichhinderedcollab-orativedevelopmentprocedures.

Anewinitiativebeganbyhavingthecourseman-agersmigratealltestingandcheck-on-learningques-tionstoBlackboard.Sothataninstructorcanascertainwhetherornotallstudentsunderstandtheinformation,instructorsmeasureeachstudent’slearningwiththreetofivequestionsattheendofeverylesson.Thisoffersabetterpictureofstudentunderstandingandallowscadretobettercoachandmentoreachstudent.

Update or validate TRAS documents.ThenextstepwastoensureallTRASdocumentsreflectedallchang-esmadetothecurriculum.Itisimportantto“balancethecheckbook”fortrainingprograms.TheTDshop


realizedthatinstructorswereoftenteaching8weeksoftrainingmaterialsin7-weekcourses.Thiswasbecauseofthetendencyovertimetoaddasmalltrainingsup-portpackageorlessonplantoacourse.Theincreaseoflessonplanswasnotbeingcaptured,andneededresourceswerenotbeingdocumented.

Instructorsmustnowverifythatthechangesbeingmadehavenotaffectedoralteredthecurrentindi-vidualtrainingplan.Theymustalsoensurethattheterminallearningobjectivesinformationiscurrent,resourcesarevalidated,andallothertabsinASAT/TDCremainrelevant.ASAT/TDCistheprimarysystemforcourseadministrativedataandprogram-of-instructiondevelopmentandisanexcellenttooltodocumenttheserequirements.ASAT/TDCdoesagreatjobofgeneratingSoldiertrainingpublicationsandofficerandcivilianfoundationstandarddocuments.Trainingdevelopmentpersonnelarerequiredtovali-datethatallcriticalskills,knowledge,ortasksremaincurrentandrelevant.ThesefinalapproveddocumentsareintheTRASfolderinSharePoint.

Maintainingabalancebetweentheprogramofinstruction,thetrainingschedule,andavailablelessonmaterialsisessential.ThesedocumentsaremaintainedonSharePoint,andwhenchangesarerequiredbecauseofnewmissionrequirements,therequestforchangegeneratesanapprovalworkflow.

Complete quality control and approval.LeanSixSigmadescribesqualitycontrolaswaste.Ifyouhavetostoptheprocesstoensureitisrunningcorrectly,thenyouhaveaddedwastetothecycle.Itisbettertocontrolforerrorsandeliminateopportunitiestocreateerrorsratherthanaddqualitycontroltoaprocess.

Giventhisinformation,theTDshopaddedcontrolsheetsateachofthenewprocessstepstoensurethatatrainingdeveloperhasatooltogaugehiswork.Oncetheinstructormeetstheminimumrequirementsofthecontrolsheets,hecanmovethedocumentsthroughSharePointworkflowtobeapprovedforpublicationandincorporationintothecourses.

SharePointallowsforadocumentedapprovalpro-cess,whichreducestheneedtotransferlargefilesthroughemail.RRSsuccessfullyfieldedthissystemandreducedemailserverrequirements.Trainingdevelopersnowgenerateworkflowsthroughthesystemdirectlytothedirectoroftraining.Previously,theprocesshadthreelevelsofqualitycontrolthatrequiredthedocumenttobereturnedseveraltimesbeforeanapprovalcouldbeobtained.Thisprocessofperfectionhasbeeneliminated,andtrainingmaterialsarereleasedtoproductionwitha90-percentorhighererror-freerate.

Notify personnel of change or conduct IKPT.Oncetheapprovalprocesshasbeencompletedandthetrain-ingmaterialshavebeenapproved,oneoftwotypesofnotificationmustoccur.Ifthechangeisminorandrequiresnomajoradjustmentstotrainingschedules,

deliverymethods,orcontent,thentheprocessissimple.Thetrainingdevelopernotifiesallcadreanddivisionchiefs,throughSharePoint,thatanewfileispostedandprovidesasimplewrite-updescribingthechange.

Ifthechangeismajor,thetrainingdeveloperisrequiredtoscheduleIKPT.Thisprocessallowsthedevelopertodeliverthetrainingasdesignedandofferinstructorsachancetoaskquestionsorgarneraddi-tionalclarityifneeded.

SharePointfilescanbeeditedandanemailcanbesenttoallmembersofthegrouptonotifypersonnelofthechange.Ifthereareanyquestionsorthematerialwaschangedincorrectly,instructorscanstillsubmitawork-flowtoaddressanychangesthatmaystillbeneeded.

TheinstructionforIKPTmaybedeliveredface-to-faceorvirtually.Ifdonevirtually,theuseofCentraVirtualClassroomistheprimarytoolused.Whenthetrainingisdeliveredface-to-face,allinstructionispro-videdthroughSharePointtoreinforcetheuseofcur-rentsystems.

RRShasdeliveredtrainingtoover15,000fieldusersthroughablendofapproaches,includinginsti-tutional(residentinstructionusingSharePointandBlackboard),organizational(synchronousvirtualinstructionusingCentra),andself-development(asyn-chronousinstructionthroughBlackboard,theArmyLearningManagementSystem,webpages,andShare-Point).ThisnewbusinessprocessallowsallcoursematerialtobelinkedfromSharePointtoallothersoft-waresystemsthatareusedforeducationaldelivery.Virtualtrainingsessionsareeasilyaccessible,andthenewapproachallowsforpostinghomework,takingquizzes,completingcheck-on-learningactivities,tak-ingexaminations,andparticipatingindistancelearn-ing.

TheArmyisbeginningtouseSharePointatanenterpriselevel.SharePointallowsschoolstoshareandcommunicatetrainingproducts,soallorganiza-tionsshouldconsideritandtakeanewlookatsomeoldproblems.

ThekeycapabilitydevelopmentfromTDCistheabilitytohaveonestandardizedprocessacrossTRA-DOCforTRASdevelopment,management,andshar-ing.RRShasdevelopedaprocessusingcurrentArmyenterprisesystems,anditsharesallfileswithfieldusers,otherinstitutionsandschools,higherheadquar-terelements,andstaffprinciples.TRADOCTRASmanagers,trainingdevelopers,anddistancelearningmanagerscouldeasilyadopttheseprocesses.

donald d. Copley, jr., iS tHe direCtor of traininG and perSonnel developMent at tHe arMy reCruitinG and retention SCHool at fort jaCkSon, SoutH Carolina. He HoldS a BaCHelor’S deGree in MarketinG and MaSter’S deGreeS froM weBSter univerSity in HuMan reSourCeS ManaGeMent and HuMan reSourCeS developMent.


hedifficultyandcomplexityofthepost-industrialmilitaryprofessionatalllevelsisso profoundandwidelyrecognizedthatitisalmostclichétomention.Thisistrueforall specialties,butfewaremorechallengingthanthefieldoflogistics—especiallyaslead-ersreachhigherlevelsofresponsibility.Acrossthevastarrayofadministrativeandoperation-almissionsandfunctionsthatextendfromthePentagontothefarthestcornersoftheworld,theprofessionalmilitarylogisticianmustbeskilledindealingwithhighlyvolatile,uncertain,complex,andambiguous(VUCA)circumstances.

TheDepartmentofDefense’seducationcommunityisworkinghardtomeetthechallengeofpreparingfutureleadersforahigh-VUCAworld,includingestablishingseveralspecialtyschools,colleges,anduniversitiestohelpshapethenecessaryskills.Yetcurriculadesignersandfacultymembersremainchallengedtomovebeyondinstitutionalizededucationalphiloso-phiesthatareintendedtodrivestudentlearningexperiences.

Traditionaleducationaldesignfocusesonthe“what”—thatis,developingcompetencymaps,determiningcurriculacontent,settingmeasurablelearningobjectives,andpublishingintricateplansofinstructionthatarebelievedtocontroltheeducationprocess.The“what”isassessedbycomparingdesiredstandardsofperformancetoactualstudentperformance.

Otherqualitativeaspectsofprofessionalmilitaryeducationseemtobeoflessersignifi-cance,ifconsideredatall.Inmanycases,theeducationexperienceappearstobefocusedprimarilyonprovidingstudentswith“knowns”andapplyingthemintheclassroomorlabora-tory.Whilelessonsofthepastarethoughttobeanecessaryingredienttolearning,embracinglessonslearnedmaybedogmaticinhigh-VUCAsituations.

Inthisarticle,wewouldliketoopenaconversationabouteducatinglogisticspractitioners,focusingmoreonthreeotherqualitiesofeducation:the“where,”“why,”and“how.”Throughournormativestance(bytakinga“should”perspective),wehopethecommunityofeducatorsandseniorlogisticiansarespurredtobetterappreciatewhatwearguearethemoredesirableprofessionalqualities.Tothatintent,weadmitweargueprovocativelyratherthanseektorat-ifythestatusquo.Ourintentisnottosuggestcurrentpracticesinmilitarylogisticseducationhavenoplaceinthefuture,butthattheymustbesubordinatedtogreaterscopesandmethods.

Whatmaybecomeapparenttothereaderisthatweuselanguageandconceptsthatmayverywellreflectaparadigmshift.Paradoxically,whilewewouldliketocommunicatetotheinstitutionusingfamiliarlanguage,weappreciatethatanemergentparadigmcannottranslatewelltotheoneatpresent.Attimes,wewillhavetoreframemeaningsandinventnewonestoattempttocommunicatetheseideas.

Forexample,throughoutthisessay,wewillemploythemetaphorsof“theswamp”and“thehighground”tocapturethemessyrealityoflogisticspracticeandtheroleofeducationinassistingthatpractice.Weorganizetheessaytotalkfirstaboutthenatureofworkingintheswampandthenabouthowtocreatelearningconditionsthatcanservelogisticiansasthehighgroundforprofessionalreflectivepractice.Ourprincipalargumentisthatreflectivepracticeis

FromtheSwamptotheHighgroundandBack

by Dr. CHriStoPHer r. PaParone anD GeorGe l. toPiC



HEADLINES


COMMENTARY

FOCUS

T

The education and development of military logistics professionals should focus less on standard solutions to logistics scenarios and more on reflective practice.


essentialtobecomingaprofessional,yetweacknowl-edgethatonecanneverquitearriveattheidealstate.

VUCAintheSwampVUCAisaparticularlyusefulacronymtodescribe

theswampyenvironmentinwhichmilitarylogisticiansoperate.Practitionerswouldliketomakedecisionswhileknowingallofthevariablesinvolvedinagivencircumstance,butthisisimpossibleintheswamp.Ineffect,theyarealwaysboundintheirabilitytoberational,exceptinraresituationswhereVUCAcondi-tionswouldbeverylow—likeinaverycontrolledsimulationlaboratory.

Nevertheless,alogisticiancanmakejudgmentscon-cerningthedegreeofVUCApresentintheswampandconsiderwhenrational-analytic(laboratory-likeorsci-entific)approachesareappropriate.AssessingthelevelofVUCAassociatedwithuniquedecisionsoractionsisakeyaspectofthereflectionprocesswepropose.Inthatregard,wethinkitusefultoexaminewhateachwordintheacronymmeanswhilerememberingthattheyoverlap.

Volatility.Volatility (orinstability)isthedegreeof environmental turbulenceorrateofchange.Somehavearguedthateverygenerationseemstothinkitseraisthemostvolatile.Weareneutralonthisdebate,butwearguethattheswampmetaphor—likeabubbling,muddy,primordialmess—assumescountlessdynam-icsatwork,makingitdifficulttodefinetheproblemorevenappreciatethesituationbecausethecontextquicklymorphsbeforewecanaddressit.

