international studies in peace and conflict conflict in
TRANSCRIPT
1
International Studies in Peace and
Conflict
Conflict in Europe 1935-45
NSWHTA Stage 6 History Teachers’ Day
25 March 2017
Dr Michael Molkentin
Shellharbour Anglican College & University of New South Wales Canberra
www.michaelmolkentin.com/resources
2
Option B: Conflict in Europe 1935–1945
Principal focus: Students investigate key features and issues in the history of the conflict in Europe 1935–1945. Key features and issues:
causes of the conflict
aims and strategies of the Allied and Axis powers
turning points of the war
impact of war on civilians
origins, nature and impact of the Holocaust
reasons for the Allied victory Students learn about: 1 Growth of European tensions
– dictatorships in Germany and Italy – the League of Nations and collapse of collective security: Abyssinia, the
Spanish Civil War – Britain, France and the policy of appeasement: an assessment – significance of the Nazi–Soviet Non-Aggression Pact
2 Course of the European war
– German advances: the fall of Poland, the Low Countries and France – the air war and its effects: The Battle of Britain and the Blitz, the bombing of
Germany – Operation Barbarossa, the Battle of Stalingrad and the significance of the
Russian campaign* – Battle of El Alamein and the significance of the conflict in North Africa to the
European War 3 Civilians at war
– social and economic effects of the war on civilians in Britain and EITHER Germany OR the Soviet Union
– Nazi racial policies: the Holocaust and the persecution of minorities 4 End of the conflict
– ‘D’ Day and the liberation of France – Russian counter offensives 1944 – final defeat 1944–1945 – Nuremburg War Crimes trials
3
Evaluating the Appeasement Policy
1. The ‘Anti-Appeasement’ interpretation
Winston Churchill was a British politician in the same party as Prime
Minister Neville Chamberlain (the Conservatives). He would succeed
Chamberlain as PM at the beginning of World War II, when the Nazi
invasion of Poland and Western Europe seemingly discredited him.
On 5 October 1938, Churchill criticised the outcome of the Munich
conference in British parliament.
Following the war, Churchill wrote a major history of the conflict in which he established
the view that appeasement was a deeply flawed policy. He used the outbreak of war to
justify his views that Hitler could never have been appeased and that concessions only
strengthened Germany’s position while weakening Britain’s.
Until the mid-1960s, when the British archives released documents on appeasement
(following the 30 year closure), Churchill’s criticism of appeasement dominated our
understanding of Chamberlain’s policies.
1. On what basis does Churchill claim that the Munich Conference was “a total and unmitigated defeat” for Britain?
2. To what extent was Churchill prescient [an accurate predictor of future events]?
Document 1
We have suffered a total and unmitigated defeat...you will find that in a period of time
which may be measured by years, but may be measured by months, Czechoslovakia will
be engulfed in the Nazi régime. We are in the presence of a disaster of the first
magnitude...we have sustained a defeat without a war, the consequences of which will
travel far with us along our road...we have passed an awful milestone in our history,
when the whole equilibrium of Europe has been deranged, and that the terrible words
have for the time being been pronounced against the Western democracies: "Thou art
weighed in the balance and found wanting". And do not suppose that this is the end. This
is only the beginning of the reckoning. This is only the first sip, the first foretaste of a
bitter cup, which will be proffered to us year by year unless by a supreme recovery of
moral health and martial vigour, we arise again and take our stand for freedom as in the
olden time.
Winston Churchill addressing parliament, 5 October 1938.
4
The ‘revisionist’ interpretation
Historians began re-evaluating Chamberlain and the appeasement policy in the mid-1960s
with the newly released documents. It became apparent that Churchill and those who
subscribed to his interpretation might not have considered Britain’s economic, strategic and
military shortcomings in 1938.
They have also debated why the British government adopted a policy of appeasement: some
argue that it was a deliberate and carefully planned approach to avoid war and redress
injustices in Versailles; others claim it was part of an anti-Soviet policy; still, others argue
that Chamberlain had no option but to appease Germany over Czechoslovakia, as Britian
wasn’t ready for war in September 1938. Indeed, some have even argued that
Chamberlain’s policy brought Britain crucial time to prepare for war with Nazi Germany.
Document 2
With the British… morality counted for a great deal. The British statesmen used practical
arguments: the danger from air attack; the backwardness of their rearmament; the
impossibility, even if adequately armed, of helping Czechoslovakia. But these arguments
were used to reinforce morality, not to silence it. British policy over Czechoslovakia
originated in the belief that Germany had a moral right to the Sudeten German territory,
on ground of national principal; and it drew the further corollary that this victory for self-
determination would provide a stabler, more permanent peace in Europe. The British
government were not driven to acknowledge their dismemberment of Czechoslovakia
solely from fear of war. They deliberately set out to impose this cession of territory on the
Czechs before the threat of war raised its head. The settlement at Munich was a triumph
for British policy, which had worked precisely to this end; not a triumph for Hitler, who had
started with no such clear intention… It was [also] a triumph for all that was best and most
enlightened in British life; a triumph for those who had preached equal justice between
people; a triumph for those who had courageously denounced the harshness and short-
sightedness of Versailles…
With skill and persistence Chamberlain brought first the French, and then the Czechs, to
follow the moral line.
