abraham ian, e. - factionalism in iran - political groups in the 14th parliament

8/3/2019 Abraham Ian, E. - Factionalism in Iran - Political Groups in the 14th Parliament

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Factionalism in Iran: Political Groups in the 14th Parliament (1944-46)Author(s): Ervand AbrahamianSource: Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Jan., 1978), pp. 22-55Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4282680 .

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Factionalism n Iran: PoliticalGroups n the 14thParliament 1944-46)*ErvandAbrahamian

THE POLITICSOF FACTIONALISMWesternobservers beginningwith Victorian ravellersandcontinuingup tothe recent arrivalof quantitativemethodologistsrom the United States haveconstantlydrawn attention o the intensityof political actionalismn Iran. Inthe words of Professor Ann Lambton: 'Factionalstrife, in one form oranother, has remained a feature of Persian life down to modern times."Similarly,a British onsul, frustrated n hisattempt o forman anti-communistfront in his region, complainedto the ForeignOffice: 'No two Persianscanever work togetherforany lengthof time,even if it is jointlyto extractmoneyfrom a thirdparty.'2Whilewesternershavefrequentlyreferred o theexistenceof factionalism nIran, few have sought to explain it. And of those few, the majorityhaveavoided socio-politicalcauses and have instead resorted to such elusiveconcepts as 'nationalcharacter', politicalculture',and 'psychodynamics'.3Arecent study, for example, arguesthat particular eaturesof child-raising nIran create adults who are intensely 'distrustful', 'cynical', 'neurotic','anxious', 'paranoid', 'xenophobic', 'anarchistic', and 'conspicuouslyindividualistic'.4 actionalismn politics, consequently,becomes a by-productof pyschological nsecurities n personalrelationships.The aim of the present study is not to minimise the importance ofpysychology in the understanding f cultures,nor to deny the existence of ahigh degreeof personal insecurityin certain cultures, but, rather, to offer asocio-political xplanationfor the prevalenceof factionalism n modern Iran:to seek the roots of conflict n the social structureof the country insteadof thepsychologicalmake-upof prominentpoliticians;and to focus on the nationalissues which continually intensified these social differences n the politicalarena.Inconcentratingon thismaintheme,thearticle nevitably ouches upona closely relatedproblemthathas long intriguedobservers:why, in an age ofrepublicanism,has the monarchynot only survivedrecentchallengesbut hasalso successfullyestablished tself as the central institutionof contemporaryIran? Or, in other words, why was the anti-courtopposition, especiallythearistocracy,unableto establisha genuine parliamentaryorm of government?The 14thParliamentI1944-46)will be used as a case studyin presentingasocio-political nterpretation.This session of the majlishas been chosen forthree reasons.First, n a nationalhistoryof factionalism,t was the assemblyofintense factionalism.As manyas seven rivalgroups labelledfraksiuns a termborrowed from the Germanparliament in constantly competingwith eachother, wasted one quarterof the session in obstructionism, and brought*I would like to thank Mr. Joseph Upton and ProfessorEllwell-Sutton or commentingon anearlierdraftof this article.1, of course,take full responsibility or any opinions expressed n thearticle.


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FACTIONALISM N IRAN 23persistent nstabilityon the governmentalevel: during hese 24 months, therewere seven changes of premiers,nine changesof cabinets,and 110changes ofministers. Second, the 14th Parliament at duringone of the rare periodsinwhich there was some degreeof freedom orpoliticalexpression.Theopinionsthatwere expressedcan be studied n numerousprimarysources. The OfficialStateGazette,at thetime, printedverbatimreportsof majlisdebates n its dailyissue of ParliamentaryProceedings Muzakirat-iMajlis-i Shawra-yi Melli).Many of the fraksiuns publishedat least two newspapers propagating heirpoliciesand often giving'inside' informationon the chamber.Further,retiredpoliticianshave in recent years reminiscedon the saferaspectsof the past injournals, speeches, and autobiographies. n addition,Americanand Britishdiplomatsoften includedfrankand detaileddescriptionsof Iranianpoliticsintheirconfidentialwar-timedespatcheso the StateDepartment nd the ForeignOffice.The Americangovernmenthas publishedsome of its collection in theState Department'sannual volumes on the ForeignRelationsof the UnitedStates. The British governmenthas not publishedits collection,but - as aresultof its 1972 decision o declassifymost war-timedocuments has openedthe ForeignOfficearchivesat the Public Record Officein London.Third, anumber of reliable secondary sources exists for examining the socialbackgroundof politiciansactive in this period: short but useful charactersketches in contemporary ournals and newspapers;Mahdi Bamdad'sfourvolume Biographies f Iranian Statesmen Tarikh-iRajal-iIran); and last, butnot leastof thesecondarysources,ZahraShaji'i's ociologicaldata n her workon Members of Parliament during the Twenty-One Legislative Sessions(Nimayandigan-iMajlis-i Shawra-yi Melli dar Bist-u-YakDawreh-i QanunGuzari).

HISTORICALBACKGROUND.1905-41Power in nineteenth-centuryranconstantly swung back and forth betweenthe monarch at the centre and the magnatesin the provinces. The rulingdynasty,the Qajars,while claimingto be all-powerfulShah-in-Shahs KingofKings),nevertheless ontrolledneitheran effectivebureaucracynor a standingarmyoutside the capital.On the other hand,the provincialmagnates largelandholdersand tribal chiefs - although often petty shahs in their owndomains, were unableto over-ride their tribal, linguistic, geographical,andsectariandivisions n order o act in concertagainst hegovernment.Theshahswere thus able to pursuea systematicpolicyof 'divideand rule' and appear ostand over their subjects with the unlimited powers of typical 'orientaldespots'.5The impactof the west in the late nineteenthcenturyled to the gradualdevelopmentof two classes which eventually destroyed he traditionalpowerstructure.On one hand, British and Russian economic penetrationslowlytransformed he petite bourgeoisieand clergy of the many local bazaars nto anationalmiddleclass, conscious, for the first ime, of its common interests.Onthe other hand, initialsteps towards modernisation introductionof secularschools, European anguages,and liberalpolitical hought- beganthe growthof an intelligentsiaeager to rebuild its national environment, especially itspolitical nstitutions, n the imageof the west. These two very differentmiddle


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24 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIESclasses coalescedbrieflyin 1905 to carrythrougha successfulconstitutionalrevolution.The fundamental aws of the constitutionwere designedto introduce aparliamentaryystemof government nto Iran.6The membersof parliamentdescribedas representinghe 'whole people'who in turn were describedas theisourceof all authority'- obtainedextensivepowers: they won the righttoapprove,disapprove,or modifyall laws, concessions, oans,andbudgets;theycould investigateany 'matterconduciveto the well-beingof the Governmentand the People'; and they were guaranteed wo-year terms free of arrest,dissolution, recess, or dismissal. The shah, meanwhile, retained mainlynominal prerogativesas the Headof State:sovereigntywas definedas a 'trustconfided by the Peopleto the personof the King'; his 'person' was investedwith the supremecommandof the armed forces; and ministerswere bothappointedand dismissed hroughhis 'RoyalDecrees'.But,as the constitutionstressed n a numberof qualifyingclauses,'Ministers annot divestthemselvesof responsibilityo Parliamentby pleadingverbalor written instructions romthe King'; 'If Parliament,by an absolute majority,declaresitself dissatisfiedwith the Cabinetor with one particularMinister, hat Cabinetor Minister hallresign'; and 'Ministers, besides being individually responsible for theirMinistry,are also collectively responsibleto Parliament or one another'sactions in affairsof more general character.'The shah retainedonly oneimportant ourceof power: the rightto appointhalf the senators o an UpperHousewhich was intended o moderate he extensiverightsof the deputies nthe Lower House of Parliament.But even this turned out to be a hollowprivilege,for the first senate was not convened until some 43 years later.Althoughthe revolutionwas greetedas a dawn for nationalrejuvenation,tin fact ushered in fifteen years of social disintegration.In the capital, themodern intelligentsia- supportedby some of the religious minorities -confrontedthe traditionalmiddle class over vital issues such as land reform,progressivetaxation, role of religion in politics, status of women, and theposition of non-Muslimsin Iran. In the provinces, local magnates,takingadvantageof dissensionsat the capital, strengthenedhemselvesvis-a-vis thecentralgovernmentand settled old scores among themselves. QashqayiandKhamsehchiefs, for example,turned Fars into a battleground ver rival landclaims stretchingback half a century. An even greater threat to nationalsurvival came from abroadin 1907 when Britainand Russia, who had beenthe main international ntagonists or a generation,now putaside theirglobaldifferences,because of their mutual fear of Germany,and signed an Entente.As a part of the international Agreement, Iran was divided into threegeographicalzones: the north was defined as within Russia's sphere ofinfluence,the south within Britain's,and the centralprovinceswere left as aneutral zone. Two years later the Russiansmilitarilyoccupiedtheir sphere.And as the FirstWorld War came to the MiddleEast,Ottoman roops invadedAzerbayjan,Germanagentsinfiltrated ribal regions in the central provinces,and Britishofficersin their zone formed the South Persia Rifles.By the end of the war Iran was in chaos. Azerbayjanhad its own Azeri-speakinggovernment.Gilan, with the help of the Red Army, had declareditselfa Soviet SocialistRepublic.Kurdistanwas a battlefield etween Assyriansand Kurds. Arabistan- later renamed Khuzistan- had transformedits


