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Introduction: 2003:Half a Year of European Turmoil

2003. Half a year of turmoil: the warin Iraq and its diplomatic aftermath seemto divide Europe as never before. Ger-many, the most loyal and pro-Americancountry in Europe since WW II, cedes itsposition to Poland. France, more or lessabsent in Eastern Europe since Napoleonand perceived by many Eastern Europe-ans through the lens of stared and stripedglasses, confirms all prejudices with

Between Chirac, Bush and Putin:The Baltic States, From Factors to Actors

in the New EuropeBy Susanne Nies*

Chirac�s rude statement, in February 2003:�Eastern Europeans missed an opportu-nity to shut up�. This statement is a re-sponse to the Eastern European pro-American stance, understood in France(as elsewhere)1 to be a lack of commit-ment to Europe. Meanwhile, Berlin andParis celebrate the 40th anniversary of thefamous Elysée-Treaty.2 For the first time,German-French cooperation raises anxi-eties in all capitals of the so-called smallEuropean states from Vilnius to Lisbon.The German-French motor is the veryreason for British-Spanish cooperation.

There is a widespread perception of a di-vide between big and small states in Eu-rope, 21 against 6, especially in the wakeof the European convention and gover-nance reform in the EU.

There is, in fact, no such thing as anold or a new Europe. Europe is an ap-proach, an impressive diversity, an op-portunity, a commitment. There is nochoice to be made between the US andEurope. European states, stretching fromthe Atlantic to the Urals � though an ev-erlasting question mark rests on Turkeyand Russia (or at least parts of these coun-

* Susanne Nies is research fellow at Center for International Studies and Research in Paris, and Free University in Berlin.

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tries) � are undoubtedly as much Euro-pean as California or New Mexico areAmerican. Europe is more than the Com-mission in Brussels, the Council, France,or Germany. The anxiety of accession can-didates is comprehensible, just as the dis-appointment of some founding members,idealists about the European idea. Never-theless, not that much has been added tothe existing debate over Europe, asidefrom the Eastern European actors. Notonly is Europe expanding, but so are itsdiscourses: the eternal Franco-German-British debate about �how much ofAmerica� and �how much of integration�should accompany the admission of newmember states into the Union. This is infact a proof of a normalization of rela-tions, and, for that matter, of Europeanintegration.

This contribution focuses on the par-ticular development of the Baltic states intheir international and European environ-ment, their transition from factors to ac-tors, and their perspectives in the enlargedEU and NATO.

The contribution is based on a seriesof interviews taken with the political elitesof the three Baltic states in 2002 and 2003.The constructivist approach, threat per-ception, and the study in discourse standat the centre of this paper�s approach.

It is organized as follows. Part I intro-duces conceptual definitions of the terms�region�, �security�, and �de-securitization� and is also devoted to adiscussion of the maintenance of securitymeasures in the aftermath of the ColdWar. Part II presents threat perceptionssince 2001. Finally, part III assesses themajor changes in orientations and per-ceptions in and of the three Baltic states,from NATO enlargement to the Chiracspeech, and provides an outlook on fu-ture developments.

Up to the middle of 2001, the admis-sion of Baltic states into NATO was ahighly controversial issue. Unexpectedpolitical change has since occurred. TheBaltic Sea region, a highly securitized areasince World War II, shifted towardsdesecuritization. This is all the more sur-

prising as the quarrels surrounding post-cold war settings were articulated in vari-ous contentious discussions throughoutthe nineties i.e. on the retreat of the RedArmy and the abandonment of its bases,the status of the Slavic population, in par-ticular in Estonia and Latvia, and, in re-cent times, NATO enlargement and theCFE-Treaty as well as the issue of visas forinhabitants of Kaliningrad. A new con-sensus between Russia and the West, whichemerged in the aftermath of the terroristattacks of September 2001, opened thedoor for change. In winter 2002, the threeBaltic states received the western placet tojoin NATO and the EU in 2004.3 As thisauthor�s interview-series proves, the vastmajority of Baltic leaders no longer con-sider Russia to be a threat to their na-tions.4 Thus, the international relationsof Baltic states are shaped today by a di-vided loyalty between Europe and the US(NATO). The question therefore ariseswhat threat perceptions do guide theseinternational relations and how the Bal-tic states now assess their own perspec-tives and Euro-Atlantic affiliations.

