institutionalizing sustainable development: experiences in five countries

ENVIRON IMPACT ASSESS REV 1985; 5:239-254 239

INSTITUTIONALIZING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: EXPERIENCES IN FIVE COUNTRIES

KEM LOWRY AND RICHARD A. CARPENTER

A multinational collaborative study during the summer of 1983 addressed organizational alternatives in natural systems management. Participants were partic- ularly interested in ways diffefent governments attempted to resolve the disparity between the interconnected quality of nature and the compartmentalized structure of bureaucracies. Five patterns of organization have evolved to meet this challenge: mission agencies managing ecosystems; independent or interagency central environmental units; environmental units within mission agencies; environmental components within central planning units; and regional superagencies. The systems developed by five nations--the United States, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand---are analyzed and compared in terms of these five patterns.

RICHARD A. CARPENTER is a Research Associate and KEM LOWRY is an adjunct Research Associate with the East-West Environment and Policy Institute in Honolulu, Hawaii. This article is based on a study of alternative organizations for natural systems management held in summer 1983 at the Institute.

In the 1970s the possible adverse consequences of economic development for renewable natural resources and the environment became an issue of world-wide concern. These natural systems cannot be used sustainably without careful management based on timely and effective assessment. The general public appears to want a healthy environment and conservation of nature. Few decision makers in the area of public policy remain unaware or unconvinced of the dangers of thoughtlessly exploiting ecosystems. Policies have been pronounced, laws passed,

Address correspondence to: Richard A. Carpenter, Research Associate, East-West Environment and Policy Institute, 1777 East-West Road, Honolulu, HI 96848.

© 1985 Elsevier Science Publishing Co., Inc. 0195-9255/85/$3.30 52 Vanderbilt Ave., New York, NY 10017

240 K. LOWRY AND R. A. CARPENTER

institutions established, people trained, and impacts predicted. Some blunders have been prevented and some restorations made. However, in most nations there is still a substantial and frustrating gap between the avowed goals for proper management of natural systems and the actual record in the field. Soils are eroding, water quality is being degraded, watersheds are losing storage capacity, impoundments are filling with sediments, species and habitats are being elimi- nated, insect pests are erupting, and coastal fish spawning grounds are disap- pearing. Innovative policy research is needed to determine how "implementation gaps" develop and to devise strategies to close them.

Even a cursory investigation will show that multiple factors can prevent and delay the achievement of sustainable development. These include:

• conscious or unconscious choice of short-term economic gains over conservation strategies for long-term productivity;

• lack of scientific and technical knowledge and inadequate predictive ca- pability in the environmental sciences, especially ecology;

. weak political motivation to enforce environmental protection regulations in the face of other urgent social problems;

. insufficient funding, trained manpower, and facilities for institutions responsible for managing natural systems; and

• the lengthy period between the implementation of governmental management efforts and detectable improvement.

This article focuses on another, perhaps critical, implementation issue: the effects of alternative organizational structures and administrative arrangements on success in managing natural systems.

There is a fundamental mismatch between naane and government. Nature is characteristically systematic. It is a highly interrelated structure of many com- plementary functions. An ecosystem comprises communities of plants and ani- mals with their nonliving surroundings of soil, air, and water plus the dynamic flows of energy and nutrients. By "natural systems" we mean the renewable natural resources and the health and quality of the air, water, and landscapes for ecosystems.

Government organizations in general, and management structures for natural systems in particular, are fundamentally compartmentalized. They are charac- terized by jurisdictional gaps and conflicts, polarization of interests, incompatible policies, conflicting uses, and lack of coordination and communication.

Since the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, held in Stockholm in 1972, over 100 nations have established separate environmental ministries or departments with mandates to protect or defend environmental val- ues, presumably against the activities of other government agencies and the private sector. In addition, each country has a range of agencies created at different

INSTITUTIONALIZING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 241

times for special missions. However, natural systems, in all their complexities and interconnections, cannot be neatly segmented for management purposes.