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FACTIONALISM N IRAN 25traditionalautonomy into virtual independencewith its own Arab sheikh.Sistanand Baluchistanwere in realityautonomousregionsruledby localtribalchieftains. Isfahancontinuedto be the domainof the Bakhtiyariribes. Farswas in disputebetweenthe Qashqayis,Khamseh,and the BritishSouth PersiaRifles. And Tehran, wedged in between these provincialand internationalforces,was a state of acuteinstability. t is not surprisingo findthat a Britishofficial in Iranadvisedthe ForeignOffice: 'The only thing to do now is toconcentraten the southand the centrewhere some healthy imbsremain.Therest of the countryis in completeanarchy.'7A 'saviour',however, appeared n 1921 in the form of ColonelRezaKhan.Riding nto Tehranwith his brigadeof dissatisfiedCossacks whose pay wasin arrears - he deposed the cabinet, named himself Supreme ArmyCommander,and helped in the formationof a new governmentheaded bySayyid Zia Tabatabai a former editor of the newspaperRa'ad (Thunder),which, in the words of a Britishminister,was 'notorious or itsAnglophilia'.8Reza Khanthen proceeded o commendhimself,on one hand,to the Britishby convincing them that he was Persia's 'last hope of salvation fromBolshevism' - and, on the other hand, to the Soviets by promising toimplementa Treatyof Neutrality.Once Britishand Russian roopswere out ofthe country he systematically ntrenchedhis own militaryposition. HeoustedSayyidZia andgainedcontrol of the ruralgendarmerie ndthe urbanpolicebyhaving themtransferredrom the interiorministry o his own ministryof war.He successfully subdued the various tribal and provincialrebels. And hegraduallytransformed he decentralised ontingentsof local levies, Cossackbrigades,and the South PersiaRifles into a centralisedarmyofficeredmainlyby his own appointees.Thus, in 1925,now enjoying a monopolyof all armedforces, he was able to depose the Qajars, and, in the Napoleonic fashion,crown himself founderof the new Pahlevidynasty.Reza Shah focused much of his reign - which lasted sixteen years - onbuildinga new order basedupon the threepillarsof army, bureaucracy,andcourt patronage.He instituted national conscription, increased the defencebudget five-fold, enlarged the army from 40,000 to 124,000 men, andmeticulouslymaintaineda specialrelationshipwith the officersby sellingthemstate domainsat nominalprices, attracting hem into the court, and placingthemin high governmentalpositions.He utilisedrisingoil revenues n order oreplace the traditionalhaphazard collection of household scribes with amodern bureaucracycapable of enforcingthe writ of the state throughoutmuch of the provinces. And the simple soldier who had risen through theofficerranksaccumulatedbytheend of his reign- mainlythroughblackmailsome 60 million tomans in the bank and over 3 million acres of the mostprosperous and in the country.9Histhrone secureon these threepillars,Reza Shah was able safely to ignorethe constitution. During previous elections - for the Ist-5th Parliaments - mostconstituencieshad experiencedrealtrials of strengthbetween rival magnatesherding heir followers to the polls.The electoralprocesshad not beenentirelydemocratic,but, at least, it had produced ndependentassemblies.During thenext eight elections - for the 6th-I3th Parliaments deputies were chosenfrom above: the shah, consulting the secret police, informed his interiorministerwho was notto sit inthemajlis;the ministerpassedon the message o


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26 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIESthe provincial governors; and the governors, in turn, instructed theirappointees on the local supervisory election councils. Parliament,consequently, ceased to be the central institutionof the state, and, instead,became a screen - even though a useful screen - hidingthe nakedness ofmilitarismwith the decorousformalityof constitutionalism. n the words ofone ex-premier:'The shah, throughout his reign, was always insistent onhaving the deputies egitimizeall his actions, decrees,andappointmentso thecabinet."'In fact, they performed his task so obediently hat the shah felt itunnecessaryeitherto convenethe senateor to modifythepowersof the majlisas envisagedin the fundamental aws.RezaShah, having full controlof the political system, beganto modernisethe socio-economic system. A 'nation-building'programme involving theextension of central institutions and the simultaneous reduction of localorganisations,customs,and languages undermined he power of the tribalchiefs.The creationof a stateeducational tructure collegesexpanded ive-foldand secondary schools twelve-fold) rapidly increased the ranks of theintelligentsia.A strictlyenforcedpolicy of secularism - expulsion of clergyfrompolitical ife, replacement f religiouscourtswith civiliancourts,grantingwomen some rights, and finally the expropriationof ecclesiastical ands -drasticallyweakened the position of the traditional middle class. And anindustrialisationdrive, focusing on communications,consumer plants, andtextile factories- togetherwith the separategrowth of the oil company inKhuzistan gave birth to a small but geographicallyconcentratedmodernworkingclass.These reforms, especiallythe way that they were implemented, endedtoaccentuaterather than to alleviate social tensions. While the intelligentsiafavouredmany of the reforms, they resented his monopoly of power, hisaccumulationof propertynthe traditional utocratic ashion, his reluctance ochangethe system of land tenure, and his eventual wooing of some familiesfromthe old aristocracy forduring hereignthe landed nterest n parliamentincreased rom 39 per cent to a new high of 58 per cent."IAlthough some ofthe aristocrats ound comfortableplaces in the new order, especially in themajlis, bureaucracy,and state enterprises,most looked back nostalgically othe ancienregimewherethey, as Il-Khans TribalChiefs),al-Saltanehs Pillarsof the Monarchy),al-Dawlehs Aid of the State),and al-Mulks Victoryof theKingdom),had often exercisedrealpower- especiallyon the local level in theprovinces.As one writer stated in later years:

RezaShahsplitthe aristocracy nto two sections.One section, formedofmen unwilling to accept him, were forced either into exile or silence.Anothersection, composedof those willing to serve him, were readilyco-opted into the regime. But whatever the shortcomings of the formersection, they were minorcompared o the crimes of the latter.If they hadpreviously exploitedin thousands of tomans and had the reputationofbeing feudalistic, he new group was corrupt,exploiting in hundredsofthousandstomans,and was commercialas well as being feudalistic.Thereign, therefore,didnot solve the problemof class exploitation.It merelyaddeda novel elementto the existingproblem."2

Similarly,while the reigncreatedsomejobs for the lower classes and brought


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FACTIONALISM N IRAN 27them security from tribalism, t also hurt them in a numberof ways: wageswere keptat a minimum; peasants ost the traditional ightof choosingtheirvillage headmen; strikeswere promptlydealt with by armedforce; unions,guilds,and craft associationswere all banned.Moreover, ndustrial xpansionwas financedmainly throughinflationandhighertaxeson basiccommodities.As an American financialadviserstated:

Altogether,Reza Shahthoroughlymilked hecountry,grindingdown thelower classes. While his activities enrichedhimself and a new class ofcapitalists,merchants,monopolists,and politician-favourites inflation,taxation,and other means lowered the standardof livingfor the masses.3These social tensions were containedmainly through the traditionaluse ofterror.Publiccorporalpunishmentwas revived. The secretpolicewas rapidlyexpanded. The propagation of any political philosophy resemblingrepublicanismand socialism was pronounced punishable by ten yearsimprisonment. Military tribunals were given a free hand with radicalintellectuals,abourorganisers, ribalchiefs,conservativepatricians,andevenreligiousdignitaries.Allpoliticalorganisations, ncludinga royalistparty,werebanned as a threatto the regime. Parliamentarymmunitywas taken awayfrom the handpickeddeputies in the majlis. And many, including someprominent politicians, lost their lives while serving prison sentences. Forexample, wo well-known cabinetministerswere murderednjail,anda third,expectinga similarfate,committedsuicide. Formembersof Reza Shah's elitelife was in no ways poor, but it could definitelybe nasty, brutish,and short.

THE DESTRUCrIONOF THE NEW ORDER, AUGUST 1941-JUNE 1943The Anglo-Sovietinvasion of Iran in August 1941 openedthe floodgatesofresentmentagainstthe new order. As soon as the army - the prideof theregime- collapsedin a three-day war, tribesmen rushed to arms, in someplaceswith weaponsboughtfromdeserting oldiers,retiredpoliticianshurriedto the capital, religious leaders who had been forced into libraries againclimbedthe pulpits,and even membersof the establishment aised heirvoicesto denounce their benefactor as a 'self-seekingmiser', a 'despot' who hadsquandered esourceson an ineffectivearmy,anda 'militarydictator'who hadtrampledon the constitutionwith his policehenchmen.Threatenedby some ofhis own deputies who now spoke of investigating his bank account,withdrawingthe title of SupremeArmyCommander,andeven abolishing hedynasty,he abdicatedn favourof hiseldest son andhurriedlyeftforexile. Inlateryears,courthistorianswere to paint tragic scenesof the countrygrievingover the loss of the 'great guiding light'. Butcloser to the time, an Americanambassadorreportedto the State Department: 'A brutal, avaricious, andinscrutabledespotin his lateryears,his fall from power and his laterdeath inexile were regrettedby no one."4The new monarch,MuhammadRezaShah, took immediateprecautions oprotectthe throne. He did all he could to assure the Allies that he would co-operate,even goingto the extent of volunteering roops fortheir war effort.'5They, in turn, signed a Treatyof Alliance mplicitlyguaranteeing he dynasty,and explicitly promisingto evacuate the country six months afterthe war.'6


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28 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIESFor internalconsumption, he new shah carefullyprojecteda public imageofhimself as an apoliticalyouth, who, having been educated n the democraticways of Switzerland,hadalwaysbeenuncomfortablen his father'sautocraticcourt, and now wanted nothing more than to reign, but not rule, as a trueconstitutionalmonarch.'7To prove his good faith,he took the constitutionaloath of office before the deputiesin parliament;reintroducedparliamentaryimmunityforthe deputies;decreedamnestyforpoliticalprisoners; ransferredmuch of his landed nheritance o the state for it to be redistributedmongtheprevious legitimate owners; remained silent when two of his father'shenchmen a policechief and a prison supervisor were arrested ormurder;cultivatedcontactswith the religiousauthoritiesby encouraging he returnofecclesiastical ands and lettingit be known that the policyof secularismhadgone far enough; permitted he revival of old aristocratic itles in the court;and quietly accepted he reality hatpoliticians ndependent f thepalacecouldnow exercise influencein the ministries,especiallyin the interiorministry.Mostimportantof allas far as parliamentwas concerned,he didnotattempt opreventthe deputiesfrom regainingtheir old rightof forming governments.Reza Shah's practicehad been to first issue a farman (decree) o his chosenpremierorderinghim to select his cabinet,and then sending him off to themajlis o obtainthe necessaryvote of confidence.Now thedeputiesrevivedtheolder procedureby which they first voted for the premier.The successfulcandidate hen automaticallyreceivedthe royalfarman. And having selectedhis colleaguesand drawn up a programme,he returned o parliament or therequiredvote of confidence.In his striving to remain on the throne, the shah had inherited oneinvaluable egacy. The invasion had occurred ust as the riggingof the 13thParliamentwas being completed.He therefore nheritedan assemblywhere asmall minoritywere now vocal anti-royalists,but where the vast majority,having gained the freedomto participate n politics, were willing to reach amodus vivendi.The shah did not dictate o them in politicalmatters.Andtheydid not attempt o intervene n the shah's specialpreserve in militarymatters.Consequently,the structure of militarycommand remainedintact: orderscontinued to go from the shah, via his militarydepartment n the palace,through the chiefs of staff directly to the field commanders, bypassing theministerof war.'8 To ensure the smooth running of this line of command,royalists were packedinto the war ministry, reducing it to a mere office ofarmy supplies.Having maintainedthe militaryas a royal sanctuary,the shah workedvigorously o keep the loyalty of the officercorps. He hadbeen raised o be firstandforemostan officer,educatedexclusively n militaryschools, exceptforthebrief stay in Switzerland.He, therefore, retained his personal interest inmilitaryaffairs in manoeuvres, nspections,graduations,promotions,oftenwearing uniforms in state functions, and invariably at military occasionsreminding his audience that they owed their existence to his father."' Heprotectedfieldcommanders from public investigationsaimed at discoveringwhy so many of them had deserted heirposts in August 1941. He invitedanAmericanmilitarymissionto helpreorganise, etrain,and,hopefully,re-equipthe armedforces. And he pressured,oftensuccessfully, or defenceallocationsthat would increaseofficers' alaries,extendtheir fringebenefits,andpreserve


