ieee generator protection tutorial presentation
DESCRIPTION
IEEE Generator Protection Tutorial by Power System Relaying Committee.These references can be downloaded from IEEE PSRC website for free.TRANSCRIPT
Special Publication of the IEEE Power System Relaying Committee
Copyright © IEEE 2011
IEEE TUTORIAL ON THE PROTECTION OF SYNCHRONOUS GENERATORS
Copyright © IEEE 2011
Developed by a working group of the Power System Relay Committee (PSRC)
First published in 1995 – widely presented within the industry, including a presentation at the 2003 PPIC Conference
Updated, published, and presented for the first time at the 2011 57th IEEE Pulp and Paper Industry Conference
Michael Thompson, ChairChristopher Ruckman, Vice ChairHasnain AshrafiGabirel BenmouyalZeeky BukhalaStephen P. ConradEverett FennellDale FinneyDale FredricksonJonathan D. GardellJuan GersRandy HamiltonWayne HartmannGerald JohnsonPatrick M. KerriganSungsoo KimPrem Kumar
Hugo MonterrubioCharles MozinaMukesh NagpalBrent OxandaleRussell W. PattersonMike ReichardMohindar SachdevKevin StephanSudhir ThakurDemetrios TziouvarasJoe UchiyamaQuintin Verzosa, Jr.Thomas WiedmanMichael WrightJohn WangMurty V. V. S. Yalla
5
Michael J. Thompson received his BS, magna cum laude, from Bradley University in 1981 and an MBA from Eastern Illinois University in 1991. He has broad experience in the field of power system operations and protection. Upon graduating, he served nearly 15 years at Central Illinois Public Service (now AMEREN), where he worked in distribution and substation field engineering before taking over responsibility for system protection engineering. Prior to joining Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, Inc. in 2001, he was involved in the development of several numerical protective relays while working at Basler Electric. He is presently a Principal Engineer in SEL’s Engineering Services Division; a senior member of the IEEE; a main committee member of the IEEE PES Power System Relaying Committee; and a registered professional engineer. Michael was a contributor to the reference book, Modern Solutions for the Protection Control and Monitoring of Electric Power Systems, has published numerous technical papers, and has a number of patents associated with power system protection and control.
6
Charles (Chuck) Mozina received a B.S. degree in electrical engineering from Purdue University, West Lafayette, in 1965. He is a Consultant, for Beckwith Electric Co. Inc., specializing in power plant and generator protection. His consulting practice involves projects relating to protective relaying applications, protection system design and coordination. Chuck is an active 25-year member of the IEEE PES Power System Relay Committee and was the past chairman of the Rotating Machinery Subcommittee. He is active in the IEEE IAS I&CPS, PCIC and PPIC Committees, which address industrial protection systems. He is the past U.S. representative to CIGRE Study Committee 34 (now B-5) on System Protection. He has over 25 years of experience as a protective engineer at Centerior Energy (now part of FirstEnergy), a major utility in Ohio, where he was Manager of System Protection. For 10 years, he was employed by Beckwith Electric as the Manager of Application Engineering for Protection Systems. He is now a consultant for that company. He is a registered Professional Engineer in the state of Ohio and a Liife Fellow of the IEEE.
FundamentalsMultifunction Generator Protection SystemsStator Phase Fault ProtectionStator Ground Fault ProtectionField Fault ProtectionSystem Backup ProtectionGenerator Breaker FailureAbnormal Frequency ProtectionOverexcitation and Overvoltage Protection
Underexcitation / Loss-of-Excitation ProtectionCurrent Unbalance (Negative-Sequence) ProtectionLoss of Prime Mover (Antimotoring) ProtectionOut-of-Step ProtectionVoltage Transformer Signal LossInadvertent Energization ProtectionOther Protective ConsiderationsTripping Modes
IEEE TUTORIAL ON THE PROTECTION OF SYNCHRONOUS GENERATORS
Copyright © IEEE 2011
Basic design and operation of synchronous generators
Power system connections
Behavior under short-circuit conditions
Generator grounding
Generator stability
IEEE guidelines
Device numbers
0
+MVAR
Overexcited
Underexcited
–MVAR
Reactive Power Into System
Reactive Power Into Generator
Overexcitation Limiter (OEL)
Rotor Winding Limited
Underexcitation Limiter (UEL)
