indian foreign policy the age of nehru

8/17/2019 Indian Foreign Policy the Age of Nehru

1/31

Indian Foreign Policy: The Age of NehruAuthor(s): Paul F. PowerReviewed work(s):Source: The Review of Politics, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Apr., 1964), pp. 257-286Published by: Cambridge University Press for the University of Notre Dame du lac on behalf of Review of Politics

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2/31

Indian

Foreign

Policy:

The

Age

of

Nehru

Paul F. Power

A

MONG

the foreign oliciesof the new stateswhichhave

emerged

rom he Western olonial

empires,

hat

of

India

occupies leading

lace.

The first on-Westernation o

be-

come

a

member

f the

British

ommonwealth,

ndia became

a

symbol

nd

catalyst

f

self-determinationor several

nationalist

movements. ndia

proceeded

on an

independent

ath

in

world

olitics

nd had

numerous mulators

n

the

world.'

Where

India's

role n

the

state-making

evolution

as met with consid-

erableapproval, ts strategyf nonalignmentas been debated

in

the

West,

and

even

in

India

since

the

open appearance

n

1959

of

the Sino-Indian

ispute.

he

criticismas

included

ues-

tions

bout hewisdom f

nonalignment,

oubts s to

ts

feasibility,

and

charges

hat ts

pplication

as shown

reference

or hecom-

munist

tates

uring

eriods

fthe

Cold

War.2 The Indian

defense

includes ssertions

hat

nonalignment

erves ndia's

welfare nd

often he

world's,

nswers

bout

ts

workability,

nd

claims

that

application

asbeenconsistent ith

professed

deals.3

x

The

independentoreign

olicies

f

the

new

stateshave been

examined

n

Robert

A.

Scalapino,

Neutralism

n

Asia,

American

olitical cience

Review,

XLVIII

(March,

1954),

49-63;

Hans

J.

Morgenthau,

olitics

Among

Nations

(Chicago,

1958),

Ch.

10;

Laurence

W.

Martin,

ed.,

Neutralism

nd

Non-

alignment

New

York,

1962),

with

ssays

y

C.B.

Marshall,

rancis

O.

Wilcox

and Arnold

Wolfers,

mong

others;

Michael

Brecher,

Neutralism:

An

Analy-

sis,

International

ournal,

XVII

(Summer,

1962), 224-236;

Kurt

London,

ed.,

New

Nations

n

a Divided World

New York, 1963), especially

aluable

forpaperson Sino-Soviet iewsof

nonaligned

ountries;

nd Mario

Rossi,

The

Third

World

New

York,

1963).

For

the

origins

f

neutralism n

Western

thought,

ee

Peter

Lyon, Neutrality

nd

the

Emergence

f

the

Concept

of

Neutralism,

he Review

of

Politics,

XXII

(April,

1960),

255-268.

2

Some

essentially

ritical

valuations f

Indian

foreign

olicy

re Vivek

[A.

D.

Gorwala],

ndia Without

llusions

Bombay, 953);

Adda

B.

Bozeman,

India's

Foreign

PolicyToday,

World

Politics,

X

(January,

958),

256-274;

S.

R.

Patel,

Foreign

olicy

of

ndia

(Bombay,

960);

and

Winston

.

Prouty,

The

United

States

Versus Unneutral

Neutrality,

peech

in

U.S.

Senate,

September 9,

1961, Congressional

ecord,

Vol.

107,

87th

Congress,

9015-

19028.

3

Sympathetic

xplanations

r

defenses f Indian

nonalignment

re

A.

Appadorai,

India's

Foreign

Policy,

nternational

Affairs,

XV

(January,

1949),

37-47;

Vincent

heean,

The

Case

For

India, Foreign

Afairs,

XXX

(October, 1951),

77-90;

P

[K.

M.

Panikkar],

Middle

Ground

Between

America

nd Russia: An

Indian

View,

Foreign

Affairs,

XXII

(January,

1954),

259-270;

and

B.

K.

Nehru,

AmbassadorNehru on

India's

Policy

of

Non-Alignment,

ndia

News,

(April 27,

1962),

8.

257


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3/31

258

THE

REVIEW

OF

POLITICS

To decide

about

the

merits

f the

criticism

nd

defense

f

Indian

nonalignment

equires

n

understanding

f

the

country's

international

elations

ince

1947.

Emerging

nto

the world

com-

munityromlienrule ndthe ostlyartitioningf subcontinent,

India

took

teps

o

protect

tself

n

South

Asia and to

pursue

elec-

tive

conomic

nd

political

bjectives

n

world ffairs. or

Indian

foreign

olicy

the

dispute

with Pakistan

over divided

Kashmir

became

and remains

central

ssue

with

mplications

or

ndia's

relations ith

he communistnd Western

owers.4

ndia's

eco-

nomic

diplomacy

as

sought

nd obtained

apital

nd

technology

from headvancednations; or xample,t receivedid fromhe

United

States

otaling

n

excess

f two billion

ollars.

Two

polit-

ical

objectives

with

humanitarian

oundations

ave been to

con-

vince or

pressure

he South

African

overnment

o

cease

racial

discrimination

gainst

Africansnd

Indians,

nd

to achieve

uclear

and

conventional

isarmament.

ndia

and other

tates

have had

no

successwith he

first

bjective.

Some

progress

as been

made

towards he

second

goal,

n

part

through

ndian

participation

s

one of the eight independent owers n Soviet-Westernrms

discussions.

oreover,

ndia

has contributed

ubstantially

o

de-

colonizing

he

overseas

mpires

nd to

bringing

sia

and

Africa

into the front

anks f

world

politics.

fforts

n

these

reas

were

dramatized

y

Indian

activities

n

the

New

Delhi Asian

Relations

Conference

f

1947,

the United

Nations,

he

Bandung

Conference

of

Asian-African

tates

n

1955,

and

the

Belgrade

Conference

f

nonaligned

tates

n

1961.5

Forseveral easons ndiasoughtobring he

People'sRepublic

4

The

religious, eographical

nd

legal

sources

f

the

Kashmir

roblem

re

described

n

Josef

Korbel, Danger

In

Kashmir

Princeton,

954),

and Lord

Birdwood,

wo

Nations nd

Kashmir

London,

1956).

The

Security

ouncil

has

met without

uccess

ver

100

times n

the

Kashmir

ssue

since

ndia

took

the

question

o

the

United

Nations n

1948.

At

Pakistan's

equest

he

Security

Council

s

again

considering

he

problem

n

early

1964

with

igns

f

mounting

tensions

wing

o

Pakistan's

ew

friendship

ith

Communist

hina and

India's

response

o

this

development.

5

For the Asian RelationsConferencen 1947, see Asian Relations: A

Report

of

the

Proceedings

and

Documentation

of

the First

Asian

Relations

ConferenceNew

Delhi, 1948).

A

study

roup

f

the

ndian

Councilof

World

Affairs

eports

n Indian

activitiesn

the

world

organization

n

India

and

the

UnitedNations

New

York,

1957).

India's role

n the

1955

meeting

f

Asian

and African

tates

may

be

followed n

George

McT.

Kahin,

The

Asian-African

Conference

Ithaca,

1956).

Nehru's

addressto the

Belgrade

Conference f

1961

is

published

in The

Conference

of

Heads

of

State

or

Government

of

Non-

aligned

Countries

Belgrade,

961), pp.