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FACrIONALISM IN IRAN 29theirrankandfile. Thearmy,whose rankshadfallensharply rom 124,000onthe eve of the invasion to less than 65,000 soon after, mostly because ofdesertions,was graduallyrebuilt o reach80,000 by mid-1943.20 As the Britishminister summarised n his annualreport,the shah 'doubtfulof the popularenthusiasm or his dynasty'hasconcentrated n thearmy,cultivatingpersonalties with the officersand'jealouslyguardinghisown controlof themilitary ...He has assumed both the title and the real authorityof the Commander-in-Chiefof the ArmedForces.'21Some westernscholarsarguethat the monarchyhas survived because of Iranian 'mystique' for kingship.22 f any suchsentiment existed in 1943, the shah was unaware of it. He was much moreaware of the practicalneed to retaincontrol of the unmysticalmilitary.The invasion, therefore, had washed away two of the three pillarssupportingReza Shah'sestablishment the bureaucracy nd courtpatronage.Politicians ndependentof the palace had engulfedthe many ministries.Andthe royal family, in orderto prevent a complete loss of its wealth, had beenforced to release most of its landed inheritance. But out of the wreckageMuhammadRezaShah had managedto salvagethe remnantsof the centralpillar - that of the military. True, the army was diminished in size,disillusionedn spirit,and disruptedn discipline,but it was still the army,theonly largeorganised orce in the state,and the shahwas stillitscommander-in-chief in fact as well as in name - at least until the end of the royalist 13thParliament.ELECTIONSFOR THE 14THPARLIAMENT,JUNE 1943-FEBRUARY1944The 14thParliament hreatened o be a second more dangerousflood whichwould wash away the remnantsof the centralpillar.As the 13th Parliamentdrew towards the end of its two-yearterm,the BritishMinister n Tehran,SirReader Bullard,informed the ForeignOffice that the shah was taking 'allpossibleprecautions' o safeguardhimself.23He firstsuggested hat the sittingmajlis should be permitted o extend its session until the end of the war. ButBullard, n spiteof his view that 'Persiandeputiesarea volatilerace with noguidingprinciples', eltthat the nationdesperatelyneededa 'safetyvalve'.24Henextproposed hat the senateshould be convened in orderto finallycompletetheconstitution.Bullard,however,vetoed the idea,arguing hatanotherhousewould merely add to parliamentaryobstructionism'.25he shah then, as afinalprecaution,broughtbackhalf a milliondollars romAmericaas a form ofinvestment n the 'political ntrigue'of the unavoidable lections.26Gone werethe days when the monarchcould, in an orderlyand directbut dull fashion,arrange he returnof the faithful yes-men' o the forthcomingmajlis.Insteadanew type of electionbegan where the monarch was reduced o using indirectmethodsof 'intrigue',where over 800 candidatesvigorouslycompetedfor the136seats,and where the campaigningbegan as earlyas June 1943,continuedthroughthe closingof the existingmajlis n November 1943, and didnot endin some districtsuntil after the openingof the 14thParliament n February1944.The lengthand livelinessof the campaignwas a reflectionof the underlyingchanges in the power structure.Power was no longerconcentratedbut wasunevenly distributedamong six different and at times conflicting forces:


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30 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIESamongthe Allies; the shah with his military; he interiorministerheadingthecivil bureacracy;the local magnates with their followers; the traditionalmiddleclass of the bazaars;and the modern labour movementorganisedbycommunist membersof the intelligentsia.The resultswere not simpledictatesof any one, but were invariably complicated compromises based on theregional strengthsof each among the six.The Allies were naturallystrongest n theirrespectivezones of occupation:the British having taken responsibility for the southern means ofcommunication n the oil provincesof Khuzistanand Kermanshah;and theRussians having manned the roads and railways in the border regions ofAzerbayjan,Gilan, Mazandaran,and northern Khurasan. But this did notmeanthat the Alliedconsuls exercisedunlimitedpolitical nfluence hroughthedirect and blunt interferenceof their troops. Rather, they exercised onlylimited influence through the indirect and subtle channels of local civiladministration.Since these administrators,especially the governors, wereobliged to work closely with the Allies in getting war suppliesto Russia,otherwiseriskingdismissal, hey tended to be amiable o consularsuggestionsin day-to-daymatters. And since the same governorswere responsibleforsupervising the ballot-boxes, they tended to be receptive to consularrecommendationsn electoralmatters.Also, the consuls did not dictate theresults,butgenerallyrestrictedhemselves o putting n a good word for one ofthe candidates who alreadyhad a strong following in the locality. As oneForeign Office expert summed up: 'It is interestingthat, in spite of allforebodingsand the Cassandra-likeprophesies of the Americans, Anglo-IranianOilCompany,andothers, the Russianshave exerted ittleinfluence nthe electionswithin their zone.'27The Iranianauthorities both the shah and the interiorminister- sharedgreater influence in the unoccupied central zone. The shah retained mostweight in regions under martial law - the tribally-disturbed istricts n theprovincesof Isfahan, Fars,Kerman,and Kurdistan.Andthe interiorminister,who at the time of the electionwas a nomineeof prime minister Ali Soheily,exercised most power in constituencies where the electoral supervisorycouncils were relatively free of both military and foreign influence.But theministerand the shah were no more ablethan were the consuls to influencethe final results n their regions withouttaking ntoconsideration he variouslocal forces.They had no control over the votes going into the ballot-boxes.Theyonly had the powerto sway the count in favour of one of the candidateswho had alreadycollecteda significantnumberof votes intothe ballot-boxes.

The relativestrengthof localcompetitorsdepended nvariablyon the socialstructure of the constituency. In rural regions, tribal chiefs and largelandowners retained the support of their nomads, peasants, and otherretainers.The results proved what one Britishconsul had anticipated: Thelandlordsare justifiablyconfident hat, in spite of radicalism n the towns, themajorityof the peasantswill continue to follow their lead on electionday.'28Meanwhile, in traditionalcities, religious notables and wealthy merchantsagain resorted to mosques and guilds in order to rally the middle-classpopulationof the bazaars.In more modernised owns, on the other hand, anew force - a labour movement headed by the Tudeh Party - made its firstimportantappearance. This party, headed by a combination of Marxist


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FACrIONALISMIN IRAN 31intellectualsand veteran union organisers, ocused its activitieson mobilisingthe wage earners, especially the industrial wage earners, into a militantmovementfor social reform. In the words of a Britishmemorandumon thecampaign, he Tudehwith itsunions was the only nationalpartyto emergeasa 'serious' modern force in a generalelection markedby a high degreeofconfusion', 'rivalries',and 'complications'.29These confusions, complications,rivalries,and eventualcompromisescanbest be seen in the confidentialand detailedbi-weekly reportsof the Britishconsul in Isfahan.30 hecampaignbeganinthiscity, known as the Manchesterof Iran,with seven seriouscandidatescontendingfor its threeseats.The firstwas Taqi Fadakar,a young lawyer fromthe TudehParty,whose strength aypredominantlyamong the textile workers.The consul summarised he localsituationas mainlya war betweenthese workers and the factoryowners:

Under Reza Shah,the land and mill owners- who aremostly ignorant,believingthat money can do everything, reactionary o a degree,andsolely interested n makingas much moneyas possible reignedabsolutein Isfahanwith the helpof the centralGovernment.But with the changeof regime n 1941 and removalof the banon Communistpropaganda,heRussian-backedTudeh, led locally by Fadakar, began to develop bytaking advantageof this strugglebetweenlabour and capital.At presentIsfahan s the centre of this strugglebecauseof the existence of an easilyorganizedbody of uneducatedopinion among the millhands.3'

A religious-conservative,Sayyid Dawlatabadi,headed the main challengetothe Tudeh. His large constituency encompassed bazaar guilds, smallndependentfarmersoutside the city, and the many clergy attachedto themosquesand seminarieswithin Isfahan. He also had the supportof the localarmy commanderwho followed royal instructions or buildingbridges o thereligious establishment.The thirdcompetitorwas HaidarEmami, a wealthymerchant-millownerwith powerful backingfrom large landowners in theprovince.Next came Sheif-PurFatemi,the patriarchof a well-known landedfamily. Although he publicconsideredhim a 'British andidate', ndhispaperBakhtar(The West)reinforcedthis image, the Britishconsul confidentiallydescribedhim as highly unreliable.32Trailingclose was StamsamBakhtiar,who, as a chief of the importantand traditionallyAnglophileBakhtiari ribes,hadescapedexecutionforbeinga 'Britishagent'a few years earlieronly by thetimely gift of his family estates to Reza Shah. And the last two challengersanother andlordanda formerpalacetutorwith family estates n the province- both drew their supporters exclusively from their own villages outsideIsfahan.As the campaign progressed, Fatemi and Bakhtiar withdrew theircandidacies to neighbouring constituencies where they faced far lesscompetition:the formerwon the nearby town of Najafabad; he latter tookShahr-iKurd,the central location of his own tribes. And the Britishconsulwho wanted to avoid public disturbancesat all cost, encouragedthe threeleadingcandidates Fadakar,Dawlatabadi,and Emami- to forman electoralalliance in which they pleadedwith their own followers to cast their threevotes for each other. Consequently, hey won handsomely- Fadakarwith30,499, Dawlatabadiwith 29,470, Emami with 27,870 - and the remaining


