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IR - AIR OPERATIONS Part UAS

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IERM VERSION

IR – AIR OPERATIONS

PART UAS – UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS

PART UAS - CONTENTS

UAS 10 UAS Categorisation

UAS 10G UAS Risk Assessment UAS 15 UAS Operating Permit UAS 20 UAS Management UAS 25 Category 1 Operation UAS 30 Category 2 Operation UAS 35 Category 3 Operation UAS 40 Category 4 Operation

UAS.10 – UAS CATEGORISATION TOP

UAS.10.A. The Authority must categorise a UAS as Category 1 or 2, in accordance with prescribed Unmanned Aircraft System categories: (MILAVREG 7.1.a1, OAREG 7.2.1.a1)

(1) Based on a submission from the MAO

(2) Based on an airworthiness and operational recommendation.

(3) Prior to introduction into service of a UAS.

(4) When a planned change to the CRE is likely to result in a change to the approved Category of an in-service UAS.

(5) Based on risk analysis.

1. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to enable Defence UAS operations while ensuring that UAS operations are conducted safely with respect to other aircraft, people and property, without undue compromise to operational flexibility.

2. The category of a particular UAS is defined by the operational capability requirement (SOI CRE), and the mitigated consequence of catastrophic failure of the system in relation to the capacity of any part of the failed system to cause death or serious injury to personnel, or significant damage to property and other aircraft when operating in the intended CRE. For instance, a UAS is normally assigned to a Category 2 or 3 because there are deficiencies in either the design itself (relative to a Category 1 UAS) or in the available evidence to confirm the adequacy of the design. The existence of latent critical failure modes must therefore be considered almost inevitable.

3. Categorisation determination underpins UAS airworthiness and therefore should be established prior to introduction to service. Where a change in the SOI CRE or associated risk of operation increases to an in-service categorised UAS, the Authority or a delegated member is required to re-evaluate the categorisation prior to conduct of operations under the revised SOI CRE.

Prescribed Defence UAS Categories (AAP 7001.048 S2 C7A)

4. The Defence UAS Categories are:

a. Category 1 UAS:

(1) A Category 1 UAS, when operating in the intended Configuration, Role and Environment (CRE), is a system for which the outcome of a catastrophic failure can reasonably be expected to result in death or serious injury, or significant damage to property.

(2) Category 1 UAS are characterised by a requirement to operate in any class of airspace, over populated areas.


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b. Category 2 UAS:

(1) A Category 2 UAS, when operating in the intended CRE, is a system for which the outcome of a catastrophic failure may result in death or serious injury, or significant damage to property.

(2) Category 2 UAS are characterised by a requirement to operate in any class of airspace with appropriate operational restriction; including limited flight over populated areas.

c. Category 3 UAS:

(1) A Category 3 UAS, when operating in the intended CRE, is a system for which the consequence of a catastrophic failure is unlikely to result in death or serious injury, or significant damage to property.

(2) Category 3 UAS are characterised by operations in segregated airspace only, where the UA of the system has a requirement to operate over sparsely populated areas, mission essential personnel and associated property, with appropriate operational restriction.

d. Category 4 UAS:

(1) A Category 4 UAS, when operating in the intended CRE, is a system for which the consequence of a catastrophic failure can reasonably be expected not to result in death or serious injury, or significant damage to property.

(2) Category 4 UAS are characterised by the UA of the system having a collision energy contribution of less than 42 Joules, and operations confined to airspace less than 400’AGL and greater than 3 nm from an aerodrome.

AMC 1 to UAS.10.A

5. UAS provide an array of capabilities which allow commanders to exploit aviation assets without risk to human crews. The air vehicle component of a UAS is normally designed to be recovered and reused and may be classified as an Unmanned Aircraft (UA), Remotely-Piloted Aircraft (RPA) or Unmanned Aerial Target (UAT). Ballistic or semi-ballistic vehicles, cruise missiles and other guided weapons are not considered UA under this regulation. (AAP 8000.010 S2 C7)

6. The category of UAS is representative of the risk to safety presented by the operation of the UAS. Category 1 UAS airworthiness and flight operations management should be equivalent to manned aircraft. Category 2 UAS may not exhibit the same level of airworthiness as a Category 1 UAS, and therefore flight over populated areas should not be authorised as a matter of flight planning convenience. The concepts of populated and sparsely populated areas, as employed in the definitions of Category 2 and 3 UAS, are used to guide operational risk determinations against people and property on the ground, and are defined in the glossary.

7. The Authority should be provided with sufficient information to make a categorisation determination. The primary determinant between UAS categories is the risk of injury to ground-based personnel, either General Public (GP) or Mission Essential Personnel (MEP). The following five requirements provide sufficient information to indicate the potential for risk to ground-based personnel and hence determine which UAS category will be the most appropriate:

a. Population Descriptions. Information on expected population groups is essential for characterising the risk presented by the UAS to personnel. Greater fidelity in the information will improve this characterisation, although a pragmatic balance between clarity and complexity should be pursued. For example, characterising population groups using ‘people per square kilometre’ can be misleading because it may not emphasise dense population centres, eg sports stadiums, schools and bodies of troops, where a UAS crash would be much more likely to cause fatalities. Where the precise areas for operation of the UAS are not yet known, proposed most likely and worst case scenarios should be presented.

b. Flight Profiles. Flight profile information including: take-off and landing cycles, mission duration, durations of operational phases, eg loiter, transit, and duration of flight near or over people. When used with the above population descriptions, the risk to personnel can be characterised.

c. Facilities. Significant facilities subjected to a hazard by the UAS, should be identified. The US military document RCC 323–99—Range Safety Criteria for Unmanned Air Vehicles, Rationale and Methodology Supplement, provides useful guidance on this topic, suggesting damage to a facility or property could result in one or more of the following severe consequences:

(1) loss or degradation of a major function,

(2) significant monetary loss,


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(3) significant environmental impact and/or cultural impeach.

d. Ships. Where a UAS is to be operated over water, information on the numbers and types of civilian and military ships subjected to a hazard by the UAS should be provided.

e. Airspace Requirements. Airspace access requirements are a key driver of the functionality and integrity of UAS systems, and need to be comprehensively disclosed.

8. The Authority may publish minimum airworthiness design requirements, safety targets, population density and any additional guidance to enable quantitative or qualitative assessment of the airworthiness of a given UAS.

AMC 2 to UAS.10.A – Category 1 and Category 2 Determinations

9. An airworthiness/operational recommendation to the Authority (through DACPA) to categorise a UAS as either Category 1 or 2 requires robust analysis of the planned operating environment, known/planned airworthiness capabilities, any planned operational restrictions and the resultant potential for a catastrophic failure of the UAS to result in death, serious injury, or significant damage to property. Documents that may assist a categorisation or a re-categorisation recommendation include: (AAP 7001.048 S5 C3)

a. SOI.

b. UAS Risk Analysis or equivalent document.

c. AAMP or equivalent document.

d. ATMP.

e. UASOP.

f. Other Authority approved OIP.

10. A Category 2 UAS is more likely to suffer catastrophic failure than a Category 1 UAS as it is generally of lower design integrity. A UAS is normally assigned to Category 2 because there are deficiencies in either the design itself (relative to a Category 1 UAS) or in the available evidence to confirm the adequacy of the design. Risk may be eliminated or otherwise minimised SFARP by limiting the exposure of people and property to the risk, which in turn is achieved by limiting where a Category 2 UAS can operate.

11. By definition, with appropriate operational limitations, a Category 2 UAS can operate limited flight over GP. However, a robust airworthiness basis for estimating the risk presented by a Category 2 UAS flying over people has not yet been identified. Accordingly, an airworthiness assessment of the risk posed by a Category 2 UAS is limited to flight near (not over) people, and would communicate: (a) the bounds within which the UAS meets any agreed Safety Targets; and (b) the extent of the airworthiness contribution to risks to GP/MEP being reduced so far as is reasonably practicable.

12. Category 2 potentially covers a wide breadth of UAS sizes and capabilities. However, Category 2 will typically be restricted to larger more capable UAS designed to higher levels of design integrity than Category 3 UAS. Lower integrity UAS will probably not meet agreed Safety Targets without being separated so far from GP that they essentially become a Category 3 UAS. Given that Category 2 UAS will be proposed to operate on an enduring basis in non-benign environments, eg outside restricted Defence bases, for long periods in close vicinity of people on the ground, the consequences of a crash could be considerable. A systematic process is therefore required to identify, analyse and treat all risks to people (both MEP and GP) on the ground.

AMC 3 to UAS.10.A – In-service UAS CRE Change Management.

13. UAS airworthiness categorisation is used to determine the level of airworthiness oversight applied to the design, construction, maintenance and operation of the UAS. The airworthiness category of a particular UAS is based on the SOI CRE and on the mitigated consequence of catastrophic failure of the system in relation to the capacity for any part of the failed system to cause death or serious injury to personnel, or significant damage to property, when operating in the intended CRE. Should changes to the intended CRE be contemplated, the effects on categorisation must be reassessed.


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UAS.10.B. The MAO must categorise a UAS as Category 3, in accordance with prescribed Unmanned Aircraft System categories: (MILAVREG 7.1.a2, OAREG 7.2.1.a2)

(1) With airworthiness and operational recommendations.

(2) Prior to commencement of operations.

(3) When a planned change to the CRE is likely to result in a change to the approved Category of an in-service UAS.


AMC 1 to UAS.10.B –Category 3 Determinations

1. Category 3 UAS present a reduced level of risk to property and people though the application of controls such as segregation of airspace and operating over sparsely populated areas. Through the application of this regulatory requirement the operational retention of risk to safety for the operation of Category 3 has been determined to be appropriate.

2. Similar to Category 2 UAS, a Category 3 UAS is also characterised by its limited adoption of aerospace design standards and as a result, the probability of failure or partial performance of the design is greater than for a Category 1 UAS. However, since Category 3 UAS are limited to segregated airspace and operations over sparsely populated areas or MEP only; this may offset, to some extent, the safety risk due to the lower levels of design integrity than Category 1 or 2 UAS.

AMC 2 to UAS.10.B – In-service UAS CRE Change Management.