In dealing with this-.mismatch, Charles Lindblom warns against "the logical fallacy of believing that the only way to improve these interconnections is to deal with them all at once" (Lindblom 1973). Lindblom notes:

Clearly, everything is connected. But because everything is connected, it is beyond our capacity to manipulate variables comprehensively. Because everything is interconnected, the whole of the environmental problem is beyond our capacity to control in one unified policy. We have to find critical points of intervention---tactically defensible, or strategically defensible points of intervention.

At the East-West Environment and Policy Institute a multinational collaborative study during the summer of 1983 addressed organizational alternatives in natural systems management. Part of this study focused on the evolution of institutional arrangements and administrative processes in natural systems management. In particular, participants were interested in how nations in the study were coping with the problem of bureaucratic compartmentalization in implementing new natural systems management laws and programs (see Appendixes 1 and 2).

CHANGES IN DEVELOPMENT PLANNING

Institutionalization of natural systems management in developing countries has taken place within an evolutionary trend in economic development towards multiple objective planning. Until the late 1950s, development was driven in two ways. In some instances, an economic need was met within physical or technical limitations only. For example, electricity was produced by damming rivers for hydropower, with minor consideration for other uses of the rivers. In other cases, a technological ca- pability or opportunity was financed because it was justified by the internal rate of return on investment, but not necessarily because the benefits from a project out- weighed its costs to society as a whole. For example, the opportunity to manufac- ture chipboard has resulted in the granting of concessions for felling forests, which may have very significant ecological consequences.

More recently, planning for development has been affected by the addition of social welfare concepts and the calculation of distribution of costs and benefits among economic sectors and classes of people, geographical units, and even between generations. In adopting these ideas, international assistance agencies have shifted away from the "trickle down" approach to development and toward planning strategies that target assistance directly to disadvantaged groups and to specific infrastructural problems.

Concern for the environment, which came into focus in the early 1970s,


remains largely separate from, and late, in the process of decision making for development. Factors affecting the environment, conservation, or sustainable use comprise only one type of policy consideration. They should not dominate the process any more than any other objective (e.g., economic growth, national security, income distribution, or' full employment). However, since environmental factors have been recognized as important, whether to redress past deg- radation or to provide for future continuous productivity, natural systems factors should be more fully integrated into the economic paradigm on which the world operates. The identification of strategic points of intervention to ensure sustainable development will make this ideal a reality.

THE TREND TOWARD CENTRAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGENCIES

While each nation is unique, five discernible patterns and trends have evolved as ways to organize the management of natural systems and environmental quality (see Table l).

Prior to the Stockholm UN Conference on the Human Environment in 1972, few nations had any governmental unit specifically named to deal with environmental matters. However, virtually all governments contained agencies for the managed ecosystems (agriculture, forestry, fisheries, range lands, and wildlife habitats), for fuels and minerals extraction, and for water resources. These units went about their rather narrowly defined missions, guided by engineering and financial analyses, to achieve economic growth and other national goals. En- lightened agronomists practiced soil conservation, crop rotation, and biological control of insect pests. Foresters recognized the multiple uses of forest lands for watershed protection, recreation, and wildlife, as well as for a continued supply of lumber. Public health was a strong motivation for assuring potable water supplies and controlling insect disease vectors. Clear public preferences sup- ported parks and recreation areas. However, there was no comprehensive management for natural systems as a whole or for the long-term, off-site effects of intensified use of the land and water. The external costs of damage from environmental pollution and degraded ecosystems were not included in the financial analyses.

TABLE i. Patterns of Government Organization for Managing Natural Resources and Environmental Quality

A. No specified environmental units. Mission agencies manage ecosystems, water, mineral, and fuels.

B. Central Environmental Unit. May be independent or interagency committee. C. Environmental Units within Mission Agencies. D. Environmental component of Central Economic Planning Unit. E. Regional Superagencies.


After Stockholm, a second pattern emerged as many countries passed environmental protection legislation and established "departments of the environment" or similarly designated agencies. The functions of these units usually included liaison with the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), provision of advice to government leaders on policies for natural systems management, and coordination of the activities of various other agencies. These agencies also serve as rallying points for nongovernment environmentalist and conservation groups, and as protago- nists for environmental quality and sustainable use. These central environmental units often took the form of an interagency committee, an independent agency, or a subsidiary part of a ministry (usually health or science and technology). Experi- ence in many countries has shown that a polarization (even antagonism) develops between these environmental units and mission agencies due to the apparent conflicts between economic growth and environmental protection.