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32 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIEStwo, left out of thealliance, ost with lessthan20,000votes betweenthem.Theconsul was evidentlysatisfiedthat the campaignwhich had begun with thereal dangerof violence had ended peacefullyexcept for an isolated incidentoutside Isfahan.COMPOSITIONOF THE 14TH PARLIAMENTThe initial confusion on the national level, caused by the multiplicityofcandidatesandpolitical orces, gradually learedas the electeddeputiesarrivedin the capital, sought out fellow members, and eventually coalesced intoorganised groups. The observer from the galleriescould see slowly thatalthough hesocialcompositionof theassemblywas notverydifferent romitsimmediatepredecessors 86 percent of the 136deputiesbelonged o an upperclass of landowners, wealthy merchants, and senior civil servants33)hepoliticalcompositionhad radicallychanged.After sessions in which the samefaces had appearedand reappearedo form unanimous or near-unanimousroyalist majorities,the new majlis brought 60 freshmen and six separatefactions challenging he royalist minority.The court deputies, although now a minority,were still the single largestgroup, mustering 30 votes within their NationalUnion Faction(Fraksium-iIttihad-iMelli).The thirtywere mostly membersof the aristocracy hat hadbeen co-optedinto Reza Shah's new order: half had regularlyattendedhisparliaments,and the others had either served in his administrationor hadmade large fortunes through state contracts. Among them were twentylandowners,four civil servants, hreereligiousnotables, wo businessmenandone lawyer.Mostrepresentedonstituencies n thecentralprovinceswherethearmyhad been the dominant orceduring heelections. Fivemenactedastheirspokesman:EzatBayat,NassirQuli Ardalan,FarajAssef- threelandownersfrom titled but not Qajar families who had sat in previous parliaments;Dawlatabadi rom Isfahan;and SayyidAhmad Bahbehaniwho had acceptedboth an ecclesiasticalpost and a majlis seat from Reza Shah, although hisfamous father who had led the constitutionalrevolution had always insistedon remaininga true mujtahid a religious eaderindependentof the state.The NationalUnionists, elpedbythecourt,triedto strengthenheirpositionwithin parliamentby formingoutside an organisationwith a similarname -National UnionParty (Hizb-iIttihad-iMelli)and publishinga daily entitledNida-yiMillat TheCallof theNation).In a laterbid to gainwidersupport, heychangedthe organisation'snameto thePeople'sParty(Hizb-iMardom), alkedin general terms of 'socialism',and issued a more radical sounding paperentitled Seda-yi Mardom(The Voice of the People).But in spite of thesepublicity measures, heiractions in parliamentreflected heir own social andpolitical backgrounds:conservativein social issues, especially in questionsdealingwith the powerof the landedelite;and royalist n constitutional ssues,particularlyn preserving he compromiseachievedin 1941-3 between kingand deputies. They can be described as the seventeenth-centuryTories ofmodern Iran.The Whigs, on the other hand, found their counterpart in the LiberalFaction (Fraksiun-iAzadi).Theydrew theirmembershippredominantly romnorthernaristocratic amilies hat had been forcedout of politicsby Reza Shah


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FACIIONALISMIN IRAN 33and now re-enteredparliament rom their home constituencieswith the helpof the Soviet authorities.Ofthe twenty in the group,most had eitherpassivelyor actively opposedReza Shah. Onlythreehad played any publicrole in hislater years. Fifteenof them were elected fromthe occupiedzone in the northand kept friendlyties with the Russianrepresentatives, s long as the lattercontinuedtheir wartime policy of discouraginga social revolutionin Iran.Almostall were from theupperranksof the traditional ocial structure: welvewere largelandownersfromQajar amilies, wo were religiousnotableswhohad been in prisonin recentyears,and four were wealthy nort'ernmerchantswho arguedthat Iran's naturaltrading partnerwas Russia.As one of themstressed n parliament: Sinceour farmersand businessmendesperatelyneed aforeign market,and since this marketexists in the north,we must do all wecan to improveour relationswith the Soviet Union.'34The Liberals were led by a triumvirateof Qajars: Muhammad ValiFarmanfarmayan,he patriarchof a branch of the deposeddynastythat hadlost one of its sons underRezaShahbut which hadsucceeded n remaining hewealthiest family in Azerbayjan;Amir Nusrat Iskandari,a directdescendantof the second Qajar king and now reputedto be the second richest man inAzerbayjan; nd AbulQasimAmini,a closerelativeof the lastQajar hah whohad found it expedientto abandonpublic life in favour of land speculationduringthe previous reign, but was now vocal in politics through his well-financedpaper Umid(Hope).The Liberalsalso looked to another raditional ristocrat,AhmadQavamal-Saltaneh,as their main candidate orprimeminister.Qavam ustifiablyhadthereputation of being the most skilful and shrewd, if not the moststraightforward, f all the veteranstatesmen.Born at the palace,where hismother was a member of the royal family and his grandfathershad beenministers or fourgenerations,he began his career n the 1890s as an assistantcourtsecretary,brieflystudiedpolitics n Paris,and returnedhome just beforethe constitutionalrevolution.During the upheaval,he presentedthe liberalviewpoint within the court and actually wrote, in his own hand, the finalproclamationgrantingthe nationa parliament. n the chaoticyears between1906and 1925,he was themost activeof the many independent oliticians:hesat in one majlisas an anti-clericalreformer;he served as governor in theprovincial administrationof Azerbayjan;and he participatedn numerousgovernments first as a deputy minister, ater as war minister,and finallyaspremierheadingfourconsecutivecabinets.With the change of regime n 1925he retiredto his tea plantations n Gilanand later to his refugein Paris.Butimmediately after the invasion, he reappeared n Tehran with his formervitality- the Britishministerreported hathe still had a greatdeal of 'courage,energy, and authority'3,with a driving ambitionto become premier again.Somesuspectedhim of planningto head the state as a republicanpresident,36and, in the words of a courtwriter,with 'his teeth baredat the royal family',threatening o cut their ties to the military."The shah, in his conversationswith western diplomats,frequently describedQavam as a 'dangerous'manwho had surrounded himself with a 'gang of cut-throats'and who waswaiting for the Russiansto executea 'desperatedesign'.38Similar to the Liberals in their anti-court views and in their classbackgrounds,buthighly suspiciousof the Russians,were 26 southerndeputies


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34 MIDDLE EASTERN STIUDIES- most of them from the British zone - organisedinto a PatrioticFaction(Fraksiun-iMehan).The groupwas formed of thirteen argelandowners,fivebusinessmen radingpredominantlywith Britain, hreejournalists, hreecivilservants,one lawyer, and one religiousnotable.A collectiveleadershipof sixacted as theirspokesmen n the majlis:Emami,the mill owner fromIsfahan;Fatemi who had won the seat of Najafabadoutside Isfahan; ShukruilahSafavi,a deputy from the southernport of Bushireand the editor of a pro-British daily Kushish (Effort);Malik Madani, a landed businessman inKirmanshah;HadiTaheri,a millionaire ilk trader n Yazdwho dominated hepolitics of his home city; and most conspicuous, Sayyid Zia Tabatabai, he'Anglophile'premierof 1921.Having ived in exile fortwentyyears,Tabatabaihad returned o politicswith a seat from Yazd arrangedby Taheri with thehope, encouraged by the British,of becoming premieragain, and with theconvictionthat he could reform Iranthroughan anti-courtcrusade. Bullardreported hat the shah was 'hystericallyafraid of SayyidZia'.39OutsideparliamentSayyidZiaorganiseda FatherlandParty(Hizb-i Vatan)and revived his old paperwith the new title of Ra'ad-i Emruz(ThunderofToday).Its editorials,writtenmostly by MazaffarFiruz(whose fatherPrinceNustrat al-Dawleh had been killed by Reza Shah), directedtheir attacksprimarilyat the court.They arguedthat since the militaryhad been the 'chiefinstrumentof dictatorship',parliament hould drasticallyreduce its size andimmediatelyplace t underciviliancontrol."0 hey stressed hat since thepalacecontinued to spend money in politicalintrigue,all of its wealth, not just thelanded inheritance,must be put under governmentsupervision."And theypersistently eminded hepublic hatRezaShah,whom theyalwaysreferred omerelyas RezaKhan,had ruthlesslyplundered he country,undermined hereligiousinstitutions,made a mockeryof the constitution, and dangerouslyintensified he many existing social tensions.'2Also associated with Sayyid Zia was another group of eleven southerndeputies, most of them tribal magnates,organised in their own DemocratFaction(Fraksiun-iDimukrat).They were led by four prominentaristocrats:Samsam Bakhtiyar,the pro-Britishchief who had been elected from theprovince of Isfahan; his relative As'ad BakhtiyarrepresentingDizful inKhuzistanwhere the family still owned largeestates; Abbas Qabadyan, hehead of the Kalhortribes in the south-west,who had spent fifteen years inprisonand had lost much of his lands; and MuhammadFarrukhMu'tasinal-Saltaneh,a veteranpolitician,elected with the helpof tribalalliesin the south-eastern province of Sistan. These Democrats naturally worked for theircommontribal nterests: or the returnof confiscated ands, forcompensationto coverhardshipscaused by forcedsedentarisation,or the rightto beararmsand migrateannuallyas in the good old days, for the appointmentof theirfollowers to administrativeposts in the provinces, and for the creationof adepartmentof tribal affairs,staffed by themselves, within the ministry ofinterior.'3Very different from the southern tribal magnates were fifteen deputies,manyof themcivilservantsrepresentingonstituenciesnearTehran,coalescedwithin the IndependentFaction (Fraksiun-i Mustaqel).Owing their seatspredominantlyto PremierSoheily, they tended to agree with his generalpolicies. Like him, many of them were non-aristociaticmembers of the