3. UAS airworthiness categorisation is used to determine the level of airworthiness oversight applied to the design, construction, maintenance and operation of the UAS. The airworthiness category of a particular UAS is based on the SOI CRE and on the mitigated consequence of catastrophic failure of the system in relation to the capacity for any part of the failed system to cause death or serious injury to personnel, or significant damage to property, when operating in the intended CRE. Should changes to the intended CRE be contemplated, the effects on categorisation must be reassessed.

UAS.10.C. The MAO must categorise a UAS as Category 4, in accordance with prescribed Unmanned Aircraft System categories: (MILAVREG 7.1.b, MILAVREG 7.1.c4, OAREG 7.2.1.a2)

(1) Prior to commencement of operations.


AMC 1 to UAS.10.C –Category 4 Determinations

1. Category 4 UAS should pose an insignificant risk to other aircraft, people and property Where operational requirements exist for Category 4 UAS to operate within 3 nm of an aerodrome or above 400 ft AGL, this may not automatically preclude a UAS from inclusion in Category 4. The flexibility provisions presented at AMC to UAS.40.A provide further guidance.

UAS.10.D. The Defence Organisation Head seeking to introduce a Category 1 or 2 UAS to Defence service must seek categorisation of the UAS IAW UAS.10.A. (MILAVREG 7.1.e)

1. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that UAS certification processes are employed that are commensurate with the risk to personnel, other aircraft and property.

2. Defence UAS airworthiness management is predicated on UAS being correctly categorised in accordance with the UAS Categorisation system. Part UAS requires that UAS operations are conducted SFARP regarding risk to personnel, other aircraft and property. The level of rigour applied to the certification process is intrinsic to achieving the intended UAS category and CRE. Timely and appropriate engagement with the applicable Authority delegate is an important consideration of this process, and is essential to achieving the intended capability. (AAP 7001.048 S5 C3)


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AMC 1 to UAS.10.D

3. The airworthiness instrument application process for new aircraft type can be useful to an organisation acquiring UAS; however, the degree to which they are applied will vary depending on the UAS Category. Applicants intending to introduce a Defence UAS into service need to understand the level of risk posed by the operation of the system and correctly categorise the UAS to ensure an appropriate level of airworthiness oversight is applied.

4. The introduction into service process for Category 1 and 2 UAS is shown in Figure UAS-1.

FIGURE UAS-1. INTRODUCTION INTO SERVICE PROCESS FOR CATEGORY 1 AND 2 UAS.

5. A Defence organisation submitting a categorisation application should provide a compilation of supporting documentation as proofs for the categorisation determination including:

a. An SOI which describes the intended CRE applicable to the UAS operation.

b. An AAMP , including any risk mitigation strategy proposed for the UAS.

c. Reference to, or documentation of, an ATMP that will control the airspace management procedures for where the UA is to be operated and how the UA is to be operated in conjunction with other military and/or civilian aircraft.

d. A covering document which identifies the proposed airworthiness categorisation and references any relevant supporting justification.

AMC 2 to UAS.10.D –Categorisation 1 or 2 application process

6. The following process can allow processing of a categorisation application for a new UAS:

a. An applicant seeking to introduce a UAS to Defence service prepares an application to be submitted to the Authority’s airworthiness delegate, with an information copy provided the relevant operational delegate and DACPA.

b. With the advice of Authority’s airworthiness delegate, the applicant submits the application to the relevant operational delegate. The Authority’s operational delegate, once satisfied, will make the recommendation to the Authority (through DACPA) to categorise the UAS as Category 1 or 2. Applications for the operation of Category 1 or 2 UAS will be endorsed by the operational and airworthiness delegates prior to submission to the Authority.

c. If satisfied, the Authority will endorse the AAMP as acceptable for the airworthiness management of the system. Note – For category 2 UAS, the operational delegate, with recommendation from the airworthiness delegate, may then recommend the Authority issue a UASOP.

SOI (Cat 1& 2)

AAMP

ATMP

Cat 1 UAS

Categorisation

Cat 2 UAS UASOP

Airworthiness Instrument & MAOC

Introduction into Service


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UAS.10.E. A Defence Organisation Head seeking to introduce a Category 3 UAS to Defence service must seek categorisation of the UAS IAW DASR UAS.10.B. (MILAVREG 7.1.f)

1. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that UAS certification processes are employed that are commensurate with the risk to personnel, other aircraft and property.

2. Defence UAS airworthiness management is predicated on UAS being correctly categorised in accordance with the UAS Categorisation system. Part UAS requires that UAS operations are conducted with risk to personnel, other aircraft and property eliminated or otherwise minimised SFARP. The level of rigour applied to the certification process is intrinsic to achieving the intended UAS category and CRE. Timely and appropriate engagement with the applicable operational delegate is an important consideration of this process, and is essential to achieving the intended capability.

AMC 1 to UAS.10.E

3. The airworthiness instrument application process for new aircraft type can be useful to an organisation acquiring UAS; however, the degree to which they are applied will vary depending on the UAS Category. Applicants intending to introduce a Defence UAS into service need to understand the level of risk posed by the operation of the system and correctly categorise the UAS to ensure an appropriate level of airworthiness oversight is applied.

4. The introduction into service process for Category 3 UAS is shown in Figure UAS-2. (AAP 7001.048 S5 C3)

FIGURE UAS-2. INTRODUCTION INTO SERVICE PROCESS FOR CATEGORY 3 UAS

UAS.10.F. The Defence Organisation Head seeking to introduce a Category 4 UAS to Defence service must seek categorisation of the UAS IAW DASR UAS.10.C. (MILAVREG 7.1.g)

1. Defence UAS airworthiness management is predicated on UAS being correctly categorised in accordance with the UAS Categorisation system. Part UAS requires that UAS operations are conducted SFARP regarding risk to personnel, other aircraft and property. Defence organisations should seek guidance from the relevant operational delegate prior to Category 4 UAS acquisitions.

AMC 1 to UAS.10.F

2. As the consequence of a catastrophic failure for a Category 4 UAS when operating in the intended CRE can reasonably be expected not to result in death or serious injury, or significant damage to property, there is no need to apply an airworthiness instrument application process as per other UAS categories; however, if desired the applicant may choose to utilise a UASOP to control multiples of Category 4 UAS under the one instrument.

3. The introduction into service process for Category 4 UAS is shown in figure UAS-3. (AAP 7001.048 S5 C3)

FIGURE UAS-3. INTRODUCTION INTO SERVICE PROCESS FOR CATEGORY 4 UAS


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UAS.10.G. UAS Categorisation must be supported by a risk analysis. (OAREG 7.1.3.a)

1. A UAS risk analysis should be conducted against the risk to other aircraft, people and property. With respect to people, use of first, second and third party can help assure identification of risk. As Unmanned Aircraft (UA) do not carry people unless Authority approval is granted, first party will not normally apply. Second party is considered to be Mission Essential Personnel. Third party is considered to be the General Public.

2. The process used to identify and manage operational risks should be consistent with approved Defence aviation risk management (AVRM) processes, or otherwise as prescribed by the responsible delegate. The risk assessment areas for each phase of flight that should be addressed include:

a. mission essential personnel

b. the general public

c. property

d. other aircraft.

3. For ease of analysis, the risks may be broken down into phases of flight:

a. launch

b. transit

c. operating area

d. transit

e. recovery.

4. Risk analysis of a Category 1, 2 or 3 UAS supports the case for categorisation, therefore the risk analysis will require updating as the SOI CRE changes.

AMC 1 to UAS.10.G - Risk Analysis General Guidelines (AAP 7001.048 S5 C3A)

5. A risk analysis not only informs the categorisation process, it also informs and supports the issue of a Type Certificate (Cat 1 UAS) or UASOP (Category 2 and 3 UAS). This AMC provides a single repository for risk analysis guidance covering all of these purposes. Consequently, the expectation is that the risk analysis guidance in this AMC will be scaled depending on its intended purpose. For example, a request for categorisation would, in most cases, be informed by an abbreviated risk analysis that covers only a few elements of this AMC. A UASOP request for a small Category 3 UAS might also extract only the relevant elements of this AMC. A UASOP request for a Category 2 UAS, on the other hand, might employ the entirety of this AMC.

6. UAS Risk Analysis. The UAS Risk Analysis (RA) is a mechanism that may be used to achieve the robust identification, analysis, evaluation and proposed treatment (eg mitigation, retention, etc) of UAS risk to other aircraft, people and property. It encompasses:

a. risks posed by the system in the context of the intended roles and environment documented in the SOI

b. risk to other aircraft, people and property anticipated to be in the area of operations

c. risks due to systems carried by the UA that may endanger other aircraft, people and property during all phases of operation (both normal or abnormal operations), for example, laser designation systems. Importantly, when assessing the failure modes of the system and the associated risks, the most hazardous activity forms the basis for consideration in determining the categorisation of the system.

7. Principle for conducting UAS risk analysis. The certification approach for a UAS is different to that for a manned aircraft, and focuses on the safety risk to other aircraft and people and property on the ground in the event of a failure or partial performance of the design. People on the ground are categorised as either:

a. Mission Essential Personnel: those personnel who are necessary to safely and successfully launch, operate and recover the UAS, plus those Defence personnel declared/identified by the Authority as essential to the operation in which the UAS is participating, eg ground troops; or

b. General Public: those people who are not declared/identified by the Authority as MEP. This includes the public, Defence personnel not essential to a mission, visitors, and personnel/dependents living on the base/facility.


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8. The above definitions allow a different level of safety risk tolerance for each population group; particularly given that the GP may be unaware of the hazards they are involuntarily exposed to as a result of UAS operations in their vicinity. The Authority may choose to define alternative or additional groups to those above depending on the circumstances, and if so, the Authority’s definitions should be used in the safety risk assessment.

9. Risk to Mission Essential Personnel. At some point during Defence operation, a UAS is likely to suffer from catastrophic failures that limit or preclude continued safe flight. Depending on the nature of the failure, the likely outcomes are an attempted emergency landing under control or an uncontrolled ground impact. Common civilian definitions for these two scenarios are as follows:

a. Unpremeditated descent scenario. A failure (or combination of failures) which results in the inability to maintain a safe altitude above the surface, eg loss of power, weight/altitude/temperature (WAT) limits.

b. Loss of control scenario. A failure (or combination of failures) which results in loss of control and may lead to impact at high velocity.