A third pattern is the inclusion of an environmental unit in each mission agency. These units help their respective agencies meet national environmental policy guidelines and serve to prepare environmental assessments of projects. They can exchange information with other like units throughout the government and may affect coordination. They are more apt to be involved in early planning of the agency's activities. However, these internal environmental units are not effective in resolving disputes between agencies or in the uniform accomplishment of national policies for the environment that cut across jurisdictional lines.

The fourth pattern, of which there are no actual examples at present, is the inclusion of environmental expertise in the national economic planning board or agency. The introduction of the costs and benefits of sustainable use into project appraisal deliberations would help to solve many perceived conflicts between environmental and developmental goals. In the United States, the Council on Environmental Quality, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Council of Economic Advisers all fall within the Executive Office of the President. This system comes close to providing an environmental proponent at the level of national economic planning. However, the full integration of ecological and environmental science information into economic planning requires staff expertise located directly within the highest planning unit.

The fifth approach involves having a special entity in complete charge of a geographic area. The US Tennessee Valley Authority, established in the early 1930s, is a model for such special organizations. There are some examples of this pattern in the developing world. In the Philippines, the National Council for Integrated Area Development may manage a river basin, a watershed, or an entire island, such as Palawan. The Electric Generating Authority of Thailand manages geographically large schemes in northeast Thailand. The Mahaweli Development Board in Sri Lanka is planning, building, and operating a huge water transfer project.

Because of their limited geographic focus, regional superagencies can integrate environmental concerns into project planning at an early stage. Where donor funding for regional development is involved from the World Bank or USAID,


a comprehensive EIA is required for projects. This requirement can help guide a sustainable use of natural systems.

Our study involved the United States and four Asian countries (Korea, Ma- laysia, the Philippines, and Thailand) that represented different stages and ap- proaches to institutionalization of environmental concerns. Each country has a central environmental unit, at least some mission agencies with environmental bureaus, and is implementing a requirement for EIAs.

KOREA

The Office of the Environment (OOE) was established in 1980 in the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs as a central agency dealing with environmental policies and pollution control (Figure 1). The OOE regulates air and water pollution, administers the EIA process, operates the National Environmental Protection Institute, and provides liaison to UNEP. The fifth five-year Economic and Social Development Plan (1982-86) is the first to incorporate environmental conservation. A noteworthy accomplishment of the OOE has been the recent completion (March 1984) of the Han River Basin environmental master plan which identifies priority issues and evaluates the cost effectiveness of different measures to control pollution in this area near Seoul with 13 million inhabitants. Implementation of the plan will require close cooperation by the Seoul city government and the Ministry of Construction. The OOE, as a subministefial level agency, does not have a seat on the high-level planning council that allocates budgets. There is controversy over whether OOE can be effective without increased administrative authority.

In March 1981, the OOE promulgated "Regulations for the Preparation of Environmental Impact Statements." Eleven types of government development projects are subject to an EIA but private sector projects are excluded. The

FIGURE 1. Korea.

! o iceo'the rimeoinister I I Ec°°°m'c "nn'°oB°'rO I I

I Mi°::ei= I ! I

Ministry of Health I and Social Affairs I

Office of the Environment I

--~ Other Agencies


proposing agency is responsible for preparing the EIA which then is reviewed by the OOE. Universities and research institutes may actually perform the assessment. The EIA is prepared before final decisions are made, but usually not before the basic plan for the project is formulated. There is little public participation. Because the EIA process is relatively recent in Korea, there are few trained assessors and the concept is poorly understood by most agencies (Han 1983).

MALAYSIA

The federal government of Malaysia sets national policies for natural systems management while the states retain control over most of the actual resources and the implementation actions (Figure 2). Efforts and results vary widely among the states. Although the federal government may seek to ensure state compliance with federal policy by means of budget reallocations, such action may actually have the effect of increasing exploitation of natural resources by the states to make up the deficit. A strong bias toward economic growth is abetted by the practice of establishing planning committees with members from development-

FIGURE 2. Malaysia.