A. J. P. Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, Penguin, New York, 1991 (originally
published 1961).
5
3. In your own words explain Taylor’s view that appeasement was a ‘triumph for British policy…’.
4. Compare and contrast the Taylor and Dixon interpretations.
Document 3
Chamberlain was under no illusions about Nazi Germany and its leaders [and]… he was
appalled by the excesses of the Nazi regime, particularly its behavior towards to Jews…
But he also recognized that, in 1938, neither the British people, the British economy, nor
the international situation supported a military response to Hitler…. Winston Churchill’s…
suggestions for a restimulated League of Nations or a growing closer to the Soviet Union
were arguably as impractical as his faith in France’s fighting prowess was misplaced.
In the circumstances, as Chamberlain wrote in January 1938 ‘in the absence of any
powerful ally, and until our armaments are completed, we must adjust our foreign policy
to our circumstances. As Ian McLeod observes ‘To this extent, necessity was the mother of
appeasement”.
Stephen Dixon, ‘Preparing for War: The Achievement of Neville Chamberlain’, Teaching
History, June 2007, pp. 8-10.
6
Counter-Revisionists
In response to the revisionist interpretation, other historians have mounted new
criticisms of British foreign policy in the 1930s. They tend to emphasise flaws in
British politicians and policy and on the negative strategic impact of permitting
Hitler to revise Versailles, re-arm and expand German territory.
5. What type of sources would Murray have relied on to write this interpretation that may
not have been available to historians writing earlier?
6. Compare and contrast Murray’s view with the orthodox interpretation, as advanced by
Winston Churchill.
Document 4
It is worth enumerating what the Western powers surrendered at Munich. The Czech army
went out the window: Czech tanks would equip three of the ten Panzer divisions that
invaded France in 1940, while four Waffen SS divisions, plus a further four of the army’s
infantry divisions, would possess Czech equipment. The remainder of the materiel
acquired when they occupied rump Czechoslovakia in March 1939 the Germans sold to the
Rumanians for oil and to the Yugoslavs and Hungarians for other raw materials… the
Germans were now in a position to dominate Eastern Europe diplomatically, economically,
and strategically.
For a short time in the 1960s and 1970s it became popular among historians to argue that
Chamberlain had saved Britain from a devastating German air attack; German air force
records have made nonsense of such claims. As late as August 1938 half of the Luftwaffe's
aircraft were out of commission, good for expensive static displays but not much else. A
senior staff officer of the German Second Air Force, when informed his units would have
to attack Britain, noted in August 1938 that his command had the ability to inflict only
'pinpricks' on the British Isles.
The Germans then, did not possess the force structure, the munitions, or the training for a
sustained attack on Britain in 1938. If war had broken out then, it would have been less
costly and less destructive than the war that broke out in September 1939.
Williamson Murray, ‘Munich at Fifty’, Commentary, July 1988.
7
Hitler and Appeasement
Analyses of the merits or shortcomings of appeasement have often centred on the question
of Hitler’s intentions. Some historians argue that Hitler lacked a master plan for war and
that he was an opportunist: he simply took opportunities to improve Germany’s position in
Europe when they presented themselves. Others see Hitler as an ‘intentionalist’- that is, he
was determined to fight a war to expand Germany’s borders.
If the former was the case then appeasement could never have worked – it only served to
make Hitler bolder, whereas the use of force would have likely contained him. If he
intended war, however, appeasement may have been useful to delay the war and give
Britain time to re-arm.
Document 5
Hitler hoped to explain to the gentlemen present his basic ideas concerning the opportunities
for the development of our position in the field of foreign affairs…
The aim of German policy was to make secure and to preserve the racial community and to
enlarge it. It was therefore a question of space. The German racial community comprised over
85 million people and, because of their number and the narrow limits of habitable space in
Europe, constituted a tightly-packed racial core such as was not to be met in any other
country.
Germany’s problem could only be solved by means of force and this was never without
attendant risk…. There remain[s] the questions of ‘When’ and ‘How’. [Hitler then outlined
three possible scenarios]
Case 1: period 1943-45. After this date only a change for the worse, from our point view, could
be expected… Our relative strength would decrease in relation to the rearmament which
would by then have been carried out by the rest of the world… If the Fuhrer was still living, it
was his unalterable resolve to solve Germany’s problems of space at the latest by 1943-45.
Case 2: If internal strife in France should develop into such a domestic crisis as to absorb the
French army completely and render it incapable for war against Germany, then the time for
action against the Czechs would have come.
Case 3: if France should be so embroiled in war with another state that it could not ‘proceed’
against Germany… Actually, the Fuhrer believed that most certainly Britain, and probably
France as well, had already tacitly written off the Czechs and were reconciled to the fact that
this question would be cleared up in due course by Germany…. An attack by France without
British support was hardly probable.
… the annexation of Czechoslovakia and Austria would mean an acquisition of foodstuffs for 5
to 6 million people… The incorporation of these two states with Germany meant… a
substantial advantage because it would mean shorter and better frontiers, the freeing of forces
for other purposes, and the possibility of creating units up to a level of about 12 divisions, that
is, one new division per million inhabitants.
‘The Hossbach memorandum’- minutes of a conference between Hitler and his general staff in
November 1937.
