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The Review of European Affairs

ISSN 2544-6703

Volume (1) Issue (2) 2017

Polish European Community Studies Association (PECSA)

Warsaw 2017

The publication of “The Review of European Affairs” was prepared within the project “Connecting the European Union of Shared Aims, Freedoms, Values and Responsibilities” (EUSHARE), the Grant Agreement/Decision No. 2016-1675/001-001, co-financed by the Erasmus+ Programme (Jean Monnet Support to Associations) of the European Union in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Poland. The publication reflects only the views of the Authors and cannot be understood as the official position of the European Union or the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Poland.

Editorial BoardEditor in Chief: Ewa LatoszekDeputy Editors in Chief: Artur Adamczyk, Małgorzata Dziembała, Marta PachockaThematic Editors of the Issue: Małgorzata Dziembała, Marta PachockaAssistant Editor: Michał Budziński

Statistical Editor: Aleksandra Borowicz

Political Sciences Editor: Kamil Zajączkowski

Economics & Management Editor: Anna Masłoń-Oracz

Finance Editor: Agnieszka Kłos

Law Editor: Aleksandra Szczerba-Zawada

Editorial cooperation and proofreading: Kinga Garnette-Skorupska, Jan Misiuna

Editorial supervisor: Czesława Kliszko

Cover design: Elżbieta Giżyńska

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ISSN 2544-6703

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Spis treści/Contents

Vasile Cucerescu

Th e Eastern Partnership: A Policy Striving

at Building Good Neighbourhoodliness? ............................................................... 5

Ludmila Golovataia

Th e Problems Caused by Intellectual Exodus. Th e Solutions to Stem

the Brain Drain in Republic of Moldova .................................................................... 25

Indrikis Muiznieks, Tatjana Muravska

Doctoral Schools at the University of Latvia: Sharing Experience and Looking Ahead ........................................................................................................ 45

Aleksandra Szczerba-Zawada

Th e European Union Antidiscrimination Law: from Prohibition of Wage Discrimination to the General Principle of Equality ............................... 61

Gaga Gabrichidze

Th e Instrument of Human Rights Clause as a Part of Conditionality in European Union–Georgia Relations ...................................... 85

Patrycja Bytner

Debt Crisis in the Eurozone Against Legal Systems Proposed

by Pierre Werner in 1970 ............................................................................................ 101

Magdalen Proczek, Rudolf Michałkiewicz

Ochrona antymonopolowa w ramach polityki konkurencji

Unii Europejskiej ........................................................................................................ 113

Adam Gąsiorek

Zróżnicowanie rozwoju społeczeństwa informacyjnego w Unii Europejskiej ......................................................................................................... 127

The Review of European Affairs Volume 1:2(2) 2017

The Polish European Community Studies Association PECSA

VASILE CUCERESCU*

The Eastern Partnership: A Policy Striving at Building Good Neighbourhoodliness?

Abstract

The Eastern Partnership of the European Union, launched in 2008 on the initiative of Poland and Sweden, has the characteristics of a very complex policy addressed to three Eastern European countries – Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine, and to three South-Eastern European countries – Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. The complexity of relations rises from the geographical, historical and geopolitical backgrounds. At the same time, these relations are imbued with various complications of internal and external nature. Considering these unusual, but present, complications, the article makes a retrospective of adopted acts that refer to the Eastern Partnership: The Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council “Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours” and the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council “Eastern Partnership”. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy: “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe” brings a new impetus in the framework of cooperation relations between the European Union and Eastern Partnership states. The relations are scrutinised through the prism of the neighbourhood policy and the Eastern Partnership policy. Positive and less positive results are revealed, accompanied by inherent challenges; all these serving as a kind of food for positive thinking in building resilience in the Eastern Europe. Relevant matter-of-fact examples are given from all Eastern Partnership countries and the way to discuss them. Open conclusions provide issues to be re-visited (revised) and several recommendations.

Key words: European Union; neighbourhood policy; Eastern Partnership; cooperation; resilience.

* European Community Studies Association Moldova, [email protected]

6 Vasile Cucerescu

Introduction

At fi rst sight, the Eastern Partnership initiative is a European policy similar to

all others. In fact, it seems to be a more appealing one due to on the one hand the

complexity of the relations that characterise the cooperation between the European

Union and all six Eastern Partnership countries, and on the other hand bilateral

cooperation of the European Union with each state. In the framework of the EU’s

external relations, the Eastern Partnership occupies a very important place. Th is

unique approach is determined by promoting good neighbourhoodliness. Eastern

neighbours represent a zone of newly established countries that strive for building

their statehood and develop cooperation with well-intended partners in which the

European Union plays a signifi cant role.

Th e Eastern Partnership initiative is a policy in continuous development,

being aff ected by multiple qualitative and quantitative changes in the light of

partners’ changing behaviour. Because of this the concept of resilience, applied to

the EU’s policies ought to be visited and re-visited. In doing it, the provisions of

EU Neighbourhood Policy and of EU Eastern Partnership will be analysed from

this perspective to see to what extent they provide necessary and self-suffi cient

instruments of cooperation for all involved parties and, if they do, to detect barriers

that seem to be inherent and govern intra-partnership cooperation relations.

1. Re-Visiting European Union Neighbourhood Policy

From its inception in 2003, the policy entitled “Wider Europe – Neighbourhood:

A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours” has

become an important external instrument of the European Union’s cooperation

with its neighbours. Th e document has fi ve parts and one annex with tables

and charts. Th e provisions focus on (1) wider Europe: accepting the challenge;

(2) neighbourhood – diff erent countries, common interests; (3) a new vision and

a new off er; (4) a diff erentiated, progressive, benchmarked approach; and (5) next

steps (Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European

Parliament 2003). Th e European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was conceived to avoid

development discrepancies between the European Union and its neighbours in order

to strengthen prosperity, stability and security of all involved parties. Th e European

Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is governed by the values of democracy, the rule of

7The Eastern Partnership: A Policy Striving at Building Good Neighbourhoodliness?

law and respect of human rights. Th e European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) works

through bilateral, regional, neighbourhood and cross-border cooperation tools.

Th e European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was designed for 16 neighbouring

countries: to the East (6) – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and

Ukraine; to the South (10) – Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco,

Palestine, Syria and Tunisia.

For certain the neighbourhood policy is one of the most ambitious initiatives

of the European Union towards its neighbours, irrespective of their geographical

position and their level of development. Th e European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)

is fully in harmony with the Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and

Security Policy. It is “an attractive European neighbourhood policy” (Kempe 2007,

188) for Eastern partners of the European Union. Additionally, Member States “have

real diffi culty in agreeing on the substance of an attractive ENP and in striking

a sound balance between off ers and demands. Th is weakens the credibility and

impact of the EU’s policy towards its neighbours” (Lippert 2007, 187). Scholars

identify diverging visions between Member States and European institutions as such

and, consequently, a converging approach is necessary to conciliate national and

supranational visions.

2. Re-Visiting European Union Eastern Partnership Initiative

Th e Eastern Partnership (EaP) is a specifi c initiative, detailing the European

Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as it addresses only six neighbours: in the East –

Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine; in the South-East – Armenia, Azerbaijan and

Georgia. Th is project was started on initiative of Poland and Sweden, and adopted in

2008. Th e Eastern Partnership (EaP) is based on the principles of international law

and fundamental values such as democracy, the rule of law, respect of human rights

and fundamental freedoms (Communication from the Commission to the European

Parliament and the Council 2008).

Th e Eastern Partnership (EaP) works on four cooperation platforms:

Platform 1: Democracy, good governance and stability – administrative reform;

integrated border management; justice; fi ght against corruption; migration and

asylum; common security and defence.

8 Vasile Cucerescu

Platform 2: Economic integration and convergence with EU policies – transport;

small and medium-sized enterprises (SME); environment and climate change; trade

and related regulatory cooperation; agriculture and rural development; statistics;

harmonisation of digital markets.

Platform 3: Energy security – electricity, gas and oil interconnections; diverse

energy supply sources and transit routes; competitiveness; secure energy supply;

integration of variable renewable energy sources.

Platform 4: People-to-people contacts – participation in EU international

cooperation programmes; capacity to reform; development of cooperation; sharing

of good practices in education and research, youth and arts.

Th e large spectrum of issues covers all fi elds of social activity. In other words, it

assembles a totality of policies, which is characteristic to any Member State and the

European Union as a whole. Probably it is the most that the European Union has

off ered to any partner in the world in terms of designed policy, i.e. a replica of general

development based on the same values shared by the European Union and Member

States. In fact, it could be compared to a kind of recipe that is off ered. Moreover, it is

supported by EU fi nancial instruments.

At the level of policy, programmes and instruments, everything is arranged.

However, let us see what happens, what are the results and the impact in the Eastern

Partnership.

3. Eastern Partnership: Challenging Issues

Th e Eastern Partnership initiative is a very composite policy as it was conceived within

the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Th e policy itself is elaborated

a-la carte to suit the needs of broader cooperation between the European Union

and its six Eastern neighbours. Th e incentives included bilateral and multilateral

cooperation between the parties.

Action plans were introduced as concrete measures to attain the objectives

stipulated in the agreements concluded by the European Union and Eastern

Partnership countries. Th e deadlines have not always been realistic for the parties

that undertook these commitments. Th is has also aff ected the perceived credibility

of the partners.

Among recent instruments of cooperation there are the Association Agreements

concluded with three Eastern Partnership members: Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.


Th ese countries, “Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine are considered the locomotives

of the Eastern Partnership in concluding and implementing the Association

Agreements” (Cucerescu 2016, 109), irrespective of the degree of implementation

of the Agreements, taking into consideration internal and external contexts. Other

members, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus have not concluded the Association

Agreements. Consequently, there are two types of members, according to this

category: “insiders of Association Agreements (Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine), and

outsiders of Association Agreements (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus)” (Cucerescu

2016, 115).

Moreover, the concluded Association Agreements display a contested membership

perspective, i.e. they neither stipulate expressly the possibility to join the European

Union, nor deny it. Incertitude hovers above the signing parties. Th is is crucial

for going ahead for all contracting parties to avoid unnecessary speculations and

scenarios. Additionally, it could fuel certain threats and create a perfect manoeuvring

space for demolitionists of security and peace in Europe. Adam Hug claims that “the

EaP was transformed by events from a broadly technocratic exercise into a geopolitical

fault line between Europe (and the wider West) and Russia” (Hug 2015, 5). Th e Eastern

Partnership should not be treated in this narrow meaning; it represents more, and it

should not stop in front of this ephemeral and inconsistent impediment.

Th e Eastern Partnership needs a broader vision and a global perspective to be

completely eff ective and effi cient. “Rethinking the past EaP strategies is unavoidable,

but positive eff ects of EaP cannot be underestimated. New initiatives must become

more pragmatic and goal oriented from both sides” (Kerikmäe 2016, 4). In other

words, there are progress indicators: positiveness, pragmatism, purposefulness,

bothsideness and innovation. And everybody should keep to them.

A straightforward approach comes from Laurynas Kasčiūnas and Dovilė Šukytė

in their joint study Th e future of the EU’s Eastern Partnership – challenges and

opportunities for Lithuania’s foreign policy. Th e authors elaborate on such issues as

dilemmas of the EU Eastern Partnership, EU external relations: lack of consistency,

Eurasian Economic Union – an alternative to the EU association policy, Ukraine –

the key to the success of the EU Eastern Partnership, as well as alternatives to the

association agreements. Th e authors suggest revision of “the principle... providing

for development of democratic and constitutional reforms in partner countries

as a prerequisite for cooperation with the EU” (Kasčiūnas, Šukytė 2013, 7).

Following the same line of ideas, in the fi ndings of the study Civil Participation

in Decision Making in the Eastern Partnership Countries by Jeff Lovitt, there are

highlighted key areas of effi cient and inclusive policy making that are valid for Eastern

10 Vasile Cucerescu

Partnership countries. Among them are: free access to information; detailed annual

budgets and expenditure statements; government websites that are easily navigable,

civil participation in political decision-making that will be informed and inclusive

if advance notice of public consultation processes is provided; citizens’ initiatives;

within the framework of the open government partnership, opportunities for public

participation and access to information, in particular open data portals, have been

further strengthened; adoption of green papers; public consultations at central,

regional and local level which should become standard practice; public consultations

should as standard practice include online consultations, expert working groups,

and public hearings; eff ective, high-quality policies and laws that require clear

procedures, professional draft ing skills, and a thorough consultative draft ing process;

monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of policies and decisions at central

and local government level should be mandatory; civil society organisations in the

six Eastern Partnership countries should equip themselves with expertise in the

draft ing of legislation; guidelines aimed at promoting civil participation in political

decision-making; the governments of the six Eastern Partnership countries have an

opportunity to build on existing standards and good practice (Lovitt 2016, 10-103).

Th ese fi ndings are presented in a soft way, being called challenges, but, in fact, they

may be called systemic chronic problems identifi ed before the Eastern Partnership

was launched. Th is is a long discussion initiated in the 1990s, but still on current

agenda. Th e explanation is very simple: post-independence established systems

oppose resistance to everything coming from the outside as it could be an existential

threat to the systems themselves.

A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy: “Shared

Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe” represents a recent initiative evolved

from vision to action in promoting citizens’ interests. Th e title of the policy speaks for

itself. It states that the principles guiding the external actions are: unity, engagement,

responsibility, partnership. Th e principled pragmatism is to guide the EU’s external

actions. It sets the priorities: security of the Union, state and societal resilience

for the East and South, an integrated approach to confl icts and crises, cooperative

regional orders, global governance for the 21st century. Th e EU’s priority for the

neighbourhood, including the Eastern one, relies on investing in state and societal

resilience, because “a resilient state is a secure state, and security is key for prosperity

and democracy” (A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security

Policy: “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe” 2016, 23).

Cooperation relations are to fully benefi t from the potential of all involved

partners, because all of them have something to give for their mutual benefi t. It is


a win-win approach that should be considered when speaking about the Eastern

Partnership.

Th e dialogue needs a multi-faceted approach. For this reason, in the following

chapter several slices of a sociological survey will be discussed. Th e survey was

performed in one Eastern Partnership country and it focuses on diff erent aspects of

the relations between the European Union and Moldova; even though the survey was

conducted a couple of years ago, it is still of great signifi cance today.

4. A Sociological Example: Moldova

A concrete case in the Eastern Partnership is Moldova. Th e sociological survey

“Widening the European Dialogue in Moldova” presents Moldovan citizens’

interesting perceptions concerning cooperation relations in Eastern Europe and the

aspirations shared by respondents. Out of multiple questions 31 (Qi–Qxxxi) the most

relevant ones for the purpose of this study were selected.

Qi) Have you ever heard of the following organisations? (%)

Yes No

1. European Union (EU) 98,2 1,8

2. NATO 86,6 13,4

3. Eurasian Customs Union (ECU) 85,1 14,9

4. Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 87,1 12,9

5. Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) 32,4 67,6

Qii) To what extent are you interested in … %

Very much

Rather interested

Rather not interested

Not at all interested

Do not know

1. What is happening in the EU 30,2 37,1 19,4 11,3 2,0

2. Relations between Moldova

& the EU

37,4 35,1 15,4 10,0 2,1

3. Relations between Moldova

& the ECU

35,3 32,1 21,5 6,3 4,8

4. Relations between

Moldova & Russia

47,4 32,7 12,6 5,1 2,2

12 Vasile Cucerescu

Qiii) How would you describe in general the relations between … ? (%)

Very

good

Rather

good

Rather

bad

Very

bad

Do not

know

1. The EU & its Eastern Neighbours 16,1 42,6 13,3 3,3 24,7

2. The EU & Moldova 17,5 51,0 15,9 3,7 11,9

3. The EU and Russia 8,9 30,4 34,1 12,3 14,3

Qiv) What is the perception of Moldova in the EU? (%)

23,0 Positive

24,5 Rather positive

22,3 Neutral

14,6 Rather negative

10,3 Negative

5,3 Do not know

Qv) What is the perception of the EU in Moldova? (%)

40,1 Positive

24,5 Rather positive

17,0 Neutral

7,6 Rather negative

7,5 Negative

3,3 Do not know

Qvi) How would you describe relations between the EU and Moldova? (%)

31,4 They are equal and mutual beneficial relations

34,7 They are mainly in the interests of the EU

24,5 They are mainly in the interests of our country

9,4 Do not know

Qvii) Do you think that relations between EU and Moldova are improving,

worsening or not changing? (%)

39,0 Improving

43,5 Not changing

8,4 Worsening

9,1 Do not know


Qviii) Do you think the EU is interested in developing closer links with Moldova? (%)

50,4 Yes

31,0 No

18,6 Do not know

Qix) Have you heard about the Association Agreement that the EU and Moldova

are planning to initial in the near future? (%)

50,0 Yes

43,5 No

6,5 Do not know

Qx) If the Association Agreement is initialled, what implications this would have

for Moldova? (%)

Do not know

26,7 Lower prices on goods & energy 62,3 Living costs would increase 11,0

62,0 Trade with the EU would increase 26,4 Limited access to the EU market 11,6

30,9 Higher level of security &

protection

56,4 More problems and pressure

from Russia

12,7

44,4 Greater mobility/freedom of

movement

43,1 More control of/limited mobility 12,5

49,0 Better education/access to EU HEIs 38,2 Expensive & lengthy reforms

of education

12,8

44,8 More economic prosperity 41,6 Costly reforms,

and economic decline

13,6

49,4 Political stability 37,4 Political uncertainty 13,2

46,2 Eradication of corruption 40,6 Hidden corruption 13,2

43,2 Rule of law and independent

judiciary

42,7 Rule of law on paper only 14,1

43,3 More freedoms and rights 43,4 Life will remain the same 13,3

31,0 Resolution of Transnistrian conflict 54,3 Worsening of Transnistrian conflict 14,7

Qxi) What types of cooperation are currently developing between the EU and

Moldova? (%). Multiple choice question

43,0 Economic cooperation 25,8 Visa partnership & mobility

40,9 Trade cooperation 18,3 Moldova’s participation in EU institutions

31,1 Student exchange 16,0 Public administration reform

30,8 Fight against corruption 12,0 Scientific and technical cooperation

29,4 Cross-border cooperation 8,0 Civil society forum

28,5 Business forum and cooperation 0 ,5 Other

27,2 Cooperation between local and the

EU’s authorities

18,7 Do not know

14 Vasile Cucerescu

Qxii) Which of the above are most successful? (%)

15,5 Economic cooperation 4,4 Business forum and cooperation

8,1 Cross-border cooperation 3,1 Moldova’s participation in EU institutions

7,9 Student exchange 1,8 Public administration reform

7,9 Trade cooperation 1,7 Scientific and technical cooperation

6,4 Cooperation between local

and the EU’s authorities

0,6 Civil society forum

5,9 Visa partnership & mobility 32,1 Do not know

4,6 Fight against corruption

Qxiii) Which of the above are least successful? (%)

14,8 Fight against corruption 3,8 Public administration reform

6,6 Economic cooperation 3,6 Moldova’s participation in EU institutions

6,5 Business forum and cooperation 2,8 Scientific and technical cooperation

5,7 Trade cooperation 2,2 Cross-border cooperation

5,0 Visa partnership & mobility 2,1 Civil society forum

4,8 Student exchange 0,2 Other

4,4 Cooperation between local and the

EU’s authorities

37,5 Do not know

Qxiv) Have you ever heard about DCTFA for Moldova? (%)

35,0 Yes

65,0 No

Qxv) What specifi cally does it involve? (%). Multiple answers question.

35,7 Liberalization of trade of goods and services

10,6 Free movement of citizens (without visa)

5,4 Reduction of customs duties

3,4 Development of economic, social and political bilateral cooperation

2,9 Free movement of labour force

1,1 Cancellation of export duties

1,1 Investment growth in Moldova

1,4 Other

46,3 Do not know


Qxvi) Th e EU believes that Moldova is …? (%)

Yes No Do not know

1. Strategic partner of the EU 35,9 45,7 18,4

2. Friendly country 80,6 11,8 7,6

3. Security threat 11,8 75,0 13,2

4. Second-class country 42,6 39,1 18,3

5. Foe 5,0 80,3 14,7

Qxvii) Th e EU sees Moldova? (%)

Do not know

86,8 Peaceful 10,2 Militant 3,0

20,7 Developed 75,7 Laggard 3,6

72,0 Spiritual 24,5 Non spiritual 3,5

51,5 Independent 45,7 Dependent 2,8

73,7 Open 23,6 Closed 2,7

81,1 Partner 14,4 Rivalry 4,5

63,7 Democratic 33,5 Undemocratic 2,8

44,5 Legal-based 52,2 Illegal 3,3

15,2 Strong 82,1 Weak 2,7

90,1 Friendly 6,0 Hostile 3,9

55,3 Important 41,2 Insignificant 3,5

Qxviii) How would you describe relations between the EU and Moldova? (%)

9,2 Active cooperation in many spheres

32,7 Gradual cooperation

41,7 More talking than concrete actions

6,0 Lack of any cooperation

10,4 Do not know

Qxix) Would you agree that Moldova could learn a lot from the EU in relation

to …? (%)

Fully

agree

Rather

agree

Rather

disagree

Absolutely

disagree

Do not

know

1. Democracy & effective governance 43,7 32,8 10,0 4,2 9,3

2. Market economy 47,6 32,0 9,6 3,4 7,4

3. State security 39,4 29,9 14,3 4,5 11,9

4. Multiculturalism 31,6 27,8 17,7 9,8 13,1

5. Religious toleration 23,8 24,7 22,7 13,5 15,3

16 Vasile Cucerescu

Fully

agree

Rather

agree

Rather

disagree

Absolutely

disagree

Do not

know

6. Social security 38,9 30,8 11,1 7,0 12,2

7. Transparent and easy accessible judiciary 37,5 30,8 11,2 6,1 14,4

8. Effective labour market 45,2 28,8 12,8 5,0 8,2

9. Reforming education system 41,2 28,7 11,8 7,6 10,7

10. Fight against corruption 44,9 24,5 12,9 7,3 10,4

11. Reforming agriculture 43,0 30,2 10,5 5,5 10,8

12. SME development 41,6 31,4 9,9 4,3 12,8

13. Protection of environment 43,0 30,2 10,9 4,3 11,6

Qxx) Is the Transnistrian confl ict an obstacle for Moldova’s closer integration

in the EU? (%)

70,2 Yes

17,6 No

12,2 Do not know

Qxxi) Could the EU and Russia work together to resolve the Transnistrian confl ict?

(%)

31,1 Yes, it is important they work together

21,4 To a degree: they have different approaches, which may be difficult to reconcile

37,0 No, they are rivals in this region

10,5 Do not know

Qxxii) Is Moldova’s foreign policy more orientated towards …? (%)

19,4 Russia including the ECU

46,1 The West/ EU

11,6 Neutral

15,0 Multi-vector

7,9 Do not know

Qxxiii) If a referendum about Moldova’s future were held today, how would you

vote in it? (%)

35,9 For more cooperation with Russia and Eurasian Union

31,8 For more cooperation with the EU

25,0 For more cooperation with both

2,0 Against cooperation with both

5,3 Do not know


Qxxiv) If you had to choose between admission to the ECU or the EU, which

option would you vote for? (%)

40,4 ECU

44,3 EU

4,9 None of the aforementioned

10,4 Do not know

Qxxv) Which sentiments do you have when thinking about the EU? (%). Multiple

choice question

46,8 Hope

21,5 Faith

20,3 Distrust

18,7 Concern

13,8 Enthusiasm

12,8 Indifference

9,2 Pride

6,2 Alienation

4,6 Do not know

Qxxvi) Which EU countries do you like the most? (%). Multiple choice question

38,2 Germany 1,6 Finland

27,6 Italy 1,5 Greece

20,8 France 1,0 Ireland

10,7 Great Britain 0,8 Hungary

10,3 Romania 0,7 Estonia

3,9 Spain 0,7 Denmark

2,5 Austria 0,6 Luxembourg

2,1 Portugal 0,5 Lithuania

1,8 Bulgaria 0,5 Slovak Republic

1,7 Sweden 0,5 Belgium

1,7 Netherland 0,1 Latvia

1,7 Czech Republic 30,5 None/Do not know

1,6 Poland

Qxxvii) How many times have you visited the EU? (%)

11,0 Once 1,4 10 times

5,3 Twice 0,2 11 times

4,1 3 times 0,2 12 times



18 Vasile Cucerescu




0,3 9 times 70,0 Never

Qxxviii) Have you ever had any problems when opening a Schengen visa? (%)

5,1 Yes

15,1 No

79,1 Never applied

0,7 Do not know

Qxxix) What other countries have you visited? (%)

48,4 Russia 0,2 Cyprus

35,5 Ukraine 0,1 Armenia

6,2 Belarus 0,1 Azerbaijan

1,6 Kazakhstan 0,1 United Arab Emirates

1,5 Israel 0,1 Estonia

1,3 Turkey 0,1 Uzbekistan

0,6 Georgia 0,1 China

0,4 United States of America 37,7 None/Do not know

Qxxx) Will Moldova become a member of the EU? (%)

46,8 Yes

33,6 No

19,6 Do

not

know

Qxxxi) If yes, when do you think this is likely to happen? (%)

0,4 2013 0,6 2027

8,5 2014 0,6 2028

17,7 2015 4,3 2030

8,5 2016 0,2 2032

6,2 2017 1,1 2033

8,8 2018 0,2 2034

1,1 2019 1,5 2035

17,3 2020 1,5 2040


0,2 2021 0,4 2045

1,3 2022 1,3 2050

5,8 2023 0,2 2070

0,9 2024 0,4 2100

5,3 2025 5,5 Do not know

0,2 2026

Th e answer for Qi is that the EU receives 98,2%. For Qii relations between

Moldova and Russia obtained the highest score of 47,4%. Th e perception of the EU in

Moldova (Qv) is positive with 40,1% as of Moldova in the EU is 23% (Qiv). Altogether

positive and rather positive attitudes constitute 2/3 (Qiv and Qv). Th e relations

between the EU and Moldova are equal and mutual benefi cial with a score of 31,4%

(Qvi). 39,0% of respondents answered that the relations between EU and Moldova are

improving (Qvii). 50,4% believe that the EU is interested in developing closer links

with Moldova (Qviii). As for the types of cooperation that are currently developing

between the EU and Moldova (Qxi), economic cooperation represents 43,0%, trade

cooperation – 40,9%. As for the success of the types of cooperation, they are below

the expectations (Qxii). Moldova is believed to be with 80,6% (Qxvi) and seen with

90,1% (Qxvii) as friendly country by the EU; these are the highest scores. When asked

about to describe the relations between the EU and Moldova, the respondents think

that it is more talking than concrete actions with 41,7% (Qxviii). When thinking

about the EU, Moldovan citizens display such sentiments as hope, faith, etc. (Qxxv).

An alarming answer is off ered to Qxxvii: 70,0% did not visit the EU at all (Nota Bene:

these are the answers of those who live in Moldova, excepting diaspora and mobility

of the working force). Moldovan citizens are optimistic, they think the country will

become a member of the EU with 46,8% (Qxxx). But when, the answers cover a period

of up to 2100 (Qxxxi).

All in all, the answers are positive or highly positive and seem to be imbued

with optimism. Is it an exaggerated optimism? At fi rst sight, it could seem for

an unarmed eye. But it is not for sure. It speaks about the heritage of Moldova:

geographically, the country is situated in the Eastern Europe, the extremity of Latin

people; linguistically, the Romanian language (mother tongue of 82% of Moldovans)

belongs to the Romance family of languages; historically and culturally, Moldova is

linked to Europe.

20 Vasile Cucerescu

5. EaP Multilateral Events

Just for scientifi c curiosity, the calendar of multilateral events was checked. Th e fi rst

half of 2017 includes about 40 events organised both in the EU and in EaP countries

(European External Action Service 2017a); in the second half it is planned to organise

65 events (European External Action Service 2017b). Th eir topics are quite diverse:

CSDP High Level Conference for alumni from EaP countries; CSDP Orientation

Course for EaP Countries; eHealth Workshop; EaPeReg Benchmarking Expert

Working Group – Workshop (Tbilisi); 12th Transport Panel; 1st Panel on Rule of

Law – focus on cybercrime; Panel on CSDP; 5th Panel on Environment and Climate

Change; 12th EaP Public Administration Reform Panel; 2nd International Women’s

Entrepreneurship Laboratory in the Eastern Partner region; Regional transport

investment conference; investment opportunities for the transport sector (including

a dedicated session for EaP); Panel on Migration and Asylum – expert meeting on

border and migration management in emergency situations; Workshop /seminar

on “Development and management of databases in civil service”; 3rd Master Class

for Commercial Attachés; Training on “Organizational Structure and Professional

Competency of Leadership in the Civil Service”; Seminar on integrity in higher

education; 5th Panel on Statistics on innovation and R&D; Workshop/seminar

on “Certifi cation of civil servants: Challenges and prospects”; 17th Platform 2 on

Economic Integration and Convergence with EU Policies; 16th Panel on Integrated

Border Management; 17th Platform 1 on Democracy, Good Governance and Stability;

Senior Offi cials Meeting; Annual workshop of EaP energy regulatory bodies; Panel

on Migration and Asylum – return, readmission and reintegration; Seminar on

“Main Approaches to Reforming the Institute of Self-Government in the Eastern

Partnership Countries”; 17th Platform 4 on People to People contacts; Skills Matching

conference; 3rd Eastern Partnership Youth Forum; Research and Innovation regional

event on funding for innovative companies; 17th Platform 3 on Energy Security;

16th Trade Panel (re-launch); Trust & Security Workshop; eTrade Workshop; eSkills

Workshop; ICT Innovation Workshop; Refl ection Seminar on CSDP; Conference

with academia and civil society from EaP countries on CSDP developments and

partnerships; Moldova National Forum on creative industries; Workshop for media

and communication experts on CSDP; 6th Meeting of Marie Skłodowska-Curie


actions National Contact Points: provision of support to facilitate the participation

of EaP representatives.

Th ere are a lot of EaP multilateral events, in total 105 only for 2017, but a pertinent

question is to what extent they are productive. As the sociological survey mentions

that the perception is that it is more talking than concrete actions. Obviously, the

focus is on the benefi ts for the recipients of these events as they are the main targets

for sharing experience and good practices. Another important issue in this context is

related to cost-impact dichotomy, which seems to be ignored or consciously assumed

by decision-makers. In case it is consciously assumed then a strategy for continuous

improvement is highly needed in this rapidly changing world.

Conclusions

Th e above-mentioned facts are conducive to certain emergent conclusions on the

EU’s policy towards the Eastern Partnership. Th ese open conclusions urge one to re-

visit (revise) the cooperation between the European Union and Eastern Partnership

countries as many times as needed to assess its eff ect on building bridges that serve

the interests of the European Union and Eastern Partnership countries.

A lot of events with participation of public offi cials are organized, however they

seem to be ineffi cient. Th e proposal is to change the format of these meetings by

inviting non-state actors (in a large sense of the concept) to obtain a balance between

the offi cials and civil society representatives – at the same time it would be better to

have more civil society members than offi cials. Th is would increase the effi ciency of

the EU’s policy and agreements in all Eastern Partnership countries.

Finally, a couple of ideas should be considered for Eastern Partnership initiative

in order to strengthen what has been started:

• To develop a better EU communication strategy at all societal levels in Eastern

Partnership countries;

• To open all EU programmes to Eastern Partnership countries;

• To increase the mobility of people from the Eastern Partnership;

• To continue and develop the diff erentiated approach;

• To maintain the more-for-more principle in political and institutional relations

with Eastern Partnership countries;

22 Vasile Cucerescu

• To think about a common security strategy both for the European Union and the

Eastern Partnership.

References

ActsA Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy: “Shared Vision,

Common Action: A Stronger Europe”. 2016. Accessed September 02, 2017. http://www.

eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf

Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. 2003.

“Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and

Southern Neighbours.” Accessed September 02, 2017. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/procedure/

EN/181231

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council.

2008. “Eastern Partnership.” Accessed September 02, 2017. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/

legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52008DC0823&from=EN

European External Action Service. 2017a. “Eastern Partnership Multilateral Events – 1st half

of 2017.” Accessed September 02, 2017. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/fi les/2017_eap_

multilateral_events_with_deliverables_update.pdf

European External Action Service. 2017b. “Eastern Partnership Multilateral Events – 2nd half

of 2017.” Accessed September 02, 2017. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/fi les/2017_2nd_

semester_eap_multilateral_events.pdf

BooksLovitt, Jeff . 2016. Civil Participation in Decision Making in the Eastern Partnership Countries.