107-117.




4/31

INDIAN FOREIGN

POLICY

259

of China

into world

ffairs,

process

ided

by

Peking's

urn

o

diplomacy

n

1954

and

to an

appreciation

f

the

nonaligned

states.Out of Indian effortsnd

the New

China's

responsiveness

came theFivePrinciplesf PeacefulCoexistencer PanchShila,

general

norms f nonintervention

nd

mutualitygreed

upon

in

the Sino-Indian

reaty

on

Tibet,

signed

decade

ago

in

April,

1954,

but never renewed.6

Subsequently

ndia

signed

Panch

Shila

declarations

r

agreements

ith numerous

uncommitted

states

nd communist

ations,

ncluding

he

Soviet

Union

in

the

year

before he

Hungarian

uppression.

ince 1959

relations

ith

Pekinghave dominatedndiandiplomacy,nd,withthe Indian

defeatsn

theborder

ighting

f ate

1962,

military

olicies

s

well.

Important

s

the

record

of

India's external

elations s

for

any

valuation

fthe

country's

ehaviorn world

ffairs,

he

mean-

ing

of the eventsmust

also

be

sought

n

the sources

f

Indian

foreign olicy.

The

origins

ange

from

raditional

hilosophies

o

today's

conomic

eeds.

Thus

the

conciliatory

uddhist

r

Vedantic

way

to

justice

has

left

markon

the

country's

xternal

utlook

as has thequestforforeignapitalto assist ts FiveYear Plans.

Some

nfluencesavebeenmore

ital han

thers. he

anticolonial

and

antifascist

tands

f the

ndian National

Congress

efore n-

dependence

ave

had a

greater

mpact

han

the

amoral

political

adviceof

Kautilya's

Arthasastra,

ating

rom

he

fourth

entury.

Among

he

major

sources f

India's

external

olicy

he

deas

and

power

of

Jawaharlal

Nehru have no

real

competitor.

er-

mitted

by

Congress

eaders to

specialize

n

foreign

ffairs,

e

preparedforpolicy-makingwo decadesbeforefreedom. ince

independence

ehru

has

created

much of

free

ndia's

foreign

policy

nd

has not

imply

estated

r

managed

t.

Five

mainfactors

produced

his

esult: is

pre-eminent

eadership

n

domestic

olitics;

his full use

of

formal nd

informal

uthority;

is

dual

role as

prime

ministernd

foreign

minister;

is function

s

a

bridge

rom

the

past;

and

his skill n

discussing

nternational

elations

n terms

6

The Five

Principles

are mutual

respect

for territorial

ntegrity

nd sover-

eignty,

mutual

nonaggression,

mutual

noninterferencen

internal

affairs,

quality

and

mutual

benefit,

and

peaceful

coexistence. See the first

White

Paper

on

the

Sino-Indian

frontier

ssue, Notes,

Memorandum and

Letters

Exchanged

and

Agreements

Signed

Between the

Governments

of

India

and

China: 1954-

1959

(New

Delhi,

1959) p.

98. For

Nehru's account of

their

origin,

see

Russell H.

Fifield,

The

Diplomacy

of

Southeast Asia:

1954-1958

(New

York,

1958),

pp.

510-511.

See

also

M.

S.

Rajan,

Indian

Foreign

Policy

in

Action:

1954-56,

Indian

Quarterly,

XVII

(July-September,1960),

224.




5/31

260

THE REVIEW OF

POLITICS

of

widely

alued

notions,

or

xample,

onviolence. ehru's mi-

nence

towers ver

his

Congress

ssociates,

he Indian

diplomatic

organization,

he

Cabinet,

nd

the nation's

major

nterest

roups.In

foreign

olicy

mattersNehru has

sought

and received

advice

from n

innercircle.Over

the

years

this

group

has in-

cluded

Lord Louis

Mountbatten,

ritain's erminal

iceroy

nd

India's first

overnor

eneral;

Sir

Girja

Shankar

Bajpai,

Secre-

tary

General

of

the

Ministry

f External

Affairs, 947-1952;

K.

M.

Panikkar,

versatilentellectualnd

India's ambassador n

Peking,

1950-53;

Maulana

Abul

Kalam

Azad,

Moslem

scholar

andCongresseader;Sarvepalli adhakrishnan,philosophernd

India's ambassador

o the

Soviet

Union,

1950-53,

subsequently

India's Vice President

nd then

President;

.

K. Krishna

Menon,

Nehru's

volatile

nd controversialdvisor nd

agent

for

many

years;

Mrs.

Vijaya

Lakshmi

Pandit,

a

sister,

ormerly

ndia's

ambassadorn Moscow nd

Washington,

ow Governor

f Maha-

rashtra;

nd Nehru's

daughter,

Mrs.

Indira

Gandhi,

who has

held

highposts

n

the

Congress.

ut

ultimately

ehru

has been

master f his own thoughtsn internationalffairs nd, to a

significant

xtent,

as

been

directly

esponsible

or the conduct

of

Indian

foreign olicy.

The

state of

Nehru's

health

may

compel

the transfer

f his

power

o

the

handsof

others.n

January,

964,

the

ndian eader

asked T.

T.

Krishnamachari,

he

Finance

Minister,

o

handle

routine

uestions

n

the

Ministry

f

External

Affairs;

nd

he

recalled

Lal

Bahadur

Shastri,

former ome

Minister,

o

rejoin

the Cabinet o

help

on internalmatters,ome ofthemrelated o

foreign

ffairs.

he health

uestion

lso

permits

ehru's

daughter

and

Mrs. Pandit o

receive

ew

power

because

of

their ervices

o

the

74-year-old

eader.

The

Age

of

Nehru,

hen,

n Indian

foreign olicy

s

approach-

ing

tsconclusion.7

he

directives

aid

down

by

the

ndian states-

man have

prevailed

or

nearly

eventeen

ears

and

increasingly

theyare subjectto challenges. ime, habit,and setbackshave

dissipated

Nehru's creative

nergies

o

form

new

approaches.

India

is

stirring,ooking

or

answers

o

the succession

ssue and

7The

deep

impact

of the Sino-Indian

dispute

on

Indian

foreign

policy

has

caused an

experienced

observer to conduct

obsequies

for the

nation's

nonalign-

ment

strategy.

See

Werner

Levi, Necrology

on Indian

Neutralism,

Eastern

World,

XVII

(February,

1963),

9-11.




6/31

INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY

261

for

a rationalizationf

India's

shift

oward he West that s

not

reflected

n

official

deology.

Thus

it

may

not be

premature

o

trace

he

roots

f

the

Age

of

Nehru ack nto

his

political

ducation

and theshaping fhisworldview.Thereafter,he influencef

this

view,

long

with

ts

changes, pon

India's

external

oals

and

diplomatic

ctivities

may

be

considered.

hen,

by way

of

con-

clusion,

n

attempt

may

be

made

to

present

he

characteristicsf

the

nitial

hase

of ndian

foreign

olicy.

