intuition as a philosophical method in india p.t. raju

7/28/2019 Intuition as a Philosophical Method in India P.T. Raju

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/intuition-as-a-philosophical-method-in-india-pt-raju 1/21

P. T. RAJU

Intuitiona a Philosophical

Method i n I n d i a

Intuition as a philosophical method is an

intricate and intriguing problem, because philosophers are not agreed as to

preciselywhat intuition

and philosophical method are. The same problemwith reference to classical Indian philosophies is further complicated bycertainpreconceivednotions about Indianphilosophies among some Western

students of the subject. During some of the lectures which the writer gavein the West, questions like "At what age do you begin to give a child train-

ing in intuition?"and "If I go to India,how long will it take to get complete

training in intuition?"were put to him. Such questions reveal, in the minds

of the questioner,the feeling that intuition is a mysteriousfaculty with the

help of which almost every Indian is able to see God or ultimate reality.

Indeed, they show also, so far as philosophy of life is concerned,a sense offrustration and disappointment with the pure logicalism of most of the

contemporaryphilosophical trends of the West. But in this attitude toward

philosophy there is the danger that a complete divorce between intellect

and intuition may be assumed, and the academic philosopher might say,with Professor Cunningham,1that, if reason and intellect are not to be

trusted,his place cannot be in a university,which implies that philosophiesbased upon intuition (and not on reason) have no place in universities,since universities are centers of critical

thinking,and the

validityof

manyintuitions is not beyond doubt and any criterion to test their validity will

have to be logical.There is another wrong conclusion which philosophers tend to draw,

namely, that thinkers belonging to cultures the philosophies of which are

supposed to be intuitive are inherently incapable of standing the strain of

logical and scientific thinking. This conclusion makes many assumptionswhich it is not possible to discuss here. For instance, it assumes that there

are two kinds of culturesand philosophies, the intellectual and the intuitive,

1G. WattsCunningham,"How Farto the Land of Yoga? An Experiment n Understanding,"The PhilosophicalReview,LVII (November, 1948).

187



and that people belonging to the one are by naturepsychologicallydifferent

from those belonging to the other. But one might retort by saying that the

true differenceis that between the progressive and the backward,and thatit is one of degree but not of kind. The backward,therefore, do not insist

that their cultural andphilosophicalachievements,obtainedby fits and starts,should continue to be improved by only the same intuitive methods and byfits and starts.

There is a further misunderstandingabout Indian philosophy, namely,that it is a single school or systemof thought. It is almost as correctto speakof Westernphilosophyas a single philosophyas to speakof Indianphilosophyas one. If one importantschool holds strong views on the dependabilityor

otherwiseof intellect, the same is wrongly attributed o all the others.Again,the term Indian philosophy is made to refer to the ancient systems alone,as if Indian philosophy were something ancient like Greek philosophy. It is

true that India is better known for her ancient philosophies than for anynew systems, but many contemporaryphilosophers in India have not been

satisfied with everything of ancient thought and have shown inclinations

toward new ideas. And none of the new philosophers has made intuition

his philosophical method, though almost every one has admitted the truth

of intuition and the shortcomingsof intellect.

II

Before proceedingwith the discussion,the meaning of the word intuition

needs to be clarified. Intuition means immediateor unmediatedknowledge.

Etymologically, it means "looking into," that is, it is knowledge obtained

not by looking outside one's self-whatever the word self means, and its

meaning may not be discussedfor the present-but by looking inside one's

self.Now, is looking into one's self necessarilyunmediated? This is a con-

troversialquestion; and the answerdependson how the processof "lookinginto" and the nature of the self are understood. If the "looking into" also

needs an instrument (karana), then the processis mediated,and knowledgeso obtainedis not immediateknowledge. First,even if some instrumentalityis needed,if the self is understood o be identicalwith the mind (manas)-as it is in Western philosophy and psychology in general-then it is its

own instrument,and the resultingknowledge may be regardedas unmediated

in the sense of being not mediated by something other than the agent of

that cognition. However, even in Western psychology, there has been a

growing feeling that there is a core to be called the self in our experience,

188 P. T. RAJU



INTUITION AS A PHILOSOPHICALMETHODIN INDIA

which is not exhausted by the mental processes.2This distinctionwas more

clearly made by the ancient Indian philosophers.3 Even when this distinc-

tion is accepted,the self may be regardedas being capable of looking intoitself in some way, without the help of the mind; and as the instrument

and the agent would here be identical, the resulting knowledge can be said

to be unmediated and therefore intuitive. The present case, which is the

second, is the self's knowledge of itself, when it is different from the mind,while the previous case is one in which the self is regardedas identical with

the mind. We may next have a third situation, in which the self is con-

sidered to be different from the mind and yet, through the instrumentality

(karanatva)of the

mind,that

is, through introspection,it

cognizessuch

mental processesas emotions, feelings, and sentiments. In this case, as the

instrument is different from the self, the agent, knowledge cannot be said

to be unmediated. Then we have a fourth situation: Some cognitionsneed not only the instrumentalityof the mind, but also that of the senses

(indriyas), for instance, the perceptualcognition of the tree in front of me.

And whether the self, as agent, is regardedas identical with the mind or

not, perceptual cognition is mediated and not unmediated. Quite often

Western philosophers treat perception as direct and immediate knowledge.

Even the Sanskritword aparoksam(not beyond senses) implies that view.But if we are to be thorough in our application of the idea of immediacy,we have to say that even sense perception is mediated. But, in all the

cases mentioned so far, mediation is not voluntary: it is spontaneouslike the workings of our involuntary nervous system. And for the reason

that knowledge is not deliberately mediated, we say that perception in all

the above casesis direct. But in the fifth situation,namely, that of inference,the resulting cognition is voluntarily mediated and is accepted by all as

mediatedknowledge.

III

In Indian philosophy, the words used for mediate and immediateknowl-

edge are paroksajinan and aparoksajina. As indicated above, the words

literally mean "knowledge beyond senses" and "knowledge not beyondsenses." But later, the secondword came to mean both sense perceptionand

the highest intuition, which is that of the Brahman, the Absolute, and

largely corresponds to the intellectual intuition of Kant, particularly as

2 See Leon Litwinski, "Towards a Reinstatement of the Concept of Self," The British Journal

of Psychology, General Section, August, 1951 .3Self (atman) does not mean the same as soul (jiva) for any Indian philosophers except the

Jainas.