Stator End Iron Limited
Steady-State Stability Limit
Stator Winding Limited
+ MW Real Power Into System
MVARNormal Overexcited Operation
Underexcited Operation
GMW
System
GMVAR
MWSystem
β
X
–X
R–R
Z
2C
V
RkVMVA AngleZ R
⎛ ⎞= β⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠2
C
V
RkVZ AngleMVA R
⎛ ⎞= β⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
Cur
rent
Cur
rent
Cur
rent
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
time, seconds0.01 0.1 1 10
wattseconds
wat
tsec
onds
TotalGenerator
System
Accumulation of Damage Over Time
Most damage occurs in period after the generator breaker opens
Types of Instability Steady-State
Transient
Dynamic
( )g se g s
E EP sin
X= θ − θ
g smax
E EP
X=
g gE ∠θL4
Power Flow
L1
L3L2
POWERSYSTEM
Power System
s sE ∠θ
X
R
Xe
d eX X2−
d eX X2+
R-X Diagram Plot
Per-Unit MVAR
Per-Unit MW
MW-MVAR Per-Unit Plot
2
e d
V 1 12 X X⎛ ⎞
+⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
2
e d
V 1 12 X X⎛ ⎞
−⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
G
Generator GSU System Reactance
Xd
VXT
XS
Where:Xe = XT + XS
Power System
1 2
78
G
78 = Out-of-Step ProtectionEs = System VoltageEg = Generator Voltage
s = System Voltage Phase Angleg = Generator Voltage Phase Angle
T
Three-Phase Short CircuitSubstation
GSU
s sE ∠Θ
g gE ∠Θ
g smax
E EP
X=
Maximum Power
Transfer
PM = Pe
A1
A2
All Lines in ServiceBreakers 1 and 2
Tripped
θC
0 90° 180°θg – θs
( )g se g s
E EP sin
X= θ − θ
Occurs when fast-acting AVR control amplifies rather than damps small MW oscillations
Most likely to occur when generators are remote from load centers
Power system stabilizer (PSS) damps oscillations – required in Western United States
Latest developments reflected inStd. 242, IAS Buff BookC37.102, IEEE Guide for Generator ProtectionC37.101, IEEE Guide for AC Generator Ground ProtectionC37.106, IEEE Guide for Abnormal Frequency Protection for Power Generating Plants
Created / maintained by the IEEE PSRC & IAS –updated every 5 years
C37.102-2006 updated version now available – includes significant changes
and additions
Device Number Function Tutorial Chapter11 Multifunction Protection System 5.2
21 Distance Relay – Backup for System and Generator Zone Phase Faults 2.4
24 Volts / Hertz Protection for GeneratorOverexcitation 3.2
27TN 100 Percent Stator Ground Fault Protection 2.2
32 Reverse Power Relay – Antimotoring Protection 3.5
40 Loss-of-Field Protection 3.3
46 Negative-Sequence Current UnbalanceProtection for Generators 3.4
49 Stator Thermal Protection –51G Time-Overcurrent Ground Relay 2.2
51TG 1&2 Backup for Ground Faults –
Device Number Function Tutorial Chapter
51VVoltage-Controlled or Voltage-Restrained
Time-Overcurrent Relay – Backup for System and Generator Phase Faults
2.4
59 Overvoltage Protection 3.2
59G Overvoltage Relay – Stator Ground Fault Protection for Generators 2.2
60 Voltage Balance Relay – Detection of Blown Voltage Transformer Fuses 3.7
63 Transformer Fault Pressure Relay –62B Breaker Failure Timer 2.564F Field Ground Fault Protection 2.371 Transformer Oil or Gas Level –78 Loss-of-Synchronism Protection 3.6
Device Number Function Tutorial Chapter
81 Frequency Relay – Both Underfrequency and Overfrequency Protection 3.1
86 Hand-Reset Lockout Auxiliary Relay 5.1
87G Differential Relay – Primary Phase Fault Protection for Generators 2.1
87N Stator Ground Fault Differential Protection 2.2
87T Differential Relay – Primary Protection for Transformers –
87U Differential Relay – Overall Generator and Transformer Protection 2.2
60
87O
50/27
87T
S
Unit Transformer
Unit Differential
71
63Transformer Fault Pressure
Oil Low
51TG151
TG2Transformer Neutral
Overcurrent
5364F
41
Field Ground
242
Voltage Balance
Second V/Hz
78
40
81
241
Frequency
V/Hz
Loss of Synchronism
Loss of Field
59
87G
49
32
ReversePower
Generator Differential
Auxiliary VTs
46 21/51V
Negative Sequence
System Backup(Note 2)
Stat. Temp
59G
50/51G
Generator Neutral
Overvoltage
Generator Neutral
Overcurrent
63
71
UAT Oil Low
UAT Fault Pressure
UAT
5051
UAT Backup
51TG1
51TG2
UAT Neutral Overcurrent
Unit Auxiliary Bus Phase Time
Overcurrent
51
A 87T UAT Differential
(Note 1)
Inadv. Energ.(Note 4)
27TN
100 Percent Stator Ground
(Note 3)1. Dotted devices optional.2. Device 21 requires external timer. See Chapter 2.4.3. See Chapter 2.2 regarding 100 percent ground protection.4. Device 50 requires external timer. See Chapter 4.1.