I

Few men, Edward Shils writes f Nehru, so intellectual

by

disposition,

ccupy comparable ositions

n

any

countries. 8

The

Indian eader'sformative

ears

ontributedo

this

disposition

and

to

the

evolution f

his

political

hought

hichdid

not

begin

to

coalesce

untilhe

approached

middle

ge.9

Born

nto an ac-

complished

ine

of Kashmiri

Brahmins

n

1889,

Jawaharlal

was

the

only

on of

Motilal

Nehru,

barrister

ho

had risen

o

prom-

inence nd wealth n

Allahabad,

religious

enter

n the

United

Provinces, ow UttarPradesh.Jawaharlal ignifiesred jewel.

His

family

ame

derives

rom

he Urdu

term

for

canal,

nahar.

An

ancestor,

aj

Kaul,

a

Sanskrit

nd

Arabic

cholar,

ad

received

from

Moghul

emperor

round 1716 an

estate

near

a canal

outside

f

Delhi after e

migrated

rom

Kashmir

y

invitationf

the

court.Nehru's ather

revailed

n

thehousehold s the

unques-

tioned

head,

allowing

modest

cope

for

the

son's

self-assertion

which

appearedonly

after

he

age

of

thirtyuring

his

politicalandintellectual

uests

fthe1920's.

Jawaharlal's

other

rovided

him

with

compensating

ffectionnd

security.

lthough

he was

orthodox,

er

husband tended

to

have few

religious

oncerns.

Educated

t home

by

tutors,

ehru

xperienced

n

isolated

tmos-

phere

of

privilege

ittle

isturbed

y

political

r

economic nrest.

Upper

middle

lass,

British

nfluences

redominated

n

the

house.

Edward

Shils,

The Intellectual Between

Tradition and

Modernity:

The

Indian

Situation (The

Hague,

1961),

p.

95.

9Nehru's

recollections

f

his

beginnings

re

found

chiefly

n

his

auto-

biography,

oward

Freedom

(New

York,

1941),

pp.

16-47.

Biographical

studies

of note are B.

R.

Nanda,

The

Nehrus:

Motilal and

Jawaharlal

(New

York,

1963),

esp.

pp.

17-105;

Michael

Brecher,

ehru:

A

Political

Biography

(London,

1959),

pp.

1-57;

and Frank

Moraes,Jawaharlal

Nehru

New

York,

1956),

pp.

15-43.

See also

Tibor

Mende,

Nehru:

Conversations

on India

and

World

Afairs

(New York,

1956),

pp.

9-18.




7/31


8/31

INDIAN

FOREIGN POLICY

263

for anti-Western

ationalism,

ocial

concerns,

nd direct ction.

His

English

ducation

nd

experiences,

ogether

iththe

Angli-

cized

part

of

his

home,

had

provided

im withthe

normswith

which o

judge

the West

by

tsownstandards;nd he had

begun

to

develop

foundation

orthe Eurasian

consciousnesshat

has

distinguished

is

mature

thought

nd

made

him

less

than

an

integrated

an.

For

eight

ears

fter

is

return

o

India Nehru

ried o

practice

law. In

spite

of his

earnestness

e had

stage fright

nd

showed

little

f Motilal's

egal

skill r

financial mbition.

merging

ssues

of social welfare nd Indian nationalismeldconsiderably ore

interest

or

him,

and

through aternal

ssociations

e

gradually

immersed imselfn

Congress

ctivitiesnd

Annie

Besant's

Home

Rule

League. During

World War I

he

got

vicarious

pleasure

from

German

ictories,

ut

basically

e was

a

loyalist.

he

Easter

Revolutionn Dublin nd

Roger

Casement's

peech

f

1916 moved

him

deeply.

The same

year

his

stylish,

rranged

marriage

ook

place,

followed

n thenext

y

thebirth

f a

daughter

nd

evidence

ofan illness fwhichhiswifedied n 1936. Newsofthefirst us-

sian Revolution

leased

him,

and

the

Bolshevik

ake-over

more

so,

though

he

then

had no fundamental

easons

for

ooking

o

communism.

e

began

to think f

politics

s

social

change

and

welcomed

he

rise

of

Soviet

power

s a counter o the

British

n

Asia

and

the

Middle East.

Nehru's

objections

o

imperialism

ounted

apidly

fter

he

Amritsarmassacre

n

1919

when

troops

killedunarmed ndian

demonstratorsnthe

Punjab.

He turned ith nthusiasmothe ead-

ership

f

Gandhi

then

chieving rominence

n

the

Congress

nd

thenation.He firstmet he

Mahatma

n 1916

at

a

Congress

meet-

ing

in

Lucknow,

lthough

he had earlier

helped

to

raise funds

for

Gandhi's

South African isobedience

ampaign.

Throughout

his association ith

he Mahatma who

did

much

to advance

his

career,

Nehru

disagreed

o a

varying

xtent

ccording

o the

topic

withGandhi's eliance n directction,tressncottageconomics,

objection

o

violence,

istrustf

science,

nd

appeals

to

religious

symbolism.

everthelessandhi's

ctivism,

ourage, olitical

cu-

men and

sense f

timing,

nd

his

call

fornational

elf-respect

nd

social reconstruction

ever

failed

to

attract

nd influence

he

younger

man. It

is

doubtful, owever,

f

Gandhi's

understanding




9/31

264

THE

REVIEW OF POLITICS

of international

elations,

lways

more

metaphysical

n

spirit

nd

parochial

n

politics

han

Nehru's,

provided

Nehru

with

many

conceptions

f

world ffairs.10

Even on the social

question

Nehruowed much to his own

experience

nd reflections.n

1920

he

came

to realize at first

hand the

plight

f the ndian

peasant

whenhe

investigated

isan

unrest

n

Oudh

where

andlord nd

moneylender

ere

especially

venal. The

exposure

ppalled

the

young

ophisticate

nd caused

him to

feel

hame bout

his

own

privileges

nd

to

doubt he

rel-

evance

of

bourgeois

ationalism.

qually mportant,

e

interpreted

theIndianpeasant ituations one where hepeasants xpected

him and

men ike

him

to

rise nd

lead them.The

Brahmin

uti-

fully

esponded.11

First

under

the

tutelage

f his

patrician

ather nd

then

of

the

paternal

Gandhi,

Nehru

acquired

stature nd

confidence

n

the nationalist

ctivities

f

the

1920's.

But

party

actionalism

in-

volving

irect

ctionists nd

parliamentary

pportunists),

isap-

pointing

esults rom

noncooperation,

trife etween

Hindus

and

Moslems,nd three

ailings

n the 1921-1923

period

reducedhis

interest

n the ndian

struggle

nd

produced

ntellectual

ethargy.

He

struggled

iththisconditionn

1926 when

he

took

his

wife

to

Europe

for her health

and entered

crucial

period

for the

molding

f his

political hought.

In

Geneva he

found

emporary

elp

for her and a

chance

to

rethink

is

position

nd India's

place

n

the

perspective

f world

politics,hen ntheLocarnophase.He was struckythe narrow-

ness

of

Indian

nationalism

nd

urged

his

father

o

become

better

informed bout

world

affairs.He

made brief

rips

to

Britain,

France,

nd

Germany

nd

talked o Ernst

oller,

Romain

Rolland,

and

Indianrevolutionistsn

exile.