8
7. On which points do the three documents by Hitler corroborate?
8. What disadvantages for Documents 6 and 7 have over Document 5 in assessing Hitler’s
pre-war intentions?
Document 7
All our actions during 1938 represent only the logical expression of the decisions which began
to be realized in 1933. It is not the case that during this year if 1938 – let us say – a particular
action occurred which was not previously envisaged. On the contrary all the individual
decisions which have been realized since 1933 are not the result of momentary considerations
but represent the implementation of a previously existing plan, though perhaps not exactly
according to the schedule which was envisaged… It was also quite obvious that the Austrian
and Czech problems would have to be solved in order to further strengthen Germany’s political
and, in particular, its strategic position. To start with I was not quite sure whether both
problems ought to be or could be solved simultaneously or whether one should deal first with
the question of Czechoslovakia or with the Austrian questions. There was no doubt that these
questions would have to be solved and so all these decisions were not ideas which were
realized at the time of their conception, but were long-made plans which I was determined to
realise the moment I thought circumstances at the time would be favourable.
Adolph Hitler in a secret speech to senior German officers, 10 February 1939.
Document 6
That damned Chamberlain has spoiled my parade into Prague (October 1938). I had not
thought it possible that Czechoslovakia would be served up to me by her friends (January
1939).
We should have started the war in 1938. That was our last chance to keep it localized. But they
yielded to us everywhere. Like cowards they gave in to all our demands. That actually made it
difficult to seize the initiative for hostilities. We missed a unique opportunity at Munich
(February 1945).
Comments made by Hitler regarding the Munich conference in 1939 and 1945.
9
Appeasement and the USSR
Appeasement made the Soviets uneasy at a time when they were deciding to either side
with the West or Nazism.
Document 8
Russian cartoon about Munich:
Chamberlain and Daladier act as
traffic policemen; the sign-post
reads 'Left - Western Europe,
Right - USSR'
A Russian historian, A. O. Chubaryan, wrote the following article, interpreting the effect
Munich had on Soviet-West relations in the critical year prior to World War II.
9. With reference to the above sources, explain how appeasement affected Soviet relations with the West. Would it be valid to suggest that the British policy of appeasement ‘pushed’ Stalin into a pact with the Nazis- and hence made the Nazi invasion of Poland possible?
10. With reference to at least TWO of the above sources evaluate the view that appeasement made war more likely. Write at least 400 words.
Document 9
To the Soviet Union, the Munich Agreement constituted a direct threat. In the first place
by conquering the Sudeten region and soon after the whole of Czechoslovakia, the
German armies drew near to the very frontiers of the USSR.
Secondly Munich showed that Britain and France preferred an agreement with the
aggressor to the formation of an alliance against him. After Munich the Soviet Union was
directly confronted with the danger of isolation, of being left to face German fascism on
its own, and with the prospect of an alliance between Britain, France, Italy and Germany.
A Russian historian, A. O. Chubaryan
10
The Levels of War
The strategic level of command is responsible for coordinating the application of national
power to achieve an end-state favourable to the national interest. The strategic level focuses
on the development and implementation of strategy as the identification of objectives (ends),
concepts (ways) and the resources (means) necessary to achieve them…
The operational level of command encompasses planning and conducting campaigns
incorporating joint forces. A campaign is a series of simultaneous or sequential operations
designed to achieve one or more strategic objectives… The operational level achieves
military strategic objectives by orchestrating, sequencing and resourcing tactical actions and
efforts…
At the tactical level, commanders prepare for, plan and conduct tactical actions to achieve
tasks on lines of operation within a campaign. Successful tactical action requires the
application of joint and combined arms fighting power to defeat the enemy at a particular
time and place. The achievement of tactical tasks is therefore critical in accomplishing
operational level objectives and, in turn, setting the conditions for the strategic objectives to
be met.
[Australian Army, Land Warfare Doctrine 1 The Fundamentals of Land Power (2014), pp. 18-20.]
[Example based on the 1991 Iraq War:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/policy/army/fm/2-0/chap2.htm]
11
The US Army’s Nine Principles of Warfighting
This is a useful rubric for evaluating success/failure in the battles of the Second
World war. For an example of it applied well in an analysis of the Battle of Kursk see
Benjamin R. Simms, ‘Analysis of the battle of Kursk’, Armor, March-April 2003, pp.
7-12.
Mass Concentrate combat power at the decisive place and time
Objective Direct every military operation towards a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective
Offensive Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative
Surprise Strike the enemy at a time, at a place, or in a manner for which he is unprepared
Economy of force Allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts
Manoeuvre Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power
Unity of command For every objective, ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander
Security Never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage
Simplicity Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and clear, concise orders to ensure thorough understanding
Analysing the battle of Kursk using the US Army’s Principles of War
Capt. Benjamin Simms
Mass- As a general principle the attacker needs a 3:1 superiority in strength to be
successful. In all areas the Soviets had at least a 2:1 advantage.
Economy of force- This refers to applying only the forces necessary to achieve a goal
and with future operational requirements in mind. By Citadel go ahead despite
protests of a number of subordinate commanders. committing their entire strategic
reserve the Germans gambled on a decisive victory; if Kursk failed they would have
no means of defending against a Soviet counter attack.
