immune building program - iis7proceedings.ndia.org/5460/5460/1_bryden.pdf · immune building...

1ColPro 200521 June 2005

Immune Building Program

Wayne A. BrydenDARPA Special Projects Office

National Defense Industrial AssociationJoint Program Management Office for Collective Protection

Collective Protection Conference21 June 2005Monterey, CA


Overview

Objectives:• Protect building occupants (keep

aerosolized agent from harming humans)

• Restore building to function quickly• Preserve forensic evidence

Payoffs:• Save lives• Restore OPTEMPO• Determine appropriate

treatment• Attribute source of attack

perimeter security

air intake

physical security portal

security

Threat: aerosolized chemical or biological agents; toxic industrial chemicals (TICs)

External standoff External proximate Internal

Goal: Make buildings less attractive targetsGoal: Make buildings less attractive targets


Threat Spectrum

Based on Unclassified Sources

TICsChemical agents

Toxins and bioregulators

BacteriaViruses

• Thousands of substances with characteristics

• Nerve agents• Blister agents• Blood agents• Choking agents

• Neurotoxins• Cytotoxins• Enterotoxins• Mycotoxins• Neuropeptides

• Vegetative cells• Spores

• DNA viruses• RNA viruses

0.00.10.20.30.40.50.60.70.80.91.0

1.00E-13 1.00E-11 1.00E-09 1.00E-07 1.00E-05 1.00E-03 1.00E-01 1.00E+01 1.00E+03 1.00E+05

Variolamajor

C. burnetii

F. tularensis

B. anthracis

SEB

Botox VX

GB

Ricin

MIC

Chlorine Ammonia

Mass (mg)

Pro

babi

lity

of In

fect

ion

/ Let

hal E

ffect

s

VEE


Challenges

ToolkitDevelop and validate a software-based planning tool to assess building vulnerability and compare the cost and effectiveness of protection options

No validated capability exists to design and optimize building protection systems

Program componentTechnical challenge

Full-scale demonstrationInstall and demonstrate protection system at an operational military site

Active chemical/biological building protection has never been used in an operational military building

Integrated system experimentation– Conduct systems analysis and full-scale

experimentation for candidate architectures– Design, implement, and evaluate optimized

systems

• Active-response building protection has never been demonstrated

• Data and models to fully and confidently perform systems trades and systems evaluations do not exist

Technology developmentDevelop required components and technologies necessary for system implementation

Many enabling components and technologies do not exist today


Building Protection Concept

Continuous Monitor

In-duct neutralization

Triggered filtrationLaboratory

Analysis

DecontaminationForensicsMedical

SAFE? SAFE?

SAFE?Outside air

inlet

Neutralize at Source

High-efficiency filtration /

neutralization & over-pressurization

Internal passive airflow control

Fast trigger

sensors

COMMAND AND

CONTROL

Airflowdiversion

Identification/Confirming Sensor

Evacuate/PPE

POSS

IBLE

ATT

AC

KPO

SSIB

LE A

TTA

CK

PROBABLY YES

MAYBE NOT

CO

NFI

RM

EDC

ON

FIR

MED

ATT

AC

KA

TTA

CK

POST

EVE

NT

POST

EVE

NT

YES

NO

YES

NO

NO

RM

AL

NO

RM

AL

OPE

RA

TIO

NO

PER

ATI

ON


Components

OperationalDemonstration(Fort Leonard Wood, MO)

Technology Development

Phase IIFull Scale Experimentation

Building Protection Toolkit

Feedback

Predictions

Feedback

Predictions

Product II Product III

Phase IAnalysis and modeling

FY06FY05FY04FY03FY02FY01

TransitionDemo siteTest Bed

Prototypes

= Go/No-Go= Evaluate

Product I


Frac

tion

of B

uild

ing

Exp

osed

(FB

E)

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

Unprotected

“Unfilterables”Passive Only

Segmentation

Modeling

Mass of agent released (mrel)

Frac

tion

of B

uild

ing

Exp

osed

(FB

E)


Frac

tion

of B

uild

ing

Exp

osed

(FB

E)

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

Unprotected

Active only

Sensors don’t work Sensors work


Frac

tion

of B

uild

ing

Exp

osed

(FB

E)