Of

particular

mportance,

ehru

represented

he

Congress

t

the

Brussels

ongress

f

Oppressed

Nationalitiesn

February,

927,

where

he

encountered broad

movement

gainst

olonialism,

nd

as

he soon

appreciated,

apital-

ism. The meetingncludedanti-imperialistsromAfrica,Asia,

10

Nehru

adapted

Gandhi's

principles

nd

applied

them

to

international

relations,

ccording

o Willard

Range,

Jawaharlal

ehru's

WorldView

Athens,

Georgia;

1961),

a

thesis find

unconvincing.

See

my

Gandhi On World

Affairs

Washington,

960).

11

For Nehru's

ense of

obligation,

ee

Margaret

W.

Fisher,

Nehru:

The

Hero

As

Responsible eader,

n

Leadership

nd

Political

nstitutions

n

India,

Richard

L.

Park and Irene

Tinker,

ds.

(Princeton,

959),

esp. p.

50.




10/31


265

Europe,

and

Latin

America.

The

communist

lement,

Nehru

recalled

ater,

was also

strong

here. 12The Marxian

pirit

nd

vocabularyppealed

o

him,

nd he issued

press

tatementttack-

ing imperialism.

rom the Brussels

meeting

ame the

League

Against

mperialism,

ith

George

Lansbury,

lbert

instein,

nd

other amous

oncommunistsn its executive ommittee.

ehru,

too,

accepted post

on

the committee.

ater

he

persuaded

he

Congress

o

affiliate,

onceding

he

potential

disadvantages

f

the socialist

haracter f

the

League

and

the

possibility

hatRus-

sian

foreign olicy

might

nfluence

t. 13

Communists

revailed

in theLeague and tried o forceNehruto abandonconciliatory

dealings

with

heBritishn

1928-1929.

He refused

nd the

League

expelled

im.

When

he

left

Brussels

n

1927,

Nehrureturnedo

Switzerland

and in

a

report

o

the All-India

Congress

ommittee

ondemned

United

States

imperialism

n Latin

America

nd

praised

the

meeting

iberally.14

ehru

and

his

father,

t

the

son's

urging,

accepted

a

Soviet nvitation o

attendthe tenth

nniversary

f

the Bolshevik evolution. heirstaywas limited o fourdays n

Moscow.

They

met

Foreign

Minister

Chicherin nd

President

Kalinin.

The

son left

with an

appreciation

f

Soviet

education,

Lenin's

reputation,

nd

the Russian

prison

ystem.

nd he saw

a need

for

free ndia

to

workfor

ordial

elations

ith

he

Soviet

Union.15

Returning

o

India

in

1927,

Nehru

continued

is

study

of

Marxism.16 issatisfied ithGandhi'smoderation,e supported

the

Congress

wing

that

demanded

ndependence

ithout

uali-

fications

s

to

Commonwealthies. And

he

pressed

he

party

o

the

eft

n

foreign

ffairs

nd

domestic

uestions.

n

the ate

1920's

12

Nehru,

Toward

Freedom,

.

124.

13

Quoted

n

Brecher, p.

cit.,

p.

113.

4

bid.,

pp.

111-12.

15

Nehru's

views of

Russia were

published

n

Indian

newspapers

nd

col-

lected nJawaharlal ehru, ovietRussia (Bombay, 929). The elderNehru's

impressions

f Soviet

Russia

were also

favorable

nd

he

expressed

hem n the

Legislative

Assembly

where he was

Leader of

the

Opposition.

See

K. M.

Panikkar nd

A.

Pershad,

ds.,

The Voice

of

Freedom:

The

Speechesof

Pandit

Motilal

Nehru

(New

York,

1961),

pp.

372-392.

s1

Without

aming

Nehru,

one writer

uggests

927

as

the start

f a

pre-

viously

nknown

ympathy

or

world

ommunism

mong

ome ndian

national-

ists. See Bimla

Prasad,

The

Origins

f

Indian

Foreign

Policy:

The

Indian

National

Congress

nd

World

Affairs,

885-1947

(Ph.D.

Thesis,

Columbia

University,

958),

p.

72.




11/31

266

THE REVIEW OF POLITICS

Nehru,

ogether

ith

ubhas Chandra

Bose,

the

rrepressible

en-

gali

patriot,

egan

to

lead

the

eft loc of the

party.

Nehru,

more-

over,

became the

Congress'

major spokesman

n external

ssues

whichhe interpretedith hehelpofMarxist nd Leninistdeas.

Thus

the

party,

nder

Nehru's

prompting,

eclared

that

India

would

not

participate

n

any

imperialist

ar,

which n his view

stemmed

rom he drives f advanced

apitalism.

II

The

appearance

f Marxist nd Leninist

xplanation

f

polit-

ical life n Nehru's houghtmustbe seen in the context f his

ideason

revolution,

ome f

which race o

his

chool

years.

learly

by

the

early

1930's

when

from

rison

e

began

to write

evealing

letters o

his

daughter,

ndira,

ubsequently

rs. Indira

Gandhi,

her father's

onfidante

nd influential

ongress

eader,

Nehru

had

arrived t

an

interpretation

f

revolution

hat has remained

more

fixed

han have

his ideas

borrowed

romMarxian

notions

through

enin.17 n

a

study

f Nehru's

political

hinking,

am-

mathNathDas showsn somedetail he contentf this nterpre-

tation,18

he

main

features

f which an be summarized

ere

with

some

dditional

ommentary.

To Nehru revolution

as meant cultural nd

social

change,

leading

o the amelioration

nd

possibly

he

ending

f

ignorance,

poverty,

nd

injustice.

he institutionsf

men,

rather han men

themselves,

ear

the

major responsibility

or

these lls. Economic

institutionsre especiallymportant.nsight nd action

can

pro-

videthe

remedies,

argely

y

application

f

science

nd

technology,

gifts

ftheWest.

However,

eform

aces

reat

material nd

human

obstacles,

o that

n

history

orwardhifts re rare and

retrogres-

sion

and

immobilismre

noticeable.

adicalism,

t least n

one's

intellectual

makeup,

s

necessary

o

implement

he

doctrine

f

progress

hich

ike truth

hould

prevail

n

spite

of

all criticisms

and difficulties.s to

means,

he

violence sed

in

revolutionary

upheavals s deplorable, ut the socialgains,forexample, rom

theFrench

Revolution,

re worth he

costs.Nonviolence

s

superior

to

violence

ut at no

time

has Nehru

dopted

he fullGandhian

17

The

letters,

ritten

etween

October,

1930,

and

August,

933,

are col-

lected

with

Rambling

Account

f

History

or

Young

People

in

Jawaharlal

Nehru, Glimpses

of

World

History

(New

York, 1942).

18

Mammath

Nath

Das,

The

Political

Philosophy of Jawaharlal

Nehru

(New

York,

1961),

pp.

45-69.




12/31

INDIAN

FOREIGN

POLICY

267

way,19

ecause he

believes

hat he

and

most

men

are not fitfor

such

a

commitment.

or the

Indian national

evolution,

onvio-

lent disobedience as a

practical

necessity, iven

the

disarmed

masses nd imperial trength.onducive o openrevolution,is

ideas work

against

ecrecy

which

degrades

he actors

and de-

moralizes he movement.

About

the

varieties

f

revolution,

hat of

self-determination

and

struggle

gainst

foreign

ule is

obligatory

o

fulfillman's

temporal urpose,

he

only

kind

about which

ruth s certain. t

is

not

clear

thathis

thought

ncludes he

unqualified

ecessity

or

socialrevolutions;heyhappen,fortunately,nd on balancemen

should

welcome

hem.