Unity of command- Efficient planning requires cooperation between the various
levels of the armed forces. The German plans were beset by disagreements. The
12
commander of Army Group Centre (Kluge) endorsed the plan but his colleagues in
command of AG North and South (Manstein and Model) disagreed, as did the
inspector general of the Panzer units, Guderian. Hitler insisted
Security- The British passed Enigma decodes of Citadel preparations to the Soviets
in March giving them ample time to prepare their defences. This prevented the
Germans achieving another principle of war: surprise.
13
To what extent was the Russian campaign a turning point in the European War?
Introduction Turning points are campaigns or battles deemed to be significant because of a discernable
strategic impact. They are relatively rare occurrences in total wars due to the size and complexity
of the forces (military, economic and political) belligerents commit to them. Decisiveness is also
rare in modern war due to limited means by which states can use force to have a directly
strategic impact on an opponent.
The Russian Campaign was clearly important because
o It ended an almost uninterrupted set of German victories
o Drew Germany into a war it wasn’t economically or militarily prepared for
o Inflicted severe losses on the Wermacht and Luftwaffe that couldn’t be replaced
o Denied Hitler key strategic goals such as lebensraum and autarky
Yet other campaigns, such as strategic bombing and North Africa were also important because
o They restrained Germany’s war economy
o Put Germany in a poor strategic position
USSR- Barbarossa Barbarossa was Germany’s most important campaign of the war up to June 1941 because it was
(a) the first directly intended to achieve a major strategic objective of the Nazi regime; (b)
because its outcome would determine if the USSR would survive to fight in a combined effort
against Germany and (c) because it involved the largest concentration of German forces yet
committed to battle.
Background- Hitler’s strategic goals- Lebensarum, racial policies and autarky through the
seizure of Soviet resources (oil and grain)
Course of campaign (brief!)- Weaknesses in planning, tactical success of the Panzer units
undermined by the army’s operational capability to maintain tempo
Consequences- Soviet counter attack- strengths of Zhukov’s leadership- German losses
Historiography- Christian suggests the failure of Barbarossa gave the USSR the opportunity to
mobilise its vast resources against Germany. Stahel argues that Barbarossa needed to bring the
war to a decisive close in the East within about 12 weeks- otherwise Germany could not support
a long term war in the East. Despite its tactical-level success it failed to achieve its operational
(campaign) level objectives hence putting Germany in a terminal strategic position of (a) a two
front war and (b) a prolonged struggle against a much more economically and militarily
powerful state.
USSR-
Stalingrad
Stalingrad was a turning point because it saw the defeat of Hitler’s only remaining option in
Russia and saved Soviet industry and raw resources
Background- Hitler’s only option left in the East
Reasons for the outcome of the campaign- Red Army’s logistical advantages vs German
weaknesses (Luftwaffe failure)
Consequences- Major blow to German operational capability in the surrender of Sixth Army;
broad theatre-level success for the USSR cements its supply lines north and secures major
propaganda victory
Historiography- McCauley argues that Stalingrad ensured a German victory was no longer
possible.
USSR-
Kursk (Operation
Citadel and Soviet
counter-offensive)
Kursk a turning point because it was the final German offensive in the east- its loss would put
Germany on the defensive for the rest of the war – a ‘Last gamble’ while Wehrmacht prepared
for a defensive war
Outcome of campaign – ostensibly the Wehrmacht won a tactical victory in that it inflicted
vastly greater losses on the Red Army than it sustained. It failed to achieve the planned
breakthrough, however, and the losses inflicted had no strategic impact on the USSR as it had
the economic capacity and population to sustain these losses.
Consequences- German losses degraded fighting power of the Wehrmacht- Citadel’s defeat
resulted in a Soviet counter attack that indicated strategic initiative passing to Red Army
Historiography- Overy states Kursk “tore the heart out of” the Wehrmacht and rendered it
ineffective for future offensives on the Eastern Front.
Strategic bombing While the Red Army was destroying Germany’s military capabilities, the British and Americans
made a significant contribution by targeting Germany’s economy and drawing reserves away
from the battlefront.
Bombing was the only way Western Allies could attack prior to D Day. It was also strategically
important for the alliance as it went some way to assuaging Stalin’s demands that his Western
Allies confront Germany directly in 1942-43.
14
Course of campaign- brief overview of escalation of bombing raids and development of
approaches such as precision and area bombing
Results- impact on Germany.
Historiography- Some have denied the usefulness of strategic bombing. Although Buckley
recognizes it couldn’t win the war alone, it did put the brakes on Germany’s economic growth
(1942-44) and destroyed the Luftwaffe, forcing it to fight in a defensive role. It also diverted
resources to home defence, hence assisting the land war in the East.
North Africa Although not in Europe, the campaigns in North Africa (1940-43) severely weakened Germany’s
strategic position and allowed the Allies to open up a southern front
Background- Hitler not particularly interested in North Africa- need to shore up Italians
Strategically important to Britain (Suez and Oil and a ‘southern front’)
Outcome of the campaign – battle won through British superiority at the tactical level (quantity
and quality of tanks, troops, artillery) and operationally: the use of air and sea power to interdict
German supply lines and ULTRA to infiltrate German signals.