Strasbourg: Council of Europe

Book chaptersCucerescu, Vasile. 2016. “EU-EaP Association Agreements: Legal, Political, Economic, Societal

and Historic Implications.” In EU Association Agreements with Georgia, Moldova and

Ukraine: Th rough Cooperation Towards Integration, edited by Carlos E. Pacheco Amaral,

Vasile Cucerescu, Gaga Gabrichidze, Ioan Horga, Anatoliy Kruglashov, Latoszek, Ewa,

Pachocka, Marta 101–117, Chisinau-Tbilisi-Chernivtsi: Print Caro

Hug, Adam. 2015. “Trouble in the neighbourhood? Th e future of the EU’s Eastern Partnership:

Introduction.” In Trouble in the neighbourhood? Th e future of the EU’s Eastern Partnership,

edited by Adam Hug, 4–7, London: the Foreign Policy Centre


Kerikmäe, Tanel. 2016. “Dimensions and Implications of Eastern Partnership Policy:

Introduction.” In Political and Legal Perspectives of the EU Eastern Partnership Policy,

edited by Tanel Kerikmäe, Archil Chochia, 1–5, Cham: Springer International Publishing

Scholarly articlesKasčiūnas Laurynas, Šukytė Dovilė. 2013. “Th e future of the EU’s Eastern Partnership –

challenges and opportunities for Lithuania’s foreign policy.” Eastern Pulse, No 3 (48): 1–7

Kempe, Iris. 2007. “Identifying an Agenda for a New Eastern Policy – Evaluating the

European Neighbourhood Policy beyond the ENP Approach”. Intereconomics, Vol. 42,

No 4: 187–190

Lippert, Barbara. 2007. “Th e EU Neighbourhood Policy – Profile, Potential, Perspective.”

Intereconomics, Vol. 42, No 4: 180–187

Sociological surveysGLOBSEC Policy Institute. 2013. “Widening the European Dialogue in Moldova.” Accessed

September 02, 2017. http://www.cepolicy.org/sites/cepolicy.org/fi les/attachments/survey_

results.pdf



LUDMILA GOLOVATAIA*

The Problems Caused by Intellectual Exodus. The Solutions to Stem the Brain Drain in Republic of Moldova

Abstract

The intellect exodus remains a phenomenon of the XX–XXI century, its study being especially valid now because the effects it can generate are unpredictable, contradictory and sometimes quite difficult to perceive. The migration of highly educated people across international borders, most often from relatively poor countries of origin to relatively rich recipient countries requires particular attention and close monitoring. The article examines patterns of recent emigration of the highly-educated from developing countries, and particularly from Moldova – the “brain drain”. The purpose of this paper is to assess the issue that is caused by highly educated and skilled migration, and to try to analyze the impact of this phenomenon on the economic development of the countries of destinations and on the origin countries. Also, in article is shown the global action and solutions undertaken by the authorities in the Republic of Moldova to stem the brain drain. The paper predominantly uses the analysis method to expose and explain the phenomenon of intellectual migration from an economic perspective. Synthesis is used as a research method to highlight and present the links between brain drain and the economic development of a state.

Key words: brain drain, labor migration, the effects of brain drain, qualified human capital.

Introduction

Th e modern period is characterized by the fact that the world economies are becoming

increasingly globalized, and in such ways that create both opportunities and worries.

* Institute of International Relations of Moldova, [email protected]

26 Ludmila Golovataia

Many sectors of the economy are deeply touched by globalization, including an

increase in trade with products, services and ideas, the movement of factors of

production, such as capital and labor, and the movement of productive activity across

international borders. Th e migration of highly educated people across international

borders, most oft en from relatively poor countries of origin to relatively rich recipient

countries requires attention and close monitoring. Th is article examines the patterns

of recent emigration of the highly-educated from developing countries – the “brain

drain”.

Even though brain drain or skilled labor migration is a long-standing

phenomenon, in recent years is has become a matter of great concern. “Brain drain”

or “skilled labour migration” can be defi ned as a one-way movement of highly skilled

people from developing countries to the developed countries that only benefi ts the

industrialized countries. To what degree are qualifi ed migrants interchangeable with

indigenous specialists is a question worthy of answering. Th erefore, the important

point is to determine the eff ectiveness of migration and its impact on the income

and wealth of the countries of destination. Major migration waves in Europe that

have occurred in recent decades, especially aft er the crisis in Syria, raised the issue

of the eff ect that migrants have on the national economy of the state. Until now,

international assessments have been reduced to the fact that migrants will help to

resolve the problem of labor shortage and achieve an increase in economic growth.

But is it really so?

As for the problem of brain exodus from Moldova, the situation is quite

threatening. Moldovan society is considerably aff ected by the brain drain, which has

a direct negative impact on the development of the economy, science and technology.

Exodus of brains and skilled workers strongly aff ect the public and private sectors

of the economy, leaving behind distortions on social equality and income per capita.

With the amplifi cation of the phenomenon of brain drain and exodus of skilled

labor, the outlook for innovation is diminishing, which is in fact the most important

catalyst for the economy and the development of a state. Moldova lacks innovation

and technology transfer, much needed for an economy in transition, which can be

assimilated and put into practice only by a highly qualifi ed staff . Th e state needs

public policies that encourage the studying youth to practice their professions in the

country in exchange for real social and economic benefi ts. Moldovan population

decreases rapidly and will continue to decline due to aging and low birth rates, which

are detrimental.

Th e purpose of this paper is to assess the issue that is caused by highly educated

and skilled migration, and to try to analyze the impact of this phenomenon on the

27The Problems Caused by Intellectual Exodus. The Solutions to Stem the Brain Drain in Republic ...

economic development of the countries of destinations and on the donor countries.

Additionally, the global and national action and solutions to stem the brain drain

are explored.

Th e paper predominantly uses the analysis method to expose and explain the

phenomenon of intellectual migration from an economic perspective. Th e article

describes the situation of brain drain in Moldova and shows the steps used in the

Republic to improve the current situation. Synthesis is used as a research method to

highlight and present the links between brain drain and the economic development

of a state.

1. The Drain of Minds – a Kind of Modern Scientific Migration

For developed countries, this problem is more urgent than for developing economies. Over the past three decades, the world’s population aged 60 and over has doubled; by 2050 its share will double again. For example, in Germany, without taking into account the refugee factor, the able-bodied population would have decreased by 8.7 million by 2050 (TASS). The number of elderly people in developed countries has already exceeded the number of minors. It is expected that by 2050 there will be twice as many retirees in the United States, Western Europe and Japan as young citizens.

According to a recently published report of Global Commission on International

Migration (GCIM), today, there are nearly 200 million migrants internationally and

around 60% of them are in developed countries, while the other 40% in developing

countries. Th e report also acknowledges that almost one in every 10 persons living

in developed countries is a migrant. Each year the more developed regions receive

about 2.3 million migrants coming from the less developed regions, accounting for

two thirds of their population growth. Th e policy of covering the labor shortage

by migrants has led to the situation that in the main countries of immigration,

newcomers constitute 5–10% of the population and 10–25% of its economically active

part (United Nations, 2016).

Th e recent migration policy of Germany is based on the hypothesis of the favorable

impact of migrants on the host economy if the basis of immigrants is unskilled labor.

Th e main idea is the fi lling of low-skilled specialties by migrants and the preservation

of an average and highly qualifi ed labor market for the indigenous population. Th is


position explains the approach to Ukraine, in which the share of potential highly

qualifi ed emigrants in the EU exceeds the share of low-skilled workers. According to

Europeans, this poses a threat to indigenous specialists in the EU countries. Th at is

why the European Union opens the doors for low-skilled workers from the countries

of the Middle East and Africa arriving through the humanitarian migration channel

and closes them to workers from Ukraine (Strielkowski, Šperková 2016) But how do

refugees aff ect the situation in the economy of Germany, for example? Th e authorities

of this country cite the data of the International Monetary Fund report, according to

which Germany’s GDP increased by 0.3% in 2016. Such growth is due to social welfare

spending, which increased signifi cantly in 2016–2017, mainly due to payments and

social benefi ts to refugees (Deutsche Bundesbank. International Monetary Fund.

Accessed July 22th 2016).

Migration, nevertheless, aff ects the economy ambiguously. Th e improvement and

acceleration of the economy at the expense of migrants depends on how successfully

new labor resources are integrated into society and their ability to give up on state

funding in the future. In places where immigrants are concentrated, social services

and payments are heavily pressured by the need for schooling, health care and social

services for poor immigrant families that are not compensated for (Ottaviano, Peri,

2012). Th e 2013 study “Th e Economic Impact of Immigration in OECD Countries”

showed that in developed European countries, as well as in Australia, Canada and

the US, its positive impact is close to zero, or at best 0.5% of GDP. Th e study analyzed

the migration of the last 50 years. Its infl uence is most noticeable in Switzerland and

Luxembourg, where immigrants provide a net profi t of 2% of GDP. Th e study said

that although migrants do not make a tangible contribution to the country’s budget,

they are not a burden to it. Th e document noted that in most countries, migrants pay

in the form of taxes and social contributions more than they receive in the form of

benefi ts (facilities). However, since the salaries of migrants are lower than the salaries

of local workers, the level of deductions to the budget, respectively, is also smaller.

Th e wide involvement of low-skilled migrants in those or other industries can reduce

labor productivity. Although low-paid immigrants can save fi nancial resources of

employers, in some cases this slows down the modernization of production (OECD–

UNDESA, 2013).

Nevertheless, the use of cheap labor by foreigners underlies the functioning of

a number of industries in developed countries. For example, in Belgium, immigrants

make up half of all workers in the mining sector, in Switzerland – 40% of construction

workers, in the USA – 70% of those employed in the agrarian sector. Th e newest

branches of the economy in developed countries, on the other hand, are now being


upheld in large part by attracting a qualifi ed foreign labor force. Th us, in the sphere

of information technology in the US, 18.3% of the employed are migrants. 60% of

the authors of the most cited works on physics are of foreign origin and 30% – in

other natural sciences in the United States. About a quarter of the founders or

presidents of US biotechnology companies were also natives of other countries.

Migration has an ambiguous eff ect on the ratio of the working and non-working

population. Everything depends on the number of dependents per unit of labor force

entering the country (children, spouses, non-working parents) (Colombo, 1998). A

vivid example is Germany in the 1970s and 1980s. In 1972, which was the peak of labor

migration, the share of employed foreigners was 65%. However, in 1981, against the

background of the cessation of migration infl ow, this indicator fell to 17%, while for

Germans it was 44%. Risks coming from migrants mainly concern unskilled local

workers, the already present migrants, who are entrenched in the labor market and

strive to increase the cost of their payment, as well as women. Th us, the results of

French studies indicate the negative impact of the Maghreb countries natives on the

employment of local women workers and their earnings (Borjas 2006).

Th ose who lose their jobs due to immigrants, turn to the state for benefi ts (Th e

Economist e-Journal, 2016). As a result, pressure on the state budget of the host

country remains. Immigration, the key part of which consists of low-skilled workers,

helps to reduce the level of payment for their labor as compared with the payment of

skilled workers. However, this factor has the opposite eff ect: increasing the number of

specialists at any level leads to a decrease in the cost of services, which favors society

as a whole, but threatens the local labor force (Th e Economist e-Journal, 2016) In the

worst conditions for low-skilled categories of workers, migration contributes to the

improvement of the situation of more qualifi ed groups of workers (Card, 2005).

Migration also has an ambiguous impact on the national budget. According

to a number of American studies, the average immigrant receives less in social

benefi ts and pays more in taxes and contributions than the average native (Blau,

Donehower, 2017). However, the impact on the budget depends on the length of

stay of the foreigner in the host country and the dynamics of immigration. Newly

arrived foreigners have a short-term negative impact on the country’s budget, as

they need employment or strengthened government support. As the length of stay

in the country and the income of migrants increase, their payments to the budget

grow, and the benefi ts they receive are reduced. Accordingly, the state of the budget

is benefi cially aff ected by the increase in the proportion of highly educated migrants.

Th is applies to a lesser extent to workers of medium qualifi cation (Richwine, 2016).


However, coming to developed countries (part from internal migration in the

EU) are mainly low-skilled labor, and therefore impact on the state budget is more

negative. With the help of migration it is impossible to solve future budget problems

related to population aging. Migrants, regardless of age, are defi nitely not able to

compensate for the corresponding losses in the treasury. In this regard, selective

immigration policy can be used here only as an additional economic tool. Despite

attempts to regulate migration by host countries, as well as to their attempts to fi lter

these fl ows qualitatively, a signifi cant proportion of migrants continue to be accepted

for humanitarian reasons, to arrive illegally without being screened and controlled,

or to enter family reunifi cation programs. 70–80% of migrants in the United States,

Sweden and Denmark account for people arriving under the programs of family

reunifi cation, which deprives the state of the opportunity to regulate the quality of

labor resources, and hence their impact on the economy. Due to the low proportion

of workers, for whom the work is the main motivation to move (only 10–15%), the

volume and immigration structure does not always correspond to the economic

needs of the host society. Hence, the economic eff ect of migration has a dual character

and poorly predicted long-term consequences.

2. Labor Market in the Republic of Moldova

Analysis of the labor market in Moldova in recent years refl ects a continued reduction

of the workforce, including the highly skilled, which negatively aff ects the national

economy of the country. In 2016 the economically active population of the R. Moldova

constituted 1272.8 thousand people, without any change in terms of 2015. Th e rate of

the population activity for 15 years old and over stood at 42.6%, being practically at the

level of 2015 (42.4%). Th is indicator reached higher values among the male population

– 45.4%, compared to the female – 40.1%. In the age group 15–29 this indicator had the

value of 30.9%, and in the age group 15–64 – 47.2%. Th e rate of activity of the elderly

working population according to national legislation (16–56 years among females and

16–61 years old among men) was 50.0%. Th e employed population constituted 1219.5

thousand persons, with no signifi cant changes compared to 2015 (+ 1.3%).

As in the case of the economically active population, there were no disparities

between the sexes (50.3% females and 49.7% males), while the percentage of men

in rural areas was higher compared to the number of people in the urban sphere

(relatively 54.1% of the rural population and 45.9% of the urban sprawl).


Th e rate of occupation of the population at the age of 15 years and older (the

proportion of employed persons aged 15 and the total population of each age group)

was 40.8% (+0.5 pp). Th e male occupancy rate (43.0%) was higher compared to that

of females (39.0%). Th e rate of employment of the working age population (16–56 for

women/61 for men) was 47.7%, the age group 15–64 years – 45.2%, and in the age

group 15–29 years this indicator has a value of 28.4% (National Bureau of Statistic of

the Republic of Moldova, 2017).

Figure 1: Evolution of the number of workers and occupations (%)

Source: National Bureau of Statistic of the Republic of Moldova, 2017.

Unusually, the very modest success of the economy is hampering the growth

of jobs. An inalienable role is also attributed to the incompatibility of demand in

the labor market with the academic training of highly qualifi ed specialists. Th e

employment rate for people graduating from higher education institution and

specialized secondary schools is higher, because with the skills the possibility of

placement on the labor market also increases. Unemployed people are oft en off ered

jobs beyond their level of training, so the existing workforce is under-prepared and

less compatible with labor market requirements. Th e inadequacy of the quality

and competitiveness of the human potential with the high needs and demands of

training and qualifi cation in the jobs declared by the economic agents leads to the

poor alignment of the nature of demand to the off er on the labor market (National

Bureau of Statistic of the Republic of Moldova, 2017).


Figure 2: Employment rate of labor force by educational level (%)


Highly skilled labor remains disappointed by the monotonous nature of the

relationship between labor supply and demand. As a result, unskilled labor fi nds its

place in the labor market rather than the highly qualifi ed one, the latter becoming

more vulnerable to migration. Unemployment increases virginly in relation to

employment, and factors such as low salaries or lack of experience determine the

vulnerability of the highly skilled labor force in the Moldovan labor market.

Figure 3: Unemployment rate by age category



Upon analyzing Figure 3 (National Birou of Statistic, Moldova, 2017) it is observed

that among the young people (15–24 years old) the unemployment rate is the highest,

which is determined by the fact that young people in the Republic of Moldova face

diffi culties in fi nding their employment aft er completing their studies. On the one

hand, lack of experience and seniority in work and, on the other hand, the lack of

activities aimed at encouraging young people’s participation creates a precarious

situation. Employment is paramount for social integration. With a quality job, young

people are stimulated to increase their economic potential, learn continually and

contribute to the socio-economic development of the countries. In Moldova the path

of young people from the studies to the workplace is aggravated by the fact that the

young population is decreasing and so many young people choose to emigrate abroad

to work. In the same way, but to some extent the same reasons, there is also highly

skilled labor migration (National Bureau of Statistic of the Republic of Moldova,

2017).

Starting with the fi rst years of independence, in the 1990s, the Republic of

Moldova faced the generic phenomenon called “brain drain”. Its essence lies in

highly qualifi ed people leaving the country to live abroad, in a very signifi cant

number and indefi nitely. In the overwhelming majority of cases, these are people with

higher education (graduate or undergoing training) and possibly with professional

experience in the fi eld of specialization. Th e extremely low salary levels, the

degradation and the lack of a modern material base adapted to the developments in

the fi eld, the budget cuts for the respective institutions – all these factors led to the

gradual devaluation of academic and scientifi c activity. Under these circumstances,

some intellectuals in post-Soviet space in general and in Moldova in particular

emigrated in search of an acceptable standard of living and well-deserved social

recognition. Th e extremely unfortunate migration phenomenon in the case of

Moldova is accentuated by the depressed situation, characterized by the unstable pace

of macroeconomic indicators development in recent years. Th e main dysfunction

of the labor market is the discrepancy between demand and supply of labor. At the

same time, there is a shortage of skilled labor, which is refl ected in two aspects: the

lack of qualifi ed staff and the high fl uctuation in certain occupational segments. On

the other hand, there is a saturation of the labor force, especially in the wholesale

and retail trade and the public administration. Labor productivity fl uctuations are

generated by low wages that do not even meet the primary needs of employees, as a

result, employees are either looking for a better paid job or choosing to work abroad,

where wages are well above those off ered in Moldova (Moraru, 2011).


At the same time, Moldovan economic agents face a shortage of staff , due to

emigration, as well as because of the low qualifi cation of the labor force. 85% of

companies report that they are facing the problem of lack of skilled labor, businesses

require a higher level of professionalism or specifi c skills from workers. Most

oft en, the economic agents mention that they are confronted with the signifi cant

gap between their needs and the professional knowledge of the graduates of the

educational institutions. Experts argue that although some mechanisms to mitigate

labor market problems have made an impact, they are not noticeable, largely since

human capital is not suffi ciently capitalized. Human capital is a constraint for the

development of the national economy and the problems in this fi eld are determined

by developments in education and health (Moraru, 2011).

In the case of the Republic of Moldova, the situation of young people on the labor

market diff ers from that of the EU, this being a dilemma on the labor market over the

last decade. On the one hand, the academic training of young specialists reduces their

compatibility with the demand in the labor market, thus creating serious disparities

in the process of employing them. On the other hand, their professional training is in

many cases questioned by employers in the absence of practical specialized knowledge

(Monitor social, 2016). Also, what makes young people vulnerable to the labor market

in terms of a highly skilled workforce is the attitude shown by young people due to

lack of interest in studies, which in turn is infl uenced by the unattractive jobs in the

job market in Moldova. In the Republic of Moldova the creation of the labor supply

is conditioned especially by the demographic processes, the economic and political

situation. Unemployment among young people is largely due to low wages in the

employment provided by employment agencies. Th is leads to the real loss of human

capital and the emergence of a shortage of highly qualifi ed cadres capable of applying

their intellectual potential. Assessing the knowledge potential and trying to work at

the workplace would increase productivity, but in fact many young specialists are

sceptical about their employment opportunities and then working conditions.

3. Global and National Action and Solutions to Stem the Brain Drain

Th e source countries of the brain drain phenomenon, because they are negatively

infl uenced, are looking for measures to limit it, while welcoming countries are


interested in encouraging this, bringing them all kinds of benefi ts, primarily

economic. One of the main causes of brain drain amplifi cation process is the lack of

jobs and poor-quality jobs. Th e European Union has approved a 75% employment

target for men and women for the 20–64 age group by 2020: an ambitious commitment

to the sustainability of the European social model, social welfare systems, economic

growth and public fi nances. It will not be easy to achieve the goal. Th e crisis has

reduced employment to 69% and increased unemployment to 10%; assuming that the

labor market is stabilizing. Th us, achieving a 75% employment by 2020 will require

an average increase in employment slightly above 1% per year. (Jeff , Chu, 2004)

Decreased fertility caused the EU working age population (15–64) to decline

already in 2012, even if immigration fl ows continue. Labor force is an essential value

for development of a competitive, sustainable and innovative economy under the

Europe 2020 objectives. In times of budgetary constraints and global competitive

pressures, EU policies on employment and skills that help shape the transition to

a green, smart and innovative economy, must be a priority. Th e EU can solve all these

problems and can substantially increase the employment of women, young people

and older workers, but only through decisive action, focused on four key priorities

(Jeff , Chu, 2004):

• First, better functioning of labor markets. Chronic high unemployment is an

unacceptable loss of human capital: it discourages workers and leads to a premature

withdrawal from the labor market and social exclusion. Flexicurity policies are the

best tool for modernizing labor markets: they accelerate the pace of reform, reduce

labor market segmentation, promote gender equality, as well as take advantage of

transitions.

• Secondly, a more competent workforce capable of contributing and adapting

to technological change through new patterns of work organization. Investing

in education and training systems, anticipating the skills needed, dissonance

and guidance services are fundamental factors in increasing productivity

and competitiveness, accelerating economic growth and, fi nally, increasing

employment.;

• Th ird, better job quality and working conditions. Th ere is no compromise between

quality and quantity of employment: high levels of job quality in the EU are

associated with equally high labor productivity and participation in employment.

Working conditions and the physical and mental health of workers must be taken

into account to meet the demands of the professional careers of the present,

characterized by more transitions between more intense and demanding jobs and

new forms of work organization;


• Fourthly, stronger policies to promote job creation and labor demand. Economic

recovery must be based on job-generating growth. Suitable conditions for

creating more jobs, including high-performance companies and business models

based on intensive research and development must be achieved. Policies that

enable the capitalization of key sources of job creation and the promotion

of entrepreneurship and self-employment are also essential to the growth of

employment (Communication from the Commission, 2010).

Support for job creation and (re)allocation of employment should be targeted

at sustainable and growing businesses, especially among SMEs. Policy initiatives

must continue to seek both to improve productivity and employment by helping to

allocate human resources to the economic and social needs identifi ed by the Europe

2020 strategy and to achieve the optimal balance between trade and non-commercial

sectors. It should also improve the labor market situation of more vulnerable groups

such as young people, women, low-skilled workers, elderly workers and minority

groups. In order to respond to the main structural economic challenges facing

Europe, transversal measures need to be complemented by specifi c actions in sectors

with a particularly high potential for job-creating growth. Employment policies to

help to create favorable conditions for job creation (Jauer, Liebig, Martin and Puhani,

2014). For this, they can mobilize the EU budget (in particular the European Social

Fund). In addition to the measures on off er, such as investment in skills and labor

activation, and services for linking supply and demand, there are a number of tools

that have a positive eff ect on the demand for labor:

• Targeting employment subsidies to new jobs. Creating adequate incentives and

employment subsidies should motivate employers to make new net recruitment,

creating jobs that would not otherwise be created;

• Reduce the fi scal burden on labor cost in a budget-neutral way by moving to

environmental taxes, consumer or property taxes, with adequate redistribution

eff ects. However, preparation and implementation need to be carefully planned so

that they do not have a negative eff ect on the employment prospects of the groups

(immediately) below the eligibility threshold;

• Promoting and supporting independent activities, social enterprises and

new businesses. Encouraging entrepreneurship, greater availability of new

business support services and microfi nance, and mechanisms for transforming

unemployment benefi ts into grants for start-ups play an important role in

stimulating self-employment and creating new jobs. Social economy and social

enterprise actors are important factors in creating inclusive and socially inclusive


jobs and require specifi c support, for example through public procurement and

access to fi nance;

• Transforming informal or undeclared work into a regulated employment.

Undeclared work is illegal. It also has serious budgetary implications, by reducing

tax revenues and social security contributions. It has a negative impact on

productivity and working standards, skills development and lifelong learning.

It also does not provide a solid basis for pension rights and access to healthcare.

Preventing and combating undeclared work, full application of Directive 2009/52

/EC on sanctions and illegal workers and measures to help workers who are not

declared to be integrated into the labor market contribute to the fi scal consolidation

process, creating a level playing fi eld for businesses and improving the quality of

jobs.

Stimulating net wages. A higher net salary is an incentive for hiring lower-skilled

workers, as reducing wage pressure will allow employers to off er vacant jobs more

easily. However, income replenishment should be designed in such a way as to avoid

the “low wage trap”. Th ese benefi ts have positive eff ects when there is a signifi cant

pay gap in the bottom of the income scale;

Modernize wage setting systems to align salary levels with productivity

developments and encourage job creation. Th e existence of wage setting systems to

ensure that real wage growth refl ects the evolution of labor productivity and labor

market conditions is a prerequisite for ensuring that increased production leads to a

corresponding increase in demand for labor and job creation. Th e evolution of wages

must take into account, according to national collective bargaining practices, the

competitive position of the Member States. While salary moderation or adjustment

may be necessary in some sectors or Member States, where wages have remained

signifi cant as a result of productivity developments, targeted wage increases could

be expected to contribute to aggregate demand (Collett, 2015).

Measures adopted internationally to attract and retain human capital in general

and scientists in particular are very diverse. One of the main strategies used to

attract and retain high-skilled labor at national and international level is to increase

investment in research, i.e. to allocate additional resources for technical-material

endowment and the salaries of researchers.

In the case of the Republic of Moldova, the return of the highly qualifi ed labor

force would entail enormous costs related to the modernization of the research and

innovation infrastructure to create conditions like those in the West, to reduce the

wage gap, to insure the privileged conditions in the institutional hierarchy, etc.

(Borodak, Piracha, 2010). An alternative to this long-lasting process would be the


creation of scientifi c diasporas abroad, which could be an intermediate stage of

the return process in the country of origin. Th e Academy of Sciences of Moldova

launched in 2008 the initiative “Development of cooperation within the scientifi c

Diaspora of the Republic of Moldova”. Th e initiative aims primarily at creating a

platform for interaction between the scientifi c Diaspora and the Moldovan scientifi c

community through the phased creation of the Scientifi c Diaspora Network of the

Republic of Moldova. A practical example in this respect is the offi cial launch on 30

April 2010 of the Joint Research Project on “Connecting the Scientifi c Diaspora of the

Republic of Moldova to the Scientifi c and Economic Development of the Country of

Origin” funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation and the Swiss Development

Agency. Th e overall objective of this research project is to promote knowledge-based

data on the Moldovan Diaspora in the main destination countries and to provide a

set of recommendations of the Government of Moldova, the scientifi c community

and the scientifi c Diaspora of the Republic of Moldova, recommendations which can

boost the development of the potential of the scientifi c community.

Th e Expert Return Program, implemented by the International Center for

Migration and Development (CMD) by the German Federal Ministry of Economics,

Cooperation and Development, supports the professional reintegration of university

graduates and experienced experts from the developing countries and who have

completed their professional training in Germany and are interested in returning

to their home country. Priority for the Program is the placement of those experts

who have skills in areas relevant to development policies in their native country.

Besides support in the process of identifying and providing job placement services

a free consultation program fi nancially supports interested experts to return home

(Returning Experts Program) (Bratu, 2015). In October 2010, the International

Organization for Migration, Mission to Moldova (IOM), in partnership with the

Ministry of Youth and Sports, the Ministry of Education and the Employment Agency,

announced the launch of a pilot program to promote and support temporary or

permanent return in Moldova, 30 young Moldovan graduates from abroad to engage

in private/public institutions in Moldova to exchange experience and implement

abilities. Th is program is implemented within the framework of the project “Support

to the implementation of the migration and development component of the EU-

Moldova Mobility Partnership”, funded by the EU and implemented by the IOM in

cooperation with the Government of the Republic of Moldova.

Th ere is a wide range of possible Diaspora activities that potentially can

contribute to Moldova’s development and may merit public support in the future.


Th eir development impact should be evaluated rigorously because either government

or donor funding would be involved.

All of the above is promoted by the Pilot Program PARE 1 + 1, operating in

Moldova, to attract money transfers of migrants in businesses. Th e main goal is to

mobilize the human and fi nancial resources of Moldovan migrants for the sustainable

economic development of the Republic of Moldova by stimulating the creation

and development of small and medium-sized enterprises. Th e program operates

according to the rule of “1 + 1”, that is, each invested Moldovan leu earned abroad

will be supplemented by 1 leu (MDL) in the form of a grant from the Program budget.

(Bratu, 2015)

Within this program, the entrepreneurs have started and developed new business

ideas, which had not been implemented in Moldova. Th e PARE 1 +1 enterprises were

among the fi rst to develop businesses in the biomass fi eld (pellets and briquettes,

green energy), exotic animal farming (chinchilla, ostriches, vipers), grow milk thistle,

paulownias, rising added value to agricultural products by creating greenhouses,

refrigerators, mills, snail farm, agricultural tourism, etc.

From the economic point of view, this program proved to be eff ective both by a

large number of open enterprises and by the fact that each leu invested by the state

attracted private investments of 3–4 lei. Th e fi gures confi rm this eff ectiveness. During

the last 7 years, under the PARE 1 + 1 program, 927 businessmen received grants. Th ey

created about 3000 new jobs and 8 million euros were reinvested in the business. Th e

PARE 1 + 1 program aims to mobilize the human and fi nancial resources of Moldovan

labor migrants in Moldova’s sustainable economic development by encouraging the

creation and development of small and medium-sized enterprises by migrant workers

and remittance recipients. Recipients of assistance are labor migrants, recipients

of their remittances, relatives of the fi rst degree of kinship. At the same time, the

experience of Moldova is studied by other countries, in which there are many migrant

citizens. An example is Serbia, which is intensively studying the Moldovan experience

of implementing such a project in its country. Th e aforementioned projects aimed to

address the phenomenon of brain drain by promoting the transfer of new ideas and

skills in migration of young and highly qualifi ed labor force mobility.


Conclusions

Th e source countries of the brain drain phenomenon, because they are negatively

infl uenced, are looking for measures to limit it, while welcoming countries are

interested in encouraging this trend, bringing them all kinds of benefi ts, primarily

economic. One of the main causes of brain drain amplifi cation process is the lack and

poor-quality jobs. In times of budgetary constraints and global competitive pressures,

EU policies on employment and skills that help shape the transition to a green,

smart and innovative economy, must be a priority. Th e EU can solve all the problems

and can substantially increase the employment of women, young people and older

workers, but only through decisive action, focused on four key priorities: better

functioning of labor markets; more competent workforce capable of contributing

and adapting to technological change through new patterns of work organization;

better job quality and working conditions; stronger policies to promote job creation

and labor demand.

Measures adopted internationally to attract and retain human capital in general

and scientists in particular are very diverse. One of the main strategies used to

attract and retain high-skilled labor at national and international level is to increase

investment in research, i.e. to allocate additional resources for technical-material

endowment and salary of researchers.

In the case of the Republic of Moldova, the return of the highly qualifi ed labor

force would entail enormous costs related to the modernization of the research and

innovation infrastructure to create conditions similar to those in the West, to reduce

the wage gap, to insure the privileged conditions in the institutional hierarchy, etc. In

the opinion of certain Moldovan experts, an alternative to this long-lasting process

would be the creation of scientifi c diasporas abroad, which could be an intermediate

stage of the return process in the country of origin. Taking into consideration these

circumstances and recognizing the necessity of involvement of the scientifi c Diaspora

of the Republic of Moldova, the Academy of Sciences of Moldova launched in 2008

the initiative “Development of cooperation within the scientifi c Diaspora of the

Republic of Moldova”.

Th e initiative aims primarily at creating a platform for interaction between the

scientifi c Diaspora and the Moldovan scientifi c community through the phased

creation of the Scientifi c Diaspora Network of the Republic of Moldova.


