j. k. dietrich - gsba 548 – mba.pm spring 2007 capital structure april 30, 2007 (la) and april 26,...
TRANSCRIPT
J. K. Dietrich - GSBA 548 – MBA.PM Spring 2007
Capital Structure
April 30, 2007 (LA)
and April 26, 2007 (OCC)
J. K. Dietrich - GSBA 548 – MBA.PM Spring 2007
An unlevered company is an all equity firm A levered company has debt and equity in
its capital structure The capital structure debate concerns the
impact on total firm value of companies having identical assets but different capital structures, i.e. levered versus unlevered
If debt in capital structure adds value, it adds to shareholders’ value
Capital Structure Debate
J. K. Dietrich - GSBA 548 – MBA.PM Spring 2007
Summary M-M Debate Issues M-M ISSUES STATE
OF DEBATE CAPITAL STRUCTURE IRRELEVANT
(1) TAXES (2) BANKRUPTCY (3) AGENCY (4) EQUILIBRIUM
TRADEOFFS
DIVIDENDS IRRELEVANT
(1) INFORMATION (2) TAXES (3) MILLER-SCHOLES
EVIDENCE
J. K. Dietrich - GSBA 548 – MBA.PM Spring 2007
Debate and Basic Concepts Portfolios
– Investors hold portfolios– Portfolios may contain bonds, stocks, and be
leveraged with debt Efficient markets
– Informed investors, transactions costs low Arbitrage
– Strong economic force operating at all times– Search for profits from “buy cheap, sell dear”
J. K. Dietrich - GSBA 548 – MBA.PM Spring 2007
Returns to Debt and Equity Each claimant on the income of the firm has
expected returns based on the degree of risk associated with the income from the claims
Management of firms must satisfy expectations of providers of capital to maintain value of firm
If higher returns are earned, shareholders gain
J. K. Dietrich - GSBA 548 – MBA.PM Spring 2007
Distribution of Corporate Income
EAC (Div + Retained Earnings)
I (Fixed Claims)
T (No Value to Investors)
E B I T
J. K. Dietrich - GSBA 548 – MBA.PM Spring 2007
Capital Structure Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963) “Pie Model of Firm Value” (pp. 2ff, 423ff)
V = B + S Unlevered versus levered firm Weighted average cost of capital (no taxes)
SSBS
BSBB
WACC rrr
J. K. Dietrich - GSBA 548 – MBA.PM Spring 2007
Propositions I and II Assumptions
– No taxes– Markets efficient– No bankruptcy or reorganization costs– Homemade leverage possible– Example problems
Economic forces simple and powerful What are investors willing to pay for?
J. K. Dietrich - GSBA 548 – MBA.PM Spring 2007
Investor Returns from EBIT
Absence of taxes in M-M Propositions EBIT = operating income paid to
shareholders and bondholders Homemade leverage possible at same terms
as firm’s cost of debt Unmaking leverage possible by buying debt What can firms do for investors they can’t
do for themselves in efficient markets?
J. K. Dietrich - GSBA 548 – MBA.PM Spring 2007
Capital Structure Irrelevant Proposition I (pp. 428-430)
(Value of firm not influenced by B and S) Proposition II (p. 432, equation 15.3)
(Overall discount rate not influenced by B and S)
oLU r
EBITSBVV
)rr(S
Brr BooS
J. K. Dietrich - GSBA 548 – MBA.PM Spring 2007
M-M Proposition I and II Graphs
rB
Cost of Funds
D/E D/E
Firm Value
rWACC
rS
Vo
00
J. K. Dietrich - GSBA 548 – MBA.PM Spring 2007
Issues in M-M Analysis Taxes reduce cost of debt Bankruptcy costs from failure to make
scheduled debt payments– Attorneys– Lost sales, production– Costs of reorganization, acquisition
Agency costs of debt– Incentives of bond and stockholders– Costs of monitoring
J. K. Dietrich - GSBA 548 – MBA.PM Spring 2007
Value of Claims on Firm: Taxes
Unlevered firm’s value (p. 442):
Levered firm’s value (p. 442, equation 15.5):
0r
)C
T(1E(EBIT)
UV
B
BC
0
CL r
BrT
r
)T1()EBIT(EV
J. K. Dietrich - GSBA 548 – MBA.PM Spring 2007
The Capital Structure Debate
rB
Cost of Funds
D/E D/E
Firm ValuerS
rWACCVo
0 0
J. K. Dietrich - GSBA 548 – MBA.PM Spring 2007
Capital Structure & Equilibrium
In equilibrium, both firms and investors expected after-tax returns on debt and equity must be consistent with each other
Value of firm will be influenced by corporate and personal tax rates (see p. 478):
B)T1(
)T1()T1(1VV
B
SCUL
J. K. Dietrich - GSBA 548 – MBA.PM Spring 2007
State of Capital Structure Debate Market equilibrium pricing reduces value of
debt financing (“Debt and Taxes” argument of Miller)
Some debt financing seems reasonable Over some range precise D/E value not
clear and there are adjustment costs– Pecking order theory of financing (p. 472)– Investment banking fees– Costs of going to market
J. K. Dietrich - GSBA 548 – MBA.PM Spring 2007
Debt and Equity as Financial Claims on a Firm’s Assets
F = Face Value of Debt
Val
ue o
f C
laim
0
Debt Claims
Equity Claim
Value of Assets
J. K. Dietrich - GSBA 548 – MBA.PM Spring 2007
Debt as a Fixed Claim
F = Face Value of Debt0
Debt Claims
Value of Assets
Val
ue o
f C
laim
J. K. Dietrich - GSBA 548 – MBA.PM Spring 2007
Equity, a Residual Claim
Equity Claim
F = Face Value of Debt0Value of Assets
Val
ue o
f C
laim
J. K. Dietrich - GSBA 548 – MBA.PM Spring 2007
Debt and Equity asContingent Claims
F = Face Value of Debt0
Equity Claim
Probability Scale
Debt ClaimsVal
ue o
f C
laim
J. K. Dietrich - GSBA 548 – MBA.PM Spring 2007
Last Classes
Prepare Chapter 18 problems Submit Part 4 (group part only) and
organize group time to incorporate feedback and complete project summary
Review course materials and midterm performance to identify topics where you need clarification or assistance