int'l crisis response journal book review

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  • 8/3/2019 Int'l Crisis Response Journal Book Review

    1/1

    CRISIS|RESPONSE+60 VOL 7 ISSUE 3

    book reviewsDeadly Indifference: The Perfect (Political) Storm

    IN HIS BOOK THE FORMER DIRECTOR OF

    FEMA, Michael Brown, describes the various

    types of indifference which conspired

    to create the perfect storm of catastrophe

    in New Orleans before,

    during and after Hurricane

    Katrina (see CRJ 3:1),

    writes Emily Hough.Take the indifference of

    neglect and over-familiarity

    with ones environment,

    often exacerbated by

    the complicity of city

    leaders when they

    ignore risk and allow

    development in unsuitable

    or hazardous areas.

    But here, there is also a

    conflict between fighting

    terrorism and mitigating

    natural risks: a shift of

    focus from natural hazard

    preparation and mitigation

    towards the fear of extremists,

    had profound implications

    on the city of New Orleans.

    The author points out

    that the US Army Corps of

    Engineers had known for years

    that foundations of the levees

    was substandard; maintenance

    had been recommended and delayed by

    authorities. Money that should have been spent

    on assessing and repairs was used elsewhere.

    And, in any event, the levees were only designed

    to protect against a Category 3 hurricane. We

    always knew New Orleans could turn into a

    fishbowl if the levees failed, says Brown.

    The indifference of bureaucracy appears to

    be a consequence of the vigorous response

    to the terrorist threat af ter September 11,

    2001, and Brown clearly has no love for

    the Department of Homeland Security

    (DHS), calling it a monstrosity.

    BastardisationThe bastardisation of FEMAs mission, theevisceration of its budget and the shifting

    of its personnel had created an air of

    tension, disillusionment and distrust of the

    administrations reorganisation plans, he

    says. Before FEMAs integration into the DHS,

    the approach was simple. The director of

    FEMA would ask for something and it would

    be done; if he had a question, he would ask

    the President. After the creation of the DHS,

    a more cumbersome chain of command

    was introduced. Brown is scathing: The

    DHS had become a bureaucratic alchemists

    dream where human lives were turned into

    pieces of paper that

    documented human suffering

    instead of alleviating

    it as micromanaging

    sorcerers carefully turnedgold into dross.

    He says that everywhere

    he turned while directing

    the emergency response

    to Katrina, he encountered

    people outside of FEMA, but

    within the DHS, who did not

    have experience or culture

    of getting things done in a

    disaster. This is illustrated

    by what happened after

    Brown had negotiated with

    airlines to evacuate people

    from the Superdome and

    the convention centre.

    When he asked for a

    progress update, he was

    informed that negotiations

    were in place with the

    Transportation Security

    Administration as to

    how best to screen the

    evacuees. The authors frustration is clear; the

    object was not to start screening and arresting

    people, but to get them on a plane and moved

    to safety. The issue was resolved eventually, but

    caused a further delay in helping to relieve the

    suffering of people trapped in hellish conditions.

    Political indifference and what Brown terms

    Not In My Best Interest (NIMBI) also played

    a primary role in the disaster. He is not shy of

    naming individuals he holds responsible for

    undermining FEMAs response, accusing them

    of wanting photo opportunities, shifting blame

    and being worried about their own personal

    image and political futures, rather than trying to

    understand the situation faced on the ground.

    When evacuations were advised by FEMA,

    procrastination and indecision fuelled by fear

    took hold; when the evacuations were ordered,

    it was too late. Local leaders delayed acting

    to avoid voter backlash in case events changed

    at the last minute and constituents questioned

    their decisions; state leaders with exhausted

    regional resources tried to take credit for

    whatever worked while blaming others for any

    failures; members of Congress pretended that

    photo ops at the disaster site actually meantthey were involved with recovery... Later, he

    adds: The immediate danger was over and we

    were working in ways that revealed the stupidity,

    greed, aggression or insensitivity of too many

    people in too many high level positions.

    Brown points out that for many politicians

    removed one step from the disaster, the events

    were seen as a time to win new votes. Indeed,

    some appear to have been indifferent to the

    effects of their actions on the disaster.

    Unsurprisingly, the media comes under

    scrutiny, prompting Brown to reflect:

    Sometimes I think that if we were to

    experience Bible stories in contemporary

    times, one of the plagues Moses would

    visit upon Pharaoh would be a scourge of

    politicians accompanied by a swarm of media

    darlings. Their presence would spread false

    expectations, misery and heartbreak throughout

    the land. Oh, wait, maybe weare living in a

    contemporary version of Biblical times.

    Frustrations with the media revolve around

    reporting out of context, giving voice to rumours

    that were not cross-checked and wanting

    to go out on search and rescue missions

    with the rescuers, not understanding that

    places taken by media in boats were places

    being denied to those in need of rescue.

    After reading this analysis and perspective

    of what went wrong and what went right

    or, perhaps more importantly, what was

    perceived to have gone wrong or right the

    whole episode remains as murky as the

    toxic waters that overwhelmed the city.

    Anyone living in an area tha t might be

    affected by a similar disaster must hope and

    pray for (and should be voting for) officials

    and leaders who are brave enough to takeunpalatable political decisions which are

    right for the community, who are decisive

    enough to take command and show leadership

    in a crisis, and who eschew self-serving

    political manoeuvring and cynical behaviour

    when peoples lives are being destroyed.

    Deadly Indifference: The Perfect Political

    Storm Hurricane Katrina, the Bush White

    House and Beyond by Michael D Brown and

    Ted Schwarz, is published by Taylor Trade

    Publishing; ISBN 978168794856

    human lives were turned

    into pieces of paper that

    documented human suffering

    instead of alleviating it, as

    micromanaging sorcerers carefully

    turned gold into dross