Th e Pilot Program PARE 1 + 1, operating in Moldova, aimed to attract money

transfers of migrants in businesses. Th is program is one of the most successful national

programs supported by the government and the best platform for cooperation between

government and business. Along with the fact that it has a very strong component

on training entrepreneurs for business development, the program promotes the

development of small and medium businesses in rural areas, the development of

villages in various regions of the country. Th e main goal is to mobilize the human and

fi nancial resources of Moldovan migrants for the sustainable economic development

of the Republic of Moldova by stimulating the creation and development of small and

medium-sized enterprises. Within this program, the entrepreneurs have started and

developed new business ideas, which had not been implemented in Moldova. Th is is

the best practice of Moldova and therefore is studied by other countries where there

are many migrant citizens. For example, Serbia is intensively studying the Moldovan

experience of implementing such a project in its country.

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INDRIKIS MUIZNIEKS*TATJANA MURAVSKA**

Doctoral Schools at the University of Latvia:Sharing Experience and Looking Ahead

Abstract

Multi- and inter-disciplinary approach in studies is an important trend towards strengthening research in Europe and in the world. The article examines a concept of doctoral schools contributing a trans- and inter-disciplinary dimension to postgraduate education. It discusses how educational institutions have to respond to the challenges of providing a high-quality research training environment. The authors show, by using the example of the University of Latvia, that the establishment of doctoral schools at university level is a worthy strategy for higher education institutions as it will give doctoral and master students an opportunity to acquire solid knowledge about subject maters and it will contribute to the creation of a stimulating research environment. The development of analytical skills and specialist knowledge promoted by doctoral schools is a valuable asset in areas where in-depth knowledge of the trans- and inter-disciplinary approach is at the centre of research.

Key words: doctoral schools, trans- and inter-disciplinarily research, universities.

* University of Latvia, [email protected]** University of Latvia, [email protected]

46 Indrikis Muiznieks, Tatjana Muravska

Introduction

In the contemporary world human societies exhibiting diverse and complex cultural

identities and diff erent beliefs interact very closely. To describe the transformation

of the 21st century’s societies with words such as complexity, interdependence and

interaction of various processes is to indicate clearly that the problems of these

societies are increasingly complex and interdependent. Moreover, the same problems

are not limited to single sectors or disciplines, and they are not easily predictable.

Reality is a nexus of interrelated phenomena that cannot be reduced to a single

dimension (e.g. Muravska 2011, 8). Currently important challenges are ahead of the

European economy and politics as well as European integration. Th e EU is facing both

a major wave of “brain drain”, seriously impacting its economy, as well as a serious

“refugee crisis”. Shortage of labour and highly skilled professionals is recognized as

an important constraint standing in the way of dynamic economic development in

the EU and it is one of the main concerns for politicians and intellectuals.

Th us, the institutions dealing with higher education and research are facing

new challenges and must respond to the new processes that strengthen the mutual

ties between international communities. Interrelation and interaction of political,

economic, social and other dimensions leads to the interdependence of studies and the

demand for integrated comparative educational settings that off er an inter-disciplinary

approach to the development of generic and specifi c knowledge, skills and competences.

Th e main objective of the article is to examine a concept of doctoral schools as

a trans- and inter-disciplinary dimension of post -graduate education while, at the

same time, discussing how educational institutions must respond to the challenge

of providing a high-quality research training environment. Th e methodology of

this contribution is based on the trans- and interdisciplinary approach as a tool in

the assessment of analytical skills and specialist knowledge development promoted

by doctoral schools. It is a strong asset in areas, where in-depth knowledge of trans-

and inter-disciplinary approach is the focus of research. Th e authors show, by using

the example of the University of Latvia, that the establishment of doctoral schools at

university level is a valuable strategy for higher education institutions. Th ey argue

that it will give doctoral and master students and opportunity to acquire solid

knowledge about subject matters by applying an inter-disciplinary approach and that

it will contribute to the creation of a stimulating research environment.

Diff erent factors have impact on the educational and research environment, i.e. the

changes in the international division of “intellectual” labour (Singh, Han 2017, 57) and

the corresponding fi nancial resources as well as a number of economic growth factors,

47Doctoral Schools at the University of Latvia: Sharing Experience and Looking Ahead

such as the period of the recent economic and social turmoil started in 2008 and its

ramifi cations for education and research. Th ese changes are reshaping global markets

and, at the same time, impacting education systems, research, innovation and knowledge

development. Such transformation processes lead to intriguing research questions such

as: how are universities adjusting to these new market demands and, specifi cally, how

are universities creating a brand? What are the implications of the “university brand”

and the introduction of a “brand society’ in the fi eld of higher education?

Universities worldwide are in the midst of a dramatic transformation of their

administrative and scholarly goals. Such reforms are driven by a sense of global

competition among higher education institutions, now forcing universities to set

strategic plans for growth and excellence. Th ese strategies join the already established

practices of outlining fi nancial solvency, global ranking, and curricula. Universities also

approach their identity in a strategic manner and increasingly concentrate their eff orts

on branding. While still being “Republics of Scholars”, in today’s economic and political

environment universities oft en perform as “Organisations” (e.g. Muravska, 2011). Th is is

a new trend in the transformation of our societies which is also true in Latvia.

1. Situation in Latvia: Maturity in Relations to Postdoctoral Studies

Th e modifi cations in the Latvian higher-education system that followed the national

implementation of the Bologna process had a domain-specifi c impact within the

whole Latvian academic community. While the legislative changes equally aff ected

all disciplines, for example, the transition to the three-cycle structure Bachelor-

Master-PhD, the effi ciency of the quality assurance policies and mechanisms

depended strongly on the maturity of each academic community in charge of their

implementation, internationalization and the ability to publish research results at the

doctoral level and beyond.

As it is shown in Figure 1, there is a large imbalance in a number of research papers

published in various fi elds. For example, in social sciences the share of publications is

only 4% while in engineering as well as in physics and astronomy it is 13%. It is clear,

that in many subject areas the number of research publications should be increased

(e.g. Muižnieks 2016).


Figure 1: Research papers published by subject areas in Latvia 2005–2015 in percentage

Chemistry

7%

Data source: Latvian Academy of Sciences; N=6743.

Figure 2 shows that the most cited research papers are in biochemistry, genetics and

molecular biology as well as, by far, in medicine. Th e least cited are research papers are in

mathematics, computer and social silences and multidisciplinary (e.g. Muižnieks 2016).

Figure 2: Research papers published in Latvia 2005–2015.

Median citation number per 50 top papers

41

28

136

35

35

30

58

11

15

12

26

15

3

38

22

18

0 50 100 150

Physics and Astronomy

Engineering

Medicine

Materials Science

Agricultural and Biological Sciences

Chemistry

Biochemistry. Genetics and Molecular Biology

Social Sciences

Computer Science

Mathematics

Environmental Science

Chemical Engineering

Multidisciplinary

Immunology and Microbiology

Pharmacology. Toxicology and Pharmaceutics

Earth and Planetary Sciences

Source: Scopus, N=6743.


Th e above information demonstrates that serious consideration should be given

to further development of research in, for example, social sciences. However, attention

should be devoted also to humanities and cultural sciences.

To improve the situation there is a need to further develop diff erent forms and

methods of education at the third level of studies − doctoral studies. One of the

instruments in implementation of this task is the establishment of doctoral schools,

methodological seminars with participation of professors and experts from partner

universities and research institutions, who advise students and supervise doctoral

study processes in one or more study areas. Th e harmonious approach in maintaining

the development of diff erent fi elds should not be forgotten. Th e number of doctoral

graduates should increase proportionally in humanities, social sciences and natural

sciences (e.g. Muiznieks 2011).

To ensure the maintenance of the Latvian “academic society” Latvia needs

100–120 new doctoral degree holders every year. During 2008–2010 there were on

average around 130 graduates per year. In 2008 a doctoral degree was obtained by 139

graduates, in 2009 by 174 graduates and in 2010 by 132 graduates. However, to reach a

qualitative change in the state of research and development in Latvia there is a need

for 300 new doctoral degree holders every year. Such an increase is not an easy task,

especially while keeping high standards for degree recipients. Th us, what follows is that

doctoral degree funding should be increased by three to four folds (e.g. Muižnieks 2011).

In 2009 a European Social Fund (ESF) was implemented in Latvia with an aim

to support doctoral studies. To a large extent the €15.5-million programme helped

in modernizing doctoral studies in all subject areas. It was very important due the

severe public debt crisis in 2008 and the resulting reductions of funds available for

doctoral studies and research (e.g. Delloite 2013).

Th e academic community at the University of Latvia is among the most

internationalized ones in the country, with long-standing scientifi c collaborations

both at European level and worldwide, and research output of the highest quality.

Th is, in turn, ensures the quality of the doctoral studies in the University’s education

system, which, for the past few years has been competitive worldwide.

To promote further academic development and interdisciplinary research, the

University of Latvia implemented a concept of interdisciplinary, topic-oriented doctoral

and master studies, in which a special role is assigned to Doctoral Schools (DS).


2. The Concept of Doctoral Schools and Their Role in Strengthening Interdisciplinary Research

Interest in the interdisciplinary approach has a long history and it sparked

a lot of debates in the recent years. While academics tend to conclude that a deep

understanding of contemporary society requires an interdisciplinary approach,

the application of this approach in higher education and sciences is still complex.

Th e present-day complexity, volatility and diversity of the globalised world demand

changes and a response to new challenges in higher education and research. In this

context, V.B. Mansilla (2005) concludes that a deep understanding of contemporary

life requires an interdisciplinary approach. Th ere is a growing need for the

involvement of experts in diff erent disciplines to handle the complex issues of the

contemporary society and to carry out interdisciplinary research related to various

topical problems. Meanwhile, higher education needs a new approach that can give

students generic knowledge, wide outlook, professional skills and competences

which in these circumstances can be a challenge. Educators and researchers agree

that the debates about disciplinarily and interdisciplinarity are complex as they

“directly challenge nothing less than the way the understanding, production and

dissemination of knowledge are structured within the academy” (e.g. Shailer 2005).

Also, interdisciplinary approach raises questions about how and to what extent

university researchers and educators should collaborate with other parties involved

in the new knowledge development (private research centers, industrial laboratories,

business and commercial organizations, etc.).

Doctoral School at the University of Latvia were launched in 2009 as projects

with an aim to promote trans- and interdisciplinary research of young scholars and to

increase the quality and effi ciency of research done by young researchers. Most of these

young scholars are Doctoral and Master’s students who will continue their doctoral

studies. Currently the 19 DS at the University are as follows: Research, Modelling and

Mathematical Methodology Improvement for Atomic and Continuous Media Physical

Processes; Study for Sustainable Use of Plant and Soil, Biological Resources European

Integration and Baltic Sea Region Studies; Th e Baltic Doctoral School named aft er

Wladimir Admoni; Doctoral School of Biomedical Research and Novel Technologies;

Human Capacity and Learning for Life Wide Learning in Inclusive Context of Diversity;

Computer Science and its Interdisciplinary Applications in Natural and Social


Science; Doctoral School in Translational Medicine, Animal Diversity and Quality

of Environment; Physics and Chemistry of Interaction between Electromagnetic

Radiation and Materials, Functional Materials and Nanotechnology; Th e Development

of Individuals, Groups and Organizations under the Infl uence of Interactions of

Psychological, Educational and Social Factors; Lettonica and Intercultural Studies;

Th e Analysis of Social and Political Processes in the Post-Soviet Area; Doctoral School

in the Vision Research; Current Issues of Th eology and Religious Studies; Insuring

International Competitiveness of the National Economy; Environmentally Friendly

Organic Synthesis; Earth Resources and their Sustainable Use.

Th e tasks of the doctoral schools are diverse. Th e schools should refl ect on and

defi ne their research topics based on what is relevant for the needs of society. Th ey

should focus on problems from multiple points of view of diff erent disciplines,

off ering the views of academia, practitioners from a variety of disciplines, expert

areas and countries. Th e main tasks of DS are to combine various fi elds of science,

academic and research work to solve scientifi cally and socially important issues; to

promote the exchange of ideas and information, including the creation of innovative

projects by encouraging the use of doctoral studies’ results in the process of fostering

innovation, to attract foreign partners and experts, to promote publication of research

results in international scientifi c journals.

Th e DS have to implement research on the basis of cooperation with diff erent

departments, research centres and institutes at their own University, as well as in

cooperation with research organisations, universities and think tanks outside of their

University, to promote new innovative methods of conducting doctoral studies in the

design and implementation of research projects.

A number of doctoral programmes can be involved in each doctoral school.

Doctoral School are also eligible to perform activities up to four years with the right

to extend the deadline. A four-year period could be extended two times on the basis

of repeated application followed by a positive decision from the Academic Advisory

Council of the University and the University leadership support.

Th e process of establishing a DS and reviewing its application consist of diff erent

stages.

1. Th e Advisory Councils of the University have to consider the following criteria:

scientifi c and practical signifi cance of the DS subject, novelty and inter-

disciplinary, cooperation potential, the possible value added that might result

from collaboration, as well as suggestions by the DS Executive Board.

2. Aft er the DS application is reviewed, Advisory Councils makes recommendations

to the University leadership.


3. Th e University leadership establishes the Commission that evaluates the DS

conformity with the development strategy of the University as well as with the

interests of social partners and the University image.

To establish a DS an applicant needs to fulfi l the following criteria and

administrative requirements:

– to cooperate with at least three diff erent doctoral programmes from three diff erent

fi elds of science;

– to submit three letters of support from institutions involved in DS;

– to establish an Executive Board, consisting of at least 10 scientists (50% of which

must be from the University staff , a least 3 board members must be scholars

attracted from abroad and at least two members must be scholars from Latvia, but

not the University staff ).

It is also stated that there must have been at least one dissertation supervised

(with doctoral degree obtained as a result) on average per one Executive Board

member of the University over the past three years.

Th e necessary documents for establishing the DS include an application, an action

plan, the applicant’s evaluation form, letters of support, a list of declared members

with attached CVs and proofs of participation in diff erent doctoral programmes,

as well as the list of doctoral theses defi ned under the supervision of University

academic staff included in the Exacutive Board of the DS. Th e participants of the DS

are masters and doctoral students, their academic supervisors, the Exacutive Board,

including its chairment and technicalsecreatary.

The DS work is organised as followes: scientific colloquia, seminars,

methodological training and other related activities. DS activities aim to improve

the sceintifi c performance of their parcitipants, analyses research theories research

methods learning, identifi cation of innovation and knwoledge transfer opportunities,

publishing oportunities of research results, etc. Th e Executive Board makes decisions

on cooperation with diff erent study programmes, research subject areas, involvement

of new participants and partner institutions, ets.

During 2009–2015 doctoral students had the opportunity to apply for grants

to carry out research projects, defend their PhDs, get additional skills, acquire

cross-disciplinary experience and boost their career. Th e number of publications

in recognized journals has signifi cantly increased. All this was possible due to the

implementation of EU ESF project “Support for doctoral studies in University of

Latvia”. It was initiated in 2009 and by the end of 2015 had a budget of €22.2 million

(European Commission 2011). From the start of the project, 541 doctoral theses have

been submitted to the Doctoral Council, 527 of them have been successfully defended


(University of Latvia 2015). Five competitions for scholarships were announced for

about 600 doctoral students and doctoral degree candidates.

Th is was a vital incentive for young researchers to undertake doctoral studies. Th e

implementation of the ESF helped increase the number of specialists with doctoral

degrees, and improve the knowledge potential of the country with high added value

in promoting economic development on the basis of innovation and development of

high-technology sectors. Apart from funding students, the ESF provided support for

guest lecturers and seminars to encourage the adoption of new research methods. Most

of these activities have been implemented through the activities of the doctoral schools.

Currently there are 19 Doctoral schools operating as interdisciplinary, based on

interdisciplinary approach to research in social, natural sciences and humanities.

3. Methodology of Interdisciplinary Research Implementation: The Example of the Doctoral School on European and Baltic Sea Region Studies

Interdisciplinarity and an integrated scientifi c approach is viewed by scholars as

research to serve society. Much of the global literature on interdisciplinarity argues

that it has a key role to play in addressing the grand challenges that society faces.

Moreover, it has a catalytic role in encouraging interdisciplinary research by defi ning

and describing the ‘grand challenges’ that require interdisciplinary solutions. Th e

increased complexity associated with interdisciplinary research means that appropriate

timescales for funding are an important consideration (Global Research Council 2016).

However, a recently published book, “Rethinking Interdisciplinarity Across Th e Social

Sciences And Neurosciences (2015)”, suggests “less focus on structures and funding

for interdisciplinarity, and more on the everyday highs and lows of collaboration”.

An eclectic approach has been selected by the University of Latvia when a

Doctoral School for European Integration and Baltic Sea Region Studies (EIBSRS)

was launched at the University in 2009 by decision of the Rector of the University of

Latvia on November 2009 to support young scholars during their research training

(University of Latvia 2009). It is also important to understand that doctoral schools

are complimentary to the doctoral programmes and doctoral programmes remain

responsible for academic admission of a PhD proposal, regular doctoral studies and

the preparation of the PhD theses for their defence.


Th e doctoral school carries out activities related to the international dimension of

the doctoral degree and helps to increase the value of the graduate on the job market,

in the society and in their personal careers as researchers. Most of doctoral students

at the School gathered “real” research experience by contributing to research projects

implemented at the Centre for European and Transition Studies funded through the

European Commission (Box 1).

Box 1

The EBSRS School covers the following research dimensions:Northern dimension – Baltic Sea Region development strategy – Baltic Sea Region: Integration and cooperation, competitiveness, business development, marketing and clusters

– Macroeconomic and financial stability– Common foreign and energy security policy– Social and demographic Dimensions in the EU policies– Migration and asylum problems in the EU– Good governance and public communication in the EU – Interdisciplinary research and education in European Integration Studies– Creative economy and innovation development in the Baltic Sea Region– Political and social dimension in the process of democratization in the newer EU member states

and candidate countries– EU legal regulation in the areas of cooperation– Recognition of national interests within the EU– Baltic sea region in the EU: cultural and historical dimension in the EU– Territorial cohesion in the Baltic Sea Region countries and EU

– Comparative law issues in the EU

Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on the University of Latvia Senate Decision No 169; European Commission,

DG Education and Culture Grant Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, No.199871-LLP-1-LV-AJM-PO; Regulations

on Promotion Councils and Promotion at the University of Latvia, No. 1/995 dated 12.04.2006, amended No. 1/335,

dated 15.11.2011.

Research training at the school is associated with deepening and widening

knowledge about the process of integration in Europe. Special attention is given to

integration of the Baltic States in the EU, regional cooperation and socio-economic

development in the Baltic Sea area. Participation in the School activities helps to

improve skills in trans- and interdisciplinary research.

Th e School cooperates with diff erent research structures at the University of Latvia

and other educational and research establishments in the country, as well as partners

from the EU and non-EU countries. Th is cooperation provides a solid platform for

advanced studies that off ers added value within and outside the discipline of young

researchers. Doctoral as well as Master students from diff erent subject areas and study

programmes such as economics, law, politics, communication, management, culture,

geography, European Studies and Baltic Sea Region Studies are welcome there.

Th e doctoral school organizes guest lectures, seminars, regular discussions

and Jean Monnet doctoral colloquia, as a part of the European Commission Jean


Monnet Programme. In addition, working groups are arranged to facilitate research-

related activities. Th e DS also arranges information sessions, promotional events and

interaction with industry, keeping up with the needs of external stakeholders.

To facilitate the operation of the School an Executive Board of the DS was set up,

which consists of 8 professors from the University of Latvia and two members from

partner institutions from abroad. Th e Executive Board is responsible for admission

of doctoral students. Applicants from the University of Latvia, higher educational

institutions in Latvia and other countries are welcome to apply. Furthermore, the

Executive Board suggests research themes and approves activities.

All the Conferences and roundtable discussions were directed at facilitating

further trans-disciplinary research on topics related to the assessment of complex and

interrelated processes of legal, cultural and socio-economic integration in Europe and

the Baltic Sea Region. Th e fi rst conference organised by the School in cooperation

with a number of Latvian and international partners was held in 2011 (Box 2).

Box 2

International Conference

“European Integration and Baltic Sea Region: Diversity and Perspectives”,

September 26–27, 2011 Doctoral School “European Integration and Baltic Sea Region Studies (EIBSRS)”University of Latvia, Centre for European and Transition Studies,Wismar Business School – University of Applied Sciences Technology, Business and DesignCanadian Embassy to Estonia, Latvian and LithuaniaThe conference is supported by the European Commission, the Latvian Embassy of Finland, the Nordic Council of Latvian office of the Canadian Embassy to Estonia, Latvian and Lithuania, the Baltic-German University Liason Office with Funds the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD)Themes of the Conference:Globalisation and the Future of the StateLegal and Historical Aspects of European Integration University – Business Cooperation: Infrastructure and EnvironmentEU Internal Market and Social Dimension Macro Regions, Territorial and special DevelopmentEU Internal Market Development and TrendsCulture, Arts and EducationResearch, Innovation and Competitiveness University – Business Cooperation: Promotion of Entrepreneurship and InnovationROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION: European Union External Relations with Focus on the Eastern Partnership and RussiaTHE LATVIA–CANADA PANEL DISCUSSION: Latvia & Canada: Socio-Economic Dimensions within the European Context

ROUNDTABLE DEBATE: University – Business partnership through the *triple helix* approach

Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on the University of Latvia Senate Decision No 169; Regulations on

Promotion Councils and Promotion at the University of Latvia, No.1/995 dated 12.04.2006, amended No. 1/335 dated

15.11.2011; European Commission DG Education and Culture Grant Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence No.199871-

LLP-1-LV-AJM-PO; Conference Programme <http://www.lu.lv/fi leadmin/user_upload/lu_portal/projekti/eibsrs/

EIBSRS__Final_Programme_01.pdf>


Since 2011 many regions and countries in the World are aff ected by the changing

of the geo-political agenda which has an impact on the society, education and

research. In the 2014 the Executive Board of the School suggested the organisation of

a conference in cooperation with other DS that was held in 2015 (Box 3).

Box 3

International Conference“European Integration and Baltic Sea Region: Diversity and Perspectives – 2015”

(Devoted to the Latvian Presidency of the European Union Council)June 11–13, 2015

Doctoral School “European Integration and Baltic Sea Region Studies (EIBSRS)”Doctoral School “Political, Social and Economic Process Analysis in Post-Soviet Area”Doctoral School “Current Issues of Theology and Religious Studies”Doctoral School “Insuring International Competitiveness of National Economy”Doctoral School “Lettonica and Intercultural Studies”Baltic Rea Region University Networkhttp://www.lu.lv/eibsrs2015/Themes of the conference:– Challenges of Population Development and Migration – Cognitive Sciences and Communication – Education and Language Policy– Management and Organisations– Knowledge Triangle and Competitiveness– The Baltic Sea Region and the Impact of International and European Law– Political Development and Governances– Territorial Cohesion and Regional Innovation – Security and Religion – Through the centuries: European Dimension of Latvian History

Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on the University of Latvia Senate Decision No 169; Regulations on Promotion Councils and Promotion at the University of Latvia, No.1/995 dated 12.04.2006, amended No. 1/335 dated 15.11.2011. European Commission Grant No. LLP-No. 2014–2634. European Integration and Baltic Sea Region: Diversity and Perspectives – 2015, Riga, Latvia, University of Latvia organized by Doctoral Schools of the University of Latvia. Conference Programme <http://www.lu.lv/eibsrs2015/programme/>

Th e conferences’ aim was to bring together participants from diff erent fi elds of

social sciences and humanities such as: economics, management science, law, political

science, sociology, regional, social sciences and humanities. Th e conferences provided

opportunities for tightening international cooperation in the area of education and

research and inspired early carrier researchers to join research groups and networks.

Another important activity of the DS is the publication of research carried out

within the framework of the school by staff members, doctoral students, visiting

scholars, EC experts and think tanks representatives (Box 4).


Box 4

Publications

All publications comprise of research results, opinions and information that can be of value to practitioners, academics, and students.

2011, the fi rst volume of the book collecting research papers. Th is publication presents research papers in conjunction with the international conference “European Integration and Baltic Sea Region: Diversity and Perspectives”, University of Latvia Press, Riga – 640 p. Research papers have been presented at the conference hosted by the Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence at the Centre for European and Transition Studies (CETS) and the publication is supported by Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence at the University of Latvia in the framework of the European Commission, Jean Monnet Programme.

2013, the second volume of the book European Integration and Baltic Sea Studies: University-Business Partnership through the Triple Helix Approach, Berliner Wissenschaft sverlag, Berlin – 336 p.

2014, the third volume EU Eastern Partnership: From Capacities to Excellence Strengthening Research, Regional and Innovation Policies in the Context of Horizon 2020, University of Latvia Press, Riga, Latvia – 180 p. Research papers have been presented at the conference hosted by the Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence at the Centre for European and Transition Studies (CETS) and the publication is supported by Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence at the University of Latvia in the framework of the European Commission, Jean Monnet Programme.

2015, EU Social Dimension. An Innovative and Refl ective Society, eds. Muravska, T., Sloka, B. Riga: LU Publishing House. Research papers have been submitted by post-doc researcher and doctoral students.

2016, the contribution to the publication “Handbook on Cohesion Policy in the EU”, Piattoni, S., Polverari, L. (ed.) Cheltenham: Elgar Publishing, by Muravska, T., Aprāns, J. & Dahs, A.

Source: Publications. LU Centre for European and Transition Studies, https://www.lu.lv/cets/publications/

Th ese publications enhance the synergy between young and senior scholars, at

the same time improving the research potential of the country.

Conclusions

Th e DS platform, which emerged in early 2010, played a paramount role in

consolidating doctoral research at the University of Latvia. Th is concept should be

evaluated in depth and, if found appropriate, developed further. On the basis of the

current limited experience it seems to be eff ective.

Interdependence of studies, for example in areas such as international relations,

governance, corporate and social responsibility is an obvious trend in the modern

university education and research. Th e experience of conducting research in DS

confi rmed that integrated and interdisciplinary research is not a substitute for mono-

disciplinary research, nor is it a competitor – this approach is supplementary.


In many cases, strong mono-disciplinary knowledge is the precondition for new

cross-cutting knowledge. Meanwhile, interdisciplinary knowledge can contribute

to creating the necessary dynamics of transferable skills within the individual fi elds

through R&D activities.

Th e experience of DS also confi rmed that internationalisation, including

international and inter-sectorial mobility of the staff and doctoral students, has

positive impact on building a stimulating research environment.

Looking ahead, it is necessary to reassess the support needed for doctoral studies

and research in the country. Th e experience of the support of the ESF was very

benefi cial for the country in general, and for the University of Latvia in particular. It

helped to signifi cantly increase the number of doctoral graduates. Th ere is a need to

ensure that the momentum gained by the extension of doctoral studies through ESF

can be maintained through the use of government funds and innovative approaches,

for example such as independent sponsored research.

All of the above-mentioned aspects are currently a subject of intensive studies,

which have to answer a number of questions:

How inter- and trans-disciplinarily in doctoral studies and science contribute to

challenges of the 21th century and consequences of the currently evolving social and

economic situation in Europe and in the World?

How the curriculum of the doctoral schools should be adopted and developed and

what are the results of the doctoral schools’ function in relation to their supplementary

role to the doctoral programmes?

What are the major priorities for the universities, doctoral and master’s

programmes, doctoral schools in their delivery of methods of training that are most

eff ective, effi cient and fair?

References

European Commission. 2011. Th e ESF in the News. Latvia supports young scientists. Accessed

September 27th, 2017, http://ec.europa.eu/esf/main.jsp?catId=67&langId=en&news

Id=7265

European Commission DG Education and Culture Grant Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence

No.199871-LLP-1-LV-AJM-PO.

European Commission, Grant Support for Associations LLP-No. 2014–2634.


European Integration and Baltic Sea Region: Diversity and Perspectives – 2011, Riga,

Latvia, University of Latvia organized by Doctoral Schools of the University of Latvia.

Conference Programme. Accessed September 27th, 2017. http://www.lu.lv/fi leadmin/

user_upload/lu_portal/projekti/eibsrs/EIBSRS__Final_Programme_01.pdf

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programme/

European Integration and Baltic Sea Region: Diversity and Perspectives, editor in chief Tatjana

Muravska, editors Roman Petrov, Biruta Sloka, Jā nis Vaivads, 2011, Riga: University of

Latvia Press. -640p. Accessed September 27th 2017. https://www.lu.lv/fi leadmin/user_

upload/lu_portal/apgads/PDF/Book_konference_EIBSRS_internetam.pdf

Callard, F., Fitzgerald, D. 2015. Rethinking Interdisciplinarity across the Social Sciences

and Neurosciences, Palgrave Macmillan, UK – 131p. Accessed September 27th 2017.

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pfrLWaniMKeF6ASJpYXwDg

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2016. http://ec.europa.eu/euraxess/pdf/research_policies/country_fi les/Latvia_Country_

Profi le_RR2014_FINAL.pdf

Doctoral Schools. 2016, University of Latvia. Accessed September 27th 2017. http://www.lu.lv/

studentiem/studijas/limeni/doktorantura/skolas/

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Meeting. Accessed September 27th 2017, http://www.globalresearchcouncil.org/sites/

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Mansilla, V.B. 2007. Targeted Assessment of Students’ Interdisciplinary Work: An Empirically

Grounded Framework Proposed . Th e Journal of Higher Education, Vol. 78, No. 2 (March/

April 2007). Th e Ohio State University. Accessed September 27th 2017. http://www.

interdisciplinarystudiespz.org/pdf/VBM-Dawes_Assessment_2007.pdf

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In Interdisciplinarity in Social Sciences: Does It Provide Answers to Current Challenges

in Higher Education and Research? edited by Tatjana Muravska, Žanta Ozolina, Riga:

University of Latvia Press, pp.- 112-130. Accessed September 27th 2017. https://www.lu.lv/

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Union Politics, edited by Federiga Bindi, Kiel A. Eliassen F., Mulino: Società editrice il.

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Provide Answers to Current Challenges in Higher Education and Research? Riga:

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ALEKSANDRA SZCZERBA-ZAWADA*

The European Union Antidiscrimination Law: from Prohibition of Wage Discrimination to the General Principle of Equality**

Abstract

The article provides an illustration of the EU antidiscrimination law through analysis of the concept of equality in the EU legal system. The analysis concentrates on the notion of equality and non-discrimination with respect to six protected characteristics (sex/gender, age, disability, racial and ethnic origin, religion/belief and sexual orientation) in the EU primary and secondary law as well as in the doctrine. It pays specific attention to the relevant case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. The equality principle has longstanding roots, plays different roles in the EU legal system and has undergone the evolutionary change from market-oriented rule to the general principle of EU law. The article seeks to draw out the fact that thanks to the excessive interpretation of the concept of equality by the CJEU the Union antidiscrimination law has evolved into an independent set of legal norms. The result is the extension of the protection against discrimination beyond the concept of the EU citizenship; though, it still requires further development to be fully effective.

Key words: equality principle, prohibition of discrimination, gender discrimination, EU antidiscrimination law.

* Jacob of Paradies University in Gorzów Wielkopolski, [email protected]

** Th is research was partially supported by the European Union’s Erasmus+ Program under grant Jean

Monnet Module “Inclusive Society Building Th rough EU Studies: Human Rights Protection in the

European Union” (EUIncSo), project number 574570-EPP-1-2016-1-PL-EPPJMO-MODULE.

62 Aleksandra Szczerba-Zawada

Introduction

Th e European Union has started as an economic organization. Th e aims of the three

predecessors of the EU, i.e. the European Coal and Steel Community, the European

Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community were to

contribute to economic development and the improvement of the standard of living

in the participating countries1. Nevertheless, in the course of integration processes

the EU human rights and social dimensions have been deepened, contributing

to bringing Europe closer to its citizens. Notably, very important role in creating

“Europe of people” has been played by the equality principle that has longstanding

roots in the EU law (MacHugh 2006, 31).

Th e right to equality and non-discrimination for all constitutes a human right

widely recognized by national, European and international law. In the EU legal system

non-discrimination is both a right itself (e.g. Art. 23 of the Charter of Fundamental

Rights of the European Union2) and a constitutive element of other human rights, as

the enjoyment of rights granted by the Treaties must be guaranteed to EU citizens on

a non-discriminatory basis (art. 18 TFEU3).