Nehruhas not

distinguished

ypes

f

polit-

ical

and social

revolutions;

ut

he has

denied the

legitimizing

name

of

revolution

o

fascist

nd

other

movements

raditionally

described

s

rightist,

ot

eeing

n them ome f thediscontent

hat

he

tends

o

assign

xclusively

o the

eft.

Legislative

revolutions

do not

mpress

im,

lthough

he

egislative

rocess

may

ontribute

to

revolutionary

oals,

llustratedn India

by

the

ending

of the

Princelytates nd theestablishmentf a planninguthorityor

the

national

conomy.

s

to

the

future,

ehru's

nderstanding

f

revolution olds

that the human

spirit,

which

he

perceives

n

agnostic

ight,

illmaintaints

ntegrity

nd

overcome

uperstition,

indifference,

nd

repression.

he

masseswill

eventually

aste

the

fruits

f

revolution,

istorically

ept

from hem

by

forceswithin

but

mainly

utside heir anks.

If

this

s the frameworkf

Nehru'sview of

revolution,

he

most

prominent

parts

with

respect

to Indian

foreignpolicy

deal

with

Marxism

nd internationalism.he

instant

ause of his at-

traction o Marxism n

the

late 1920's

stemmed rom

his dislike

of the Second Socialist

nternational.ts

post-1917

ecordfilled

him

with

distaste,

ecause t was too

bureaucratic

nd

insuffi-

ciently

militant,

ut

chiefly

ecause the British abour

Party,

member f the

Second

International,

ad

proved

bitter

isap-

pointmento Indiannationalists ho expected heparty o give

themmore ffective

upport.

n contrast ehrubelieved

hatthe

Soviet

Union was

genuinely

nticolonial

oth n

dealing

with

ts

own

internal

minorities

nd in

its

relations

with

dependent

peoples

elsewhere.

Thus,

around

1927,

he turned

inevitably

19

The

Mahatma's

heory

f

nonviolences

explored

n

my

article Toward

a Reevaluation

f

Gandhi's

Political

Thought,

he Western olitical

Quarter-

ly,

XVI

(March,

1963),

99-108.




13/31

268

THE REVIEW OF

POLITICS

with

good

will toward

ommunism,

or

whatever

ts

faults,

t was

at least

not

hypocritical

nd

not

mperialistic. 20

oncurrently,

e

found

hat

communistsad dictatorial

ays

and

vulgar

meth-

ods. 21 His devotion o the

potentialities

f science whichhe

identified ithMarxianclaims o a science

f

history

trengthens

communism'sttractionsor

him.

Moreover,

ehru

had

not

pre-

viously

ound

a basis for his social conscience

n Indian

ideas,

whetherraditional

r

renaissance,

r in

liberal

r Fabian

notions,

although

ll

of thesehad influenced

im.

Additionally,

e had

become

issatisfied

ith ndian

nationalism,

elieving

t acked co-

herent,modem deology. isillusionmentith omeprior aith id

not

predispose

im

n

favor

f

Marxism,

or

part

from is brush

with

Theosophy

n

boyhood,

he had

always

taken

pride

n

his

skepticism.

lthough

n

April,

1936,

Nehrucalled socialism is

vital

creed, 22

e

viewed

Marxism

not as

a

faith

ystem

ut as

a rational

hilosophy

hat

gave

him

his

first nd

only

network

f

values,

inking

hanges

espite

ime nd

place

and

bridging

ntel-

lect and

matter.23

There is a closerelationshipetweenNehru'sMarxian deas

and

his

internationalism.

or the

period,

1927-1938,

he associa-

tion s

found n an

awareness

f

nternational

ife n

which

ndian

nationalism as

only

one

important

nit that had to take

its

properplace.24Breaking

way

from he

concentration

f

other

Congress

eaders

n Indian

or,

at

most,

mperial

uestions,

ehru

rethought

is deas

about

self-determination

n

a

Marxian

ntellec-

tual context nd a European,political ramework.n thisphase

he becameconvinced

hatthe riseof fascism

n

Italy,

pain,

and

Germany,

rovided

vidence

f how

Marxian

principlesxplained

otherwise

isjointed

istorical

ircumstances,

nd that his

Indian

nationalismmustserve a

broad

internationalism

lluminated

y

20

Nehru,

Toward

Freedom,

p.

126.

21

bid.

22

Ibid.,

p.

398,

from

Nehru'sPresidential ddress

t

the49th session

f

the

Congress artyn Lucknow.

23

Compare

nother

iew

of

what

Nehru

discovered: In

his

younger

ays

he

read

Marx

thoroughly

nd found the Marxian

analysis

f

imperialism

useful tool

during

the

long

struggle

gainst

the

British.

Chester

Bowles,

Ambassador's

Report

(New

York,

1954),

p.

106.

2

The

leader

of

the nationalMoslems n

the

independence

truggle

rote

of Nehru:

I

may

also

mention

hat

Jawaharlal

as

always

been moremoved

by

internationalonsiderations

han most ndians.

He

has

looked

at

all

ques-

tions

rom n

internationalather

han

a

national

oint

of

view.

Abul

Kalam

Azad,

ndia

Wins

Freedom

Calcutta,

1959),

p.

65.




14/31

INDIAN

FOREIGN POLICY

269

these

xplanations.

e did

not

think

f this

elationship

s a dimi-

nution f

Indian

aspirations

o

freedom.

nstead,

he

considered

Indian nationalismn its

highest

manifestation

o coincidewith

this nternationalism,hat is to say,

during

he

Popular

Front

period,

with

antifascism,

or at that

time

his

appreciation

f

Marxismhad

reached

ts

peak.

To

be

an

internationalist

as

to

be

antifascist,

e told a London

audienceof

the

Conference n

Peace and

Empire

n

July,

938.25

To Nehru nd

to

many

sso-

ciated

with

him

n the

Congress

hismeant hat

ny

ndiannation-

alist

worthhis

salt

would be an

internationalist

ighter

n

the

strugglegainst mperialismndfascism. he next tagewouldbe

a world

ederation

f

undefinedharactern which

ocially

espon-

sible nd

pacific

ationalism

ould

prevail.

The

apogee

of Nehru's

ttachmento a Marxian

nterpreta-

tion of world

politics

ame in

1937-38

when

he

flew

o

Europe.

In

Spain

he saw a

Manichean

tragedy

nd

raised

his voice in

support

f

the

Republican

egime.

e detected

ragedy

n

Czecho-

slovakia

nd

England.

He

accused

heBritish

overnment

f

seek-

ingan economic lliancewithGermanyn an efforto strengthen

Britain's

waning

role in world

politics

where

Germany,

ussia,

and

the United States

provided eadership.26

e

believedthat

the Munich

agreement

onfirmed

is

analysis

f

British

olicy.

The

Nazi-Soviet etente nd

Russian

aggression

n

Finland dis-

appointed

im,

but he

viewedthem s

understandableeactions

to

Western

vils.

Nehruwrote

o

Maulana

Azad

that

the

attack

was

to be

explained y

Sovietdesire o

prevent

ritish

mperialismfrom

using

Finland as a future

umping

ff

platform

oran

invading

ussia.27

At

another

imehe

interpreted

ovietbehavior

as

paying

ack the

mperialist

owers

n

their

wn

coin. 28

He

confessed

hat

Russian

opportunism

nd

power

politics

ad dam-

aged

world ocialism.