States ]

I Their Natural

Resources Ministries or

Agencies

I I

! r'me 11 Minister's Office

i

I

Planning Unit

I i Ministry of I Science, I

Technology and ] Environment I

Federal Cabinet ]

I i ] I Ministry of Primary Industriesl Agriculture

I

I Division of Environment

I [ Other Agencies


oriented agencies and private industry. In contrast to the preceding five-year development plan, there are no environmental goals in the latest Fourth Malaysia Plan (1981-85).

Within this context the Department of Environment (DOE) operates under the Ministry of Science, Technology and the Environment. While the DOE sets pollution standards and monitors water quality, enforcement is left to the states. Typical of the conflicts among federal agencies is the unsuccessful attempt by the DOE to bring soil erosion controls into the creation of oil palm plantations by the Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA). Other major problems include discharges from the tin mines, watershed deterioration, and pesticide contamination of surface water. The DOE enforces pollution control standards, monitors pollutants, including pesticides, and provides liaison to UNEP.

The EIA is not yet formally required, but the Malaysian government states that some trials are occurring and it is anticipated that the next five-year plan, beginning in 1986, will fully implement a procedure. To date, the proposed guidelines and procedures have not been submitted to the Cabinet for approval. In the meantime, the DOE has sponsored the preparation of a few informal EIAs and the Environmental Quality Council (which includes one public member) has reviewed these documents. The strong role of the states in managing natural systems will complicate the uniform implementation of any EIA process (Masters and Jaafar 1983).

PHILIPPINES

The National Environmental Protection Council (NEPC), created in 1977, and comprising the leaders of all relevant ministries, is a part of the Ministry of Human Settlements headed by Mrs. Imelda Marcos (Figure 3). President Marcos himself was chairman of the NEPC at its inc6ption. However, in 1978 he created the Ministry of Human Settlements and his wife became chairperson. The Min- ister of Natural Resources is the Executive Officer of the NEPC. This politically powerful body actually meets very seldom, but its secretariat has had some success in coordinating government activities. In particular, the NEPC has been able to do research and provide authentic information on the Philippine landscape. For example, the rate of disappearance of mangroves in the archipelago was mapped with the aid of satellite remote sensing analysis performed by the Natural Resources Management Center. This effort led to proscriptions against further incursions on these coastal resources. In the Philippines there is a penchant for ad hoc interagency committees that negotiate and compromise to achieve a harmonious plan for proceeding where policies and jurisdictional authority seem to conflict. Strong leadership in the NEPC secretariat has kept environmental concerns on the table in these bargaining sessions. However, the present grave financial crisis in the country has jeopardized budgets for mitigation and pro-


I Office of the President J

Other Ministries [ I

National Environmental Protection Council

National Economic and Elevelopment Authority

I Ministry of I I Ministry of Human Settlements Natural Resources

I I

I-- . . . . N;tnia°gna/Reen;~Urctes I I

I I

i o, er I 1 Na 'o° 'Po"ut'on 1 Agencies Control Commission

I I

I Other

Agencies

FIGURE 3. Phillippines.

tection measures. A separate agency, the National Pollution Control Commission, sets air- and water-quality standards.

In December 1981 a Presidential Decree established the current EIA procedure to be implemented by the National Environmental Protection Council (NEPC). This replaces a procedure in effect since 1977 which had proved to be overly ambitious. Now, the EIA is required for public and private projects of only three types (heavy industry, resource extraction, and infrastructures) and for 12 types of "environmentally critical areas" (mangroves, coral reefs, etc.). The major responsibility for initiating an EIA process, the actual review, and issuance of the Environmental Compliance Certificate is with the NEPC. Other agencies are required to acquire and provide pertinent information about their projects. Each environmentally relevant agency is required to establish its own environmental unit to work with the NEPC. After the project proponent prepares the EIA, it is circulated for comment and sometimes a public hearing is held. The NEPC approves the EIA or returns it for revision or for inclusion of protective measures.

