islamic republic of iran world bank transport sector joint workshop
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Islamic Republic of Iran World Bank Transport Sector Joint Workshop. Private Investment in Transport Infrastructures and Services April 28, 2004 Michel Bellier Lead Transport Specialist World Bank. Overview. International Trends on Private Participation in Infrastructure and Key Issues - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
Islamic Republic of IranWorld Bank
Transport SectorJoint Workshop
Private Investment in Transport Private Investment in Transport Infrastructures and ServicesInfrastructures and Services
April 28, 2004April 28, 2004
Michel BellierMichel BellierLead Transport SpecialistLead Transport Specialist
World BankWorld Bank
Overview International Trends on Private International Trends on Private
Participation in Infrastructure and Key Participation in Infrastructure and Key IssuesIssues
Transport Sector SpecificitiesTransport Sector Specificities
PPI ModelsPPI Models Policy and Transaction Specific Policy and Transaction Specific
RecommendationsRecommendations
Investment in Infrastructure Projects with Private Participation
Developing countries, 1990-2002
Source: World Bank PPI Projects Database.
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
(2002 US$ billion)
Source: World Bank PPI Projects Database
Water and Sew erage
$44 bn.
Toll-roads$73 bn.
Railw ays$30 bn.
Seaports$21 bn.
Airports
$13 bn.
Natural Gas$44 bn.
Electricity$224 bn.
Telecom$356 bn.
Total Private Investment = $US 805 billion
(in US$ 2002 billion)
Breakdown of Investment in
Infrastructure with Private Participation Developing Countries, 1990-2002
Fiscal stresses and competition for public Fiscal stresses and competition for public resourcesresources Leading to cuts in public investment Leading to cuts in public investment
Conflicting Government policy objectivesConflicting Government policy objectives Contradictions between Government roles:Contradictions between Government roles:
Policy maker, regulator and operatorPolicy maker, regulator and operator Inefficiencies of Public sector monopoliesInefficiencies of Public sector monopolies
Restrictions on management freedom Restrictions on management freedom caused by service norms and procedurescaused by service norms and procedures
Why Is Private Participation Considered By Government ?
0
50
100
150
200
Subsidies throughmispricing
Costs of technicalinefficiency
Public investment
Public Sector Legacy : Inefficiency
$ bn annually
Source: WDR 1994
123
55
200
Benefits From Private Participation
Better technical efficiencyBetter technical efficiency Private management responsible and accountablePrivate management responsible and accountable Avoids political interferenceAvoids political interference Allows placing performance risk on private sectorAllows placing performance risk on private sector
Allocative efficiency more likely achieved by Allocative efficiency more likely achieved by competition in the market or for the market competition in the market or for the market
Better response to markets or technological changes Better response to markets or technological changes Financial markets and innovative products Financial markets and innovative products
Key Issues Learned From Past Experience
Private provision may entail new or hidden Private provision may entail new or hidden costs for governmentcosts for government Realized guarantees and liabilitiesRealized guarantees and liabilities
Major public role still required in most Major public role still required in most sectorssectors
Continued need to prioritize and accurately Continued need to prioritize and accurately account for public expenditure on account for public expenditure on infrastructureinfrastructure
Key Lessons Learned From Past Experience (2)
Unrealistic expectations (government, investors) Unrealistic expectations (government, investors) lead to failurelead to failure
Arguments over the impact on access and prices, Arguments over the impact on access and prices, particularly for the poor, but overall benefitsparticularly for the poor, but overall benefits Few arguments over technical efficiencyFew arguments over technical efficiency
Difficulties to sustain cost-covering fees is a major Difficulties to sustain cost-covering fees is a major threat to the sustainability of private operationsthreat to the sustainability of private operations
Effective regulation critical to achieve benefits Effective regulation critical to achieve benefits Shift in public opinion due to disillusionmentShift in public opinion due to disillusionment Reduced enthusiasm of many investors in Reduced enthusiasm of many investors in
developing countries infrastructuredeveloping countries infrastructure
Government Resists Private Participation When
Strategic issues are at stakeStrategic issues are at stake Ownership is believed necessary to control Ownership is believed necessary to control
social impactssocial impacts Private monopoly would exploit usersPrivate monopoly would exploit users
Private Sector Finds Entry Unattractive When
Risks are not properly allocated or the Risks are not properly allocated or the legal/regulatory framework impedes legal/regulatory framework impedes mitigation measuresmitigation measures
There is no secure revenue flowThere is no secure revenue flow There is a high probability of commercially There is a high probability of commercially
damaging government interferencedamaging government interference Sunk capital will not be recoveredSunk capital will not be recovered
What is Special About Transport?
