Iraq Going ForwardIraq Going Forward

Promoting a democratic and stable IraqPromoting a democratic and stable Iraq

Feb 15, 2011Feb 15, 2011

Agenda

The Iraq War and the American Occupation

Tracking Change in Iraq: Key Updates

National Interests and Policy Objectives

Strategic Options

Recommendations & Implementation

Possible Scenarios for The Future

Key Challenges in 2012 and Beyond

The Iraq War and the American OccupationTimeline of US War Decision: 9/11: Focus on Iraq at the top: Late September 2001: preliminary planning order; November 2001: specific planning order; Afghanistan War:October-December 2001; “Axis of Evil”: January 2002; April 2002:Blair agrees on regime change; June 2002: Bush Doctrine; Post-9/11: Debates in Administration on Iraq. Fall 2002: “U.N. Detour” : Summer: Powell and Blair push Bush toward UN; September: Bush speech to GA; November: UNSC 1441; Iraq permits return of inspectors (UNMOVIC). October 2002:Congressional approval of use of force resolutions by wide margins;December 2002:Troop deployments to Kuwait begin; January 23, 2003: Blix criticizes Iraqi compliance; February 2003: Powell presentation to UNSC; February 14, 2003: Blix reports Iraqi cooperation; IAEA reports no nuclear program; No use of force resolution from UNSC. Military Operations start: March 19, 2003: Air campaign begins; April 9, 2003: US forces take Baghdad; April 10, 2003: Kurdish forces take Kirkuk; April 11: US and Kurdish forces take Mosul; : US forces take Tikrit; May 1: Mission Accomplished!

The Iraq War and the American Occupation: War Decision

• WMD and Terrorism?: 9/11 effect of new focus on WMD and terrorist link – Bush Doctrine(Anthrax scare of September/October 2001; Cheney focus on WMD issue); Other intelligence sources reporting Iraq BC; Iraq and nuclear: intelligence community divided;Administration pushes the nuclear issue (“smoking gun a mushroom cloud”) for public opinion; Iraq-al-Qaeda: intelligence community skeptical. Defense Dept. sets up a special office outside of IC to establish links. They turn out to be baseless (Atta Prague meeting).

• Democracy?: Belief that political status quo in Middle East produced 9/11, so have to

change the status-quo; Some strongly for democracy (Wolfowitz, Bush himself); others less committed to form and more interested in change (Cheney, Rumsfeld); Democracy as American default option; Belief in “ripple effect” in region.

• Oil?: Oil as important background – why the region matters to U.S., why the military is there; But oil absent from accounts of lead-up to war(No mention of Iraq in National Energy Policy released before 9/11); Policy during occupation: no privatization of Iraqi oil, no withdrawal from OPEC, no contracts for US companies.

• Israel?: US commitment to Israel a constant – hard to explain change; Some members of Administration very strongly pro-Israeli (Douglas Feith); No evidence that Israel pushed for this (focus on Iran even then), but supported it; Israel wary of being forced to compromise with Palestinians to help US on Iraq – stalled on “Road Map”(Bush public support for Palestinian state in lead-up).

• Change or Continuity?:A major change in American Gulf policy or the logical culmination of an established pattern?

Logical endpoint: escalating military involvement since the Iranian Revolution, enduring oil interest

Change: overturn the status quo, direct involvement in local domestic politics

Public Opinion Before The Invasion

The Iraq War and the American Occupation: Saddam’s Decision-Making

Regime security perspective can help explain the seeming irrationality of his behavior: Fear of domestic enemies: Shi’a opposition, military coup Fear of Iran U.S. in past not using military force to bring down his regime WMD: suspended after 1991, but wanted people to think that

he had them: Sure that the U.S. knew he did not have them Gave up this game in December 2002, but too late•Military planning: divide forces to prevent coup, focus on Iran, belief that US would not fully invade

The Iraq War and the American Occupation: Iraq Occupation• Direct Rule: Stage 1 – the “Quick Exit”: ORHA and Gen. Garner; 60 and 90 day contracts;

State would continue functioning; Local meetings to generate new government; Relieved in May 2003. Stage 2 – “MacArthur in Baghdad” (May-Nov. 2003): CPA and Amb. Bremer; Disband army, ban Ba’thists from bureaucracy; Governing Council and slow transition; Privatization of economy (except oil); Beginning of insurgency