10. A key differentiator is that the former should allow the UAS on-board systems and/or the operator to guide the UAS to a safer landing location, whereas the latter will probably provide no opportunity for choosing the landing location. While the latter scenario will often result in impact at high velocity, design features such as parachutes may be employed to reduce kinetic energy.

11. Whilst operating over MEP, a forced landing or crash of a UAS would present a hazard to MEP. For the Authority to understand the magnitude of this risk and therefore whether risk avoidance or reduction measures are warranted, it is important to establish the likelihood of serious injury or fatality to MEP for the roles and operating environments. With few exceptions, operations over MEP require the Authority’s retention of a level of safety risk to MEP. Therefore, and regardless of apparently favourable outcomes for any risk analysis, the Authority will adopt a cautious approach while evaluating UAS operations proposed to be carried out over MEP, particularly when large groups are involved, and in any case will ensure the risk is reduced SFARP.

12. Calculating the risk to MEP as a result of an unpremeditated descent is usually a function of the following elements:

a. the likelihood of a UAS system failure leading to an unpremeditated descent;

b. the ability of on-board systems to sense the failure and autonomously guide the UAS to a safe landing location;

c. the controllability and likely range of the UAS following likely system failures throughout each phase of flight; and

d. the availability of safe locations, away from MEP and facilities, in which to complete the forced landing.

13. Calculating the risk to MEP as a result of the loss of control of the UAS is a function of the following elements:

a. the likelihood of a catastrophic UAS system failure leading to the UAS departing flight (including structural failures, jammed actuators, and software faults in flight critical systems);

b. the size of the danger area under the UAS, recognising that some failure mode, eg a departing wing, will probably result in the UAS dropping straight to the ground, while others, eg a stuck actuator, may result in the UAS crashing some distance laterally;

c. the distribution of MEP within this danger area for each phase of flight, which could be estimated as follows:

(1) the information could be gleaned directly from the SOI if the required fidelity of information has been included in that document; or

(2) the Authority’s airworthiness delegate could derive, from discussions with operators, the most likely operating scenarios and the most hazardous operating scenario, eg an exercise with a high population of Defence staff, with the UAS flying in close proximity, and for each scenario present an estimate of the likelihood of injury/death of a Defence member;

14. An analysis of the risk to MEP as a result of a UAS ‘fly-away’ or ‘escape’ is also required, i.e. where a UAS has departed from its assigned area and is not responding to operator control. This might intuitively appear unnecessary, since the risk to MEP due to an unpremeditated descent or loss of control, is likely to substantially exceed the risk due to an escape. While this may often be true, this analysis imposes little additional burden and ensures a more comprehensive assessment of all sources of risk.

15. Risk to General Public. There are numerous ways in which a UAS can present risk to members of the GP that will warrant an appropriate level of engineering assessment. For example:


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a. Whilst the UA might spend the vast majority of its time well away from the GP, some operations may be near/over the GP, eg. during take-off/landing; short transits; or surveillance operations.

b. Even where the UAS is to be used solely within a restricted Defence range, the UAS is likely to have an endurance that is well beyond the size of the range. A UAS system fault may result in the UAS exiting the range and presenting a hazard to the GP.

c. An operator’s ability to keep the UA away from the GP and facilities (including ships) is dependent on the UAS and the operator being presented with navigation and status information of suitable integrity.

d. An operator’s ability to effectively de-conflict with other aircraft depends on the integrity of UAS technical airworthiness equipment, eg navigation equipment, IFF, data link, lights.

16. For the Authority to be informed as to the magnitude of this risk and therefore whether risk avoidance or reduction measures are warranted, the likelihood of serious injury or fatality to the GP for the roles and operating environments presented in the SOI should be established. As previously discussed in AMC 2 to UAS.10.A, a airworthiness assessment of a non-Category 1 UAS operation over GP is currently indeterminable. However, appropriate risk analysis can support operations close to GP. Note that the risk to the GP due to a UAS escape requires particular attention, especially for long range UAS where an escape can often present a hazard to major population centres.

17. The inputs to the RA should be ideally derived by the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) of the UAS, in conjunction with operational requirements and an initial SOI provided by Defence. The RA should include consideration of both airworthiness and operational risks. In addition, to allow the Authority to target any risk avoidance or other treatment measures, the RA should be broken into the different phases of flight, for example take-off/launch, transit/mission and landing/recovery.

18. Since both airworthiness and operational issues contribute to the UAS Risk Analysis, each is examined separately below.

19. Airworthiness. The airworthiness element of the risk analysis should consider those critical factors that may impact the design integrity of the system. These may include:

a. Flight control system failure.

b. Engine Failure.

c. Autonomous Recovery Systems/Flight Termination Systems failure.

d. Positional information system failure.

e. Failure of any component of the ground based infrastructure critical to the operation of the system.

f. Data link failure.

g. Launch and recovery systems failure.

20. Airworthiness risks should be identified through the application of a system safety process acceptable to the Authority’s airworthiness delegate.

21. Operations. The Operational element of the Risk Analysis should identify those critical operational factors which may impact safety. These may include:

a. Mid air collision resulting from inadequate mission planning or operator induced error.

b. Controlled flight into terrain.

c. Uncontrolled flight into people on the ground and/or property.

d. Loss of control through operation outside approved limits.

e. Incorrect use of on-board mission systems e.g. laser designation systems.

22. The RA may provide support for:

a. UAS categorisation or re-categorisation determination process.

b. Determine appropriate operational restriction.

c. Development of an ATMP.

d. The issue of an appropriate airworthiness instrument.


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23. The process used to identify operational risks should be consistent with Defence approved risk management processes. An Initial Operational Risk Analysis for a Potential Category 2 UAS example is available on the ACPA website.

24. ATMP. An ATMP is part of the operational RA process to address the specific risks of collision with other airspace users. Operational or airspace limitations may be considered in the analysis; however, where it is impractical to consider these factors in absolute terms, the ATMP development may need to consider:

a. Mid–air collision risk analysis. Depending on the complexity of the UAS and the intended area of operations, the ATMP may consider mid-air collision risks; however, the difficulty of modelling the likelihood may require the risk to be considered in absolute, worst case terms, i.e. the likelihood that a collision will occur is assumed to be certain if the aircraft is operating within a certain density level or volume of airspace. Similar to ground impact, it may also be possible to model the likelihood of a mid-air collision event. However, this type of modelling is considerably more complicated than that available for ground impact risk because it is necessary to:

(1) model space in three dimensions

(2) consider the speed of both the aircraft and RPA

(3) consider the respective trajectories of each in terms of head-on, following or some crossing angle

(4) consider the reliability and effectiveness of any collision avoidance systems fitted to the aircraft and/or RPA.

b. Mathematical modelling. It might be possible to mathematically model the risk posed by a UAS. The extent of mathematical modelling would depend on the category of the UAS and its intended operating environment. Where historic accident data or quality design data is not available for modelling the risk posed by a UAS, estimates may need to be based on judicious assumptions. For example, data from similar UAS categories may form a suitable basis. The Authority acknowledges that the calculation of individual and collective risk to different population groups will likely employ numerous assumptions and probability-based mathematical modelling techniques. This is acceptable, provided the resultant evaluation against any agreed Safety Targets makes appropriate allowance for sensitivity and uncertainty. Care needs to be taken, however, in drawing unsubstantiated conclusions on the safety of a UAS based on the outcomes of mathematical modelling. Further, some UAS failure modes, such as software assurance and software safety shortfalls, are not well suited to mathematical modelling via probabilistic methods.

25. Risk Mitigation. There are several means available to reduce the risk posed by a UAS to other aircraft, people and property:

a. Design mitigation. Design mitigation concerns the application of appropriate rigour to the design and construction process such that system’s likelihood of catastrophic failure is known and controlled. Through the application of more rigorous design standards, or integration of systems designed to support safe operation, the likelihood of failure can be reduced.

b. Operational mitigation. Operational mitigation concerns the application of restrictions and limitations to the operating environment of the system. This may include such measures as limiting operation to exclusive airspace, over designated ground safety template or restricting flight over populated areas.

c. Systemic mitigation. Systemic mitigation concerns the application of regulatory standards to organisations involved in the design, construction, maintenance and operation of the system. Systemic mitigation is designed to reduce the occurrence of organisational and human errors which can contribute to failure of a system. Systemic mitigation supports both the design and operational mitigation, and assures an appropriate level of safety of activities supporting the ongoing airworthiness of the system.

26. UAS Acquisition. Where a new UAS is to be developed to meet emerging operational requirements the risk mitigation measures should be specifically designed to maximise the operational capability of the system in the required roles and environment. For example, where the operating environment includes operations over populated areas and/or within airspace occupied by other users, the design (including airworthiness standards) should be appropriately specified to include all required on board safety systems and an appropriate level of design rigour. Alternatively, systems may be developed that inherently (due to very small size and overall design) pose an insignificant risk to other airspace users and personnel and property on the ground and therefore do not need on-board safety systems or the same level of design rigour.

27. The acquisition of an existing UAS limits the level of mitigation that can be applied because the design of the system, and therefore its likelihood of failure, will be more or less fixed. Where Defence requires a system to operate in a role and environment against which the system has already been certified, then appropriate design mitigation may


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have already been applied. However, where Defence seeks to expand the operational role of an existing UAS, modification of the system or operational restrictions may be the only avenues open to the Authority to enable operations.

AMC 2 to UAS.10.G – Category 1 UAS Guidelines

28. Category 1 UAS are intended to operate in all classes of airspace, both Civil and Military administered, with flight over populated areas and therefore require the ability to act and respond as manned aircraft do

29. A Risk/consequence summary derived from an analysis of the risk of a ‘potential’ Category 1 UAS (when operated in its planned SOI CRE), should arrive at the outcome that the consequence of a catastrophic failure of a Category 1 UAS will be death, serious injury or significant damage to property. The purpose of such an assessment is to assure that Category 1 UAS risk is treated with clarity.

30. Notwithstanding, all risks should be eliminated or otherwise minimised SFARP, such that the likelihood of a catastrophic event would be considered rare and the subsequent risk is low for safety.