Modeling


0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

TACT = 25 sec

TACT = 0 sec

Unprotected

Active Only Passive Only

Passive + Active

Sensors don’t work1-12 logs passive protection

Sensors work• Trigger detection < 30 seconds• Advanced shelter-in-place capability

Frac

tion

of B

uild

ing

Exp

osed

(FB

E)

Modeling



0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

Passive + Active

Unprotected

30,000 ft2 testbed

Internal release

Experimental data point


• Active strategies are critical − Experiments show sensors

effectively initiate active protection

• Optimal architectures include both passive and active components

• Immune Building systems can be applied to diverse building types− Specifics will differ from

building to building: characterize beforehand (to design an appropriate system) and afterwards (to maintain performance)

− Coordinate design with HVAC, fire suppression, blast protection, etc. to avoid conflicts (e.g., structural, airflow)

Frac

tion

of B

uild

ing

Exp

osed

(FB

E)

Testing


Demonstration

Challenge the IB system in an occupied building under real-world operating conditions:– IB System sensors, neutralization,

filtration, and active controls will be fully propagated in building

– Releases in arbitrary locations and will include internal and external releases for BOTH chemical and biological threats

– Challenge against simulants for spores, encapsulated agents, filter penetrants (SF6), low vapor pressure agents, mid-vapor pressure agents, and dusty agents

– Subset of releases carried out as independently refereed validation tests

IB System Installation is complex and risky– Modeling will reduce risk in the design phase– Testbed will be utilized to optimize strategies,

components, and CONOPS

IB System Installation is complex and risky– Modeling will reduce risk in the design phase– Testbed will be utilized to optimize strategies,

components, and CONOPS

Nord Hall, Fort Leonard Wood, MO


Technology DevelopmentAdvanced Filtration

air ++++++

- - -- - -++++++- - -- - -

++++++

- - -- - -++++++

Regeneration(Heat)

Photocatalytic Oxidation

Chemical Filtration

Electrostatic Precipitation

SMART Filter FosterMillerFosterMiller

22 22

CL 2 + 2Na CLO 2 2 CLO 2 + 2Na CL

RegReg Reg

to HVAC

Control Signals

Gas

eous

Chl

orin

e

Dilu

ent

Dilu

ent

(Air,

N 2, …

Solid

Sod

ium

Chl

orite

Hum

idifi

er

CLO 2 + Diluent

CLO 2 + Diluent

CLO 2Generator

CLO 2Generator

CLO 2Generator

AlarmSignal

CLO 2Sensor

AirflowMultiport Injectors

HVACDuct

CL 2 + 2Na CLO 2 CLO 2 + 2Na CLCL 2 + 2Na CLO 2 CLO 2 + 2Na CL

RegReg Reg

to HVAC

Control Signals

Gas

eous

Chl

orin

e

Dilu

ent

Dilu

ent

(Air,

N 2, …

Solid

Sod

ium

Chl

orite

Hum

idifi

er

CLO 2 + Diluent

CLO 2 + DiluentReg

Reg Reg

to HVAC

Control Signals

Gas

eous

Chl

orin

e

Dilu

ent

Dilu

ent

(Air,

N 2, …

Solid

Sod

ium

Chl

orite

Hum

idifi

er

CLO + Diluent

CLO + DiluentReg

Reg Reg

to HVAC

Control Signals

Gas

eous

Chl

orin

e

Dilu

ent

Dilu

ent

(Air,

N 2, …

Solid

Sod

ium

Chl

orite

Hum

idifi

er

CLO + Diluent

CLO + Diluent

CLOGenerator

CLOGenerator

CLOGenerator

CLOGenerator

CLOGenerator

CLOGenerator

AlarmSignal

CLO 2Sensor

AirflowMultiport Injectors

HVACDuct

Decontamination

Real-Time Neutralization

22

2

2

2

2

22

dielectric capillaries

volume-filling non-thermal plasma

e-

e- e-

OH-

OH-

O3

air

other compounds

added to airstream

RF energy

Enhancements

oxidative species


Chlorine Dioxide Effects

20,000 ppm-hours ClO2• Only polyurethane foam seriously damaged

200,000 ppm-hours ClO2• Copper and steel corroded• Polycarbonate discolored

Collateral DamageExposure Time (hours)