189



interpretedby Caird. The second word still retained, however, the meaningof mediatedcognition such as syllogistic inference (anumana) and analogy

(upamana).It will be asked,perhaps,whether Kant's conceptionof intellectual intui-

tion, as interpreted even by Caird, has anything to do with the highestintuition in Indian philosophy, particularlyas understood by the Advaita

of Safikara; or intellectual intuition contains mediation as a moment, but

the highest intuition, according to the Advaita, has no such moment and

is pure immediacy. But the objector has behind his objection the feelingthat immediacycan be only sensuous immediacy. What the Advaita refers

to here is theimmediacyof,

andto,

consciousness.Indeed,

the Advaitin does

not call it the immediacyof, and to, the intellect, which the first positionin Section II involves. At that level of immediacy,senses and mind (manasand buddhi, intellect, included) are transformed nto self (dtman) or dis-

appear in it. Indeed, even accordingto Kant, if God possessed intellectual

intuition, his intellect would be intuitive and his intuition intellectual; and

we have to say that both intellect and intuition in their ordinarysense must

have been transformed n his experience.

Again, not all schools of Indian philosophy accept the Advaita view of

the highest intuition (aparoksanubhiti). The Advaita of Saiikarais non-dualistic. There are two other important Vedantic schools, the qualifiednon-dualismof Raminuja and the dualism of Madhva. These philosophicaldifferences are found among both the Vaisnavas and the gaivas. There

are other schools occupying intermediatepositions between the three. Ac-

cording to the Advaita, the Brahmanis the same in essence as the Atman

(Self) and is of the natureof consciousness (jnina).4 In other words, the

very substanceof the Brahman is consciousness. But as the Brahman has

no other toitself,

as consciousness it knows itselfonly.

Hereknowledge,its subject,and its object are one and the same. This knowledge is a form

of experience (anubhuti) and is intuition in the highest sense. But Ramanujaand Madhva, though they accept the view that knowledge is self-revealing,do not believe in the absenceof distinctions.

But there are schools that do not hold that knowledge (jfLna) is self-

revealing.5 Kumarila, a follower of the Purva-Mimramsa,maintains that

knowledge is not self-revealing,but that its existence is known only throughinference. Prabhikara,another follower of the same school, however, con-

The essenceof the Brahmanand the Atman is said to be not only consciousnesscit) butalso existence(sat) and bliss (nannda).

'The intricate ogical arguments or and againstthe positionmay be seen in Madhusudana,AdvaitasiddhiBombay:Nirnayasagar ress,1917), pp. 768-784.

190 P. T. RAJU



INTUITION AS A PHILOSOPHICALMETHOD IN INDIA

tends that knowledge is self-revealing. But, while for Kumarila atman is

of the nature of consciousness,for Prabhakara t is not. The Siakhya and

Yoga schools accept Kumarila's position, and so the highest intuition weare speaking of is possible according to them. Ordinarycognition is not

self-revealing but revealed by atman, for ordinary cognition is a modifica-

tion of buddhi (reason understood in a substantive sense), a product of

prakrti (matter, nature), which is unconscious. Accordingto the Nyaya and

the Vaisesika,atman is by nature unconscious,and cognition arises when it

comes into contactwith mind. No cognition is self-revealingbut is revealed

by another cognition (adhyavasaya). The Jainas believe that knowledge is

self-revealing and, therefore,also in the possibility of the highest intuition.

The Buddhists,particularlyof the Mahayana, accept a kind of experience(anubhuti) above discursivereasoning; and though they do not accept an

eternal atman,the Vijfinnavadins mong them contend that the highest stageof nirvana is consciousness (vijinna).6

These few details are given only to show the wide variety of views held

concerningthe highest realization. For some, it is an experience (anubhuti);for others (the Nyaya and the Vaisesika), it is not, as there can be no

experienceat all at that level. For some, again, knowledge is self-revealing,

and so this intuition is involved in all kinds of experience. The Advaitinswould particularlyinsist on this point. For others, knowledge is not self-

revealing, though a few of these, again, accept the view that the highestintuition is true and is a distinctexperience,not necessarily nvolved in other

kinds of experience. Forthese, intuition is a mysterious aculty,not rationallyunderstandable. There are differencesof view as to whether this intuition

is a faculty of the mind as distinct from the self. On the whole, Sahkara

holds the doctrineof the self-luminosityof consciousnessconsistently to the

end and establishes his doctrine of unmediated knowledge (aparoksanu-bhuti) of the Brahman;Ramanujatakes a middle course, for, while he ac-

cepts knowledge as self-revealing, he insists on the distinctionsbetween the

knower, the known, and knowledge even at the highest level. Others take

a more extreme course. Among the non-Vedanticschools, including Jainismand Buddhism,a similar variety of views is to be found.

IV

The above points refer mainly to intuition as the direct and unmediated

knowledge of the Brahman,Atman, and Nirvana. But the word intuitionis used also in the sense of the knowledge of physical objects and other

6See Mahayana-sutralankara. 12, SylvainLevi,ed. (Paris:LibrarieHonoreChampion,1907).

191



minds, unmediatedby the senses. This is a mysteriouspower obtained

through yogic discipline. It corresponds o telepathy, clairvoyance,and other

kinds of extra-sensoryperception. According to Patafijali, the author ofthe Yoga-sitras, this ability is a power acquiredthrough certain types of

yogic practices. The Nyiya calls it an extraordinaryperception (alaukika).

Accordingto this school, it is of two kinds, complete and incomplete (yuktaand yunjana). In the former, one knows all things at all times; in the

latter, one knows an object only when one makes an effort.

V

Can the above typesof intuition be made methodsof philosophy? Indeed,no school in India makes use of intuition alone as a philosophical method.

The Nyiya school, for instance, while discussing the two forms of yogic

perception, says only that they are propounded by the Vedas and Purinas

(Epics), and at no place appeals to intuition to establish its doctrines.7All

the schools, except the Carvaka,give a high place to this type of intuition,for it is a great achievement for the yogin, though they warn him not to be

attractedand temptedby it. It is an extraordinary erceptionat the empirical

level, though it is not the highest type of intuition, namely, the intuition

of God or the Brahman or Nirv.na. This higher type of intuition is alsoaccepted by all except the Cirvikas. Both types are cognition without the

usual instruments and media of knowledge. And though both types are

acceptedas truthful and attainable,neither is made use of as a philosophical

method, only because it cannot be so used.