31. Airworthiness Design. To undertake its role, in addition to requiring high integrity design for safety-of-flight systems (similar to manned aircraft), a potential Category 1 UAS may have:

a. Approved navigation and communication capability; (ability to navigate and communicate IAW ICAO rules with an appropriate level of redundancy). Key factors include:

(1) The ability of the UA to be controlled by a ‘remote pilot’.

(2) Ability to act as a communications relay between remote pilot and ATC.

(3) Transaction time and continuity of communications link.

(4) Required navigation performance.

(5) Timeliness of UA response to ATC instructions.

b. Approved means of self separation and/or collision avoidance or Certified detect and avoid capability. Detect and avoid is the ability of a UAS to remain well clear and avoid collisions with other airborne traffic, terrain and potentially weather. A Detect and avoid1 system should have the ability to:

(1) Detect traffic and avoid collisions.

(2) Identify and avoid terrain.

(3) Identify and avoid severe weather.

c. Approved Recovery/ Launch system may have the:

(1) ability to launch and recover from joint user aerodromes (military/civilian) complying with traffic flow and regulation.

(2) ability to recognise and understand aerodrome signs, markings and lighting; whilst providing visual separation from other aircraft and vehicles.

(3) ability to recover UA safely under abnormal/emergency conditions (loss-link, power plant failure etc).

d. Approved operators and maintenance personnel.


32. Category 2 UAS are intended to operate in any class of Airspace, civil or military administered, with appropriate operational restriction, including limited flight over populated areas.

33. The risk/consequence summary derived from an initial analysis of the risk of a ‘potential’ Category 2 UAS (when operated in its planned SOI CRE), should arrive at the outcome that a catastrophic failure of the Category 2 UAS may result in death, serious injury or significant damage to property. The purpose of such an assessment is intended to assure that Category 2 UAS risk is treated with clarity.

1 Detect and avoid provides the intended functions of self-separation and collision avoidance as a means of compliance with regulatory requirements to “see and avoid” compatible with expected behaviour of aircraft operating in the airspace system. UA operations beyond line of sight may require an automated detect and avoid system due to potential communication latencies or failures. This ability need not be organic to the UAS. Potential detect and avoid options include terrestrial (ie ATC/Surveillance) or airborne (ie AEW&C or chase/escort aircraft) systems.


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34. The risk treatments should eliminate or otherwise minimise risk SFARP, such that the likelihood of a catastrophic event occurring is rare for peacetime operations2 and the subsequent risk is low for safety.

35. The ACPA web site provides an example of an initial operational risk analysis to support risk assessment and categorisation determination of a potential Category 2 UAS. This example is not meant to provide a comprehensive template; rather, it identifies many issues that require critical evaluation if a UAS is to be used in an airspace and ground environment that would normally be the province of a Category 1 UAS.

36. Airworthiness design. Some UAS designs may not meet all the certification requirements of a Category 1 UAS. However, the reasons for desiring a Category 2 UAS over a Category 1 may range from value for money to an absence of other UAS being able to achieve Defence capability requirements. Therefore in addition to Defence UAS data, it may be necessary to consider other existing UAS certifications and/or data from other NAA/MAAs when undertaking an airworthiness analysis.

37. For Category 2 UAS where the design integrity cannot be assured against an approved airworthiness standard, or the design integrity of the system cannot be assured through certification in the manner of a Category 1 UAS, the Authority will determine appropriate operational restrictions to manage the risks that the UA will pose to other aircraft, people and property and then apply risk mitigations via the UASOP and/or other OIP. A Category 2 UAS may have:

a. Approved navigation and communication capability suitable for any airspace (as per Category 1 UAS), or operational restriction and mitigation measures to enable operation in the required airspace;

b. Approved means of self separation and/or collision avoidance or Certified detect and avoid capability (as per Category 1 UAS), or operational restriction and mitigation measures to enable separation in the required airspace, such as Air Traffic services (ATS) in controlled airspace;

c. Operational restrictions and mitigation measures to protect persons on the ground from UAS failures that lead to uncontrolled ground impacts;

d. Approved recovery/launch system (as per Category 1 UAS) or appropriate operational restriction; and

e. Approved operators (as per Category 1 UAS) or suitably trained operators restricted to operate in specific airspace only, and approved maintenance personnel (as per Category 1 UAS).

f. Suitably trained and authorised maintenance personnel.

38. Populated Areas. Where limited flight over a populated area is required for completion of essential mission objectives by a Category 2 UAS, specific operational restrictions and limitations will be applied to ensure the risk of a catastrophic failure that may result in death, serious injury or significant damage to property, particularly third party (general public), will be low by treating the likelihood of such an event being able to occur.

39. The intent of the regulation is that a Category 2 UAS should maintain its operations over sparsely populated areas, and only fly over populated areas by exception. Examples where limited flight over populated areas may be permitted are:

a. Sensor limitations of the UAS require extended loiter over a populated area to achieve an essential National security objective.

b. A limited series of UA launches/recoveries, in support of a Defence joint exercise will require short duration transit overhead populated areas on arrival/ departure, because there are no alternative reasonably practicable launch/recovery sites that do not require overflight of populated areas.

c. A limited series of short duration transits over populated areas are required to access an operating area for essential training and there are no reasonably practicable alternative routes that avoid overflight of populated areas.

40. Each of the above examples exhibits a common theme, namely that there is an overriding and substantial capability imperative for flying over the general public. Further, all reasonably practicable steps would have been considered to reduce the general public’s risk exposure. Where such an argument cannot be mounted, either the flights should not be authorised or a Category 1 UAS should be employed. Loitering over populated areas for training purposes, for example, is reserved for Category 1 UAS.

41. Ultimately, Category 2 operations over the general public involve a measure of risk retention, and this retention should be an exception rather than a routine occurrence.

2 Higher risk levels may be tolerable for some Category 2 UAS operations (warlike conditions, Counter Terrorism, etc) and would be authorised by the appropriate authority.


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42. Category 3 UAS are only permitted to operate in Segregated Airspace, over Sparsely Populated areas and over Mission Essential Personnel and associated Property3, with appropriate operational restriction.

43. The risk/consequence summary derived from an analysis of the risk of a potential Category 3 UAS, when operated in its SOI CRE, should arrive at the outcome that a catastrophic failure of a Category 3 UAS is unlikely to result in death, serious injury or significant damage to property. The combination of Segregated Airspace operations, flight over sparsely populated areas and flight above mission essential personnel and property combined with airworthiness assurance and operational mitigations (UASOP, ATMP) should be part of risk management that eliminates or otherwise minimises risk SFARP.

44. Sparsely Populated Areas. Flight over Sparsely Populated Areas is essential for completion of mission objectives by a Category 3 UAS; however, specific operational restrictions may be applied by the Authority to the respective UASOP to ensure the UAS presents risk reduced SFARP to people and property on the ground.

45. Segregated Airspace. In considering the risk that UAS operations present to other airspace users the term segregated airspace is used. Segregated Airspace is airspace of specified dimensions allocated for use by a UA. Mixing of other aircraft (manned or unmanned) and a UA within a Segregated Airspace intended for use by the UA should be avoided. Specific operational restrictions pertaining to UA flight within Segregated Airspace (sustained, limited or otherwise), should be identified within the ATMP to ensure the UAS presents risk reduced SFARP to other airspace users. Airspace Control Measures (ACM) may be used to facilitate the containment means of a Category 3 UAS within Segregated Airspace. 4

46. Additional considerations for segregated airspace include air traffic density, particularly if the UAS airspace is other than controlled airspace, as other aircraft may be able to enter the airspace volume without a clearance. Danger Areas designed for General Aviation (GA) transit and similar flight paths should be avoided. Importantly, the see and avoid principle is a main safety defence for any shared UAS airspace and the inclusion of UAS active strobe lights to enhance visibility could enhance safety.

47. The Authority will need to be assured that Category 3 UAS operations will remain within the allocated Segregated Airspace by assessing expected performance versus required performance and determine the level of confidence that an airspace incursion will not occur. Factors that may affect the performance of the UAS include:

a. communications performance

b. controller experience

c. maturity of procedures.

48. For example, a UAS is allocated Segregated Airspace volume of 10nm x 10nm. An assessment of the level of performance and confidence of the UA’s ability to remain confined to that airspace volume is conducted. Due to a reduced level of confidence (based on, for example, inexperienced controllers), in order to provide an adequate airspace buffer in the event of degradation in expected navigation performance, the UA may be further constrained to operate within a reduced airspace volume of 5nm x 5nm thereby reducing the risk of the UAS exiting the Segregated Airspace volume via a 5nm buffer.

49. Category 3 UAS whilst limited to operations over sparsely populated areas, may have a requirement to operate over mission essential personnel and associated property. The Authority’s relevant operational delegate will need to ensure that the operational restriction applied to a Category 3 UAS operation results in risk reduced SFARP in keeping with its categorisation.

50. Category 3 UAS should have:

a. flight control, navigation and communication capability with appropriate redundancy that enable safe operation within the Segregated Airspace, and/or over sparsely populated areas or MEP,

b. suitably trained and authorised operations personnel, and

c. suitably trained and authorised maintenance personnel where maintenance is required on the platform.

3 Personnel and associated property whose conduct or presence is essential to the successful execution of an operational or military training UAS mission (e.g. supported troops, critical infrastructure, survivors from a SAR task, UA launch/recovery equipment/ personnel etc). 4 The Joint Airspace Coordination Centre (JACC) at HQJOC may provide guidance for the implementation of airspace ACM that can achieve segregated airspace requirements.


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AMC 5 to UAS.10.G – UAS Category 4 Energy Calculation (AAP 8000.010 S10 C1)

51. Category 4 UAS are characterised by the UA of the system having a collision energy contribution of less than 42 Joules.

52. Although the design integrity of the system cannot be assured through certification, when the UA has an energy assessment of 42 Joules5 or less, the risk of serious injury or damage caused by the UA is low. The consequence of catastrophic failure for Category 4 UAS is the expected outcome when operating a UA with a physical size constraint (<42J) and operationally restricting the UA away from other airspace users (as per CASA rules for model aircraft flying).