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I. Concepts

The Baltic Space

European dividing lines are multipleand relative.5 This was demonstrated onceagain at the end of the Cold War: theboundaries of the area connoted by theterm �East� shifted due to the politicaland economic integration of former partsof the Soviet bloc into the �West�. Since1991 new transitory terms have emergedin Europe, such as Central Europe or theBaltic Sea Region. The latter is composedof Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, Po-land, Germany and the Scandinaviancountries and constitutes a highly clus-tered space, both in political and eco-nomic terms.

Changes in the region, formerly di-vided by the iron curtain, have beenthreefold: new borders were drawn,former states emerged with the reestab-lishment of Estonia, Latvia, andLithuania, and Kaliningrad became anenclave. As a result, former Soviet repub-lics from East to North and West have

adopted a new political orientation, lead-ing to quarrels and negotiations overpost-Cold War arrangements with Mos-cow. New regional and international af-filiations have arisen. The Warsaw Pactdisappeared, and NATO and the EU willsoon be enlarged.

Since the three new Baltic states havebeen the most concerned with change andsecurity challenges, this paper will be lim-ited to the consideration of these as wellas the issue of Kaliningrad.

Security

In the conceptualisation of security,traditional approaches assign primacy tostate actors and their military capabilities.

For both traditionalists and wideners,security is about survival and existentialthreat. The difference between the twoapproaches lies in the perception of threatand thus the very nature of existentialthreats. For traditionalists, they are mostlymilitary. For wideners they can be mili-tary, political, societal, environmental, andother.

Both approaches agree nevertheless thatthe use of extraordinary measures is justi-fied in case of an existential threat.

This paper adopts the widener ap-proach to security, which has becomenearly �traditionalist� in recent times. Itinsists on the desecuritization approach.

Securitization/ Desecuritization

Waever locates all public issues on aspectrum ranging from non-politicized(meaning the state does not deal with itand it is not in any other way made anissue of public debate and decision) topoliticized (meaning the issue is part ofpublic policy, requiring government de-cision and resource allocation, or, morerarely, some other form of communalgovernance), to securitized (meaning theissue is presented as an existential threat,requiring emergency measures and justi-fying actions outside the normal boundsof political procedure). The placement ofissues is open, according to Waever. Anyissue can be placed on any part of thespectrum, depending on circumstances.

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The placement varies from state to stateand across time.6

Securitization means that the commonrules of political games are abandoned forthe sake of homeland defence. Extraordi-nary measures are thus justified.

Desecuritization is to be understood asthe shift back to the normal political gameand bargaining. How to assess securitizationshifts? Perceptions are essential. The studyof discourse, through interview series andmedia-analysis reveal changes. The decisionover desecuritization or securitization isbased on threat perception, which variestremendously from state to state, and re-gime to regime. If culture or religion issecuritized in some states, in others it isnot.

II. Quarrels overpost-Cold War

settings: maintainedsecuritization in the

aftermath of theSoviet collapse

(1991-2001)

The Baltic Sea Region:bridge or battlefield?

For centuries the strategic position ofthe Baltic Sea Region has contributed toits role as an economic and political in-terface between the East and West, Northand South, as well as its role as a battle-field between neighbouring civilizationsand states. The Westphalian order wasunaccomplished in the Baltic provincesof the Tsarist Empire. Up to the end ofWorld War I a curious medieval order,represented by a domineering Germannobility, coexisted with Russian centralrule.

Nationalist revival, the end of the Ger-man-Russian medieval entente in the re-gion, and the collapse of the Tsarist Em-pire led to the emergence of three inde-pendent Baltic states in 1918.

The Western allies were hesitant in rec-ognizing the new states due to the un-clear fate of Russia during its civil war:only after the defeat of the Whites thesplit-offs of the defunct Empire whererecognized and admitted to the Leagueof Nations. This linkage between Russiaand its periphery was repeated in 1991:Western states recognized the new situa-tion in the Baltics only after the August1991 putsch, during the course of whichGorbachev was replaced by Yeltsin, whohappened to support Baltic independence.

The fate of the Baltic interface has thusalways been determined by the state ofBig Power relations, in particular East-Westrelations.

The region has been securitized sincethe Hitler-Stalin Pact in 1939 and under-went three successive Soviet-German gov-ernments during World War II.

The most obvious expression of post-war securitization was the extreme Soviet

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militarization of the front, especiallyLatvia, and the transformation ofKaliningrad into a closed military zone.

Polemics in the 1990s

Surprisingly, the Baltic issue remainedsecuritized until 2001, even after the endof East-West confrontation.

The most important confrontations andpolemics concerned:

- The conflict over independence, inparticular between Moscow and Vilnius,which lasted until the Moscow putsch inAugust 1991. The Soviet Union tried toput pressure on its republics by reducingthe supply of energy during 1988 to 1991.