Varied products and marketsVaried products and markets Two components: infrastructure and servicesTwo components: infrastructure and services
Transport services serving customersTransport services serving customers Transport infrastructure Transport infrastructure
Integrated with service provision, or Integrated with service provision, or Commonly owned but separately operated by several providers, orCommonly owned but separately operated by several providers, or Separately operatedSeparately operated
Significant externalities (environment, safety)Significant externalities (environment, safety) Prominence of social and strategic considerationsProminence of social and strategic considerations
The Case for PPI in the Transport Sector
Large benefits for services activitiesLarge benefits for services activities Less arguments for infrastructure Less arguments for infrastructure
Natural monopoly (road networks)Natural monopoly (road networks) Significant market power (ports/airports)Significant market power (ports/airports) Difficulty to recover infrastructure costsDifficulty to recover infrastructure costs Requires a dedicated source of income Requires a dedicated source of income
When integration extends a natural monopoly, separate When integration extends a natural monopoly, separate provision of services may be consideredprovision of services may be considered Market monopoly and not technical monopolyMarket monopoly and not technical monopoly Mixed results in rail sectorMixed results in rail sector
Cost Reductions From Private Sector Supply
in the Transport Sector
Road maintenance: 50% in ColombiaRoad maintenance: 50% in Colombia Rail labor costs: 50% in ArgentinaRail labor costs: 50% in Argentina Bus operations: 40% in UKBus operations: 40% in UK Shipping costs: 30% in VenezuelaShipping costs: 30% in Venezuela Ports: 30% in BrazilPorts: 30% in Brazil
Scope for Private Sector in Transport (1)
INFRASTRUCTURE SERVICES
Urban Road Usually public construction and management
Access expressways and bridges can be tolled
Free entry and competitive franchises in the bus market, Reduce barriers to entry of the informal sector
Interurban road
Independent public road agencies may be commercializedConstruction and maintenance contracted out to private sector.Concession of high traffic volume toll roads
Private freight services in competitive markets
Competitive or periodically contestable private operations for passenger services
Scope for Private Sector in Transport (2)
INFRASTRUCTURE SERVICES
Urban rail Success of concessionary systems yet to be proved.LRT are potential cases (concession or affermage)
Performance based management contracts (social objectives should be embodied)
Interurban rail
Separation of infrastructure from services to encourage competition, but long-term efficiency yet to be proven.Vertically integrated concession (freight, passengers to lesser extent) PPP of greenfield projects
Partial concession or franchising of specialized services (multiple operators)
Outsourcing of support activities
Scope for Private Sector in Transport (3)
INFRASTRUCTURE SERVICES
Ports Public corporatised and commercially run landlord functions may remain for strategic planning purposes. Concessionning or privatization of ports or terminals
Private provision of Channeling and dredging Tug services Stevedoring Landside. Portside
Airports Airports: . corporatised landlord model . passenger and freight terminals can provide good opportunities for privatization or concession
Airlines
Airports: specific services by private sector Airside Landside
The Spectrum of Choices
Public supply and operation Public supply and operation Corporatization and performance agreements Corporatization and performance agreements
Management contractsManagement contracts Leasing (Affermage)Leasing (Affermage)
Franchise Franchise Concession (BOT)Concession (BOT)
Build-Own-Operate (BOO) Build-Own-Operate (BOO) Divestiture by license Divestiture by license
Divestiture by saleDivestiture by sale Private supply and operationPrivate supply and operation
((Ranked by increasing risk transfer Ranked by increasing risk transfer to private sector)to private sector)
Difference Between Options
Risk allocationRisk allocation IncentivesIncentives Operational requirementsOperational requirements Regulatory requirementsRegulatory requirements In all models, a contract defines In all models, a contract defines
objectives, duties and rights of partiesobjectives, duties and rights of parties
Put relationship between government and supplier Put relationship between government and supplier on a formal basison a formal basis
Are best seen as eitherAre best seen as either Appropriate for a government agencyAppropriate for a government agency An interim stage to concessioningAn interim stage to concessioning
ButBut Tend to be badly enforcedTend to be badly enforced Have only weak incentives to efficiencyHave only weak incentives to efficiency
Examples: Urban rail, airport terminalExamples: Urban rail, airport terminal
Management Contracts
Leasing (Affermage) Responsibilities of public sector Responsibilities of public sector