53. The calculation of collision energy contribution maybe calculated using the Kinetic Energy equation - ½ x Mass x Velocity2. For example, a calculation to determine the maximum velocity a 1kg UA can operate at to be appropriately categorised at a Category 4 UAS is as follows:

a. 42 Joules= 0.5 x 1kg x Velocity2

b. Therefore:- Velocity = 9.17m/s or 33km/hr

54. In this example, 1 kg UAS cannot have the ability to travel faster than 33km/hr to be appropriately categorised as a Category 4 UAS.

5 Clothier, Reece A. and Walker, Rodney A. and Palmer, Jennifer L. and Fulton, Neale L. (2010) ‘Definition of airworthiness categories for civil Unmanned Aircraft Systems

(UAS)’. In: 27th International Congress of the Aeronautical Sciences, 19-24 September 2010, Acropolis Conference Centre, Nice.


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UAS.15 – UASOP TOP

UAS.15.A. The Authority must issue a UASOP for operation of a Category 2 UAS following compilation of supporting documentation for inclusion with the UASOP, that identifies or records: (MILAVREG 3.7.a, TAREG 2.8.4)

(1) documents supporting Categorisation determination

(2) the UAS configuration, role and environment (CRE)

(3) the approved SOI

(4) approved airworthiness configuration

(5) the UAS Risk Analysis

(6) the authoritative operating and maintenance documentation

(7) operational restrictions imposed

(8) any other limitations or special conditions

(9) recommendation on the airworthiness of the UAS in the intended CRE

(10) inclusion of the UAS on the Defence Register

(11) completion of other activities required by the Authority.

1. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure risks associated with UAS authorisation to fly are mitigated SFARP.

2. A Category 2 UAS is typically characterised by its limited adoption of aerospace design standards and as a result it does not meet Type Certification requirements. Therefore, Category 2 UAS are subject to an abridged process leading to the issue of an Operating Permit in lieu of a Type Certificate.

3. The UAS Operating Permit (UASOP) is an airworthiness instrument issued by the Authority for Category 2 UAS. The UASOP summarises the UAS basis of certification, key airworthiness restrictions and special conditions to balance the operational requirements with the risk of the UAS operation.

4. A UASOP enables a Category 2 or 3 UAS to operate in its designated Configuration, Role and Environment (CRE). This includes both certification of the system to operate in accordance with the CRE and assurance of the management arrangements supporting the continuing airworthiness of the system. A UASOP is issued to support a defined level of capability of the system required for operations. This may include operation for the purposes of system qualification, acceptance, or in limited roles prior to the acceptance into service of the system. Issue of a UASOP, as with other airworthiness instruments, does not automatically imply that the system has met defined capability objectives. (AAP 7001.048 S3 C4)

AMC 1 to UAS.15.A – UASOP Contents

5. A UASOP should:

a. identify the UAS

b. reference the approved SOI or OIP defining CRE

c. reference appropriate design documentation which identifies the approved airworthiness configuration(s)

d. identify operational restriction applied to mitigate the risk the UAS presents to personnel, property and other aircraft

e. identify, or reference, any unique airworthiness management arrangements required for ongoing operations with the UAS type

f. identify operational, maintenance and engineering authority for the UAS

g. identify the approved UAS operational units

h. identify the authoritative operating and maintenance documentation

i. identify any applicable operating limitations resulting from:

(1) the immaturity of the supporting management arrangements


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(2) airworthiness issues affecting the system’s suitability for the SOI purpose and scope

(3) T&E activities performed prior to issue of the UASOP.

6. Category 2 UAS Risk Analysis. The analysis of individual and collective risk (as described in AMC 1 to UAS.10.G) posed to different population groups provides the Authority with confidence that a Category 2 UAS has the potential to meet any Safety Targets (or Target Levels of Safety) against which all airworthiness considerations can be benchmarked. Different Safety Targets may be defined for the GP versus MEP; Australian operations versus overseas wartime operations; or even different Safety Targets for various types of operations within Australia, eg training versus support to disaster relief operations. Till the time, a policy is established on the implementation of Safety Targets for UAS operations, a Category 2 UASOP applicant will need to propose a relevant set of Safety Targets for each new UAS application. These agreed Safety Targets, when merged with the ground population and flight profile information, will define the level of integrity required by the UAS design. For example, where Category 2 UAS operations are required in closer proximity to the GP, accurate navigation information and low ‘loss of control’ crash rates will be key airworthiness contributors to meeting the agreed Safety Targets. In addition, many of the WHS hazards presented by manned aircraft are also relevant to a Category 2 UAS, eg. on-board lasers, hazardous substances, and post-crash hazardous materials. Some UAS may present additional personnel hazards, such as high energy components in launch equipment and the lack of on-board crew to provide safety interlocks, eg manually arming non-eye safe lasers. A Category 2 UASOP applicant must therefore ensure that these risks have been assessed and treatments implemented, using input from other SMEs wherever necessary.

7. Airworthiness Recommendation. A recommendation on the airworthiness of a Category 2 UAS is dependent on the following two key elements:

a. Design Compatibility with operational environment. For Category 2 UAS, the safety of people on the ground must be assured via a comprehensive assessment of all the risks emanating from design deficiencies. Where reasonably practicable, these safety risks are to be eliminated or reduced through engineering effort. Where design solutions to reduce this risk are not reasonably practicable, the design deficiencies must be characterised and communicated to the operators so that operational risk treatments can be pursued. Since design and/or design evidence for a Category 2 UAS will often be deficient, airworthiness efforts to analyse the integrity of key UAS systems will be impeded, but this should not prevent the UASOP applicant from highlighting possible design shortfalls and proposing corresponding operational risk treatments. For example, while design data on the integrated GPS/INS may not be available, an inspection may reveal the system appears markedly less complex than similar manned aircraft systems and therefore the design is probably of lower integrity. Information (or professional estimates, where authoritative information is not available) on possible drift rates if the GPS signal is lost; the potential for unannunciated errors; and the potential for erroneous position information, will support informed risk treatment decisions by the operational community. The UAS design deficiencies that may warrant analysis and evaluation under this clause depend upon its CRE. Further information to assist the evaluation of a Category 2 UAS design can be found in the eADRM AAP 7001.054.

b. In-service support arrangements. Only certain equipment on a Category 2 UAS make a direct contribution to safety, and that the criticality of continuing airworthiness (engineering and maintenance) support is likely to vary between Category 2 UAS and between operating environments. For example, modular architectures for critical systems may reduce the likelihood of safety-related maintenance occurrences. Conversely, operational risk treatments might depend heavily on the design integrity of a critical system, and hence future design changes to that system would need to be critically assessed. Given this variability, Category 2 UASOP applicants are provided with reasonable latitude to implement pragmatic arrangements for ensuring continuing airworthiness support, commensurate with its contribution to safety.


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UAS.15.B. The Authority must issue a UASOP for operation of a Category 3 UAS following compilation of supporting documentation for inclusion with the UASOP, that identifies or records: (MILAVREG 3.7.b, TAREG 2.8.5)

(1) documents supporting Categorisation determination

(2) the UAS configuration, role and environment (CRE)

(3) the approved SOI

(4) approved airworthiness configuration

(5) recommendation on the airworthiness of the UAS in the intended CRE

(6) the UAS Risk Analysis

(7) the authoritative operating and maintenance documentation

(8) operational restrictions imposed

(9) any other limitations or special conditions

(10) Completion of other activities required by the Authority

1. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure risks associated with UAS authorisation to fly are mitigated SFARP.

2. The UASOP is an airworthiness instrument issued by the Authority for a Category 3 UAS. The UASOP summarises the UAS basis of certification, key airworthiness restrictions and special conditions to balance the operational requirements with the risk of the UAS operation.

3. Category 3 encompasses a wide range of UAS sizes, weights and levels of design integrity, and operating environments ranging from short-term trials in remote locations through to routine use near MEP. Given the many possible permutations and combinations, the prescribed set of requirements cannot be applied all Category 3 UAS. Instead, this UAS DASR allows the flexibility to tailor the prescribed set of requirements to suit the broad range of Category 3 UAS and operating environments.

AMC 1 to UAS.15.B – UASOP Contents

4. Refer to AMC 1 to UAS.15.A – UASOP Contents.

5. Given the multiplicity of Category 3 UAS designs and operating environments, close consultation with the Authority’s staff is encouraged to define the level of evidence required to support the issue of a Category 3 UASOP. Further guidance on the certification process for Category 3 UAS is provided on the UAS Sharepoint site.

6. Category 3 UAS Risk Analysis. Category 3 UAS are characterised by deficiencies in their design integrity, so catastrophic failures that result in ground impacts may not be uncommon. A risk analysis (as described in AMC 1 to UAS.10.G) should be conducted to assess the safety risks posed by a Category 3 UAS design while operating within the intended operating environment. Where reasonably practicable, these safety risks are to be eliminated or reduced through engineering effort. Where design solutions to reduce this risk are not reasonably practicable, the risk must be communicated to the operators so that operational risk treatments can be pursued. A challenge presented by Category 3 UAS is that they exist in multitude of designs with varying levels of performance and integrity, and operating in a wide variety of operational areas. As such, ‘one size fits all’ requirement set for assessing the risk to people on the ground is not feasible. Rather, the depth of assessment should be commensurate with the risk associated with the proposed UAS operation. For a small, light-weight, Category 3 UAS operating in a benign operating environment, a simple qualitative assessment may be sufficient to inform the operator’s risk treatment decisions. However, for a large, heavy-weight, Category 3 UAS intended to be operated over large groups of MEP and/or in close proximity to GP, a comprehensive quantitative assessment may be warranted. The UASOP applicant should consult with the Authority’s staff to determine appropriate compliance requirements for this clause. Further guidance is also available on the UAS SharePoint site.