- The quarrel over citizenship and thestatus of the Slavic population in Estoniaand Latvia, which first arose in 1991. Thisconflict, even if it still re-emerges fromtime to time, is more or less settled, asmanifested by the departure of the OSCEmission from Latvia and Estonia in late2001.

- Polemics over the retreat of the RedArmy and its installations.7 The disman-

tling of the Russian radar station inSkrunda in 1999 brought the Red andRussian Army retreat to a close. In theearly 1990s the Baltic states considered theRed Army retreat from other parts ofEurope through Kaliningrad and Latvia(1991-4) particularly frightening.

- The conflict over NATO enlargement.This conflict emerged with Baltic inde-pendence in 1991, but became virulentafter the adoption of the MembershipAction Plan (MAP) in 1998. The Russiangovernment tried to influence the progressof integration by strengthening its tieswith the Baltic states, for instance by meansof the CFE treaty, the border treaty, oralso by staging open protests to Westernintegration.

- The dispute over the Schengen re-gime and its implication for the Russianexclave of Kaliningrad (since 2001). Thisitem concerned first of all theneighbouring countries, Poland andLithuania.

All these conflicts have been settled: thefirst two during the 1990s, and the twoothers recently, in 2001 and 2002.

III. The shift towardsdesecuritization

1. Factors

Introduction

The following four factors have had amajor impact on the geopolitics of theBaltic Sea region: the change in domesticelite, the American-Russian relationship,NATO enlargement, and EU enlargement.If the NATO debate has been stronglyaffected by the September 11th attacks, thephilosophy and course of the EU enlarge-ment, on the contrary, remains un-changed. While NATO agreed to inviteRomania and Bulgaria, and Russia ceasedrejecting this idea, the EU has a lot morenarrow-minded approach, putting the twoBalkan states, Romania and Bulgaria, in athird class waiting room, till 2007. Tur-key, interested in the EU membershipsince 1963, has an option to negotiate, if,by the end of 2004, Ankara fulfils theAcquis Communautaire. Until the war inIraq, Russian-Western confrontation

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shifted from strategic to the EU issues,with Kaliningrad as the most importantbattlefield. In the last month, a new coali-tion emerged, with Russia, Germany andFrance taking an aggressive stance towardthe Anglo-Saxon Alliance in the war inIraq and frightening the small Europeancountries in the Convention debate ofnew governance in Europe.

After long intra-institutional debateson future candidates, both the EU andNATO have committed themselves to a�Big Bang� scenario:  

In November 2002, the TransatlanticAlliance invited seven candidates to join:Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ro-mania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.8

The EU Commission has announcedthat it will invite eight, mostly Centraland Eastern European candidates to joinin 2004: Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, andthe Czech Republic, as well as the twoMediterranean countries, Cyprus andMalta.9

The domestic factor:elite turnover

The idea that it takes time and a newgeneration for mentalities to change isapplicable to developments in the Balticstates. In less than four years the percep-tion of Russia has already changed con-siderably. What was considered to be amilitary threat in the early nineties is nowseen as a rational actor. Two reasons forthis 180-degree turn should be mentioned:

- The generational change in the elite,from old to young people;

- Recent developments in East-West re-lations.

The international environment (1):the regional impact of the newAmerican-Russian partnership

The Russian commitment to the West-ern Alliance and the common strategyagainst terrorism has resulted in impor-tant and immediate pay-offs for Mos-cow:

- Russia has been recognized as a mar-ket-economy, first by the US, second bythe EU, with World Trade Organization(WTO) admission now scheduled for2006.10

- After exclusion from the G7 after theAugust 1998 crisis, Russia was reintegratedinto the now G8.

- The immediate end of negative andcritical Western media reports on Russianbrutalities in Chechnya.

- The NATO-Russia rapprochementand Russia�s integration as a special ally,with the formula �Council of 20� inRome, May 2002.

These advantages have been obtainedin exchange for

- Immediate Russian alignment in the�War against Terror�;11

- American access to Russian intelligencedata, especially that concerning Afghani-stan;

- The opening up of Russian aerospacefor American airlifts;

- Tolerance of the American presencein Central Asia.12

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This new international deal introducedharsh shifts in the relations between Rus-sia and the former Soviet republics: ifPutin reneged on opposing NATO en-largement, his stance towards Georgiabecame aggressive in 2002. In recenttimes, i.e. since the Iraq divide in inter-national public opinion, Moscow becamemuch more reserved towards the US, with-out, for the moment at least, any worsen-ing in its relationship with the formerSoviet periphery. NATO and EU integra-tion became an acquis international since2001.