0 5 10 15 20

Odor threshold

Spores

Incipient collateral damage

Explosive limit

TWASTEL

IDLHNIOSH human

standards

Bacteria & Viruses

Effective Kill Levels

10

100

1000

10000

100000

1000000

0.1

1

10

100

1000

10000

100000

ClO

2ga

s ph

ase

conc

entra

tion

(ppm

)

0.01

Mechanism of Inactivation

Active Inactive

ClO2 Oxidation

Protein “unfolds”and is

inactivated

• Demonstrate and validate the effectiveness of ClO2decontamination technology in a building

• Develop and validate EPA approved decontamination protocols and techniques

• Transition capability to government and industry

U.S. Government Joint Program

First Operational TestAnniston, AL


AUVS

Flux multiplier cavityIntense UV source

Airflow

500 – 10,000 cfm

BP246i BioProtector commercial prototype

Technology Transition:Novatron High-Intensity UV

ApproachCreation of intense UV and killing of microorganisms in HVACTechnology

• Low power, continuous-wave UV DC lamps• Uniform photon flux multiplication (increases

UV flux by a factor of 50 or more)• UV interaction with DNA to induce

crosslinking• Air sterilization – in less than 1 second – only

a few feet needed for high kill levels even for high velocity airflow

• B. subtilis 4.5 to 6.2 log kill• 0.3 I.W.G. pressure drop


Technology Transition:Cold Plasma

Cold Plasma Neutralization• In-duct air neutralization• Scalable – low power, “real-time kill”

(single pass) [duct mounted] e-

e- e-

OH-OH-

O3

dielectric capillaries

volume-filling non-thermal plasma

oxidative species

air

> 1 (model agreement)DFP (nerve)

> 3 (experimental constraint)B. anthracis

Log reductionAgent

TITAN Technology• Cold plasma induced hydroxyl radical

generation (BIT)• Activation of H202 yielding exponential

number of long-lived hydroxyl radicals• Mesh “active layer”• Scaleable system

> 5Diazinon (nerve)

> 5CEES (mustard)

> 6B. subtilis (spore)

Log reductionAgent

PlasmaSol Technology• Ambient air plasma generator• Non-thermal electrical plasma• Dielectric wall discharge suppresses the

glow-to-arc mode transition• Electrode configuration enables plasma

to have 100% contact with species of gas treated

• High energy density (typically energy densities of barrier, corona discharge are 0.01 – 0.1 w/cm3)

• Air / medical equipment sterilization


BPTK Modeling and Simulation

• External threat• parameters

• Internal threat parameters• CB component parameters

• People movement• Responder actions

CONTAM model (.PRJ file)

• External concentration• Wind pressure

ExternalEnvironment

ProtectiveArchitectures

Building CADDrawingThreats Population

Characteristics CONOPS

MESO.dat TK Wrapper IFC Translator ACATSWrapper

MESO/RUSTIC CONTAMX ACATS

• FBE for Architectures• Costs of Architectures• Recommended Architecture

• Casualties For Responses• Recommended Response

• Internal Room Concentrations, Pressures, & Airflows• Room and Inhabitant Exposures• Sensor Response Times• HVAC Response Times

IFC file

TK Post-Processor ACATS Post-Processor


Immune Building Transition • Demonstration system provides test platform for

future technology development.• Improved sensors• Improved neutralization technologies

• Fort Leonard Wood will continue to operate the demonstration system (MOA in place, DoD memorandum issued for support beyond DARPA’s departure).

• Contractor involvement helps mature building protection technologies.

• IB is coordinating with the DoD R&D and user communities.

• Promulgate IB lessons learned to protective building design processes (Toolkit).

• Working with homeland security community on technology development and extension of concept to tall buildings

Science & technologycommunity

DOD chem/biocommunity

DoD civilengineeringcommunity

DoDoperationalcommunity

Industrialbase

homeland security

community


Additional Information

Publicly accessible sites with additional information about the DARPA Immune Building Program:

http://www.darpa.mil/spo/programs/ib.htmhttps://dtsn.darpa.mil/ibdemo/default.asp

immune building program - iis7proceedings.ndia.org/5460/5460/1_bryden.pdf · immune building...

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