The

fault, hen,

was not thatof

Marxism-

Leninism.

Nehru's nvolvement

n frustrated

egotiations

o

achieve a

national ndian participationn WorldWar II, the civil dis-

obedience f

1942,

and his

subsequent mprisonmentepressed

prior

optimism

bout

men

reshaping istory

with

the

help

of

Marxism. n

prison

during

1944

he wrote

major

work,

The

25

Jawaharlal

Nehru,

The

Unity

of

India

(New

York,

1942),

pp.

268-277.

26

Ibid.,

p.

302.

27

Jawaharlal

Nehru,

A

Bunch

of

Old Letters

(Bombay,

1958),

p.

430.

28

Jawaharlal

Nehru,

China,

Spain

and the War

(Allahabad, 1940) p.

244.




15/31

270 THE

REVIEW

OF

POLITICS

Discoveryof

ndia.29 He delved nto

his

Indian

heritage

nd

found

much to

reject

from aste

abuses

to

supernaturalism,

ut

he valued

the

middle

way

of

Gautama and

the

life-affirmationf the

early

Vedic

Aryans.

He

expressed

his debt to Marx and Lenin for

pro-

viding

him with

a

theory

f

social

development,

lthough

as Don-

ald

E.

Smith has

commented,

Nehru saw the

difficulty

f recon-

ciling

dialectical

materialismwith

the idealism of other

phases

of

his

thought,

specially

his

concern

for

an

ethical

approach

to

life.30

Influences ther

than

Marxism,

especially

he

sentimental

uman-

ism of Rabindranath

Tagore,

Gandhi's

teachings

about correct

means,and Westernpragmatism,made themselves elt n thisre-

statement

of

his

philosophy.

A

drawing

away

from materialism

appears

in

his

acknowledgment

hat

life is

in

touch

with an

in-

visible world

which

thinking

man

cannot

ignore.

Released

from

prison

in

June,

1945,

Nehru took his

revised outlook with

its

contrarities

nd

inconsistencies

nto

the

final and successful on-

test with

weakened

imperialism.

ndian

sovereignty,

ollowed

by

the Hindu-Moslem

upheavals,

disputes

with Pakistan over the

accession of threePrincely tates,and the assassination fGandhi,

brought

new

problems.

t also

brought

him

great

political power

to build a social

democracy

and

to formulate

foreignpolicy

in

keeping

with his

understanding

f

the

principles

o

guide

India

in

world

affairs.

III

Soon after

ndependence

Prime

Minister Nehru

expressed

his

belief that

morality

and

self-interest

nspire

and

direct Indian

foreign

policy.31

This

unexceptional

conviction,

pplicable

to

any

state,

has

provided

the

guidelines

for

discussion f

India's external

relations.

Studentsof Indian

foreign

policy

have oftenfound

one

or

the

other

of

these

inspirations

o be

paramount. Probably

the

national interest

has received more

attention,32

development

helped by

Nehru's

tendency

fter

approximately

1955

to

defend

29Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India (London, 1956).30

Donald

E.

Smith,

Nehru

and

Democracy

(Bombay,

1958),

p.

34.

31

See

Jawaharlal

Nehru,

Visit

to America

(New

York,

1958),

pp.

29-30;

and S. L.

Poplai,

ed.,

Select Documents on

Asian

Affairs:

ndia

1947-1950,

II

(Bombay,

1959),

21-24.

32

For

the national interest

view,

see,

for

example, Appadorai,

op.

cit.;

and E.

Malcom

Hause,

India:

Noncommitted and

Nonaligned,

XIII

Western

Political

Quarterly (March 1960).

Quincy

Wright

has taken

peace

as

India's

main

concern,

although

Michael Brecher

and Norman D. Palmer

stress

national self-interest

n

the

report

of the

Conference

on

India and the




16/31


271

Indian

foreign policy

from

charges

of

self-righteousness

y

dis-

claiming

that

it

has

any

special

moral

qualities.

But the

moral

concerns of

Nehru

have had

important,

ndeed,

crucial influence

on the substance nd the executionof Indian foreign olicy.Even

if

one

sees

Nehru more

as the

leading

spokesman

for his

associates

in

the

Congress,

here

s

a

highly

thical nd reformistontent

to

many

of the ideas

transmitted

o free

India

from the

years

before freedom.

J.

C.

Kundra

identified

hese

as

support

for

anticolonialism

nd international

ooperation,

rejection

of

white

racialism,

endorsement f

an

ethical

outlook,

and

an

absence

of

fear of

communism.33

Doubtless

self-interest

as

guided Nehru;

witness he case of

Kashmir,

where his

government

sed

force to

take and absorb

territory

or

reasonsof

strategy

nd

religious olicy.

Yet

the

young

Indian

government

lso exhibited moral sensi-

tivity

n

the

Kashmir

crisis;

for

t

observed

egal

formalities

s to

the accession

of

the state to

India,

promised

a

plebiscite

to the

population,

nd

submitted

he

controversy

o

the UnitedNations.

The

application

of

Nehru's

general

directives

or his

country's

foreign olicymaybe described nderorder nd strategy.he

world

order

may

be

exemplified

y

India's declared

friendship

with

ll

states,

whatever

heir

olitical

r

economic

ystems;

y

ts

advocacy

of

self-determinationor

all

peoples,

and

of

the elimina-

tion

of

war,

by

the removal

of

its

historicalor

potential

causes,

Western

mperialism,

Caucasian

racism,

economic

want,

military

alliances,

national

fear,

izable

conventional

rmaments,

nd nuclear

weapons.

he

problem

f

war,

Nehru

nsisted

t

the

Belgrade

meet-

ing

of neutralsn 1961, s of

greater riority

han

any

of ts roots

which

must

be

approached

in

terms

of

solving

the

higher

ssue.34

The

heading

of

strategy

s

essentially

hat of

nonalignment

United States

in

1959,

found

in

Selig

S.

Harrison,

India and the United States

(New

York,

1961),

pp.

38-43.

A

history

for the Indian

Council

of World

Affairs

uses

principle

and interest

to

explain

the sources of

India's

foreign

policy.

See

K. P.

Karunakaran,

India In World

Affairs,

(Calcutta,

1952),

pp.

21-57.

33

J.

C.

Kundra,

Indian

Foreign

Policy,

1947-1954: A

Study

of

Relations

with

the Western

Bloc

(Groningen,

1955),

p.

43. Resolutions of

the

Indian

National

Congress

party

from

1885

to

1952

dealing

with external affairs are

compiled

in The

Background of

India's

Foreign

Policy,

N. V.

Rajkumar,

ed.

(New

Delhi,

1952).

s3

The

Conference of

Heads

of

State

or

Government

of Nonaligned

Coun-

tries,

p.

116.

Opposition

to

war

and

military

acts

is also

important

n

Congress

statements. See

All India

Congress Committee,

Resolutions

on

Foreign

Policy:

1947-1957

(New

Delhi,

n.d.), pp.

11,

14-15,

33,

51-52.




17/31

272

THE

REVIEW

OF

POLITICS

or

independent olicy,

which

n

Nehru'smind s more

han

an

ad

hoc

response

o the Cold

War.