VI

For, what is philosophical method? Classical Indian philosophy did not

know ofany

distinction between the methods of thespecial

sciences, on

the one hand, and that or those of philosophy, on the other. And so, the

question as to whether the philosophical method was or was not the same

as the scientificwas not mooted by the philosophersof the time. For them,

philosophy was knowledge in the widest sense; the words used by them are

darfana (perception, view), mata (opinion, doctrine), siddhanta (theory,

doctrine), etc. Quite often, since the word darsana s used to mean a systemor school, it is contendedthat philosophy meant for the Indian philosophersthe perceptionof reality,which, for many of the Vedintins at least, means

perception of the Brahman. Their view is often identifiedwith the wholeof Indianphilosophy,but it is to be repeatedthat the view of this one school

7Karikavaliwith the commentary,Muktavali,etc. (Benares: JaikrishnadasHaridasGupta,1951), p. 209.

192 P. T. RAJU




is not the whole of Indian philosophy. According to the Nyaya and the

Vaisesika schools, perception of the Brahman or Isvara (God) is not the

same as perception of reality, for these two schools accept the eternalityof atoms, space, time, and atman (self), which are therefore separatefrom

the Brahman or Isvara and are as real as it or he. But the more important

point is that, at the stage of liberation (mukti), at which atman regains its

pure state, it does not perceive anything, since it is by nature unconscious.

Thus, there is no scope for any darsana (perception), even if by dariana

is meant the unpolluted perception of the original reality. So, the word

dariana has to be understood as is the word view, which means not onlythe view I have of the street or scenery before me but also the view I hold

of the natureof mind, matter, etc. Such an interpretation s necessitatedbythe synonymsof the word darsana n the sense of philosophy, such as mata

(opinion, doctrine) and siddhanta (doctrine, theory). For instance, the

Saiva philosophy is called not only SaivadarSanabut also Saivasiddhanta.

Another reason given for the opinion that the method of Indian phi-

losophy is intuitive is that philosophy in India is also called moksasastra, he

science of salvation or liberation. Indian philosophy aims, it is said, at

pointing out the path to liberation; and, as the state of liberation, which

is the original pure state of one's self, is known only through intuitionand not through intellect, it is thought that the method of Indianphilosophymust be intuitive and not logical. Almost all the Indian systems speak of

moksa (liberation) as the aim of philosophical activity. Therefore, theymust discuss the natureof moksa, the method or way (marga) of attainingmoksa, and the nature of reality, both phenomenal and noumenal, with

referenceto which moksa has to be explained. But, it must be pointed out,none of the problems connected with these topics can be solved by means

of intuition alone. Neither human nature nor the nature of the physicalworld can be explained merely through intuition. Indeed, reason cannot

work in a vacuumand with mere assumptionsor axioms arbitrarilyaccepted,if it is to explain any existent fact. Therefore, it is based upon intuition

in the widest sense of direct experience,whether sensuous or non-sensuous.

The truths of intuition are integratedinto a system by reason.8 The nature

of moksa cannot be explained, therefore, without the help of reason, and

philosophy consists of this explanation. Hence, even for those systems for

which moksa is the ultimate aim of philosophy, philosophical method con-

sists not merely in intuition but also in rationally integrating the intuited8In this sense, even human beings are accredited with intuitive understanding by some Western

thinkers, while Kant thought that God alone might possess it. See W. H. Walsh, Reason andExperience (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1947), pp. 57 ff.

193



truths. Furthermore, t should not be forgotten that for those schools for

which the original pure state of self (atman) is not conscious, that is, the

Nyaya and the Vaisesika, there can be no intuition of moksa. Its nature isonly inferred with the help of reason. Again, for those schools for which

the Brahman is not the only reality, intuition of the Brahman does not

explain the nature of the other realities. Explanationof these realities and

their mutual interrelationships s the work of reason and not merely of

intuition. For instance, the existence of atoms is logically proved by the

Vaisesikas, and most of the followers of this school do not claim to have

experiencedthem intuitively; and this intuition, they say, is heard of in the

Vedas and the Puranas. TheSamhkhya

nd theYoga, though they say

that

atman is by nature conscious, treat it as different from prakrti (nature);and so, intuition of the former does not explain the nature of the latter.

The Sramkhyaroves the pluralityof selves and their differencefrom nature

with the help of reason. Further, most schools do not accept moksa

(liberation) and the state of the individual during liberationmerely on the

basis of intuition. They prove the truth of both with the help of logic,with phenomenal experience as the starting point.

Another important reason for the view that Indian philosophy depends

on intuition as its method may be the reliance by many schools on scripture

(sruti). The sruti consists of a number of utterances about the experiencesof several discoverersof inner truths, which are therefore intuitions. But

though the Vedic seers may be said to have basedtheir statements on intui-

tions, their followers and commentatorswho expoundedtheir views did not

use intuition for their argument. In the discussionsamong themselves, they

depended upon grammar and etymology for the interpretationof verbal

statements,and upon perceptionand inferencefor the interpretationof ideas.

Again, not all the Indian schoolsacceptthe fruti as authority. The Buddhistsand the Jainas, in their controversieswith the followers of the Vedic tradi-

tion, depended exclusively upon perception and inference for establishingtheir conclusions,as did also the Vedic followers in their controversieswith

the Buddhists and the Jainas. Yet, all these schools accepted intuition in

the sense of suprarational,non-discursiveknowledge, which is direct ex-

perience (aparoksanubhiti) of the ultimatereality,whatever that be. Indeed,intuition in the sense of direct perception or sensation is accepted by all

schools,though many

of them are aware of the defects ofperception

as a

form of knowledge. Some of the later CQrvakas,.g., Jayarasi, he authorof

Tattvopaplavasimha;Buddhistslike Nagarjuna, the author of Madhyamika-

karikas;and Advaitins like Sriharsa, he authorof Khandana-khandtakhdya,

194 P. T. RAJU




point out the shortcomings not only of inference but also of perception.