Notes:
Field Breaker
Overvoltage
IEEE TUTORIAL ON THE PROTECTION OF SYNCHRONOUS GENERATORS
Copyright © IEEE 2011
Generator protective relaying technology has evolved from discrete electromechanical and static relays to digital multifunction protection systems
With availability, additional performance, economic advantages, and reliability of digital multifunction protection systems, this advanced technology is incorporated into most new protection schemes
In most cases, new generators are protected with one of the following:
Dual MGPSs
Single MGPS, possibly backed up by single-function relays
Microprocessor
Other Analog Inputs
One or More Power Supplies
Digital Inputs
ROM
RAM
Data Acquisition
System
Inputs Outputs
Voltage Inputs
Current Inputs
Targets
User Interface
EEPROM
Communications
Digital Outputs
11GMGPS #1
Relaying Functions24
27/5932-132-240464950
51V or 2150/51G
59G607881
87G27TH or 59THD or 64S
11GMGPS #2
Relaying Functions24
27/5932-132-240464950
51V or 2150/51G
59G60
64F81
87G27TH or 59THD or 64S
52
87O
87AT87T
52
Generator Transformer
High-Voltage System Bus
Auxiliary Bus
Field
Note: Only use functions as appropriate.
IEEE TUTORIAL ON THE PROTECTION OF SYNCHRONOUS GENERATORS
Copyright © IEEE 2011
Saturation
Stator differential protection does not detect turn-to-turn faults
Current can be 6 to 7 times nominal and can damage stator
Use turn-to-turn protection schemes to detect and avoid damage
Imperfection in generator construction
Temperature variations
Winding connections
External faults
Terminal voltage and load variations
IEEE TUTORIAL ON THE PROTECTION OF SYNCHRONOUS GENERATORS
Copyright © IEEE 2011
The Method of Generator Neutral Grounding Determines its Performance During Ground Faults
Solidly GroundedLow ImpedanceHigh ImpedanceHybrid GroundingUngrounded
Multiple Bus (No/Low Z/High Z)Directly connected to busLikely in industrial, commercial, and isolated systemsMay have problems with circulating 3rd harmonic▪ Use of single grounded machine
can helpAdds complexity to discriminate ground fault source if ground resistance is high (less than 25A)
BUS
G G G
Same type of grounding used on 1 or mutiple generators
62
400 A
2000/5
2000/5
8780%
• 45MVA Generator
• 2000/5 CTs
• 87 Set at 0.2A Pickup
• 20% of Winding Not Protected
Low Resistance Grounding Systems
Percentage of Stator Winding Unprotected
87G – Generator Differential
87GD – Generator Ground Differential
51N – Neutral Overcurrent
IG
IA
IB
IC
3I0IG
Residual currentcalculated fromindividual phasecurrents. ParalleledCTs shown toillustrate principle.
0
90
180
270IG
3IO
-3Io x IG cos (180) = 3IoIG
IG
IA
IB
IC
3I0IG
Residual currentcalculated fromindividual phasecurrents. ParalleledCTs shown toillustrate principle.
0
90
180
270
IG
3IO-3Io x IG cos (0) = -3IoIG
59N, 3V0 overvoltage, covers ≈ 95% of windingTuned to the fundamental frequencyMust work properly from 10 to 80 Hz during startup.