Uncertainty.Uncertaintyistherecognitionthatwhathashappenedbeforeisnotanaccuratepredictorofwhatwillhappenlater.So,pre-existinganswersorsolutions(includingtechnologies)arenotavailableandmaybeneverwillbe.Thestructuresoftheenvironmentaldomains,missions,systems,andprocesseswefacearecomplexandhighlyinteractive.Intheswamp,cause-and-effectrelationshipsareimpossibletoisolatefromothers,andthemassiveamountofinteractivevariablesmakeassessments,judgments,anddecisionsaboutthefuturemorelikeagamble—especiallywhenconsideredinaglobalcontextoroverlongperiodsoftime.

Complexity.Complexityintheswampreferstothecountlesseventsinvolvedandthedegreeofintercon-nectednessamongthemthatresultinrandomnessandunpredictabilityratherthancertainty.Thehigherthecomplexity,thelesscertainlogisticiansarethatthesituationcanbestudiedinanobjectiveway.Noteveryactionshowsimmediatefeedback.Atbest,delayed,confusing,unforeseeablesideeffectsdevelop.

StudyingastateofhighVUCAintheswampisliketryingtostudyanarchy.Howcanyoudevelopaframeworktostudychaos?Indeed,theparadoxisthat,bydefinition,nolawsgoverncause-and-effectrelation-shipsinanarchicsystems,sooutcomesarerandom.

Onecanatbestreflectonthecircumstance—asubjec-tiveendeavor—ratherthanobjectivelydeterminehowvariableswillinteract.Interpretingcomplexsituationswillalwaysresultinsomelevelofequivocation,whichisournexttopic.

Ambiguity.Whenlogisticspractitionersadmitthattheycannotbescientificallyobjectivebecauseoftheanarchicnatureofhighlevelsofvolatility,uncertainty,andcomplexity,theirattemptsatexplainingwhatishappeningintheswampareinfusedwithambigu-ity.Mindfulthatmultiplemeaningsarecompetingformakingsenseintheswamp,reflectivepractitionersacknowledgethatexpectedlackofclarity.Ontheotherhand,unreflectivepractitionersmighthaveafalsesenseofclarity—abias—andforcetheillusionofasharedunderstandingandseekclosureratherthancontemplatethealmostendlesspossibilitiesofinterpretations.

IntheVUCA-ladenswamp,reflectivepractitionersunderstandthatadditionalinformationdoesnotneces-sarilyaddclaritybutoftengeneratesmorequestionsandmorepossiblemeanings.Awealthofinformationcreatesapovertyofattention,andapovertyofatten-tionaddsevenmoreambiguity(paraphrasingNobellaureateHerbertA.Simon).

Logisticspractitionersshouldbefamiliarwiththeconceptofambiguityindailylife.Almosteverywordhasmorethanonedefinition—andforgoodreason.Definitionsvaryacrosslanguages,editions,types,andcultures(evenlocalorcloselyrelatedsocialstruc-tures).Meaningsarederivedfromcontext,culture,andinterpretationsofpastevents.Onewilllikelyfinddif-ferentdefinitionsofthesamephraseinothergroupswhohavehaddifferentexperiencesandhavecontextu-alizedthoseexperiencesindifferentways.

Meaningsarenotasobjectiveasonemightthink;yet,semantichistoryhastremendousinfluenceonhowsituationsareframed.Indeed,thehermeneuticmethod(theinterpretationofothers’text)tostudythecontex-tualizationofthepastcanhelpgainabroaderviewaboutmakingsenseofthepresent.

Forexample,mostSoldiershaveattendedameetingwheretheseniorrankingofficialdeclaresthatthefirsttaskathandistoagreetotermsofreference(meaning,agreewithmultipleagenciesandinternationalpartici-pantsintheroom).Intheswamp,acceptingmultiple,diversemeaningsmaybenefitthecollaborative“sen-semaking.”Itmaybemorevaluabletoremainopentodifferentmeaningsthantoriskanimosityinattemptstoforceagreementonterms.

Intheswamp,actionsmustbetakenandlogisticsmustbeprovided.Reflectionwithoutactionisuseless,andactionwithoutreflectioniscareless.Educatingthemilitarylogisticspractitionertoworkintheswampisinconflictwiththeconventionalbeliefthatthewaytothateducationisbestdeterminedbydevelopingwhatshouldbetaught.Suchadeterministicmodelofeduca-

52 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

tionwillnotbeveryhelpfultothosewhohavetooper-ateinhigh-VUCAenvironments.

Weneedtofocusmuchlessonthe“what”ofeduca-tion(thatshouldoccurmorenaturally)andmoreonthe“where”ofeducation(themetaphorichighground).

Where:StructuralInertiaOurtraditionalstructuresformilitarylogisticsedu-

cationseemorientedonbuildingschoolhousesand,morerecently,centersofexcellencethatfeedpracti-tionersknowledgethatworks.Withfewexceptions,logisticscurriculadesignedinmilitaryschools,col-leges,anduniversitiesarestructuredafterthehierar-chicalsystemofmilitarydecisionmakingthatinvolvesagreatdealofdeterminingthe“what.”Thissystemincludesthetop-downcontrolofcontent,governancebyapprovalsofcompetencymapsandlearningobjec-tives(gearedtoatechnicaltrainingculture),andformalaccreditationsandcertifications.Hence,thecurriculaaremiredinthisstructuralinertia.

AlthoughVUCAsituationsrequirecustomization,standardizationappearstobethedominantvalueintermsofmanagingthescaleofproductivityinoureducationalinstitutions.Thefallacypromotingsuchindustrial-age,large-scale,production-lineapproachesistheassumptionthatsituationsdescribedintheclass-roomwillrepeatintherealworld.Thelogicisthatifthestudentcanperformtostandardintheclassroom,thestudentwillapplythosestandardsinhisfield-work—thatis,intheswamp.

Thisisamaladaptivebelief,particularlywherestandardsoflearningcanbecomecompetencytrapsandourpractitionershavetobeinventiveandimpro-visational.Thinkingoftheclassroomorexercisescenarioastherehearsalstageforthereal-worldperformanceisadangerousassumption;yet,itappearsthatalargepartoftheeducationcommunityembracesthisbelief.ProfessorDonaldA.Schön,inhisseminalbook,The Reflective Practitioner,putsitthisway:

[Withan]emphasisonproblemsolving,weignoreproblemsetting,theprocessbywhichwedefinethedecisiontobemade,theendstobeachieved,themeanswhichmaybechosen.Inreal-worldpractice,problemsdonotpres-entthemselvestothepractitionerasgivens.Theymustbeconstructedfromthematerialsoftheproblematicsituationswhicharepuzzling,troubling,anduncertain.Inordertoconvertaproblematicsituationtoaproblem,apractitio-nermustdoacertainkindofwork.Hemustmakesenseofanuncertainsituationthatinitiallymakesnosense.

Educatingthereflectivemilitarylogisticspracti-tionerwillinvolvecontinuouslydeconstructingandreconstructingthe“where”componentofthelearning

function.Thecenterofattentionmovesawayfromengineeringstructurestocreatingorganicstructuresthatpermitfluidmovementofpractitionerstoandfromtheseminar(thehighgroundforreflection)andeachuniquejobsetting(theswamp).

Emphasesondeterministicknowledgesolutions(sometimeseuphemisticallyreferredtoas“toolkits”)arediminishedwhile“reflectionwhileinaction”becomesmoreprominent—inessence,theswampbecomesthe“where.”The“where”ofeducationstartstoblendthesetraditionallyseparateworlds;thehighgroundandtheswampmerge.Thequalityofreflection(the“why”)thatoccursbetweentheswampandthehighgroundisvestedinthecriticallyimportanttaskofprofessionalinquiry.

Why:ReflectionasProfessionalInquiryCentraltoprofessionalizingmilitarylogistics

practitionersistheshapingoftheirdesirenotonlytolearnbut,moreimportantly,tostrivetochallengeold,acceptedknowledgeandcreatenewknowledge.Onethingthatmakesmilitarylogisticiansprofes-sionalistheirsenseofobligationtoquestionthestateofprofessionalknowledge.Ultimately,thepur-poseofprofessionaleducationistohelpinstillthissenseofobligation.

Wewilldiscussfourkeyideasaboutthe“why”ofeducating:valuingpraxis,designing(andcommunicat-ing)professionalinquiry,researching-in-action,andbeingphilosophicallysavvy.

Valuing praxis.Inquiringandreportingaroundtheideaofpraxis—theunificationoftheoryandpractice—shouldbeapreeminentprofessionalvalue.EighteenthcenturyphilosopherImmanuelKantsummarizedthisideabysaying,“Perceptionwithoutconceptionisblind.Conceptionwithoutperceptionisempty.”

Anidealprofessionalqualityistobecomeaneffec-tivetheorist,engagingintheimaginativeprocessoflinkinginterestingfactsintorelationshipsthataredriv-ingustowardamoreholisticandintegrativeview.Inshort,theorizingisaboutpresentingalargercontextofhowthingsareorcouldbe.

Traditionalstudentsinmilitarylogisticseducationalprogramstendtofocusfarmoreonpractice(andsearchingforbestpractices)andfarlessondevelop-ingordebunkingtheoriesofpractice,whichiscalled“abductivereasoning.”

Overthepast50years(sincetheobscurepublica-tionofHenryEccles’1959book,Logistics in the National Defense),uniformedlogisticianshaverelin-quishedcontroloftheirgeneraltheoryofeffective-nessandallowedoutsidebusinessadministratorsandacademicstoprovidemuchofthetheorythatmilitarylogisticiansstudy.Partoftheidealstateofmilitarylogisticseducationwouldincludecontinuousupdatingofageneraltheoryofmilitarylogistics.


Designing professional inquiry.Theprofessionoffersopportunitiesforintrinsicallymotivatedlogisticianstobecomeconfidentinhowtoapproachinquiryandreportoutcomeswithrichdescriptionsandconcisesummaries,bothconversationallyandinwrittenform.Theconversationalformcanbedescribedas“consultativestewardship”andisaskillthatdeliverscoaching,guidance,direction,andassessment.Withthisskill,professionalsengageinsubstantivediscussionanddebatewithpeers,subor-dinates,andsuperiors.

Professionalinquiryisimportantbothintherealmofdivergentknowledge(exploringtheunknowns)andinconfirmingordenyingassimilativeknowledge(readdressingorchallengingtheknowns).Bothofthesereasonsforinquiryareimportantforaddressingtheperpetualissueofavoidingprofessionalmyopiaoracompetencytrap.AssociologistGianfrancoPoggiesaid,“Awayofseeingisalsoawayofnotseeing.”Thecurrentstateoftheprofessionmayindicateblindnesstothevalueofconsultativestewardship.

Researching-in-action.Thebestprofessionalprac-titionerscouldideallybedescribedasresearchers-in-action.Theydevelopinnovativeandimprovisationalwaystodesignlogisticswhileworking,ratherthanusingmechanistictemplates(techniquesorbestpractices)learnedintheconventionalclassroomthatassumeanear-context-freeapplication.