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FACIIONALISM IN IRAN 35bureaucracywho originallysupportedReza Shahbut eventuallygrew fearfulof his personalrule. They were, therefore, independent' f thecourt. And likehim, while willing to collaborate with both Britain and Russia, theyanticipated he end of the war and plannedto draw in the United Statesas acounterbalancing hird force againstthe two traditionalrivals in Iran.Theytherefore considered themselves 'independent'of both Britain and Russia.Soheily had encouraged the replacementof British soldiers with 28,000American ransport roops. Hehadendorsed he shah's invitation o Americanmilitaryadvisers,but once they had arrivedhe hadunsuccessfully riedto usethem in orderto weakenthe ties betweenthe court andthearmy."Convincedthat political involvement nevitablyfollowed economicinvolvement,he hadtempted American companies with an oil concession and had grantedanAmerican financialexpert,Dr. ArthurMillspaugh,extensivepower over thecountry's economy: control over the budget, imports, prices, governmentsalaries, and distributionof food commodities.45TheIndependentswere ledin the majlisby 'AliDashti,one of theprominentessayists of modem Iran.An earlyenthusiastof Reza Shah ever since he hadbeen expelledfrom the 5th Parliamentby the clergy, Dashti, togetherwithSoheily, had organised the royalist and secularist New Iran Party. Hisenthusiasm, however, had waned when all political organisations, ncludinghis own party,were bannedandhe was brieflyplacedunderhouse arrest.Buthe succeededin rehabilitatinghimself and hiding his own feelingsuntil theinvasion, when, overnight, he was metamorphosed from a royalistbackbencher into. the foremost parliamentaryopponent of the court. Heimmediatelydemandedamnestyforpoliticalprisoners,persistentlydenouncedthe old shah for violating 'man's inalienableright to private property',andfrequentlywarnedthe youngshah thathe shouldkeephis hands out of publicissues if he wanted to remainon the throne.46The IndependentFaction was supportedoutside the majlis by the JusticeParty(Hizb-i 'Adalat).Thisorganisation,originally ormedby Dashti in 1942and soon joined by the other members of the caucus, had considerableinfluence n the statebureaucracy nd was associatedwith fourpaperspopularamongthe well-to-do:Bahram Mars),Nida-yi 'Adalat Callof Justice),Mehr-iIran(Sun of Iran)- all three,at one time or another,publishedby the partyasits official organ; and Ittila'at (Information), he Times of Iran, edited by'Abbas Mas'udi, a member of the faction in parliament.These five groups- National Unionists,Liberals,Patriots,Democrats,andIndependents though differing n policy towards the court and the foreignpowers, all shared one common factor:being members of the upper class -whether of the royalistaristocracy, he anti-royalistaristocracy,or the seniorbureaucracy they were,on the whole, conservative n social issues. Radicallyopposed to them were eight representativesof the Tudeh Party Faction(Fraksiun-iHizb-iTudeh).Of the eight,all were membersof the intelligentsia.Two had their family origins in the titledaristocracy, wo were high-schoolheadmasters,another two were lawyers, one was a medical doctor, one auniversityprofessor,one an engineer,and one had spent most of his adult lifein the trade union underground.Five of the eight, including he two from thearistocracy,had been in prison recently for advocating Marxism. All exceptFadakarof Isfahanwere elected from northernconstituencies.But they owed


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36 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIEStheir seatsnot so much to the Russiansas to union voters and to the assistanceof such local landlordsas Qavam,Amini,and Farmanfarmayan. lthoughthefraksiun, consistent with partydiscipline,stressedthat it should not be side-trackedfrom mass politics into the cul-de-sacof parliamentary oliticking, tneverthelessmade full use of the assemblyboth as a propagandaorumand asa means of obtainingsocial legislation, imiting royal power, and orientatingforeign policy towards the Soviet Union. Consequently,the three mainnewspapersof the Tudeh- Mardom The People),Rahbar(The Leader),andRazm (Battle), all edited by members of the fraksiun, closely followedparliamentary olitics,explaining o thepublicthe party'sday-to-day actics nthe complicatedmaze of the 14thMajlis.The six fraksiuns togethertotalled I10 membersin a house seating 136representatives.Ofthe other 26, ten were inactive- five hadtheircredentialsrejected, wo died earlyin the session,anothertwo resigned,and the last wasin a British prison for his German connections. But the remaining 16 wereactivein an informalcluster known as theIndividualsMunfaradin). he mostprominentamongthe Individualswas Dr. MuhammadMossadeqal-Saltaneh,a veteranpoliticianwhose birthplacedhim at the top of the old establishment,but whose views on constitutionalism,nationalism,and social reform hadgradually taken him into the ranks of the new radical but non-communistintelligentsia.As a convinced constitutionalist,he had been forced intoprovincialexileforpersistently pposingReza Shah's rise to power; anduponreturning o parliament,he insistedthat the constitutionwould not be secureuntil the militaryhad beenbroughtunderciviliansupervision.As a nationalisthe argued,with crusadingzeal,thatpaststatesmenhadtriedto preserveIran'sindependencewith a mistakenpolicy of 'positive equilibrium':eitherallyingwith one empire againstanother,or givingconcessionsto both, or seeking athirdcounterbalancingorce. Iran had thus become a free-for-allwhere themajorstatescompeted o graspas muchas theycouldin order o preserve heirinterestsvis-a-vis their own internationalrivals. To end this scramble,heformulateda simple theoryof 'negativeequilibrium'.According o thistheory,the major powers, especiallyBritainand Russia, would be content to leaveIran alone if it scrupulouslyrefusedto grantconcessions to any internationalpower.47Mossadeq has a reputationin the west of being an emotionalxenophobewho consideredforeignersas inherently mperialistic. n fact, hisformula was based on the trust that neutralismcould satisfy the legitimateconcerns of all the internationalpowers. And as a reformer,he threatened oundermine the political base of the upper class with a new electoral lawintroducing literacy qualifications, which would disenfranchise the ruralmasses who continuallyvoted for their magnates, and replacingsupervisoryelectoralcouncils with independent ommitteesstaffedby intellectuals, herebyblockinginterference rom the state authorities.48Five young professionalsrepresentinghe radicalIran Party (Hizb-iIran)were the closest to Mossadeqamong the Individuals.This party, begun as anEngineer'sAssociation in 1941, had triedto transform tself into a nationalorganisationby attracting he intelligentsia,but failing to become a majorforce,it hadsettleddown as a smallbutvocal circle of professionals. tsviewswere expressed mostly through its party organs, firstShafaq (Twilight)andlater Jibheh (Front). Both papers concentrated on the activities of the


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FACTIONALISM N IRAN 37Individuals n parliamentand advocatedrapidsocial modernisation hroughindustrialisation, he elimination of the 'parasitical aristocracy',and theestablishmentof a 'genuineconstitutionalmonarchy'.49

These parliamentary roupswere divided on threemajorissues. First,thequestion of social reform drew a simple but sharp line between theconservativemajorityand the radicalminorityformed of the Tudehand theIndividuals. Second, the problem of preserving national independence,especiallyin the looming Cold War, cut equally sharpbut more complicatedlines. The Tudehand the Liberals, eeingBritainas the mainenemy, intendedto ally with the Soviet Union. ThePatriotsand the Democrats, earingRussiaas the chief threat, hoped to work closely with Britain.The Independents,distrustingboth, planned o relyon the United States.TheIndividuals,on theotherhand, proposed o save the country's independence hrougha policyof'negative equilibrium'. n most ThirdWorld countries where there has beenone obviousenemy, nationalismhas tendedto be a unifyingsentiment.But inIran, where, owing to geographical easons,there has been no singleenemy,nationalismhas tendedto be a disunifying orce. Andthird,the constitutionalissue isolated he royalists n the National UnionFaction from the anti-royalistmajority n theothersix groups.As the Britishmilitaryattachereportedon theeve of the openingof the 14th Parliament:The shah is obsessedby the fear of a strong Constitutionalbloc in themajlis, or thearmyis likelyto bea firstclassproblem,both as regards heshah'spretensions o makeit the instrumentof his policyand as regardsthe share it consumesof the annualbudget. For some days it had beenevidentthat parliamentwould not be opened if the shah could preventit.50

As a last minutegambit, he monarchapproachedMossadeqwith the plan ofenforcing martial aw and appointinghim premier f Mossadeq declared heelectionsnulland void on groundsof 'corruption nd undue interference'.ButMossadeqaddedthe conditions hat his proposals orelectoralreformsshouldbe accepted and new elections should start immediately throughout thecountry.51The shah decided to face the existing danger rather than beconfronted, in the near future, by a larger danger produced by electoralreform.

CONVENING OF PARLIAMENT,FEBRUARY-MARCH 944Theshahreluctantly pened parliament n late February, nce two-thirdof thedeputies, enough to form a quorum,had arrived in the capital. The routinebusiness of the new session beganwith the four main anti-royalistgroups-Liberals,Patriots,Democrats,and Individuals allying to initiatea collectiveoffensiveagainst heroyalists n the NationalUnionFaction.They introducedanovel oath of office stressing the duty of each deputy to defend theconstitutionalrights of the majlis. They selected As'ad Bakhtiyarof theDemocratsas Speakerof the House,and Madaniof the Patriotsas the DeputySpeaker of the House. And in the bi-annual elections for the crucialparliamentary ommittees where most legislationwas hammeredout, they


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38 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIESsuccessfully solated he courtdeputies.The NationalUnionists btainedonly 5of the 18 seats on the financecommittee,4 of the 16on the interior ommittee,2 of the 16 in the foreign affairs committee,and 2 of the 13 on the armedservicescommittee.The latter,which was vital for the shah if he was to retainthe army, was packed with five tribalchiefs who had borne the brunt ofmilitaryexpansion n thepreviousdecade.Recentenemiesof thearmywere todecide its fate. The bloc continuedits offensive once the routinebusiness wascompleted, by forcingthe resignationof PremierSoheily. Although Soheilywas by no means a courtfavourite,he hadantagonised he otheranti-royalistswith hispolicyof obtainingarmsfrom UnitedStates,52 ith his interventionnthe majlis elections, and with his suspected 'corrupt' handling of fooddistribution."