Results- Secured British strategic interests and degraded Germany’s strategic position: it allowed
an invasion of Italy in 1943- creating a three front war. It also denied Hitler the Middle East’s oil
stocks and forced the Germans to divert forces to secure southern France.
Historiography: Thompson sees North Africa important for what it later allowed the Allies to do,
that is, invade Italy and the Balkans and pressure Germany from the south too.
Conclusion Allied victory in the Second World War was a coalition effort. Germany was defeated by the
Soviets and the Western Allies cooperating to destroy its economic and military resources over a
period of five years. Hence there was no single turning point, as such.
Soviet victories in the east prolonged the war to their advantage. While Germany’s reserves
dwindled, the Soviets mobilised their immense population. Also, the Eastern Front campaign
proved the most damaging to Germany’s military forces.
Western allied victories in the bomber offensive and North Africa built upon the successes the
Red Army had in 1941 and 1942 to ensure Germany was in a strategically impossible position
by the end of 1943.
15
The Air War and its Effects: The Bombing of Germany, 1940-1945 ‘Strategic Bombing’
Until D-Day in 1944 the only way the Western Allies could harm Germany
This was called ‘strategic bombing’- its goal was to damage Germany’s
economy and industry and make it difficult for it to wage war
Bomber squadrons flew raids on Germany from bases in Britain (Britain
became a giant airport for the bomber offensive)
There were generally two approaches taken
o The RAF mainly bombed by night. Bomber Command’s chief, Arthur
‘Bomber’ Harris advocated area bombing. This meant his bombers
targeted cities with firebombs to intentially destroy homes and kill
German civilians
o The USAAF (United States Army Air Force) came to England after
USA declared war in late 1941. It mainly bombed by day and pursused
a policy of precision bombing, targeting specific industrial and
military targets (factories, oil refineries railway centers etc.)
Key Aspects: (get details from the text, or online)
• Ineffectiveness of RAF’s raids in 1940-41
• Arthur ‘Bomber’ Harris takes command of Bomber Command
• Technological improvements- Lancaster bomber, navigational and bombing
aids (OBOE), ‘window’
• American involvement – US 8th Air Force from 1942 on
• Casablancca directive and Operation Point Blank 1943
• Long range fighter escorts
• Destruction of the Luftwaffe in 1944-45
16
German Air Defences
•Luftwaffe interception squadrons (day and night)
•Radar
•Anti- Aircraft batteries (flak)
Case Study 1: Battle of the Ruhr March-June 1943
Objective: to disrupt German steel production in the Ruhr factories.
New technologies and tactics employed by RAF and USAAF: pathfinders,
OBOE, bomber streams of up to 800 aircraft.
Luftwaffe diverted major air defences: 1/3 of all German AA guns there
by mid-year.
German steel production fell by 200,000 tons. Despite doubling resources
it only increased by 20 per cent in 1943.
RAF loss rate 4.7% in 43 raids.
Case Study 2: The Bombing of Dresden February 1945
• Four raids: 722 RAF and 527 USAAF bombers, 784 US fighters. 3,900 tons
of bombs.
• 6.5km square destroyed – 25,000 Germans killed.
• Dresden basically undefended as Flak guns and fighters diverted to fight
Red Army. Six British bombers lost- three by FF. One US aircraft lost.
• Critics: Dresden was a site of cultural significance only; intended to show
USSR western air strength.
• Apologists: Dresden housed 50,000 workers employed in 110 factories. It
was the largest unbombed area in Germany.
The Cost
RAF Bomber Command
55,573 killed out of a total of 125,000 aircrew (a 44.4% death rate)
PLUS 18 000 wounded and/or taken prisoner
460 Squadron (Australian)
Suffered 1018 combat deaths from a normal strength of 200 airmen
The Results
•61 German cities bombed
•3.5 million homes destroyed
•300 000 German civilians killed
•800 000 injured
17
•German industrial production grew between 1942 and 1944- despite Allied
bombing
Did strategic bombing contribute to the German defeat?
John Buckley, of the University of Wolverhampton put the following arguments forward in his 1998 book, Air Power in the Age of Total War. Buckley acknowledges that critics of the bombing campaign usually point to two
pieces of evidence to deny its effectiveness:
a) German civilian morale remained high right to the end of the war and
they continued to support the Nazi war effort and
b) German industrial production grew between 1942 and 1944- some
historians even argue that bombing helped increase German
production by making civilians ‘pull together’ in defiance
Buckley however argues the bomber offensive did indeed damage Germany’s war
effort. He claims,
a) German industrial output can be accounted for because
i. Albert Speer, Germany’s minister for armaments,
brilliantly reorganised the German economy for
maximum efficiency in 1942
ii. The German war economy had a lot of “slack” in it prior
to this- therefore it had great potential to grow
b) Bombing acted as a ‘brake’ on these German production increases, ie-
the German munitions industry would have grown even more without
the bombing. He notes, for example that
i. Tank and aircraft production in 1944 was a third lower
than what the Germans planned- evidence that bombing
presented them with big problems
c) Bombing did affect German morale significantly. Buckley cites a few
figures
i. 1/3 of German civilians had no protection from air raids-
six million of them left cities for protection
ii. In 1944 work absenteeism rates were 25 per cent
iii. Post war surveys had 91 per cent of German civilians
claim bombing was the greatest hardship and “key factor
in the collapse of their morale”
18
Buckley also suggests that the bombing offensive had other effects on the German
war effort.
a) The bomber offensive forced the German military to divert masses of
men and resources away from the battlefront to defend the home front.