Again, most of the Indian philosophers accept two kinds of perception,the

determinateand the indeterminate. Indeterminateperceptionis

puresense

awareness;but discursionenters determinateperception,which is relational.

It is knowledge in which the distinction between subject and predicateis a

moment. It is always of the form, "That is an X." Some schools, e.g., the

Nyaya, do not accept indeterminate perception as knowledge at all, for

knowledge is either true or false, and the question of truth and falsity is not

relevant to indeterminateperception. Others, however, e.g., the Buddhists,treat indeterminateperceptionas a form of knowledge. But now, for schools

like the Nyaya, intuition, in the sense of non-discursiveknowledge, cannot

be a philosophicalmethod at all, for the simple reason that it can be neithertrue nor false. But philosophy has to be either trueor false.

Another important doctrine to be referredto in this connection is that

of pr,amanya,he natureof truth. Very interesting controversieshave been

carriedon by the severalschools aboutthe questionas to whether a cognitionis true by itself or made true by another cognition. This is not the same

question as whether cognition is self-revelatory or not. For the highest

intuition, namely, the intuition of the Brahman,if one has it, there can be

no othercognition

either toprove

ordisprove

it. In the case ofmy percep-tion of the book in front of me, I may know that I know the book, but

this knowledge that I know the book does not make my knowledge of the

book either true or false. So, even if we accept the self-revelatorycharacter

of knowledge at the empirical level, the self-revelatorycharacterof knowl-

edge is not the same as the truth of that cognition. Now, the Naiyayikas(followers of the Nyaya) maintain that no cognition by itself is either true

or false, but is made so by another cognition.9 If every cognition has to

refer beyond itself to another cognition in order to be true or false, then

non-discursiveknowledge cannot be true; and in order to be true knowledgemust be discursive. So, accordingto the epistemologyof the Nyaya, intuition

as immediatenon-discursiveknowledge can be neither true nor false.

Accordingto some Buddhists,everycognition is false by itself, but is made

true by anothercognition, the secondcognition here being the cognition that

the object cognized serves the purpose for which it is meant. This is a

pragmatic conception of truth. But it means that, so far as the empiricalworld is concerned,pure intuition by itself, even as indeterminateperception

(nirvikalpakapratyaksa),cannot be

true,unless made so

byanother

cogni-tion. Hence, knowledge at the empirical level must be discursive.

9This interpretations givento the doctrinesof the otherschoolsalso. Seethe author'sThoughtand Reality (London:GeorgeAllen and Unwin, Ltd., 1937), PartIII, chap.VIII.

195



According to the Mimamrsa nd the Advaita of Sankara,every cognitionis true by itself, but may be renderedfalse by anothercognition. Sometimes

this theory is interpreted'as meaning that the truth of a cognition is self-revealed,whereas the falsity of a cognition is revealedby anothercognition.

Only the upholders of this doctrine accept intuition as a philosophicalmethod. But the admissionthat falsity is revealed by another cognition and

that the possibility of an empirical cognition's being false is always presentmakes discursive knowledge a necessarycomplement to the intuitive until

this possibility is removed; and it is removed only at the highest level of

intuition, where the distinctionsbetween subjectand object and subject and

predicatevanish.

A significant point to be noted is that the truth of the higher intuitionitself needsproof, since it is not commonly possessedby all men. As already

mentioned, the Nyaya and the Vaisesikaaccept it as an instrumentof valid

cognition on the authorityof the Vedas and the Puranas. The Nyaya, for

instance, accepts four sources of valid cognition: perception, inference,

analogy, and the sruti. Intuition in the sense of telepathy and other extra-

ordinary forms of perception is included in perception. And this school

makes very little use of scripture in establishing its conclusions. In fact,

neither the Nyaya nor the Vaisesika could furnish a commentary on theVedanta-siitras or Brahma-s&tras) f Badarayana,which attemptedto sys-tematize the Upanisadic statements. The Vaisesika, again, did not treat

scriptureas a distinctsourceof knowledge, but said that it could be included

in perceptionor inference. The Siamkhya nd Yoga schools acceptedpercep-

tion, inference, and scriptureas valid sources of knowledge, but accepted

scriptureonly to supporttheir conclusionsindependentlyarrived at throughthe other means of cognition. In fact, they say that only those entities which

cannot be establishedthrough

theordinary

sources ofknowledge

should be

establishedthrough scripture.10That the doctrinesof the above four schools

were established ndependentlyof scripture s supportedby the fact that theycould not furnisha commentaryon the Vedanta-stras. Vijfianabhiksuwrote

a commentaryfrom the Sfmnkhya oint of view only during the fifteenth

century,long after the doctrineswere propoundedand criticizedby the rival

schools. The name of Kapila, the founder of the Sarhkhyasystem, occurs

in the SvetMivataraUpanisad, which belongs to the pre-Christianera."

According to Indian tradition,a school is consideredto be orthodox and a

'See Iswarakrishna,Samkhyakirikas VI.

"It is difficult to fix the date of the Upanisads. See S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy(London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1948), Vol. I, p. 141. Also S. K. Belvalkar and R. D.

Ranade, The Creative Period (Poona: Bilvakunja Publishing House, 1927), p. 89.

196 P. T. RAJU




follower of the Vedic tradition only if it has been able to furnish a com-

mentaryon the Veddnta-sutras.This shows that neither the Nyaya and the

Vaisesika nor the Sahkhya and the Yoga started their philosophical activityas elaborations and interpretationsof the Upanisadic intuitive statements.

To be sure,they acceptedthe possibilityof intuiting empiricaland noumenal

realities, but they did not use intuition either in expounding their doctrines

or in controvertingthose of their rivals.

It is only the Vedanticschools that startedas expounders, nterpreters,and

systematizersof the Upanisadic statements. The Vedanta-s&trasomposed

by Badarayanafor systematizingthe Upanisadic statements and removingcontradictionswere later found inadequatefor the purpose. As controversies

arose among the Vedantic followers themselves and between the Vedantinsand their rivals, need was felt for further clarificationand development of

the ideas. And so, commentaries and commentaries upon commentaries

had to be written, and this kind of work continued with more or less vigoruntil about the fifteenth century. Besides the Vedas, there were other kinds

of scriptures,such as the Agamas of the Saivas and the Vaisnavas, which

also were regardedby some as of equal authority. And in order to remove

conflict between them and the Upanisads, commentariesreinterpretingthe

Vedanta-sutrasand theUpaniads

were written.Thus,

clear-cutdifferences

developed among the Vedantic schools.