Inquirydevelopedbetweentheswampandthehighgroundshouldnotemphasizecompleteness,andplansshouldbeconsideredworks-in-progressthatareneverquitecomplete.Suchinquirydoesnotseekclosurebutratheropeningstounexpectedpossibilities.Militarylogisticiansshouldaspiretounderstandthevalueofbothqualitativeandquantitativeresearch,thelimitsofusingappliedsciencetechniquesinlogistics,andtheimportanceofappreciatingwhentoemployabductivereasoning(betterforhigh-VUCAsituations)insteadofdeductiveorinductive reasoning(betterforlow-to-moderate-VUCAsituations).

Abductivereasoninginvolvesthediscoveryoftenta-tiveinferencesandsearchstrategiesforpossibleexpla-nations.Surpriseisthetriggerofabductivereasoning,soitgoeshand-in-handwithbeingapracticalskepticaboutone’sbeliefsystem.AccordingtoHerbertA.Simon(inhisseminal1973article“TheStructureofIllStructuredProblems”inthejournalArtificial Intel-

ligence),suchcriticalinquiryneedsablendingofluck, persistenceinsearch,andsuperiorheuristics.

Accordingtomodern-dayphilosopherNicholasRescher,oursenseofluckinvolvesappreciationofchaos(smallchangescanleadtoamplifiedeffects),theunpredictabilityofothers’choices,thenatureofchance(theunrulinessofthingshappening),andourownignorance (consistingofbothfallaciesininterpretinginformationandalackofinformation).Despitetheresultingrandomnessineverydaylife,wecanstillabductivelyreason,whichismoreofanatti-tudethanamethodology.

Abductivereasoningtheoristsarguethatmuchofourcreativityinvolvesextendingwhatwealreadyknow.Weborrowmeaningsfromawideassort-mentofexperiencesandlearntocrosslinesbetweenknowledgedisciplines(sciencesandhumanities)tomakesenseofnovelsituations.Toreasonabductivelyrequiresanopensearchstrategythatincludeshavingadisciplinedconversationwithoneself,collaboratingwithotherswhohavevaryingviews,callingonpastexperiencesthatcanbesynthesizedandevaluatedashypothesesfortakingactionnow,andextendinganddisplacingoldconceptsuntilusefulmeaningsaredis-coveredforthesituationathand.

RecallArchimedes’shoutsof“eureka,” fromtheGreekverb,heuriskein,whichmeans“tofindout.”Superiorheuristics(fromthesamerootword)involvescreativityinreframing,findingrulesofthumb,analo-gies,metaphors,similes,andhistoriesthatmayrelatetomakingsenseofthesituationathand.Thereflectivelogisticspractitionerexpectssurpriseasheabductivelyreasonsabouttheemergentreality.Aneclecticcareerpathandmultidisciplinaryeducationalopportunitiesprovidethepractitionersuperiorheuristicswhendeal-ingwithhigh-VUCAsituations.

Educationshouldinvolvecoachingstudentstoberesearchers-in-actionastheyencounterproblemsoftherealworld.Studentsshouldtreattheirpastfieldexpe-riencesintheswampashypothesesforaction,notasproofsforaction.Academicstudyshouldbeorientedmoretowardlearningaboutthephilosophybehindthepracticeofabductivereasoning.Crossingoverintononlogisticsfieldsofstudy,includingliberalarts,hastremendousvalue.Suchstudiesserveascreativesourcesforheuristicsandexercisingprofessionaljudg-mentwhenfacedwithhigh-VUCAsituations.

Central to professionalizing military logistics practitioners is the shaping of their desire not only to learn but, more

importantly, to strive to challenge old, accepted knowledge and create new knowledge.

54 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

Being philosophically savvy.Militarylogisticspractitionersshouldstrivetobecomephilosophicallysavvy.Thatis,theyshouldstrivetoremainopentoideaswhilebeingcriticallymindfulenoughnottosuccumbto(paraphrasingphilosopherLewisFeuer)clichés,catchwords,placards,parades,slogans,ideo-logicalclubs,circles,peerandpopulistunsubstanti-atedinfluences,orthodoxy,andoverrelianceontechnique.

Professionalmilitarylogisticianshavetobesophisti-catedenoughtorecognizeandresistanti-intellectualism,dogmaticbeliefs,culturalbiases,andideologically-basedinfluencesandtodealeffectivelywithinconve-nientfactsthatmaycontradictprevailingbeliefs.Weneedmilitarylogisticianswhocanengageincriticalreviewsofotherwisepopularorunexaminedargumentsinmilitary,academic,andcontractedstudies.

Forexample,professionallogisticiansshouldrou-tinelychallengethewisdomofpopularmanagementbooksthatuncriticallyespousetheworthinessoffads,suchasBalancedScorecardandLeanSixSigma.Wealsoneedprofessionalswhoembracewellarticulatedarguments,scholarlywork,thestatementsoftalentedandinsightfulthinkers,andthosewhorespectfellowprofessionalsdespiterankandpositionaldifferences.

How:ConnectingtheSwampandtheHighgroundRatherthaneducatingthroughepisodicclassroom

experiencesthatareseparatefromactualpracticeinthefield,thelogisticscommunityhastofindwaystomergethetwoexperiences.PerhapseducatorsshoulduseavirtualseminarontheInternetwhileinjectingshort(maybe2-or3-week)small-groupsessionsoveraperiodofyears.Real-worldexperiencesshouldserveasopportunitiesforapracticum,andtheeducatorshouldbethecoachanddiscussionfacilitatoralongtheway.

Educationalprogramsshouldberedesignedtousethecohortsemi-narasanopportunitytogotothehighground.Studentsshouldmovethemselvesfromtheimmersionofday-to-dayproblemsatworktoatemporaryvantagepointwheregroupmembershelpeachotherreframetheirsituationsandpartici-pateindesigningawayahead.

Takingadvantageofthehighgroundinvolvescollaborativethoughtexperimentsandadaptingtothesituationathandwhennotechnicalsolutionseemstowork(i.e.,creatingdivergentknowledge).Thepurposeofthecohortseminar,then,facilitatedbythelogisticseducator,istoexplorethroughdia-

logandinventivelycreatedivergentformsofknowl-edgeasagroup.Thestudentsreturntoworkwitharefreshingviewandequippedwithnewinsightsandimagesoftheirmission.

Someinthedefensecommunitymaypreferusingthecasestudyorscenariomethodintheclassroom.Insteadofstudentsbringingtheirswampyexperiencestotheclassroom,themoretraditionalscenariomethodistopresentwell-developedanddetailedcasestudiesthatareintendedtohelpthestudentsbecomebetterproblem-solvers.

Criticismsofthescenariomethodaremany.First,casestudiestendtobedevelopedaroundpreconceivedthemesandtheoriesofactionthatprovideopportuni-tiesfordeductivereasoning(developingsolutionsfromapotentiallyillusiveframework,suchasmilitarydoctrine).Few,ifany,opportunitiesexistfortheorybuildingandtesting-in-action(whichareassociatedwithabductivereasoning).Undertheswampycondi-tionsofhigh-VUCAsituations,abductivereasoningisthepreferredskill.Thebenefitofusingrealup-to-datesituations(thatareindeedmessy)isthatstudentsarerequiredbothtocriticizeprevalenttheoriesordoc-trinesthatappearirrelevantandtopromotetheongo-ingdesignofnewtheories.

Second,scenario-basedexercisesimplythattherearecontext-freelessonstobelearned.Thatis,oneassumestheconditionswillrepeatintherealworldandthestudentswillnowbefamiliarwiththem.ButSoldiersareunlikelytoexperienceexactlythesamelogisticsoperationoverandoveragain.Inhigh-VUCA,real-world,militarylogisticssituations,thelogisticsschemecannotbestatic,soknowledgeofmilitarylogisticsmustalwaysbetransforming.

Thetraditionalsearchforhistoriclessonslearnedmustbecontinuouslyevaluated,andeffortshavetobetakentounlearnthem;theknowledgeofmilitarylogis-

Traditional models of military

logistics education focus on students

being able to recognize situations

and know what to do. Our proposed

philosophy assumes practitioners

will be making sense of novel

situations, inventing what to do

as they are doing it, and reflecting

on the situations as they are

happening and in retrospect.


ticsis,andhastobe,ephemeral.History’sgreatestroleinmilitaryeducationistoconfirmthateveryoperationisunique.Whilethecontextprovidedincasestudiescannevermatchthecontextthatrecentstudentexperi-encesprovide,historyservestobearichsourceforbuildingheuristicdepthinpractitioners.

Third,scenariomethodlearningreinforcestheideathatwecanfindrootcausesanddefineproblemsthroughanalysisandotherformsofscientificreduc-tionism.Inhighlycomplex,interactivesituations,prac-titionersmayatbestappreciatetheuniquesituationstheyarein.Appreciationismakingsubjectivejudg-mentsoffactaboutthestateofthewholesystem.Itisaviewofoneselfandone’sorganizationaspartofalargerenterpriseinanevenlargerglobalcontext.

Unlikecasestudies,wherecausalitycanbemoreclearlydeterminedinretrospectandaspectsofcausal-ityappearisolatable,projectingonthecurrentsituationisbetterstatedasanexerciseof“retrospectionantici-patedinfantasy”(associalphilosopherAlfredSchutzsaysinhisCollected Papers).Oneshouldseektotwistthisabductivereasoningideawiththismaxim:“Ifyousetouttoinventthefuturenow,youarenotinventingthefuture;youareinsteadbeinginventiveinthepres-ent.”Thisisamuchgreaterskillthanuntanglinghis-toriccasestudiesintoneat,oversimplified,proximatelycausalterms.

Studyinghistoryisnottheproblem.Onthecontrary,weadvocateadetailedapproachtostudyinghistory.Ourobjectionisabouthowcasesaredesignedandbiasedtowardprovingapointordevelopingscien-tifictechniques.Theseareillusorygoals.Weadvocateaffordingpractitionerstheopportunitytogotothehighgroundinthemidstoftheirday-to-daystrugglesintheswamp,wherenooneknowshowthingswillturnout.Educatingmilitarylogisticspractitionersshouldbemoreaboutreflectivepracticethanthedeterministicsearchforbestpractice.

Inthefaceofhigh-VUCAconditions,traditionaleducationalstructuresformilitarylogisticiansaremal-adaptivebecausetheyfocusonthe“what.”Ourgoalinthisessayistosuggesttheneedtodeconstructandrestructureourconceptualizationsofeducationtowardthequestionsof—o Where:Reframingeducationawayfromthelocus

ofdeductivereasoningandstandardized“technical”structurestowardmoreabductivereasoningandcon-textual,adaptive,sensemakingopportunities.

o Why:Orientingonpraxis,designing,researching-in-action,andphilosophicalknowledge.

o How:Creatingacohort-basedseminarapproachthatcontinuouslyconnectstheswamptothehighground.Giventheseconceptsoflogisticseducation,acol-

legialbodyofreflectivepractitionerscanopportunisti-callycreateemergentandoftenephemeralformsof

knowledgethat,underhigh-VUCAconditions,aremoreimportantthanknowing“what”themilitarylogisticscommunityalreadyknows.

Themostsignificantingredientinthistransforma-tionmustbearenewedemphasisonthequalityofeducatorsasfacilitatorsoftheproposedreform—particularlytofosterabductivereasoningskillsinpractitioners.Intheirroleasongoingseminarfacili-tators,thesecarefullyselectededucatorsshouldbe,aboveall,highlyskilledinshapingtheconversationsandcreatingopportunitiestogainperspectiveontheswampfromthehighground.