7. Airworthiness Recommendation. A recommendation on the airworthiness of a Category 3 UAS is dependent on the following key elements:

a. Deficiencies in UAS design. Category 3 UAS are characterised by deficiencies in their design integrity. Remote Pilots who are aware of these design deficiencies and how they might manifest, are better able to safely operate the UAS. While OEMs might document some of these design deficiencies in aircrew operating instructions (eg


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Flight Manual or similar), in all likelihood many of the design deficiencies will not be disclosed. Rather, dedicated effort by Defence would be needed to identify and assess the latent design deficiencies. This dedicated effort may not be warranted for UAS operating in benign environments where a ground impact poses minimal risk to people on the ground. However, where Category 3 UAS are to be operated on an enduring basis in higher-risk environments (for example frequent flight over MEP), the effort applied should be commensurate with the safety contribution. The UASOP applicant should consult with the Authority’s staff to determine compliance requirements for this clause. Where identification and assessment of design deficiencies is warranted, AAP 7001.054 Section 4 Chapter 4 provides relevant guidance.

b. Systems contributing to safe separation and collision avoidance. By definition, Category 3 UAS are limited to segregated airspace (a defined 3-dimensional airspace allocated for specific use) only. Even so, other aircraft (manned or unmanned) may not be totally precluded from the segregated airspace. Where technical equipment (such as transponders, altimeters, radios, navigation and anti-collision lights, positional systems, etc.) make a positive contribution to safe separation of the UA from other aircraft, the performance and integrity of the equipment must be proportionate with its contribution to safety. This requires that any performance and/or integrity shortfalls associated with these systems must be identified and the risk treated.

c. In-service support arrangements. Robust in-service engineering and maintenance support can retain the as-designed level of performance and integrity of a Category 3 UAS, and reduce the likelihood of preventable failures. However, Category 3 UAS are characterised by deficiencies in their design integrity, and even the most diligent engineering and maintenance is unlikely to markedly reduce the incidence of catastrophic failures. Furthermore, for Category 3 UAS that operate in a benign operating environment, a ground impact is an economic rather than a safety issue, so the cost of robust engineering/maintenance may not be justified. Consequently, no mandatory engineering and maintenance requirements such as design or maintenance organisation approvals are prescribed for a Category 3 UAS. Rather, UASOP applicants are required to demonstrate to the Authority that the proposed continuing airworthiness (i.e. engineering and maintenance) support arrangements are proportionate to their safety contribution.


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UAS.15.C. The MAO must request a UASOP change or reissue when: (OAREG 7.1.6.a.1-2)

(1) An airworthiness change to the Category 2 or 3 UAS has been made which is equivalent to a Major change to the Type Design; or

(2) An operational change to the Category 2 or 3 UAS has been made which introduces new CRE.

1. The MAO should notify the Authority (through DACPA) of the initial issue or any revision to the Category 2 or 3 UASOP.

AMC 1 to UAS.15.C – UASOP Change Management

2. Prior to requesting a UASOP change or reissue, the MAO should ensure the following has occurred:

a. a recommendation from the Authority’s airworthiness delegate in respect of any change to the airworthiness configuration or operation of the Category 2 or 3 UAS in the intended CRE has been obtained;

b. a recommendation from the Authority’s operational delegate in respect of any change to the intended CRE has been obtained;

c. that any activities required under Part UAS to support a change have been completed to the extent necessary to support the UAS operation in the intended CRE and can be sustained at the expected rate of effort; and

d. any operating limitations resulting from the change due to the immaturity of supporting arrangements, airworthiness issues, or T&E activities have been appropriately identified and mitigated.

UAS.15.D. The MAO must periodically review a UASOP where an independent review process is not required. (OAREG 7.1.1.c)

1. The MAO will determine an appropriate interval for airworthiness review of a UASOP under their control that is not subject to an Independent Board of Review.

AMC 1 to UAS.15.D – UASOP Review Period

2. The maximum period of review should not be greater than 24 months.


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UAS.20 – UAS MANAGEMENT TOP

UAS.20.A. The MAO must manage UAS airworthiness and flight operations according to the following UAS categories: (MILAVREG 7.1.c)

(1) Category 1 UAS: under issue of Airworthiness Instrument, unless managed as a Non-Defence registered aircraft.

(2) Category 2 UAS: under issue of Airworthiness Instrument or UAS Operating Permit (UASOP), unless managed as a Non-Defence registered aircraft.

(3) Category 3 UAS: under issue of a UASOP, unless managed as a Non-Defence registered aircraft.

(4) Category 4 UAS: under a system that presents a negligible risk to other airspace users, people and property.

AMC 1 to UAS.20.A – Category 1 UAS and Category 2 UAS

1. Category 1 UAS aviation safety management is equivalent to manned aircraft due to potential operations throughout all categories of airspace and over populated areas. A requirement to operate under an Authority issued airworthiness instrument and MAOC is as appropriate for the UAS as it is for manned aircraft; therefore, operator qualification and robust airworthiness certification are essential.

2. The aviation safety assurance process should assure that the overall safety risk to personnel, other airspace users and property is appropriately identified, analysed and evaluated and if necessary communicated to the appropriate authority for treatment. Any restrictions on the Unmanned Aircraft (UA) operating over populated areas are to be documented in the UASOP.

3. The level of airworthiness assurance required by Category 1 UAS may not be achievable for some UAS, or required when the UAS may be operated at an acceptable level of safety without AMTC. Therefore, the airworthiness management for Category 2 UAS may be conducted under an Authority issued UASOP.

4. The authorisation process for a Category 2 UAS should be no different to the process followed for an aircraft/Category 1 when seeking an airworthiness instrument.

AMC 2 to UAS.20.A – Category 3 UAS

5. Category 3 UAS present a reduced level of risk to property and people through the application of controls such as segregation of airspace and operating over sparsely populated areas. However they present a greater risk than Category 4 UAS and therefore like Category 2 UAS, the airworthiness management of a Category 3 UAS is conducted under a UASOP (issued by the Authority).

6. A Category 3 UAS operating under a valid UASOP is appropriately managed in accordance with the requirements set by the Authority. Accordingly, understanding and applying the operational and airworthiness requirements of the Authority is essential for Category 3 operations.

7. An AAMP may be used to document the acquisition airworthiness process.

AMC 3 to UAS.20.A – Category 4 UAS

8. Refer to UAS.40 – Category 4 Operations.


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UAS 20.B. Authority approval is required for any Category UAS to carry humans, or carry or employ weapons. (MILAVREG 7.1.d)

1. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that the increased risk created by weaponisation or carriage of humans by UAS is reduced SFARP.

2. The Authority retains authority to approve any Category UAS to be inhabited by humans, or to carry or employ weapons, noting that the physical size constraints of Category 4 UAS make it unlikely that a UA of this size would be able to carry humans.

AMC 1 to UAS.20.B

3. Laser pointers, range finders, laser spot trackers and designators are not considered weapons under this regulation; however, all risk to safety from lasers will require assessment and appropriate approval for use.

UAS.20.C. The MAO/ Defence Organisation Head must periodically review a Category 4 UAS management system. (OAREG 7.1.1.d)

1. Not all Category 4 UAS will be operated by a Military Air Operator (MAO), and where this is the case, the responsibility for their safe operation resides with the Head of the Defence Organisation operating the UAS. The MAO/ Defence Organisation Head should determine an appropriate interval for airworthiness review of a Category 4 UAS management system under their control.

UAS.20.D. The MAO/ Defence Organisation Head must ensure a Statement of Operating Intent (SOI) for Category 1 and 2 UAS is issued. (OAREG 7.1.2.a)

1. An SOI should be developed for all Category 1 and 2 UAS. The SOI should describe the intended configuration, role and environment (CRE) applicable to the UAS operation. However, in describing the operational roles, a UAS SOI should document additional factors which may be taken for granted for manned systems. These factors include:

a. UA specifications (including relevant masses, speeds, dimensions and payloads),

b. flight profiles proposed for the UA,

c. the extent to which the UAS is required to operate over people and property including the duration and expected population density, amplifying;

(1) population distributions of Mission Essential Personnel to whom the UA may present a hazard,

(2) population distributions of the general public to whom the UA may present a hazard,

d. airspace environments in which the UA may operate, including the extent to which the UAS will operate in shared airspace, and

e. extent to which the UA is required to operate in the vicinity of high value or high risk assets such as aerodromes, ships, fuel and explosives storage areas, or civil infrastructure.

2. At the acquisition phase an initial UAS SOI should be produced in conjunction with the development of operational requirements, which may evolve to remain applicable to the UAS selected to meet those requirements. The UAS SOI provides the required context and inputs to assess the risks posed by the system.


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UAS.20.E. The MAO must ensure OIP that defines the CRE for Category 3 and 4 UAS is issued. (OAREG 7.1.2.b)

1. Not all Category 4 UAS will be operated by a Military Air Operator (MAO), and where this is the case, the responsibility for their safe operation resides with the Head of the Defence Organisation operating the UAS.

AMC 1 to UAS.20.E – Configuration, Role and Environment OIP

2. For Category 3 UAS, CRE OIP should include:

a. UA specifications (including relevant masses, speeds, dimensions and payloads),

b. flight profiles proposed for the UA,

c. the extent to which the UAS will operate over sparsely populated areas and property, including the duration and expected population density, amplifying population distributions of MEP to whom the UA may present a hazard.

d. specific details of the segregated airspace environments in which the UA may operate, and

e. extent to which the UA is required to operate in the vicinity of high value or high risk assets such as aerodromes, ships, fuel and explosives storage areas, or civil infrastructure.

3. The MAO may choose to issue generic OIP that details the CRE of all Category 4 UAS under their control, due to the constrained operating environment and physical size restrictions inherent with Category 4 UAS (MILAVREG 7 Annex A).

UAS.20.F. The MAO must ensure an ATMP management system is established that assures UAS Category 1, 2 or 3 airspace use is appropriate for the authorised activity. (OAREG 7.1.3.a)

1. The Air Traffic Management Plan (ATMP) should outline the systems, Airspace Control Measures (ACM) and procedures to be used to ensure that UAS operations are safely carried out in conjunction with other air traffic. The ATMP should cover all phases of operation from launch to recovery, including abnormal operations and recovery at unplanned destinations. Additional factors may also include specific air traffic management processes required in support of the flight and how these will be identified to the Air traffic service provider.

2. An ATMP details the airspace management procedures for where the UA is to be operated and how the UA is to be operated in conjunction with other military and/or civilian aircraft. The ATMP supports the SOI and associated Risk Analysis through implementation of air traffic management measures to specifically address the risk of collision with other airspace users for UAS. While it may be initially used to set the specific operational requirements / restrictions to be adhered to supporting a case for UAS Categorisation, the document will form part of the ongoing airworthiness management process post UASOP approval.