•Transfer to Iraqi Sovereignty: American shift in Nov. 2003 – move to Iraqi sovereignty: Transitional Administrative Law and UN role; June 27, 2004: Iyad Allawi government; Constitutional Assembly election: January 2005; Constitutional referendum: October 2005; Parliamentary election: December 2005; First government: Ibrahim al-Ja’fari (Da’wa) as prime minister. Coalition of UIA, Kurds and Accordance Front. Served April 2005 – March 2006; Second government: Nouri al-Maliki (Da’wa) as prime minister. Same coalition. Begins April 2006 to today.• Insurgency: Elements of the Insurgency:Various Sunni groups: Islamists, ex-Ba’thists,

nationalists; Al-Qaeda in Iraq ( الرافدين بالد في and “Islamic State of Iraq”; Mahdi Army (القاعدة( المهدى of Sadr movement. Other militias, absorbed into government: Peshmerga of KDP (جيشand PUK; Badr Brigade of SCIRI ( البدر police in south. Insurgency Timeline: August – (فيلق2003: bombings in Baghdad, death of Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim; April 2004: first Fallujah battle and Sadrist uprising in south; Abu Ghraib pictures; November 2004: second Fallujah battle; February 2006: bombing of Askariyya Mosque; December 2006: hanging of Saddam Hussein; 2006-07: appalling levels of violence

Tracking Change in Iraq: Trends in Patterns of Violence

ENEMY-INITIATED ATTACKS AGAINST THE COALITION AND ITS PARTNERS, BY WEEK

Tracking Change in Iraq

Tracking Change In Iraq: Key Updates

Iraqi politics are dead-locked: lack of national unity government

Tracking Change In Iraq: Key UpdatesSecurityReduction in size of Army bases from 500 to 126 – aim is to be at 94 by September 1, 2010Currently 88,000 troops on the ground – aim is to be at 50,000 by September 1, 2010Moved 18,000 vehicles out of Iraq, and more than 600,000 containersUS has picked up or Killed 34 of the 42 top AQ in Iraq officials. – AQ in Iraq has lostcontact with AQSL (Al-Qa’ida Senior Leadership) in Pakistan and Afghanistan.All of this is a result of the mixed efforts of the US troops along with Iraqi military andlaw enforcement efforts.

EconomyIraq’s Real Gross GDP estimated at 4.3% due to falling oil prices and global economic downturnIraq’s Presidency Council ratified a $73.26 billion budget for 2010. – 23.5% increase from2009Extended Natural Gas negotiations with Royal Dutch Shell for an additional 6 monthsElectricity production rises 14% since 2009

FundingThe US, GOI, and International community have committed $162.83 billion towards Iraq’s Reconstruction efforts.The US has appropriated $53.31 billion towards these efforts through four major funds –ISFF, IRRF, ESF, CERPCongress has also allocated $6.10 billion towards smaller reconstruction initiativesThe Government of Iraq (GOI) has committed $91.43 billion

military

82% of US bases have been closed or transferred to the government of Iraq82% of US bases have been closed or transferred to the government of Iraq

4,408 US military deaths to date4,408 US military deaths to date

Society

300, 000 Iraqi youths aged 10-18 have never attended school 300, 000 Iraqi youths aged 10-18 have never attended school

65% of Iraqi youths do not know how to use a computer 65% of Iraqi youths do not know how to use a computer

30% youth unemployement rate 30% youth unemployement rate

62% of youths believe a relative can kill a girl for profaning family honour62% of youths believe a relative can kill a girl for profaning family honour

42%, 2010 42%, 2010Electricity demand that cannot be met

Tracking Change In Iraq: Key Updates

European and U.S National InterestsEuropean and U.S National InterestsVital•Secure The US & Europe from threats or attacks from hostile states or terrorist networks•Prevent a regional conflict in The Middle East• Ensure stability in economic system

Extremely Important•Suppress terrorism•Prevent regional proliferation of WMD •Prevent emergence of regional hegemon•Reduce potential volatility of global energy market

Important• Discourage human rights violations• Promote the development of democratic institutions and values

Policy ObjectivesPolicy ObjectivesShort Term (1 year)Short Term (1 year)

Ameliorate political and security Ameliorate political and security conditionsconditions

---------------------------------------------------- Continued decrease in violenceContinued decrease in violence

Increase professionalism and size of Increase professionalism and size of Iraqi Security ForcesIraqi Security Forces

