iran: a political calculus
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Iran: a political calculusPublished on openDemocracy (https://www.opendemocracy.net)
Iran: a political calculus
Iran: a political calculus Omid Memarian [1] 6 September 2010 Iran’s hardline leadership is skilled at using external threats to its own advantage. By learningthe lesson the United States could aid Iran's people and strengthen its democracy, says OmidMemarian.
The summit meeting between Israeli and Palestinian leaders in Washington on 2 September 2010testifies to the serious attention the Barack Obama administration is devoting [2] to this enduringmiddle-east conflict. But even these vital negotiations are overshadowed by an issue with apotentially greater destructive capacity: the future of Iran [3], and the calculations of the UnitedStates and the wider international community in relation to the country’s nuclear programmes andplans.
These calculations are being made against the background of complex shifts and varying signals inIranian domestic politics. An example of the latter came with the remark [4] of Iran's supreme leaderAyatollah Ali Khamenei on 18 August 2010, that if Washington were to drop its mix of “threats andsanctions" towards Iran, then Tehran might be prepared to negotiate. At the same time heemphasised that the country will continue to pursue its nuclear project [5], a pledge symbolised bythe opening of the Bushehr [6] nuclear plant on 21 August 2010.
Khamenei’s [7] scornful description of the economic and political pressure being exerted on Iranhighlights the way that western (especially American, but also European) policies and attitudes alsobecome part of Iran’s own political calculations. The question then arises: how do sanctions, and thepossibility of military attack [8] on Iran’s nuclear facilities, play into current Iranian politics; willinternational pressure [9] on Iran of this kind help Iran’s opposition and even moderateconservatives to push towards democratic change, or rather contribute to strengthening the radicalgovernment in power?
The turning-point
The international community’s policy towards Iran is designed to contain its nuclear [10] ambitions,specifically to prevent the transformation of a civil-nuclear programme into a military one (anintention that Iran has repeatedly denied). There is also great concern on the United Nations SecurityCouncil that Iran's nuclear path [11], and the regional fears raised by the language and attitudes ofits leaders, will lead to a nuclear race in the middle east and the end of the non-proliferation treaty[12] (NPT).
True, Iran’s leaders are used to living [13] with foreign pressure in the form of sanctions and militarythreats. These have even (as an Iranian official told me) “pumped blood” into the Islamic Republic.Its three decades of life has seen war [14] (with Iraq, 1980-88), regular sanctions, conflict on its borders [15] (Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan), the encouragement of “regime change”, and waves ofinternal opposition - yet the Islamic Republic survives, wields strong regional influence, and is led bya radical government that feels confident [16] in its own power.
However, the current situation does present new difficulties for the government, in that the latestphase of external challenge coincides with major changes in Iranian domestic politics. Theturning-point here was the presidential elections of June 2009 - of which the incumbent MahmoudAhmadinejad was quickly declared [17] the winner - and the ensuing systematic, pre-planned repression [18] of the opposition.
The domestic struggle
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Iran: a political calculusPublished on openDemocracy (https://www.opendemocracy.net)
The effort to impose a rigorous one-party style of governance on an Iran whose leadership hadalways been balanced [19] between various factions met huge popular resistance and street-protest [20] in the second half of 2009. It also opened cracks within the clerical establishment, amongmoderate conservatives, and with groups (such as the bazaaris) traditional loyal to the IslamicRepublic. A key faultline is between (on one side) radical conservatives led by Ahmadinejad, thesecurity establishment and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC [21]) and (on the other)reformist politicians, moderate conservatives, independent clergy in the holy city of Qom, and Iran’scivil society.
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's [22] aggressive consolidation of power in 2009 was enabled by securingabsolute control over the electoral system, from the interior ministry to the Guardian Council (whichis in charge of approving candidates); the force of the basij [23] militias and the IRGC secured hisnationwide hegemony. But this centralisation of power is creating tensions [24] even with thepresident’s fellow-conservatives, especially in the context of the parliamentary and city-councilelections due in 2011.
Ahmadinejad’s own tone [25] has fuelled discontent. When in 2009, for example, members of the majlis (parliament) questioned the qualifications of some of the president’s cabinet nominees, heasked the parliament to "trust" him on the grounds that he had more than 20 million votes againstthe few thousand gained by many in the majlis. In addition, the president’s failure to implement lawspassed by parliament led to vocal [26] criticism from influential conservatives such as AhmadTavakoli [27], Ali Motahari and the speaker of the majlis, Ali Larijani (albeit Larijani and Ahmadinejad appeared [28] at a joint press conference on 22 August 2010 to emphasise their readiness tocooperate).