Thefocusofthesenioreducationaladministratorisnolongeroncontrollingthecontent(the“what”)butonensuringthatcohortseminarsareresourcedintheformofexcellentfaculty,well-designedseminarrooms,andopportunitiesforvirtualseminarexperiencesasneeded.Thequalityoftheconnectionsamongthemembersoftheseproposedcollaborativegroupsdependsontheseresourcesandthoseexpertfacilitators.

Ourdefenselogisticsschools,colleges,anduniversitiesmustshiftattentionfromseekingcontext-freeknowledge(“bestpractice”ortechnicalknowl-edge)tofacilitatingcontext-richknowledge(therealmofreflectivemilitarylogisticspractice).Traditionalmodelsofmilitarylogisticseducationfocusonstudentsbeingabletorecognizesituationsandknowwhattodo.Ourproposedphilosophyassumespractitionerswillbemakingsenseofnovelsituations,inventingwhattodoastheyaredoingit,andreflectingonthesituationsastheyarehappeningandinretrospect.

Theswamp/highgroundapproachtoeducationwillprovideacohortvenueinwhichthepractitio-nercanbecomemoreprofessional.Werecognizethetremendouschallenges—intellectual,structural,andresource—thatsuchashiftwouldentailwithintheDepartmentofDefenseeducationalenterprise.Somepeoplewillhavereasonswhywecannotorshouldnotchangeourtraditionalapproach,andmanywillnotentertainevenexperimentingwithanewmethod.However,inthehigh-VUCAworld,itcomesdowntoasingleinescapablequestion:Whateducationalphiloso-phywillhelpprofessionalizeourlogisticians?

dr. CHriStopHer r. paparone iS an aSSiStant profeSSor in tHe arMy CoMMand and General Staff ColleGe’S departMent of joint, interaGenCy, interGovernMental, and Multinational operationS at fort lee, virGinia. He iS a retired arMy Colonel and HaS a pH.d. deGree froM pennSylvania State univerSity.

Colonel GeorGe l. topiC, uSa (ret.), iS tHe viCe direCtor in tHe Center for joint and StrateGiC loGiStiCS at tHe national defenSe univerSity. He Served aS a quarterMaSter offiCer for 28 yearS on aCtive duty and for 3 yearS aS tHe deputy direCtor for StrateGiC loGiStiCS on tHe joint Staff.


The author provides a working list of questions that planners need to answer to ensure that they are meeting the needs of the unit. This list offers guidance for company-grade officers and noncommissioned officers coordinating the military decisionmaking process at the brigade command post.

AdvicetoaNewSustainmentPlannerattheBrigadeCommandPost

by kennetH lonG

nreceiptofamission,oratthehintofanewwarningorder,andperiodicallythroughouttheday,asustain- mentplanneratabrigadecommandpostshouldcoordinatewithfellowstaffofficersinthewarfighting functionalcellstodefinethescopeofthemissionathand.Thisarticlepresentsalistofquestionsandcon-siderationsthatIhavefoundusefulwhensupportingconventionaloperations.Thelistrepresentsthewisdomofmanyyearsofsupportoperationsexperience.Thequestionsaredesignedtokeepyou,asasustainmentplanner,anticipatingmissionrequirementssothatyouareforecastingsustainmentneedsandnotreactingtomaneuverplan-ners.

ThesearequestionsthatIwouldadvisecaptains,lieutenants,noncommissionedofficers,andSoldiersinthecommandposttoanswer.Remember:Soldiersaresergeantsintrainingright now, soleadersshouldbeeducatingthemrightnow.

S–1Inadditiontoactingasthecommander’sadjutant,theS–1coordinateswiththeunitsurgeontopulltogether

planningconsiderationsaffectingpersonnel-andstrength-managementplans.TheS–1mustbecross-trainedintheS–4’sfunctionalareasinordertoprovidesoundandtimelyadviceandensurethatpersonnelsupportandlogisticssupportareintegrated.

1.Whatistheflowofunitpersonnelintothetheater,includingattheaerialportsandseaportsofembarkationanddebarkation,andwhatistheflowcapacityateachlocation?

2.Whatarethepersonnelreception,staging,onwardmovement,andintegrationrequirementsintheater,toincludetrainingandaccountability?

3.Whatisthecasualtyestimateforecastbyeventandbattlefieldlocation?4.Whatisthecasualtyevacuationmanagementplan?5.Whatarethecurrentunitstrengthsandmilitaryoccupationalspecialty(MOS)shortages?6.Whatisthestatusofcrewmanninginpacingitems?7.Whatarethepersonnelreplacementtransportationrequirementsintheunitareaofresponsibility?8.Whatarethepostaltransportationrequirementswithintheunit?9.HaveweestablishedcoordinationwiththeArmyairspacecommandandcontrol(A2C2)staffofficer?

MedicalOperationsRehearsetheplanningprocesswiththebrigadecombatteam’s(BCT’s)entiremedicalsupportteam—theBCT

S–1,thesurgeon,thesupportoperationsofficerandhismedicalplanningofficer,andthebrigadesupportmedi-calcompanycommander,whoistheexecutoroftheBCTplan.Themedicalcompanycommandershouldhaveacloserelationshipwiththemedicalplatoonsofthebattalionsinordertoprovideseamlessandeffectivecasualtyevacuation.Nurturethisrelationshipingarrisonaswellasthefield.

1.Whatisthepriorityofsupport?2.Whatistheavailabilityofgroundandairassets?3.Isthecommandandcontrolandsupportstructureinplaceinthetheater?4.Whatisthelocalinfrastructurelike?5.Whataretherulesofengagementforsupportingnon-U.S.patients?6.Whatarethecasualtyestimatesandtherequirementsfornonstandardevacuation?7.Whataretheprotocolsforreactingtomass-casualtyevents?

O

JANUARY–FEBRUARY 2011 57JANUARY–FEBRUARY 2011 57

8.Whataretheplansforambulanceexchangepoints,forwardsurgicalteams,andaidstationsthroughouttheareaofoperations?

9.Whatistheplanforcleananddirtyroutes?10.WherewillyoupositionairassetsandArmyairspacecommandandcontrol?

S–2Itisagoodideatoidentifyarear-battlesubject-matterexpertintheS–2shopwhocanfocusonthreatstothe

brigadesupportareaandlinesofcommunication.Youwantanexpertinthemaincommandpostfocusingonspe-cialconsiderationsfortherearareathreatsothat,asmessagetrafficorspotreportscomein,hecanimmediatelybealertedtotheimpactonrearoperations.TheprimaryS–2officerisprobablytoofocusedonthemainbattleareatosatisfythisneed.HavethisS–2rearareasubject-matterexpertpresentthethreatbriefingatthesustain-mentrehearsalandcultivatethisrelationship.Herearesomespecificquestionstocoordinatewithhim:

1.Whatarethethreatstosustainmentthroughoutthebattlespace?2.Doesthethreatprioritizeattacksbyphaseagainstsustainmentassets?3.Whatisthestatusofthecurrentthreatcapabilityportfolio,andhowdynamicisthestatus?4.WhenisthenextS–2/G–2rearareathreatprofilewithoverlaysbeingpublished?5.Whenisthenextscheduledoperationsandintelligenceinformationtransfertotheadministrationandlogis-

ticsradionetwork?

S–3Astheterrainmanager,commandprioritizer,andconceptofmaneuverdesigner,theS–3isanimportantsus-

tainmentplanner.Herearesomequestionsandcoordinationpointstoengagehimandhisstaff:1.Whatarethepossibilitiesandprobabilitiesforexploitation,andwhatarethetriggersandbattlefield

conditionsthatwouldcauseustomakethedecisiontoexploit?2.Whataretheinitialconceptsforpositioningbattalion-sizedelements,andhasthespacebeenallocated

forthebrigadesupportarea,logisticselements,unitmaintenancecollectionpoints,andambulancecollectionpoints?

3.Dowehavethelatestlistofworkingfragmentaryorders(FRAGOs)?4.Whatbranchesandsequelsareanticipated?5.What“beprepared”missionsareanticipated?6.Arethereanyemergingideasfortheconceptofmaneuver?7.Howdynamicisthemissionprofileofthenexthigherheadquarters,andhowquicklycouldthemission

forecastchange?8.Whereistheunitinitshigherheadquarters’priorityofsupport?9.Whattaskorganizationchangesareanticipated,andaretheyabsolutelyessentialforthismission?

(Rememberthateachtaskorganizationchangerequiressomechangestothesupportforcesthatmustbecross-leveledaswell.Anythingotherthanthestandingoperatingprocedureisproblematic.)

10.Whatarethecriteriafortransitioningtoanewphaseoftheoperationintermsofbattlefieldstatus?11.WhatisthestatusforA2C2,andwhenwastheunit’slastrehearsal?12.Whatistherequiredrateofsupplyforammunition?

o ArethereanyDODICs(DepartmentofDefenseidentificationcodes)thatareorneedtobecommandregulated?

oWhoisthereleaseauthorityforcommand-regulatedammunition?13.Howcomplexisthismission?

oHowmanymovingpiecesarethere?oWherearethekeyspotsonthegroundforleaders?

14.Arethereanychokepointsthatarecrucialtothemission?15.Areforcesallocatedtothetacticalcombatforce,andwhatistheplanforthemilitarypolice?16.Whatisbeingconsideredforthereconnaissanceandcounter-reconnaissancefights,andhowwillweuse

thereconnaissance,surveillance,andtargetacquisitionbattalion?

S–4YoumaybetheS–4ortheSPOplanneraskingallofthesequestionsofothers.Youshouldbemindfulofthe

following:1.Howmanyandwhattypeofcurrentmissionscurrentlyarebeingsupportedorplanned?2.Whatisthecombatpowernow,andwhatisthecombatpowerforecastforthenext6,12,and24hours?


3.WhatisthecurrentstatusforclassIII(fuel),classV(ammunition),classVIII(medicalmateriel)andclassIX(repairparts),andwhatistheirforecastedstatusforthenext6,12,or24hours?

4.Istheunitdoinganythingunusualwithsustainmentrightnow?Inthenext24hours?5.Towhatdegreeareunitcapabilitiescurrentlyengaged?6.Wherearethecurrentandfuturesupportarealocations?7.Whatcommandandsupportrelationshipchangeshavetakenplace?8.Whattaskorganizationchangeshavetakenplaceinandoutofthebrigade?9.Whatareroutemanagementandallocationplanswithinthecorpsanddivision?10.Wherearethemovementcontrolteams,andcantheunitsupportthem?11.Whatisthestatusofroutes(includingdivisionandcorpsmainsupplyroutes)?12.Whatisourpriorityofsupportindivisionandcorpsorders?13.Whatisthe5-daylookforwardtomissionprofile?14.Willthebrigadesupportactivityhavetomove?

oIsitmoving?oWherecanitgo?oHowfastcanitgetthere?oWhenwillitgetthereandbereadytoprovidesupport?

15.Whereistheforwardlogisticselement?oWhatisinit?oWhatisitsmissionandpurpose?oWhoisinchargeofit?