Begin bilateral and multilateral Begin bilateral and multilateral dialogue dialogue Convene conference for international Convene conference for international

coalition for Iraqcoalition for Iraq

Achieve movement forward on Achieve movement forward on political reforms including:political reforms including: National ReconciliationNational Reconciliation Protection of women and minoritiesProtection of women and minorities Crack down on militiasCrack down on militias Cooperation with neighboring Cooperation with neighboring CountriesCountries Progress on key decisions: Kirkuk, oil Progress on key decisions: Kirkuk, oil

distribution revenuesdistribution revenues

Long Term (4+ years)Long Term (4+ years) Prevent failed state, conflict, and Prevent failed state, conflict, and

regional hegemonregional hegemon----------------------------------------------------------

Strengthen ISF & Transfer Strengthen ISF & Transfer AuthorityAuthority Increase size and capabilities of ISFIncrease size and capabilities of ISF Secure borders with Syria and IranSecure borders with Syria and Iran UN peacekeeping/development roleUN peacekeeping/development role Increase US training effortsIncrease US training efforts

Develop governing institutions Develop governing institutions Implement employment programsImplement employment programs Build sustainable infrastructureBuild sustainable infrastructure Support public finance reformsSupport public finance reforms Make political institutions legitimate Make political institutions legitimate

and inclusiveand inclusive Develop stable oil infrastructureDevelop stable oil infrastructure

StrategicStrategic OptionsOptionsOption 1: Complete DrawdownOption 1: Complete Drawdown

Short Term:Short Term: Unconditional withdrawal within 16 monthsUnconditional withdrawal within 16 months

Long Term:Long Term: Station rapid reaction forces in the region which can be used to gather Station rapid reaction forces in the region which can be used to gather

intelligence, battle Al Qaeda, and manage humanitarian crisesintelligence, battle Al Qaeda, and manage humanitarian crises Persuade UN to take on governance development, NATO to expand training Persuade UN to take on governance development, NATO to expand training

programs programs Fund employment and economic development programs that create jobs and Fund employment and economic development programs that create jobs and

stabilize oil infrastructurestabilize oil infrastructure

ProsPros ConsCons

Prevent further loss of blood and treasurePrevent further loss of blood and treasure High risk of increase in violence, civil war, High risk of increase in violence, civil war, failed state failed state

Restore strength of American forces for Restore strength of American forces for other global challengesother global challenges

Potential for increase in terrorist activityPotential for increase in terrorist activity

Internationalize operation in Iraq, expand Internationalize operation in Iraq, expand responsibility responsibility

Difficult to involve international forcesDifficult to involve international forces

Pressure on Iraqi governmentPressure on Iraqi government US will shoulder blame for further violenceUS will shoulder blame for further violence

Option 2: Stay the CourseOption 2: Stay the Course

Short Term:Short Term: Keep current troop levels in placeKeep current troop levels in place Maintain the current goals and costs; human, political and economicalMaintain the current goals and costs; human, political and economical

Long Term:Long Term: Stay in Iraq as long as it takesStay in Iraq as long as it takes

ProsPros ConsCons

Continued security in the regionContinued security in the region Extremely high costs: human & financial, Extremely high costs: human & financial,

Continue to eradicate Al Qaeda from IraqContinue to eradicate Al Qaeda from Iraq US further isolated from its alliesUS further isolated from its allies

US could be related with progress rather than US could be related with progress rather than with invasionwith invasion

Continued negative image of US Continued negative image of US

Affirmation of US military supremacyAffirmation of US military supremacy US continues to shoulder burden of Iraq aloneUS continues to shoulder burden of Iraq alone

Permanent dependence on US aid, “US Permanent dependence on US aid, “US responsible for Iraq”responsible for Iraq”

Strategic Options

Strategic Strategic Options Options Option 3: Regulated TransferOption 3: Regulated Transfer

Short Term:Short Term:Reduction of U.S. forces to 50,000 troops in the first half of 2011Reduction of U.S. forces to 50,000 troops in the first half of 2011Continued gradual withdrawal over 4 years, conditions permitting, subject to periodic Continued gradual withdrawal over 4 years, conditions permitting, subject to periodic revisionsrevisions