THAILAND

The National Environment Board (NEB) was created in 1975 within the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM). Thus located, the NEB worked alongside the powerful National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB). In 1979, however, after several years of trial, the NEB was moved out of the OPM and


I I

I Other Ministries

Office of the Prime Minister

I

I I

I National Economic and I

Social Development Board I I

Ministry of Science, Technology I and Energy I

I National Environment Board J

I I

FIGURE 4. Thailand.

into the Ministry of Science, Technology and Energy (Figure 4). At this lower level, the NEB has encountered difficulties in coordinating, communicating with and enforcing regulations with other line agencies; there have been even greater problems with state enterprises, such as the Electric Generating Authority of Thailand. The NEB sets pollution control standards, administers the EIA process, and provides liaison to UNEP. Implementation and enforcement of pollution control laws and rules often rests with line agencies. For example, the Department of Mineral Resources oversees the disposition of mine tailings.

The National Environmental Quality Act was amended in late 1978 to require the preparation of an EIA for NEB approval on any public or private project. Guidelines were published in the next two years. An initial environmental evaluation (IEE) is prepared by either the project proponent or the NEB. On the basis of this document a decision is made whether or not to prepare a full EIA for the project. If so, the terms of reference (TOR) are prepared by the NEB. The EIA is prepared according to these TOR, reviewed by the NEB, approved or returned for revision, and finally monitored for compliance by the NEB (Lesaca 1983). NGOs and the public are not often involved in the EIA although they may object to projects. If disputes arise over NEB approval, the proponent may appeal to the NESDB or the cabinet.

UNITED STATES

The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) states national goals and objectives but also contains a remarkable action-forcing provision---the En- vironmental Impact Statement (EIS). The procedures for preparation and review of EISs are promulgated by the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) which


is composed of three presidential appointees and located in the Executive Office of the President (Figure 5). The CEQ has no line authority over other agencies but if the presiderit so wishes to use it, the Council has a powerful coordinating ability. In the current Reagan administration, the CEQ is minimally funded and is not active.

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is independent of any cabinet department and its administrator reports directly to the president. The EPA issues and enforces regulations concerning air and water pollution, solid wastes, pesticides, toxic materials, noise, and ionizing radiation. Other agencies of government, as well as the private sector, must conform to these pollution control regulations.

The NEPA policies are imposed on all departments and agencies through the requirement of an EIS for "major'actions of Federal agencies significantly affecting the environment." Because per/nits and licenses to private sector projects are construed to be such actions, most substantial developments in the United States are covered. The CEQ has issued guidelines for EIS preparation, most recently amended in 1978. Every agency is forced to look beyond its narrow mission to assess environmental consequences. The proponent agency is responsible for preparing a draft EIS and all relevant agencies must provide information for this document and then review it. The draft EIS is made widely available for comment from all interested parties and a. public hearing may be held. The EPA is responsible for review of the environmental quality (pollution)

FIGURE 5. United States.

I Office of Mangement

and Budget

Cabinet Departments

Agriculture

Interior

Other Departments

F q I

I I °°°n°"°n Environmental Quality

Independent Agencies

e J Other Agencies


aspects of the proposed project. The EIS is revised according to the comments received and issued in final form, again being made widely available. There is no veto or approval of the project by the CEQ or EPA. The proponent may proceed unless challenged in court as to the "adequacy" of the EIA. The history of implementation in the United States shows many instances of substantial delay and contentious debate during the early years. However, as agencies became better at preparing adequate EISs and as legal precedents have developed, the delays have been reduced in number and in length of time.

CONCLUSIONS FROM THE SUMMER STUDY

These countries have tried to cope with the problems of bureaucratic compartmentalization of environmental concerns by consolidating authority and by developing techniques for enhancing coordination and communication and for resolving conflicts among agencies, policies, and competing resource uses. It is not possible to judge the effectiveness of these mechanisms because there is no objective documentation on the actual use of some of the techniques and because the meaning of effectiveness varies so much among individuals and contexts. However, if we limit the concept of effectiveness to mean "increasing the prob- ability of sustained use of natural resources" some conclusions may be drawn.

We have found that the central environmental units usually function at a government level that is too low to compete equally with other groups with an interest in development planning. These environmental units are both inade- quately funded and staffed for the tasks assigned. Most importantly, they are not consulted at the inception of the decision-making processes for economic development planning or natural resource management. Frequently, the course of projects and their soundness in terms of conservation and environmental quality can be best determined and controlled early in the process.