Th e article provides an illustration of the EU antidiscrimination law through an

analysis of the concept of equality in the EU legal system. Th e analysis concentrates

on the notion of equality and non-discrimination with respect to six protected

characteristics (sex/gender, age, disability, racial and ethnic origin, religion/belief and

sexual orientation) in the EU primary and secondary law as well as in the doctrine. It pays

specifi c attention to the relevant case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union.

Th e article also seeks to draw out the fact that thanks to the excessive interpretation

of the concept of equality by the CJEU the Union antidiscrimination law has evolved

into an independent branch of EU law exceeding the protection against discrimination

beyond the EU citizenship. Despite its great role in the achievement of the aims of the

EU, equality (and non-discrimination) remains a complex concept of unequivocal

meaning that inevitably implies defi ciencies in the EU antidiscrimination law.

1 See respectively art. 1 of the Treaty constituting the European Coal and Steel Community, art.

1 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community and art. 1 of the Treaty establishing

the European Atomic Energy Community.

2 C 202, 7.6.2016, 389–405.

3 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (consolidated versions), OJ C 202, 7.6.2016,

47–200.

63The European Union Antidiscrimination Law: from Prohibition of Wage Discrimination ...

1. The Concept of Equality and Non-Discrimination in the European Union Law – Two Sides Of The One Coin?

1.1. Equality and Non-Discrimination – Conceptualization

Equality and non-discrimination remain equivocal concepts. Despite wide and

deep doctrinal analysis, the discussion on equality is characterized by considerable

conceptual and methodological confusion (McCrudden, Prechal 2009, 1). Th us,

although widely recognized by national, European and international law, both

understanding of equality and non-discrimination and their relationship to each

other diff er considerably across legal systems and among scholars (MacNaughton

2009, 47). Th ese diff erences have signifi cant implications since the legal framework

of equality and non-discrimination depends upon their meaning. Th is is refl ected

in the antidiscrimination law of the European Union, in which diff erent approaches

to equality are visible; although it has adopted a rather traditional version of the

equality paradigm (formal one), based on individual rights and identity-neutral

justice (Caruso 2002, ii).

With a large degree of simplifi cation three main concepts of equality can be

identifi ed. On the one hand there is formal equality, on the other – substantive

equality and somewhere in between them lies equality of opportunity, which

combines elements of both of the above-mentioned concepts.

Formal equality assumes that similar situations should be treated in a similar way in

accordance with Aristotelian maxim that “justice demands that equals be treated equally

and unequals be treated unequally” (MucHugh 2006, 31). Th is is a procedural approach

to the principle of equality, implemented through the introduction of a prohibition of

discrimination, under which any diff erentiation of treatment is morally prohibited and

cannot be justifi ed on any grounds. In accordance with this symmetrical approach

to equality the obligation of equal treatment applies only to entities considered to be

equal; here two vital questions arise – fi rst of all, who is equal and second, what does the

requirement of equal treatment mean? If the answers were to be sought in the concept

itself, one would have to conclude that equal entities are those who should be treated

equally and equal treatment is the treatment of those who are equal. In this respect

formal equality theory needs clarifi cation (Arnardóttir 2003, 9–10). Equal entities will


be singled out for their similarity, i.e. possessed characteristic that is recognized as

relevant in a given situation. Th e choice will be determined by prevailing cultural,

political and social value climate (Makonnen 2007, 14).

On the other hand, the substantive equality formula refers to the situation of the

group to which the individual belongs and focuses on achieving a fair distribution

of goods and benefi ts (so called equality of results, Makonnen 2007, 14). Th is

asymmetrical approach to the principle of equality implies the possibility of treating

individuals diff erently, respective of whether the group they belong to has been

discriminated against in the past, to mitigate negative eff ects of this discrimination.

Th erefore, achievement of equality of outcomes may require measures such as parity

or quota system. Equal treatment is, however, a rule and diff erentiation is permitted

only as an exception (Arnardóttir 2003, 24).

Th e model of equality that seems to strike a balance between two above-

mentioned concepts being to some point substantive equality and later - formal, is

the so-called equality of opportunity. In accordance with this approach it is possible

to treat individuals diff erently, but only at the level of competition. Th erefore equality

of chance is guaranteed without aff ecting outcome of the competition. Th e purpose

of this concept of equality is to provide all individuals with equal opportunities

with respect to access to education, employment, health care, etc. by eliminating

prejudices and other factors that can have discriminatory eff ects (Makonnen 2007,

14). Th e doctrine emphasizes the role of the CJEU in developing this concept of

equality through eff ort to discover the material aspect of the formal equality in the

EU antidiscrimination legislation (De Vos 2007, 10).

All three above-mentioned concepts are refl ected in the EU antidiscrimination

law. Th e evidence of the dominant role of the formal equality in EU law is seen in the

comparative logic the concept of discrimination is based on, especially with respect

to direct discrimination which requires identical treatment of identical situations.

As long as the comparable situations are treated consistently (for example equally

badly) the requirements of the EU equality law are satisfi ed. Th e question of whether

two situations are comparable is crucial for the establishment of discrimination as

in this case no distinction must be made on the basis of protected characteristic

which indicates that certain other distinctions will be permitted. It gives rise to

a situation in which the selection of a characteristic that is considered to be neutral or

irrelevant (such as economic status or eye colour) allows to avoid accusation of direct

discrimination (lack of comparability) despite the fact individuals are in a similar

situation with respect to the other characteristic. Th is comes in for criticism from

the doctrine (Pogodzińska 2009, Fredman 1992, 120 et seq.). On the other hand, the


concept of indirect discrimination is results-oriented in the sense that an apparently

neutral practice or criterion are considered to have discriminatory nature if they

have unjustifi able adverse impact upon the group to which the individual belongs.

Th is follows the logic of substantive equality as well as the affi rmative actions that

aim to mitigate the unfair situation of disadvantaged groups through ensuring

their fair share in the distribution of benefi ts (Barnard, Hepple 2000, 564–565).

Th e concept of equality of opportunity is refl ected in the obligation of reasonable

accommodation. Th e concept of reasonable accommodation obliges the employers to

adopt, where necessary in a particular case, appropriate measures enabling a person

with a disability to have access to, participate in, or advance in employment, or to

undergo training, unless such measures would impose a disproportionate burden

on the employer. Although the EU equality law does not explicitly defi ne the denial

of reasonable accommodation as a form of discrimination nor it compels Member

States to classify it in that way (Burri, Prechal 2010, 51) the CJEU interprets reasonable

accommodation duty as part of a wider equality obligation (HK Danmark, C-335/11

& C-337/11, para. 54) applied in order to guarantee compliance with the principle

of equal treatment of people with disability to create for them equal professional

chances. Th is proves that the qualifi cation of the reasonable accommodation duty in

the EU legal system as the exception (to the formal equality formula), widely spread

among academics (e.g. Dudek 2010, Ellis, Watson, 2015), is disputable.

Th e European Union antidiscrimination law is characterized not only by

equivocal concept of equality but also by ambiguous relation between equality

and non-discrimination. With respect to this it is worth noting that the notion

that equality and non-discrimination are positive and negative forms of the same

principle is widely accepted. Th e former confi rms the right to be treated in the same

manner as the others, the latter – expresses the prohibition on diff erent treatment,

unless the opposite is objectively justifi ed (in both cases) (Nowicki 2001, 215). Positive

and negative concepts of the principle of equality are, however, not equivalent

(MacNaughton 2009, 47). Th e EU legislature seems to share this view as it defi nes

discrimination as a qualifi ed form of unequal treatment. Th is is exemplifi ed by

the defi nition of discrimination contained in the EU’s equality directives: Council

Directive 2000/43/EC4, Council Directive 2000/78/EC5, Council Directive 2004/113/

4 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment

between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, OJ L 180, 19.07.2000, 22–26.

5 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal

treatment in employment and occupation, OJ L 303, 02.12.2000, 16–22.


EC6 and Directive 2006/54/EC7. Under these sources of EU law discrimination, as

opposed to “normal” unequal treatment, occurs only if less favourable treatment is

based on one of the protected characteristics: sex, disability, religion or belief, racial

or ethnic origin, sexual orientation or age. Equality is defi ned in the directives as the

absence of any form of prohibited discrimination on any of the grounds mentioned

above, as the EU law recognizes diff erent types of discriminatory treatment.

1.2. Prohibited Forms of Unequal Treatment in the European Union Legal System

Th e equality directives prohibit direct and indirect discrimination, harassment and

instruction to discriminate.

Direct discrimination shall be taken to occur where one person is treated less

favourably than another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation,

on any of the protected grounds (e.g. art. 2 (a) of the directive 2004/113/EC). Th e

concept of direct discrimination is based on comparable logic which embraces

hypothetical comparisons as well as comparisons with the treatment of actual

persons (Ellis, Watson 2015, 146). According to the settled case law of the CJEU the

comparability of the situations must be examined, inter alia, in light of the object of

the national legislation establishing the diff erence in treatment (Kuso C-614/11, para.

45). In addition, any less favourable treatment of a woman related to pregnancy or

maternity leave (within the meaning of Directive 92/85/EEC8) also constitute direct

discrimination even though there is no male candidate – so that no comparator

(Dekker C-77/88). Interestingly, direct discrimination can be established even in the

absence of a victim. It was confi rmed by the CJEU in Feryn case (C-54/07), where

the Court concluded that the existence of such discrimination is not dependent on

6 Council Directive 2004/113/EC of 13 December 2004 implementing the principle of equal

treatment between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services, OJ L 373,

21.12.2004, 37–43.

7 Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the

implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in

matters of employment and occupation (recast), OJ L 204, 26.7.2006, 23–36.

8 Council Directive 92/85/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the introduction of measures to encourage

improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently

given birth or are breastfeeding, OJ L 348, 28.11.1992, 1–7.


the identifi cation of a potentially wronged party who claims to be the victim. Th e

objective of equality would be hard to achieve if the scope of the protection against

discrimination was to be limited to only those cases in which an unsuccessful

candidate for a post, considering himself to be the victim of direct discrimination,

brought legal proceedings against the employer. In such circumstances the fact

that an employer publicly declares that it will not recruit employees of a certain

characteristic constitutes direct discrimination as it is likely to strongly dissuade

certain candidates from submitting their candidature and, accordingly, to hinder

their access to the labour market.

Indirect discrimination occurs where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or

practice would put persons of a protected characteristic at a particular disadvantage

compared with other persons, unless that provision, criterion or practice is objectively

justifi ed by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate

and necessary (art. 2 (2)(b) of the directive 2000/78/EC). Th e concept of indirect

discrimination is also based on a comparison, although this time it takes place in a

group perspective instead of individual one (a victim of the alleged discrimination has

to identify a group of persons in order to make a comparison). Th is form of unequal

treatment was more problematic to defi ne than direct discrimination. Doubts arose

as to whether the adverse treatment must have actually happened or it might be only

anticipated or how to assess the “group” impact of the unfavourable treatment as it

may be diffi cult to adduce statistical evidence to such claim (Ellis, Watson 2015, 150).

It is worth noting that as far as the direct discrimination can be justifi ed only in cases

explicitly prescribed by law, the indirect discrimination can be justifi ed by legitimate

aim if applied measures are appropriate and necessary (i.e. proportional) what makes

it more “fl exible” to defend against discrimination claims.

Moreover, discrimination includes harassment and sexual harassment, as well as

any less favourable treatment based on a person’s rejection of, or submission to such

conduct [art. 2 (2) (a) of the directive 2006/54/EC]. Harassment is a situation where an

unwanted conduct related to the protected characteristic of a person occurs with the

purpose or eff ect of violating the dignity of a person and of creating an intimidating,

hostile, degrading, humiliating or off ensive environment and sexual harassment

– where any form of unwanted physical, verbal, non-verbal or physical conduct

of a sexual nature occurs, with the purpose or eff ect of violating the dignity

of a person, in particular when creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading,

humiliating or off ensive environment.


For the purpose of equality directives an instruction to discriminate against

persons on the protected grounds also constitutes a forbidden form of discrimination

[art. 2 (4) of the directive 2000/43/EC].

Th anks to the case law of the CJEU discrimination is understood to include

discrimination due to association. Th is type of discrimination occurs when a person

is treated less favourably because of his or her association (relations) with someone

who possesses one of the protected characteristics, even though she or he does not

have the characteristic herself/himself (Karagiorgi 2014, 25). In Court’s view presented

in Coleman case C-303/06 the principle of equal treatment (in that particular case

with respect to disability) applies not only to a particular category of persons but by

reference to the protected ground. What is more, a person may face discrimination

also because of an assumption about his or her characteristic (e.g. sexual orientation or

racial origin) which may or may not be factually correct (Chopin, Germaine 2015, 37).

2. The European Union Antidiscrimination Law: Selected Protected Characteristics in Several Fields

2.1. The Genesis of the Protection Against Discrimination in the European Union Law

Th e most fundamental aspect of equality in EU law, apart from prohibition of

discrimination based on nationality, which lays outside the scope of this paper, was the

principle of equal treatment of women and men with respect to remuneration. Article

119 TEEC (now art. 157 TFEU), that obliged Member States to ensure and maintain

the application of the principle of equal pay for equal work between men and women

workers, was introduced because of economic reasons – to prevent Member States

from gaining a competitive advantage through cheap female work that could distort

the functioning of the internal market (More 1999, 518). Th is bare Treaty provision

was transformed into a complex set of rules on equal treatment of women and men in

employment and social security and subsequently – into antidiscrimination law on

other grounds also as a result of judicial activity of the CJEU.


Th e Court issued a series of milestone judgments in which it recognized the

direct eff ect of art. 119 TEEC allowing individuals to enforce the right to equality

before national courts (Defrenne C-80/70). Moreover, the CJEU started to apply

the perspective of human rights protection to equality issues, broadening a narrow

economic perspective, as it repeatedly stated that there can be no doubt that the

elimination of discrimination based on sex forms part of the fundamental rights,

constituting general principles of EU law, the observance of which it has a duty to

ensure (Defrenne C-149/77, para. 2). Furthermore, the CJEU instigated the process

of development of the material scope of application of the equality principle as it

confi rmed that the concept of same work contained in art. 119 (1) TEEC included

cases of work of equal value (Worringham C-69/80, para. 2). Th e EU legislator

followed this logic and adopted several directives that introduced the gender

equality principle beyond the specifi c issue of equal pay, although still in the area

of employment typifi ed by the Council directive 75/117/EEC of 10 February 1975 on

the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the application of the

principle of equal pay for men and women9, Council directive of 9 February 1976 on

the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards

access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions

(76/207/EEC)10 or Council Directive 79/7/EEC of 19 December 1978 on the progressive

implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters

of social security11.

Th e initial burst of legislative activity during the 1970s owed during the

subsequent years and the CJEU became a key engine for development in the EU

antidiscrimination law. Th e CJEU expanded the notion of discrimination to cover

indirect discrimination, permitted a shift in the burden of proof from complainant to

respondent and pushed the boundaries of the material scope of the law (Bell 2011, 615).

Th e Court also broadened the personal scope of protection against discrimination

holding that the prohibition of gender discrimination cannot be confi ned simply to

discrimination based on the fact that a person is of one or other sex and as such must

extend to discrimination arising from gender reassignment, which is based, essentially

if not exclusively, on the sex of the person concerned (P v. S, C-13/94, para.20). Th is

conclusion increased the number of protected grounds in the EU antidiscrimination

law including implicitly sexual identity, however the breakthrough was made by the

9 OJ L 45, 19.2.1975, 19–20.

10 OJ L 39, 14.2.1976, 40–42.

11 OJ L 6, 10.1.1979, 24–25.


introduction of Article 13 TEC (now Article 19 TFEU) on virtue of the Amsterdam

Treaty. Th is treaty provision allowed to adopt directives prohibiting discrimination

on diff erent than gender characteristics, namely Council directive 2000/43/EC and

Council directive 2000/78/EC that banned discrimination on grounds of racial or

ethnic origin, religion or belief, age, disability and sexual orientation. Th e directives

changed signifi cantly the existing approaches to combating discrimination based on

these grounds across Europe, aiming to ensure all individuals living in the EU, both

EU citizens and third country nationals, benefi t from eff ective legal protection against

such discrimination (Chopin, Germaine 2015, 8). Th ey emphasise the need to establish

eff ective protective mechanism against discrimination available to all who claim

being discriminated against. Th e instruments are designed to guarantee the eff ective

access to justice in discriminatory cases and include shared burden of proof (art. 8

of the Directive 2000/78/EC), prohibition of victimization (art. 11 of the directive

2000/43/EC) and duty to ensure that judicial and/or administrative procedures for the

enforcement of obligations under directive are available to all persons who consider

themselves wronged by failure to apply the principle of equal treatment to them (art.

9 of the directive 2000/78/EC). Similar provisions are enshrined in the subsequent

equality directives, i.e. directive 2004/113/EC12, directive 2006/54/EC13, following

the relevant case law of the CJEU and raising the level of protection against unequal

treatment throughout the European Union. Th e process of constitutionalising the

equality principle in the EU legal system has been concluded with the Lisbon Treaty.

2.2. Equality and Non-Discrimination in the Primary Sources of European Union Law

Aft er the Lisbon reform the status of equality principle was strengthened. Th e EU’s

and Member States’ obligations under equality and non-discrimination have been

clarifi ed in the primary sources of EU law.

12 Council Directive 2004/113/EC of 13 December 2004 implementing the principle of equal

treatment between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services, OJ L 373,

21.12.2004, 37–43.

13 Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the

implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in

matters of employment and occupation (recast), OJ L 204, 26.7.2006, 23–36.


Equality is one of the EU values. In accordance with art. 2 TEU14 “the Union is

founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality,

the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging

to minorities. Th ese values are common to the Member States in a society in which

pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between

women and men prevail”. Moreover, promotion of the equality, also in its relations

with the wider world, and combating discrimination are EU objectives is listed in

art. 3 TEU. In order to pursue these goals eff ectively, in defi ning and implementing

its policies and activities, the Union shall aim to combat discrimination based on sex,

racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation (art. 10

TFEU). Th e idea of mainstreaming implemented in the EU law refers particularly

to the gender equality what is highlighted by art. 8 TFEU (“In all its activities, the

Union shall aim to eliminate inequalities, and to promote equality, between men

and women”). Article 157 TFEU confi rms the principle of equal pay for equal work

for man and women – the fi rst explicitly mentioned protected characteristic in

the EU law. It stipulates that each Member State shall ensure that the principle of

equal pay for male and female workers for equal work or work of equal value (what

codifi es the case law of the CJEU) is applied. For the purpose of this article, the

term “pay” is construed broadly and means the ordinary basic or minimum wage

or salary and any other consideration, whether in cash or in kind, which the worker

receives directly or indirectly, in respect of his employment, from his employer.

In accordance with the settle case-law of CJEU pay within the meaning of art. 157

TFEU covers all consideration which employees receive directly or indirectly from

their employers in respect of their employment i.a. special travel facilities for former

employees (Garland, C-12/81), benefi t paid by an employer to a woman on maternity

leave (Gillespie, C-342/93), overtime pay (Herzog, C-399, 409 & 425/92, C-34, 50 &

78/93), special bonus payments made by employers (Krüger, C-281/97), termination

payments (Gruber C-249/97) and occupational pension scheme (Bilka, C-170/84).

Art. 157 (2) TFEU explains that equal pay without discrimination based on sex

means either that for the same work at piece rates shall be calculated on the basis of

the same unit of measurement or that pay for work at time rates shall be the same

for the same job.

Th e two subsequent paragraphs express legal authorization respectively to the

EU institutions and Member States. Art. 157 (3) TFEU authorizes the European

Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative

14 Treaty on the European Union (consolidated versions). OJ C 202, 7.6.2016, 13–46.


procedure, and aft er consulting the Economic and Social Committee to adopt

measures to ensure the application of the principle of equal opportunities and equal

treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation, including

the principle of equal pay for equal work or work of equal value, complementing

and extending the competent norm enshrined in art. 19 TFUE. According to art. 19

(former art. 13 TEC) “without prejudice to the other provisions of the Treaties and

within the limits of the powers conferred by them upon the Union, the Council,

acting unanimously in accordance with a special legislative procedure and aft er

obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, may take appropriate action

to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief,

disability, age or sexual orientation”. Th e doctrine emphasises limited ambit of this

article that does not allow to use it as a legal basis of measures to promote equality

beyond prohibition of discrimination (Ellis, Watson 2015, 16). Under art. 157 (4) TFEU

so called positive actions are permissible. Th e provision states that “With a view

to ensuring full equality in practice between men and women in working life, the

principle of equal treatment shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining

or adopting measures providing for specifi c advantages in order to make it easier for

the underrepresented sex to pursue a vocational activity or to prevent or compensate

for disadvantages in professional careers”. Th is kind of legitimization was expressly

introduced into EU antidiscrimination directives and gave rise to numerous judgment

of the CJEU (i.a. Hofmann, C-184/83, Kalanke, C-450/93, Marschall, C-409/95,

Abrahamsson, C-407/98) revealing the Court’s ambiguity towards these kinds of

measures which although intended to promote substantive equality are treated as the

exceptions to the principle of (formal) equality (Szczerba-Zawada 2016).

Important support for the principle of equality in the EU has been provided by

giving legal force to the Charter of the Fundamental Rights by virtue of the Lisbon

Treaty. Nowadays the Charter has the same legal value as the Treaties (art. 6 TEU).

Chapter III of the Charter titled “Equality” guarantees that everyone is equal before

the law (art. 20) and introduces general antidiscrimination clause according to

which “any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic

or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other

opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual

orientation shall be prohibited” (art. 21). Th is autonomous non-discrimination

provision must be interpreted in the light of art. 52 (2) of the Charter that envisages

that “rights recognised by this Charter which are based on the Community Treaties

or the Treaty on European Union shall be exercised under the conditions and within

the limits defi ned by those Treaties”. Th is implies the limited scope of application


of art. 21 (1) to the fi elds and grounds mentioned in art. 19 TFEU and the 4 equality

directives. Th e Charter pays special attention to gender equality stating that “Equality

between men and women must be ensured in all areas, including employment, work

and pay” (art. 23). It also legitimates the affi rmative action in favour of the under-

represented sex.

Th e category of primary sources of EU law consists of also so called general

principles of law. Th eir status is similar to the Treaties and has been formulated by

the CJEU pursuant to its obligation under Article 19 of the TEU to ensure that in

the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed.Th e general

principles of law play a crucial – constitutional – role in the EU legal system as “they

put fl esh on the bones of a legal system which, being set out in framework Treaties,

would in their absence have remained a skeleton of rules falling short of a proper legal

order” (Ellis, Watson 2015, 99). Th e catalogue of general principles of EU law includes

the principle of equality. It is clear against settled case of law of CJEU in accordance

to which the prohibition of discrimination is merely a specifi c enunciation of the

general principle of equality, which is one of the fundamental principles of EU law

(Ruckdeschel, C-117/76 & C-1677, para. 7). Th is general principle of equality, which is

one of the fundamental rights, precludes comparable situations from being treated in

a diff erent manner unless the diff erence in treatment is objectively justifi ed (Portugal

v Council, C-149/96, para. 91). Interestingly, the CJEU qualifi ed both principles:

equality and non-discrimination as general principle of EU law using both terms

synonymously which makes the relations between equality and non-discrimination

diffi cult to outline precisely. It is also unclear if the status of a general principle

refers to non-discrimination irrespective of grounds or only to gender and age as

stated expressly by the CJEU. Regardless of these uncertainties, the general principle

of equality and non-discrimination plays a very important role in the EU law as it

is used as a standard of review of the legality of actions taken by the EU and the

Member States. Th e CJEU has made it clear that the Member States are constrained

by the general principles (including equality) when they implement Union measures

even if the time for implementation of the (equality) directives has not passed. As

Court noted in landmark Mangold case (C-144/04), para. 76, “observance of the

general principle of equal treatment, in particular in respect of age, cannot, as such,

be conditional upon the expiry of the period allowed the Member States for the

transposition of a directive intended to lay down a general framework for combating

discrimination on the grounds of age, in particular so far as the organisation of

appropriate legal remedies, the burden of proof, protection against victimisation,


social dialogue, affi rmative action and other specifi c measures to implement such

a directive are concerned”.

2.3. European Union Secondary Law on Equality and Non-Discrimination

Th e EU secondary equality legislation is typifi ed mainly by directives. Th is specifi c

source of EU law is binding upon Member States as to the result to be achieved,

giving national authorities some discretion with respect to forms and methods.

National legislators must adopt implementing measures to transpose directives, but

the implementation shall in no circumstances constitute grounds for a reduction

in the level of protection against discrimination already aff orded by Member States

in the fi elds covered by the directives (i.a. art. 7 of the directive 2004/113/EC).

Th e implementation of the directives means achievement of their objectives. In

case of equality directives this is to lay down a general framework for combating

discrimination in order to put into eff ect the principle of equal treatment on the

grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation (Council Directive

2000/78/EC), racial or ethnic origin (Council Directive 2000/43/EC) and sex/gender

(Directive 2006/54/EC and Council directive 2004/113/EC). As the CJEU reiterates,

the Member States’ obligation to achieve the results envisaged by the equality

directives is binding to all the authorities of the member states: legislative, executives

and judicial bodies. “It follows that, in applying national law, and in particular the

provisions of national legislation specifi cally introduced in order to implement a

directive, national courts are required to interpret their national law in the light of

the wording and the purpose of the directive in order to achieve the result referred

to” (Johnston C-222/84, para. 6).

Th e anti-discriminatory directives prohibit direct and indirect discrimination,

as well harassment and instruction to discriminate. It is worth highlighting that

the protection against diff erent forms of discrimination is limited to concrete

areas as the material scope of application of the directives covers: employment and

occupation (Council Directive 2000/78/EC, Council Directive 2000/43/EC, directive

2006/54/EC), social protection and social advantages (Council Directive 2000/43/EC,

directive 2006/54/EC and directive 79/7/EEC), education (Council Directive 2000/43/


EC) and access to and supply of goods and services (Council Directive 2000/43/

EC and Council directive 2004/113/EC). Th erefore the EU equality law provides

protection against discrimination diversifi ed upon both the protected characteristics

and fi elds of protection. As a result there is a hierarchy of protected characteristics

– the characteristic that is protected against discrimination to the widest extent

(in four areas) is racial or ethnic origin, gender is protected in three areas, while

the characteristics protected only in one area are as follows: religion or belief, age,

disability and sexual orientation.

Table 1: Personal and material scope of application of EU prohibition against

discrimination

Area

of protection

Protected characteristics

Racial or

ethnic originGender

Religion/

beliefAge Disability

Sexual

orientation

Employment X X X X X X

Social

protectionX X

Access to goods

and services X X

Education X

Source: Own elaboration based on equality directives

It is important to notice that all the directives set the minimum requirements of

protection against discrimination. It means that the Member States may introduce

or maintain provisions which are more favourable than those laid down in the

directives, and, at the same time are not allowed to lower the standard of protection

already established in their national legal systems.

As the aim of the directives is to put into eff ect the principle of equality they

envisage solutions to encourage victims of discrimination to refer to the protection

mechanism. Th is includes the shared burden of proof according to which when

persons who consider themselves wronged because the principle of equal treatment

had not been applied to them they can, before a court or other competent authority

establish facts from which it may be presumed that there has been direct or indirect

discrimination, then it shall be for the respondent to prove that there had been no

breach of the principle of equal treatment (art. 19 of the directive 2006/54/EC). Th e

shared burden of proof plays a signifi cant role in ensuring that the principle of equal


treatment can be eff ectively enforced which has been confi rmed in the established

case law of the CJEU. Th e same refers to the so called prohibition of victimization,

i.e. protection of individuals who claim discrimination from any adverse treatment

or adverse consequence as a reaction to a complaint or to proceedings aimed at

enforcing compliance with the principle of equal treatment (art. 9 of the directive

2000/43/EC).

Despite its fundamental role in the EU law and constantly broadened scope of

application through the judicial activity of the CJEU the equality principle does not

have absolute character as all the antidiscrimination directives allow some exceptions

to equality principles, including genuine occupational requirements, protection of

women regarding pregnancy and maternity, reasonable accommodation for disabled

persons, positive actions, justifi cation of diff erences of treatment on grounds of

age. Th e table below indicates the exceptions to equality principle envisaged in four

directives constituting the core of EU antidiscrimination secondary legislation.

Table 2: Exceptions to equality principle in the EU law

Exception to

the equality principle

Directive

2000/43 2000/78 2004/113 2006/54

Occupational requirements Art. 4 Art. 4 - Art .14 (2)

Protection of women regarding

pregnancy and maternity- - Art. 28

Justification of differences of treatment

on grounds of age- Art. 6 - -

Positive actions Art. 5 Art. 7 Art. 6 Art. 3

Reasonable accommodation for

disabled persons- Art. 5 - -

Source: Dudek 2015, 271.

Under the exceptions concerning occupational requirements Member States are

allowed to accept that a diff erentiation of treatment based on a one of the protected

characteristics does not constitute discrimination but only if, by reason of the nature

of the particular occupational activities concerned or of the context in which they are

carried out, such a characteristic constitutes a genuine and determining occupational

requirement, provided that the objective is legitimate and the requirement is

proportionate. Similar exceptions have been extended to churches and other public or

private organizations the ethos of which is based on religion or belief, but exclusively

with respect to the religion or belief if by reason of the nature of these activities or


of the context in which they are carried out, a person’s religion or belief constitute

a genuine, legitimate and justifi ed occupational requirement, having regard to the

organization’s ethos. Th is diff erence of treatment in such a case cannot, however,

justify discrimination on any other ground (e.g. sexual orientation). Although

allowed, the CJEU consequently interprets this provision as the derogation of the

individual right which must be interpreted strictly and applied in accordance with the

principle of proportionality. Moreover, the Member States should assess periodically

the introduced limitations with respect to genuine occupational requirements in

order to decide whether it is justifi ed to maintain this kind of derogation in the light

of social developments (Johnston C-222/84, paras. 4, 37).

Th e aim of the exception allowing to guarantee specifi c rights to women on

account of pregnancy and maternity (such as maternity leave) is, as explained by

the CJEU, fi rstly, to ensure the protection of a woman’s biological condition during

pregnancy and thereaft er until such time as her physiological and mental functions

have returned to normal aft er childbirth and secondly, to protect the special

relationship between a woman and her child over the period which follows pregnancy

and childbirth, by preventing that relationship from being disturbed by the multiple

burdens which would result from the simultaneous pursuit of employment (Hofmann

C-184/83, para. 25). Lack of one of the above-mentioned reasons will result in the

similarity of situation of men and women that requires their similar treatment in

the light of which the exception at stake cannot be accepted. Th e aims of protecting

female workers are valid only if, there is a justifi ed need for a diff erence of treatment

as between men and women. Th is is not the case of prohibition of women’s nightwork,

as whatever the disadvantages of nightwork may be, it does not seem that, except

in the case of pregnancy or maternity, the risks to which women are exposed when

working at night are, in general, inherently diff erent from those to which men are

exposed (Stoeckel C-345/89, para. 15).

It must be noted that the above-mentioned derogations constitute the so called

‘closed system of exceptions’ as regards direct discrimination (Burri, Prechal 2010,

10). It means that in the situation that amounts to direct discrimination the diff erent

treatment is accepted as far as one of these exceptions applies. In the case of indirect

discrimination, however, the justifi cations may be based on other grounds under

the condition that the diff erentiation pursues legitimate aim and the measures to

attain that aim are appropriate and necessary (as envisaged by a defi nition of indirect

discrimination).


Th e obligation to make a reasonable accommodation constitutes of two elements:

it envisages that the employer must take appropriate measures unless this would

result in a disproportionate burden on his or her account. As opposed to the above-

mentioned justifi cations to diff erent treatment, the CJEU does not require a narrow

interpretation of the concept of the reasonable accommodation. It rather postulates a

broad defi nition of the reasonable accommodation duty covering elimination of the

various barriers, not only material but also organisational, that hinder the full and

eff ective participation of persons with disabilities in professional life on an equal basis

with other workers (HK Danmark C-335/11 & C-337/11), what confi rms the thesis that

this concept should not be classifi ed as an exception to the formal equality but rather

as an example of equality of opportunity.