Nonalignment,

he

superior

methodfor

achieving

he

right

nternational

rder,

would

be

India's

policy

ven ntheabsence fthe

truggle

etweenhecom-

munist

nd

anticommunist

locs. For

nonalignment

s

a

means

to

combat

he

entire

ystem

f traditional orld

olitics

n

which

imperialism

nd

war are natural

esults nd the

concentration

f

power

s a

leading

haracteristic.

hus Indian

foreign olicy

nder

Nehru

has demanded n end to

bipolarity,

he

particular

ind

of

concentration

hich ndia has

faced

for

almost wo decades.

The cultural nd politicalntegrityfnations equires breaking

up

of

the

great

amps

whenever

hey

ppear

n

internationalis-

tory.

The

process

will,

Nehru has

argued, pread

the

arena

of

peace.

To

be

consistent,

e

has often

aid that

India does not

demand

third

loc,

n illicit

bjective.

s

Nehru

old

theUnited

Nations

Assembly

n

December, 1947,

India travels

lonely

road.

True

internationalism,

s

incompatible

ith

alignment.35

Strengthening

his

notion

s his

nsistence

hat ndia will not bar-

gainfor elfishnds hroughn independentath n world olitics.

But,

o

compensate

or

ndia's

possible

solation,

ehruhas

present-

ed

his

nation s

a

pillar

nd

guardian

f nternational

rganization

against

he selfish

nterestsf the

major

nations.36

Nehru's

deas on

revolution,

otably

he Marxian

analyses

f

capitalism,

mperialism,

nd

war,

have influenced he

fields

f

order

and

strategy.

onetheless,

he

Indian leader's

movement

awayfromMarxism, eflectednThe Discoveryf ndia,reduced

its

appeal

to

him s a master

heory

f

ife.

or

himMarxism

ad

nearly

hat

status

during

1936-38;

but

in

the

postindependence

period

o

1958,

it was

more

of a

major

political

nd

economic

explanation,ubject

o

limiting

ircumstances,

ther

xplanations,

and

revisions.

onsequently,

ith

the

acquisition

f

sovereignty,

Nehru

did

not

himself

ngage

n or

cause

his

nation o

enter

he

militant lass

struggle

f

international

ommunismnd

its

pene-

tration fnoncommunistocietiesyconstitutionalrothermeans.

And

he did not

attempt

o

build

an

Indiannation fter

he model

of

Soviet

Russia,

despite

is

admiration or

muchof the

Russian

social

reconstruction.

n

the other

hand,

he

considered

imself

35

M. N.

Das,

op.

cit.,

p.

202.

36

Ross

N. Berkes nd

Mohinder .

Bedi,

The

Diplomacy f

India: Indian

Foreign

olicy

n

the UnitedNations

Stanford,

958),

pp.

2-3.




18/31

INDIAN

FOREIGN

POLICY

273

and his followers

o be builders

f democratic

ollectivism,

ho

owed

much

to

Marxian

inspiration

nd

analysis

from

Marx

through

enin to

Stalin,

whom

Nehrurated s inferior

o

Lenin.

As to worldpolitics,Nehruentered reedomwithmanyfewer

doubts bout the motives f socialist tates

nd those

aspiring

to

oin

their

anks han

boutthe

capitalist

nd

imperialist

emoc-

racies,

ncluding

he United States. The

former,

espite

their

internal

oercion,

ere

fundamentally

orrect

n

their

rientation,

while

the latterwere diseased

by

private

apital

and

monopoly,

and

therefore ad

foreign olicies

tending

oward

domination

andwar.

The

impress

f

Nehru's ttraction

o

Marxism

n

Indian

con-

ceptions

f

order nd

strategy

s

a

significant

haracteristic

f

the

Indian

record

n

foreign

elations,

specially

etween1951

and

1958.

Earlier,

etween

947 and

1950,

Nehru's

government

ad

a

pro-Western

rientation

ithin he

frameworkf

nonalignment.

During

this

period

British

nfluence

as

especially

oticeable

e-

cause of the

relatively

raceful

issolution

f

empire,

he residues

ofEnglishaw,administrationndlanguage,nd India'sfavorable

sterling

alance

n

London.

The

writing

f

the

ong

and

complex

Indian

Constitutionook

place

in

those

years,

nd discussion

f

its

Western

emocratic

lements

nfluenced

he nation

to look

West.

Moreover,

oviet

Russia then

considered ehru

a

tool

of

imperialism.

hrough

n

unclear

eft

trategy,

he Zhdanov

ine,

adopted

n

early

1948,

Moscow

stimulated

ommunistsnd

their

clients o

undertake

ndustrial

abotage

nd

rural

nsurrection

n

manyparts fSouthand Southeast sia.37The Indian state nd

central

overnments

esponded

uccessfully

ith

rmed

force

nd

detentions.

oscow

changed

o

a

more

flexible

ine

n

early

1950,

making ossible

nited

ronts ith

he

national

ourgeoise

f

the

new

states n

a

struggle

gainst

apitalism

nd

imperialism

ed

by

the

United

States.

World

communism

lso

shiftedn

1950-51

towards he

abandonment f

the

two

camps

doctrinewhich

Stalinformallycrapped n early1952.38The nationalvictory

37

Changes

in

often

negative

Russian

directives and

their

sometimes

in-

correct

nterpretation y

the Indian

Communists

from

1945

to 1954 are

studied

in

John

H.

Kautsky,

Moscow

and the

Communist

Party

of

India

(Cambridge

and

New

York,

1956).

38A

stringent

Moscow

line on

neutrality-neutralism

asted

from

the

war

years

to

early

1952,

giving

way

to

a softer view

looking

to

benefitsfor

inter-

national

communism

in

Europe,

where

neutrality-neutralism

might

weaken

Western

security

plans,

and

in former colonial

areas where it

might

serve

as




19/31

274 THE

REVIEW OF

POLITICS

over most

of the violent ommunist hreats

n

India and

the

evolution

f

international

ommunistdeas

opened

the

way

for

Nehru to

exhibit

nderlying

eferenceo the

words

nd acts

of

communisttates.

Evidence f the

shift f Indian

foreign olicy

o a

posture

f

deference

o

internationalommunism

merged

uring

heKorean

conflict.39

lthough

ew

Delhi

supported

he

United

Nations

on-

demnation

f North

Korean

aggression,

ehru's

government

ent

only

Gandhian

mbulance

nitto

Korea,

declining

o make

a

combat

ontributionorreasons

f cost and

effectiveness.

ndia's

responseontrasted ith hecombathelpofTurkeynd Ethiopia,

non-Westerntatesno

stronger

han India.

Subsequently,

ndia

found

t

possible

o sendfive

housand

roops

o

supervise

risoners

in

Korea,

and still ater

to

provide

rmed

troops

or

the

United

Nations hields

n

the

Middle East and

the

Congo.

But in these

ventureshe

political

isksweresmall nd

the

benefits

otentially

large.