Environmental councils, including high-level Officials, may have strong 13o - litical influence but seldom actually meet because the members are so busy. If the groups do meet, lower level designees for the actual members attend. These councils also are prone to "back scratching," in which the environmental transgressions of each agency are overlooked by mutual consent. Councils can offer advice but do not effectively operate programs. Councils do appear to be effective in guiding the implementaion of EIA regulations, especially in review- ing these reports.

Environmental agencies at the subministerial level find it difficult to participate in policy formulation and decision making. The other missions of the ministry (e.g., health or energy) may obscure, dilute, or distort the objective of sustainable use. Such lower level agencies are at a hierarchical disadvantage in commenting on the practices of other ministries.

In some instances the central environmental agency is given responsibility for administering and enforcing pollution control laws. This regulatory function inhibits the much-needed coordination role of these units.


The ability to implement sustainable use policies varies with the type of proponent of the economic development activity. Projects managed solely by government agencies may be difficult for the environmental agencies to deal with for the reasons listed here. However, in many countries the private sector investments are not covered at all by requirements for coordination or preparation of an EIA. In many countries, government-chartered corporations are exempt from mechanisms that coordinate normal agencies. Finally, even some government agency projects are exempted from having to prepare an EIA (e.g., energy) when they are so important that it is felt no delay or diversion can be counte- nanced. In the Philippines, a Minister may initiate a request for an exemption; but if he does the NEPC then will place full public responsibility for any adverse consequences on his agency.

In general, the EIA procedure generates and distributes more information about government activities and opens up the decision-making process to more diverse groups. Departures from overall national policy, conflicts among goals, and failures of compliance with regulations are exposed. Coordination of natural systems management is fostered by EIA process to the extent that the following procedures are involved:

Scoping Setting the boundaries of an EIA may take the form of a meeting called by the project proponent at the inception of the project. All relevant and interested agencies, NGOs, and affected parties are notified and then participate. Thus agencies are informed of actions that may affect their own programs and can begin providing information and opinions.

Information Responsibilities Each agency may be designated as the source of authentic information about the part of natural systems with which it is concerned (e.g., soils in Department of Agriculture, air quality in a Department of Health, wildlife habitat in a Depart- ment of Natural Resources, etc.). Any proponent agency must go to the other agencies for these data in order to prepare the EIA and thus an additional exchange is promoted.

Review The EIA report (preferably at the draft stage) may be circulated for review and comment to all other relevant agencies. Each agency may be required to issue a written comment, thus promoting a sincere review of the adequacy of the EIA and the consequences of the proposed project to other missions of government.


Public Participation When the EIA process is open and participative, all agencies must become aware and prepare to comment on proposed projects. Hearings often involve testimony from many different agencies with a degree of coordination resulting through this increased information exchange.

Monitoring and Postproject Evaluation The predicted consequences of a project as revealed by the EIA may affect many agencies. Each agency will monitor those consequences that concern it and will feed information back to the operating agency. If this continuing guidance to management is built into the EIA then coordination will be enhanced.

A third general impression is that much of the recent "action" in natural systems management in the five countries studied has occurred in the environmental units within mission agencies rather than in the central environmental agencies. Many of these mission agency units have produced plans and technical analyses of high quality. Somewhat paradoxically, the most obvious "implementation gaps" fall within the jurisdictional responsibility of the agencies in which such units are located. These implementation gaps persist because of intraagency conflicts over policies, resource uses, and jurisdictional responsibilities. For example, mangroves continue to be cleared and corals mined even though environmental units have identified the consequences of such activities and sometimes even have secured the passage of laws and regulations governing these activities.

There have been some modest successes in resolving these conflicts. One mechanism is the formation of ad hoc, even informal, interagency task forces to coordinate policy and resolve jurisdictional disputes. In the Philippines, task forces such as the one on coastal zone management have developed formal memoranda of' agreement signed by all parties. These agreements allocate jurisdictional responsibilities regarding the management of particular ecosystems.