The activityof writing commentariesupon commentarieswill perhapsbe

interpretedas being basedupon intuition as a philosophical method. It maybe contended that there was an original intuition and the rest was merelyits elaboration. Even if the contention were true, elaborationand interpreta-tion were not intuitively done. It was with the help of logic and reason

that the whole superstructureof a system was raised on an idea acceptedon the authority of some scripture. And the scripturewas nothing more

than a revelation to one or more seekers of truth, and was later acceptedastruth by his or their followers on authority.

Now, does this acceptanceof an original intuition justifyus in saying that,for Indian philosophy, the philosophical method is intuition? First, manyschools did not follow the method of writing commentaries upon com-mentarieson the intuitive wisdom of the Upanisads and the Vedanta-sitrasfor developing and expounding their systems. Second,differentschools andsub-schools of the Vedanta understoodand interpretedthese original intui-tions in

quitedifferent

ways,and in

orderto justify their understandingandinterpretationthey used logic and reason. Their method was to show thatrival interpretationswere illogical and contraryto fact. Anyone who goesthrough the commentariesof Saikara and Ramanujaon the Vedanta-sutras

197



cansee howtheytried orefuterivaldoctrines.Also,acceptancef scripturalauthority oes not constitute he useof intuitionas a philosophicalmethod,

unless the personwho accepts t uses intuitionat every step and saysthatit confirms r contradictshe doctrinen question.

Furthermore,he developmentof Indianphilosophyhas had its own

peculiarity.Up to thepresent,t hasbeena philosophy f life,inquiringntothe natureand aims of humanlife. It was wont, therefore,o probeintothe deeper ruthsof our innerbeingand adopteda markedlynwardatti-tude. Thesignificantruths t discovered erediscoveredhroughmeditative

contemplation nd disciplined ntrospection.Even so, there werevarietiesof expression nd of opinionwhichresulted n conflictsand controversies.

It was foundnecessary,herefore,not only to removecontradictions ithina singletradition utalso to defend hattraditionromthe attacks f others.

Hereis the sphereof reasonandlogic. Moreover, ot onlywasit necessarythat these nnertruthsbe madeconsistentwitheachotherbutalsothattheybe madeconsistentwith the truthsof the outerworld. Now, therearetwo

ways of accomplishinghis task: the approachmay be made from the

innerto the outer,and the outertruths so interpreted s to appearcon-

sistentwith the inner;or the approachmaybe madefromthe outerto the

inner,and the inner truthsso interpreteds to appearconsistentwith theouter. That the innerand the outermustbe consistentwith each otheris

accepted ybothapproaches,uteachassumes different attern, nd often

eitherunderemphasizesr overemphasizeshe inneror the outertruths,as

the casemaybe. Somesub-schools f the Vedanta,particularlyf the Ad-

vaita,are so engrossedwith the innerthat they do not give due attention

to the outertruths.Theywouldacceptany theoryof the outerworld,pro-vided t didnot denythe innertruths.Hence,theircosmologies remeager

and weak,and someof them do not even careto developsuchdoctrinesat all. The Nyayaandthe Vaisesika re,indeed,exceptions; ut,compara-

tively, theirphilosophies f the innerlife are meager. However,because

of the generalemphasison the importance f the inner life in Indian

philosophy, here is the belief that it dependson intuitionmainlyas its

philosophicalmethod.

But just as logic cannot work without some data intuitively accepted

(modern ogicwould substitute ssumptionsor intuitive ruths) aboutthe

outerworld,so,

withregard

o the truthsof the innerworldalso, logicmust startwith intuitively btained ruths.Theyare the datato startwith.

Logic stepsin when we attempt o clarifyand interrelatehem. Only to

those who are not interestedn the realmof inner truthsor who come

198 P. T. RAJU




suddenly to realize, as if it were strange, that there is such a realm, would

the inner truths appearto be merely intuitive and a philosophy concerning

them to be using only intuition as its method. There can be no philosophywithout the use of intellect, just as there can be no logic without data

obtained intuitively in the widest sense of the term. If philosophy is to be

philosophy of experience, both intuition and intellect are equally necessaryfor its development.

Still anotheraspectof philosophicaldevelopmentin India should be noted.Indian philosophy started with primary emphasis on, and interest in, inner

truths and began its interpretationof the outward in consonance with its

understandingof the inner. But this aspect belongs only to the Vedantic

schools, and not to the Nyaya, Vaisesika, Samnkhya,nd Yoga among theorthodox or to the heterodox schools of Jainism, Buddhism, and Carvaka,with which all the orthodox schools had to contend. In these controversies,the Vedantic schools had not only to reformulatetheir doctrinesabout outertruths in accordancewith facts, but also to prove the reality of inner truthsthemselves. The Carvakas,who were materialistsand neitheracknowledgedthe authority of scripture nor accepted the reality of the self (itman),to say nothing of God, acted as a check upon any tendency to accept truths

uponthe

authorityof

scripture.The

necessityof even

innertruthsexpoundedby the Upanisads,with which the orthodox schools started,had later to be

proved with the help of the method of postulation (arthapatti). Some of

the orthodox schools did not accept postulation as a distinct means of

cognition, but turned it into a form of syllogism. In any case, they had to

prove the inner truths besides acceptingthem on scripturalauthority,which

latter method may be identified with intuition. In fact, as the Carvakas

did not at firstacceptthe validity of inference and later even that of percep-tion, the other schools had to prove the validity of both. Thus, the forms

which the systems finally took have the appearanceof logically formulated

systemsrather than collated intuitive truths,though the Vedantic schools inthe form of commentaries on commentaries on the Vedanta-sutras,whichare themselves systematizationsof the Upanisadictruths,appearto be recon-ciliations and systematizationsof the Upanisadicintuitions.