Ahmadinejad’s absence since the 2009 election from meetings of the Expediency Council has alsodrawn criticism. This is the legal body [29] that mediates between the majlis and and the GuardianCouncil, all of whose members are appointed by the supreme leader; it is led by the former presidentAli Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani [30]. Ahmadinejad has criticised the Expediency Council for acting"beyond the constitution and sharia", a comment that Ali Motahari [31] called "a sign ofdictatorship". The president’s statement that there is no political party but the party of velayatefaqih (the rule of the jurist) is a further sign of his inclinations.
All this suggests that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad intends to engineer the 2011 election as he and hisallies did the 2009 one - and that this time, since leading reformists such as Mir-Hossein Moussavi[32] have already been banished from the political arena, it is the moderate conservatives who willbe marginalised. The path to the next presidential election in 2013, and the conversion of Iran into apopulist dictatorship in perpetuity, will then be clear. It seems that Ahmadinejad feels confident thathe has all the major tools to complete this job - strong support from Ayatollah Khamenei’s office,control of Iran’s state broadcaster, command of the basij militias and the IRGC, domination of theGuardian Council, and reliable backing from influential pro-government clerics such as AyatollahMesbah-Yazdi [33].
Such political calculations raise questions over the role of Iran’s traditional and independent clergy,and whether they might challenge the supreme leader's [34] (to date) unconditional support forPresident Ahmadinejad and the growing departure of the country’s leadership from the constitutionof the Islamic Republic.
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is formally accountable to the Assembly of Experts, an elected body [35] ofeighty-six high-ranking clerics charged with that role. Some of its members, such as Ayatollah AliMohammad Dastgheib, have been openly critical [36] of the supreme leader. But in reality, theassembly is incapable of seriously endangering Khamenei's position.
In fact, the radical faction in power has used all the great resources of propaganda at its disposal toproject the idea that Khamanei is beyond the constitution and any form of democratic accountability.In July 2010, Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, the secretary of the Guardian Council, even said [37] thatAyatollah Khamenei had been delivered by God to his position as leader.
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Iran: a political calculusPublished on openDemocracy (https://www.opendemocracy.net)
There is a pattern here, whereby Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his allies are attempting to put thelegitimacy of power [38] beyond the people's vote; to put their own thoughts and beliefs beyondIran's constitution and political institutions; and to form a new discourse in Iran's politics. All this maybe part of a political project that echoes developments in Russia, with Ahmadinejad playing [39] therole of Vladimir Putin by putting in place mechanisms that entrench his and his allies [40]’ rule.
It is likely now that new, reliable members of parliament will be handpicked, more than ever, in the2011 election and that the choice of the next president will be made in the same way. Such atransformation in Iran's politics will end the political life of many leading conservative figures,creating a homogeneous political world that reflects the will of Ali Khamenei and MahmoudAhmadinejad. The danger of a return of reformists, or of a threat to the monopoly of the IRGC overpolitics and the economy, will be ended. In this sense, the severe post-election crackdown onreformist politicians and human-rights activists was the first stage of the show - 2011 will be the thefinal episode.
Thus, the coming year in Iran’s domestic politics is crucial. The moderate conservatives know thatthey have just over a year to reverse the current course. They have resources: one of their number, Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf [41], is a popular mayor of Tehran; the city-council there is relativelymoderate and diverse (including four reformist members); and moderates still have a voice withinthe parliament, bazaar, and media. It is an unequal struggle, but the moderate conservatives haveno choice but to wage it.
This is also true of the opposition, both the outright anti-regime forces and “inside-opposition”figures such as the reformist presidential candidates of 2009, Mir-Hossein Moussavi and MehdiKarroubi [42] - both of whom are still capable of affecting the political equation.
The danger of war
This domestic picture helps to clarify the impact of external pressure on Iranian politics. A formerhigh official in Tehran told me recently that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad welcomes this pressure and usesit as a means to isolate his opponents even more. "When the country is in danger, everybody has tosupport the government and criticising the government would be equal to helping Iran’s enemies",he said.
Iranian leaders are masters at turning foreign threats to their advantage. This includes theinternational concern with Iran's nuclear programme, which (contrary to the image of rule byfanatics) the radicals in Tehran are rational in seeking to use for bargain and leverage.
The Iranian leadership has managed to reach a situation where negotiation with Washington - andeven a limited military attack - could serve its domestic goals and guarantee its survival. If it choosesto compromise, Iran could in principle offer measures that would lift international sanctions [43] inexchange for less foreign pressure over its internal politics and human-rights situation. And even ifnegotiations fail or prove abortive, leading to a United States or Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear sites,the government - fuelled by a strong wave of nationalist sentiment - can use this as an opportunityto establish total control.
A military assault [44]on Iran will have other disastrous effects: it would lead to more human-rightsviolations, worsen the situation for Iran’s middle class, push Iran further towards dictatorship, andend any prospect of a more democratic country in the near future. For the Iranian leadership, thereare many positives in this scenario; the elite has prepared for it for a long time and knows how tomake the best of it. In this sense those who support the option of military attack against Iran inWashington and Tel Aviv are Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s hidden allies.