The international environment (2):NATO enlargement

The Warsaw Summit on September 25/26th 2002 amounted to informal consent onthe upcoming �Big-Bang� enlargement.13

The central issue at the November Summit,some two months later, was no longer en-largement, but the reform of theorganisation both in structure and doctrine.

Does this mean that the controversiesover Baltic admission belong to the past,

and that the Russian government welcomesthis step now?

In fact, the Bush speech at WarsawUniversity in June 2001 was already a signthat Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania wouldbe included, whatever the Russian posi-tion. Aside from the rhetoric, Russia hadand has no means to prevent NATO en-largement. Moscow has tried to make in-fluence by suggesting a linkage betweenNATO admission and the CFE Treaty. Yetthis linkage was refuted once again byAmerican Secretary of Defence, DonaldRumsfeld, in Warsaw.14 Russia has yet tosign the bilateral border treaties with theformer Soviet republics15 . These territo-rial regulations are normally required forany NATO admission, but, as put byChristoph Bertram, Director of the SWPBerlin, NATO does not accept this kindof linkage and expression of power poli-tics. Thus, a precedent will be created withthe admission of states without ratifiedborder treaties.16

Russia has not been able to exerciseeven a symbolic influence on the issue ofNATO enlargement.

In public declarations, especially sincethe Council of 20 Declaration, Russia hasnot recently opposed NATO enlargement.Accordingly, two myths exist on Russia�sattitude towards the Baltic region:

a. Russia is not worried about the Bal-tic states� integration in NATO and theEU

b. Russia is worried about the Balticstates� integration in NATO and the EU.

Both patterns are wrong. Russia is con-cerned, but due to limited means, and toa shift of priorities, this concern does notdetermine Russian politics towards theregion any more.

Desecuritization and NATO enlarge-ment do not, for sure, coincide automati-cally. If desecuritization goes hand in handwith the enlargement, the following rea-sons are to be mentioned as well:

- The Russian demilitarisation of theregion, especially Kaliningrad, and theborders, but not the Leningrad District..

-Finland and Sweden are most likelyto join the Alliance in the near future,since the Baltic enlargement isolates themfrom Western standards and intelligence.

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The international environment (3):EU enlargement and the

troublesome Kaliningrad case

Russia and the US share certain dis-trust for the hybrid structure of the EU,expressed over and over again throughthe famous question �Mr. CSFP - what isyour telephone number?�, or in Mr.Rogozin�s question about his homologueEU negotiator with regards to theKaliningrad matter. Both countries aremore familiar with traditional bilateral ormultilateral diplomacy (under one or theother lead) than with dealing with supra-national organisations. 17

The Kaliningrad issue was put on theEuropean and international agenda sud-denly and at a surprisingly late point intime. The problem existed throughout the1990s, but the perception of a problemdid not.

Since the end of the closed militaryzone in 1991 and the attainment of en-clave status due to Lithuanian andBelarusian independence, the former Ger-

man Königsberg is at the centre of a com-plex cluster of problems, both domestic(Russian) and international:

- the reorganisation of the post-Sovietspace; Russian-style federalism applied tothe specific situation of an enclave; theeconomic survival of the enclave in a bet-ter-off regional context;18 the establish-ment of a special economic zone;rumours, fears and misperceptions, suchas Kaliningrad separatism, the return ofGerman rule, the loss of a war trophy,etc.

- bilateral agreements between the en-clave and its immediate neighboursLithuania, Poland, and Belarus; the Rus-sian military presence as a European andinternational problem; the specific impli-cations of the future EU membership ofbordering countries for the 15.000 squarekilometres territory and its one millionRussian-speaking inhabitants, who origi-nate from all parts of the former Sovietunion.

The polemics over Kaliningrad has re-peatedly been subject to serve as a litmus-test of current East-West-relations. The

most outstanding examples are rumoursabout an impending German-Russian dealto exchange Kaliningrad in return for theannulment of Russia�s foreign debt orabout intelligence data on the presenceof Soviet nuclear weapons in the region.19

A liberal visa regime has been main-tained between Poland, Lithuania, Belarus,and Kaliningrad since 1991. Latvia didnot participate. This regime will now cometo an end, with the progressive integra-tion of Poland and Lithuania into theSchengen regime.

If the military issue has nearly beenresolved thanks to the reduction of Rus-sian military forces in the region,20 themovement of people to and fromKaliningrad has become a highly conten-tious issue.