3rd Harmonic methods cover remaining 5% of winding near neutral
27TN, 3rd harmonic undervoltage59D, Ratio of 3rd harmonic voltage at terminal and neutral ends of winding
64S, Subharmonic voltage injection, covers 100% of winding
High-impedance ground limits ground fault current (limits damage on internal winding to ground fault)
Conventional neutral or zero-sequence overvoltage relay (59G) provides coverage for the ground faults involving up to 90%–95% of the winding from phase terminal
51G connected in the primary or secondary neutral circuit can be used as a backup to 59G
R 59G
Last 5%–10% near neutral not covered by neutral overvoltage relay (59G) because a ground fault in this winding region bypasses grounding transformer or resistor (R) or 59G, solidly grounding the machine
R 59G
R 59G
XHL Sensitively set 59G relay to detect ground faults (up to 95% of the winding) can also pick up for faults on the HV side of GSU or in the VT secondary circuit
R
Co CHL
3Io
Io
Zero-Sequence Network
3R Xo
XHLV0VR
0R 0
0 HL
ZV : V •Z X
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠
Third-harmonic voltage develops in stator due to inherent presence of third harmonic flux in the rotor field
Rotor MMF
R
Co
3I3h
I3h A, B, C
Generator winding and terminal capacitances provide path for the third-harmonic stator current via grounding resistor
Machine construction – the pitch of the stator
Levels of excitation (MVAR) and machine output (MW)
Terminal capacitance
Present in terminal and neutral ends
Can vary with loading
Detects ground faults near neutral
Note: If third harmonic goes away across neutral resistor, conclude a
ground fault near neutral
Full Load
No LoadNeutral
–V3RD
Fault at Terminal
Terminal
Fault at Neutral +V3RD
Terminal
Full LoadNo Load
Neutral
Normal OperationFull LoadNo Load
Terminal
NeutralNo Load
Full Load
+V3RD
–V3RD
R 59G
C0
Under normal conditions, 27N3 is picked up because of the third-harmonic voltage drop across neutral resistor
I3h
27N33I3h
R 59G
C0
For a fault close to neutral of the stator winding, 27N3 drops out because the fault bypasses the neutral resistor
A supervisory overvoltage (59C) relay located at the generator terminal blocks 27N3 operation during startup or shutdown to avoid misoperation
I3h
27N33I3h
R 59G 27N3
59G
27N3
0%5%
100%~95% of winding from terminal by 59G
~15%–30% of winding from neutral by 27N3
R 59G
59D
Compares third-harmonic voltage magnitude at the generator neutral to that at the generator terminals
Ferroresonance damping resistor
R 59G
59G
59D0%5%
100%
59D
59D
~95% of winding from terminal by 59G
~15%–30% of winding from neutral and terminal by 59D
Does not rely on third-harmonic signature of generator
Provides full coverage protection
Provides online and offline protection –prevents serious damage upon application of excitation
Is frequency independent
64S
20 Hz Generator
Injection Signal
Pickup Setting
Measurement Value
20 Hz Filter
Measurement Signal For stator ground fault, 20 Hz increases and relay (64S) operates
IEEE TUTORIAL ON THE PROTECTION OF SYNCHRONOUS GENERATORS
Copyright © IEEE 2011
Hazards of field faults
Field ground protection
Tripping considerations
Field ground relay selection and settings
Field overcurrent
Exciter Field Breaker
Voltage Relay
Grounding Brush
Field
64F
DC
Shorts out part of field winding – expect unit vibrations, possible damageCauses local rotor current – expect rotor heating, distorted rotor, vibrationCauses arc damage at fault points
Ground #1
Ground #2
Use on generators with brushes
Has variable detection sensitivity
Exciter Field Breaker
Voltage Relay
Grounding Brush
Field
64F
DC
Exciter64F
+
–
Generator
Field Breaker Control
R2
R2
Voltage Relay
Varistor
Generator Field
Positive
Negative
Field Breaker Control
Test Pushbutton(optional)
ExciterField
Breaker
Brush
Field
+
–
CR
C1
C2
RR
64F
AC
Immediate tripping is recommended on first ground
However, most installations alarm and shutdown the machine in orderly manner if ground alarm persists
Relays should also be provided with time delays to override transients
IEEE TUTORIAL ON THE PROTECTION OF SYNCHRONOUS GENERATORS
Copyright © IEEE 2011
System backup protection for generators consists of time-delayed protection for phase-to-ground and multiphase fault conditions
Backup generator protection schemes protect against failure of system protection and subsequent long-clearing system faults
Relay settings for backup relaying must be sensitive to detect low fault current conditions
Settings must balance opposing sensitivity requirements to detect distant faults and security to prevent unnecessary generator tripping
Use either distance or voltage-restrained overcurrent relay to
detect system multiphase faults.
Note locations of current and voltage transformers.
Use a time-inverse transformer neutral connected overcurrent relay for system ground faults.
98
Choose protection based on line relay type
If distance type, back up with distance
If time-overcurrent type, back up with V-R or V-C overcurrent
Time coordinate with system relays including breaker failure relaying
Voltage element supervises (torque controls) a sensitive, low pickup time-overcurrent element
Under fault conditions, voltage drops below set level – dropping out voltage element and permitting overcurrent element to operate
Cur
rent
Lev
el
V-R overcurrent consists of an overcurrent element whose pickup level varies as a function of voltage applied to relay
Normally, generator terminal voltage is above voltage setting, VS1, and current pickup setting is IS
Cur
rent
Pic
kup
Leve
l
When close-in fault occurs, voltage can drop below voltage setting, VS2, and current pickup level is reduced by factor k to kISFor voltages between VS1 and VS2, pickup level varies proportionately between IS and kIS
Cur
rent
Pic
kup
Leve
l
Set pickup below generator fault current using synchronous reactance
V-C pickup will likely be below rated current
V-R pickup must be above rated current
Calculate 51V voltage element setting to avoid 51V relay misoperation under extreme emergency conditions (with lowest expected system voltage)
To allow for selectivity, time-delay settings must be coordinated with transmission system primary and backup protection, including breaker failure time
Coordination is usually calculated with zero voltage restraint
Use three V-C or V-R time-overcurrent relays for complete multiphase fault coverage
Note that generator fault current may decay rapidly when low voltage is at generator terminals – overcurrent phase fault backup may not operate for system faults
Check setting with fault current decrement curve for particular generator and excitation system
Setting detects line fault when protection equipment fails
Relay impedance reach and time delay must be coordinated with system primary and backup protection, including breaker failure time
Setting must remain conservatively above machine rating to prevent inadvertent trips on generator swings and severe voltage disturbances
F5
F4
F3
FLT
F1
F2
The impedance relay for each generator requires sensitive settings to detect
faults at the ends of long lines in the
presence of other sources.
