improvements for truthful mechanisms with verifiable one-parameter selfish agents
DESCRIPTION
Improvements for Truthful Mechanisms with Verifiable One-Parameter Selfish Agents. Carmine Ventre Joint work with A. Ferrante, G. Parlato and F. Sorrentino. Selfish agents. An Autonomous System may report false link status to redirect traffic to another AS Different “components” which - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
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Improvements for Truthful Mechanisms with Verifiable One-Parameter Selfish Agents
Carmine Ventre
Joint work with
A. Ferrante, G. Parlato and F. Sorrentino
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Selfish agents
An Autonomous System may report false link status to redirect traffic to another AS
Different “components” which have their own goal may not follow the “protocol”
The Internet
source destination
AS1
AS2
Link down
Selfish agents
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One-Parameter Selfish Agents
Selfish agents own the links and privately know their speeds (one single number)
How to compute opt(s1,…, sm)?
Routing/Scheduling
s1
sm
s2source destination
J1, …, Jn
Unsplittable traffic (jobs)
b1
b2
bm
GOAL: compute opt(s1,…, sm)
e.g. minimize the makespan (maxi worki/si)
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Mechanism design
Mechanism: M=(A, P)
Computes a schedule
X = A(b1, …, bm)
Provides a payment
Pi(b1, …, bm)
Agents’ GOAL: maximize their own utility ui(b1, …, bm) := Pi(b1, …, bm) – costi(X)
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Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Selfish Agents
A(b1, …, bm) solution
… …
w1(b1,…,bm) wi(b1,…,bm) wm(b1,…,bm) work
wi(b1,…,bm) ¢ ti cost
ui(b1, …, bm) = Pi(b1,…, bm) – wi(b1,…,bm) ¢ ti utility
Truthfulness: ui(ti,b-i) ¸ ui(bi,b-i) 8 b-i, bi with bi 2 i
ti = 1/si is the i’s type
i’s type set
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Prior Works
Concept of mechanism with verification (observe jobs’ release time) [Nisan & Ronen, 99]
Truthful mechanisms for one-parameter selfish agents [Archer & Tardos, 01]
Truthful mechanisms with verification for one-parameter selfish agents [Auletta et al, 04]
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Our main contribution
Payments computation depends by i No polynomial-time in general
It works only in some case
Payments computation does not depend on i It does not require finite I Polynomial-time Preserve approximation ratio
Solves for the continuous case
[Prior]
[Ours]
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Verifiable One-Parameter Selfish Agents
ti = 1
i underbids1/2
1
3
i’s release time should be 2 but…
… i’s finishing time is 4
i overbids
2
1
1 i can wait 2 time slots delivering the results in the right time
IDEA ([NR99]): No payment for underbidding agents
Verification is impossible!
costi(X, ti) = wi(X) ¢ ti
i={1/2, 1, 2}
Verification = observe jobs’ release time
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Weakly-Monotone Algorithms
Truthful mechanism with verification for one-parameter agents must use weakly-monotone algorithms ([ADPP04])
wi(bi, b-i)
bi
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An easier and more powerful payment function
speeds are integers
A weakly-monotone
Pi(1)(bi, b-i)= Wmax / bi (= Wmax ¢ s’i)
)(A, P(1)) is truthful
Proof idea:
ti
utility) = (payment) - (cost)
true - false
(payment) ¸ (cost)
Wmax is an upper bound to the work assigned by A
Verification
No payment
si 2 N ) Wmax ¢ si ¸ Wmax ¢ si-1 (*)
¸ 1 · 1
bi bi
ui(bi) · 0, ui(ti)¸ 0 by (*)
Payment ¸ Cost
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payment) ¸ (cost)
“Proof”
ti = 1/si & bi = 1/(si-1)
(payment) = Wmax Pi(ti) = Wmax ¢ si
Pi(bi) = Wmax ¢ (si-1)) Pi(ti) - Pi(bi) = Wmax
cost) · Wmax cost) =
· Wmax/si · Wmax
wi(si) – wi(si-1)
si
·wi(si)
si
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Generalization of P(1)
Upper-bounded and discrete type sets: Pi
(2)(bi, b-i)= Pi(1)(bi, b-i) ¢ ci
(2)
ci(2) is a suitable constant
Applications CPU speeds are expressed as multiple of (M)Hz
(discrete) It does not exist CPU of 100.83 Mhz
“good” solution don’t use very slow machines (upper-bounded)
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P(2) and our results
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Continuous type sets: generalization of P(2)
(b1, …, bm) (b1R, …, bm
R)
(-r1, …, -rm)
rounding
si
ri-1 ri
siR
Pi(3)(bi, b-i)= Wmax/ bi
R ¢ ci(3)
ci(3) constant (value depends by rmin and )
rmin depends by the minimum possible speed
“continuous” “discrete”
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P(3) and our results
computation time is independent from the chosen smaller ) better apx ratio but larger payments bigger upper bound ) larger payments
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Makespan problem in general environments
i’s finite & discrete
[ADPP04] characterization
i’s discrete but not finite?
i’s continuous?
Use P(2)
Use P(3)
Are i’s upper bounded?
don’t care
“good” algorithms induces upper bounded type sets
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Conclusions
Power of verification Payments more efficient then the previous ones In (many) real life applications we can preserve
the approximation ratio of existing algorithms Weak-monotonicity suffices (for truthful
mechanisms) in more general settings Open problems
Unbounded continuous type sets in general Running time vs Amount of money (Tradeoff)