The United States has fewer options [45]. But by removing the threat of a military attack,Washington would make the job of Tehran’s hardliners more difficult, and encourage fragmentationamong the top layers [19] of the political elite. In the present circumstances, the end of the militaryoption would create space for those in Iran seeking to hold the hardliners in check, and offer anopening to Iranian democracy and the Iranian people.
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Iran: a political calculusPublished on openDemocracy (https://www.opendemocracy.net)
Sideboxes'Read On' Sidebox: Ali M Ansari, Iran under Ahmadinejad: The Politics of Confrontation [46] (Routledge, 2007)
Planet Iran [47]
Tehran Bureau [48]
IranWatch [49]
Ali Gheissari & Vali Nasr, Democracy in Iran: History and the Quest for Liberty [50] (Oxford UniversityPress, 2006)
Ray Takeyh, Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic [51] (CFR, 2006)
Iranian.com [52]
Rooz [53]
Iran and IAEA [54]
Michael Axworthy, Empire of the Mind: A History of Iran [55] (C Hurst, 2007)
Trita Parsi, Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Iran, Israel and the United States [56](YaleUniversity Press, 2007) Sidebox: Omid Memarian is an Iranian journalist and civil-society activist. He was awarded Human RightsWatch’s highest honour, the Human Rights Defender award, in 2005. His website is here [57]
Also by Omid Memarian in openDemocracy:
"Under the radar: an Iranian and America [58]" (16 January 2006)
"Ahmadinejad, Iran and America [59]" (15 January 2007) - with Dariush Zahedi
"Iran: prepared for the worst [60]" (30 October 2007)
"Iran on the move [61]" (11 June 2009)
"Iran and the United States: time to engage [62]" (1 May 2007) Related stories: Iran 2010-11: four scenarios and a nightmare [63] Iran's ocean of dissent [64] Iran's stolen election, and what comes next [65] Voices of a new Iran [66] Iran: revolution for the hereafter [67] Iran's election: people and power [68] The children of Iran: lives in tumult [69] Iran: a green wave for life and liberty [70] Iran: torch of fire, politics of fun [71] Iran: a phantom victory [72] Iran: what happened, where now? [73] Iran: from protest to politics [74] Iran: a time to rethink [75] How to make peace with Iran [76] Mahmoud Ahmadinejad: a political shadow [77] Iran's tide of history: counter-revolution and after [78] Country or region: Iran
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Iran: a political calculusPublished on openDemocracy (https://www.opendemocracy.net)
Topics: Conflict Democracy and government International politics $(document).ready(function () { $("div#contentgrid").removeClass('grid-8');$("div#contentgrid").addClass('grid-6'); }); About the author
Omid Memarian is a journalist who writes for the IPS (Inter Press Service) news agency and the DailyBeast, and whose work has been published in the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, the WallStreet Journal, and the San Francisco Chronicle. In 2005, he received both Human Rights Watch'sHuman Rights Defender award and the Hellmen Hemet award. In 2007-09, he was a World PeaceFellow at the UC Berkeley Graduate School of Journalism. He is currently working on a multimediaproject on the condition of "American Muslims in the Obama Era", and teaches journalism at theInstitute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR). His website is here [79] Read On
Ali M Ansari, Iran under Ahmadinejad: The Politics of Confrontation [46] (Routledge, 2007)
Planet Iran [47]
Tehran Bureau [48]
IranWatch [49]
Ali Gheissari & Vali Nasr, Democracy in Iran: History and the Quest for Liberty [50] (Oxford UniversityPress, 2006)
Ray Takeyh, Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic [51] (CFR, 2006)
Iranian.com [52]
Rooz [53]
Iran and IAEA [54]
Michael Axworthy, Empire of the Mind: A History of Iran [55] (C Hurst, 2007)
Trita Parsi, Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Iran, Israel and the United States [56](YaleUniversity Press, 2007) More On
Omid Memarian is an Iranian journalist and civil-society activist. He was awarded Human RightsWatch’s highest honour, the Human Rights Defender award, in 2005. His website is here [57]
Also by Omid Memarian in openDemocracy:
"Under the radar: an Iranian and America [58]" (16 January 2006)
"Ahmadinejad, Iran and America [59]" (15 January 2007) - with Dariush Zahedi
"Iran: prepared for the worst [60]" (30 October 2007)
"Iran on the move [61]" (11 June 2009)
"Iran and the United States: time to engage [62]" (1 May 2007) Subjects
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Iran: a political calculusPublished on openDemocracy (https://www.opendemocracy.net)
Iran [80]
Conflict [81]
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International politics [83]
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