Sensitive settings may cause backup relays to unnecessarily trip generator under some loading conditions or for minor, stable swings
With this system configuration, it is generally possible to set backup relays to detect only close-in faults
Redundant line relaying and breaker failure relaying are necessary for line, bus, and transformer protection
Set impedance relay to smallest of thethree following criteria:
120% of longest line (with infeed) – if unit is connected to breaker-and-a-half bus, calculate percent using adjacent line length
50%–66.7% of load impedance (200%–150% of generator capability curve) at machine-rated power factor
80%–90% of load impedance (125%–111% of generator capability curve) at relay maximum torque angle (MTA)
30.0
25.0
20.0
15.0
10.0
5.0
0 20.015.010.0–10.0 5.0–5.0
–5.0
50-67% of GCC @ RPFA
Shortest Line (No Infeed)
Transformer High Side
Zone 2
Zone 1
MTA
RPFA
GCC
Longest Line(With Infeed)75.5 Ohms
jX
R
GCCZone 1Zone 2System
Zone 1 set to cover 120% of GSU impedance.
Zone 2 limited to 67% of generator capability curve
at rated power factor.
Zone 2 reach will not provide adequate phase fault system backup protection as it would
require an extremely large setting. The only way to ensure adequate protection to avoid sustained currents to the fault is to provide redundant transmission system protection.
IEEE TUTORIAL ON THE PROTECTION OF SYNCHRONOUS GENERATORS
Copyright © IEEE 2011
Provides for tripping of backup breakers when the generator breaker does not open after trip initiation upon detection of
FaultAbnormalcondition
Open circuit to trip coilMechanism fails to open breakerBreaker opens but breaker contacts fail to interrupt faultTripping of circuit breaker left open after maintenance
Generator trips may not always be from high-current events (faults)
Overexcitation
Overvoltage
Sequential tripping
Need to include breaker auxiliary contact status in addition to current detectionBF protection should be fast enough to maintain stability but not so fast as to compromise tripping security
Breaker flashover is a type of breaker failureBreaker flashover is most likely to occur just prior to synchronizing or just after generator is removed from service
Three-phase simultaneous flashovers are rare, thus most protection schemes are designed to detect the flashover of one
or two poles
IEEE TUTORIAL ON THE PROTECTION OF SYNCHRONOUS GENERATORS
Copyright © IEEE 2011
Underfrequency occurs as the result of sudden reduction in input power through loss of generators or key intertie importing power
Overfrequency occurs as the result of sudden loss of load or key intertie exporting power
Regional reliability councils will typically provide settings for underfrequency load shedding and generator tripping
Load shedding schemes must coordinate and meet regional criteria
Generator tripping criteria must accommodate any frequency excursion during any islanding scenario
Generator tripping permitted on or below curve without requiring additional equivalent automatic
load shedding.