Approximately 120.000 people cross theKaliningrad borders every day, a total ofnine million times each year. They runsmall cross-border businesses, which is atypical expression of the difference in thestandard of living in the region. Thesecrossings have been facilitated by the cur-rent liberal visa regime between Lithuania,

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Poland, Belarus, and Kaliningrad, whichis intended to stabilize the weak borderregions.21 Curiously, the travels to andfrom the Russian mainland have been lessimportant, due, last but not least, to thecosts of travelling: to date it is less expen-sive for a Kaliningrader to travel to Ber-lin (a distance of 600km), to Warsaw (400km), or to Vilnius than it is to travel toSt. Petersburg or Moscow.22

A problem that should have been an-ticipated became controversial only in thesummer of 2002. Lithuania and Poland,who will enter the EU some time in 2004,are obliged to adopt the so-called SchengenAcquis, which was integrated into theAcquis Communautaire in 1999, chapterJustice and Home Affairs. An opting outis no longer possible, as practiced byDenmark and the UK in the past.

The integration into the regime willbegin early next year, delayed perhapsuntil the summer, with full integrationafter successful implementation some sixyears later.

Thus, the liberal post-Cold War bor-der regime will disappear, although some

exceptions and special regimes may be al-lowed, as the French and Greek examplesprove.23

Unfortunately and for specific reasonson both sides, Kaliningrad became thecentre of an EU-Russian confrontation:

- Since both sides had disorganizedviews on the issue, different and contra-dictory opinions started to circulate atvarious levels;

- Russia benefited from the issue andput all of the blame for its former disin-terest and domestic failure in the enclaveon the EU;

- playing upon populist opinion, theRussian media hyped up the issue; claimswere raised there would be no visa forRussians to travel from one part of Rus-sia to another, as Dmitry Rogozin, spe-cial envoy of the President and Chair ofthe Foreign Affairs Commission of theDuma put it;24

- the beginning of the quarrel coin-cided with EU hesitation in recognizingRussia as a market economy. Kaliningradnegotiations failed twice during EU-Rus-sia summits in May and June 2002.

A multitude of proposals have beenpresented, such as a special regime basedon a cheap visa, a tunnel from Kaliningradto Belarus, or a corridor through Polandand Lithuania, the last of which conjur-ing up bad memories in Warsaw, as theGdansk corridor connecting the city tothe German Reich had served to preparethe German invasion in 1939.

Visas are highly symbolic in nature andthey function to express either mutualtrust or distrust. In an era of new tech-nologies, visas, which are still deliveredin the 19th century manner, prove to beinefficient and costly.25 The current visaregime does not fulfil the aim of control-ling the flow of persons while at the sametime opening borders for trade.

According to the realists and politicalnegotiators involved in the debate, sev-eral short, medium, and long-term solu-tions have to be distinguished.

For example, Vytautas Zalys, Lithuanianconsul in Kaliningrad, proposed a mul-tiple visa regime, under which visas wouldbe offered at low prices. Furthermore, he

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suggested that consular points should bereinforced, in particular at border cross-ings. The idea was simple. Once the de-bate dies down, this short-term scenariowill likely be introduced.

The idea of a non-stop train link hasalso been debated.

Negotiating all of the possible exemp-tions from the severe Schengen regimefor a short-term compromise presupposesthat Russia reforms its system of controls,produces passports, and starts to cooper-ate with the Schengen Information Sys-tem in the medium term.

For the time being and for the sake ofcost reduction, Moscow has abolished alarge number of border controls, thus leav-ing its Western neighbours with the taskof guarding borders. The Finnish experi-ence with the long Russian border has beenvery costly and negative in that respect.

2. Perceptions:a study in discourse

This chapter summarizes the mainchanges in politics and perception the

three Baltic states went through duringthe last year. The thesis is based on a se-ries of interviews conducted by the au-thor of this paper in Moscow, Berlin, andKaliningrad during the summer of 2002.

Threat perception and motivationfor NATO membership

If Russia is not considered to be animmediate danger any longer, why thenjoining a defence alliance as NATO? Theanswers of the author�s interview partnerswere the following:

- joining NATO and the EU is consid-ered to be an attestation of normality, ofa stable market economy, and of democ-racy. Membership enhances foreign directinvestment and international trust.

- The three Baltic states have strongTrans-Atlantic affinities. These will be re-inforced by NATO membership.

- For the younger generation, andtoday�s elite, the Western way of life is�fun�. As a Lithuanian journalist explainedto the author, participation in the Alli-ance is part of this fun.