VII

Provided we do not forget that Indianphilosophy

has beenprimarilyconcerned with the inner life of man and with the place of man in the

universe and his destiny, we may say that it is neither more intuitive norless intellectual in its methods than Western philosophy. Taking into further

199



consideration he fact that Indianphilosophy has had no significantdevelop-ment since about the fifteenth century and therefore cannot show as many

ramificationsand as much progress as modern and contemporaryWesternphilosophy can, we may say with justification hat, up to the fifteenth cen-

tury,Indian philosophy showed as vigorous a development of logic as could

be expected. The elaboratedefinitions, he methodsof definition,and logical

analysisof conceptswhich the Neo-Nyiya gave us and the practiceof which

was later adopted by the other schools would leave no doubt in the minds

of any serious student about the intellectualism of the methods of the

philosophers of that time. But if we consider philosophy as interpretationof experienceand experienceas both inner and outer,and as primarilydirect,

we have to acceptalso the view that no philosophy can dispensewith intui-tion. Quite often, the Middle Ages of Europe are referredto as the Dark

Ages, and the medieval period of Europeanphilosophy as having no phi-

losophy but only theology; and it is also said that the period tolerated no

freedom of inquiry and put arbitrary imits on reason. But Whitehead saysthat it was a period of reason.l2 The Schoolmen argued and argued,even

about the numberof angels that could danceon the point of a needle. It is

the modern period, he says, that turned its attention to history, fact, and

experience.It is an

acceptedmethod now to start from

experience, argueabout it, and test our arguments again by experience. That is, we use both

intuition and intellect. When it is said that the Middle Ages were opposedto the free use of reason,it is meant that they were opposed to that freedom

of inquiry which is not merely arguing but also discovery. And discoveryincludes direct experience. Intellect cannot work without intuition, and in-

tuition needs intellect for its development and as a check.

So much is admittedeven by Western philosophers. ProfessorMontaguewrites that the "theory that truth can be attained by a supra-rationaland

supersensuous acultyof intuition is mysticism."13He saysfurther:"Intuitionmight be defined not only as imagination touched with conviction, but also

as the outcome of sub-conscious nduction or deduction."14 And intuition

touchedwith conviction is the same whether it occursin the scientist or the

poet.5l This imagination is that function of mind which forms hypotheses.

Logically it is the function of forming hypotheses,and psychologically it is

imagination. Again, ProfessorMontague writes: "It is the latter business of

comparing the newly born hypotheses of imagination with the established

1 A. N. Whitehead,Scienceand the ModernWorld (New York: The New AmericanLibraryof World Literature,nc., 1949), p. 39. Certaintendencies n contemporaryogical positivismmaybe called tendenciesof "unbridled ationalism."

"W. P. Montague,Waysof Knowing (London: GeorgeAllen andUnwin, Ltd.,1948), p. 55.1 Ibid.,p. 66. Ibid.,p. 64.

200 P. T. RAJU




community of older principleswhich constitutes the work of reason."'l But

is not the forming of hypotheses the work of reason also? That is, at this

point it is difficult clearly to demarcatereason from imagination, for theframing of hypotheses is a function of reason as well. Thus, we have facts

directly experienced,and reasoninterrelatingthem by positing relations and

new facts andprinciples. Without intuition in the sense of directexperience,reason cannot work, and what we call the intuition of the mystics is ex-

perienceat a level at which reasonceasesto function. And, when the mystics

say that reason cannot grasp their highest reality, they mean that at that

level there is no scope for the work of reason,as there are no differencesor

distinctions to be interrelated.

As ProfessorMontague complains, some of the mystics adopt a negativerelation to the world and maintain that the world is not real. As the world

of pluralityis not real, as the highest realityis the only real, and as the work

of reason or intellect is confined to the realm of plurality, they say that

reason or intellect cannot grasp reality. But even these mystics do not use

intuition as a philosophical method. Philosophy is always discursiveknowl-

edge, logical understanding of the nature of the universe. What these

mystics generally do is to disprove,with the help of reason, all the positive

conclusions about the world arrived at by the same reason in rival phi-losophies. Their philosophies generally appear to be destructive (vitan-

divadas), not constructive.Their positive contribution to philosophy lies in

their contention that there is a kind of knowledge which is intuitive but not

discursive and that through it alone can reality be known. But intuition

itself gives them no philosophy, for there is nothing to think about and

thought as such ceases to exist in that intuition.

One importantpoint which these negativistic philosophersseem to over-

look isthat,

if the truth of intuition and of theirreality

is basedon,

and

derived from, considerationsof empirical fact, either through inference or

postulation, the latter must also be regardedas true if the former are true.

This objection was raised, in fact, by the realistic Vedintins in India, for,

they said,if the data are false, the conclusioncannot be true. The importanceof this objection was noticed by the later followers of the extremist sub-

schools of even the Advaita of Safikara,who said, therefore, that the world

is neither unreal nor real. The truth of the world is a relative truth; onlythe truth of the Absolute is absolutely true. And the distinction between

the relative and absolute truths turns out to be the distinctionbetween what

is true to the humanintellect and what is true to the highest intuition. Some,

Ibid.,p. 65.

201



like the followers of Sankara,say that what is true from one point of view

and false from another can be neither true nor false. Others say that it is

both true and false. But all this elaboration of the ideas of truth andfalsityis the work of intellect, not of intuition.

Taking Bergson, for instance, should we say that he used intuition as a

philosophical method? In spite of all his strictures against intellect and

logic, it was only with their help that he attempted to show their short-

comings. All that he succeededin proving was that there is such a form

of cognition as intuition and that it is with its help that we can cognizetime or duration. But is the experience of space the same as the conceptof space? The experienceof space is as much an intuition as the experience

of time. Kant said as much, before Bergson, in calling space and timeforms of intuition; even as forms of intuition, they are as much intuited.

If succession s not time, simultaneity s not space. We need not here discuss

the question of whether time or space is or is not spiritual. But there are

many things in the world which we know through intuition in the sense

of directexperience. And so long as we areprepared o leave them unrelated

and unco-ordinatedwith each other, reason does not enter the scene. But

when we attemptto co-ordinateand relate them and disprovefalse intuitions

and confirm the true, we need the work of reason. Bergson, for example,had to use reasonfor relating time with spaceand otherobjectsof experienceand in developing principles of this interrelating.

Bradleyalso admittedthe necessityof intuition,when he saidthat, without

the "This" in immediate experience, thought cannot work; otherwise, the

workings of thought would be a consistent fairy tale without relevance to

actuality.17Mr. Walsh says that Bradley admits somewhat tacitly the truth

of intellectual intuition in our experience,which Kant thought belongs onlyto God's experience.'8 Thought cannot incorporatethe immediacyof feel-

ing and sense and therefore remains until the end "an unearthly ballet ofbloodless categories"and a "spectralwoof of impalpable abstractions."In

orderto succeedin its work and attain its objective, thought must pass into

something other and higher. And this higher, which is to retain the mediacyof thought and the immediacyof feeling and sense, can be nothing other

than intellectual intuition, which creates sensations according to its con-

ceptions.

17F. H. Bradley, The Principles of Logic (London: Oxford University Press, 1922), Vol. II,

p. 660. See also Rudolf Carnap, Meaning and Necessity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,n.d.), p. 12. Just as Bradley says that reason cannot determine whether a proposition is factuallytrue or not without immediate experience, Carnap admits that semantics cannot determine thesame without direct observation.

'8Reason and Experience, p. 62.

P. T. RAJU02




VIII

It maybe interesting ndusefulfor comparative urposeso knowsome

of themeaningsn whichthephrasentellectualntuition s used n Westernphilosophy.Walsh, n his bookReasonandExperience,ivesfour mportantmeanings.First, ntellectual ntuition n the full Kantiansenseis a hypo-theticalcognitive aculty,attributedo God,whichsimultaneouslyntuits he

particulars nd thinksthem.19Second, ntellectual ntuition s the appre-hensionof self-evident ruths. "Intuition f the self-evident . . lies at thebasis of all knowledge.We have only to supplementhis with the theoryof Descartes hat inferencetselfreduces t its bestto intuition o reach herationalistdoctrineof scientific

knowledgen its

strongestorm."20 n the

third place, intellectual ntuition is the intuition of universals.Aristotlebelieved hatthe universals reperceivedn the particularsndexistin the

particulars,n re. So, they aredirectlyperceived.But they are not sensedor intuitedwith the help of the senses.Therefore,heymustbe intuitedbythoughtorintellect.Thus,all formsare ntellectuallyntuited.In the fourth

place,every nferencehas an elementof intuition.Murewrites:"HadKant

paidmoreattention o the natureof inferencehe mighthavefound it less

easy to deny to thoughtits native momentof intuition. The discursive

factor n thought s revealednot only in the dispersion f an identical on-cept througha multiplicity f sensuousntuitionswhichinstantiatet, butalso in the movementof inference rompremiseso conclusion; nd in the

graspingof a conclusion complementaryactorof intellectualntuition s

plainlymanifest, ot as actseparateromdiscursionutasthere-immediationof the discursivemediatorymovement."2l Dr. Ewing identifies the insightthat thepremisesnecessitatehe conclusionwith intellectualntuition.Herewe are reminded f Bradley's iew that in inferencewe synthesizehe data

and intuitthe conclusionn an integratedwhole.22Now, withoutgoing into detailedexplanation ndcriticism f thesedoc-k9Some interpreters equate intuiting the particularswith creating the sensations that accord with

the categories.

20Here we are reminded of the view of the Mimamrsakas, amely, that among the grades of theuniversals all universals except the highest and the lowest are both universal and particular,because each universal, as different from the others of the same grade, is a particular comingunder a higher universal, and, as comprehending the species coming under itself, is a universal.The lowest in the gradation must be a pure particular and the highest a pure universal. Now,at least those universals that are particulars must be intuited also, besides being conceived. Again,as individual entities, all universals must be intuited. Thus, not only sense but also intellect musthave the power to intuit; which means cognition as such must be an intuition as well.

1 G. R. G. Mure, An Introduction to Hegel, p. 96, quoted by Walsh in Reason and Experience,pp. 56-57.

"Bradley, The Principles of Logic, Vol. I, p. 258: "We first do a certain work on our data;and this work is the construction. We then by inspection discover and select a new relation,and this intuition is the conclusion."

203



trines,we may say that in Western philosophy, too, the presenceof intuition

is admitted not only at the level of sensation and perception, but also at

that of intellect or thought. Intuition is the grasping of an object as a solidunity or integrality. It is present, therefore, not only when pure qualitieslike colors and smells are grasped but also when individual objects like

pens and pencils, universals like humanity and redness,and the Absolute or

Brahman at the suprarational evel are cognized. When I perceive a penas a pen and not merely as a combinationof qualities like colors and touch,I have an intuition. That the pen is perceived as a pen and not always as

a group of qualities is shown when, in the erroneousperceptionof a pencilas a pen, we make the contradictingjudgment, "It is a pencil and not a

pen." We do not say that we did not really perceivethis or that quality,butthat we did not perceive this or that object. The knowledge that we did

not really perceive this or that quality is a result of later analysis of our

experience. And even when we perceive a color like red, we have intuition,becausethe object is seen as a solid unity. A quality is a quality only when

it is seen in relation to its substance.

Regarding the cognition of universals,there are two views: accordingto

Plato, they are only rememberedbut not perceived, whereas, according to

Aristotle, theyare

perceivedin the

particulars.But Aristotle

saysthat

theyare only intellectually intuited and not sensuously. Among the Indian phi-

losophers, the Naiyiyikas say that universals are sensuously intuited. Now,

even taking Plato's doctrine,when we rememberan object,do we remember

it as a solid unity or as a group or combination of interrelated elements?

In rememberingan object as a solid unity, there is an element of intuition,

whether the object is a physical object or a universal. And Plato treats the

Ideas as substances,which shows that the universals are solid unities and

not mere groupingsof elements. So, if we acceptthe view that the cognition

of any solid unity involves intuition, then there must be intuition at the levelof thought also.

One may now ask: If thought, like perception, involves intuition, what

is the difference between the two? Is not thought said to be discursiveand

perceptionnon-discursive?In answer,it may be asked: If the perceptionof

a book is of the form "It is a book"and not merely of the form "book,"is

not perception also discursive? Perception itself becomes relational knowl-

edge with the relation between "It" and "book." We may hold that there

is a stage in perception at which cognitionis of the

simpleform "book."

But when I wish to communicatemy knowledge or bring it to the level of

communicabilityor even to that level at which I can relate it to other bits

of my own knowledge, it would be of the form "It is a book" and would

204 P. T. RAJU




be relational.Forall thesestages,philosophers ave used the wordpercep-tion. Even if we believethatperceptions originallyof the form "book"

and is intuitive, t is potentiallyrelationaland discursive, ecause t laterassumeshe form"It is a book." "It"and "book"hen becomeelementsofthe originalperception"book." But the elementsnow remain ntuitions;andagainthe awarenessf thewhole,thoughdiscursive,etainsan intuitive

background.At the level of thinking,we pass beyonddemonstrativeeference.But

even when we make a judgment ike "Man s mortal,"we have two solidformalunities,"man"and "mortal," istinctlyentertained y thoughtandrelatedby it. These solidunitiesare intuitions. If so, even at the level of

thoughtor understanding, e have intuition.The abovediscussion howsthat, exceptat the highest (that is, of the

Absolute and of the mystic) and the lowest levels of cognition, thoughtcannot work without intuitions and intuitions cannot be understoodwithout

thought,and that the distinctionbetween houghtand intuitioncannotbeclear-cut. If thought is relational and relations need terms to relate, then,in the sameprocessof cognition, he cognitionof the terms s intuitiveandthe act of relating s discursive.This means that thought s permeated yintuition. And even in

perception, articularlyt that level at which it is

communicable,ntuition s permeated y thought. If philosophys a com-municable ystemof knowledge,ntuitionby itselfcannotbe its method. Ifa communicableystemof knowledges one basedon intuitions,hen intui-tion mustbe one of the methodsof philosophy,whether n the Eastor theWest.

Kant contrastedntuitionandconcepts, aying hat intuitions(percepts)withoutconceptsare blind and conceptswithout ntuitionsareempty. Heused the wordintuition n the meaningof sensationonly. But later,even

categories,sunitaryormsof theunderstanding,ereregardedsintuitions.They are intuitively used and intuitively known, and confer unitary formon the manifoldof sensations. f intuition s the awareness f solidunities,then it appliesas much to categoriesas to sensations.We have alreadyreferred o Bradley'sview, according o which we inspector intuit theconclusionn a synthesizedwholecomprisinghe data. His view is justifiedonly if intuiting he conclusionmeans the perception not a sensuousper-ception,of course)of the formalunityof the whole. So, whenever hereis

perceptionof a

unity,whetherformal or

material,we have intuition.

And the self-sameprocessof cognition s discursive lso if it is awareofthe relationalaspect,too. This awarenessmay be of three kinds: sub-conscious and voluntary, subconsciousand involuntary (spontaneous), and

205



consciousand voluntary. The subconsciousand voluntary type may be found

in those cases in which we draw conclusions without knowing that we are

doing so; in the use of categories, our awareness is subconscious and in-voluntary; only in explicit inference is the awareness of relational activityconscious and voluntary.

This latter considerationshows that the opposition between intuition and

concepts is not the same as the opposition between intuition and discursive

thought. If to perceive a sensationis not regardedas discursive, hen simplyto cognize a universal is also not discursive. Discursive knowledge comes

in when we begin to be aware of relations. If it is said that no conceptcan be cognized without cognizing its relations with the particulars and

that cognition of a concept is therefore always relational, as much can besaid about the cognition of even a color like red, for even here cognitionis of the form "It is red"and thereforeinvolves a relation between "It"and

"red." If it is said that there must have been a cognitive stage at which

the distinction between "It"and "red" s not drawn,we may say that there

must have been a stage at which every concept without relation to its par-ticularsis grasped. Indeed, neither stage can be demonstratedand fixed, but

only postulated. From the standpoint of communicable knowledge or of

every kind of knowledge that can be used and related, pure sensation andconcepts are equally hypotheses.

IX

The above discussionmight have warned us that, in order to answer the

question whether Indian philosophy as a whole, or one or more of its

systems, uses intuition, either solely or conjointly with reason, as a philo-

sophical method, one must be careful about the meaning of the word intui-

tion and about the object with reference to which intuition is claimed tobe the proper method of cognition. Intuition may be ordinary or extra-

ordinary. Clairvoyance,telepathy, etc., and the intuition of the mystics are

extraordinary. All of us may possess these powers but to such a degreeas to be negligible. But intuition in the ordinarysense of direct awareness

of solid unities or unitaryforms is used by all of us, and we are either aware

of its use or acknowledge it if it is subconscious or spontaneous. Both

Western philosophy and Indian philosophy use it as one of their methods.

But intuition alone can never be aphilosophical

method and is not so used

even by Indian philosophers.The real differencebetween Indian and Western philosophiesdoes not lie

in their use or avoidanceof intuition as a philosophical method, but in the

206 P. T. RAJU




spheresof theirprimarynterestandtheirattitudes.Indianphilosophyhasbeeninteresteduntil now morein the innerlife of man and has adopted

a more inwardattitude,while Westernphilosophyhas been interestedngeneralmore n theouter ife of man and hasadopted noutward ttitude.23Becauseof thisdifference,t is wrongly hought hatIndianphilosophyhasused intuitionalone as its method,while Westernphilosophyhas usedreason. The formeralso has used reasonas its method,but primarilyorthe clarification ndelaboration f innertruths.

We mayconcludeby saying hat (1) manyclassical ndianphilosophersmaintainedhatexperience f thehighestreality, he Brahman Absolute),Atman(Self), orPurusa Self), ispossibleonlythroughunmediated nowl-

edgeorintuition; 2) somemaintainedhatevenatthat level ourexperiencecannotbe unmediated;3) eventhe formergroup, n its controversies ithits rivals,had to prove,with the help of reason,not only the realityofthe Brahmanor the Atman but also the validityand even the possibilityof the highest ntuitionas unmediatedognitiveexperience;4) almostallof them accepted he extraordinaryorms of empiricalknowledgelike

clairvoyancendtelepathy; 5) most of themheld thatall empirical nowl-

edge that claimstruth is discursive; nd (6) all of them used reasonto

interrelatenot

onlythe different orms of

valid knowledgebut also thedifferent ormsor levelsof realitywhichthey accepted.a2We should not use the terms subjective attitude and objective attitude to denote this difference,

for we may adopt an objective attitude even in the study of our inner life and a subjectiveattitude in the study of the outer.

207

intuition as a philosophical method in india p.t. raju

Documents