60
59
58
57
56
550.1 3.31 10 100 300
Time (s)
Freq
uenc
y (H
z)
Operation outside shaded area is limited in extent, duration, and frequency of occurrence
Severe restrictionscould be imposed onthe generator itself
Possibility of frequency operational limits exists for the generator in the form of time-frequency characteristics
V%
f%
106
104
102
100 102
98
96
104
94
989694
Copyright ©2005 IEC, Geneva Switzerland
Protection of the long tuned blading in the low-pressure turbine element for steam units
Possibility of cumulative blading fatigue and blading failure
Similar limitations for combustion and combined-cycle turbines
Virtually no frequency limitations for hydro generating units
Example of fictitious steam turbine operational limits shown in the plot
Prohibited OperationRestricted Time
Operating Frequency Limits
Continuous Operation
Restricted Time Operating Frequency Limits
Prohibited Operation
62
61
60
59
58
57
56
0.0010.005
0.010.05
0.100.50
1.05.0
10.050.0
100.0Time (Minutes)
Obtain turbine capability from manufacturer
Verify if IEC 60034-3:2007 is applicable
Have manufacturer approve protectionscheme
63
62
61
60
59
58
57
56
55
541000100101
Continuous Operating Region
10-Minute Maximum
Total Accumulated Time Limit (Minutes)
Limits similar to steam turbine
Example of frequency limits in the plotFr
eque
ncy
(Hz)
IEEE TUTORIAL ON THE PROTECTION OF SYNCHRONOUS GENERATORS
Copyright © IEEE 2011
V/Hz application can result in:
Heating of stator core iron
Stray flux increasing beyond design limits causing additional heating
Overvoltage application:
Stresses stator insulation and connected components
Cannot be reliably detected using V/Hz alone
Offline generator voltage regulator problems
Operating error during unit synchronizing
Control failure
VT fuse loss in voltage regulator (AVR)System problems
Unit load rejection: full load, partial rejection
Power system islanding during major disturbances
Generators: 1.05 pu (generator base)
Transformers:
1.05 pu at rated load at 0.8 PF
1.1 pu at no load
V%
f%
106
104
102
100 102
98
96
104
94
989694
Copyright ©2005 IEC, Geneva, Switzerland
100
105
110
115
120
125
130
0.1 1 10 100
Time (minutes)
110
120
130
140
0.01 0.1 1 10 100
Individual manufacturers should be consulted for limits
of a specific transformer.
V/H
z (%
)
IEEE TUTORIAL ON THE PROTECTION OF SYNCHRONOUS GENERATORS
Copyright © IEEE 2011
Limiting factors are rotor and stator thermal limits
Underexcited limiting factoris stator end iron heat
Excitation control setting control is coordinated with steady-state stability limit (SSSL)
Minimum excitation limiter (MEL) prevents exciter from reducing the field below SSSL
Reactive Power Into System
Reactive Power Into Generator
Rotor Winding Limited
MEL
Stator End Iron Limited
SSSL
Stator Winding Limited
+ MWReal Power Into System0
+MVAR
Overexcited
Underexcited
–MVAR G
MVAR
MWSystem
MVARG
MWSystem
Field open circuit
Field short circuit (flashover across slip rings)
Accidental tripping of field breaker
Voltage regulator control system failure
LOF to main exciter
Loss of ac supply to excitation system
Machine that initially operates at 30% load and underexcited. Impedance locus follows path from E to F to G and oscillates in region between F and G
Generally for any loading, impedance terminates on or varies from D to L
Impedance variation with the machine operating at or near full load – locus follows path from C to D
Two modern offset mho relays can be used
Relay with 1.0 pu impedance diameter detects LOF condition from full load to about 30% load
First relay is set with short time delay; 0.1-second delay suggested for security against misoperation during transients
Diameter = 1.0 puOffset =
Diameter = Xd
0.5
–R
–1
–2
–1 –X 1 2
+X
+R
′dX2
Second relay is set with time delay; 0.5 to 0.6 seconds provides protection for LOE condition up to no load
Two offset mho relays provide LOE protection for any loading level
Both relays are set with offset of X′d/2
Diameter = 1.0 puOffset =
Diameter = Xd
0.5
–R
–1
–2
–1 –X 1 2
+X
+R
′dX2
Experience has shown that these settings are secure over a wide range of system conditions. However, transient
stability analysis should be performed to verify this.