- Perceived threats in the three statesare located less in the military domain,than in the soft-security sector: ecology,especially due to the contamination ofthe Baltic Sea, the Russian military, andnuclear waste; political instability inBelarus and Kaliningrad; terrorism inthe sense that the Baltic states could serveas a basis for preparing attacks. One ofthe most important issues facing all Bal-tic Sea states jointly will be border con-trol � a project for the future, sincetoday�s situation is more than dysfunc-tional, even between the Baltic statesthemselves.

IV. From factors toactors: The Balticstates in the New

Europe

Changed patterns: thedesecuritization shift

One decade after the collapse of theSoviet Empire, the Baltic Sea Region does

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not constitute a major East-West-Northsecurity concern anymore.

A securitization shift has taken place,from the East to the South, and, withsome interruptions, along the new bor-derline from the Baltic to the Black Sea.

Rationality, scarcity of means, as wellas strategic considerations prompted theformer opponents to adopt a coopera-tive stance in the Baltic Cold War contactzone. For the moment, this approachcorresponds to a win-win constellation forboth sides. The present situation at thesouthern border of Russia is more likelyto deteriorate than is the new pattern ofcooperation in the Baltic region.

Three theoretical options exist for thefuture of the Baltic Sea region:

Option 1: There will be a new shift inthe region towards securitization.

Option 2: The region will become akind of Baltic Benelux, and the formerconflicts an anachronism. The region willserve as a bridge and transit line betweenEast and West. The politically and eco-nomically clustered space will integrate via

harmonization, adhesion to European,and international structures. Securitisationwill be difficult in that context. NATOand EU accession has a different meaningtoday than it did in Cold War times oreven with the first NATO enlargementround in 1997. Adhesion is to be consid-ered as a certificate of good governance,stability, and reliability.

Option 3: The region will oscillate be-tween option 1 and 2, as it did in thehistory of the 20th century.

To date only the second option seemsto be realistic, for the following reasons.First, members of the Russian elite with atraditional and anti-Western approach inthis respect have no decisive influence andare not likely to get it very soon: theirbasis is mostly the military, which itself isin a deep crisis, due to failed reforms andthe heavy Soviet heritage. Second, coop-eration with the Western capitals and inthe Baltic Sea Region will have more pay-offs for Russia than confrontation. Third,just as the Baltic Germans have been aninterface between continental Europe andRussia, the Baltic states could serve as an

economic bridge: the energy supply chan-nelled through Klaipeda and Ventspils areoutstanding examples for an already ex-isting situation. Finally, in a medium termthe post-Cold War setting in the south ofthe former Soviet Union will be a greaterforeign policy priority both for Russiaand for the US.

Remaining security issues

Despite this, security concerns remainin the Baltic Sea region. Security concernsmust be perceived as potential threats,such as the unclear fate of the Lukashenkaregime in Belarus and ecological prob-lems. According to an interview partnerat the Estonian Embassy in Berlin, one ofthe most frightening scenarios for Tallinnis the explosion of Sosnovy Bor NuclearPower Plant near St. Petersburg, whichcould lead to the flow of millions of refu-gees to Estonia. The most important se-curity issue for the time being, and inthe context of the war on terrorism, iscertainly the anachronistic border con-trol in the countries of the region, and

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the total lack of cooperation in this re-spect. Kaliningrad is only one expressionof this more general problem. Thus, asolution has to be found not only in termsof access to the enclave, but also the trans-parency of the circulation of goods andpeople in the region as a whole. The Bal-tic region�s bridge function between East,North, and West, and the prestige of thisrole will depend on a successful and com-mon establishment of control mechanisms.

From factors to actors: newopportunities for new actors

The defreezing of the Cold War in theBaltics ten years after the Soviet implo-sion means a resurging opportunity ofnormal political bargaining. After a de-cade of introverted behaviour, typical oftransition countries between Germany andRussia, the Baltic states transformed intoactive subjects in regional relations. Espe-cially Lithuania and Poland aspire to anactive role in political and economic East-East rapprochement, thus the transmissionof their own experience to countries such

as Georgia. Belarus is considered to be anightmare in terms of unforeseeable re-gime changes, refugees etc. Being normalactors and the international recognitionof this fact constitutes one of the mostimportant aims of all the CEE countriesat the moment.