PREMIERSA'ID. MARCH-NOVEMBER 944Directly after Soheily's fall, representativesor the main anti-court actions-Farmanfarmayan f the Liberals, Farrukhof the Democrats,Taheri of thePatriots, and Mossadeq of the Individuals,met in the caucus rooms ofparliamentand chose MuhammadSa'id as their compromisecandidate forprimeminister.As a careerdiplomatwho had served abroadduringthe pasttwelve years, he was considered ndependentof Reza Shah's establishment.Moreover,as a close friendof Madanianda native of Azerbayjan, ducated nBaku,and recentlyambassador n Moscow, he was acceptableboth to the pro-Britishand the pro-Russian ristocrats.TheForeignOfficecommented hat thenew premier was 'honest', 'friendly' to the Allies, but probably lacked thestrengthof character' o standup againstthe deputies.54Sa'id, guaranteedof a parliamentarymajorityand given the subsequentroyal armanto forma government,proceededo choose his ministers n closeconsultationwith the factionsin the majlis. Keeping he foreign ministry forhimself, since diplomacywas his specialty,he gave three posts to the northernLiberals and four to the southern Patriots and Democrats.Years later, hecomplainedthat the factions interferedso much while he was formingtheadministrationhat heended up with colleagueshe had never set eyes on beforein his life.55 At the time some newspapers, especially royalist newspapers,protestedthat the deputies, by participating o directly in the selection ofministers,were dangerouslyviolatingthe separationof powers between thelegislativeandexecutive branchesof the constitution.56 his was to bethe firstof many constitutionalcriticismsdirectedat the 14th Parliament.In spiteof criticism,Sa'idsuccessfullyobtaineda largevote of confidence nparliament or his cabinetand his programme,whichexplicitlystated hat oneof its first aims would be to 'reform' the army and place it on a 'correctfooting'.57n the debate,a spokesman ortheLiberalsargued hat to safeguardcivil liberties he militaryhad to be drastically ut and reorganised.5"notherLiberal proposed a bill to investigatethe 'treacherous activities' and the'financialdealings' of all citizens who had actively supportedthe formerregime.59 An Independent. while not supporting the new government, voicedhisbacking or thegeneralaim of bringing he militaryunderciviliancontrol.60Farrukh,speakingfor the Democrats, ook the rostrum to make a personal


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FACIIONALISMIN IRAN 39attackon on the Chief of Staff for secretlymeddling n politics.61And SayyidZia concludedwith thesharpestof a seriesof sharpdenunciations f thecourt:'Fortwenty-threeyearswe have wasted our scarce nationalresourceson aninefficient,corrupt,and despotic army. It is now time to reduce the defencebudget,cut the ties between theChiefsof Staffandthe shah, and,at last, takethe militaryunder parliamentary upervision.'62 he Britishmilitary attacheobserved hat the generalmood in Parliamentwas one of immediatelyimitingthe 'shah's activitieswithin strictlyconstitutionalbounds'.63A ForeignOfficeexperton Iran who was askedto investigatewhattheseconstitutionalboundswere, summedup the ominoustruth: 'The Shah is Commander-in-Chiefutwhat this involves is in dispute.Sincethe interpretationf the Laws, accordingto the SupplementaryLaws, is the businessof the Majlis, t is for the Majlis osay to what extent the Shah should command the armed forces.'64AndBullard,now raisedto an ambassador,reportedhome that the shah, in aconfidentialinterview, had bitterlycomplainedof lack of authorityin theconstitutionandhadexpressed he immediate earthat he would verysoon beat the 'mercy'of parliament.65Theanti-courtbloc receivedadditional upport rom two important ourcesoutsideparliament: rom theFreedomFront(Jibheh-iAzadi),a coalitionof 31newspapers ncludingsuch diverseanti-royalistdailies as the Tudeh,Mardomand Rahbar,the conservativepro-RussianUmid,the conservativepro-BritishBakhtar,and the conservativepro-AmericanNida-yi 'Adalat;66 nd from Dr.Millspaugh, he Americanadviser,who had been given extensive economicpowers in the expectationof bringingaid, but insteadhad arrived with anambitiousprogramme hreatening o cut the 'wasteful'armydown to 30,000men, to settle the 'just grievances'of the tribespeacefully,to transferall ofRezaShah's wealth to the statetreasury,andto listen to the recommendationsof such deputiesas Sayyid Zia who intendedto put the 'young man' in hisright place as a decorationon the throne.67In springof 1944 it seemedonly a matterof time before the constitutionalissuewould be settledfinallyeither by the aristocracy stablishinga genuinelyparliamentaryystem, or the military,in a pre-emptivecoup, re-establishingroyal autocracy.Butbeforeevents could run their expectedcourse, the othertwo issues- thesocialcrisis causedby classconflicts,and thenationalproblemcreated by internationalrivalries - erupted onto the scene, forcing theconstitutional struggle in to the background, dividing the aristocraticopposition, and, consequently,giving a new lease on life to royal authority.Thesocialdynamiteexplodedonly twenty daysafter Sa'idobtainedhis voteof confidence.The crisis was initiatedby mill-owners in Isfahan who, hurtfinancially by the Tudeh, and, in the words of the British ambassador,.outraged that such important persons as themselves should be treateddisrespectfullyby mere workmen using such foreignslogans as "equality,"68first ormedyellow unions, financedright-wingparties, empted abour eadersto break from the communist movement,offeredbribesto local authorities norderto have martial aw, and finally, havingordereda general ock-out, leftthe city.69Since the workers were dependent on the mills for their breadrations distributedby the factory granaries, the lock-out immediately andliterallyturnedinto a life and death struggle. In desperation,hey broke intothe plants, fighting the army in the process and losing some fifty wounded.


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40 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIESThey were promptly supported by fellow unions that organised a generalsympathystrikethroughoutthe city.The upheavalin Isfahan,describedby opponentsas a 'workers' revolt',70convinced the southern magnates to call off their offensive against themonarch.Theirprimary politicalaim was no longerto destroythe militaryfoundationsof royal dictatorship.Butrather,their main social fear was: noshah, no army; no army,no property.As the anti-courtand pro-BritishdailyRa'ad-i Emruz argued: the Tudeh, with its 'satanical'doctrine of 'classstruggles'had misled 'ignorantworkmen' into seizingthe plants;the seizurehad not only reducedthe industrial entreof the nationinto 'socialanarchy',but had also violated the citizen's inalienable'rightof private property'asguaranteedbythereligiouscode of Islamandby thefundamentalaws of Iran;and the local revolt would continue to threaten to spread into a generalrevolutionagainstpropertyunlessimmediatemilitaryaction was takenby thegovernmentto stampout the TudehParty.7'Thereactions o the upheavalwere apparentn localpoliticsof the south, innationalpolemicsof the capital,and in factionalalliancesof the majlis.In thesouth, Qashqayi ribes,who had been fightingsuccessfullyboth the armyandthe pro-BritishKhamsehsince 1941, now sent theirown contingents o helpthe armyin its occupationof Isfahan.72 hey informed he Britishconsul thatthey would assist in the task of 'maintainingorder'."They further nformedthe shah that they, as 'traditional bulwarks of the monarchy', had no'grievances'againstthe crown.74And they signeda secret'pactof friendship'with their long-time enemies in the south - with the Khamseh, with theBakhtiyaris,and with the governor of Fars province.75The British militaryattachereported hat this pact would win the supportof 'southernproperty-owners' since it had the common goal of resisting Tudehsubversion'.76Andthe Britishambassador xplained hat these formerrivals were willing to worktogether because they, like 'all men of property', intended to preventrevolution by creatingsome semblanceof stability n their 'feudal south'.77Similarreactionsoccurred in the capital.Six pro-Britishdailies, includingFatemi'sBakhtar, resignedfrom the FreedomFront andjoined a competingUnionof NationalNewspapers Ittihad-iJarayid-i Melli).78 nd in parliament,the events of Isfahan- rumouredto have made seven hundred casualties-became the most 'prominent' issue, over-shadowing the constitutionalproblem.79 s a result, he two conservativegroups fromthesouth, DemocratsandPatriots,brokewith theirfellow anti-courtaristocratsrom the north,theLiberals,and instead formeda new majoritybloc with the royalistsof theNational UnionFaction.These threeparties ntroduceda bill permitting ocalgovernors o imposemartial aw over industrialplants.Theyvotedtogether nthe bi-annual elections for parliamentary officers, winning a significantmajority n the vital committees, retainingMadaniof the Patriotsas DeputySpeaker,and placinga NationalUnionist,Sayyid MuhammadTabatabai,asSpeakerof the House.80They changed Sa'id's cabinet, supplantingLiberalswith new nominees of the court. And they sent a staunch anti-communistroyalistto Isfahanas governor with instructions o re-establishaw and orderat any cost, even at the cost of distributingarms to potentially dangeroustribesmen.The threefactions, moreover,workedclosely togetherin financialmatters.