3. An ATMP should be developed as part of the Risk Analysis process (see AMC 1 to UAS.10.G) by considering a number of factors, including: (MILAVREG 7 GM, OAREG 7.1.3)

a. where the Unmanned Aircraft (UA) is required or likely to operate

b. the nature and density of the air traffic in the required area of operations, noting such specifications are likely to change as mission objectives change post UASOP approval

c. the size and velocity of the UA, and unique characteristics of the UAS according to Categorisation

d. the accuracy, integrity and reliability of fitted systems such as positional information, collision avoidance, flight control, communication and other relevant UAS systems

e. the strategy or method for the safe interaction or de-confliction with all other airspace users

f. the requirements for notification to other airspace users of intended operations with the UA

g. the requirements for notification to other airspace users of any segregated airspace required for the intended operations

h. the anticipated segregated airspace volumes required to support operations, including airspace boundary buffers


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i. any utilisation of unique ACMs strategies such as Flexible Use Airspace (FUA), User Preferred Trajectories (UPTs) or UAS Transit Corridors.

4. Changes in the area of operations may require amendment to the ATMP. The Authority endorsed ATMP management system should ensure appropriate review mechanisms are in place that can accommodate such changes in a manner that affords oversight but affords some operational flexibility while not invalidating the any UASOP operational limitations.

5. The Headquarters Joint Operations Command Air & Space Operations Centre (ASOC) Joint Airspace Control Cell (JACC) provides support for the development or amendment of UAS ATMPs and should be used to gain SME advice before an ATMP is recommended for endorsement by the appropriate authority.

6. Noting that Category 1 UAS may have a certified Detect and Avoid capability, an ATMP for Category 1 UAS should focus on degraded mode operations. An airworthiness deficiency, such as the lack of a certified ‘detect and avoid’ capability, will require a degree of operational limitation or risk mitigation to reduce risk SFARP to other airspace users. These conditions and limitations should be detailed for a Category 1 UAS.

7. Take off, landing and transit over populated areas by Category 1 and 2 UAS may be approved by the relevant Authority delegation, subject to appropriate risk mitigation and residual risk retention. Category 2 UAS transit through non-segregated airspace may be conducted where UAS transit routes have been designated and activated by the appropriate airspace management agency, which includes Airservices Australia, Defence Air Traffic Services or HQJOC Joint Airspace Co-ordination centre (JACC). Any desire for permanent transit routes should be processed via the JACC in all cases.

UAS.20.G. The MAO must ensure a Flying Management System is maintained for UAS Operations. (OAREG 7.1.5.a)

1. A Flying Management System (FMS) assures that the organisational structure provides the required operational capability while eliminating or otherwise minimising risk SFARP. The organisation conducting operations does so within a framework that ensures that qualified personnel, who are competent to perform the required roles, are authorised to fly specified operations within approved limitations and instructions.

AMC 1 to UAS.20.G – FMS for Category 1 or 2 UAS

2. UAS Remote Pilots (RP) are considered flight crew for FMS requirements. A Category 1 UAS Crew member should be designated the UA Captain for each air vehicle participating in a UAS mission and should be subject to the requirements of DASR Part ORO.55 – Aircraft Captaincy tailored to suit the operational role and any unique operating characteristics of the system as listed in the SOI and as required by the relevant operational head. In applying DASR Part ORO.50—Aircraft crewing, Category 1 UAS operations should be conducted by crews appropriate to the UAS operational role and any unique operating characteristics of the system as listed in the SOI and as required by the relevant operational head.

3. Category 1 and 2 UAS should meet the requirements of DASR Part ORO.10 – Flying Management System, except that:

a. the UAS crew competency system should be appropriate to the UAS operating roles documented in the SOI; and

b. the Flight Authorisation process for a UAS should be based upon the requirements of DASR Part ORO.30 - Flight authorisation and should involve all UAS crew required for safe and successful conduct of each UAS flight.

AMC 2 to UAS.20.G – FMS for Category 3 and 4 UAS Operations. (OAREG 7.1.5.b)

4. Appropriate controls that assure an acceptable Category 3 or 4 UAS FMS include:

a. key Staff are identified and appointed;

b. OIP are applicable, approved, available and relevant to the scope of operations;

c. crew competency is defined, assessed and maintained;

d. authorisation process for conduct of operations;

e. AVRM is applied relevant to the impact of operations on other airspace users, people and property;

f. any necessary ground safety or exclusion templates are implemented and controlled;


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g. use of ground and air collision avoidance, flight termination and emergency recovery systems is defined and controlled;

h. OIP issued to manage UAS flying operations take account the CRE and any unique operating characteristics of the UAS; and

i. the UAS is only operated when serviceable and suitable for the proposed operations.

UAS.20.H The MAO must ensure that operation of a non Defence registered UAS by or on behalf of Defence, or by a foreign military within Australian airspace, is conducted IAW the requirements of DASR Part UAS and DASR Part NDR. (OAREG 7.1.7)

AMC 1 to UAS.20.H – Non-Defence registered UAS

1. A foreign military equivalent Category 1, 2 or 3 UAS operating in Defence exercises or under sustained operations within Australian Airspace will comply with Part UAS requirements. As a non-Defence registered aircraft Part NDR also applies.

2. The acceptability to Defence of the risk from operations involving non-Defence registered UAS is predicated on the demonstration that an appropriate level of airworthiness oversight and management has been achieved. Category 1 or 2 UAS operations should be approved by the Authority on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the airworthiness and operational recommendations. Any extant UAS airworthiness instrument issued by a foreign national or military airworthiness authority could be a contributing factor in the approval process.

3. Where a Category 1 UAS is to be operated as a non-Defence registered aircraft, the Authority approval is contingent upon the Recognition of Prior Acceptance (RPA) of the UAS design in the intended roles and operating environment. In addition, the initial and continuing airworthiness requirements prescribed by the NAA/MAA should present a commensurate level of safety.

4. Compared with manned aircraft, UAS airworthiness regulation has not yet matured, and the Authority is yet to identify any civil or military Airworthiness Authority that is regulating UAS design in a manner that the Authority assesses as being comprehensive. Authority agreement to RPA for a UAS therefore cannot be presumed, even where a NAA/MAA is recognised as competent under other DASRs. There are three elements to Authority confidence that RPA for a UAS is warranted. These are as follows:

a. The airworthiness authority must establish regulations for UAS design that achieve a comparable level of safety to manned aircraft of similar weight;

b. The airworthiness authority must define a UAS design standard that presents an appropriate level of safety for regular UAS operations near and over people; and

c. The airworthiness authority must confirm that the design of a particular UAS meets the design standard.

5. Adherence to Authority’s requirements for RPA will require prior consultation with Authority’s staff to arrange for an assessment of the nominated Airworthiness Authority.


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UAS.25 – CATEGORY 1 UAS OPERATIONS TOP

UAS 25.A. The MAO must ensure Category 1 UAS are operated in accordance with the requirements of DASR Part ARO and Part ORO. (OAREG 7.2.2.a)

1. Approval to operate a Category 1 UAS may be granted following the Authority issue of an Airworthiness Instrument and MAOC (DASR Part ARO.100).

2. Category 1 UAS operations should be as for manned aircraft; tailored for UAS requirements.

3. A Category 1 UAS Crew member should be designated the UA Captain for each air vehicle participating in a UAS mission and should be subject to the requirements of DASR ORO.55, tailored to suit the operational role and any unique operating characteristics of the system as listed in the SOI. Category 1 UAS operations should be conducted by crews appropriate to the UAS operational role and any unique operating characteristics of the system as listed in the SOI.

UAS.25.B. The MAO must ensure Category 1 UAS are operated in accordance with the approved airworthiness instrument and supporting documents. (OAREG 7.2.2.b)

1. In addition to those documents that would support an Airworthiness Instrument, conformance to the ATMP and UAS type flight information manuals is also required.

UAS.25.C. A Category 1 UAS Remote Pilot must be a qualified military Pilot, or hold equivalent civilian IFR Pilot qualifications. (OAREG 7.2.2. c & d)

1. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to mitigate the risk posed by the Category 1 UAS to other airspace users, people and property. A Category 1 UAS is able to conduct unrestricted flight operations. A qualified military pilot is someone who has completed an Authority recognised and approved military pilot course, and holds or has held a Military Instrument Rating on a current in-service military aircraft. An equivalent civilian IFR Pilot qualification is considered to be a command instrument rating.

2. The Authority’s operational delegate may develop a Military UAS Remote Pilot (RP) Qualification and Training course and seek appropriate approval to meet the intent of this regulation. In so doing, the operational delegate will show how a RP trained under such a course meets the equivalent standard and competency required. The In-Flight Emergency Management (IFER) training and other similar manned aircraft Pilot skill sets must also be considered in addition to core flying achievements when applying for such recognition.

3. The core knowledge, skills and attitude to operate UAS remain the same as for manned aircraft. All UAS crew should have an understanding of the airborne environment and the relevant rules of the air. Any reduction in training requirements of UAS RP may increase the risk burden of other airspace users or the risk to people and property on the ground. As such, the documented training system in place for Category 1 UAS should parallel that of manned aircraft and comply with the full requirements of DASR Part Aircrew.

UAS.25.D. The MAO must ensure a Category 1 UAS Remote Pilot (RP) is trained and qualified in accordance with DASR Part Aircrew, or an equivalent training and qualification system. (OAREG 7.2.2.c)

1. The core knowledge, skills and attitude to operate UAS remain the same as for manned aircraft. All UAS crew should have an understanding of the airborne environment and the relevant rules of the air. Any reduction in training requirements of UAS RP may increase the risk burden of other airspace users or the risk to people and property on the ground. As such, the documented training system in place for Category 1 UAS should parallel that of manned aircraft and comply with the full requirements of DASR Part Aircrew.