The European battlefield

The Baltic states will join NATO andthe EU at the very moment of a renewedidentity crisis. The reassessment of Euro-pean and international institutions has notcome to an end yet, some 15 years afterthe fall of the Berlin wall. NATO has toworry about its first or second class sta-tus in the resolution of international con-flicts, reach a more definitive stance onits pre-emptive strikes doctrine, and re-assess the concepts of a defence alliance,member state military spending, the needfor a rapid reaction force, adequate meansto confront asymmetric risks, and deci-sion making. It cannot be ruled out thatNATO�s role will be reduced to somethingof a second OSCE and that unilateralism

or bilateralism will be the decisive inter-national relations pattern in the future.

The EU has to come to terms with thelargest and most expensive enlargementin history at a moment of economic cri-sis in its motor-economies Germany and(to a lesser degree) France due, not least,to the introduction of the Euro. Unequalcommitment to political integration andfed-up member states are perceived as anobstacle to the requirements of Europeangovernance. The big-against-small quarrels,as well as the implicit argument on vari-able geometry, has accompanied the de-cade.

The American position hostile to thepolitical integration of Europe will bestrengthened in the short run with theinclusion of the CEE candidates. It risksexacerbating interior dividing lines of theUnion for the next two years. A morepro-European commitment together witha trans-Atlantic orientation, very much likeWest Germany� s position of the 1970s,should be expected in the medium term.Meanwhile, and to reinforce this commit-ment, a surplus of sensitivity is required

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on both sides of the former iron curtain.Western European states must recognizethe Eastern transition from Phare-assistedcountries to policy makers, from objectsto subjects, from factors to actors. AndCEE states should admit that Europeanintegration needs not to proceed fromscratch, and does not begin with theirentrance, but has been the result of a dif-ficult battle over all the decades sinceWorld War II. The EU is not a Citroen2CV, as a Polish diplomat put it, but hasproven able to deal with extremely diffi-cult historical challenges: the place of Eu-rope in the era of superpowers, the col-lapse of Breton Woods, and the unifica-tion of post wall Europe.

EU enlargement will imply theeasternisation and even a certainrussification of the organization: 1.4 mil-lion of so-called Euro-Russians fromLatvia, Estonia, and Lithuania will becomeinhabitants of the EU. The border betweenthe EU and Russia will be extended tosome 1.300 kilometres. Baltic NATO mem-bership concerns the larger region: theSwedish non-participation in NATO be-

comes more and more problematic. Mostlikely, the integration of Estonia, Latvia,and Lithuania into NATO will lead tothe integration of Sweden sooner or later.In the East, Europe in 2004 will have tofind mechanisms how to build up an East-East interface, without, however, increas-ing insecurity and instability. CEE coun-tries, and in particular the Baltic states,will become important actors in this re-design.

The new European lines

The upcoming enlargement will deci-sively draw a new border from the Balticto the Black Sea. This border risks to besecuritized at least partly, since economic,military, and political differences are veryimportant on both sides of the dividingline. Moreover, the political evolution ofcountries like Belarus, Ukraine, andMoldova is difficult to anticipate. For thetime being they belong neither to theWest nor to the East in any clear manner.

The concerned countries of the bor-der line have a common interest in keep-

ing this border politicized and avoidingits securitization. Since a lot of actors areimplicated and a regional structure forhandling conflicts is missing, a constantlong-term tension in the border regioncould have devastating effects on the pros-perity and political stability of this partof Europe. The Baltic states have a veryimportant place to take in bridging thegap.

Bibliography

Davies, Norman: Europe A History. Ox-ford University Press 1998.

European Comm. Report Kaliningrad2000.

Föhrenbach, Gerd: Die Westbindung derBaltischen Staaten. Nomos Baden-Baden2000.

Kirby, David: The Baltic World 1772-1993:Europe�s Northern Periphery in an Age ofChange. Longman Publishing Group 1995.

Nies, Susanne: Les pays baltes dans leurenvironnement : enjeux et perspectives stratégiques,Etude DAS/ CERI, Paris 2002, http://www.defense.gouv.fr/das.

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Norgaard, Ole: The Baltic States afterIndependence. Studies of Communism in Tran-sition. Cheltenham 1996.

Vardys, Vytas: The Rebel Nation.Westview Series on the Post-Soviet Repub-lics. Westview Press 1996.

NATO-enlargement Daily Brief.NEBD. NEBD@Latvia-USA.org (dailymailing list, compiled by the LatvianEmbassy in Washington, on NATO-en-largement and security issues)

-http://www.securities.co.uk (media-ser-vice on emerging economies)

1 Le Figaro February 19 th, 2003, Les payscandidats au centre de la bataille, p. 2 The EasternEuropean governments, from Prague to Vilnius,had signed a Washington (Bruce Jackson) �pre-pared letter, the Vilnius 10 declaration, in sup-port of the Anglo-Saxon position on Iraq.