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FACTIONALISM N IRAN 41When the government introduced its annual budget, the deputies fromAzerbayjan, eft out of the financecommittee,found that the allocationforTehran was twenty times more than for the whole of WesternAzerbayjan,although the population of the latter was estimated to be triple that of theformer. One deputy from Tabrizcomplained: Everytime the topicof publiceducationcomes up, you people insist that Turkish-speakingraniansmustlearn Persian. But, in actual fact, you are unwillingto spendeven the taxescollectedin Azerbayjan or buildingof schools in the same province.'8'Andwhen Sa'idproposeda bill loaningan additional um of 15 million tomans tothe war ministry,againstthe adviceof Millspaugh,he received he supportofnot only National Unionistsbut also of Patriotsand Democrats.82atemiof thePatriots,who a few months earlierhad demandeda cut in the army, nowdeclared: Unless we immediately inancean effectivemilitary,such uprisingsas occurred n Isfahancanspreadanddestroy he whole foundationsof privateproperty.'A Democrat,whose spokesmanhad been vocal in denouncingthechiefs of staff,exclaimed:'Since our house is on fire all citizensshould be infavour of a strong army. Withouta strongarmy, Iran will burn into ashes.'Meanwhile,the opposition,unable to preventthe passageof the bill, tried toturn the debate into an investigationof the entire military establishment.ATudehrepresentativentroduceda motion to set up a committeeof inquirytocashier the officerswho had desertedthe front in 1941. One of Mossadeq'ssupportersunsuccessfullyproposedto reduce conscription romtwo yearstoone year. Another argued that, according to the constitution,all nationalmatters, ncludingmilitarymatters,should be underciviliansupervision.Theassistantwar ministerreplied hatalthoughthis argumentwas correct,on thewhole, nevertheless, he fundamental aws vested the supremecommand ofthe armed forcesin thepersonof the king.At thispoint, Mossadeqwas unableto resistdeliveringa shorthistoryof the constitutionalmovementconcludingwith a veiled threat:

The shah has no rightto interferen nationalpolitics, because, accordingto the fundamental laws, the ministers, not he, are responsible toparliament. If he interferes, he can be held responsible. If he isresponsible, hen some deputieswill concludethat shahs can be changedin the same way as ministerscan be dismissed.In spiteof a lengthy debate,Said carried hroughthe bill. National Unionists,Patriots, and Democrats voted for the loan, Liberals and Independentsabstained.The TudehandIndividuals ast their votes againstthe government.The 14th Parliamenthad begunwith a general assault on the monarch. Butbeforethe offensivecouldachievelastingresults, wo of the anti-court actions,shakenby Isfahan,were voting to strengthen he royal army. The industrialworkers- the newest class of modern Iran- hadburst into the nationalarenaand thus inadvertentlypreservedthe shah, the oldest symbol of traditionalIran.The alliance between royalists and southern conservatives was furtherstrengthened n Octoberby the suddenoutbreakof the national issue in theform of an oil crisis.Duringthe preceding hirteenmonths, Soheilyand Sa'idhad been secretly negotiatingwith western oil companies for concessions inthe south-easternprovinces.The former had encouraged StandardOil and


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42 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIESStandardVacuum of the United States.83The latter,on the other hand, hadfavoured Royal Dutch Shell of Britain.84But anti-western politicians,eventuallydiscovering hese behind-the-scenes iscussions, eaked he news tothe public in August of 1944.8S The Soviet reacted, slowly but notunexpectedly,two months later by asking for equivalentprivilegesin thenorthernprovinces.Sa'id, however, was convinced that either a straight yes'or a straight 'no' would both lead to the same disastrousend, the permanentloss of the region.Heargued hat economicpenetrationwould inevitablyresultin the establishmentof 'Soviet Republics',and he felt that a rebuttalwouldencourage he Russiansto organisedissidents n Kurdistanand Azerbayjan.86He thereforerepliedevasively that all oil negotiationswould be postponeduntil the end of the world war. He confidentiallynformed he British hat hehad given an evasivereplyin order o makehis real'no'more'palatable'.87 utthe Russians, refusing to accept his answer, persisted in demanding anagreement as soon as possible, denounced him as a 'crypto-fascist',andencouraged he Tudehto hold mass ralliescallingfor his resignation.This crisis, initiatingthe Cold War in Iran long before the Cold War inEurope,consolidated he position of the shah by sharpening he differencesamong his opponents. The pro-western groups, Democrats,Patriots, andIndependents,ogetherwith theirNational Unionof Newspapersnow totalling24.editors,allied with the National UnionFactionto supportSa'id's'heroic'stand.Thepro-RussianLiberals oinedthe Tudehwith itsFreedomFrontof 26papers o denounce Sa'id as a dangerous Britishstooge'. Andthe Individualsstood on neutralground, opposingRussiandemands,refusingto supportthepro-British a'id, andinsisting hat the whole crisis had provedtheir argumentthatconcessions o one powerwould inevitably eadto demands orequivalentconcessions from rivalpowers.88The oil crisissubsided n November as suddenlyas it had arisen n October.The Russians, failing to gain a concession of their own but succeedinginpreventingthe west from obtainingtheirs, informedthe deputies that theywere willing to dropthe demandsif a more 'trustworthy'premierreplacedSa'id.89Members of parliament, especially the National Unionists, alwayshavingthe unthinkableat the back of their minds- the danger of separatistrevolts in the north- grabbedat the opportunityand withdrewtheirsupportof the government.90 he Britishmilitaryattache,who continued o back Sa'idto the veryend, explained he behaviourof the deputiesnot in termsof rationalfears but of irrational individualism':

The Persians ake a childishdelightin any such 'grown up' disease as apolitical crisis. Being individualists without loyalty, discipline, orcohesion, they are loath to sink their differences,fix upon a commonpolicy and elect leaders to carry out that policy.9'

PREMIERBAYAT,NOVEMBER1944- APRIL 1945Sa'id's downfall was precededby two weeks of searching,mostly in closedparliamentary essions, for a viable successor. It was apparent hat no pro-western candidatewould be acceptable o the Russians. It was also equallyapparent hat no pro-Russian andidatewould be acceptable o the west. The


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FACTIONALISM N IRAN 43advantage, herefore, ay with the two factionsnot closelyassociatedwith theforeignpowers- the royalistNationalUnionists nd the anti-royalistneutralistIndividuals.The Individualspromptly presented Mossadeq and graduallycollecteda majorityfor him by receivingthe full supportof the pro-SovietLiberalsand Tudehandthe half-heartedupportof theNationalUnionists.Thelatter,although hreatenedby his internalpolicies,felt thathis externalpoliciescould alleviate the fears of the foreign powers. But Mossadeq,seeing theprecariousbases of his majorityanddeterminingo retakehis seat in the majlisonce he ceased being premier, requesteda special dispensationfrom theconstitutionalclausethat obligedall membersof the executive to resigntheirpostsin the legislativebranch.92 he NationalUnionists efusedto vote for therequest arguing that it would undermine the fundamentalseparation ofpowers.The National Unionistsnow judged the time appropriate o offer theircandidate,MortezaBayat Saham al-Sultan,to the pro-BritishPatriots andDemocrats.Bayat, a staunch royalist - a participant n all of Reza Shah'sparliaments,a founding member of the court People'sParty, and an elderbrother of Ezzat Bayat in the National UnionFaction - was, nevertheless,acceptableo the southernconservativesbecausehis largefamilyestateswereconcentrated n the Britishoccupied province of Kermanshah.Musteringasmallmajority,he firstrewardedhis supportersby givingsevencabinet poststo royalistsand four to pro-Britishpoliticians.He then triedto alleviate thefears of the opposition. He stated that previous premierswere wrong tonegotiatebehind closed doors. He promisedto keepthe deputiesthoroughlyinformedof the international ituation. And he helped Mossadeqpass a lawwhich made it a criminaloffencefor any publicofficialsecretlyto discuss oilconcessions with either a foreign companyor a foreigngovernment."9Bayattook office in November with a slim majority formed of NationalUnionists ndpro-BritishDemocrats-Patriots. ut he leftoffice six months laterhavinglost the votes of all Democrats-Patriots nd of some dissidentNationalUnionists,and insteadhaving gaineda significantminoritycomposedof loyalNationalUnionists,neutralist ndividuals,andpro-SovietTudeh-Liberals. hisfundamentalchange in the bases of his support was precipitatedby theproblemof Millspaugh.Bayatdiscovered,as soon as he took charge,that hisauthoritywas disputedby this foreign 'adviser',who not only persisted inschemingto cut the militarybudget,butalso used his positionto freeze he 15million tomansrecently oaned to the war ministry.94 henew prime ministerwas facedwith the choice either of seeingthe armyfrustrated r of preparingthe early exodus of the economic mission. He chose the latter withouthesitation, ntroducing,only two weeks aftertakingoffice,a bill to withdrawthe financial powers granted to Millspaugh by parliament two yearspreviously. This promptly alienated the pro-western factions who wereconvinced that Iran would need all its foreign links to remain free of thecommunist world. But it immediatelyattracted he neutralistsand the pro-Russians, who, for some time had accused the mission for becoming adangerousbond which could eventually drag Iran into the western world.Bullard, who, a few weeks earlier, had described Bayat's cabinet as 'acollectionof decentmen', now complained hathe had no 'confidence' n thissamegovernment.9" few monthslaterhe was to describeBayatas 'one of the


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44 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIESmost stupid men in Persia'.96And the Soviet embassy, which had been soactivein bringingaboutSaid's downfall,was now willingto pursuea policyof 'non-interference'n the activitiesof the new primeminister.

Bayat,havingantagonisedhis original riends,moved rapidly urther o winover his new-found friends.He helpedthem set up a parliamentaryommitteeto investigatepro-Britishdeputies mplicatedn a scandal nvolvingthe illegalsale of importlicences to businessassociatesof SayyidZia. He replaced hegovernorof Isfahanwith a moderatewho stopped he distribution f arm's ndpermittedunionsto organiseagain.The Democratsdeclared hat thischangeofpolicy threatened o bring'anarchy'back to the city.97He was moregenerousthan thepreviouspremier n granting he Tudehpermits o hold massrallies nTehran. Indeed he used martial aw againstthe anti-communists,restrictingthe activitiesof SayyidZia'sFatherlandPartyandbanning en dailiesaffiliatedwith the Union of NationalNewspapers.The Patriotsdenounced this as an'unlawful' use of the policeto stifletheconstitutional ightof freeexpression.98He introduced an electoral bill proposingto increase the representationofTehran rom 12to 15deputies,Azerbayjanrom 15to to 20, Isfahan rom 3 to6. And he drew up the country's first labour bill, limiting work hours,regulating factory conditions, initiating paid holidays, banning the use ofchildren in industry, and guaranteeingunion rights, including the right tostrike.The conservative Ra'ad-i Emruzand Kushish,which had welcomedBayat'selection,now suddenlydiscovered hathe hadpacked hecabinetwithhis 'feudal'relativesand that he had no systematicprogrammeoreliminating'mass poverty'.99Meanwhile, the radical Rahbar, which had originallydescribedBayatas a typical'feudalist',now arguedthat with enemies such asthe reactionary Sayyid Zia he needed and deserved the friendship of allprogressives. ?00The prime minister, in initiatingan innovative strategy, was carefullycalculatingto exchange the pro-westernvotes with almost the same totalmustered by neutrals and pro-Russian deputies. He accomplished thisconversion as planned, but, unfortunately for his administration, hemiscalculatedby underestimatinghe fearsof his own fellow royalists.In theeyes of moreconservativemembersof the court faction, Bayat'spolicieswerenot daring but dangerous,not expedientbut explosive, not a reflection ofsocial-minded conservatism but of politically-motivatedadventurism,notexperimentalbut, as NasrollahFatemi has written, threateningly flirtatious'with communism.10'Theirfears,which were aroused in earlyJanuarywhenhe replaced he governorof Isfahan,and grew rapidly in Februarywhen heintroducedthe new labour bill, broke into the open in March when ademonstrationof university students, protestingagainst 'corrupt'politicians,clashed violently with the police outside the parliamentbuilding. Ra'ad-iEmruzexpressed he anxietyof manyconservativeswhen it argued hatthesestudents- describedas 'rebelswithout a legitimategrievance'who hoped toestablisha 'dictatorship f the intelligentsia' had beenencouraged ndirectlyby the lenient attitudesof the government.'02The clash instantly split Bayat'smain supporters, he National Unionists,into two separatefactions. Thirteenmembers,almost all from western andscatterednorthernconstituencies,headedby EzzatBayat,remainedoyalto theprime minister. But the other seventeen, all from central and southern