16.Whatambulanceexchangepointsareactive?17.Whendidwelastgiveanoperationsandintelligenceupdateovertheadministrationandlogisticsnetwork

forallsustainers?18.Whatconvoysareontheroad,andwherearetheygoingandwithwhatsupport?19.Wherearethemilitarypoliceandtacticalcombatforce?20.Whatisthecurrentbattlerhythmforlogisticspackages?21.Whatisthebattlerhythmofsustainmentbrigadeconvoys?22.Whatairassetsareavailable,andareanydedicated?(A2C2)23.Howareourreportingsystemsdoing?(complete?timely?accurate?)24.Howgoodisourforecasting,andwhatmethod(s)areweusing?25.Whatarethebrigadesupportbattalioncommander’stopthreeconcernsandhiscommander’scritical

informationrequirements?26.Whatisourfullarrayofcapabilities?27.DothegraphicsprovidetheabilitytoquicklyissueaFRAGOforanythingwithintheareaofoperations

andareaofinterest?28.Doeseveryone(includingthesustainmentbrigadesupportingus)havethecurrentgraphicsanddaily

executionFRAGO?29.HaveItalkedtotheSPOandbrigadeexecutiveofficerinthelast4hours?30.HowcanImaketheplanmoreadaptableandprovidemorecapabilitiesandchoicesfor

thecommander,andhowcanIcreateopportunitiestosupportthecommander’seffortstoseizetheinitiative?

31.Whereisthenextthreattosustainmentcomingfrom?32.Whereisthealternatecommandpostrightnow,andcouldtheytakeoverthebattleinamoment’s

notice?33.WhenwasthelasttimeIsleptfor4continuoushours?34.WhoelseinthebrigadecommandpostneedstoknowwhatIknow?35.WhenwasthelasttimeIcheckedinwitheveryone?

S–5Inanoperationalenvironmentwithhybridthreats,wecanbesurethattherewillbesomeelementoffear

amongthepeopleinvolved.TheS–5willbepullingtogethermanystaffcapabilitymultipliersthatwillbeavail-abletotheBCT.TheS–5isanidealstaffofficerforcoordinatingdifferentassets,suchascivilaffairs,linguists,liaisons,teamsfromawholeofgovernmentapproach,andnongovernmentalorganizationsthatprovideorreceivesupportintheoperation.TheS–5hasanaturalalliancewiththejudgeadvocategeneralofficer.Creatingaone-stopshopforthesecapabilitiesisanexcellentidea.

JANUARY–FEBRUARY 2011 59JANUARY–FEBRUARY 2011 59

1.Whatisthestatusofciviliansandtheireffectonlinesofcommunication?2.Whatcivilianlinesofeffortwillaffectourmission?3.Howcanwemakeuseofthelocalpopulationandinfrastructure?4.Whatisthestatusoflaw,order,anddisciplineinthecivilianpopulation?5.Whatsourcesofinformationandinformalleadershipcanweuse?6.Whataretheculturalandreligioussymbolsofimportancethatwemustbeabletorecognize?

FiresFiresisthefirststopincoordinatingrequirementsfromotherwarfightingfunctionalareas.Thefiresbat-

talion’sammunitionrequirementscanrepresentasmuchas80percentofthesupplytonnagebeingtransportedthroughtheareaofoperations.Theirfiringbatterypositionareascompeteforspaceonthebattlefieldwithmanyofthesupportteams.Specialcoordinationandplanningisrequiredtoreceivefiressupportforthelinesofcom-municationandsupportareas.Considerthefollowing:

1.Howmuchsupplytonnageisforecast?2.WhoandwhereisthesourceofsupplyforclassV?3.Willwebefiringinsupportofotherbrigadeswhilewearepreparing?4.Willotherbattalionsbeassignedinourareaforsupportingfires,andifso,whatisourcommandandsup-

portrelationshipwiththem?5.Whatpositioningareasdoweneedtosupportthefiremission?6.ArethereanyArmyairspacecommandandcontrolissuesthatwillaffectouraerialresupplyandmedical

evacuation?7.Whataretheplansforout-of-sectorsupport,ifany?8.Inadefense,arethereplansforstockpilingammunitioninalternatefiringpositionsandpositionareas,and

whatistheplanforrichergradeammunition?9.Wherewillcounterfireradarbepositioned,andwhatifthecoveragedoesnotincludethebrigadesupport

area?10.Whatisthefiresthreatdoctrinefortargetingsustainmentareas?11.Willanyassetsbeemployedinthereconnaissanceandcounter-reconnaissancephase?

EngineersEngineersprovideuniquemaintenanceandsupportessentialtotheBCT’smissionaccomplishment.Engineer

capabilitiescandramaticallyimprovethesustainmentoperationsandsurvivabilityofthesupportareasandunits.Keepthefollowinginmindwhenplanningforengineersupport:

1.Willengineersbetaskorganizedtosupportthismissionasdirectsupporttobattalionsorasanindependentengineertaskforce?

2.WhatistheforecastfortonnageofclassesIV(constructionandbarriermaterials)andVforthismission?3.Whatisthestatusofpreconfiguredpushpackagesinlogisticssupportareas?4.Whatarethesection’sspecialmaintenanceissues?5.Whatisthestatusofmaterials-handlingequipment(MHE)?6.DowehavetodoanyrepackagingofclassesIVandVforthismission?

oWherewillitbeconducted?oHowmanypeopleandwhatMHEwillberequired?

7.WherewillclassVbekeptinyourobstaclepackages,andhowwillthatammunitionbesecuredandtrans-ported?

8.Whatassetsdowehaveinthebrigadesupportactivitythatcanbeusedtoprovidesustainmentprotection?9.Whatistheplanforimprovingroadnetworks?

oWhatequipmentisavailableforroadwork?oWhataretheprioritiesforroadimprovement?

10.Howwillinfrastructurebeusedtosupporttheengineerworkeffort?11.Whenwasthecombinedobstacleoverlaylastupdatedanddistributed?

Reconnaissance,Surveillance,andTargetAcquisitionBattalionThereconnaissanceandcounter-reconnaissancefightisacombatoperationthatrequirescompleteplanning

andsupport.Inmanycases,thereconnaissance,surveillance,andtargetacquisitionbattalion’sconceptofopera-tionwillseverelychallengeitsabilitytoconductroutineresupply.Answerthesequestionswhileplanningforreconnaissanceandcounter-reconnaissance:

1.Whatistheconceptforreconnaissanceandsurveillance?2.Whatistheconceptforsustainment?3.Whatistheplanforrecoveryandmedicalevacuationoperationsforwardoftheforwardlineofown

troops?4.Doweneedtoconstituteaforwardlogisticselementtosupportsustainmentoperations?5.Afterthereconnaissanceandcounter-reconnaissancemission,wasthefollow-onmissionreserve,screen,or

followingsupport?6.Whatistheplanformaintenancerecoverytotheunitmaintenancecollectionpointinthebrigadesupport

area?7.Willthebattalionbescreeningorprotectingindepthoralongaperimeter?8.Whatistheenemy’sdoctrineforconductingreconnaissanceinwavesagainstsustainmentassets?

FinancialManagementFinancialmanagementisgenerallyanadditionaldutyfortheS–4section.Particularlyinstabilityoperations,

thisstaffsection’sconceptofsupportwillbecrucialtooverallsuccess.1.Whowillberesponsibleformanagingthebrigadebudgetandspendingplansandreportingtothedivision

G–8?2.Whoconsolidatesandreviewsfundingrequirements,andwhatistheprocessforvalidatingthefunding

requirements?3.Whowillrecommendspendingorfundingprioritiestothebrigadecommander?4.Howmanypayingagentswillwehaveinthebrigade?

o Howmanydoweactuallyneed?o Havetheybeentrainedandputonordersbythesupportingfinancialmanagementcompany?

5.Dothepayingagentshaveaplacetosecuretheircash(asafe)?6.Howmanyprojectpurchasingofficers(Commander’sEmergencyResponseProgram)andfieldordering

officers(localpurchases)willwehaveinthebrigade?o Howmanydoweactuallyneed?o Havetheybeentrainedandputonordersbythesupportingcontractingofficer?

Takethesequestionsandusethemasabasisforobtainingtheinformationyouneedtomakeeffectivedeci-sionsinthemilitarydecisionmakingprocess.Ifyouhavecommentsorimprovementstothislist,[email protected].

kennetH lonG iS an aSSiStant profeSSor and CurriCuluM deSiGner in tHe departMent of loGiStiCS and reSourCe operationS at tHe arMy CoMMand and General Staff ColleGe. He HoldS a BaCHelor’S deGree in aSian HiStory and politiCal SCienCe froM MiCHiGan State univerSity and a MaSter’S deGree in SySteMS ManaGeMent froM tHe univerSity of SoutHern California. He iS CoMpletinG a doCtorate of ManaGeMent froM Colorado teCHniCal univerSity. He iS a Graduate of tHe arMy infantry offiCer BaSiC and advanCed CourSeS, tHe arMy CoMBined arMS and ServiCeS Staff SCHool, and tHe arMy CoMMand and General Staff ColleGe.

Correction

IntheNovember–December2010issueofArmy Sustainment,anannouncementappearedin“Headlines”concerningtheArmyAviationandMissileCommand(AMCOM)EnvironmentalHotline.TheAMCOMEnvi-ronmentalhotlinewascreatedtoresolveissuespertainingtoobsoleteproducts,hazardousmaterialalternatives,regulatoryguidance,andalternativetechnologiestoreducetheenvironmentalburdenonAMCOMmaintenanceorganizations.

Thephonenumberappearingintheannouncementwasincorrect.Thecorrectphonenumberindividualscanusetoaskquestionsaboutcurrentlyapprovedsubstitutematerialsanddepotmaintenanceworkrequirementsis(256) 313–1711.

Thehotlineisavailable24hoursaday,7daysaweektoanswerquestionsandrequestsrelatedtoaviationandmissileassets.Soldierscanalsoasktheirquestionsbysendingafaxto(256)955–[email protected].

60 ARMY SUSTAINMENT


Radical Change Needed in Ammunition Procurement

ThearticleintheSeptember−Octoberissue,“Small-ArmsAmmunitionProductionandAcquisition:TooManyEggsinOneBasket?”waswellresearched,clear,andinsightful.Thethreescenariosforanalysisofferedinthearticleareinterestingasmeasuresoftheammunitionindustrialbaseandaboutasgoodasany.

However,whilesingle-siteammunitionplantswithmultipleproductionlines,dwindlingcommoditysuppliers,increasingcostofmaterials,anduncertainfuturedemandarerealproblems,theyshouldbeviewedassymptomsofaproblemthatisworsenedbypoormanagement,lackofvisionaryleadership,anddivergentpriorities.

TheArmy,withTitle10responsibilityforDepartmentofDefense(DOD)ammunitionproduction,hascreatedanenvironmentwithasingleprocurementsourceformanycriticalmunitionscomponentsandrawmaterials(suchasnitrocellulose,aspointedoutinthearticle).TheArmyMaterialCommand(AMC)overtimehassacrificedfundingforbadlyneededmodernizationofammunitionplantproductionlinesandfacilities,includingbackupsystems.Ammunitionplantfundshavebeenroutinelydivertedtosupportotherpeacetimeprograms,whichtheauthorsaccuratelycallthe“peacedividend.”