2 The Elysée Treaty has been signed in January1963 between France and Germany and stipu-lates a preferential relationship between the twocountries within Europe. If General de Gaulleaimed at European and French reinforcement,the German Bundestag counteracted any anti-American ambition while including the famousPreamble in the Treaty. The latter stresses the im-portance of the transatlantic link.

3 NATO summit Prague, 21-22 November 2002,EU council in Copenhagen, December 2002

4 cf. Nies (2002)5 Cf.: Dacie, Norman 1998:18.6 Buzan, Waever 1998: 237 The retreat of the Red Army from Eastern

Europe started in 1991, short after the dissolu-tion of the Warsaw-Pact. The retreat from Lithuaniawas accomplished in September 1993, from Esto-nia and Latvia 1994, while, on the basis of abilateral agreement, the radar station in Skrunda,Latvia, has been maintained by Moscow till 1999.Now, Russians are unhappy to learn that Skrundawill be used for NATO intelligence gatheringpurposes.

8 NATO announcement at the Warsaw-summit,end of September 2002: Kaiser, Robert G., NATOready to admit Seven Eastern Bloc Countries. Wash-ington Post, 26 Septembre 02.

9 European Commission, 9th of October 2002.Reuters 04.02.02, http://groups.yahoo./com/group/nedb. NATO Enlargement Daily Brief,04.10.02: European Union to Recommend 10 Can-didate Countries for Admission.

10 Important divergences remain on this issue,most notably the Russian energy market, both inprices and in terms of state or private property.

11 Putin�s speech on September 11th 2001.12 Cf. Roger Kanet, Terorism and the US-

Russian Relationsship, http://www.apsanet.org,presentation of August 24, 2002.

13 Kaiser, Robert G., NATO Ready to AdmitSeven Eastern Bloc Members. Washington Post,26 September 2002

14 Robert Kaiser, Washington Post, 26.9.2002.15 At the time of editing this issue of the BDR,

the Russian Parliament has finally ratified a bor-der treaty with Lithuania, signed by two coun-tries in 1997.

16Interview with Christoph Bertram, formerDirector of IISS, Berlin June 24, 2002

17 This preference for bilateralism is even re-flected in the Russian style federalism, which isbilateral (and asymmetric): Moscow negotiatesissues case by case with its subjects.

18 The region is economically highly dispersed:poor Polish border regions, Belarus etc. Curiousphenomena occurred, such as Lithuanian pen-sioners living in neighbouring Belarus to makebetter use of their pensions in a country withlower price level.

19 Daily Telegraph, January 2001.20 The decrease of military presence in the

region has been tremendous: from 100.000troops in 1991 to 14.000 today, with cuts an-nounced for a new decrease to 9.000 this year.Cf. Facon, Adomeit , Mironov report .Kaliningrad is one of the most concerned re-gions with military cuts, and even the militaryitself doesn�t see any sense to maintain strongpresence in the specific situation of a far awayenclave. In the same time, FSB activities in theregion have been reinforced, and a special en-voy of the governor of the strong North-WestDistrict has been nominated. Representativesfrom the Baltic ministries and governmentsdon�t consider Kaliningrad any more as a mili-tary threat. See the interview series of the au-

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thor, published in December 2002 in a studyfor the French Ministry of Defence (DAS).

21 For the moment Poles, Lithuanians andKaliningraders buy vouchers for travelling. Dueto the Russian-Byelorussian treaty both countriesrenounced on visa. Only Latvia refused to par-ticipate in any liberal regime with Kaliningrad:the transit to and from the homeland has thus tobe diverted through Belarus.

22 The Soros Foundation initiated a �Russiansto Russia� programme in summer 2002, to en-hance contacts between the enclave and mainland.This is exactly what was done by West Germanyto run isolated West Berlin. For more details ontransport issues, mentality etc. see the report ofthe EU Commission 2001, Fairlie, Nies http://www.oei.fu-berlin.de (Kaliningrad report, Febru-ary 2002).

23 France has a special bilateral regime withMorocco and Greece with foreign workers fromUkraine and Moldova. Both regimes limit accessto the concerned Schengen country and prohibitborder crossings to the others.

24 cf. Vinogradov, Michail, The Duma protectsKaliningrad, Izvestija 20.6.02, p.2.

25 Interview with a representative of the GermanMFA, Ulrich Bethkenhagen, summer 2002: accord-ing to him the procedure with Russia is long andcostly, the refusal rate low, the criminals still crossthe borders and are not refused.