Another promising mechanism for resolving conflicts and coordinating activities is the regional or area-wide authority for planning and/or management. The Integrated Area Development Plan mechanism in the Philippines, the comprehensive plans mandated by the National Environment Board in Thailand for environmentally critical areas such as the Songkla Lake Basin, and the Han River Basin planning process in Korea all hold out the promise of a planning and management system that responds to nature in a more holistic fashion. Indeed, by establishing jurisdictions roughly congruent to natural systems, regional planning and management can correct the prevailing bureaucratic compartmentalization. The ultimate test of these efforts will be in how the plan is translated into allocative and regulatory activities.

Finally, it is worth noting that some of the apparent successes in narrowing implementation gaps in natural systems management can be explained largely


in terms of the knowledge, dedication, and political skills of a few individuals. While we may celebrate these bureaucratic heroes, the continuing challenge lies in developing the knowlege, awareness, and institutional structures and processes to ensure that sustainable development does not depend only on the extraordinary efforts of a few individuals.

APPENDIX 1. PROJECT PARTICIPANTS

Richard A. Carpenter, Research Associate, "EAPI

Soo-Saeng Han, Planning and Management Coordinator, Office of the Environ- ment, Seoul, Korea

Maynard M. Hufschmidt, Senior Fellow, EAPI

Abu Bakar Jaafar, Division of the Environment, Malaysia

R. M. Lesaca, Visiting Fellow and recently retired Director, UNEP, Bangkok

Kern Lowry, Adjunct Research Associate, EAPI, and Assistant Professor, Urban and Regional Planning, University of Hawaii at Manoa

David Masters, Graduate Student, University of Hawaii at Manoa

Celso Roque, Visiting Fellow at EAPI and Director General, NEPC, and As- sistant Minister of Natural Resources, Philippines, at the time of the study.

Amado S. Tolentino, Jr., Visiting Fellow and Staff Member, National Environ- mental Council, Philippines

Geoffrey Wandesforde-Smith, Institute of Ecology, University of California, Davis

Somluckrat Wattanavitukul, Research Associate, EAPI, and Professor, Tham- masat University, Bangkok

APPENDIX 2. WORKING PAPERS PRODUCED DURING THE PROJECT

Memoranda

Richard Carpenter and Sornluckrat Wattanavituknl. Prospectus for a Study on Alternative Government Organization for Administration of Natural Resources and Environmental Quality. September 1982, 6 pp.

Richard Carpenter and Kern Lowry. Project Plans. March 15, 1983, 7 pp.

R. M. Lesaca. Comments on AO Report Outline. September 23, 1983, 4 pp.

R. M. Lesaca. Organization for Environmental Administration in Thailand and Its EIA System. September 1983, 11 pp.


Celso Roque. Some Thoughts on the Alternative Government Organizations Project. August 1983.

Geoffrey Wandesforde-Smith. Indonesia. August 1983, 4 pp.

Geoffrey Wandesforde-Smith. Thailand. August 1983, 3 pp.

Somluckrat Wattanavitukul. Environmental Administration in Thailand. Feb- ruary 1983.

Reports

Soo-Saeng Han. The State of the Environment in Korea. 1983, 140 pp.

Kem Lowry and Norman Okamura. State Implementation of a Federal Envi- ronmental Mandate: The Case of Coastal Zone Management in Hawaii. Au- gust 1983.

David Masters and Abu Bakar Jaafar. Legal and Institutional Arrangements for Natural Resources Management in Malaysia. September 1983.

Celso Roque. Alternative Government Organizations for Natural Systems Man- agement: A Future Research Agenda. October 1983.

Amado S. Tolentino, Jr. The Philippine EIS System: Learning from Experience. September 1983.

Amado S. Tolentino, Jr. Philippine Coastal Zone Management: Organizational Linkages and Interconnections. November 1983.

REFERENCES Hart, S.-S. 1983. The State of the Environment in Korea. Honolulu, HI: East-West

Environment and Policy Institute. Lesaca, R. M. 1983. Comments on AO Report outline. Unpublished manuscript. Hon-

olulu, HI: East-West Environment and Policy Institute. Lindblom, C. 1973. Managing the Environment. Washington, DC: US Environmental

Protection Agency. Masters, D., and A. B. Jaafar. 1983. Legal and Institutional Arrangements for Natural

Resources Management in Malaysia. Honolulu, HI: East-West Environment and Policy Institute.

institutionalizing sustainable development: experiences in five countries

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