Overthepast20years,whileservingthreecommandtoursinmunitionsplantsanddepots,IwatchedAMCroutinelyshiftfundingdesignatedtoupgrademunitionsproduction,includingdemilitarizationproduction.Usingthe“robPetertopayPaul”moneymanagementmethod,AMCpromisedtorepayAMCCOM[ArmyArmament,Munitions,andChemicalCommand],IOC[ArmyIndustrialOperationsCommand],OSC[ArmyOperationsSupportCommand],JMC[JointMunitionsCommand],andsoforth,butnoreimbursementwasforthcoming.BecauseDODisdirectedbylawtouseAMCanddoesnothaveammunition“buyingpower”oralternativesforprocurement,theproblemcontinuedtogrow.

WhatisnotunderAMC’spurviewbylawisthe“specialty”munitionsprocuredandmanagedbytheindividualservices.Inmyopinion,thisisbecausetheyareconvincedthattheArmyisincapableofmeetingtheir“special”needsandrequirements.GivenAMC’strackrecord,thisisaprudentmove.

Aholisticdefensemunitionsoperationwouldmakemunitionscheaperandproductionmoreflexible.Withmasspurchasingofcommodities,parts,andequipmentandlong-lifecontractsforammunitionplantfacilities,

DODwouldhavethebuyingpowertogeneratecommercialcompetition,therebyincreasingqualityandbroadeningtheindustrialbase.

Thesimplesolutionisaradicalchangeinhowwedoammunitionbusiness.Inshort,theProgramExecutiveOfficeAmmunitionneedstobecomeaDefenseorganizationcapableoftrulymanagingDefenseneeds—andthisneedstohappenintherealjointworldgovernedbyTitle10oftheU.S.Code,chapter38,notanotherpseudoArmy-jointorganizationlikeJMC.Logically,directionofmunitionsproductionshouldfallundertheAssistantSecretaryofDefenseforAcquisition,Technology,andLogistics,withsupplychainmanagementgoingtotheDefenseLogisticsAgency(DLA).Today,DLAprovidesover80percentofallDefensesupplyneeds,anditdoessoverywellatcompetitiveprices.DLAistheworld-classsustainmentorganization.However,itdoesnotprocureormanageammunition.

TheArmyhasdoneduediligenceinstudyingtheammunitionproblem.However,itdoesn’tseemlikeArmyseniorleadershavereadanyofthestudies.Inmy20-plusyearsexperienceinmunitionsproduction,recommendationsfromRANDCorporation,PacificNorthwestNationalLaboratories,theGovernmentAccountabilityOffice,andtheNationalDefenseUniversityhaveadvocatedafundamentalchangeinthemanagementofourammunitionindustrialbase.Manyrecommendationshavecalledfortheprivatizationofthemunitionsproductionbase.Tobesure,someelementssimplywouldnotbeprofitableasacommercialsingle-buyersystem,butthatcanbeaccountedfor.

Intheend,theArmy(meaningAMC)hasfailedtoimplementstudyrecommendationsbecauseAMCwouldloseaccesstoeasilyaccessedmoneyappropriatedformunitionsproduction.Nowmorethanever,theneedtoprivatizeisparamount.DODisanticipatingleanbudgetsinthefuture.Wemustprivatizemunitionsproductionorprovidelong-termGOCO[Government-ownedcontractor-operated]productioncontracts,anditmusthappenquickly.

Thechallengeistobreakoutoftheoldcontractingmodelandrealizethat,withmandatedshort-termcontracts,thecontractorcannotbefinanciallyresponsibleformunitionsproductionshortfalls.IftheArmyseriouslyaddressedmunitionsproductionandproduction-basemodernization,itwouldawardlong-termproductioncontracts(fornotlessthan20years)thatallowGOCOoperatorstoprocureupdatedmunitionsproductionequipmentandamortizethatequipmentovertime.Nomanufacturer



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Continued on page 69

62 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

ArmyReserveUnitsReceiveFirstNewLine-HaulTractorTrucks

TwoArmyReserveunitsinMichiganhavereceivedthefirstoftheArmy’sfuelandsupply“primemovers”torollofftheassemblyline.The180thTransporta-tionCompanyand182dTransportationCom-pany,bothpartofthe310thExpeditionarySustainmentCommand,eachreceived60newM915A5line-haultrac-tortrucksduringafirst-unit-equippedceremonyhostedbytheProgramExecutiveOfficeforCombatSupportandCombatServiceSup-porton29SeptemberattheU.S.ArmyReserveWalkerCenterinGrandRapids,Michigan.

TheM915A5line-haultractortruckisaproductofDaimlerTruckNorthAmericaandisthefirsttruckoftheline-haulvehiclefamilytocomestraighttounitswithafullyintegratedarmorprotectionpackage(A-kit)thatisdesignedforpeacetimeandhumanitarianmissions.Thevehiclecanalsobefittedwithanadditionalarmorprotectionpackage(B-kit)whenneeded.TheB-kitarmorcanbeinstalledonthevehicleinunder8hoursandprovides360-degreeprotectionforthecrewinacombatenvironment.

Inadditiontoarmorprotection,thetruckhasincreasedpower,anenhancedaxleandsuspensionsystem(tohandletheadditionalweightofthearmor),twofueltanks(toincreasethedistancethevehiclecantravelbeforeneedingtorefuel),andadditionalcabspaceforthecrew,itsequipment,andadditionalcommunicationsequipmentthatisintegratedinthevehicle.

TheArmyReservewillreceivethefirst710M915A5sthatwereorderedfortheArmy.TheArmyhasordered350moreofthesevehiclesfortheactiveforce.

ArmyChiefofStaffProposesChangestoBalancetheArmyforaSecondDecadeofPersistentConflict

DuringtheAssociationoftheUnitedStatesArmyAnnualMeetingandExpositioninOctoberinWash-

ington,D.C.,ArmyChiefofStaffGeneralGeorgeW.Casey,whooriginatedtheimperativetobalancetheforce,saidthatchangestotheArmy—thedrawdowninIraqandgrowingtheforce—havehelpedtoimprovetheArmy’sbalanceandtoincreasedwelltime.How-ever,hesaidmoreworkisneededinorderto“prepareforthenextdecadeofpersistentconflictagainstaper-sistentenemy.”

GeneralCaseyoutlinedthreeneedsthattheArmycurrentlyhas:totrain,reequip,andmodernizetheforce.HesaidthattheArmyneedstoregainitscapa-bilityforfull-spectrumcombat,whichhaserodedbecauseofarapiddeploymenttempothathasleftnotimeforfull-spectrumtraining.

LieutenantGeneralDanielP.Bolger,theArmydep-utychiefofstaffforoperations,plans,andprograms,saidthattheabilitytoconductfull-spectrumtrainingdependsondwelltime.Asdwelltimeimproves,moretrainingcantakeplace.

GeneralCaseyalsocitedtheneedtoreconstitutetheArmy’sequipment,whichhassufferedfromcombatlossesandexcessivewearfromtheconstantdeploy-ments.GeneralCaseysaidthatthisreconstitutionincludesnotonlyrepairingthecurrentequipmentsetbutalsobuildingforthefuturebyfieldingthenewgroundcombatvehiclein7years.



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The M915A5 line-haul tractor truck is the “prime mover” in the Army’s fleet of semitrailers and fuel tankers. In September, two Army Reserve units received the first 120 of 801 vehicles that the Reserve component will be issued. (Photo by MAJ Jenny Griffin, 310th Expeditionary Sustainment Command PAO)


LogisticsCommonOperatingEnvironmentFeaturedinInteractiveguide

TheArmyLogisticsInnovationAgency(LIA)hasaninteractivewebsitecalled“TheArmyGuidetotheCommonLogisticsOperatingEnvironment(CLOE)”thataimstoteachlogisticiansabouttheimportanceoftheconcept.

CLOEistheOfficeoftheDeputyChiefofStaff,G–4,initiativetosynchronizelogisticsconcepts,organizationalapproaches,information,andanewgenerationoftechnologiesintoasingleoperationalandtechnicalarchitectureforcurrentandfutureforcestructures.CLOEisdesignedtoprovidecommandsandlogisticianswithimprovedsituationalawarenessandfleetmanagersofmajorsystemswithimprovedlifecyclemanagementbymovinglogisticsdatafromcondition-basedmaintenancesystemsintologisticsinformationsystems.

LIA’sinteractiveguidedescribesCLOEthrougheasilytraversablemodulesthatexplainwhatCLOEis,howitwillbeimplemented,andhowitfitsinwithothercurrentinitiativesandthejointforce.TovisittheguideontheInternet,gotohttps://lia.army.mil/cloe/.

ArmyLeanSixSigmaExcellenceAwardsAnnouncedThe2010ArmyLeanSixSigmaExcellenceAwards

ProgramwinnerswerehonoredatthePentagonduringa

16Octoberawardsceremony.Thoserecognizedincludethe—oAssistantSecretaryoftheforArmyFinancialMan-

agementandComptroller,whoreceivedtheEnter-priseLevelProjectSponsorAward.

oAssistantSecretaryoftheArmyforAcquisition,LogisticsandTechnology,whoreceivedtheHead-quarters,DepartmentoftheArmyLevelOrganiza-tionalDeploymentAward.

oArmyMaterielCommand,whichreceivedtheArmyRegulation10–87LevelOrganizationalDeploymentAward.

o21stTheaterSustainmentCommand,whichreceivedtheSubordinateLevelOrganizationalDeploymentAward,aBlackBelt,andtheNon-GatedProjectTeamAward.

oProgramExecutiveOfficeforCombatSupportandCombatServiceSupport,whichreceivedaMasterBlackBelt.

oAssistantSecretaryoftheArmyforManpowerandReserveAffairs,whoreceivedaMasterBlackBelt.

oArmyCommunications-ElectronicsLifeCycleMan-agementCommand,whichreceivedaBlackBelt.

oMilitarySurfaceDeploymentandDistributionCom-mand,whichreceivedaGreenBelt.

oProgramExecutiveOfficeEnterpriseInformationSystems,whichreceivedaGreenBelt.

Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRA-DOC) Pamphlet 525−4−1,The United States Army Functional Concept for Sustainment 2016–2028,pres-entstheArmy’soverarchingvisionforsustainingfutureforcesduringthe2016to2028timeframe.PublicationoftheArmy’sFunctionalConceptsinOctober2010wasthefinalstepintherevisionoftheArmyConceptFramework.ThefirsttwostepswerepublicationoftherevisedArmyCapstoneConcept(ACC)inDecember2009andpublicationoftherevisedArmyOperatingConcept(AOC)inAugust2010.

TRADOCPamphlet525−4−1summarizesthekeycapabilitiesneededtointegratefutureArmysustainmentcapabilitieswiththejointforceandtoleveragethecapabilitiesofallied,partner,andhost-nationforcestoensuresuccessfulandsustainedoperations.

Thepamphletoutlinessustainment-requiredcapabilitiesfordeploymentanddistribution,transportation,supply,maintenance,fieldservices,operationalcontractsupport,generalengineering,medicalandforcehealthprotection,humanresources,financialmanagement,religioussupport,band

RECENTLY PUBLISHED

support,explosiveordnancedisposal,ArmySpecialOperationsForcessustainment,andsecurityofsustainment.

Thepamphletdescribessustainmentbyechelon,sustainmentcapabilitiesforotherwarfightingfunc-tions,andsustainmentcapabilitiesthatdependonotherwarfightingfunctions.

Field Manual 4−90, Brigade Support Battalion,publishedinAugust2010,describeshowthebrigadesupportbattalion(BSB)conductslogisticsoperations.ThemanualwaswrittenforBSBstaffofficersandnoncommissionedofficersandoffersasummaryofthefunctionsperformedbyeachunitandstaffsectionassignedtotheBSB.