By 1944
i. 33 per cent of all artillery production and 20 per cent of
ammunition production went to anti aircraft defences
ii. Two million Germans were employed in aerial defence
(airmen, flak gunners, radar operators, air raid wardens
etc.)
b) The bomber offensive destroyed the Luftwaffe by
i. Seriously disrupting aircraft and fuel production. The
production of aviation fuel fell from 180,000 tons to
20,000 tons between March and November 1944.
ii. By drawing the German pilots up into battles they were
consistently outnumbered in. After long range American
fighter escorts began in late 1943 the Luftwaffe began
suffering critical losses. When the Allied landed in
Normandy (D-Day) in 1944, they had complete air
superiority- the Luftwaffe couldn’t do anything about it.
In conclusion, Buckley states
“The debate as to what the offensive actually achieved will go on, but the weight of
modern research and opinion appears to back the view that considerable damage
was done to the German war economy, hindering output in a variety of ways and
contributing to the Allied victory. However, it is also the case the hope that air
power alone would bring about the defeat of Germany was unattainable. Air power
worked only when integrated into an overall strategy for the prosecution of the
war.”
(Buckley, Air Power in the Age of Total War, p. 166)
Richard Overy in The Bombing War: Europe 1939-1945 (2013) approaches the
question of strategic bombing’s effectiveness differently.
Overy evaluates strategic bombing against the three objectives it had.
1. Destruction of an enemy state’s economy
19
Overy identifies three strategic bombing campaigns in which this was the principle
goal: German bombing of Britain in 1940-41 (the Blitz), German bombing of Soviet
industry in 1941-43 and Allied bombing of Germany (1939-45).
‘The three air offensives against the war economy achieved much less than had been
expected and much less that the limited intelligence had suggested’. [Overy, p. 616]
Overy argues that the Luftwaffe’s campaign against Britain in 1940-41 caused a 5 per
cent reduction in War Economy output. Germany lost 11 per cent in 1944 – but in
both cases these losses were against rising production output. German bombing in
USSR ‘hardly dented’ Soviet war production.
2. Destruction of civilian morale
Despite unprecedented casualties exceeding 600,000 dead and mass dehousing, none
of the societies subject to bombing collapsed.
He argues this was due to (1) bombing increased reliance of civilians on authorities;
(2) it forced civilians into uniformed service in civil defence; (3) a long term
expectation of the demands of total war and (4) the effect of bombing on assisting
the propaganda, demonisation of the enemy.
3. Specific political ends
Bombing was most successful in achieving political ends – but even here its impact
was negligible. The Allies used bombing as a substitute to launch an invasion of
France in 1942 to placate Stalin. Overy argues this did not satisfy Stalin however.
Overy concludes that, ironically, the most valuable impact of bombing was not
strategic (as intended) but operational: it tied up personnel and resources on the
home front and, in the Allied bombing offensive, allowed for the destruction of the
Luftwaffe, which gave the armies advancing on Germany air superiority.
20
Syllabus Section 3: Civilians at War
Social and economic effects of the war on civilians in Britain and EITHER Germany OR the Soviet Union
You are going to complete this part of the course by researching and composing a
response to the following essay question
2012: (B) Assess the social and economic effects of the war on civilians in Britain and EITHER
Germany OR the Soviet Union.
You must examine the impact of the war on British society. You may choose to focus on
EITHER Nazi Germany OR the USSR.
You should take research notes on some type of organised scaffold such as this:
Britain Nazi Germany OR USSR
Onset of total war –
when, how, to what
extent
Rationing and shortages
of consumer goods
Economic organisation/
management
Civilian controls
Civilian morale
The role of women
Exposure of civilians to
enemy action
Role of key individuals
Extent of internal
resistance
Sources to which you have access include:
Ken Webb Conflict in Europe 1935-1945
HTA Study Guide (.pdf of the Conflict in Europe chapter)
History Today articles in the ‘Additional Readings’ folder, especially
Richard Overy ‘An Economy Geared to War’
Rowena Hamal, ‘British Civilian Morale’
Matthew Stibe ‘Women and the Nazi State’
‘Gnnady Bordugov ‘War and peace: Stalin’s regime and Russian nationalism’ The World at War (documentaries- on the V-Library server to download)
Episode 11. Red Star: The Soviet Union (1941-43)
Episode 16: Inside the Reich: Germany (1940-44)
21
Books in the Library, especially
Richard J. Evans, The Third Reich at War
David Christan, Power & Privilege (for USSR)
Chris Corin and Terry Fiehn Russia Under Tsarism and Communism (your National Study text book- it has a chapter on the Soviet home front in WW2)
Juliet Gardiner, Wartime: Britain 1939-1945
You will have five periods of class time to complete the research for this essay. It will
then need to be completed for homework.
