internet comparison sites
DESCRIPTION
Internet Comparison Sites. 27 June 2011 - London Harriet C. Gamper Civic Consulting. Theory v. Reality. IDEAL ‘Frictionless comparison’ ICS differentiate on quality aspects as well as price Effective screening means best options are oversampled Feedback mechanism (experience goods) - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
Internet Comparison Sites
27 June 2011 - London
Harriet C. Gamper
Civic Consulting
Theory v. Reality
IDEAL
‘Frictionless comparison’ ICS differentiate on quality
aspects as well as price Effective screening means
best options are oversampled Feedback mechanism
(experience goods) Consumers are able to cut
through the excess of information to find a suitable product
REALITY
Too much information and choice – consumers cannot make an informed decision
Large overlap between users of the 4 most visited UK ICS (Mintel)
Consumers search on ICS then purchase direct from the retailer
Consumer distrust
1. Perception that suppliers do not cover the whole market
2. ICS are not impartial – rankings are influenced by commission bias
3. Comparisons are not like for like
Market coverage
Impartiality
Like for like comparisons
Underlying economics
Two-sided platforms
ConsumersService is free
TradersPay commission
ICS find a valuable match between the two
Funding:1. Advertising2. Sale of data3. Commissions:
Pay-per-clickPay-per-action
A paradoxical business model
Seller-side paradox Decision to affiliate intensifies pricing
rivalry on the platform
Buyer-side paradox No price dispersion and so no longer a
reason to consult ICS at all – consumers go straight to retailer (Ellison and Ellison)
Conclusions: Market coverage
is only partial Price dispersion
will persist
The two-sided business model is flawed
What does this mean for consumers? Two-sided ICSs argue that they are impartial:
“Proud to be an independent company providing impartial and unbiased comparison”
Do ICSs actually work? To find out, consumers would have to research the
market themselves ′Satisficing′/bounded rationality
Waste of time ′Shopping around′ amounts to an ineffective remedy
Trader obfuscation Blocking of shopping agents
PriceRunner Website – ‘What makes PriceRunner different?’ “PriceRunner also includes hundreds of online AND high street stores you won't find anywhere else. Some of them simply can't afford to advertise - despite offering some cracking deals. And others would rather you didn't know how uncompetitive their prices (including those all-important ‘hidden extras') really are. We list them anyway!” (http://www.pricerunner.co.uk/user-guide/impartiality.html)
Refusal to be listed – eg Direct Line http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T1CYDQG9RIs
Price obfuscation Bait/headline pricing Tariff chaos – changing prices/tariffs too frequently
Conclusion – the release of complete and up-to-date information is crucial to allow ICS to operate effectively
Three cumulative levels of disclosure
Obligation for sellers to release pricing data to allow ICS to provide full market coverage (ban on refusal to deal/be listed) ICS support Article 21 of the telecommunications package
With regards to relational services (eg retail banking & utilities), obligation for sellers to release usage profile data (with consumer consent) to allow ICS to provide customised price comparisons – consumer data portability Data ownership issues around reselling without consumer
consent
With regards to relational services, obligation for sellers to tell consumers if there is a better tariff for their profile – on-going duty to disclose
Possible solutions/1: Change the business model from two-sided to one-
sidedConsumers fund ICS rather than firms by paying: 1. A fee: problem – consumer bias against paying upfront for
advice (“hyperbolic discounting”)2. A subscription (eg Which? model): problem – excludes some
consumers 3. A % of savings made: problem – can be difficult to calculate
saving (not always)
The incentives of ICS change: Full market coverage Accurate rankings Best algorithms Most accurate and up-to-date information from firms
Possible solutions/2? Independent comparison site, for eg run by national regulator or at EU
level Expensive - need to raise consumer awareness Resource-intensive Difficult to keep up-to-date with changing technologies
Code of conduct / self regulation Weak – as cannot be enforced and sites can simply leave the code Studies have shown a lack of consumer trust in online trust
marks/certification
Banning two-sided ICSs through regulation (ban on commissions) Proportionality? Ban selling consumer data (without permission) / use of cookies
(links to digital agenda)
Use existing EU legislation to sponsor solution
UCPD provisions on misleading actions and omissions mean traders have a duty to disclose information to consumers Only applies to B2C In a one-sided business model where the consumer pays the
ICS, could the ICS be regarding as acting on behalf of the consumer?
Traders would be forced to disclose full information, allowing more effective comparisons
Only one-sided business models could be allowed to benefit from this interpretation
Therefore one-sided business models would enjoy a competitive edge over two-sided models.