Th e other accepted exception to the equality principle allows for diff erentiation

of treatment on ground of age if, within the context of national law, it is objectively

and reasonably justifi ed by a legitimate aim, including legitimate employment policy,

labour market and vocational training objectives, and if the means of achieving

that aim are appropriate and necessary (art. 6 (1) of the Directive 2000/78/EC). Th is

rather broad formula of justifi cation of diff erent treatment based on age is criticized

in the doctrine as weakening the protection of discrimination with respect to this

characteristic (Zawidzka-Łojek 2013, 220).

Th e attempt to reach out beyond the strict consistency of treatment, which can

lead to unequal treatment in practice, is made with the acceptance of the so called

positive actions in the EU law. Th ese measures, referred to in chapter 3.2, are intended

to promote substantive equality through quotas and other actions taken in favour of

underrepresented groups. As such, although discriminatory prima facie, they are in

fact intended to eliminate or reduce actual inequalities which may exist in the reality

of social life. Nevertheless constituting derogation from an individual right to equal

treatment, such measures must remain within the limits of what is appropriate and

necessary in order to achieve the aim in view (Briheche C-319/03).

Conclusions

Antidiscrimination law, including EU law, is controversial. It is the result, to some

extent at least, of the fact that what is qualifi ed as discrimination in law is both wider

and narrower than its social understanding (Khaitan 2015, 2). Th e problem with


the EU non-discriminatory law is its limited and equivocal material and personal

scope of application which implies that it refuses to prohibit conduct that many

would consider discriminatory (e.g. earlier retirement age for women) while in other

instances it qualifi es as discrimination treatment that is hardly considered to be as

such by laymen such as company’s dress code banning all head coverings. Th erefore,

despite the qualifi cation of concepts such as direct and indirect discrimination,

harassment, affi rmative actions or reasonable accommodation as part of equality

mechanism, also as a result of the creative judicial interpretation of the Court of

Justice of the EU, there is a need for further development. New forms of prohibited

unequal treatment (e.g. multiple discrimination), new grounds of protection (e.g.

gender identity) and new fi elds of protection (e.g. corporate boards) are waiting for

introduction. Th eir explicit legal recognition would, undoubtedly, contribute to put

equality into practice and to further satisfy the aim of the EU antidiscrimination law.

Th is requires shift from formal equality, predominant in the EU antidiscrimination

law, to substantive equality that would change the character and scope of duties

under the principle of equality. It would enable to transcend the norm of equality

set usually by the majority group, which in fact deepens the existing inequalities.

At this stage of development, the EU antidiscrimination law, although it has some

redistributive eff ect (e.g. under the concept of indirect discrimination), it does not

demand a resolution of the underlying structural problems which disadvantage

diff erent minority groups (Fredman 1992, 125).

Although the status of equality as a general principle of EU law mitigates

identifi ed weaknesses, at least partially, allowing to broaden the scope of obligations

of the Member States under equality principle (as proved by the Mangold judgment),

and adoption of equality legislation would enhance eff ectiveness of the protection

against discrimination. Th e latter faces, unfortunately, legal obstacles – the principle

of subsidiarity that governs the shared competences, under which the matter of

equality and non-discrimination falls, makes, in fact, EU legislative activity in this

area dependent on the acceptance of the Member States which have so far opposed

the proposals of new equality directives [e.g. Council Directive on implementing

the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of religion or belief,

disability, age or sexual orientation 2008/0140 (CNS)].

To sum up, despite its market-related origins, the principle of equal treatment has

evolved into a constitutional right of equality that is one of the general principles of

EU law. It is also the judicial activity of the Court of Justice of the European Union

that shaped the principle of non-discrimination in a way that was not explicitly


envisaged in the founding Treaties that allowed to expand its personal and material

scopes of application. However, much still needs to be done to improve the level of

protection and to strike a balance between equality and diversity, as the equality of

treatment must not be based on the assumption of identical treatment that results

in eradication of all diff erences. Th e equality principle should guarantee the same

scope of freedom to develop one’s identity and not force somebody to resign from

their individualism in the name of similarity. In this perspective the principle of

equality is used to protect diff erences to assure that they do not adversely aff ect the

minority groups through perpetuation of stereotypes, as the problem to be addressed

is not unequal treatment per se, but the disadvantage which oft en is attached to such

treatment (Fredman 1992, 128).

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GAGA GABRICHIDZE*

The Instrument of Human Rights Clause as a Part of Conditionality in European Union–Georgia Relations

AbstractPolitical conditionality became an integral part of the external policy of the European Union (EU) in the early nineties. EU–Georgia relations are no exception to this. The aim of this paper is to provide a brief investigation of the place, significance and function of human rights’ clauses as a part of political conditionality in the legal framework of the EU–Georgia relations. To this end, the paper briefly reviews human rights clauses in international agreements of the EU and analyses the relevant articles in EU–Georgia bilateral documents and autonomous instruments of the EU. Further, some considerations in respect of effectiveness and consistency of human rights are also provided. It is argued that the human rights clause plays a less important role in practice than it would be expected as an “essential element” of agreements concluded by the EU.

Key words: Human rights clause; Conditionality; Georgia.

A number of instruments have been used by the EU to facilitate the export of its

values and norms. In the fi rst place, bilateral documents should be mentioned (trade

and association agreements, action plans). However, unilateral acts of the EU, such as

decisions of the Council, progress reports prepared by the Commission, etc., are also

of very high signifi cance (Cremona 2011, 275). Whereas, conditionality is the key tool

to ensure that partner countries comply with human rights and democracy standards

and it can be applied in diff erent ways. While ex ante conditionality – whether in the

framework of an association agreement or cooperation agreement – is to be fulfi lled

* New Vision University (Tbilisi), [email protected]

86 Gaga Gabrichidze

in advance, ex post conditionality is a part of a relevant agreement and constitutes

a precondition for its application/implementation (Fiero 2003, 131). Th e latter is more

widespread in the external policy of the EU and an example thereof is the practice of

including human clauses in agreements concluded by the EU with third countries.

Conditionality can also be divided into positive and negative conditionality. Positive

conditionality involves promising benefi ts to a partner country if it fulfi ls certain

conditions. Negative conditionality involves reducing or terminating benefi ts in case

the partner country does not comply with the conditions (Fiero 2003, 100). Oft en,

the policy of the EU towards the partner is a combined version of both forms of

conditionality. Th is is also the case with Georgia.

Th e paper aims to provide an overview and an analysis of human rights as

a part of political conditionality in EU–Georgia relations. Th e starting point is a brief

overview of human rights clauses provided for in international agreements concluded

by the EU. Th is will lead us to an overview and analysis of the place and meaning

of human rights as envisaged in EU–Georgia bilateral documents as well as in

autonomous instruments of the EU. Finally, the issue of eff ectiveness and consistency

of human rights as a part of political conditionality will be addressed. It is argued

that human rights clauses lack strict and concrete mechanisms which would ensure

their eff ectiveness in practice and go beyond the scope of consultations and political

dialogue within the bodies established under the existed cooperation framework.

1. Human rights in international agreements of the European Union

Th e EU has concluded numerous agreements with third countries or regional

groups of third countries, such as, for example, ACP-EU Partnership Agreement

(Th e Cotonou Agreement), which is the legal framework for EU’s relations with

79 countries from Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacifi c. Although the main object

of regulation of most of them is trade, many agreements exceed the scope of trade

regulation and cover broader aspects of cooperation. Just as diverse are the titles

of these agreements: trade agreement; political dialogue and cooperation agreement;

framework agreement; economic partnership agreement; trade and cooperation

agreement; partnership and cooperation agreement; stabilisation and association

agreement; Europe agreement; association agreement. Human rights clauses as

87The Instrument of Human Rights Clause as a Part of Conditionality European Union...

a part of political conditionality have been an integral part of all these agreements

concluded by the EU since the early nineties.

In 1995, the Council approved a suspension mechanism to be included in

Community agreements with non-member states which enabled the European

Community, in cases of serious and persistent violations of human rights, to react with

immediate eff ect. Whereas, human right should be defi ned as an essential element

of the agreement. Th is mechanism provided for taking “appropriate measures” in

the event of violation of human rights. Th at does not necessarily mean that the

appropriate measure should be suspension or termination of the agreement. As a rule,

the EU uses dialogue with the government of the partner country as a primary tool

for solving the problems. Furthermore, suspension of cooperation in certain areas,

imposition of a trade embargo, postponement of planning or starting new projects,

etc., can also be considered as an appropriate measure (Communication from the

Commission 1995).

2. Human Rights in European Union–Georgia Bilateral Documents

2.1. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement

Th e fi rst legal basis for the relationship between the EU and Georgia was the

Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between the European Communities

and their Member States, on the one part, and Georgia, on the other part, which was

signed on 22 April 1996 and entered into force on 1 July 1999 for a period of ten years.

Aft er the expiry of this period in 2009 the PCA was being automatically renewed

year by year1.

Already in the preamble of the agreement it is stated that the parties are

“convinced of the paramount importance of the rule of law and respect for human

1 Article 97 of the EU–Georgia PCA provided that it should be automatically renewed year by year provided that neither party gives the other party written notice of denunciation of this Agreement six months before it expires.

88 Gaga Gabrichidze

rights, particularly those of persons belonging to minorities, the establishment of

a multiparty system with free and democratic elections and economic liberalization

aimed at setting up a market economy, and recognizing the eff orts of Georgia to

create political and economic systems based on these principles”. Furthermore,

Article 2 of the PCA defi nes the essential elements of the agreement. Whereas, it

should be noted that in the Georgian version of the PCA the term the term “basic

elements” is being used. It cannot be considered as a correct translation of the term

“essential elements” which can be found in the English version of the PCA. Based

on the practice of the EU, the term “essential elements” does have a certain meaning

and defi nes those conditions whose violation puts the application or even existence

of an agreement into question. In particular, these are the following: Respect for

democracy, principles of international law and human rights as defi ned in particular

in the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris for

a New Europe, as well as the principles of market economy, including those enunciated

in the documents of the CSCE Bonn Conference.

Special importance is conferred on the provision of Article 2 of the PCA by

Article 98 of the PCA. Namely, according to the latter, if either Party would consider

that the other Party has failed to fulfi l an obligation under the agreement, it can take

appropriate measures. Before so doing, it shall supply the Cooperation Council2 with

all relevant information required for a thorough examination of the situation with an

aim to seek a solution acceptable to the parties. However, in cases of special urgency,

the parties had no obligation to address the Cooperation Council and could react

immediately in cases of violation of the agreement, which could be in form of partial

or full suspension of the application of the PCA. Th e joint declaration to Article 98

annexed to the PCA defi nes the term “cases of special urgency” as cases of material

breach of the agreement by one of the parties. Whereas, violation of the essential

elements of the agreement set out in Article 2 is considered such a breach. Th is form

of human rights conditionality is the classic version of the so-called „Bulgarian“

clause (It was fi rst used in the Europe Agreements with Bulgaria and Romania

in 1993), which replaced the „Baltic“ clause (fi rst used in the Europe Agreements

with Baltic states in 1992) in the practice of the EU. Th ey diff er considerably from

one another as, on the one hand, according to the „Baltic“ clause, only in case of

a serious infringement of the essential provisions either party is enabled to

immediately suspend the agreement either in whole or in part, while under the

„Bulgarian“ clause either party is able to suspend the agreement another party fails to

2 Th e Cooperation Council was established under Article 80 of the PCA.


fulfi l any obligation under the agreement. On the other hand, the „Bulgarian“ clause,

in contrast to the „Baltic“ clause, provides for consultation procedure and envisages

immediate suspension only in cases of special urgency (Gabrichidze 2011, 47).

Here should be noted, that the PCA did not limit itself to only laying down human

rights conditionality. It also provided for legal grounds for cooperation in the fi eld of

human rights. In particular, Title VII of the PCA was devoted to this issue. Article

71 of the PCA envisaged that the parties should cooperate on all questions relevant

to the establishment or reinforcement of democratic institutions, including those

required in order to strengthen the rule of law, and the protection of human rights

and fundamental freedoms according to international law and OSCE principles. Th is

cooperation should take the form of technical assistance programmes.

2.2. European Union–Georgia Action Plan under the European Neighbourhood Policy

On 14 June 2004, Georgia was off ered to participate in the initiative of the European

Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) (Communication from the Commission 2003).

Although the ENP did not substitute the PCA – the main legal basis of Georgia-EU

relationships at that time – it expanded the scope of perspectives off ered by the EU.

Specifi cally, the ENP provided for the possibility to participate in the internal market

and to further deepen the economic integration.

In the ENP Strategy Paper the Commission expressly refers to the central role

and importance of values in external policy of the EU. In particular, it is stated that

“the Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy,

equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights. Th ese values are common to

the Member States in a society of pluralism, tolerance, justice, solidarity and non-

discrimination. Th e Union’s aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of

its peoples. In its relations with the wider world, it aims at upholding and promoting

these values“ (Communication from the Commission 2004, 10). Furthermore, in

the same document the Commission defi nes political conditionality with respect

to those countries which would be covered by the ENP. Specifi cally, with regard to

Southern Caucasus countries it is stated that „the EU should consider the possibility

of developing Action Plans with these countries in the future on the basis of their

individual merits. With this in view, the Commission will report to the Council on

progress made by each country with respect to the strengthening of democracy, the

90 Gaga Gabrichidze

rule of law and respect for human rights” (Communication from the Commission

2004, 8).

In addition, the EU–Georgia bilateral Action Plan, which was the basic tool for

the implementation of the ENP, laid down priority areas, which should be accorded

particular attention within the framework of the cooperation. It is worth mentioning

that the list starts with strengthening the rule of law, especially through reform

of the judicial system, including the penitentiary system, and through rebuilding

state institutions and strengthening democratic institutions and respect for human

rights and fundamental freedoms in compliance with international commitments of

Georgia (EU–Georgia Action Plan, 3).

In addition to the priorities, the Action Plan provided for general objectives

and actions which had to complement the priorities (EU–Georgia Action Plan, 4).

One of these objectives is political dialogue and reform (EU–Georgia Action Plan,

4.1) including the component “Democracy and the rule of law, human rights and

fundamental freedoms” (EU–Georgia Action Plan, 4.1.1).

2.3. Association Agreement

Along with other Eastern neighbours of the EU Georgia is also included the EU

Eastern Partnership initiative. Eastern Partnership, initiated by Polish and Swedish

Governments, was decided to be adopted by the European Council on March 2009.

Formally it was founded on 7 May 2009 (Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership

Summit 2009).

Together with the other objectives intended to deepen cooperation, the Eastern

Partnership provides for the possibility of concluding a new enhanced agreement

with partner states which also includes the creation of a deep and comprehensive

free trade area. Negotiations with Georgia in this respect began on 15 July 2010. Th e

text of the EU–Georgia Association Agreement was initialled by the parties on 29

November 2013, at the third Eastern Partnership Summit and signed on 27 June 2014.

On the basis of Article 431 of the Association Agreement, the provisional application

of substantial parts of the Association Agreement started on 1 September 2014. It fully

entered into force on 1 July 2016, the fi rst day of the second month following the date

of the deposit of the last instrument of ratifi cation or approval (Article 431.2 of the

EU–Georgia Association Agreement). Th us, the EU–Georgia Association Agreement

is the current legal framework of relations between Georgia and the European Union.


As for the place and importance of human rights under the EU–Georgia

Association Agreement, fi rst of all, in the preamble there are several references to

human rights. In particular, it is stated that the EU is built on the following common

values: democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule

of law. Whereas, it is also underlined that these values also lie at the heart of political

association and economic integration as envisaged in the Association Agreement

(Paragraph 3 of the Preamble of the EU–Georgia Association Agreement). Further,

the parties declare that they are committed to further strengthen the respect for

fundamental freedoms, human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to

minorities, democratic principles, the rule of law, and good governance (Paragraph 7

of the Preamble of the EU–Georgia Association Agreement). Besides, the parties, one

more time, confi rm that they are committed to all the principles and provisions of

the Charter of the United Nations, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in

Europe, in particular of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 of the Conference on Security

and Cooperation in Europe, the concluding documents of the Madrid, Istanbul and

Vienna Conferences of 1991 and 1992 respectively, and the Charter of Paris for a

New Europe of 1990, as well as the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human

Rights of 1948 and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and

Fundamental Freedoms of 1950 (Paragraph 10 of the Preamble of the EU–Georgia

Association Agreement).

In the fi rst provisions of the Association Agreement it is stated that one of the

aims of the association relationship established between the EU and Georgia is

enhancing cooperation in the area of freedom, security and justice „with the aim

of reinforcing the rule of law and the respect for human rights and fundamental

freedoms“ (Article 1.2 f) of the EU–Georgia Association Agreement).

In addition, also here, just as in the PCA, respect for the democratic principles,

human rights and fundamental freedoms are considered in the rank of essential

elements of the agreement. Concerning their meaning there is a reference to the

United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, the European

Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of

1950, the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 of the Conference on Security and Cooperation

in Europe and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe of 1990 (Article 2.1 of the EU–

Georgia Association Agreement).

As in the case of the PCA, the status of an essential element lends special

signifi cance to the democratic principle and protection of human rights compared

to other obligations under the Association Agreement. In case of a dispute, a party

may take appropriate measures if the matter is not resolved within three months of

92 Gaga Gabrichidze

the date of notifi cation of a formal request for dispute settlement (Article 421 of the

EU–Georgia Association Agreement) and if the complaining Party continues to

consider that the other Party has failed to fulfi l an obligation under this Agreement.

Th e fact of violation by one of the parties of democratic principle or human rights

is one of the exceptions when the other party is not under obligation to follow

the procedure of a three month consultation period before reacting and taking

appropriate measures (Article 422 of the EU–Georgia Association Agreement.).

In the Title II of the Association Agreement, which is devoted to political dialogue,

reform and cooperation in the fi eld of foreign and security policy, strengthening

respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is declared as one of the aims

of political dialogue (Article 3.2 h) of the EU–Georgia Association Agreement).

Furthermore, in the context of domestic reform it is mentioned that the parties will,

among others, cooperate on developing, consolidating and increasing the stability

and eff ectiveness of democratic institutions and the rule of law and on ensuring

respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (Article 4 of the EU–Georgia

Association Agreement).

And fi nally, in Title III of the Association Agreement dealing with the issues of

freedom, security and justice, the issue of the rule of law and respect for human rights

and fundamental freedoms is separately addressed. Specifi cally, it is noted that in

their cooperation in the area of freedom, security and justice the parties shall attach

particular importance to further promote the rule of law, including the independence

of the judiciary, access to justice, and the right to a fair trial (Article 13.1 of the

EU–Georgia Association Agreement). Moreover, it is underlined that respect for

human rights and fundamental freedoms will guide all cooperation on freedom,

security and justice (Article 13.3 of the EU–Georgia Association Agreement).

Logically, provisions of the Association Agenda which was formally adopted by

the EU and Georgia on 26 June 2014 and establishes priorities for the period 2014-2016

with a view to prepare for the implementation of the Association Agreement are more

concrete. One of the priorities of the Association Agenda is, in accordance with the

Association Agreement, political dialogue and reform, whereby one of the aims of the

cooperation is to strengthen the respect for democratic principles, the rule of law and

good governance, human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the rights of

persons belonging to minorities as enshrined in the core UN and Council of Europe

Conventions and related protocols (Paragraph 2.1 iii) of the EU–Georgia Association

Agenda). In the context of cooperation, on the one hand, a reference is made to the

EU Special Adviser on Constitutional and Legal reform and Human Rights Th omas

Hammarberg‘s report from September 2013 „Georgia in Transition“ (Hammarberg


2013) and, on the other hand, a list of issues is provided for, which should be covered

by cooperation (Paragraph 2.1 iii) of the EU–Georgia Association Agenda).3

3. Human Rights in Autonomous Instruments of the European Union

In the preamble of Regulation No 2053/03 concerning the provision of technical

assistance to economic reform and recovery in the independent States of the former

Soviet Union and Mongolia which was adopted on 19 July 1993, the Council made a

reference to the fact that technical assistance will be fully eff ective only in the context

of progress towards free and open democratic systems that respect human rights.

Regulation no 1279/96 of 25 June 1996, which replaced Regulation No 2053/03, is more

explicit. In particular, according to Article 3.11 of Regulation no 1279/96, when an

3 Specifi cally, the list includes the following issues: Adoption of a comprehensive National

Human Rights Strategy and Action Plan; actively pursue in this strategy and action plan the specifi c

recommendations of UN bodies, OSCE/ODIHR, the Council of Europe/European Commission

against Racism and Intolerance and international human rights organisations notably in implementing

anti-discrimination policies, protecting minorities and private life and ensuring the freedom of

religion; Adoption of a comprehensive anti-discrimination law, as recommended by UN and Council of

Europe monitoring bodies, to ensure eff ective protection against discrimination; Taking steps towards

signature, ratifi cation and transposition into national legislation of relevant UN and Council of Europe

instruments in the fi ght against discrimination, including taking into account the UN Convention on

Statelessness and the standing recommendations of the Council of Europe on the European Charter for

Regional or Minority Languages; Responding appropriately to the conclusions and recommendations

of relevant Council of Europe bodies on compliance by Georgia with the Framework Convention for

the protection of national minorities; Ensuring eff ective implementation of the UN Convention on

the Rights of Persons with Disabilities; Ensuring eff ective execution of judgments of the European

Court of Human Rights; Maintaining eff ective pre- and non-judicial mechanisms for both dispute

settlement and the protection of human rights; promoting and raising awareness on human rights

and anti-discrimination in the judiciary, law enforcement, administration; Continuing to strengthen

media pluralism, transparency and independence in line with Council of Europe recommendations;

Taking the recommendations of the Public Defender’s Offi ce into account in policy-making and

provide adequate resources and strengthen the PDO offi ce; Supporting the eff ective functioning of

the institutional mechanism foreseen in the antidiscrimination law; Build monitoring capacities of

the Parliamentary Committees on Human Rights and Legal issues linked to the implementation of

the Human Rights Strategy and Action Plan; Supporting Civil Society Organisations and notably the

representative social partners (trade-unions and employers’ organisations) as service providers and

watchdogs in areas prioritised by the EU–Georgia Association Agreement, including labour rights,

privacy, rights of minorities and other vulnerable groups and media freedom.

94 Gaga Gabrichidze

essential element for the continuation of cooperation through assistance is missing, in

particular in cases of violation of democratic principles and human rights, the Council

may decide upon appropriate measures concerning assistance to a partner state.

Th e next succeeding regulation combined approaches of the both predecessor

regulations. Namely, in the preamble of Regulation no 99/2000 of 29 December

1999 it is stated that assistance from the EU will be fully eff ective only in the context

of progress towards free and open democratic societies that respect human rights,

minority rights and the rights of the indigenous people. Besides, Article 16 of

Regulation no 99/2000 envisages that in cases of violation of democratic principles

and human rights, the Council may decide upon appropriate measures concerning

assistance to a partner country.

In 2006 a new fi nancial mechanism – the European Neighbourhood and

Partnership Instrument (ENPI) – was established with the purpose to support

the European Neighbourhood Policy (Regulation no 1638/2006). It replaced and

enhanced the fi nancial assistance programmes TACIS (for Eastern European

countries) and MEDA (for Mediterranean countries). Programmes and projects

fi nanced within the framework of ENPI should be consistent with European Union

policies and respect commitments under multilateral agreements and international

conventions to which the EU and its partners are parties, including commitments

on human rights, democracy and good governance (Article 5 of Regulation no

1638/2006). Accordingly, cases of threats to democracy, the rule of law, human rights

and fundamental freedoms would provide a basis to conduct an ad hoc review of

strategy papers (Article 7 of Regulation no 1638/2006). Moreover, together with

the values of liberty, democracy and the rule of law, respect for human rights and

fundamental freedoms are the principles that may trigger „appropriate steps“ in

respect of any assistance granted to the partner country within the framework of the

ENPI when they are failed to be observed (Article 28 of Regulation no 1638/2006 in

conj. with Article 1.3 of the same regulation).

In 2014 the ENPI was replaced by the European Neighbourhood Instrument

(ENI) (Regulation No 232/2014) which also declared promoting human rights

and fundamental freedoms as one of its objectives and priorities (Article 2.2 a)

of Regulation No 232/2014; Paragraph 1 of Annex II of Regulation No 232/2014).

Th e progress of partner countries shall be regularly assessed and support may be

reconsidered by the EU in the event of serious or persistent regression (Article 4.2

of Regulation No 232/2014). In general, analogous to the ENPI, according to the

rules of the ENI, in the event of threats to democracy, the rule of law or human

rights and fundamental freedoms an ad hoc review of the programming documents


may be conducted (Article 7.10 of Regulation No 232/2014). However, in the ENI

the provision on „appropriate steps“ in respect of any assistance granted to the

partner country is missing. Exactly this fact is referred to in the Statement of the

European Parliament annexed to the Regulation establishing the ENI. In particular,

the European Parliament underlines that the regulation does not contain any explicit

reference to the possibility of suspending assistance in cases where a benefi ciary

country fails to observe the basic principles such as the principles of democracy, the

rule of law and the respect for human rights. Th e European Parliament considers any

suspension of assistance under the ENI to modify the overall fi nancial scheme agreed

under the ordinary legislative procedure. As a co-legislator and co-branch of the

budgetary authority, the European Parliament is therefore entitled to fully exercise

its prerogatives in that regard, if such a decision is to be taken. With this statement

the European Parliament underlines its readiness to support possible decisions on

suspending fi nancial assistance (European Parliament 2014).

4. Effectiveness and Consistency of Human Rights as a Part of Policy of Political Conditionality

The main problem of human rights clause can be either non-existence of an eff ective

mechanism of its implementation or non-use of the existing one. As for the human

rights clauses used in EU–Georgia relations, no questions remain open concerning the

content of these clauses. In particular, it is clear what is the meaning of human rights

as there are given references to concrete international contractual frameworks and

mechanisms existing in the fi eld of human rights protection. Furthermore, the fact,

that protection of human rights is one of the essential elements of agreements, leaves no

room for interpretation. Th e core question remaining open concerns eff ectiveness and

consistency of application of human rights clauses. Th ese clauses are, by their nature,

part of ex post conditionality. Respect for human rights by partner countries is not a

condition to be fulfi lled in advance but a condition for application/implementation

of the relevant agreement. Accordingly, in the event of failure to comply with this

obligation the partner country has to expect negative consequences.

Obviously, it is diffi cult to evaluate the impact of the EU on human rights

protection in Georgia on the basis of objective criteria. However, it should be possible

to identify the attitude of the EU towards the level of compliance with conditions

regarding human rights protection as provided for in agreements concluded with

96 Gaga Gabrichidze

Georgia. With this in mind, a look at the relation of a progress or a backward step in

respect of human rights with the instruments off ered by the EU to Georgia with the

aim of deepening bilateral relations can be taken.

For the purpose of getting a general picture of the situation regarding human rights

protection in Georgia, annual reports of the international non-profi t organisation

“Freedom House” can be used. Whereas, the ratings of “Freedom House” are based on

scores assigned to 25 indicators. Each country is assigned two numerical ratings – from

1 to 7 – for political rights and civil liberties, with 1 representing the most free and 7 the

least free. Th e average of ratings determines whether it is Free, Partly Free or Not Free.

Since the 1992 reporting year Georgia is being rated as a “Partly Free” country4.

Specifi cally, starting from 1996, the ratings of Georgia concerning state of political

rights and civil liberties are as follows:

Table 1: State of political rights and civil liberties in Georgia

Report Political rights Civil liberties Result

1996/1997 4 4 Partly Free






2003 4 4 Partly Free













Source: https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world#.VcB_psDtmko (accessed on 15 August 2017).

4 In 1991–1992 report covered the 1991 reporting year, Georgia was rated as Not Free.


If political conditionality would be eff ectively and consistently used from the side

of the EU in relations with such countries as Georgia, in parallel with deepening and

developing bilateral relations there should a progress in these countries regarding

human rights protection. In the table, the year 1996 is taken as the starting year as in

1996 the EU–Georgia PCA was signed. Other important dates in this context are: the

year 1999, when the PCA came into force; the year 2004, when the ENP started; the

year 2009, when the Eastern Partnership Initiative started; the year 2010 – beginning

of negotiations on conclusion of an association agreement between Georgia and the

EU; the years 2013–2015 – initialling, signing and entering into force of the EU–

Georgia Association Agreement.

As the table shows, Georgia’s rating remained more or less stable during the

period under consideration at a level of the average or below the average. Only in

2005-2006 (provided in the 2006 and 2007 annual reports) and 2012–2014 (provided

in the 2013, 2014 and 2015 annual reports, respectively) state of both, political rights as

well as civil liberties, was rated at the level of the average. If we compare the dynamics

of deepening the EU–Georgia relations with the situation in Georgia regarding

protection for human rights, we can see that the latter lags behind. Th is indicates that

human rights clause plays a less important role in practice than it would be expected

by an “essential element” of the agreements concluded by the EU.

Of course, the “Freedom House” reports cannot be considered a determining

factor of the EU external policy. However, annual progress reports concerning the

implementation of the ENP in Georgia prepared by the Commission also refer to

problems with human rights5. Nevertheless, the EU uses political dialogue as the

primary mechanism to address these diffi culties.

Th erefore, in general, eff ectiveness and consistency of human rights conditionality

can be called into question. Th ere are several reasons for this. First, it was not

conducive to fulfi lment of this condition that the EU was off ering to deepen relations

with the Eastern Partnership countries without a diff erentiated approach. For

example, it was off ering conclusion of association agreements to countries with

diff erent state of human rights protection. As of now it seems that the EU, with the

revised ENP, takes a more diff erentiated approach (Joint Communication 2015).

However, it is not to be ignored that sometimes economic and political interests and

not human rights are in the foreground while developing relations with a partner

5 ENP Country Progress Reports for Georgia can be found on the following website (accessed

on 13 August 2017): http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/georgia/eu_georgia/political_relations/

political_framework/enp_georgia_news/index_en.htm

98 Gaga Gabrichidze

country (Ghazaryan 2014, 172). It is obvious that this aff ects the eff ectiveness of the

instrument of political conditionality. Second, the absence of a clear EU membership

perspective in the Association Agreement can also aff ect motivation of the partner

country.

Nevertheless, it should be also noted here that the absence of a rigid approach

to human rights conditionality can be reasonable to some extent. Deepening of

cooperation with a partner country through dynamic integration will more likely

make this country more obliging in respect of human rights protection in the future.

It cannot be denied that strict application of human rights clause can interfere

with bilateral cooperation in other important areas. Besides, it is questionable how

eff ective consistent and strict political conditionality would be in respect of human

rights protection.

Conclusions

Considered as the main instrument for supporting human rights protection in

partner countries, human rights clause is an integral part of legal frameworks of

cooperation between the EU and third countries, including Georgia. Moreover, it is

an essential element of the EU–Georgia Association Agreement and thus, a formal

condition for its application/implementation. But in fact, human rights clause as

a part of political conditionality does not have strict and concrete mechanisms which

would ensure its eff ectiveness and go beyond the scope of consultations and political

dialogue within the Association Council. In practice, the use of the suspension

mechanism by the EU can be expected only in dramatic cases of human rights

violations. If we take a perspective of political sciences, in the end, impact of the EU

policies on the domestic policy of partner countries can be explained with external

incentives model (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005, 7), according to which the

level of compliance with requirements set by the EU is directly connected to the cost-

benefi t calculations by the partner country: the determinacy of conditions, the size

and speed of rewards, the credibility of threats and promises, the level of adoption

costs, etc (Schimmelfennig 2005, 3). Considering the practice of the EU related to

the use of human rights clause there are also reasons to assume that on the side of

the EU the cost-benefi t calculation also can play important role in handling human

rights clause.


References

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Cremona, Marise. 2011. “Values in EU Foreign Policy”, in: Malcolm Evans and Panos

Koutrakos (eds.), Beyond the Established Orders: Policy Interconnections between the EU

and the Rest of the World, Oxford: Hart Publishing: 275–315.

Fiero, Elena. 2003. European Union‘s Approach to Human Rights Conditionality in Practice,

Leiden: Brill/Nijhoff .

Gabrichidze, Gaga. 2011. „Human Rights Clause in EU Trade Agreements“. In International

Standards of the Protection of Human Rights and Georgia, Tbilisi: 47–57.

Ghazaryan, Nariné. 2014. Th e European Neighbourhood Policy and the Democratic Values of

the EU, Oxford: Hart publishing.

Hammarberg, Th omas. 2013. Georgia in Transition – Report on the human rights dimension:

background, steps taken and remaining challenges. Assessment and recommendations.

Schimmelfennig, Frank. 2005. Th e International Promotion of Political Norms in Eastern

Europe: a Qualitative Comparative Analysis, CES Working Paper, Harvard University:

Center for European Studies.

Schimmelfennig, Frank and Sedelmeier, Ulrich. 2005. Introduction: Conceptualizing

the Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe, in: Schimmelfennig, Frank and

Sedelmeier Ulrich (eds.): Th e Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe, Ithaca:

Cornell University Press: 1–28.

European Union Law

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of technical assistance to economic reform and recovery in the independent States

of the former Soviet Union and Mongolia, 29. 7. 93, Offi cial Journal of the European

Communities No L 187/1.

Annex 2, Communication from the Commission on the inclusion of respect for democratic

principles and human rights in agreements between the Community and third countries.

COM (95) 216 fi nal, 23 May 1995.

100 Gaga Gabrichidze

Council Regulation (EURATOM, EC) No 1279/96 of 25 June 1996 concerning the provision

of assistance to economic reform and recovery in the New Independent States and

Mongolia, 4.7. 96, Offi cial Journal of the European Communities No L 165/ 1.

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their Member States, on the one part, and Georgia, on the other part. Offi cial Journal of

the European Communities 1999, L 205.

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provision of assistance to the partner States in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 18. 1.

2000, Offi cial Journal of the European Communities L 12/1.

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Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and

Southern Neighbours“. COM (2003) 104 fi nal.

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May 2004.

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(Accessed on 15 August 2017).

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Prague, 7 May 2009, Brussels, 7 May 2009 8435/09 (Presse 78).

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Neighbourhood Policy, Brussels, 18.11.2015 JOIN(2015) 50 fi nal.



PATRYCJA BYTNER*

Debt Crisis in the Eurozone Against Legal Systems Proposed by Pierre Werner in 1970

Abstract

The debt crisis in the European Union has shown that the mistakes made during the creation of Economic and Monetary Union have contributed to the emergence of a crisis and have made it more difficult to help the states that are affected by it. The article compares the shape of the Economic and Monetary Union with the concept of monetary integration presented in 1970 by Pierre Werner, which assumed coordination at the level of the European Union fiscal and monetary policy. The text attempts to answer the question whether the application of solutions adopted by Pierre Werner would help avoid a debt crisis in the European Union.Key words: Economic Partnership Agreement, ECOWAS, European Union, primary commodities, product diversification.

Key words: debt crisis; Pierre Werner; Eurozone; economic connections; monetary policy

Introduction

Th e problem of excessive government debt is one of the biggest problems in the

world economy. Although it is now largely related to the 2007+ fi nancial crisis, this

phenomenon is not new, because the fi rst time that it has severely disrupted the global

fi nancial system was in 1980’s. Th en, aft er a series of oil crises, the debt crisis hit Latin

* Warsaw School of Economics, [email protected]

102 Patrycja Bytner

American countries had a negative infl uence on the economic development of the

region. Th en, the eff ects of the crisis were felt not only in the countries which were

hit by the crisis.

At present, the euro area debt crisis is one of the most pressing problems that

the European Union is facing. Th e strong economic connections between countries

in the zone have caused the problems of several countries to shift the functioning

of the whole community, not only at the economic but also at the political level. Th e

essence of the crisis is that the excessive indebtedness of some European Union states

(especially Greece) has undermined the stability of the remaining and functioning

economies of the Member States. Th e global crisis of 2007–2009, which had negative

eff ects on the functioning of the global capital markets, was one of the most important

causes of escalation of the crisis in the European Union (see more: Narodowy Bank

Polski 2009). At that time, although the value of the euro was not weakening, the

level of excessive indebtedness of individual states infl uenced their creditworthiness.

Th is situation has started to become a threat to the rest of the community. Infl ation

increased and poorer Eurozone economies had problems with their competitiveness

(see more: Narodowy Bank Polski 2010).

Th e debt crisis of the European Union has shown the weaknesses of the Economic

and Monetary Union. Attempting to step out of the crisis and helping the Member

States was at the same time an attempt to reform the Eurozone. When European

Union was looking for solutions to the problems of the community, steps were made

to deepen the integration and unifi cation of those sectors which were not included in

the Treaty From Maastricht1. One of the ways to solve problems, was the resumption

to the Werner Plan which was presented in the 1970s. Th is report suggested that the

implementation of the common monetary policy could be eff ective only in the pursuit

of sound fi scal policy (Werner 1970, 17). By analyzing the causes of the current crisis

in the Eurozone, the statement proposed by Pierre Werner has again become more

relevant.

Th e article attempts to answer the question of the optimal shape of the Economic

and Monetary Union, which would help avoid debt crises. Th e currently functioning

model of the EMU was compiled with the EMU proposal designed by Pierre Werner

1970. Next, the main theses of the Werner Plan and EMU design fl aws aft er the Treaty

of Maastricht will be presented. Th en, both solutions will be analyzed in the context

of their effi ciency and sovereignty of fi scal policy in the Member States. Finally, the

issue of the eff ectiveness of EU crisis management and the fi ght against the eff ects

1 Th e Treaty on European Union (TEU), Dz.U. C 191 z 29.7.1992

103Debt Crisis in the Eurozone Against Legal Systems Proposed by Pierre Werner in 1970 ...

of the debt crisis will be discussed, with particular emphasis on the analysis of the

mechanisms in EMU.

Th e starting point for this article was the critical analysis of publications on the

debt crisis in the European Union (both domestic and foreign authors). In addition,

an analysis was made of the most important legal acts that directly or indirectly

aff ected the evolution of the crisis and the functioning of the EMU, as well as the

reports of transnational institutions examining the macroeconomic situation in

Europe. Th en the results of the analysis of previous legal acts and the current ones

were synthesized in order to obtain a holistic view of EMU management and to

attempt to evaluate what would be the optimal structure of EMU.

1. The Main Thesis of Pierre Werner’s Plan

Pierre Werner was the Prime Minister of Luxembourg in 1959–1974 and 1979–1984.

During his political career he was actively involved in establishing the foundations

for the functioning of the European Economic Communities. One of his most

important contributions was the preparation of a plan for the creation of the European

Monetary Union in 1970, which was called Werner’s Plan. Th e plan assumed the

creation of an economic and monetary union in three stages realized in ten years.

Th e implementation of Werner’s assumptions was interrupted by the oil crisis, which

caused a collapse of “the snake in the tunnel mechanism” (similar to the current

Exchange Rate Mechanism – ERM2). Th e integration planned by Werner was stopped

at the fi rst stage of his plan. Twenty years later, the Euro currency introduction

plan written by Deloros (in the “Report on economic and monetary union on the

European Community”) largely benefi ted from Werner’s accomplishments. Despite

this, it was diff erent in several key aspects. Th ese diff erences have proven to have

signifi cant implications for the further functioning of the European Union.

Th e main assumption proposed by Pierre Werner was that the coordination

of monetary policy at European Union level would be eff ective only if the rational

budgetary policy was pursued. Th e strategy on how to closely coordinate these two

policies was to hand over country competences in this area to the EU institutions.

2 Th e Exchange Rate Mechanism was introduced in 1979 under the European Monetary System

(EMS). Member States agreed to keep the rates of individual currencies within a specifi ed range

expressed in ECUs within +/- 2.25% of the agreed parity rate.

104 Patrycja Bytner

According to the assumptions, the proposed system of the central banking was

modeled on the Federal Reserve System in the United States. Th is institution

was responsible for the monetary policy. It was also the second most important

institution designated as the “center of economic policy decisions”. In the Werner’s

Plan it was responsible for the development of a broad budgetary policy and making

macroeconomic decisions. Th is institution was accountable to the European

Parliament (Nowak-Far 2001, 21) and was supposed to be able to infl uence the budgets

of the Member States, particularly with regard to the defi cit problem, sources of

funding and the use of possible budget surpluses. Th e assumptions adopted by the

Werner commission also assumed the harmonization of tax systems and the transfer

of monetary policy to the level of the Community. Th is proposal required greater

integration than the integration within the single market. It was associated with a

signifi cant limitation of the sovereignty of states in economic decisions, which, in the

face of the oil crisis and related problems in the foreign exchange markets, were met

with social resistance in the countries of the European Communities.

2. Disadvantages of the Economic and Monetary Union after the Treaty of Maastricht

Foundations of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the plan to introduce

a common currency with the criteria of convergence have been included in the

Maastricht Treaty. When the foundations of the EMU were being created, for the

above-mentioned political reasons, they departed from Pierre Werner’s assumptions

on shaping the budgetary policy shaping. Th e European Central Bank (EBC) was

created in diff erent institutional and functional shape from Werner’s Plan (see more:

Fedorowicz 2010, 139−156). EBC was the institution responsible for monetary policy

of the EU. Due to political disputes the plan to construct an independent fi scal policy

coordination institution was completely ignored. Th is was the issue that undermined

the functioning of the EU, contributing not only to the current Eurozone debt crisis,

but also to the negative implications for Member States’ fi scal policies.

Th e primacy of politics over previously adopted economic assumptions was

observed not only in establishing the legal basis for the EMU, but also in shaping the

foundations of the Eurozone. While observing the process of selection of countries

able to participate in economic integration, it is impossible to resist the impression

that they are largely driven by political arguments rather than economic ones. It was


already visible in 1997 when the shape of the euro area was decided upon. Although

only two from eleven candidates fulfi lled the criterion of budgetary convergence

(and six out of nine debt-to-GDP ratios showed an upward trend), it was decided in

May 1998 that all the candidate countries would begin to integrate at the same time

(Szołucha 2012, 96). Th e problem has also been the enforcement of the convergence

criteria, specifi cally the provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact, already in the

near future, since the euro zone began to operate. Th e imposition of sanctions was

strongly correlated with decisions of a strictly political nature, as refl ected in the

decision of the ECOFIN Council taken in 2003 to refrain from taking additional

measures against Germany and France under the excessive defi cit procedure (Panfi l

2011, 162-164). Th is provision was repealed by the Court of Justice in Luxembourg.

Th is situation clearly demonstrated the dependence of the sanctioning process on

politics (Jędrzejowicz, Kitala, Wronka 2013). According to estimates, the convergence

criteria were broken 60 times by the euro area countries between 2002 and 2011 and

the European Commission’s activities were limited to the so-called formal early

warnings “blue letters” to governments (Cziomer 2012, 11).

In addition, it is important to mention the real problems of EU institutions in

the control of countries, not only in terms of the convergence criteria, but also in

the quality of the data they report on budgetary expenditures and the real economic

situation in these countries. A good example is the situation in Greece, which at

the time of the Eurozone entry was painted incorrectly due to falsifi ed data sent to

Eurostat, and untrusted information passed on to the EU institutions until the onset

of the crisis in that country (see more: Wyżnikiewicz2015, 105-113).

It should also be noted that EU Member States have strengthened the process of

economic integration while political integration was avoided. Th ere was integration

only in some random areas (Cziomer 2012, 11). Th is rhetoric was confi rmed during

the preparation and implementation of the Lisbon Treaty3 and was yet another cause

of the escalation of the eff ects of excessive debt.

3 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the

European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007, Dz.U. C 306 z 17.12.2007.

106 Patrycja Bytner

3. Dilemma of Sovereignty and the Shape of Fiscal Policy

Comparing the observed way of coordinating the fi scal policies of member states

and taking into account the indispensable impact of policy on economic decision-

making, Werner’s message to create a self-contained institution that could infl uence

the budgets of the Member States and at the same time control and coordinate budget

policies to avoid fi nancial crises seems well thought through. Th e discipline of fi scal

and budgetary policy determines the eff ectiveness of monetary policy, which is

particularly important at the time that emerging economies attempt to get out from

the crisis (Gasz 2013, 64). Th e increase in debt causes increasing government bond

yields, increasing debt servicing costs and calls for new sources of defi cit fi nancing.

Th e fi scal and budgetary policy of the euro area until the onset of the crisis was

shaped ad hoc, in a chaotic and inconsistent manner. Th e crisis has shown that the

targeting of fi scal monitoring on the nominal and structural balance of the public

fi nance sector has proven insuffi cient to ensure macroeconomic security of the

euro area (Gasz 2013, 67). Th ere was a lack of institutions equipped with the tools to

allow for fair scrutiny of the members of the Union, but also a lack in the tools and

incentives to mobilize member states to save in times of prosperity. At the same time,

the convergence criteria began to be questioned, particularly in peripheral countries,

where they are viewed by some researchers as one of the causes of the crisis.

Establishing the solutions described above would require States to completely

renounce sovereign public fi nance policy. While observing a package of anti-crisis

measures taken within the Community, it is impossible to resist the impression

that members are seeking deeper economic integration, but the renunciation of

such an important instrument by the states can be a long-term process or even

impossible in the current political situation (see more: Kubin 2007, 149−198). Werner,

in his assumption of the Economic and Monetary Union, called for a higher level

of Community budget, transnational development of medium-term objectives and

short-term economic policy. He was also keen on tax harmonization, because in his

way of thinking diff erences in this fi eld aff ect the movement of goods, services and

capital in the Community. It is currently limited to turnover taxes, excise duties and

other indirect taxes, and can only be implemented to the extent that is necessary

for the proper functioning of the internal market, for example by setting minimum


limits on VAT rates (TEU art 93). Due to the subsidiarity principle, the process of

tax harmonization was therefore limited to the necessary minimum, creating a

situation in which decisions made by individual states could aff ect other members of

the Economic and Monetary Union4. Despite the criticism of such a solution, which

is one of the obstacles to complete integration and even mutual competition among

euro area members, the state still does not want to waive the privilege of shaping its

own tax policy (especially in the case of direct taxes). However, it is not a surprise that

individual countries are apprehensive of one of the most important tools for shaping

their economic policy, especially given the diversity of economies of the euro area

member countries (see more: Szeląg 2003).

However, that the problem of Community fi scal policy undoubtedly was connected

to the lack of real convergence of economies in the euro area. In combination with

the renunciation of autonomous monetary policy and diff erent challenges facing

individual countries, this phenomenon would hinder the eff ective management of

the euro area. Th ese issues have not been noticed, either in the Werner Report or in

the Maastricht Treaty, where the infl ation target has allowed peripheral countries

to relatively quickly pass nominal criteria and develop economic growth (TEU

Art. 141 par. 1). Th e illusion of real convergence has been broken by a crisis that has

shown some that countries’ appearance of economic growth, in fact hid mismatched

business cycles and non-synchronized economies. As a result, the problem of the

so-called one size fi ts all came into light, that is, the mismatch of euroland interest

rates to the economic situation of individual states or the general macroeconomic

dispersion (Gotz 2012, 73). Consequently, the future shake-up only in one of the

countries of EMU may also be a problem for countries in good economic conditions.

On the other hand, with the current method of fi scal policy coordination, it is

impossible to fi nd another solution and a reliable control measure; one that would

make it possible, for example, to create, at the time of integration, an aforementioned

institution responsible for fi scal policy, which would operate in parallel to the ECB.

In the case of pursuing a common fi scal policy throughout the euro area, the issue

identifi ed by Philipp Bagus as a “Tragedy of the commons” should also be mentioned.

It could be observed by analyzing Greece’s behavior. Th rough its excessive credit

expansion and populist government policies, it has contributed signifi cantly to the

4 Tax harmonization issues were also addressed in the context of the signing of the Euro Plus

Pact in 2011. For the Europa Plus Pact see: More: Conclusions of the European Council 24-25 March

2011, online, access: 10.11.2016 (http:/www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/presdata/PL/

ec/120311.pdf.)

108 Patrycja Bytner

problems not only in the euro area(see more: Bagus 2011, 80–94). Th e temptation

“to stow away” by some members of the Economic and Monetary Union was also

not taken into account by the Werner Report, and now, paradoxically, it has been

strengthened by crisis-led instruments such as a fi xed rate loan, TARGET2 settlement

system, Emergency Liquidity Assistance, which can promote over-exploitation of the

common goods (Gotz 2012, 73). In addition, the temptation to abuse is enhanced by

the way the EU operates. Th e situation of misuse of rules and fractures of the basic

assumptions of budgetary policy was noted at a time when it was no longer possible

to punish the state, but it required support as was the case with the Greek debt crisis.

Th is phenomenon is the voice of diff erent political cultures in EU member states and

diff erent decision-making mechanisms. A striking example is the extreme approach

to budget spending in Greece and Germany, where populist politics contrasts with

budget pragmatism.

4. The Struggle with the Consequences of Excessive Debt and Crisis Management

During the fi ght against the eff ects of the fi nancial crisis, the eyes of the observers

were turned towards the European Central Bank, which also did not deal with

criticism. As previously mentioned, Werner’s plan advised to create a central banking

system based on the American model. However, the solution was selected without

giving ECB the central feature of the central bank functions, this of the last-instance

lender. It was also forbidden to buy Member State bonds on primary markets (TEU

art. 104). Such decisions made the ECB have limited capacity at the time of the

crisis, and in the initial phase, engaging in repo operations (which were pledged),

contributed further to deepening defi cits in countries struggling fi nancially. In

addition, it is questionable to set infl ation targeting as the main area of ECB activity,

as it could lead to overheating of economies and the creation of artifi cial booms

– such as in Ireland and Iceland (see more: Czernicki 2012). Introduction of the

Werner Report’s assumptions at the time of the ECB’s establishment would create

greater opportunities and better ways to deal with the crisis. Th e independence of

this institution, whose weakness has been brutally exposed in the fi nancial crisis,

is also of great importance. Th e ECB had to reduce the credibility of repo securities

under political pressure as a result of the fi rst rescue eff orts for Greek public fi nances.

In 2012, the European Central Bank launched the Outright Monetary Transaction


(OMT) program, which was a contradiction of the ECB’s assumptions, which could

not directly fi nance defi cits in the Member States (Gasz 2012, 67).

Th e establishment in 2011 of the so-called European semester5, an annual cycle

of economic policy coordination, seems important for fi scal harmonization. It is

a solution aimed at ensuring sound public fi nances and preventing excessive disruption

of macroeconomic imbalances which was introduced when a spillover problem was

identifi ed at Community level. In the same year, a package of directives called

a six-pack6, and a year later, a very controversial Treaty on Stability, Coordination

and Management in the Economic and Monetary Union (Compact) were signed. In

addition to strengthening the mechanism of penalizing the member states for failing

to comply with budgetary discipline (Fiscal Pakt art 7 and 8), the provisions of the

agreement oblige the state to inform about the plans for issuing public debt (Fiscal

Compact art 6). Th is was done too late, as perhaps owing to such co-ordination and

control if it were to be introduced from the very beginning of the existence of the euro

area, problems with the real threat of Member States’ default and the repercussions

that the whole community had could be avoided. Th e issue of controlling and closer

coordination of economic policies was also touched upon by Werner, who called

for a periodic review of each of the countries in the community, in order to avoid

diff erentiation of economic policies and, consequently, their lack of coherence over

a longer period of time.

Th e crisis has also highlighted the lack of crisis management framework and the

lack of anticipation of negative consequences of economic shocks in the European

Union. It was only as a result of the existing problems that aid mechanisms were

established for the Member States (eg the European Stability Mechanism) or the

lack of supervisory bodies such as the European Banking Authority, the European

Securities and Markets Authority, the European Insurance and Occupational

Pensions Authority, European Systemic Risk Board was addressed. Th e European

Stability Mechanism was established in September 2012. Its role is to mobilize funding

5 Regulation (EU) No 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November

2011 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of

budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies.

6 In the six-pack are: Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council

of 16 November 2011 on the eff ective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area, Regulation

(EU) No 1174/2011 on enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in

the euro area, Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic

imbalances and Council Regulation (EU) No 1177/2011 of 8 November 2011 amending Regulation

(EC) No 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive defi cit procedure.

110 Patrycja Bytner

and provide fi nancial assistance to the euro area Member States with serious fi nancial

problems that may undermine the fi nancial stability of the euro group as a whole. Th e

ESM assumes two types of state aid. Th e fi rst is a preventive credit line, which has no

implications on the benefi ciary’s economic policy. Th e second source of aid is loans,

which are subject to macroeconomic adjustments. In addition to state aid, ESM also

received the option to purchase bonds in the primary or secondary market and to

provide fi nancing to fi nancial institutions (Luc 2011, 145–167).

Th e actions described above may help avoid future problems or at least help

identify them earlier. Th e negligence in integration process relating to such an

important part, for example, to the banking union and the no-bail-out clause

prohibiting the possibility of providing assistance to a country in fi nancial trouble7

is undoubtedly one of the causes of the crisis in the European Union. Th ese problems

were not foreseen by the legal basis of the Economic and Monetary Union but were

also not addressed in the Werner report. Th e assumption of the self-suffi ciency of

states in the event of a crisis was undoubtedly a mistake and was contrary to the

goal of economic integration. By creating a single market, with the single currency

and monetary policy, only a optimistic vision of the future was pursued, without

exploring any problems that could arise in the future.

Conclusions

Looking at the solutions chosen by the Economic and Monetary Union and the

Werner report, it can be said that the concept created by the Luxembourg Prime

Minister, in spite of a few shortcomings, was closer to realizing the basic conditions

of an optimal currency area than the rules under which the current euro area

functions. Looking at the causes of the crisis and its course, it could be argued that

the Economic and Monetary Union, resembling that proposed in 1970, though much

more diffi cult and taking longer to create, and requiring many political concessions,

could be more resilient to internal abuse by individual members of the community.

One of the causes of the debt crisis (even taking into account the failure to consider

the elements of crisis management and the divergence of economies) is the artifi cial

separation of monetary policy from fi scal and de facto management at diff erent levels,

7 Art. 125 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing

the European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007.


which caused the accumulation of many of the aforementioned problems. With

the announcement by Greece of troubled debt repayments, they joined the domino

eff ect, causing the fi rst and at the same time, an extremely severe crisis in the euro

area. Observing the EU’s eff orts to fi nd ways out of trouble, it is impossible to resist

the impression that it is slowly beginning to move towards Werner’s suggestions. In

order to eff ectively coordinate the functioning of Economic and Monetary Union,

however, there is a need for a simultaneous political agreement, which is extremely

diffi cult to accomplish, especially in the current political situation.

References

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monatary union on the European Community, Presented April, 17, 1989, Brussel

Bagus, Philip. 2011. Tragedia euro, Warszawa, Instytut Ludwiga von Misesa.

Branna, Justyna, Wąsowicz, Regina. 2013. Semestr europejski. Przewodnik po kluczowych

dokumentach, Warszawa: Ośrodek Informacji i Dokumentacji Europejskiej.

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zmian w funkcjonowaniu Unii Gospodarczo-Walutowej, alternatywa dla członkostwa

w strefi e euro”. In Europejski ład gospodarczy w 2020 roku, ed. J. Staniłko, Warszawa:

Instytut Sobieskiego.

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Europejskiej”, Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska, Vol. XIX, 1: 7–26.

Fedorowicz, Magdalena. 2010. „Kompetencja prawotwórcza Europejskiego Banku

Centralnego”, Studia Europejskie, No 4: 139–156.

Gasz, Małgorzata. 2013. „Mechanizmy przeciwdziałania kryzysowi zadłużenia w strefi e

euro”, Nierówności społeczne a wzrost gospodarczy, No 30: 62–70.

Gotz, Marta, 2012, Kryzys i przyszłość strefy euro, Warszawa, Difi n.

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europejskiej integracji gospodarczej, Piła, Państwowa Wyższa Szkoła Zawodowa w Pile

Jędrzejowicz, Tomasz, Kitala, Marcin, Wronka, Anna., Polityka fi skalna w kraju należącym

do strefy euro. Wnioski dla Polski, on-line, 20.05.2017, http://www.nbp.pl/badania/

seminaria_bise/jedrzejowiczO.pdf.

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Kamiński, Tomasz. 2013. „Wpływ kryzysu gospodarczego w Europie na politykę zewnętrzną

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Kubin, Tomasz. 2007. Polityczne implikacje wprowadzenia unii walutowej w Europie,

Katowice: Wyd. Uniwersytetu Śląskiego.

Luc, Sylwia. 2011. „Koordynacja polityki w Unii Europejskiej w obliczu kryzysu

ekonomicznego”, Prace i Materiały Instytutu Rozwoju Gospodarczego SGH, nr 85:

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Narodowy Bank Polski

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3(31).

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Szeląg, Konrad. 2003. „Jednolita polityka budżetowa w strefi e euro – realna wizja, czy

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RUDOLF MICHAŁKIEWICZ*MAGDALENA PROCZEK**

Ochrona antymonopolowa w ramach polityki konkurencji Unii Europejskiej

Abstrakt

Celem niniejszego opracowania jest przedstawienie najważniejszych założeń polityki konkurencji Unii Europejskiej, a także ukazanie związku tej polityki z postanowieniami dotyczącymi nadużywania pozycji dominującej z perspektywy ekonomicznej oraz prawnej. Badanie zostało przeprowadzone w oparciu o literaturę przedmiotu, publikacje instytucji Unii Europejskiej, a także bezpośrednią analizę postanowień Traktatu o funkcjonowaniu Unii Europejskiej. W opracowaniu omówiono istotę polityki konkurencji wraz z jej traktatowymi założeniami oraz wskazaniem ekonomicznych celów postanowień Unii Europejskiej w zakresie polityki konkurencji, a także scharakteryzowano stosowane praktyki antykonkurencyjne w postaci nadużywania pozycji dominującej przez przedsiębiorców i ich potencjalny wpływ na handel między państwami członkowskimi. Opracowanie wieńczy próba oceny polityki konkurencji UE, w której zostały wskazane obszary, które wymagają dalszej nowelizacji. Opracowanie ma charakter opisowo-problemowy.

Słowa kluczowe: polityka konkurencji; ochrona antymonopolowa; Unia Europejska; pozycja dominująca.

* Ernst & Young, [email protected]** Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie, [email protected]

114 Rudolf Michałkiewicz, Magdalena Proczek

Wprowadzenie

Niniejsze opracowanie ma na celu przedstawienie najważniejszych założeń polityki

konkurencji Unii Europejskiej, a także ukazanie związku tej polityki z postanowieniami

dotyczącymi nadużywania pozycji dominującej przez przedsiębiorców. Zestawie-

nie tych dwóch zagadnień zostało dokonane na podstawie bezpośredniej analizy

postanowień Traktatu o funkcjonowaniu Unii Europejskiej (TFUE) oraz pozostałych

aktów prawnych związanych z tą problematyką. Pozycje zwarte, wykorzystane

w tym badaniu, to w przeważającej większości prace polskich autorów, stanowiące

ciągle relatywnie niewielki dorobek w tych obszarach, które postanowiono w ni-

niejszym opracowaniu wyeksponować. Odwołano się również do badań instytucji

publicznych – zarówno krajowych, jak i Unii Europejskiej. Praca ma charakter

opisowo-problemowy. W postępowaniu badawczym wykorzystano metodę badań

niereaktywnych, analizę krytyczną treści i syntezę.

1. Istota polityki konkurencji Unii Europejskiej

Polityka konkurencji stanowi bardzo istotną część działalności Unii Europejskiej.

Początków tej polityki należy upatrywać w okresie przyjęcia traktatów rzymskich

w 1957 r., będących podstawą systemu, którego celem była ochrona przed destabilizacją

konkurencji na wspólnotowym rynku. W swym założeniu „miał on umożliwić

stworzenie dopracowanych, skutecznych przepisów, które zapewnią właściwe

funkcjonowanie europejskiego rynku, a konsumentom pozwolą czerpać korzyści

z systemu wolnorynkowego” (Komisja Europejska, 3). Podstawą prawną dla polityki

konkurencji UE są artykuły zawarte w Tytule VII Traktatu o funkcjonowaniu Unii

Europejskiej zatytułowanym – „Wspólne reguły w dziedzinie konkurencji, podatków

i zbliżenia ustawodawstw”, w szczególności art. 101 do 109 TFUE.

Chcąc zobrazować czym jest polityka konkurencji, można by ograniczyć się do

stwierdzenia, że polityka konkurencji to działania polegające na stosowaniu norm

prawnych, które stanowią gwarancję tego, że poszczególni przedsiębiorcy będą

uczciwie ze sobą rywalizować (na zasadach konkurencyjnych). Taki stan rzeczy

w założeniu doprowadzić ma do poprawy wielu parametrów ekonomicznych,

115Ochrona antymonopolowa w ramach polityki konkurencji Unii Europejskiej

ostatecznie mających bezpośredni wpływ na całą gospodarkę, jak potencjał

przedsiębiorstw oraz przedsiębiorczości, wachlarz produktów oferowanych

konsumentom, jakość nabywanych dóbr i usług. Odwrotny efekt, w związku ze

stosowaniem polityki konkurencji, można zaobserwować natomiast względem cen

nabywanych dóbr i usług, które maleją w ramach poprawnie działającej konkurencji.

Mając powyższe na uwadze, Unia Europejska obrała sobie za cel przeciwstawienie

się antykonkurencyjnym praktykom przedsiębiorców. W ramach tych działań,

Komisja Europejska wykrywa praktyki ograniczające konkurencję i nakazuje

ich zaniechania, a także zajmuje się kontrolą koncentracji przedsiębiorstw

w poszczególnych branżach, kwestią pomocy publicznej udzielanej przez państwa

członkowskie oraz zajmuje się rozwojem koncepcji liberalizacji rynków

Komisja Europejska wraz z organami antymonopolowymi państw członkowskich,

ma obowiązek zapobiegać antykonkurencyjnym działaniom podejmowanym przez

przedsiębiorstwa, a także zwalczać te praktyki. Zadania te, Komisja Europejska wraz

z organami antymonopolowymi państw członkowskich wykonuje w ramach polityki

konkurencji UE (Komisja Europejska, op. cit.).

Polityka konkurencji Unii Europejskiej stanowi zatem podstawowy element

rynku wewnętrznego, którego głównym zadaniem jest dostarczenie konsumentom

na terytorium UE lepszej jakości dóbr i usług przy zachowaniu niskich cen. Główne

działania, na których oparta jest unijna polityka konkurencji, to:

• zwalczanie porozumień naruszających konkurencję;

• zapobieganie praktykom polegającym na nadużywaniu przez przedsiębiorstwa

pozycji dominującej na wskazanym rynku (na rynku wewnętrznym lub znacznej

jego części);

• nadzorowanie proponowanych połączeń przedsiębiorstw;

• nadzorowanie pomocy państwa dla przedsiębiorstw, gdyż może ona prowadzić do

zachwiania konkurencji.

Określone w art. 101 TFUE antykonkurencyjne porozumienia przedsiębiorstw

(kartele) polegają w szczególności na:

• ustalaniu w sposób bezpośredni lub pośredni cen zakupu lub sprzedaży albo

innych warunków transakcji;

• ograniczaniu lub kontrolowaniu produkcji, rynków, rozwoju technicznego lub

inwestycji;

• podziale rynków lub źródeł zaopatrzenia;

• stosowaniu wobec partnerów handlowych nierównych warunków do świadczeń

równoważnych i stwarzaniu im przez to niekorzystnych warunków konkurencji;

lub


• uzależnianiu zawarcia kontraktów od przyjęcia przez partnerów zobowiązań

dodatkowych, które ze względu na swój charakter lub zwyczaje handlowe nie mają

związku z przedmiotem tych kontraktów.

Jednakże nie należy zapominać, że powyższe działania nie muszą stanowić

antykonkurencyjnych praktyk, ponieważ porozumienia te mogą przyczyniać się

„do polepszenia produkcji lub dystrybucji produktów bądź do popierania postępu

technicznego lub gospodarczego, przy zastrzeżeniu dla użytkowników słusznej części

zysku, który z tego wynika” (art. 101 ust. 3 TFUE).

Artykuł 102 TFUE określa praktyki, które ustawodawstwo unijne uznaje za

nadużywanie pozycji dominującej. Według powyższego artykułu, „niezgodne

z rynkiem wewnętrznym i zakazane jest nadużywanie przez jedno lub większą

liczbę przedsiębiorstw pozycji dominującej na rynku wewnętrznym lub na znacznej

jego części, w zakresie, w jakim może wpływać na handel między państwami

członkowskimi”.

Wskazany powyżej artykuł zawiera również katalog przykładowych zachowań,

które mogą świadczyć o tym, że przedsiębiorca nadużywa pozycji dominującej.