22
Nazi Racial Policy and the Holocaust: Essay Response
From the syllabus:
Key Features and issues:
origins, nature and impact of the Holocaust 3. Civilians at War
– Nazi racial policies: the Holocaust and the persecution of minorities
Sample introduction
Despite the focus of popular histories and television documentaries on the period of
the ‘Final Solution’ (1943-45) and the extermination camps such as Auschwitz in
particular, the impact that Nazi racial policy had on civilians was complex and
varied. Two factors determined the way in which civilians experienced Nazi racial
policy. Firstly, the implementation of Nazi racial ideology changed over time.
Although historians debate the extent to which this was a centrally planned
phenomenon it is clear that as time went on the impact on civilians became more
violent and systematically conducted. Furthermore, the Nazis imposed their policies
differently in different regions. Jews and minorities in occupied Western Europe did
not experience persecution and violence as early as, or to the extent, that their
counterparts in Eastern European communities did.
Suggested paragraph outline:
1. To assess the impact that Nazi racial policy had on civilians during the war it is
necessary to first outline the features and objectives of Nazi racial policy.
Traditions of anti-Semitism in Europe
Social Darwinism and Eugenics
Volksgemeinschaft
Role of Jews as scapegoats for 1918, Bolshevism and for German troubles in 1939 (cite Hitler’s January 1939 speech?)
2. Jews and minorities in Germany 1935-45
Early examples of anti-Semitic legislation: 1935 Nuremberg Laws
German homosexuals
Kristallnacht
Deportation and forced labour of German Jews in wartime
2010 HSC Essay Question
(b) Assess the impact of Nazi racial policies on civilians during the European war.
23
3. Jews and minorities in Eastern Europe.
Establishment of ghettos
Establishment of camps
Resettlement
‘The Final Solution’
4. Jews and minorities in Western Europe
Comparisons with previous paragraph
5. Jews, Slavs and minorities in the Soviet Union.
Intensity of conflict on Eastern Front (‘war of annihilation’ as Hitler ordered his troops before Barbarossa) rooted in Nazi ideas about Slavic peoples and their right to lebensraum
Einsatzgruppen (SS ‘Task Groups’)
Treatment of POWs
Forced labour
6. The role of Nazi racial ideology in encouraging resistance and non-compliance
Warsaw Ghetto uprising
Partisan forces in the USSR
Conclusions
Overall impact- number dead, effect on European demography
But within these overall totals Nazi racial policies affected different communities in various ways and to different extents
24
The Nuremberg War Crimes Trials – Preparing for the Examination
Reading 1
Michael Biddiss ‘Victor’s Justice? The Nuremberg Tribunal’, History Today, May (1995), 40-
46.
1. Outline the planning that went in to the trial of Nazi war criminals by Allied leaders,
1943-45. In your response refer to
Tehran Conference 1943
Soviet and US enthusiasm for judicial prosecution/ British resistance
The London Agreement
2. What were the four charges applied to the defendants at Nuremberg?
3. In what respect was the charge ‘Crimes Against Humanity’ legally novel?
4. What problems, from a legal perspective, did the prosecution face over the charge of
‘conspiracy against peace, humanity and the norms of war’ and ‘crimes against peace’?
5. In Bidiss’ view had the International Military Tribunal achieved its objectives?
6. What, suggests Biddiss, have been the failures, in the longer term, of the Nuremberg
Trials?
Reading 2
Jan Lemnitizer, ‘The Conversation’, Nuremberg war crimes trials 70 years on: a complex legacy,
20 November 2015, https://theconversation.com/nuremberg-war-crimes-trials-70-years-on-
a-complex-legacy-50503
1. How have the Nuremberg trials been ‘widely celebrated’?
2. What are some of the hypocrisies that critics of Nuremberg might cite to criticise the integrity of the trials?
3. What significance does Lemnitzer credit the Nuremberg trials with?
Writing Exercise – essay on the Nuremberg trials
Example 1: Using Nuremberg in an essay on Nazi racial policy
Assess the impact of Nazi racial policy on European civilians
Include a paragraph (at the end of the essay?) considering whether or not European civilians
got justice at Nuremberg. In this paragraph you might acknowledge that while a number of
leading Nazis were punished, the vast majority went unpunished as a result of the Allies
desire to quickly de-Nazify and re-build Germany as a bulwark against Soviet Communism.
Furthermore, the trials were undermined by hypocrisies that saw comparable Allied actions
(area bombing, Soviet atrocities against Poles in 1939) unacknowledged.
25
Example 2: An essay focused on Nuremberg
Assess the significance of the Nuremberg war crimes trials.
Major Point 1 – The trial brought to justice some leading Nazis (examples) who had been
instrumental in heinous acts against European civilians by charging them with four crimes
and handing out some heavy sentences.
Major Point 2 – The trials were undermined by hypocrisy and charges of their being a
‘victor’s justice’
Major Point 3- The trials were also limited in scope due to the Cold War imperative to
rebuild and de-Nazify Germany. The high proportion of Wehrmacht officers involved in
atrocities on the Eastern Front went unpunished, for example.
Major Point 4- Nonetheless, Nuremberg established a precedent for modern, international
law including the Genocide Convention, Universal Declaration on Human Rights and
Geneva Convention and, in 1998, the ICC.
Conclusion: The IMT had symbolic significance but it was limited in its pursuit of justice by
the political pressures that limited its scope and the refusal of the allies to apply the same
standards of warfighting to themselves. The Cold War limited international legal
cooperation until the 1990s, when the IMT’s example was revived in the ICC.