Moreover

New Delhi

emphasized

elf-determination

nd

no-force

o

bring

Korean

peace,

as

if

the

United

Nations

orces

did notprotecthesevalues. India urged cease-fire henthe

United

Nations

rmies rossed he 38th

parallel,

rguing

hat

the

war

must

ot

be

enlarged

nd

that

egality

equired

he

pursuers

to

stop

at the line. India's

confidential

arning

o

the United

States hat

Peking

would

enter he

war

f

the

parallel

were

rossed

proved

n

accurate

prediction

nd

gave

New

Delhi satisfaction

when

the United

Nations

could not

hold North

Korea

by

con-

ventionalmeans. Afterhe ruce othPekingnd Moscowberated

India for tsformula

n

repatriation

f

prisoners.

ut

ndia's over-

all conduct n

the

Korean

episode

helped

to

serveSino-Russian

interests.

Clearly

he

South Korean

government

oined

the Na-

a transitional

phase.

See

George

Ginsburgs,

Neutrality

and Neutralism

and

the Tactics of Soviet

Diplomacy,

American

Slavic and East

European Review,

XIX

(December,

1960),

531-560.

39

Representative

of the views of

Nehru's

articulate

followers s

the

state-

ment

of

the

Bengali journalist

and

novelist,Chanakya Sen,

that

it

was

duringthe Korean war that

nonalignment

as an international force made its first

impact

on a world crisis.

Asian sentimenthad

already

been

outraged

by

the

dropping

of the first

tomic

bombs on

Japan,

an

Asian

country,

and

by

the

nuclear

tests carried out in areas

adjacent

to

Asian

lands.

Now

Asians realized

that

the

Western

powers

and

their rivals

had

chosen another

Asian

battlefront

to

fight

Europe's

war which

had

nothing

to do

with the

national

interests f

the

non-Communist

Asian

countries.

They

bent their

diplomatic

energy

for

quick

containment

of the Korean

War

and

for its

early

end.

Chanakya

Sen,

Against

the

Cold

War

(New York,

1962),

pp.

248-249.




20/31

INDIAN

FOREIGN

POLICY

275

tionalist

hinese

egime

s

an

official

arget

f ndian

displeasure,

contrasting

ith Nehru's

guarded

commentsn

the

communist

seizure

f

power

n

Czechoslovakia,

nationwhose reedom e

had

known irsthand.40

Indian behavior

n the UnitedNations fter he main

Korean

crisis

eclined

rovided

urther

ndicationsf

New

Delhi's

naviga-

tion n world

politics

ased

on check

points

rom

he

port

ide.

Nehru's

government

eniedthe

competence

f a United

Nations

inquiry,

eaded

by

an

Indian,

nto enforced

abor in the

Soviet

Union,

on

the

grounds

hatthe

study

ealt

with

single

kind

of

slave aborand didnotstudy onditionslsewhere.41ndia,how-

ever,

had

objected

previously

o other

nvestigations

ecause

they

were

oo

broad.

Additional

vidences found n

thecareer fV.

K.

KrishnaMenon

in

the United

Nations.

Associatedwith

Nehru

since

1935,

fter

ndependence

rishaMenon

became ndia's

High

Commissionern

GreatBritain

nd in

1952

began

his

UnitedNa-

tions

ervice,

ecoming

hief

elegate

n two

years.

In the

world

organization

e

articulated nd

executed

procedural

nd

sub-

stantive pproach

holding

he West,and

especially

he United

States,

esponsible

or

ctively

r

passively

mpeding

he

dvanceof

international

eace,

Afro-Asian

ationalism,

nd

the

underdevel-

oped

ands.

In

1956 Nehru

ewarded

rishnaMenon

with

abinet

rank.

A

neopacifist,

rishna

Menon

oonbecameDefense

Minister,

implementing

rom

958 his

and Nehru's

elief

hat

Russia

would

be

a

socialist riend

o

check he

New China

and

the

United tates.

Congressndpublic emands ollowinghefrontierebacle 1962)

compelled

he

Prime

Minister

o

release

Krishna

Menon

from

he

government.

espite

he

ntellectual

inship

f

Nehru

nd

Krish-

na

Menon for

nearly

three

decades,42

here

s

no

substantial

evidence f

undue

influence n

Nehru

or

that Krishna

Menon

exceeded

his

authority,

xcept

during

he

Hungarian

risiswhen

he

voted

gainst

United

Nations

esolution

alling

or

upervised

electionsn

Hungary

nstead

f

following

nstructions

o

abstain

n

all Hungarianssues.43KrishnaMenon's mportances thathe is

40

Norman

Cousins,

Talks

With

Nehru

(New York,

1951),

pp.

55-57.

41

A/C.

3/SR.

53

(23

November,

1953).

42

A

biographer

speaks

of

Wahlverwandtschaft,

rare

linking

of

minds. See

Emil

Lengyel,

Krishna

Menon

(New

York,

1962),

p.

99.

Harold

J.

Laski was

Krishna

Menon's

guru

in

his

formative

years

when

he drew

his

political

ideas

from

ources

familiar

to

Nehru.

43

Brecher,

Nehru,

p.

573.




21/31

276

THE

REVIEW

OF

POLITICS

a

prism

which

xaggerated

ehru's

mind

where,

s A. D.

Gorwalla

wrote n

1959,

A

considerableendernessoward ommunism

s

discernible. 44

The

Hungarian

risis

roduced

much discussedllustration

of

the

Indian

leader's

kindly

reatmentf Sovietmisdeeds.

On

November

,

1956,

he

explained

o the ndian

people

with he

aid

of a note from

Bulganin

hat the

unrest

n

Hungary,

ating

o

October

3,

was a

confusing,

omestic

onflict;

nd

he

delayed

ntil

November

9

before

dvising

he

Lok

Sabha,

after

mounting

riti-

cism,

hatSoviet rmies ad

suppressed

genuine,

ational

evolt.

Even thenhe interpretedussian ction s an outgrowthfthe

Warsaw

Pact,

a

reaction o

NATO,

and of the

undesirable otion

of

military

lliances;

he said

that

his

deplorable

iolencewas

not

akinto

the

aggressiongainst

gypt.45

hat

Nehru

distinguished

Soviet

and Western

ggressions

as

no

surprise

o

experienced

observersf Indian

foreign olicy

who

knewthat he

and other

Afro-Asiansad

not

considered

mperialistic

he

activitiesf Soviet

Russia

in

Eastern

Europe

after

1945.46

The Middle Eastern risis f 1956 fittedntoNehru's nter-

national

reconceptions

n a

way

hatno other

world risis ad done

since

he

Spanish

CivilWar. He

saw the

niquitous nglo-French

imperialists

ttacking,

ut

eventually

ebuffed

y,

formerolonial

nation,

gypt,

hich

rewmoral

nd

political

id from he

virtuous

new

states nd

the

traditional

nti-imperialist,

oviet

Russia. The

United tates'

olitical

ssistance

o

Egypt

id not

fit ince

America

was an ally fthe ggressorsntheColdWar. Israel, newfactor,

44A.

D.

Gorwalla,

Perils of

Panch

Shila,

in

A

Study of

Nehru,

Rafiq

Zakaria,

ed.

(Bombay,

1959),

p.

257.

45

Jawaharlal

Nehru,

India's

Foreign

Policy

(New

Delhi,

1961),

pp.

557-

560. About

the

execution

of Imre

Nagy,

Nehru

said,

Those who are dead

are

dead,

but

I

earnestly

hope

that this

process

will

not

continue.

Ibid.,

p.

563.

46

Shortly

after

the

Bandung

Conference

Nehru told

the

Lok

Sabha that