MEL and LOF characteristicare coordinated so they do not overlap
MEL prevents leading var excursions into the LOF characteristic to avoid relay misoperation for system transients
Negative-offset mho element characteristic leaves underprotected area relative to SSSL and stator end iron limit curve of the machine capability
0.8
0.4
0
–0.4
–0.8
0.4 0.8 1.20
Generator Capability
SSSL
LOF Relay
pu (MW)
Q
P
MEL
Generator
G
GSU SystemReactance
VXd XT
XSWhere
Xe=XT + XS
V2 1_ + 1 2 Xe Xd
Per Unit MW
Per Unit Mvar
V2 1 1 2 Xe Xd
MW - Mvar PER UNIT PLOT
X
R
Xd + Xe 2
Xe
Xd - Xe 2
R-X DIAGRAM PLOT
This scheme combines positive-offset mho relay, directional relay, and undervoltage relay applied at generator terminals and set to look into machine
Directional unit supervises mho unit because positive-offset allows it to operate for faults external to generator terminals
XS
1.1 (Xd)
Offset =
Machine Capability
MEL
SSSL
Z2 Setting
Z1 Setting
R
X
′dX2
Improves coverage
IEEE TUTORIAL ON THE PROTECTION OF SYNCHRONOUS GENERATORS
Copyright © IEEE 2011
System AsymmetriesOpen system circuits
Downed conductors
Stuck breaker poles or open switchesUnbalanced loads
Untransposed transmission lines
Single-phase GSU with unequal impedancesUnbalanced system faults
Strongest I2 source is generator phase-to-phase fault
Generators connected with delta-wye GSU transformer
System ground faults appear as phase-to-phase faults to the generator
Generator ground faults typically do not create as much I2
I2 in the stator creates a magnetic field component that rotates in opposite direction of rotor and power system (positive-sequence) field component
As a result, double-frequency current is induced in rotor
At twice fundamental frequency, skin effect promotes current in rotor surface areas and, to a smaller degree, in the field winding
Beyond a point, the induced surface currents can cause heating of metal
wedges that hold field windings and / or retaining rings on rotor ends, causing them
to anneal, expand, and loosen with catastrophic results
For salient-pole machines, double-frequency currents concentrate at pole faces and teeth
Much current appears in the pole-face amortisseur windings
Continuous Unbalance Current CapabilityGenerator Type Permissible I2 Stator
Rating PercentSalient Pole
Connected Amortisseur WindingsNonconnected Amortisseur Windings
105
Cylindrical RotorIndirectly CooledDirectly Cooled
To 350 MVA351–1250 MVA1251–1600 MVA
10
88 – [(MVA-350)/300)]
5
Short-Time Unbalance Current Capability
Generator TypeK Permissible
(I2 in pu)Salient Pole 40Synchronous Condenser 30Cylindrical Rotor
Indirectly CooledDirectly Cooled
0–800 MVA801–1600 MVA
30
10See Graph (next slide)
22I t
[ ]= − −22I t 10 (0.00625)(MVA 800)
=22I t 10
2 2It C
apab
ility
Values shown in Tables I and II of this chapter are for machines manufactured to IEEE C50 standards since 2005
Equipment nameplate data and / or the manufacturer may be consulted to verify machine capabilities
2
Has limited I2 sensitivity of about 60% of generator full-load rating
Generally insensitive to load unbalances or open conductors
Limited protection as damaging heat can occur even at low levels of I2
Allows backup protection for unbalanced faults (high levels of I2)
Allows relay characteristics that can match generator I2 capabilities
Allows I2 pickup settings down to 0.03 pu
Can be set to alarm at lower than generator limits, allowing plant operator to attempt to reduce I2 before trip occurs
Minimum Pickup 0.04 pu
K Setting Adjustable Over
Range 2–40
10
40
2
5
Negative-Sequence Current (per unit)0.1 101
0.10.01
1 • 103
100
1
10
Tim
e (s
econ
ds)
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Generator Type Potential Damage
Diesel Risk of Explosion
Gas Turbine Gear Damage
Hydro Blade Cavitation
Steam Overheating
Generator Type Typical Motoring Power
Diesel 5% - 25%
Gas Turbine > 50%
Hydro 0.2 - 2%
Steam 0.5% - 3%
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The 78 protection scheme protects the generator from OOS or pole-slip conditions
Common relay schemes for detecting generator OOS events include:
Single blinder
Double blinder
Concentric circle
When a Generator Goes Out-of-Step (Synchronism) with the Power System, High Levels of Transient Shaft Torque are Developed.
If the Slip Frequency Approaches Natural Shaft Frequency, Torque Produced can Break the Shaft.
High Stator Core End Iron Flux can Overheat and Damage the Generator Stator Core.
GSU Subjected to High Transient Currents and Mechanical Stresses.
171
172
One pair of blinders (vertical lines)
Supervisory offset mho
Mho limits reach of scheme to swings near the generator
Double Lens
Scheme
Double BlinderScheme
The most popular OOS protection is the single blinder scheme
Pickup area is restricted to shaded area defined by inner region of mho circle and area between Blinders A and B
Z3(t3)
Z0(t0)Z2(t2)
Z1(t1)
A B
Positive-sequence impedance must originate outside either Blinder A or Blinder B
It should swing through the pickup area and progress to the opposing blinder
Swing time should be greater than time-delay setting
Rotor Angle Generator G_1
Ang
le (d
egre
es)
Time (seconds)
–— Case 1 (tc = 90 ms), with controls
–— Case 2 (tc = 180 ms), with controls
–— Case 3 (tc = 190 ms), with controls
– – Case 1 (tc = 90 ms), without controls
– – Case 2 (tc = 180 ms), without controls
– – Case 3 (tc = 190 ms), without controls
R-X diagrams show trajectory followed by impedance seen by relay during disturbance
When an oscillation in the generator is stable, the point of impedance does not cross the line of the system
When an OOS condition occurs, the point of impedance crosses the line of the system impedance each time the slip is completed
R-X Diagram for Case 1R-X Diagram for Case 1R-X Diagram for Case 1
Case 1Tc = 0.09 ms
Case 2Tc = 0.18 ms
Case 3Tc = 0.19 ms
R (ohm) R (ohm)
X (o
hm)
R (ohm)
X (o
hm)
.