26
Historiography
WW2History.com
www.ww2history.com
Interviews with leading scholars in the field such as Robert Citino, Richard Evans,
Richard Overy, Ian Kershaw and Max Hastings.
Andrew Roberts
US Army War College lecture ‘Why Hitler Lost the War: German Strategic Mistakes
in WWII’
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5agLW7fTzBc&list=PLZ1Ga3lb1AR6BlUARB
_wpqnn5_smg1oat
David Stahel
Muskegon Community College Lecture: Operation Barbarossa-Russia be dammed!
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KxsdfcgfSS8
Stahel summarises the thesis from his study of Barbarossa and demonstrates how,
despite its initially stunning tactical successes, the Wehrmacht failed badly during its
1941 invasion of the USSR.
Robert Citino
US Army Heritage and Education Centre Lecture- The Wehrmacht in the battles of
1942
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UNDhswF1GKk
Citino talks about the Wehrmach in the campaigns in 1942 in North Africa and the
USSR. His thesis is that the battles of 1942 represented a change in the nature of the
war from one involving quick decisive battles to a materielschlact (struggle of
materials), which the German military was not capable of fighting.
James Holland
‘Blitzkrieg: exploding the myth’, Wartime, Issue 77, Summer 2017, 10-18.
Holland provides a concise and accessible overview of German, British and French
strategy. He demonstrates how Hitler’s strategy went badly awry in 1940, putting
the Reich in a very difficult position.
27
OFFICIAL ASSESSMENT TASK NOTIFICATION
Faculty: HSIE
Course: HSC Modern History
Task: Research: Conflict in Europe 1935-1945
Date Issued:
Date Due & Time:
Weighting: 25 per cent
Marks: 25
Outcomes being
Assessed:
H2.1
H3.3
H3.5
H4.2
Task Description:
Assess the significance of the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact
in leading to the outbreak of the Second World War. Integrate
a detailed discussion of at least two other factors that also
contributed to the growth of tensions in Europe into your
response.
You are required to respond to the above question in an essay of no
more than 1,500 words (exclusive of footnotes).
In researching this assessment task you should consult a range of
sources including
both scholarly and general works,
articles and book-length studies,
material that is online and in print and
recent scholarship (publications from the last decade).
Drawing on the ideas and arguments of other historians to support
your work is recommended. You are, nonetheless, required to
develop your own argument in response to the question.
You are required to submit your research notes and drafts along
with your essay.
Direct quotations and references to original ideas must be attributed
to their sources in scholarly footnotes. A complete bibliography of
sources consulted also needs to be provided.
Successful responses will:
28
Addresses the question with a sophisticated and sustained argument that comprehensively addresses the question
Present a logical, coherent and well-structured response drawing on clear identification of relevant key features of the period
Support their interpretation with detailed, relevant and accurate historical information that consults the range of sources outlined above.
Other
requirements
Submit your essay as a PDF or Word doc on Canvas by 3:25pm on
the due date. Submit research notes in class.
Plagiarism and other academic malpractice will be penalised in
accordance with the College’s relevant policy and BOSTES
standards.
29
Marking Criteria: Essay
Assesses the significance of the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact with a sophisticated and sustained argument that integrates, in detail, two other factors.
Presents a logical, coherent and well-structured response drawing on clear identification of relevant key features of the period. The student communicates with fluency and sophistication. Evidence is thoroughly and effectively integrated into arguments throughout the essay.
Supports interpretation with detailed, relevant and accurate historical evidence and consistently makes use of appropriate terms and concepts. The student consults an impressive range of relevant sources. It is evident that their ideas are based on a careful consideration of the work of other scholars. Employs a consistent and properly formatted referencing system.
21-25
Assesses the significance of the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact with a sound attempt at argument that considers two other factors. The analysis of the two other factors may not be integrated into the consideration of the pact.
Presents a well-structured response drawing on relevant key features of the period. The student communicates with consistent clarity. Evidence is usually integrated into arguments.
Provides detailed, relevant and accurate historical evidence and often makes use of appropriate terms and concepts. The student consults a range of relevant sources. It is evident that their ideas have been influenced by the work of other scholars. Employs a generally consistent and properly formatted referencing system.
16-20
Assesses the significance of the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact with a largely narrative response. The treatment of the two other factors is not linked effectively to the pact.
Presents a generally well-structured with some identification of features of the period. The student communicates with a sound overall structure but paragraph and sentence structure is inconsistent. Evidence is sometimes successfully integrated into arguments.
Provides adequate historical information and makes some use of appropriate terms and concepts. The student consults some useful sources, though the depth or breadth of their research indicates some inadequacies in their preparation. Employs a referencing system with some inconsistencies and/or formatting issues.
11-15
Presents a narrative or descriptive response, which is largely relevant but may be generalised and/or incomplete. The student may not adequately address the content required in the question.
Presents a structured but simple response, with some mention of relevant key features of the period. The response may be significantly under the word limit.
Provides limited accurate historical information incorporating some historical terms. Inadequate or limited research. Referencing is attempted but is incomplete.
6-10
Attempts a narrative or description which may be only generally relevant and/or seriously incomplete
May be disjoined and/or very brief
1-5
Feedback: