incentive structure of land acquisition and land allocation in...
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Incentive structure of land acquisition and land allocation in Vietnam
Dung T. Ngo & Thang N. TranHue University of Agriculture & Forestry
Utrecht, 9 July 2015
Land acquisition & allocation
Legal context
Roles of local governments
Case studiesForest allocation
Resettlement
Forest contract
RationaleVietnam: rapid change from central-planning market economy (1990s)
Land acquisition:Industrialization: agr. land to factory, storageUrbanization: housing, infrastructure
Land allocation: decentralize state-land management to different stakeholders
Legal context
Constitution 1992, 2013: land and natural resources under public property, managed & represented by State
Land use rights: allocated/ leased to individuals and organizations by the State
State delegates to province: land ownership, management regime
Four cases of land acquisition:
1. National defense/ security purpose (Article 61);
2. Socio-economic development for national/ public interest (Art. 62); (purpose vs. compensation)
3. Violations of land law (Art. 64); 4. Termination, voluntary return,
risks of threat (Art. 65).
Three decision-making levels:
National Assembly: highly national benefits
Prime Minister: offices, infrastructure, electricity, water service… at national level
Provincial Council: provincial infrastructure, housing, forest conservation, etc.
Steps of land acquisitionStep 1 •Request for land acquisition by the investor
Step 2 •Announcement on location, time, reasons
Step 3 •Submit investment plan including S/EIA
Step 4 •Submit compensation plan, resettlement, feedback
Step 5 •Prepare land dossier and submit for land acquisition
Step 6 •Conduct compensation, resettlement plan
Step 7 • Implementation of land acquisition and site clearance
Step 8 •Hand-over in field and contract
Case #1: Forest land allocation
Key actors Duties
State forest enterprises (SFE) Allocate forest to local people
Forest Protection Dept. (FPD) Facilitate allocation procedures: forest inventory, local meetings
Local people (groups, households) Group formation, forest inventory, forestboundary
Forest allocation = assign forest areas to villages, groups, or individual households for 50-year period with most property rights
Stakeholder Allocation to Perceived Benefit(s) of Allocation
Perceived Cost(s) of Allocation
State Forest Enterprises
Individual Reduce forest protection duties Less benefits from timber extraction Group
Forest Protection Unit (district level)
Individual - Reduced protection duties
- Direct payment from SNV
- Less direct benefits from sanction
- High time and effort in allocation (forest inventory and demarcation)
Group - Reduced protection duties
- Direct payment from SNV
- Effort in allocation (but lower than for household allocation)
Local People Individual - Forest products
- Red book for long term investment and loan from bank
- Rationale for sanction
- Integrated other land uses (plantation, NTFPs)
- Time and effort in management
- Protection cost is higher if allocted patches are in remote area.
Group - Forest products
- Red book for long term investment and loan from bank
- Rationale for sanction
- Receive larger areas of natural forest
- Transaction costs associated with penalty agreement, harvest approval
- Investment to generate incomes from degraded forest
Findings
SFE: reluctant to return rich forests for allocation; delayed in process
FPD: highly active due to benefits and conservation purpose
Local people:Interested in rich/medium forest and barren land;
Not interested in degraded forests (high cost for conservation)
From areas vulnerable to natural disasters
From industrial zone/city development
From hydropower plant, reservoir
construction
Case #2: Resettlement stories
Before vs. After resettlement
Case studies in 5 villages of Huong Tra district, TT Hue province (2012)
Findings
Actors: local government – hydropower companies - resettlers
Infrastructure, school, water, electricity: improved
Livelihood option: decreased
Land access: Limited, insufficient for agr. production;
Career and job: limited
Case #3: Forest protection contractContext: Implementation of PFES in Lam Dong province;
Main actors: Forest fund – Local government – local groups for forest protection contract
Assessment of stakeholders’ participation: legal framework –capacity – implementation
Payment for forest environmental service (PFES) in Vietnam
Payment for forest environmental services
Provincial Fund
Central Fund
entrusted payment for ESES providers
ES usersEnvironmental services
FindingsLegal framework:
Robust and rationale for participation in PESInsufficient clearance & disseminationTime pressure for PES implementation
Capacity:District, commune staff: sufficient training in procedures but not facilitation skills;Knowledge of local people on their rights in PES: limitedFund management: insufficient in enforcement of violation
ImplementationBudget collection: effectively due to state gov. support in pilotForest protection: somewhat limited due to payment < opportunity costs for commercial plantation (rubber, coffee)Long-term vision: possible if carbon credit, land ownership function well.
Lesson learnt & discussion
Legal framework: very important for monitoring, conflict solving (land rights, acquistion procedures, compensation)Participatory decision making process: legality, capacity, practiceCivil society & NGOs: capacity building, monitoring, transparency, fundingBenefit sharing mechanism: simple, transparent, consensus