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UAS.30.A. The MAO must ensure Category 2 UAS are operated in accordance with the requirements of DASR Part ORO. (OAREG 7.2.3.a)

UAS.30.B. The MAO must ensure Category 2 UAS operations present a lower risk than Category 1 UAS to other airspace users, people and property when operated in the approved CRE. (OAREG 7.2.3.b)

1. The MAO should have OIP that details the implementation of any operational restriction imposed when recommending categorisation for a Category 2 UAS. Restrictions on airspace access and limitations on flight over populated areas are broad risk mitigations that can achieve the desired outcome. RP training standards are also excellent mitigation. Use of AMTC required rigour for the UASOP supporting documents may also decrease risk.

UAS.30.C. The MAO must ensure Category 2 UAS are operated in accordance with the approved UASOP and supporting documents. (OAREG 7.2.3.c)

1. Operation of a Category 2 UAS may occur after an Authority categorisation and issue of a Category 2 UASOP.

2. All Category 2 UAS operations must be in accordance with approved OIP. In all cases the UASOP will provide any significant operating limitations and restrictions. The ATMP forms the basis for how the risk of collision with other airspace users is mitigated and will supplement the UASOP requirements.

UAS.30.D. A Category 2 UAS Remote Pilot must be a qualified military Pilot, or hold equivalent civilian IFR Pilot qualifications, unless the UAS flight will be constrained to CAT 3 UAS airspace, people and property limitations. (OAREG 7.2.3.e)

1. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to mitigate the risk posed by the Category 2 UAS to other airspace users, people and property. A qualified military pilot is someone who has completed a recognised and approved military pilot course, and holds or has held a Military Instrument Rating on a current in-service military aircraft. An equivalent civilian IFR Pilot qualification is considered to be a command instrument rating.

2. Operations of a Category 2 UAS within Category 3 airspace and population constraints may offer increased operational flexibility. For example, a military Pilot might transit the UAS to a segregated airspace over a sparsely populated area for an extended mission, where a lesser qualified AVO might be used to support a mission. At end of mission, a military Pilot can then remotely pilot the UAS from the segregated airspace to the intended landing location.

3. The MAO may develop a Military UAS Remote Pilot (RP) Qualification and Training course and seek appropriate approval to meet the intent of this regulation. In so doing the MAO will show how an RP trained under such a course meets the equivalent standard and competency. The In-Flight Emergency Management (IFER) training and other similar manned aircraft Pilot skill sets must also be considered in addition to core flying achievements when applying for such recognition.

UAS.30.E. The MAO must ensure a Category 2 UAS Remote Pilot (RP) is trained and qualified in accordance with DASR Part Aircrew, or an equivalent training and qualification system. (OAREG 7.2.3.d)


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UAS.35.A. The MAO must ensure Category 3 UAS operations present a lower risk than Category 2 UAS to other airspace users, people and property when operated in the approved CRE. (OAREG 7.2.4.a)

1. Approval to operate a Category 3 UAS will be granted following the MAO categorisation and the issue of a UASOP.

2. A Category 3 UAS should not commence operations before being categorised.

3. The MAO should have OIP that details the implementation of any operational restriction imposed when recommending categorisation for a Category 3 UAS. Restrictions on segregated airspace access and limitations on flight over MEP are broad risk mitigations that can achieve the desired outcome. Air Vehicle Operator (AVO) training standards are also excellent mitigation.

4. Flexibility provision. UAS operations may not compromise suitability for flight within legally enforceable airspace boundaries; however, segregated airspace requirements outside of national airspace boundaries will be problematic. Where UAS operations will occur outside a country’s national airspace, the ATMP should list available means to ensure the UAS operation will not compromise suitability for flight.

AMC 1 to UAS.35.A – Maritime operations

5. A ship operating in international waters desiring to employ a Category 3 UAS may utilise several mitigations to ensure the operation will not compromise suitability for flight. These might include:

a. utilising ship radar surveillance, when UA operations are within range of the sensor

b. broadcasting UAS advisory messages over marine band radio where suitable;

c. notification of UAS operations to other naval operators via mission planning tools, such as air tasking orders.

UAS.35.B. The MAO must ensure Category 3 UAS are operated in accordance with the requirements of the approved UASOP and supporting documents. (OAREG 7.2.4.b)

1. Operation of a Category 3 UAS may occur after Authority categorisation and issue of a Category 3 UASOP.

2. In all cases the UASOP will provide any significant operating limitations and restrictions. The ATMP forms the basis for how the risk of collision with other airspace users is mitigated and will supplement the UASOP requirements.

UAS.35.C. The MAO must ensure a Category 3 UAS register is maintained. (OAREG 7.2.4.c)

1. A UAS register requirement is not intended to be a complicated matter and is intended to supplement the UAS management system. For example, the use of a UAS register can afford the ability to collocate reference to all supporting UAS documents. The register can be a simple as a spread sheet held at a delegated unit.

2. If desired, application may be made to DACPA to hold the UAS registration on the Defence Register. Such a request might be approved if the UAS in question required significant resources and funds to maintain.

UAS.35.D. The MAO must ensure a Category 3 UAS Air Vehicle Operator (AVO) is trained and qualified in accordance with DASR Part AIRCREW, or an equivalent training and qualification system. (OAREG 7.2.4.d)

1. Whilst segregating a UAS from other users of the airspace may reduce the risks associated with their operation, the core knowledge, skills and attitude to operate remain the same. All UAS crew should have an understanding of the airborne environment and the rules that pertain to them. Reducing the training requirements of


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UAS crew serves to increase the risk burden of other concurrent airspace users. To further help reduce the risk imposed on other airborne users of airspace, restrictions should be applied dependant on the level of training received.

2. Category 3 UAS based on the SOI CRE and intrinsic categorisation of operations solely in segregated airspace are not required to be operated in accordance with the rules of the air as advised in the Defence Aeronautical Information Package. As such the documented AVO training system in place for Category 3 UAS may parallel that of manned aircraft, or the MAO may develop an equivalent training and qualification system that meets the specific Category 3 UAS requirements.


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UAS.40.A. The MAO / Defence Organisation Head must ensure Category 4 UAS operations present a negligible risk to other airspace users, people and property. (OAREG 7.2.5.a).

1. A Category 4 UAS should not commence operations before being categorised.

2. Category 4 UAS should pose an insignificant risk to other aircraft, people and property.

3. Not all Category 4 UAS will be operated by a Military Air Operator (MAO), and where this is the case, the responsibility for their safe operation resides with the Head of the Defence Organisation operating the UAS.

AMC 1 to UAS.40.A – Operational restrictions

4. The MAO / Defence Organisation Head should have OIP that details the implementation of any operational restriction imposed when categorising a Category 4 UAS, such as vertical airspace limitations and lateral displacement from aerodromes. Applying the operational restrictions to Category 4 UAS is akin to CASA’s model aircraft flying requirements and ensures the risk to other aircraft remains low.

5. Flexibility provision 6 Operational requirements may exist for Category 4 UAS to operate within 3 nm of an aerodrome or above 400 ft AGL. Category 4 UAS are granted the following exemptions:

a. Operation within 3 nm of a Defence aerodrome. Should operation of a CAT 4 UAS be required within 3 nm of a Defence aerodrome:

(1) Written agreement is required from the Senior ADF Officer (or delegate) for the relevant Defence aerodrome that details how CAT 4 UAS operations will interact safely with other aviation activity.

(2) If an Air Traffic Service (ATS) is provided at the Defence aerodrome, written agreement is required from the Senior Air Traffic Control Officer (SATCO) that details how CAT 4 UAS operations will interact safely with other aviation activity, including a provision for the ATS provider to suspend CAT 4 UAS operations for safety reasons.

(3) Where CAT 4 operations will occur outside of ATS hours and the airspace will revert to Class G (uncontrolled) airspace, compliance with CASR 1998 Part 101 – Unmanned Aircraft and rockets is required.

b. Operation within 3 nm of a civil aerodrome. Should operation of a CAT 4 UAS be required within 3 nm of a civil aerodrome, compliance with CASR 1998 Part 101 – Unmanned Aircraft and rockets is required.

c. Operation above 400 ft AGL. Operation of CAT 4 UAS above 400 ft AGL is only permitted where the operating airspace is provided an ATS or is Restricted Airspace (RA).

d. Written agreement is obtained from the relevant airspace authority that details how CAT 4 UAS operations will interact safely with other aviation activity.

UAS.40.B. The MAO / Defence Organisation Head must ensure Category 4 UAS are operated by approved and competent personnel. (OAREG 7.2.5.b)

1. The MAO/ Defence Organisation Head should have OIP that details the level of training and competency required of Category 4 UAS operators.

UAS.40.C. The MAO / Defence Organisation Head must ensure a Category 4 UAS register is maintained. (OAREG 7.2.5.c)

1. As with Category 3 UAS, registration requirement are intended to assist management process and need not be complicated. Registering of Category 4 UAS by type only is sufficient.

6 Authority Decision Brief – CAT 4 UAS operations within 3 nm of a Defence aerodrome or above 400 ft AGL of 12 Jun 15 (AB22283236).


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UAS.40.D. The MAO / Defence Organisation Head must ensure a Risk Management Plan is maintained for the operation of Category 4 UAS. (OAREG 7.2.5.d)

1. The Risk Management Plan should be completed inline with the requirements of accepted Defence risk management doctrine.

UAS.40.E. The MAO / Defence Organisation Head must comply with DASR Part ORO.15 if appointing a Category 4 UAS Manager. (OAREG 7.2.6.a)

1. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that Category 4 UAS operations under an appointed UAS manager will maintain the same level of airworthiness and safety oversight, equivalent to the level of oversight an MAO would provide.

2. The MAO/ Defence Organisation Head letter of appointment should be in writing and should include the scope and limitations of the delegation.

UAS.40.F. An appointed Category 4 UAS Manager must ensure that UAS are operated: (OAREG 7.2.6.b)

(1) in accordance with the categorisation requirements

(2) by approved and competent personnel

(3) under a Risk Management Plan

(4) in accordance with any additional requirements of the Authority.

1. Purpose. The intent of this regulation is that Category 4 UAS operations under an appointed UAS manager will maintain the same level of airworthiness and safety oversight, equivalent to the level of oversight an MAO would provide. A Category 4 UAS Manager’s experience should include:

a. UAS operations.

b. Aviation Airworthiness Management.

c. WH&S Management.

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