Zachowania te polegają w szczególności na:

• „narzucaniu w sposób bezpośredni lub pośredni niesłusznych cen zakupu lub

sprzedaży albo innych niesłusznych warunków transakcji;

• ograniczaniu produkcji rynków lub rozwoju technicznego ze szkodą dla

konsumentów;

• stosowaniu wobec partnerów handlowych nierównych warunków do świadczeń

równoważnych i stwarzaniu im przez to niekorzystnych warunków konkurencji;

• uzależnianiu zawarcia kontraktów od przyjęcia przez partnerów zobowiązań

dodatkowych, które ze względu na swój charakter lub zwyczaje handlowe nie mają

związku z przedmiotem tych kontraktów”.

Jak zauważa doktryna oraz orzecznictwo, wskazana powyżej defi nicja nie jest

wystarczająca, by jasno określić, które przedsiębiorstwa dopuszczają się zachowań

antykonkurencyjnych, związanych z nadużywaniem pozycji dominującej. Zgodnie

z wypracowanym poglądem nauki prawa konkurencji UE, pozycja dominująca

przedsiębiorstwa jest to „pozycja ekonomicznej (rynkowej) siły przedsiębiorstwa,

która umożliwia mu zapobieganie skutecznej konkurencji na rynku właściwym,

przez możliwość przejawiania zachowań w znacznym stopniu niezależnych od innych

konkurentów, klientów, a w końcu także od konsumentów” (Szydło 2010, 82–83).

Co warte podkreślenia, regulacje UE w zakresie ochrony konkurencji, nie

zakazują przedsiębiorcom posiadania na wskazanych rynkach pozycji dominującej.

Zgodnie z wypracowanym stanowiskiem Komisji Europejskiej (Komunikat Komisji


z dnia 24 lutego 2009 r. w sprawie priorytetów, którymi Komisja będzie się kierować przy

stosowaniu art. 82 Traktatu WE w odniesieniu do szkodliwych działań o charakterze

praktyk wyłączających, podejmowanych przez przedsiębiorstwa dominujące, Dz. Urz.

UE z 2009 r., C 45/7), prawo Unii Europejskiej nie zabrania żadnemu przedsiębiorstwu

posiadania pozycji dominującej, o ile pozycja ta nie jest utrzymywana za sprawą

działania niezgodnego z prawem konkurencji. Podkreślenia wymaga jednak fakt,

że szczególną rolą przedsiębiorstwa zajmującego pozycję dominującą, jest stanie

na straży, aby żadne inny przedsiębiorstwo lub uczestnik rynku, ze względu na

zawinione działania dominującego przedsiębiorstwa – nie mógł ponieść szkody

w związku z ograniczeniem konkurencji na danym rynku.

Na mocy rozporządzenia Rady (EWG) nr 4064/89 z dnia 21 grudnia 1989 r.

w sprawie kontroli koncentracji przedsiębiorstw Komisja Europejska jest uprawniona

do wydania zakazu połączenia przedsiębiorstw lub zakupu przedsiębiorstwa,

w przypadku w którym transakcja ta mogłaby się wiązać z ryzykiem powstania

ograniczenia konkurencji na danym rynku. Istnieją trzy rodzaje decyzji wydawanych

przez Komisję Europejską w zakresie połączeń przedsiębiorstw i są to odpowiednio:

• bezwarunkowa zgoda – taka zgoda jest wydawana w ok. 90% przypadków już na

etapie wstępnego badania wniosku;

• warunkowa zgoda – w takim przypadku Komisja Europejska narzuca

przejmującemu/nabywającemu przedsiębiorstwu dodatkowe warunki, od

spełnienia których warunkuje wydanie zgody na przeprowadzenie transakcji;

• brak zgody.

Rodzajem praktyk, które również mogą zostać potencjalnie uznane za

ograniczające konkurencję jest „wszelka pomoc przyznawana przez państwo

członkowskie lub przy użyciu zasobów państwowych w jakiejkolwiek formie,

która zakłóca lub grozi zakłóceniem konkurencji przez sprzyjanie niektórym

przedsiębiorstwom lub produkcji niektórych towarów, jest niezgodna z rynkiem

wewnętrznym w zakresie, w jakim wpływa na wymianę handlową między państwami

członkowskimi” (art. 107 TFUE).

Przykładami takiej pomocy są m.in. pożyczki, subwencje, ulgi podatkowe,

gwarancje rządowe. Istnieje oczywiście szereg wyłączeń w przypadkach, w których

udzielenie takiej pomocy nie stanowi de facto pomocy. Chodzi o sytuacje szczególne,

takie jak np. działalność podejmowana na obszarach objętych klęskami żywiołowymi,

ochrona miejsc pracy w przypadku ryzyka upadku przedsiębiorstw, czy też wsparcie

udzielane na terytoriach, na których występuje wysoki poziom bezrobocia.

Wszelkie działania podejmowane przez Unię Europejską w ramach polityki

konkurencji są skrupulatnie analizowane i przewidują liczne wyjątki, które mają


zapewnić ochronę nie tylko konkurencji, ale również służyć wolności gospodarczej

i rozwojowi gospodarczemu (np. wyjątki wyłączające możliwość uznania zawieranych

porozumień między przedsiębiorcami za antykonkurencyjne).

2. Cele postanowień Unii Europejskiej dotyczące prawa konkurencji

Cele, jakim przyświecało wprowadzenie przepisów Unii Europejskiej w zakresie

konkurencji są wielorakie. W okresie poprzedzającym wprowadzenie Traktatu

Lizbońskiego przez długi okres celem Unii Europejskiej było zagwarantowanie

niezakłóconej konkurencji na rynku UE. Traktat Lizboński dokonał zmiany

w tym zakresie. W obecnym brzmieniu Traktatu o Unii Europejskiej (TUE), nie

ma już odniesienia do niezakłóconej konkurencji, lecz pojawia się pojęcie rynku

wewnętrznego.

Zgodnie z brzmieniem art. 3 TUE „Unia Europejska ustanawia rynek wewnętrzny.

Działa na rzecz trwałego rozwoju Europy, którego podstawą jest zrównoważony

wzrost gospodarczy oraz stabilność cen, społeczna gospodarka rynkowa o wysokiej

konkurencyjności zmierzająca do pełnego zatrudnienia i postępu społecznego

oraz wysoki poziom ochrony i poprawy jakości środowiska. Wspiera postęp

naukowo-techniczny”.

W okresie po wprowadzeniu Traktatu Lizbońskiego, konkurencja została

potraktowana przez państwa członkowskie jako środek, a nie cel sam w sobie. Służy

ona ustanowieniu rynku wewnętrznego, o czym świadczy dołączony do wersji

skonsolidowanej TUE protokół (nr 27) w sprawie rynku wewnętrznego i konkurencji,

w którym „państwa członkowskie uznały, że rynek wewnętrzny obejmuje system

zapewniający niezakłóconą konkurencję” (Kurcz 2010, 32). Co więcej, dążąc do

realizacji tego celu, państwa członkowskie przyznały kompetencje Unii Europejskiej

do podjęcia kroków zmierzających do przyznania nowych uprawnień organom

europejskim, co znajduje swoją podstawę w art. 352 TFUE.

Zgodnie z art. 3 ust. 3 TUE Unia Europejska jako cel obrała sobie nie tylko

zrównoważony rozwój gospodarczy i stabilność cen, ale również zobowiązana

jest przy tym zapewnić brak wykluczenia społecznego (Kurcz 2010, 33). W tym

miejscu pojawia się wątpliwość, w jaki sposób Unia Europejska chce zapewnić

równowagę między polityką konkurencji, która w swoim założeniu ma ograniczać

interwencjonizm państwowy (chodzi o kwestię pomocy państw członkowskich


dla przedsiębiorstw), a z drugiej strony ma zapewniać pełne zatrudnienie i brak

wykluczenia społecznego, co (zwłaszcza to drugie) jest co do zasady niemożliwe

do wykonania bez interwencji ze strony państwa. W literaturze przedmiotu

można często odnaleźć tezę, że „pomoc publiczna zasadniczo oddziałuje na rynek

negatywnie, uprzywilejowując wybranych uczestników gry rynkowej i pogarszając

sytuację konkurencyjną pozostałych przedsiębiorców” (Materna 2009, 25; Marquardt

2007, 51).

Istnieje również kilka podstawowych celów, niewymienionych w traktatach,

a które bez większego wysiłku jest w stanie wyodrębnić doktryna. Jednym z nich jest

zapewnienie dobrobytu konsumentom „przez zachowanie konkurencyjnej struktury

rynku jako mechanizmu zapewniającego optymalny społecznie rozdział środków

produkcji i równocześnie kształtujący należycie cenę i podaż oferowanych towarów

i usług” (Kępiński 2013, 7).

Jednak pojęcie dobrobytu konsumenta, często stosowane w literaturze i orze-

cznictwie przedmiotu jest na tyle nieprecyzyjne, że nie wiadomo czy chodzi o dobro-

byt wszystkich konsumentów, czy tylko kupujących wskazane dobra. Nie jest także

sprecyzowane, czy pod tym pojęciem należy rozumieć również kupujących z sektora

B2B (ang. business-to-business) takich, jak inni producenci, sprzedający, pośrednicy

czy detaliści, czy tylko tych z sektora B2C (ang. business-to-consumer), gdzie występuje

bezpośrednia relacja przedsiębiorcy z końcowym odbiorcą – konsumentem.

Innymi celami wyodrębnionymi w doktrynie, których ochronie służą regulacje

UE dotyczące konkurencji są np. (Materna 2009, 28):

• „ochrona małych i średnich przedsiębiorstw,

• redystrybucja dochodów,

• zachowanie miejscowej kontroli biznesu,

• przeciwdziałanie nadmiernej koncentracji władzy politycznej”.

Należy też zaznaczyć, że celem przepisów dotyczących konkurencji jest nie tylko

zapewnienie dobrobytu konsumentów, ale również ochrona ich interesów, bowiem

każdy przepis dotyczący szeroko pojętej ochrony konkurencji służy pośrednio

również ochronie konsumentów.

Przepisy dotyczące konkurencji, to de facto także ochrona pozostałych

przedsiębiorstw przed zagrożeniami, które mogą potencjalnie wyniknąć ze strony

mocniejszych uczestników wspólnego rynku (realizacja celu ochrony małych

i średnich przedsiębiorstw). Stawiając czoło nieuczciwym praktykom przedsiębiorstw,

nie należy zapominać, że przepisy dotyczące ochrony konkurencji mają w głównej

mierze zapewnić swobodę konkurencji, umożliwiając jednocześnie działanie przede


wszystkim pozostałym małym i średnim przedsiębiorstwom, a także chroniąc ich

interesy.

Jest to istotne o tyle, że to właśnie pozostałe przedsiębiorstwa operujące na

określonym rynku właściwym są głównymi „adresatami”, w których wymierzone są

praktyki ograniczające konkurencję. To przedsiębiorstwa jako pierwsze odczuwają

następstwa antykonkurencyjnych zachowań na rynku, takich jak nadużywanie

pozycji dominującej przez silniejszych uczestników rynku. Następstwa te, w ślad

za mniejszymi przedsiębiorstwami, odczuwają następnie odpowiednio konsumenci

oraz cały rynek UE, co nie pozostaje bez wpływu na handel między państwami

członkowskimi.

3. Nadużywanie pozycji dominującej a handel między państwami członkowskimi

Zgodnie z art. 102 TFUE niezgodne z rynkiem wewnętrznym i zakazane jest

nadużywanie przez jedno lub większą liczbę przedsiębiorstw pozycji dominującej na

rynku wewnętrznym lub na znacznej jego części, w zakresie, w jakim może wpływać

na handel między państwami członkowskimi.

Jak zostało zauważone w doktrynie oraz orzecznictwie UE, przesłanka

traktująca o możliwości wpływu określonej praktyki przedsiębiorstwa na handel

między państwami członkowskimi powinna być rozumiana w sposób szeroki.

„ Przesłanka ta powinna zostać uznana za spełnioną w przypadku, w którym na

postawie obiektywnych czynników prawnych lub faktycznych można z dostatecznym

stopniem prawdopodobieństwa uznać, że określone zachowanie przedsiębiorcy może

w sposób bezpośredni lub pośredni, faktycznie lub potencjalnie wpływać na warunki

handlu między państwami członkowskimi, co w efekcie może stanowić zagrożenie

dla realizacji integracyjnego celu Unii” (Kohutek, Sieradzka 2008, 60–61).

Organom antymonopolowym państw członkowskich na podstawie art.

35 rozporządzenia Rady (WE) nr 1/2003 z dnia 16 grudnia 2002 r. w sprawie

wprowadzenia w życie reguł konkurencji ustanowionych w art. 81 i 82 Traktatu został

nadany obowiązek każdorazowego badania podczas wszczynania postępowania

antymonopolowego w przypadku naruszenia ustawy antymonopolowej danego

państwa członkowskiego czy określona praktyka nie narusza jednocześnie norm

prawnych określonych w art. 101 lub art. 102 TFUE. Jeżeli takie naruszenie zostanie

stwierdzone, to wtedy organ antymonopolowy danego państwa członkowskiego jest


zobowiązany uznać, że wskazane naruszenie występuje, zaś postępowanie uzyskuje

status transgranicznego, gdyż spełniona zostaje przesłanka „wpływu na handel

między państwami członkowskim”. Zarazem organ monopolowy danego państwa

członkowskiego jest zobowiązany do wszczęcia równoległego postępowania w spra-

wie naruszenia określonych regulacji UE (Krasnodębska-Tomkiel 2015, 20–27).

Obowiązek zastosowania prawa antymonopolowego UE nie jest ograniczony je-

dynie do sytuacji, w których nadużywanie pozycji dominującej w sposób rzeczywisty

ma wpływ na handel między państwami członkowskimi, gdyż norma prawna za-

warta w art. 102 TFUE została ukształtowana za pomocą wyrażenia „może wpłynąć”

a nie „wpływa”.

Zgodnie z wytycznymi Komisji Europejskiej z 2004 r. (Guidelines on the eff ect on

trade conceptcontained in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty), w celu udowodnienia, że

określona praktyka wpływa na handel między państwami członkowskimi niezbędne

jest wykazanie, że:

• określona praktyka wpływa na handel między państwami członkowskimi,

• wpływ jest możliwy,

• wpływ jest dostrzegalny.

Omawiane wytyczne uznają, że wpływ nie jest odczuwalny w odniesieniu do

porozumień między przedsiębiorcami, gdy łącznie zostają spełnione następujące

warunki:

• wspólny udział przedsiębiorców w określonym rynku właściwym w ramach Unii

Europejskiej, na którym praktyki wywarły wpływ, nie przekracza 5%;

• wspólne roczne obroty, osiągnięte przez określonych przedsiębiorców na

właściwym rynku UE, na których sprzedawano określone dobra, nie przekraczają

40 mln EUR.

Doktryna wskazuje, że dla stwierdzenia występowania przesłanki wpływu na

handel między państwami członkowskimi wystarczające jest ustalenie, że określona

praktyka stosowana przez przedsiębiorcę, wywiera pośredni lub bezpośredni,

rzeczywisty lub hipotetyczny wpływ na całokształt handlu między państwami

członkowskimi. W tym miejscu warty jest podkreślenia fakt, że z wytycznych

Komisji Europejskiej z 2004 r. wynika, że zniekształcenie struktury rynku UE,

które może zostać dokonane w szczególności przez ograniczenie możliwości wejścia

na ten rynek nowemu przedsiębiorcy, może zostać uznane za naruszenie regulacji

antykonkurencyjnych UE. Z wytycznych Komisji Europejskiej wynika także, że

przepisy antymonopolowe UE znajdują zastosowanie również we wszelkich rodzajach

transgranicznej (ang. cross-border) aktywności gospodarczej przedsiębiorstw

(Kolasiński 2016, 5–10).


Praktyki, stanowiące część ogólnej strategii działania przyjętej przez

przedsiębiorcę zajmującego pozycję dominującą na rynku, powinny być badane

pod kątem tego, jaki skutek wywołuje sama strategia przedsiębiorstwa. Jeżeli

przedsiębiorstwo dominujące podejmuje różne działania, lecz wszystkie są

ukierunkowane na realizację tego samego celu (np. na ograniczeniu sprzedaży przez

konkurentów), dla możliwości zastosowania art. 102 TFUE wystarczy, aby chociaż

jedno z działań podjętych przez przedsiębiorcę dominującego mogło wpływać na

handel między państwami członkowskimi (Kowalik-Bańczyk 2010, 34–42).

W wytycznych Komisji Europejskiej z 2014 r. w odniesieniu do rodzaju określonego

działania przedsiębiorstwa wyodrębnione są takie praktyki bądź porozumienia, które

w swej istocie są zdolne wywierać wpływ na handel, np. porozumienia dotyczące

podziału poszczególnych rynków, których uczestnicy mają siedziby na terytoriach

różnych państw członkowskich. W tym celu jest możliwe wyodrębnienie dwóch

podstawowych aspektów. Mowa o zasięgu terytorialnym, czyli obszarze, na którym

określona praktyka dominującego przedsiębiorstwa jest stosowana (nadużycie

pozycji dominującej), a także miejscu, w którym określone przedsiębiorstwa mają

swoje siedziby oraz istocie praktyki, to znaczy czego dotyczy dane porozumienie

(Minkiewicz 2014, 8–20).

Regulacje UE w zakresie ochrony konkurencji ze względu na wpływ na handel

między państwami członkowskimi znajdą najprawdopodobniej zastosowanie,

w odniesieniu do charakteru oferowanych dóbr (przez co należy rozumieć nie tylko

towary, ale również usługi), które mogły zostać objęte określonym porozumieniem lub

praktyką stosowaną przez dominujące przedsiębiorstwo, jeżeli dobra te ze swej natury

mogą zostać w łatwy sposób sprzedane w handlu między państwami członkowskimi

lub są one potrzebne przedsiębiorstwom, które chcą dokonać ekspansji na rynek UE

lub też tym przedsiębiorstwom, którzy dokonują rozszerzenia swojej działalności na

inne państwa członkowskie. Jednak w przypadku, w którym ze względu na charakter

oferowanego dobra zainteresowanie ze strony przedsiębiorstwa z innego państwa

członkowskiego jest ograniczone lub brak jest popytu na oferowane dobro ze strony

przedsiębiorców chcących dokonać rozszerzenia swojej działalności, zdecydowanie

trudniejsze będzie stwierdzenie, że dany przypadek podlega regulacjom UE

(Minkiewicz 2014, 8–20).

Dzięki dołączeniu organów antymonopolowych do współpracy z Komisją

Europejską w ramach programu egzekwowania prawa antymonopolowego UE,

znacznemu zwiększeniu uległa skuteczność oddziaływania organów publicznych

UE w tym zakresie. W najlepszy sposób jest to odzwierciedlone w publikowanej na

bieżąco ewidencji postępowań prowadzonych wspólnie przez wszystkich członków


Europejskiej Sieci Konkurencji. W okresie przeszło 10 lat funkcjonowania Euro-

pejskiej Sieci Konkurencji, w okresie od wejścia Polski do Unii Europejskiej, zostało

zaewidencjonowane wszczęcie blisko 2000 postępowań w sprawach naruszeń zarów-

no art. 101, jak i art. 102 TFUE. W blisko połowie wszczętych postępowań, zostały wy-

dane merytoryczne decyzje kończące postępowanie. Warty podkreślenia jest jednak

fakt, że z blisko 2000 wszczętych postępowań, tylko niewielką część stanowiły sprawy

prowadzone przez Komisję Europejską (Krasnodębska-Tomkiel 2015). Przyczyniło

się do tego zakończone sukcesem zaangażowanie organów antymonopolowych

państw członkowskich w Europejską Sieć Konkurencji, które w trakcie prowadzenia

postępowań antymonopolowych zostały uprawnione i jednocześnie zobowiązane,

gdy to konieczne, do stosowania przepisów dotyczących konkurencji zarówno

w wymiarze krajowym, jak i Unii Europejskiej.

Wnioski

Niewątpliwie stworzone przez politykę konkurencji UE instrumenty stanowią silny

oręż w rękach jej organów. Przeprowadzona w niniejszym opracowaniu analiza

korelacji regulacji dotyczących praktyk nadużywania pozycji dominującej jako form

ograniczania konkurencji i przepisów polityki konkurencji Unii Europejskiej pozwala

jednoznacznie stwierdzić, że prawo jest w tym zakresie ukształtowane w sposób

bardzo szeroki. Już na podstawie samej konstrukcji obowiązujących postanowień

TFUE, można dowieść, że niektóre regulacje stoją w sprzeczności z zasadą swobody

przedsiębiorczości. W konsekwencji wciąż można odszukać kwestie, które mogłyby

ulec zmianom. Za przykład mogą posłużyć regulacje w zakresie indywidualnych

wyłączeń porozumień spod zakazu ich zawierania. W takich przypadkach organy

antymonopolowe Unii Europejskiej lub państw członkowskich wymagają od

przedsiębiorstw udowodnienia, że ich współpraca (zawarte porozumienie) przynosi

osobom trzecim (zwłaszcza konsumentom) określone korzyści. Taki stan rzeczy

prowadzi do sytuacji, w których zakazowi zawierania porozumień mogą podlegać

także neutralne w skutkach dla konsumentów i podmiotów trzecich porozumienia,

które spełniają ustawowe przesłanki do uznania ich za zakazane, jednak brak jest do

tego ekonomicznych podstaw.

Bezpośrednia analiza przepisów TFUE dotyczących polityki konkurencji

prowadzi również do krytycznych wniosków. Niewątpliwie negatywnie należy ocenić

zakaz zawierania porozumień przez przedsiębiorstwa, których jedynym skutkiem jest


doprowadzenie do osiągnięcia przez nie pozycji dominującej. Nie można się zgodzić,

że takie działania są same w sobie szkodliwe, gdyż zakazane są jedynie ewentualne

negatywne skutki, które może nieść za sobą nadużywanie tak uzyskanej pozycji.

W tym zakresie zastosowanie znajdują odrębne przepisy, zatem takie stosowanie

owych regulacji stanowi ponownie naruszenie zasady swobody przedsiębiorczości.

Mimo powyższych przykładów ukazujących niedoskonałość niektórych

postanowień dotyczących ochrony konkurencji Unii Europejskiej, należy jednak

stwierdzić, że co do zasady polityka konkurencji UE oraz związane z nią przepisy

spełniają swoją rolę. Potwierdzeniem tego jest fakt, że na poszczególnych rynkach

właściwych Unii Europejskiej przedsiębiorstwa mają coraz większą świadomość

prawną w zakresie ochrony konkurencji, a zwłaszcza w odniesieniu do stosowania

praktyk nadużywania pozycji dominującej. Świadczy to o tym, że przepisy dotyczące

ochrony konkurencji oraz polityka konkurencji Unii Europejskiej, mimo ograniczonej

legislacji (w porównaniu z innymi dziedzinami prawa UE), spełniają swoją rolę

i są wystarczającym narzędziem w rękach organów antymonopolowych zarówno

Unii Europejskiej, jak i państw członkowskich. W dobie postępującej globalizacji

i coraz częściej spotykanej dominacji ogromnych, międzynarodowych koncernów,

nie można sobie wyobrazić funkcjonowania rynku Unii Europejskiej bez regulacji

dotyczących polityki konkurencji. Z drugiej strony obowiązująca zasada swobody

przedsiębiorczości skłania ku trwałemu poszukiwaniu „złotego środka”, celem

umożliwienia jej stosowania, ale także zintegrowania jej z polityką konkurencji, co

w efekcie powinno przełożyć się na poprawę konkurencji, a następnie dobrobytu

konsumentów.

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Przegląd Prawa Handlowego, nr 6, https://sip.lex.pl/#/publikacja/151287920. Dostęp:

08.10.2017.

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się kierować przy stosowaniu art. 82 Traktatu WE w odniesieniu do szkodliwych działań

o charakterze praktyk wyłączających, podejmowanych przez przedsiębiorstwa dominujące

(Dz. Urz. UE z 2009 r., C 45/7).

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publications.europa.eu/pl/publication-detail/-/publication/8200c251-aa42-11e6-aab7-

01aa75ed71a1. Dostęp: 08.10.2017.

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publikacja/151109595. Dostęp: 08.10.2017.

Krasnodębska-Tomkiel, Małgorzata. 2015. ‘Konwergencja systemów ochrony konkurencji

w Unii Europejskiej w zakresie przeciwdziałania praktykom ograniczającym konkurencję’.

Wolters Kluwer Polska: Europejski Przegląd Sądowy nr 7, https://sip.lex.pl/#/publikac-

ja/151258508. Dostęp: 08.10.2017.

Kurcz, Bartłomiej. 2010. Prawo i ekonomia konkurencji. Wybrane zagadnienia. Warszawa:

Wolters Kluwer Polska.

Marquardt, Piotr. 2007. Pomoc publiczna dla małych i średnich przedsiębiorców. Warszawa:

LexisNexis.

Materna, Grzegorz. 2009. Pojęcie przedsiębiorcy w polskim i europejskim prawie ochrony

konkurencji. Warszawa: Wolters Kluwer Polska.

Minkiewicz, Mariusz. 2014. ‘Pojęcie wpływu na handel i reguła konwergencji w praktyce

stosowania prawa UE przez polskie sądy i Prezesa UOKiK’. UOKiK: Internetowy

Kwartalnik Antymonopolowy i Regulacyjny, nr 3, https://sip.lex.pl/#/publikacja/151297064.

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Rozporządzenie Rady (EWG) nr 4064/89 z dnia 21 grudnia 1989 r. w sprawie kontroli

koncentracji przedsiębiorstw, Dz. Urz. UE z 1989 r., L 395.

Rozporządzenie Rady (WE) nr 1/2003 z dnia 16 grudnia 2002 r. w sprawie wprowadzenia

w życie reguł konkurencji ustanowionych w art. 81 i 82 Traktatu, Dz. Urz. UE z 2003 r., L 1.

Szydło, Marek. 2010. Nadużywanie pozycji dominującej w prawie konkurencji. Warszawa:

Wolters Kluwer Polska.

Traktat o funkcjonowaniu Unii Europejskiej, Dz. Urz. UE z 2012 r., C 326.

Traktat o Unii Europejskiej (wersja skonsolidowana), Dz. Urz. UE z 2016 r., C 202.

Traktat z Lizbony zmieniający Traktat o Unii Europejskiej i Traktat ustanawiający Wspólnotę

Europejską podpisany w Lizbonie dnia 13 grudnia 2007 r., Dz. Urz. UE z 2007 r., C 306.



ADAM GĄSIOREK*

Zróżnicowanie rozwoju społeczeństwa infromacyjnego w Unii Europejskiej

Abstrakt

Społeczeństwo informacyjne, z uwagi na istotność zagadnienia dla rozwoju poszczególnych państw czy regionów w XXI wieku, stanowi obszar zainteresowania wielu badaczy. Jego ele-menty składowe, a szczególnie zastosowanie nowoczesnych technologii (ICT), przyczyniają się do bardziej efektywnego gospodarowania dostępnymi zasobami, lepszego wykorzystania po-tencjału obywateli, a w konsekwencji, uzyskania wyższego wzrostu gospodarczego i poziomu życia mieszkańców. Unia Europejska także sprzyja rozwojowi społeczeństwa informacyjnego na obszarze państw członkowskich – działania, mające temu służyć, zostały zapisane m.in. w Strategii „Europa 2020”. Jednakże, jak wskazuje wiele analiz, najbardziej zaawansowane ugru-powanie integracyjne na świecie nie jest, pod wieloma względami, terytorium jednolitym. Dla-tego też cel artykułu sformułowano jako przedstawienie zróżnicowania, które występuje w Unii Europejskiej, pod względem zaawansowania procesu rozwoju społeczeństwa informacyjnego. Dla osiągnięcia założonego celu posłużyła analiza literatury przedmiotu oraz analiza danych statystycznych, pochodzących z bazy Międzynarodowej Unii Telekomunikacyjnej (ITU) oraz Europejskiego Urzędu Statystycznego (Eurostat) dla lat 2010-2016. W rezultacie przeprowa-dzonych badań można stwierdzić, że społeczeństwo informacyjne w poszczególnych państwach członkowskich UE znajduje się w różnych stadiach rozwoju, jednakże postęp, dokonujący się na tym obszarze, jest stale widoczny. Co więcej, obserwuje się zmniejszenie występujących dyspro-porcji pod względem dostępności do nowoczesnych technologii. Dalszym działaniem powinna być edukacja społeczeństw tak, aby świadomie i w większym stopniu wykorzystywały możliwo-ści, które oferują ICT.

Słowa kluczowe: społeczeństwo informacyjne; Unia Europejska; ICT.

* Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny w Katowicach, [email protected]

128 Adam Gąsiorek

WprowadzenieSpołeczeństwo informacyjne, w literaturze określane jako społeczeństwo „nowego

typu”, wykształciło się w XX w. na skutek rozpowszechnienia technologii

informacyjno-komunikacyjnych (ICT), ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem sieci

Internet. Nie ulega więc wątpliwości, że wraz z rozwojem technologicznym, który

jest procesem ciągłym, także społeczeństwo informacyjne ewoluuje, przystosowując

się do nowych osiągnięć, wśród których na początku XXI w. można wskazać

m.in. komunikację mobilną – zagadnienie to przedstawione zostanie w pierwszej

części artykułu. Wskazuje się, że rozwój tego rodzaju społeczeństwa nie następuje

jednorodnie, ale jest dość zróżnicowany pod względem geografi cznym. Istotną

materią jest więc próba określenia pozycji Europy na tle pozostałych regionów świata

i jej zmiana na przestrzeni ostatnich lat, będąca przedmiotem części drugiej artykułu.

Wartym zainteresowania wydaje się również zagadnienie różnorodności, występującej

w Unii Europejskiej – przybliżone na wybranych przykładach w części trzeciej

– w kontekście postępu we wprowadzaniu kolejnych elementów, charakteryzujących

społeczeństwo informacyjne, w poszczególnych państwach członkowskich UE,

a także określenie, czy na skutek działań strategicznych, podejmowanych przez Unię,

pojawia się konwergencja, oznaczająca wyrównywanie szans rozwojowych wszystkich

unijnych obywateli. Celem artykułu będzie zatem przedstawienie zróżnicowania,

które występuje w Unii Europejskiej, pod względem zaawansowania procesu rozwoju

społeczeństwa informacyjnego. Dla osiągnięcia założonego celu posłuży analiza

literatury przedmiotu oraz analiza danych statystycznych, pochodzących z bazy

Międzynarodowej Unii Telekomunikacyjnej (ITU) oraz Europejskiego Urzędu

Statystycznego (Eurostat) dla lat 2010–2016.

1. Społeczeństwo informacyjne – ewolucja pojęcia

Zagadnienie rozwoju społeczeństwa informacyjnego stanowi istotny element badań

naukowych w XXI w. Jednakże należy wskazać, że pojęcie „społeczeństwo infor-

macyjne” powstało już w II połowie XX w., a za jego twórcę uznaje się japońskiego

antropologa T. Umesao. Zgodnie z opracowaną defi nicją, „johoka shakai” oznaczało

wówczas społeczeństwo, którego rozwój jest przede wszystkim zdeterminowany przez

technologie informacyjno-komunikacyjne – ICT (Olszak 2014, 15). Na przestrzeni

129Zróżnicowanie rozwoju społeczeństwa informacyjnego w Unii Europejskiej

kolejnych lat wielu twórców, reprezentujących różne dziedziny nauki, podejmowało

analizy, mające na celu dokonanie charakterystyki „nowego typu społeczeństwa” –

oprócz szeregu defi nicji (Tabela 1) sformułowali oni także wiele określeń, zastępujących

pierwotną wersję, pochodzącą z 1963 r. W literaturze można zatem znaleźć – między

innymi – pojęcia: społeczeństwo informatyczne, społeczeństwo medialne, społe-

czeństwo globalnej informacji, społeczeństwo wiedzy, społeczeństwo oparte na in-

formacji i wiedzy, społeczeństwo postindustrialne czy nawet społeczeństwo usług

(Haber, Garwol 2011, 53; Chmielarz 2007, 261; Nycz 2011, 15; Nowak 2013). Pomimo

dość dużej różnorodności w zakresie pojęciowo-defi nicyjnym, która spowodowała

niejednoznaczność opisywanej kategorii, przyjmuje się, że wciąż najczęściej używanym

i rozpowszechnionym terminem jest „społeczeństwo informacyjne”.