ThemanualplacesBSBoperationsinthelargercontextofmodularforcelogisticsandsustainmentofbrigadecombatteamsandsupportbrigades.ThemanualdescribestheorganizationalstructureandfunctionsoftheBSB’sheadquartersandheadquarterscompanyandheadquartersstaff,distributioncompany,fieldmaintenancecompany,brigadesupportmedicalcompany,andforwardsupportcompanies.

64 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

NewAdjutantgeneral’sCorpsCoursesLaunchedInresponsetothechangingoperationalenvironment

andgrowingskillrequirementsforSoldiersinhumanresources(HR)support,theAdjutantGeneral(AG)SchoolhaslaunchedtwonewspecializedcoursesforpersonnelservinginbrigadeS–1sections,HRorgani-zations,andHRstaffelements.Thesecoursesreplacethe4-weekHumanResourceManagementQualifica-tionCourseandareeach2weekslong.

TheBrigadeS–1OperationsCourseandtheHumanResourcesPlansandOperationsCoursearedesignedtoprovidetheindepthtechnicaleducationnecessarytosupportwarfightingcommandersandtheArmyForceGenerationprocess.Eachcourseoffersjust-in-time-focusedtrainingforHRleadersabouttostepintokeyHRpositionsatthebrigadeandtheaterlevelsandpre-paresthemtointerpret,integrate,coordinate,andimple-mentArmyHRprogramsandpolicies.

ThecoursesareopentoActivedutyandReserveSoldiersaswellasDepartmentoftheArmycivil-ians(GS–11toGS–13)whenspaceisavailable.HRleaderswhoserve,orexpecttoserve,inbrigadeS–1positions—or,forcivilians,inavalidhumanresourcesmanagementposition—shouldseriouslyconsidertak-ingoneorbothcourses.

PersonneleligibletotaketheBrigadeS–1Opera-tionsCourseinclude—oAllofficerswiththebranchareaofconcentration

(AOC)42whoareinthegradesofcaptainandmajorandwhohavecompletedacaptainscareercourse.

oAllwarrantofficersinmilitaryoccupationalspe-cialty(MOS)420AwhohavecompletedtheAGWarrantOfficerBasicCourse.

oAllMOS42Anoncommissionedofficersinthegradesofstaffsergeant(promotable),sergeantfirst

PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

class,ormastersergeantwhohavecompletedtheAGSeniorLeaderCourse.

CandidatesalsomustcurrentlyserveinbrigadeS–1positionsorbependingassignmentinbrigadeS–1positionsattheofficer-in-charge,noncommissionedofficer-in-charge,ortechnicianlevel.

TheHRPlansandOperationsCourseisopentoall—oBranchAOC42officersinthegradesofcaptain,

major,andlieutenantcolonelwhohavecompletedacaptainscareercourse.

oMOS420AwarrantofficerswhohavecompletedtheAGWarrantOfficerBasicCourse.

oAllMOS42Anoncommissionedofficersinthegradesofstaffsergeant(promotable),sergeantfirstclass,mastersergeant,orsergeantmajorwhohavecompletedtheAGSeniorLeaderCourse.

Candidatesmustcurrentlyserveorhaveanassign-mentpendingastheofficer-in-charge,thenoncom-missionedofficer-in-charge,oratechnicianinthehumanresourcesoperationsbranch(ofasustainmentbrigadeorexpeditionarysustainmentcommand),anHRsustainmentcenter,atheatergatewaypersonnelaccountabilityteam,amilitarymailterminal,oranHRcompany.

ThefirstBrigadeS–1OperationsCoursegradu-atedon29October;ninemoreclassesareplannedforfiscalyear2011.SeveniterationsoftheHRPlansandOperationsCoursealsoarescheduled.Thefirstbeganon1November.Eachcoursehasamaximumcapacityof30students.

ThesecoursesareintheArmyTrainingRequire-mentsandResourcesSystem.Individualsinterestedinattendingeithercoursemayemailthedeputycoursedirectoratmichael.dean.henley@conus.army.milorcall(803)751–8353orDSN734–8353.

oTobyhannaArmyDepot,Pennsylvania,whichreceivedtheNon-GatedProjectTeamAward.Infiscalyear2010,LeanandSixSigmapractitio-

nerssavedtheArmy$1billionandprovidedanother$3.3billionincostavoidance.

StrategicLandpowerEssayContestAnnouncedTheArmyWarCollegeandtheArmyWarCollege

FoundationaresponsoringtheArmyWarCollegeStrategicLandpowerEssayContest2011.Thecontestisdesignedtoadvanceprofessionalknowledgeofthestrategicroleoflandpowerinjointandmultinationaloperations.Thisyear,thesponsorsareespecially

interestedinessaysontheapplicationofdesigninconflicttermination.[Design,inthiscase,isdefinedasthemethodologyforframingacomplexinteractiveproblemanddevelopingasolution.]

Thecontestisopentothepublic,andessaysmustbepostmarkedby17February2011inordertobeconsidered.Formoreinformationoracopyoftheessaycontestrules,entrantscansendalettertoDr.MichaelMatheny,ArmyWarCollegeDepartmentofMilitaryStrategy,Planning,andOperations,122ForbesAvenue,Carlisle,Pennsylvania,17013–5242,[email protected],or,call(717)245–3459.


ArmyLogisticsUniversityNamesNewBuilding

On10November,theArmyLogisticsUniversitydedicateditsneweducationbuildingas“HeiserHall”inhonorofthelateLieuten-antGeneralJosephM.Heiser,Jr.AveteranofWorldWarII,theKore-anWar,andtheVietnamWar,Gen-eralHeiserservedascommanderofthe1stLogisticalCommandinVietnamfrom1968to1969andretiredin1973afterservingastheArmyChiefofStaffforLogisticsfor3½years.

MajorGeneralJamesL.Hodge,thecommandinggeneraloftheArmyCombinedArmsSupportCommandandSustainmentCen-terofExcellence,notedGeneralHeiser’saccomplishmentsandhisimportancetologistics.“GeneralHeiserwasaprofessional,acaringleader,alegendintheOrdnanceCorps,”GeneralHodgesaid.“Accordingly,thisfacilityisafittingtributetohismemory.Unquestionably,Gen-eralHeiserworkedthroughhis30-yearmilitarycareertoimproveandtransformtheentirespectrumofArmy

Above, this display case inside Heiser Hall commemorates the career of General Heiser, an Ordnance Hall of Fame member and a former Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics.

At left, Colonel Joel Heiser and his wife Brigitte help Major General James L. Hodge, commanding general of the Army Combined Arms Support Command and Sustainment Center of Excellence, and Colonel Mark A. McCormick, president of the Army Logistics University (ALU), unveil a plaque naming the new ALU education building Heiser Hall.

logistics,sothisfacilitywillcontin-uethatgoalasitprovidestheoppor-tunitytoshapelogisticians,officersandnoncommissionedofficers,througheducationandtraining.”

GeneralHeiser’sson,retiredColonelJoelHeiser,spokeabouthisfather’slifeandcareer.GeneralHeiserjoinedtheArmyin1943soonaftertheattackonPearlHar-bor.“DuringWorldWarII,myfathersupportedouroperationsinEuropeasanammunitionofficeronGeneral[DwightD.]Eisenhower’sstaff,movingfromEnglandfirsttosupportourinvasionatNormandyandthenintoFranceandGermany;hewasonthegroundthere.Fiveyearslater,hewasinKorea2weeksafterthewarstarted.”

ColonelHeisernotedthatwhatmadehisfathergreatwaswhohewasasahumanbeing.GeneralHodgesaid,“Ultimately,thisbuild-

ingwillprovidealastinglegacytoLieutenantGeneralHeiserandhismotto,‘Awell-supportedcombatSol-dieristhebackboneofaneffectiveArmy,anditisthelogistician’sjobtoprovidethatsupport.’”

The Army Logistics University’s new education building was memorialized as Heiser Hall on 10 November in honor of Lieutenant General Joseph M. Heiser, Jr. (Photos by Julianne E. Cochran, ArmySustainment)

66 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

January–February

Commentary:TrainingLogisticiansfortheCurrentandFutureOperationalEnvironments

MAJJasonJ.F.Murphy 20

DefenseMedicalLogisticsBalancedScorecard LTCGretaL.BennettandPeterA.Battaglia 34

EasingtheEPICSearchforLogisticsPolicyInformation DemetriusGlass 18

ExpandingAerialDeliveryCapabilityinAfghanistan CW4JimmyTaylor 26

ImprovingDistributionofOrganizationalEquipment MAJT.J.Wright 14

InternationalSecurityAssistanceForceLogisticsOperationsinAfghanistan

COLSheliaJ-McClaney,LTCJennyNewton,CanadianForces,andLTCDouglasA.LeVien

29

LogisticsAssistanceRepresentativesKeeptheArmyRollingAlong CharlesW.Fick,Jr. 8

ManagingARFORGENOperationsinaModularSustainmentBrigade MAJCharlieWard 2

ParachuteRigginginAfghanistan CW3JefferyS.Page,USAR 23

PBUSEIncorporatesAutomaticIdentificationTechnology JeannetteJ.JonesandJeffW.Davis 17

Spectrum:CampaignPlanningforLogisticsOrganizations MAJKevinM.Baird 39

TheArmyCapabilitiesIntegrationCenter:BuildingaFutureForce CSMPatrickJ.Laidlaw 11

TheProsperityPlan:ImplementingSoldierandFamilyCare Chaplain(MAJ)RoyM.Myers 36

TheRoleofIntelligenceinSustainmentOperations LTCHeberS.Meeks,USAR,andMAJBartonT.Brundige,USAR

5

March–April

Commentary:WorkingOutattheJIIM:EmbracingtheCommercialSectorasFirstAmongEquals

Dr.ChristopherR.Paparone 38

Focus:ALU’sCollegeofProfessionalandContinuingEducation RichardW.Price 2

GFEBS:AdvancingSustainers’Capabilities LTCKarlE.LindquistandChristopherLyew-Daniels 3

ImprovingAccesstoHAZMATTransportationInformation Dr.UptonR.ShimpandChristineL.Holiday 32

ImprovingTrainingforRecruiters COLJamesH.ComishandDonaldD.Copley,Jr. 34

LogisticsPartneringLessons CW2JulianPrice 26

LogisticsTrainingandAdvisoryTeams:AConceptintheMaking MAJMichaelF.Hammond 22

OIFFuelDistributionChallenges MSGJohnnyA.Castillo 8

OperationKilowatt:TheGeneratorShopinaModularEngineerBattalion 1LTLeslieMcCann 37

Spectrum:LogisticsinthePLA Dr.MartinAndrew 46

Spectrum:StrategicMobility COLKennethE.Hickins 39

StartingaPartnershipThroughLogisticsKeyLeaderEngagement LTCChristopherJ.Whittaker 29