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FACIIONALISMIN IRAN 45provinces, edby Dawlatabadi f Isfahan, gnoringroyal pleas, eft and formedtheir own NationalFaction(Fraksiun-iMelli).'03They were not mere courtplacemen executingthe will of the shah. On the contrary, hey were royalistaristocratswhose independentpoliciesand fears usually but not always, as inMarch 1945, coincidedwith those of the shah. Their defectionautomaticallyjeopardised he administration. n the bi-annualelections for parliamentaryofficers,heldin mid-April, overnmentsupporters btaineda slightedgein theimportant committees, and their candidate for Speaker, MuhammadTabatabai,was re-electedwith the majorityof one singlevote over Farrukh.And threedays later,when Bayatreluctantly ame to parliamento provehismajority,he foundthat his backers NationalUnionists,Liberals, ndividuals,and Tudeh- could muster only 45 votes, while the opposition,formed ofPatriots,Democrats, ndependents, nd the new NationalFaction,was able togather48 votes. Bullard ighedwith relief that Bayat'sgovernment,which heclaimedhadbegunto 'disintegrate'ivemonthsearlier,hadfinallybeenforcedto resign.'04

PREMIERHAKIMI,APRIL-JUNE1945The resignationof Bayat began a six-week parliamentary risis. At first,thefactions obbiedfortheirown specialcandidates.TheLiberals ampaigned orQavam.The Individuals,helped by the Tudeh, ntroducedSadeqMushtasharal-Dawleh.Sadeq,who had beengenerallyrespectedbecauseof his role in theconstitutional revolution, his imprisonmentby the Britishduring the FirstWorld War,his consistentsupport orsecularreformsbeforebeingforced ntoretirementby RezaShah, was now smearedby opponentsas 'senile'mainlybecause of his activitiesas chairmanof the Soviet-IranianCulturalSociety.'05TheIndependents,meanwhile,triedto collect votes forMansural-Mulk,who,becausehe was working fairly harmoniouslywith the Russians n his capacityas governorof Khurasan,was distrustedby the Britishas 'eithera Petainor aQuisling'.'06The National Unionistsbroughtforward FathallahPakravan,asoldier turned diplomat-courtier,who hoped to make a success of Bayat's'soft' policy towardsthe Tudehand the Russians.And at the same time, theroyalistdissidents, he NationalFaction,togetherwith the Democrats-Patriots,worked on behalf of Muhsin Sadr al-Ashraf as a suitable candidate toreintroduce Sa'id's 'hard' line against the Tudehand the Soviets. Sadr, areligious udge in his eighties,hadthe notoriousreputationof being the mostconsistentlyconservativeof all conservativeadvisers o the monarch,whetherthe monarchwas a Qajaror a Pahlevi.Duringtheconstitutional evolution,hehad personallypresidedover the executionof a numberof liberal ntellectuals.And duringReza Shah'sreign, he had servedthe king both as a backbenchdeputy, andas a tough high-court udge. Bullardhad describedhim in 1943 asa 'stiffreactionaryex-mulla'.'07The factions,failingto gatherenoughvotes for their own favourites, inallysettledupon a compromisecandidate IbrahimHakim al-Mulk.As a formercourt doctor who had taken part in the constitutionalrevolution, Hakimireceived ukewarmsupport romroyalistsas well as anti-royalists.As a nativeof Azerbayjanwith old friendsamong politicians n Fars, he was acceptable


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46 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIESboth to northernersand to southerners.And as a respectable tatesmanwhohad taken care to keep his hands clean of all foreign associations,he wasbacked half-heartedly by pro-westerners, pro-Russians,and neutralists.'08Bullarddescribedhim as a 'harmless nonentity'who was 'old', 'deaf, andwithout any recent 'experience' n publicaffairs.'09Hakimi, having received an ample but tepid majority,tried to retain hissupportersby choosingministerswho were not directlyassociatedwith any ofthe parliamentary factions. He hoped to half-satisfy most by not fully-satisfying any one group. Instead he found himself dissatisfyingmost. AsBullardreported, he premier,when he returned o the majlisto obtain thenecessaryvote of confidence,was confrontedby 'generaldisapproval'."I0heLiberals,pointingout that the north was not representedn the government,opposedhim."' The Individualswithdrew theiroriginalsupport,arguingthatan 'impartial' tatesman,such as Sadeq,should have been invited to preparethe interiorministryfor the forthcoming15th Majliselections."2As a finalblow, both Democratsand Patriots,disgruntled hat none of their spokesmenhad been given ministries,refusedto continue their initialbackingfor thepremier."3The Hakimi government, therefore, ended before it had evenofficiallystarted.

PREMIERSADR, JUNE-OCTOBER 945Hakimi's ailuredrove most courtdeputies o become moreroyalist han eventhe royal family. The two court factionsfused back into the NationalUnionFaction, allied with the Democrats-Patriots, nd, underestimating he fearsexpressedby the palace,cast theirdecisivevotes for the arch-monarchist adr.Only three royalist deputies shared the concern held by the shah that theelection of such an extreme conservative could force the opposition- theliberalas well asthe radical, he neutralas well as the pro-Russian, he internalas well as the externalopposition- to take extremecountermeasures."4 adr,obtaininga majorityand a subsequent arman, packedhis supporters nto thecabinet.Of the three most importantministries,he retainedthe interior forhimself, gave the war department o its former royalist head,and handedtheforeignofficeto a pro-Britishdiplomat.The latterwas considered o be so pro-British hat the Americanembassy was soon pressing o have him removed.' sAnd of the seven less importantministries, our went to the southern factionsand threewere given to royalist politicians.Sadr returned to parliamentwith his cabinet in mid-Juneexpecting animmediate vote of approval. But, instead, he entered a long three-monthstrugglewith a determinedminorityformed of Liberals,Individuals,Tudeh,and a few dissenters from the Independentsand National Unionists.Thesefactions - outraged by the victory of an arch-conservative, earful of hiscontrol of the bureaucracy ust beforetheexpectedelections,and alarmedby apro-Britishdominance n the administration organiseda joint boycott of theassembly. And since they could jointly muster enough deputies to reduceparliamentbelow its quorum,theirboycottturned into an effective filibuster.Wheneverthe governmentcame either to ask for a vote of confidence or topresent a bill, they would file out of the chamber, thus automaticallyterminatinghe meeting.For the Britishambassadorhis was anotherproofof


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FACrIONALISM IN IRAN 47immaturityamongthe 'natives' forgettinghis earlierdiscription,he made funof newspapers hat depicted he samepremieras a 'hardened eactionary"6 -but for many Iraniansthe filibusterwas a drastic and necessarymeasuretoundo the originaldrasticand unnecessaryelectionof Sadr. In theireyes, Sadrwas not just another undesirablepremier, but was the symbol of royaldespotism,the embodimentof religious conservatism,and the epitome ofright-wing dogmatism.Their fearswere further ntensifiedas Sadrproceeded o enforcehis 'hard'line policies. Bayat'sreformbillswere withdrawn.An agreement,describedbyBullardas 'of great importance o British nterests',was negotiatedbetweenIran and the British-owned mperialBankof Persia."7And martial aw wasused in Tehran to curtail mass meetings, to ban some 48 newspapers,tooccupythe Tudehheadquarters,nd to arrestover one hundredof the party'scadres. Sadr expressed regret in his later memoirs that parliamentaryimmunity had deterredhim from detainingthe eight Tudehdeputies."8TheAmericanambassador ormedthe impression hat he was out to 'abolish theTudeh'."19n such circumstances, he oppositionfelt it had no choice but topersistin its parliamentary oycott.The filibuster tirredup a constitutional torm. The minority,championingparliamentaryrights, insisted that cabinets had no legitimacy until theyreceivedthe vote of approvalfrom the deputies.'20 he majority,resorting ocourt prerogatives,claimed that cabinetsobtainedlegal authorityfrom themomentthe royal armanwas issued.2'Forthe former, he vote was essential,the farman ceremonial;for the latter,thefarman was fundamental, he votesuperficial.Onememberof the government,who, as a colleagueof Sayyid Zia,had recently advocatedthe curtailment of court influence, now blatantlymisinterpretedhe fundamental aws to argue hatthe shahwas endowed withthe unlimited power of appointingand dismissingall cabinet ministers.'22Finding hemselveson shaky legal grounds,the majoritybloc triedto shift thedebateon to the moralrightsand wrongs of filibusteringby a minority.Theymaintained hat such behaviourhad killedparliamentaryife, was tramplingover the rightsof the public,and could encourage desperateundesirables oplot whole-scale social dissolution. The opposition retorted that'obstructionism s a vitalweapon in the hands of any parliamentaryminorityin order to defend democracy

abraham ian, e. - factionalism in iran - political groups in the 14th parliament

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