Defines enterprise objectivesDefines enterprise objectives Finances infrastructure and equipment and Finances infrastructure and equipment and
retains ownership of assetsretains ownership of assets Responsibilities of the operator (Lessee) Responsibilities of the operator (Lessee)
Deploys operating resourcesDeploys operating resources Takes some commercial risks, and makes most Takes some commercial risks, and makes most
marketing decisionsmarketing decisions Payment of lessee from users charges and partly Payment of lessee from users charges and partly
related to resultsrelated to results Examples: LRTExamples: LRT
Franchise
Delegation of operating rights to a private Delegation of operating rights to a private providerprovider Services defined in the contractServices defined in the contract
Infrastructure financed by governmentInfrastructure financed by government Operating equipment generally financed by Operating equipment generally financed by
private sectorprivate sector User chargeUser charge Revenue risk born by the franchiseeRevenue risk born by the franchisee Examples: urban bus servicesExamples: urban bus services
Concessions General Characteristics
Specific exploitation rights awarded to a Specific exploitation rights awarded to a private companyprivate company Financing, construction and operationsFinancing, construction and operations Usually long term contractUsually long term contract
Incentive to generate and secure revenueIncentive to generate and secure revenue Consistent with public ownership of assetsConsistent with public ownership of assets Consistent with quality regulation by public Consistent with quality regulation by public
sectorsector Examples: toll roads, airport terminals, portsExamples: toll roads, airport terminals, ports
Concessions Regulation
Regulation critical when natural monopoly or Regulation critical when natural monopoly or market power, or PPP agreement rely on market power, or PPP agreement rely on regulatory interpretationregulatory interpretation
Regulation by the contract or a regulatorRegulation by the contract or a regulator Independent regulation recommendedIndependent regulation recommended
Monitoring fulfillment of contract conditionsMonitoring fulfillment of contract conditions Technical regulationTechnical regulation Economic regulationEconomic regulation
Ensuring users protectionEnsuring users protection
Concession Requirements
Economically justified projects Economically justified projects Financial return meeting investors thresholdsFinancial return meeting investors thresholds Acceptable outcome (user access/affordability)Acceptable outcome (user access/affordability) Properly structured contracts to deliver risk Properly structured contracts to deliver risk
transfer and efficiency benefitstransfer and efficiency benefits Sophisticated legal enabling and enforcement Sophisticated legal enabling and enforcement
environmentenvironment Expert concession design team (legal, financial)Expert concession design team (legal, financial) Competitive procurementCompetitive procurement
Policy Recommendations
Government role: policy maker, investment decision, Government role: policy maker, investment decision, regulator of infrastructure servicesregulator of infrastructure services Not a provider of services, determines outputsNot a provider of services, determines outputs Promoting ministries should have strong capacityPromoting ministries should have strong capacity
Enabling legal and compliance environmentEnabling legal and compliance environment Effective regulationEffective regulation
Expectation of continuing public commitment Expectation of continuing public commitment throughout the duration of the PPI contractthroughout the duration of the PPI contract
Competitive procurement where possibleCompetitive procurement where possible Competition for the market when monopolyCompetition for the market when monopoly
Transaction Recommendations Project has to be economically viable Project has to be economically viable
Government point of viewGovernment point of view Acceptable impact on the access and affordability Acceptable impact on the access and affordability
of services to users of services to users Project has to be financially viableProject has to be financially viable
Private sector point of viewPrivate sector point of view Possibly with public financial or risk mitigation Possibly with public financial or risk mitigation
supportsupport Arms length contractual relationship between Arms length contractual relationship between
government and private providergovernment and private provider
References
Guides on the design of PPP and procurement of private Guides on the design of PPP and procurement of private participationparticipation Concessions for InfrastructureConcessions for Infrastructure Hiring AdvisorsHiring Advisors
Toolkits (Toolkits (http://rru.worldbank.org/Toolkits/index.ht)http://rru.worldbank.org/Toolkits/index.ht)
Port Reform Port Reform Public Private Partnerships in HighwaysPublic Private Partnerships in Highways
Private Participation in Infrastructure Advisory Services (PPIAF)Private Participation in Infrastructure Advisory Services (PPIAF)