Tabela 1: Wybrane defi nicje pojęcia „społeczeństwo informacyjne”

Lp. Autor Definicja

1 D. Bell Społeczeństwo, w którym zatrudnienie w usługach związanych z informa-

cją zaczyna przeważać nad pracą i zatrudnieniem w rolnictwie i przemyśle.

Wykształca się ono na skutek postępu technologicznego i rosnącego zna-

czenia informacji, a nie siły (pracy) czy energii (maszyn).

2 K. Doktorowicz Istotny element strategii politycznej, określającej kierunki rozwoju cywi-

lizacyjnego, ekonomicznego i społecznego państw oraz ich organizacji

ponadnarodowych o największym potencjale gospodarczym i informa-

tycznym na świecie.

3 T. Goban-Klas Społeczeństwo, które nie tylko posiada rozwinięte środki przetwarzania

informacji i komunikowania, lecz przetwarzanie informacji jest podstawą

tworzenia dochodu narodowego i dostarcza źródła utrzymania większo-

ści społeczeństwa.

4 S. Juszczyk Społeczeństwo staje się społeczeństwem informacyjnym, kiedy osiąga

stopień rozwoju oraz skalę i skomplikowanie procesów społecznych

i gospodarczych, wymagające zastosowania nowych technologii

gromadzenia, selekcji, przetwarzania i wykorzystania olbrzymiej liczby

informacji powstałych w ramach owych procesów.

5 J. Kisielnicki Społeczeństwo, które posiada dostęp i umie wykorzystać: informatyczną

infrastrukturę, zasoby informacji i wiedzy dla realizacji zbiorowych

i indywidualnych celów w sposób skuteczny i ekonomiczny.

6 K. Krzysztofek,

M.S. Szczepański

Społeczeństwo, w którym informacja jest intensywnie wykorzystywana

w życiu ekonomicznym, społecznym i politycznym oraz społeczeństwo,

które posiada bogate środki komunikacji i przetwarzania informacji,

będące podstawą tworzenia większości dochodu narodowego oraz

zapewniające źródło utrzymania większości ludzi.

130 Adam Gąsiorek

Lp. Autor Definicja

7 C.M. Olszak Społeczeństwo, które posiada nieograniczone (lub prawie nieograniczone)

możliwości dostępu do ICT, informacji i wiedzy, które umożliwiają osiąga-

nie różnych celów społecznych, ekonomicznych, edukacyjnych, ekologicz-

nych i kulturowych, będących podstawą tworzenia większości dochodu

narodowego orz zapewniających źródło utrzymania większości ludzi.

8 A. Toffler Społeczeństwo informacyjne jako trzecia fala rozwoju społecznego,

w którym podstawowym surowcem jest informacja.

9 E. Ziemba,

R. Żelazny

Społeczeństwo, w którym ludzie, firmy i administracja publiczna

posiadają oraz wykorzystują infrastrukturę ICT w procesach eksploracji

i eksploatacji informacji dla realizacji zbiorowych i indywidualnych celów

w sposób skuteczny i efektywny.

Źródło: Sarama 2011, 38; Haber, Garwol 2011, 53–54; Olszak, Ziemba, Żelazny 2010, 18; Olszak 2014, 15;

Ziemba, Żelazny 2013, 556; Tracz-Krupa 2013, 439.

Nie ulega wątpliwości, że zamieszczone w tabeli 1 defi nicje stanowią tylko

niewielką część spośród dostępnych w bogatej literaturze. Podkreślenia wymaga

również fakt, że rozważania, wyjaśniające istotę społeczeństwa informacyjnego,

akcentują różnorodne aspekty tego pojęcia, np. ekonomiczne, socjologiczne,

politologiczne czy technologiczne (F. Webster, w ramach prowadzonej analizy,

wyróżnił pięć różnorodnych defi nicji, z których każda zwraca uwagę na inne kryteria

identyfi kacji zagadnienia – technologiczne, gospodarcze, zawodowe, przestrzenne

i kulturowe) (Webster 2006, 8–31). Można także zauważyć, że coraz częściej

formułowane są defi nicje wieloaspektowe, które starają się łączyć kilka (przynajmniej

dwa) obszary nauki.

Najważniejszym dobrem w społeczeństwie informacyjnym – jak wynika

z dotychczasowych analiz – stała się informacja, z której wprost wynika posiadanie

wiedzy. Co więcej, dwa przywołane zasoby rozpatruje się w kategorii substytutu

wobec ziemi, surowców naturalnych czy pracy w gospodarce (Nycz 2011, 15), a ich

posiadanie, odpowiednie przetwarzanie i wykorzystanie warunkuje uzyskanie

przewagi konkurencyjnej na współczesnym rynku (Olszak 2014, 15–18). Można

zatem przyjąć, że informacja i wiedza są zasobem strategicznym, wykorzystywanym

przez coraz więcej podmiotów, a więc niejako równorzędnym wobec klasycznych

czynników produkcji. W literaturze znaczne grono autorów skłania się również ku

stwierdzeniu, że informacja stała się towarem, gromadzonym i dystrybuowanym

w skali międzynarodowej, którego wykorzystanie w sposób racjonalny przynosi

wymierne korzyści dla określonych podmiotów (Chmielarz 2007, 261–264).


Społeczeństwo informacyjne jest kategorią niejednoznaczną nie tylko z uwagi na

różnorodność spojrzeń względem jego istoty, ale również z powodu płaszczyzn, które

obejmuje, jak i ogniw, z których składają się poszczególne płaszczyzny (schemat 1).

Schemat 1: Płaszczyzny i ogniwa społeczeństwa informacyjnego

Źródło: Ziemba, Żelazny 2013, 556; Chmielarz 2007, 262.

Rezultatem teoretycznych rozważań nad zagadnieniem społeczeństwa

informacyjnego, było wyróżnienie jego charakterystycznych cech, do których

zaliczono (Nycz 2011, 15):

• dominację sektora usług w gospodarce (szczególnie nauki, służby zdrowia oraz

fi nansów i ubezpieczeń);

• dominację specjalistów i naukowców w strukturze zawodowej kraju;

• wzrost znaczenia wiedzy teoretycznej, będącej źródłem innowacji;

• dążenie do uzyskania przez społeczeństwo kontroli nad rozwojem technologicznym

gospodarki;

• rozwój koncepcji uczenia się obywateli przez całe życie;

• tworzenie „technologii intelektualnych”, będących podstawą w procesie podej-

mowania decyzji zarówno w aspekcie politycznym, jak i społecznym.

Należy jednak zwrócić uwagę na fakt, że nie w każdym społeczeństwie

informacyjnym obie płaszczyzny – technologiczna i społeczna – są w jednakowo

wysokim stopniu rozwinięte. Konsekwencją takiego stanu jest możliwość opisu

132 Adam Gąsiorek

wybranej społeczności jedynie przez niektóre z przytoczonych cech. Dowodzi to,

że społeczeństwo informacyjne nie jest stanem, ale raczej procesem (schemat 2),

w którym rozwój poszczególnych ogniw ma miejsce dzięki inicjowaniu odpowiednich

działań.

Schemat 2: Stadia rozwoju społeczeństwa informacyjnego

Stadium wczesne

(infrastrukturalne

•zapewnienie odpowiedniej jakości infrastruktury informatycznej,

jak i oprogramowania

•zapewnienie dostępu do Internetu, najlepiej szerokopasmowego

Stadium pośrednie

(edukacyjne)

•zapewnienie powszechnego poziomu umiejętności korzystania

z technologii informatycznych

Stadium

stabilności

(dojrzałości)

•bardzo dobra dostępność do odpowiedniej infrastruktury

•powszechna umiejętność korzystania z technologii

•świadomość społeczeństwa odnośnie możliwości, korzyści

i zagrożeń, wynikających ze stosowania technologii

Źródło: Łukasik-Makowska, Sala 2011, 375.

2. Europa na tle świata – wybrane wskaźniki rozwoju społeczeństwa informacyjnego

Ujęcie procesowe społeczeństwa informacyjnego, jak przytoczono w pierwszej

części artykułu, zakłada, że następuje stały rozwój jego poszczególnych elementów

składowych, którego dynamika może być jednak zróżnicowana terytorialnie. Należy

zatem podjąć próbę analizy, mającej za zadanie wykazać różnorodność regionów

świata pod względem intensyfi kacji rozwoju wybranych ogniw – komponentów


społeczeństwa informacyjnego. Nie ulega wątpliwości, że ponadregionalne lub

kontynentalne grupowanie państw przyczyniło się do uzyskania wyników na

dużym poziomie ogólności, które mogą służyć wyłącznie do wyciągania wniosków

o charakterze ramowym, jednak powodem takiej konstrukcji zestawienia był sposób

gromadzenia danych przez Międzynarodową Unię Telekomunikacyjną.

Wykres 1: Gospodarstwa domowe z dostępem do Internetu w domu (w %)

w latach 2010–2016

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Afryka Państwa arabskie

Kraje Azji i Pacyfiku Wspólnota Niepodległych Państw

Europa Ameryka Północna i Południowa

Źródło: International Telecommunication Union, 2017.

Pierwszym wybranym wskaźnikiem jest odsetek gospodarstw domowych,

posiadających dostęp do Internetu w domu. Jak można zauważyć na wykresie 1,

w Europie przybiera on corocznie w latach 2010–2016 najwyższe wartości (osiągając

poziom 84%), na drugim miejscu od 2013 r. znajduje się Wspólnota Niepodległych

Państw (w 2016 r. 67,8%), a zaraz za nią Ameryka Północna i Południowa (64,4%).

Natomiast dostęp do Internetu w domu w państwach arabskich, Azji i Pacyfi ku

oraz w Afryce posiada wciąż mniej niż połowa gospodarstw domowych.

Szczegółowe ujęcie wskaźnika, dotyczącego odsetka gospodarstw domowych,

które posiadają dostęp do Internetu w domu (tabela 2) pozwala na sprawdzenie,

czy regiony, których wyniki są niższe od najlepszego (Europy) zmniejszają odległość

do niego, czyli rozwijają sieć dostępu do Internetu w gospodarstwach domowych

szybciej od niego, czy ma miejsce stagnacja bądź sytuacja przeciwna. Można przyjąć,

134 Adam Gąsiorek

że wszystkie regiony świata, poza Afryką, zmniejszyły swoją odległość do Europy

(posiadającej każdego roku najwyższą wartość wskaźnika) w latach 2010–2016.

Najwyraźniej uczyniła to Wspólnota Niepodległych Państw (o 17,7 p. proc.) oraz kraje

Azji i Pacyfi ku (o 10 p. proc.), a najmniej obszar obu Ameryk – tylko o 3,1 p. proc.

Negatywnie na tle pozostałych wyróżniła się Afryka, która zwiększyła odległość do

lidera – Europy – o 4,7 p. proc. w okresie badanych sześciu lat.

Tabela 2: Gospodarstwa domowe z dostępem

do Internetu w domu w latach 2010–2016 (w %)

Rok AfrykaPaństwa arabskie

Kraje Azji

i Pacyfiku

Wspólnota

Niepodległych

Państw

Europa

Ameryka

Północna

i Południowa

2010wynik 3,8 22,7 20,2 33,8 67,7 45,1

odległość 63,9 45,1 47,6 33,9 22,7

2011wynik 5,6 27,8 23,9 39,1 70,6 48,3

odległość 65,0 42,8 46,8 31,5 22,3

2012wynik 7,5 31,0 29,1 49,2 73,6 51,9

odległość 66,1 42,5 44,5 24,4 21,7

2013wynik 9,0 34,3 33,8 56,2 76,0 55,5

odległość 67,0 41,7 42,3 19,8 20,6

2014wynik 11,1 38,5 37,6 60,9 79,0 58,3

odległość 67,9 40,5 41,3 18,1 20,7

2015wynik 13,6 43,1 42,7 63,5 81,3 61,4

odległość 67,7 38,2 38,6 17,8 19,9

2016wynik 15,4 45,7 46,4 67,8 84,0 64,4

odległość 68,6 38,3 37,6 16,2 19,6

Odległość – odległość od największego odsetka w danych roku (w punktach procentowych).


Biorąc pod uwagę nominalną zmianę miernika dostępu gospodarstw domowych

do Internetu, największy wzrost nastąpił – analogicznie jak w przypadku zmniejszenia

odległości – we Wspólnocie Niepodległych Państw (34 p. proc.), następnie w krajach

Azji i Pacyfi ku (26,3 p. proc.) oraz w państwach arabskich (23,1 p. proc.). Warto

podkreślić, że nawet Afryka odnotowała wzrost na poziomie 11,6 p. proc. jednak

był on niższy od przyrostu w Europie, który wyniósł 16,3 p. proc. – wolniejsze

tempo wzrostu wpłynęło na zwiększenie odległości kontynentu afrykańskiego od

europejskiego pod względem dostępności gospodarstw domowych do Internetu

w domu. Należy zauważyć, że Europa wciąż utrzymała pierwszą pozycję w rankingu,


a Wspólnota Niepodległych Państw – druga w zestawieniu – osiągnęła w 2016 r.

europejski poziom sprzed sześciu lat.

Drugim wybranym wskaźnikiem jest odsetek korzystających z zasobów Internetu

w poszczególnych regionach świata. Wykres 2 ilustruje jego odczyty w latach 2010–

2016, na podstawie których można stwierdzić, że również – jak wskaźnik pierwszy

– przybiera on najwyższe wartości w Europie (osiągając na koniec okresu poddanego

analizie poziom 79,1%), następnie (w 2016 r.) we Wspólnocie Niepodległych Państw

(66,6%) oraz w Ameryce Północnej i Południowej (65%). W pozostałych regionach

świata z zasobów Internetu korzysta mniej niż połowa ich mieszkańców, a w Afryce

jest to jedynie ¼ populacji.

Wykres 2: Osoby korzystające z zasobów Internetu w latach 2010–2016

– odsetek populacji poszczególnych regionów świata

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Afryka Państwa arabskie

Kraje Azji i Pacyfiku Wspólnota Niepodległych Państw

Europa Ameryka Północna i Południowa


Szczegółowe ujęcie wskaźnika, dotyczącego odsetka osób, które korzystają

z zasobów Internetu (tabela 3) pozwala na sprawdzenie czy regiony, których wyniki

są niższe od najlepszego (znów Europa) zmniejszają odległość do niego, co oznacza,

że liczba mieszkańców, korzystających z Internetu zwiększa się w szybszym tempie

niż w regionie liderującym, czy ma miejsce stagnacja bądź sytuacja przeciwna. Można

przyjąć, że wszystkie regiony świata w latach 2010–2016 zmniejszyły swoją odległość

136 Adam Gąsiorek

do Europy. Największy przyrost miał miejsce w przypadku Wspólnoty Niepodległych

Państw (o 20,5 p. proc.), w pozostałych regionach nie przekroczył 10 p. proc.

Tabela 3: Osoby korzystające z zasobów Internetu w latach 2010–2016

– odsetek populacji poszczególnych regionów świata

Rok AfrykaPaństwa arabskie

Kraje Azji

i Pacyfiku

Wspólnota

Niepodległych

Państw

Europa

Ameryka

Północna

i Południowa

2010wynik 9,6 23,7 22,5 33,5 66,6 48,6

odległość 57,0 42,8 44,1 33,1 0,0 17,9

2011wynik 11,9 26,4 25,2 39,5 67,8 51,0

odległość 55,9 41,4 42,6 28,3 0,0 16,8

2012wynik 14,0 29,3 28,0 49,4 70,0 55,0

odległość 56,0 40,7 41,9 20,6 0,0 15,0

2013wynik 16,7 32,2 30,7 54,4 71,7 55,9

odległość 55,0 39,6 41,0 17,3 0,0 15,8

2014wynik 19,6 35,8 34,6 58,2 74,6 58,1

odległość 55,0 38,8 40,0 16,4 0,0 16,5

2015wynik 22,5 39,0 38,2 61,7 76,3 62,2

odległość 53,8 37,3 38,1 14,6 0,0 14,1

2016wynik 25,1 41,6 41,9 66,6 79,1 65,0

odległość 54,0 37,5 37,2 12,5 0,0 14,1


W ujęciu nominalnym, miernik wskazujący odsetek korzystających z zasobów

Internetu, odnotował największy wzrost – analogicznie jak w przypadku analizy

odległości – we Wspólnocie Niepodległych Państw (33,1 p. proc.), następnie

w państwach Azji i Pacyfi ku (19,4 p. proc.) oraz w państwach arabskich (17,9 p. proc.).

Warto podkreślić, że w Europie przyrost wartości wskaźnika wyniósł jedynie 12,5

p. proc. i był najniższy spośród regionów poddanych analizie. Należy jednak

zauważyć, że kontynent europejski utrzymał pierwszą pozycję w rankingu, a druga

w zestawieniu Wspólnota Niepodległych Państw osiągnęła w 2016r. poziom, jaki

Europa odnotowała sześć lat wcześniej.

Biorąc po uwagę przytoczone wybrane wskaźniki rozwoju społeczeństwa

informacyjnego, zwrócenia uwagi wymaga fakt, że Europa, zarówno pod względem

dostępu gospodarstw domowych do Internetu, jak i odsetka osób, korzystających

z jego zasobów, zajmuje pierwsze miejsce na świecie (wyniki na poziomie

ok. 80%), jednocześnie cechując się jedną z niższych dynamik ich wzrostu. Na


szczególną uwagę zasługuje Wspólnota Niepodległych Państw, która pod względem

analizowanych mierników w 2016r. zajęła drugie miejsce na świecie, wyprzedzając

Ameryki: Północną i Południową – przyrost odczytów wyniósł ponad 30 p. proc.

na przestrzeni opisywanych sześciu lat. Kontynent afrykański wciąż pozostaje

regionem z najsłabiej rozwiniętym społeczeństwem informacyjnym: jedynie 22,5%

jego mieszkańców korzysta z zasobów Internetu, a 15,4% posiada do niego dostęp we

własnym gospodarstwie domowym.

3. Społeczeństwo informacyjne w Unii Europejskiej – zaawansowanie rozwoju w poszczególnych państwach członkowskich

Ostatnim etapem prowadzonej w artykule analizy jest spojrzenie na proces rozwoju

społeczeństwa informacyjnego w państwach członkowskich Unii Europejskiej oraz

potencjalne zjawisko konwergencji, zachodzące pomiędzy nimi, biorąc pod uwagę

wybrane wskaźniki, opracowywane przez Eurostat. Porównaniu będą podlegać

dane dla lat 2010 i 2016 – pierwszy z nich wyznacza moment rozpoczęcia działań,

związanych z realizacją strategii na rzecz inteligentnego i zrównoważonego wzrostu,

sprzyjającego włączeniu społecznemu „Europa 2020”, a drugi jest ostatnim rokiem,

za który są dostępne dane statystyczne.

Tabela 4: Odsetek osób korzystających z Internetu co najmniej raz w tygodniu

Kraj 2010Odległość

od średniej

Odsetek

średniej2016

Odległość

od średniej

Odsetek

średniej

UE-28 (średnia) - - - 79 - -

UE-27 (średnia) 65 - - - - -

Belgia 75 10 115,38 84 5 106,33

Bułgaria 42 -23 64,62 58 -21 73,42

Czechy 58 -7 89,23 79 0 100,00

Dania 86 21 132,31 94 15 118,99

Niemcy 75 10 115,38 87 8 110,13

Estonia 71 6 109,23 85 6 107,59

Irlandia 63 -2 96,92 79 0 100,00

Grecja 41 -24 63,08 66 -13 83,54

138 Adam Gąsiorek


od średniej

Odsetek

średniej2016

Odległość

od średniej

Odsetek

średniej

Hiszpania 58 -7 89,23 76 -3 96,20

Francja 72 7 110,77 82 3 103,80

Chorwacja - - - 71 -8 89,87

Włochy 48 -17 73,85 67 -12 84,81

Cypr 50 -15 76,92 74 -5 93,67

Łotwa 62 -3 95,38 77 -2 97,47

Litwa 58 -7 89,23 72 -7 91,14

Luksemburg 86 21 132,31 97 18 122,78

Węgry 60 -5 92,31 78 -1 98,73

Malta 60 -5 92,31 76 -3 96,20

Holandia 88 23 135,38 92 13 116,46

Austria 70 5 107,69 82 3 103,80

Polska 55 -10 84,62 70 -9 88,61

Portugalia 47 -18 72,31 68 -11 86,08

Rumunia 34 -31 52,31 56 -23 70,89

Słowenia 65 0 100,00 73 -6 92,41

Słowacja 73 8 112,31 78 -1 98,73

Finlandia 83 18 127,69 91 12 115,19

Szwecja 88 23 135,38 91 12 115,19

Wielka Brytania 80 15 123,08 93 14 117,72

Źródło: Eurostat, 2017.

Wskaźnik, odnoszący się do częstotliwości korzystania z Internetu wskazuje

(tabela 4), że w 2016 r. 79% obywateli Unii Europejskiej przeglądało jego zawartość

co najmniej raz w tygodniu i było to o 14 p. proc. więcej, aniżeli sześć lat wcześniej.

Wartości powyżej średniej (lub jej równe) odnotowano w trzynastu państwach,

jednakże Słowacja i Słowenia w 2016 r. znalazły się poniżej odczytu przeciętnego, zaś

Czechy i Irlandia zrównały się z nim. Należy zwrócić uwagę na fakt, że zróżnicowanie

w ramach UE, biorąc pod uwagę okres poddany analizie, istotnie się zmniejszyło:

w 2010 r. Rumunia z odczytem na poziomie 34% stanowiła jedynie 52,31% przeciętnej,

a Holandia i Szwecja odnotowały poziom 88%, czyli 135,38% średniej, natomiast

w 2016 r. także Rumunia z odczytem na poziomie 56% wyróżniła się negatywnie

(70,89% średniej), a najlepszy okazał się Luksemburg – 97%, czyli 122,78% wartości

przeciętnej. Różnica między państwem o najgorszym i najlepszym odczycie zmalała

z 54 p. proc. do 41 p. proc., jednak wciąż jest to poziom dość wysoki. Nadto,

w 2016 r. w żadnym unijnym państwie członkowskim odsetek osób, które korzystają


z Internetu przynajmniej raz w tygodniu, nie znajdował się poniżej 50%, co jeszcze

sześć lat wcześniej miało miejsce w Bułgarii, Grecji, Włoszech, Portugalii i Rumunii.

Co więcej, już w sześciu państwach wyniósł on powyżej 90% – Danii, Luksemburgu,

Holandii, Finlandii, Szwecji i Wielkiej Brytanii.

Tabela 5: Odsetek gospodarstw domowych posiadających szerokopasmowy

dostęp do Internetu


od średniej

Odsetek

średniej2016

Odległość

od średniej

Odsetek

średniej

UE-28 (średnia) - - - 83 - -

UE-27 (średnia) 61 - - - - -

Belgia 70 9 114,75 82 -1 98,80

Bułgaria 26 -35 42,62 63 -20 75,90

Czechy 54 -7 88,52 80 -3 96,39

Dania 80 19 131,15 92 9 110,84

Niemcy 75 14 122,95 90 7 108,43

Estonia 64 3 104,92 85 2 102,41

Irlandia 58 -3 95,08 86 3 103,61

Grecja 41 -20 67,21 68 -15 81,93

Hiszpania 56 -5 91,80 81 -2 97,59

Francja 66 5 108,20 79 -4 95,18

Chorwacja - - - 77 -6 92,77

Włochy 49 -12 80,33 77 -6 92,77

Cypr 51 -10 83,61 74 -9 89,16

Łotwa 53 -8 86,89 75 -8 90,36

Litwa 54 -7 88,52 71 -12 85,54

Luksemburg 70 9 114,75 97 14 116,87

Węgry 51 -10 83,61 78 -5 93,98

Malta 69 8 113,11 82 -1 98,80

Holandia 80 19 131,15 95 12 114,46

Austria 64 3 104,92 85 2 102,41

Polska 57 -4 93,44 76 -7 91,57

Portugalia 50 -11 81,97 73 -10 87,95

Rumunia 23 -38 37,70 70 -13 84,34

Słowenia 62 1 101,64 78 -5 93,98

Słowacja 49 -12 80,33 78 -5 93,98

Finlandia 76 15 124,59 91 8 109,64

Szwecja 83 22 136,07 89 6 107,23

Wielka Brytania - - - 92 9 110,84


140 Adam Gąsiorek

Miernik, opisujący posiadanie szerokopasmowego dostępu do Internetu przez

unijne gospodarstwa domowe pokazuje (tabela 5), że w 2016 r. już 83% z nich posiadało

tego rodzaju możliwość połączenia z siecią – było to o 22 p. proc. więcej, aniżeli w 2010

r. Wartości powyżej średniej odnotowano w dwunastu krajach w 2010 r. i dziesięciu

krajach sześć lat później. Koniecznym wydaje się podkreślenie, że po dokonaniu

zestawienia lat 2010 i 2016, Belgia, Francja, Malta i Słowenia, mimo podwyższenia

wartości wskaźnika, znalazły się w 2016 r. poniżej przeciętnej. Natomiast w przypadku

Irlandii wystąpiła sytuacja odwrotna – na skutek wzrostu odsetka o 28 p. proc. mogła

zostać zaliczona do grupy, posiadającej wartość wskaźnika powyżej średniej. Nie

ulega wątpliwości, że znacząco zmniejszyło się zróżnicowanie, występujące w Unii

Europejskiej: jeszcze w 2010 r. Rumunia, z odczytem na poziomie 23%, stanowiła

jedynie 37,7% średniej, a Szwecja, która odnotowała poziom 83%, aż 136,07% wartości

przeciętnej. Z kolei w 2016 r. Bułgaria z odczytem na poziomie 63% wyróżniła się

negatywnie (75,9% średniej), natomiast najlepszy okazał się Luksemburg – 97%, czyli

116,87% przeciętnej. Różnica między państwem o najgorszym i najlepszym odczycie

zmalała więc z 63 p. proc. do 34 p. proc., co, średnio ujmując, oznaczało zmniejszanie

rozwarstwienia o 4,8 p. proc. rocznie. Analogicznie jak w przypadku wskaźnika

poprzedniego, w 2016 r. w żadnym unijnym państwie członkowskim odsetek

gospodarstw domowych, posiadających szerokopasmowy dostęp do Internetu, nie

znajdował się poniżej 50%, co jeszcze sześć lat wcześniej miało miejsce w Bułgarii,

Grecji, Włoszech, Rumunii i Słowacji. Co więcej, już w sześciu krajach wyniósł on

90% i więcej – Danii, Niemczech, Luksemburgu, Holandii, Finlandii i Wielkiej

Brytanii.

Tabela 6: Odsetek osób, które dokonały zakupów

w Internecie w ciągu ostatnich 12 miesięcy


od średniej

Odsetek

średniej2016

Odległość

od średniej

Odsetek

średniej

UE-28 (średnia) - - - 55 - -

UE-27 (średnia) 40 - - - - -

Belgia 38 -2 95,00 57 2 103,64

Bułgaria 5 -35 12,50 17 -38 30,91

Czechy 27 -13 67,50 47 -8 85,45

Dania 68 28 170,00 82 27 149,09

Niemcy 60 20 150,00 74 19 134,55

Estonia 17 -23 42,50 56 1 101,82

Irlandia 36 -4 90,00 59 4 107,27



od średniej

Odsetek

średniej2016

Odległość

od średniej

Odsetek

średniej

Grecja 12 -28 30,00 31 -24 56,36

Hiszpania 24 -16 60,00 44 -11 80,00

Francja 54 14 135,00 66 11 120,00

Chorwacja 14 - - 33 -22 60,00

Włochy 15 -25 37,50 29 -26 52,73

Cypr 18 -22 45,00 29 -26 52,73

Łotwa 17 -23 42,50 44 -11 80,00

Litwa 11 -29 27,50 33 -22 60,00

Luksemburg 60 20 150,00 78 23 141,82

Węgry 18 -22 45,00 39 -16 70,91

Malta 38 -2 95,00 48 -7 87,27

Holandia 67 27 167,50 74 19 134,55

Austria 42 2 105,00 58 3 105,45

Polska 29 -11 72,50 42 -13 76,36

Portugalia 15 -25 37,50 31 -24 56,36

Rumunia 4 -36 10,00 12 -43 21,82

Słowenia 27 -13 67,50 40 -15 72,73

Słowacja 33 -7 82,50 56 1 101,82

Finlandia 59 19 147,50 67 12 121,82

Szwecja 66 26 165,00 76 21 138,18

Wielka Brytania 67 27 167,50 83 28 150,91


Pomimo tego, że ok. 80% gospodarstw domowych w Unii Europejskiej ma

szerokopasmowy dostęp do Internetu i wielu jej mieszkańców często korzysta

z zasobów w nim zamieszczonych, to dokonywanie zakupów w Internecie, jak

wynika z tabeli 6, jest stosunkowo mało intensywne. W 2016 r. jedynie niewiele ponad

połowa unijnych obywateli (55%) zadeklarowała, że w ciągu ostatnich dwunastu

miesięcy nabyła towar lub usługę za pomocą Internetu. Co prawda, w porównaniu

do 2010 r. nastąpił istotny wzrost odczytu, o 15 p. proc., jednak można przypuszczać,

że poziom 40% był dalece niewystarczający. Wartości powyżej średniej odnotowano

w dziewięciu państwach w 2010 r., a sześć lat później w trzynastu – do Danii,

Niemiec, Francji, Luksemburga, Holandii, Austrii, Finlandii, Szwecji i Wielkiej

Brytanii, mających odczyty ponad przeciętną, na koniec badanego okresu dołączyły

Belgia, Estonia, Irlandia i Słowacja. W przypadku tego wskaźnika podkreślić należy,

142 Adam Gąsiorek

że zróżnicowanie, które występowało w Unii Europejskiej w 2010 r. – Rumunia,

z odczytem na poziomie 4% (10% średniej) vis-a-vis Danii, która odnotowała poziom

68% (170% średniej) – zostało w 2016 r. zwiększone. Wówczas najniższy odsetek

deklarujących zakupy przez Internet odnotowano także w Rumunii [wyniósł on

12% (21,82% średniej)], natomiast najwięcej deklarujących (83%) zaobserwowano

w Wielkiej Brytanii (150,91% przeciętnej). Różnica między państwem o najgorszym

i najlepszym odczycie wzrosła więc z 64 p. proc. do 71 p. proc. Wartym podkreślenia

jest również negatywny fakt, że wyłącznie w przypadku ośmiu państw w 2010 r.

i trzynastu w 2016 r. ponad połowa ich mieszkańców dokonała zakupu towaru lub

usługi drogą internetową.

Wnioski

Społeczeństwo informacyjne w poszczególnych państwach członkowskich Unii

Europejskiej znajduje się w różnych stadiach zaawansowania, czego dowiodła

przedstawiona analiza. Pomimo wiodącej pozycji, jaką Europa – w ujęciu łącznym

– zajmuje na świecie pod względem dostępu gospodarstw domowych do Internetu

i korzystania z jego zasobów przez Europejczyków, ujawnione różnice wydają się być

znaczące. Różnorodność w zakresie wdrażania nowoczesnych technologii ICT oraz

ich wykorzystania w codziennym życiu bezpośrednio wpływa na możliwości, jakie

posiadają obywatele państw członkowskich UE. W regionach, w których społeczeństwo

informacyjne znajduje się w pierwszej fazie rozwoju są one zdecydowanie mniejsze,

aniżeli tam, gdzie mieszkańcy świadomie i z łatwością wykorzystują dostępną na rynku

technologię. Dane statystyczne, dotyczące przekształceń w zakresie społeczeństwa

„nowego typu”, które zbierają instytucje i organizacje międzynarodowe, powinny być

przyczynkiem dla działań, podejmowanych w celu przechodzenia do kolejnych faz

jego zaawansowania tak, aby w całej Unii Europejskiej społeczeństwo informacyjne

osiągnęło stadium stabilności (dojrzałości) i dzięki temu nastąpiło wyrównanie szans

wszystkich mieszkańców obszaru ugrupowania. Inicjatywy te z pewnością wpłynęłyby

na poprawę realizacji założeń Strategii „Europa 2020” oraz przyczyniłyby się

do zmniejszenia zjawiska wykluczenia cyfrowego, dotąd w niektórych krajach UE

będącego na stosunkowo wysokim poziomie.


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