StrategicLeadershipCompetenciesCannotWait MAJAmyL.Gouge 7

The10ThingsWarrantOfficersNeedtoKnowAboutARFORGEN CW4RichardC.Myers,Jr. 16

TheContainerManagementQuandary MAJDarrylR.Weaver,USAR 10

TransitioningaBaseFromCoalitiontoU.S.Control MAJBrianLesiak 18

May–JuneAParadigmShiftatNTC:CSSBsThatThink“InsidetheBox” MAJJohnM.Ruths 2

ATRADOCBestPractice:AVirtualWaytoKeepTrainingCurrent DonaldD.Copley,Jr. 52

BuildingtheLocalEconomyatQ-West SSGPatriciaMcCarthy,WAARNG 44

DeployedArmyBands CW5JohnS.Fraser 54

FuelSupportatContingencyOperatingBaseSpeicher LTCVincentC.Nwafor,SFCThomasE.Harrell,Jr.,andSSGPaulaMiller

20

LandWarNet:IsYourITWorkforceReady? CW3DannieWalters 26

LogisticsSupportinanAustereEnvironment:TheMissiontoSinjar CPTJackA.Tyer,TNARNG 32

MDMPforSustainmentUnits MAJDanielMisigoy 14

PayingAgents:TheGood,theBad,andtheUgly MAJBillKeltner 29



HEADLINES


Index of Army Sustainment Articles—2010

COMMENTARY

FOCUS


ResourcingandTrainingaLevelIIILogisticsTrainingandAdvisoryTeam LTCCarlosE.Lopez 36

SharetheRoad:ConvoyEscort MAJKrisA.Kough,CAARNG,andCPTCurtisA.Goller,III,CAARNG

23

Spectrum:TheGlobalizationofMilitaryLogistics MAJChristineM.Schverak 57

SustainmentintheArmy’sFirstAdviseandAssistBrigade LTCDavidWilson 7

TacticalGroundReportingImprovesOperationalPicture CPTSpencerBrown 46

The16thSustainmentBrigadeinIraq:SupportingtheDrawdown COLMartinB.PittsandLTCRobertS.Mott 18

TheCommander’sEmergencyResponseProgram:SynergisticResultsThroughTraining

MAJMarkW.Lee 10

TheHumanResourcesOperationsBranch CPTRodenA.Carrido 41

TrainingWithIndustry LTCMarshallN.Ramsey 50

UnitContractingProblemsDuringOverseasTrainingExercises MAJWilliamT.Cundy 48

July–August

AligningMetricstoAchieveSupplyChainGoals MAJJosephM.Mrozinski 38

ALULectureSeriesSupportsCulturalAwarenessSkillsTraining StaffFeature 25

ArmyAmmunitionManagementInformationSystemChallenges MAJJamesM.L.Cook 40

BCS3:TakeAnotherLook LTCDaleFarrand 36

Commentary:ACaseofContractinginToday’sEnvironment MAJJohnP.Kilbride 42

Commentary:ANewApproachtoClassIXControl CW4MartinD.Webb 22

Commentary:ExcessEquipment:AnEmbarrassmentofRiches CPTDavidN.Danford 48

Commentary:Yes,Horatio,It’sTimetoRenametheAGCorps LyleN.Adams 51

Focus:TheSCoESimulationCenterSupportsTrainingforaNewDeploymentMission

MAJJeffreyL.SchultzandRalphL.Poole 2

ForwardSupportCompanyOperationsinHaiti CPTJulioJ.Reyes 6

ImprovingtheAutomaticResetInductionProcess MarkS.Paun 26

IncreasingandSustainingthePolishMilitaryContingentinAfghanistan MAJEricR.Peterson 10

InternationalandJointLogisticsSupport:ExerciseTalismanSaber LTCWilliamC.Johnson,Jr. 12

Spectrum:AmmunitionManagement:AJointorArmyFunction? COLThomasS.Schorr,Jr.,andCOLKennethDeal 52

SustaininganAfghanNationalArmyEmbeddedTrainingTeam MAJDavidL.ThompsonandCPTChristineM.Rhyne,USAF

3

The6thMedicalLogisticsManagementCenter MAJEdgarG.Arroyo 14

TheArmyAirliftClearanceAuthority:SpeedingSuppliestotheWarfighter ShannonR.Lauber 30

TheCorpsLogisticsPlanningandDecisionCycle LTCMillicenA.Dill 16

UsingHolidayBlockLeavetoUpdateTrainingMaterials DonaldD.Copley,Jr.,andRodneyEdmond 28

WhatDODLogisticiansShouldKnowAbouttheCoastGuard LTCJamesC.Bates,USA(Ret.),andCW4StephenW.Brown,USCG(Ret.)

44

September–October

“SupportatAltitude”foraMultifunctionalAviationTaskForce CPTMichaelR.Miller 34

Building“LogNation”intheU.S.CentralCommand MGKennethS.Dowd 3

Coblenz1919:TheArmy’sFirstSustainmentCenterofExcellence AlexanderF.Barnes 50

Cold-ChainManagementandtheUseofTempTaleTechnology COLMitchellE.Brew,MAJMichaelRonn,andPO1SummerWebb,USN

44

Commentary:CollaborativeManagementWillImproveWeaponSystemSustainment

RickConlinandJimMacIntosh 55

ConductingGlobalContainerManagementTrainingOnline ThomasCatchings 29

EquippingtheCombatSupportHospital:ACaseStudy LTCCharlesH.Strite,Jr. 39

EvolutionofPetroleumSupportintheU.S.CentralCommandAreaofResponsibility

COLJeffreyB.CarraandCW4DavidRay,USMC(Ret.)

16

ExtractingArmyForcesFromtheField—ALogistician’sPerspective LTCJerryB.Steinke,MNARNG 20

PERIODICALS POSTAGEAND FEES PAIDAT PETERSBURG VIRGINIAAND ADDITIONAL CITIES

ISSN 2153–5973DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMYARMY SUSTAINMENTUS ARMY LOGISTICS UNIVERSITY2401 QUARTERS ROADFORT LEE VIRGINIA 23801–1705

Official Business

o WhyLogisticiansFailatKnowledgeManagemento InnovativeMethodsforTeachingAmmunitionSupplyo SpecialOperationsLogisticsSupporto RiversofLife,RiversofDeatho BalancingMOSCompetencyandWarriorTaskProficiencyo ExpandingLogisticsCapacityo SecurityAssistanceFromtheLogisticsPointofViewo WhyShouldIStudyMilitaryHistory?o SustainmentBrigadeForwardMedicalOperationso SuppliesFromtheSkyo JointMultinationalReadinessCenterRecoveryTraining

Coming in Future Issues

68 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

Focus:LogisticsOfficerCorpsUpdate:BlendingFunctionalandMultifunc-tionalExpertise

LTCMarshallN.RamseyandLTCTimGilhool 2

FosteringaGoodRelationshipWithContractorsontheBattlefield MSGArthurHarris,Jr.,USA(Ret.) 26

GulfWarLogisticsRecordsDonatedtotheSustainmentCommunity StaffFeature 32

InteragencyLogisticsTraining:PerpetuatingtheWholeofGovernmentApproachtoDisasterLogistics

Dr.BillyJ.Davis 30

MovingTowardaMoreSustainableArmyFoodProgram DavidJ.Sherriff 13

Spectrum:Small-ArmsAmmunitionProductionandAcquisition:TooManyEggsinOneBasket?

MAJMarkW.Siekman,USAR,Dr.DavidA.Anderson,andAllanS.Boyce

60

TheFinancialManagementCampaignPlan:RaisingtheBartoAchieveSustainmentExcellence

LTGEdgarE.StantonIII 8

TheNewFM1–0,HumanResourcesSupport ThomasK.Wallace,Jr. 10

TheOrdnanceSchools’MovetoFortLee GayleA.Olszyk 46

November–December1stInfantryDivisionRecognizesBenefitsofLogisticsReportingTool SGTBenjaminKibbey,USAR 64

45thSustainmentBrigade:AerialDeliveryinAfghanistan CW2MichelleG.Charge 17

45thSustainmentBrigade:Echelons-Above-BrigadeConvoyManagementinAfghanistan

MAJMichaelJ.HarrisandCPTEricP.Roby,USMC 14

45thSustainmentBrigade:SupplydistributioninAfghanistan MAJKerryDennard,MAJChristineA.Haffey,andMAJRayFerguson

12

ADayintheLifeofaDALogisticsIntern AlisonSilverioandSusannahTobey 63

ANeglectedPrincipleofWarinLogisticsAdvising MAJJamesJ.Zacchino,Jr. 32

ASeriesofFirsts:The3dESCinOperationUnifiedResponse MAJPaulR.Hayes 9

AFSBsandRDECOM:StrengtheningtheMaterielEnterprise MAJO’NealA.Williams,Jr. 20

ArmySeeksClaimantsUnderRetroactiveStop-LossSpecialPayProgram RobertPidgeon 56

BulkPetroleumManningRequirementsinanESC CPTShariS.Bowen 61

Commentary:TheLogisticsBranch:MultifunctionalandFunctional LTGMitchellH.Stevenson 3

ContainersforHaiti:ProvidingTransportationandTemporaryInfrastructure ThomasCatchings 46

ContractOversightontheBattlefield LTCPeterW.Butts 34

ContractingSupportBrigadeRespondstoHaitiMission LTCAmericusM.GillIII 49

ConvoySupportTeams LTCStevenL.Updike,USAR 19

DeployinganExpeditionarySustainmentCommandtoSupportDisasterRelief

MAJPaulR.Hayes 4

ExpeditingClassIXDeliveriesinIraq 1LTAlexysM.Myers 62

FixingtheCurrentReserveComponentsPayProcess MAJNolandI.Flores,CAARNG 54

Focus:InternationalRecruitingSummit DonaldD.Copley,Jr.,andJuliaC.Bobick 2

ImprovementStrategiesforLogisticsAutomationSupport CPTAndrewM.Sawyer,CW2RosungD.Petty,andSSGJonathanC.Shaw

52

MedicalEquipmentConcentrationSites:AManagementSolutionforArmyReserveMedicalEquipmentRepairandTrainingNeeds

LTCPaulWakefield,USAR(Ret.) 50

NewEquipmentFielding:WhatCananAFSBDoforMe? MAJCamillaA.Wood 22

Spectrum:WhereAreWeGoing?TheFutureofJointLogistics MAJRobertP.Mann 58

SupportOperations:LessonsLearnedinaMultifunctionalMedicalBattalion

LTCDouglasH.GaluszkaandSGMDavidFranco 40

SustainingaBCTinSouthernIraq LTCMichaelB.Siegl 28

TheBatteryManagerMaintenanceProgram LTCAnthonyW.Adams,KYARNG 38

TheCapabilitiesoftheArmyFieldSupportBrigade’sAcquisition,Logistics,andTechnologyDirectorate

LTCStevenG.VanRiper 25

UsingLessonsLearnedforContractinginHaiti LarryD.McCaskill 48


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Ifyoumailyourarticle,pleaseincludeacopyonCDifpossible.

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canprocure,install,andamortizetheirequipmentunderthe5-yearcontractsofferedbyAMC.

Iapplaudtheauthorsfortakingonthistoughandsensitivetopic.Theyprovideathoroughanalysisoftheproblem,butIdon’tthinktheyaddressthesolution.Iagreethatwe(theArmy)haveplacedtoomanyeggsinonebasket.However,thecosts

associatedwithamelioratingoursinglesourcesoffailurearecostprohibitive.Nowisthetimetoimplementthefindingsofthestudiesmentionedaboveandmanagewhatremains.

Colonel tHoMaS S. SCHorr, jr.Seoul, korea



HEADLINES


COMMENTARY

FOCUSContinued from page 61