Long Term:Long Term:Promote the establishment of UN peacekeeping forcePromote the establishment of UN peacekeeping forceAugment programs to train Iraqi Security ForcesAugment programs to train Iraqi Security ForcesPromote strategic cooperation among Iraq & its neighbors Promote strategic cooperation among Iraq & its neighbors Promote the integration of “awakening” forces into ISFPromote the integration of “awakening” forces into ISFEnhance civilian reconstruction and development programsEnhance civilian reconstruction and development programs

ProsPros ConsCons

Provides flexible solution to respond risk Provides flexible solution to respond risk (insurance thru benchmarks)(insurance thru benchmarks)

Continued drain on US forcesContinued drain on US forces

Demonstrates US commitment to Iraq & Demonstrates US commitment to Iraq & region to insurgents & international region to insurgents & international communitycommunity

US image in Iraq continues to serve as US image in Iraq continues to serve as terrorist recruiting toolterrorist recruiting tool

Continued security will give time for ISF to Continued security will give time for ISF to grow and political & economic progressgrow and political & economic progress

American presence will continue to alienate American presence will continue to alienate international community international community

Projects image of responsible, powerful USProjects image of responsible, powerful US Lack of domestic political willLack of domestic political will

EvaluationEvaluation

1

2

3

CompleteDrawdown

Stay the Course

Regulated Transfer

FeasibilityFeasibility

HighHigh

LowLow

Medium/HighMedium/High

DomesticDomesticConsensusConsensus

Medium/HighMedium/High

LowLow

MediumMedium

RiskRisk(if failed)(if failed)))

HighHigh

HighHigh

LowLow

BenefitBenefit

LowLow

Low/MediumLow/Medium

HighHigh

ImplementationImplementation Augment Provincial Reconstruction Teams, USAID, Iraq Transition Augment Provincial Reconstruction Teams, USAID, Iraq Transition

Assistance Office, Active Response Corps.Assistance Office, Active Response Corps. Continued active role by the US to shape the outcome of the Continued active role by the US to shape the outcome of the

election to ensure that election to ensure that No party be allowed to subvert Iraqi democracy

Promote economic development by:Promote economic development by: Strengthening Iraq’s oil infrastructureStrengthening Iraq’s oil infrastructure Diversifying Iraq’s economy Diversifying Iraq’s economy Micro finance schemes to encourage small business growth Micro finance schemes to encourage small business growth

Transfer authority to multilateral institutionsTransfer authority to multilateral institutions Entrusting NATO with a larger mandate for training ISFEntrusting NATO with a larger mandate for training ISF UN peacekeeping forces.UN peacekeeping forces.

Vetting uprising forces and employing them through the Vetting uprising forces and employing them through the government.government.

Make foreign aid conditioned upon inclusive governance practices, Make foreign aid conditioned upon inclusive governance practices, transparency, sharing of national resources.transparency, sharing of national resources.

Possible Scenarios for The Future•Best Case Scenario: Violence levels continue to decrease; international organizations effectively fulfill peacekeeping, training objectives; Iraqi Security Forces become larger and more capable of providing security; economic development discourages ex-militants from returning to insurgency; Iraqi government works to include Sunni voices into the decision-making process; malicious foreign interference replaced with regional cooperation

•Worst Case Scenario: After U.S. withdrawals, sectarian warfare intensifies into a civil war; militias and terrorist organizations regain ground in Iraq; neighboring countries fuel civil war by supporting various Iraqi factions; tensions lead to economic stagnation and gridlock among governing officials, causing each leader to pursue sect-based interests; Iraq’s provinces threaten to secede.

U.S Plans for Iraq after The Military leaves

Key Challenges in 2012 and Beyond•Complete the constitutional and legal basis for Arab and Kurdish political accommodation; move towards truly “national” treatment of Sunni and Shi’ite•Stable planning and funding of economic and infrastructure development.•Fully shift away from outside aid; create stable planning, spending, and control of budget without major deficits.•Creation of jobs for steadily growing population. Rise in per capita income from 160th to Gulf standards, better distribution of income.•Structural reform of agriculture•Conversion-modernization-privatization of state industries.•Reconstruction and modernization of upstream and downstream petroleum sector; pipelines and Gulf facilities; stable Iraqi-foreign company partnership.•Deal with foreign refugees and internally displaced persons.•Shift and downsizing of Iraqi military from counterinsurgency to deterrence and defence against foreign threats.•Shift of police and security forces from counterinsurgency to rule of law; checks on corruption and organization crime.