Apply OOS if swing impedance passes through GSU or generator
This zone is protected by differential relays that do not respond to power swings
Consider application of OOS if swing passes outside GSU but line protection is blocked or does not respond to swings
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Common causesWiring failureOpen in VT draw-out assemblyBlown fuse due to short-circuitFuse left out after maintenance
Affected functions21, 27, 32, 40, 50/27, 51V, 67N, 78, 81Automatic voltage regulator (AVR runaway)
When fuse blows, unbalanced voltages created
Two sets of VTs required
Loss of One or Two Phases
Negative-sequence voltage & no negative-sequence current = fuse loss
Negative-sequence voltage & negative-sequence current = fault
Three-Phase Loss
Low three-phase voltages & low three-phase current & positive-sequence current = fuse loss
Low three-phase voltages & high three-phase currents = fault
Wye-wye grounded VTs on ungrounded system
Mitigation
Line-to-line rated VTs
Broken-delta VTs
VT loading resistor
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Operating errors
Breaker head flashovers
Control circuit malfunctions
Combination of above
Typically, normal generator relaying is not adequate to detect inadvertent energizing
Generator behaves as induction motor
Flux induced into generator rotor causing rapid rotor heating
Rotor current is forced into negative-sequence path in rotor body
X1S = system positive-sequence reactance
X1T = transformer positive-sequence reactance
X2G = generator negative-sequence reactance
EG = generator terminal voltage
ES = system voltage
ET = transformer high-side voltage
I = current
R2G = generator negative-sequence resistance
UnitStep-Up
Transformer
EquivalentHigh-Voltage
System
Equivalent SystemVoltage
X1T X1S
X2G
R2G
Gen.EG ET ES
Gen.
I
Undervoltage (27) supervises low-set, instant overcurrent (50) –recommended 27 setting is 50% or lower of normal voltage
Pickup timer ensures generator is dead for fixed time to ride through three-phase system faults
Dropout timer ensures that overcurrent elementgets a chance to trip if voltage is higher than 27 setting during event
GeneratorPhaseVoltage
Generator Phase
Currents
Fault Inception
Breaker Opens
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Large gas turbines are started as a motor using static frequency converter
V/Hz is maintained constant until rated voltage is reached, after which rated voltage is maintained
Extended operation occurs at low speeds while purging and firing cycles are completed
Generator must be protected during low-frequency operation
Some protection such as phase overcurrent and phase unbalance is provided by converter controls
To be effective, multifunction generator relays must maintain protection down to low frequencies
At lower frequencies, protective functions may deviate from normal specifications
In some cases, protective functions may have to be disabled during starting because of possible false operation
Fault-to-ground on dc link cannot be detected by converter controls
Fault causes dc current to flow through any wye-connected VTs and generator ground
.
DC current saturates magnetic elements (VTs and distribution transformer in generator neutral)Damage can occur if fault is not cleared – PT can be damaged in approximately 50 msTwo strategies to address this fault include
Measure dc current in generator neutral (e.g., with transducer) and use dc relay and turn converter off before damage occurs
Eliminate any ground path through magnetic elements during starting (use delta-connected VTs and disconnect generator neutral while starting)
To avoid damage to generator or GSU unit, synchronizing across breaker should be done within tight limitsTypical recommendations are
Electrical degrees ±10
Voltage 0 to +5 percent
Frequency difference < 0.067 Hz
Synchronizing equipment or supervising relays should take into account breaker closing time and relative slip, closing breaker in advance so that angle between generator and system at closing is as close to zero as possible
Generators may be operated at lower frequency during startup and shutdown
Electromechanical relays can become very insensitive at off nominal frequencies
Plunger-type overcurrent relays have flat characteristics down to low frequencies and are used to provide supplementary protection during start up and shutdown –these relays cannot be energized continuously and have to be disconnected during normal operation
Microprocessor-based relays can provide protection down to lower frequencies and generally do not require supplementary protection
(E)(D)(C)(B)(D)
(B)
(E)
(C)
(A)
(A)(F)
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0 70 80605040302010
Pic
kup
in M
ultip
les
of 6
0 H
z P
icku
p
Frequency in Hz
Harmonic Restraint Transformer Differential Relay
Plunger-Type Current RelayInduction Overcurrent RelayGenerator Differential RelayGenerator Ground Relay
Plunger-Type Voltage Relay
(A)(B)(C)(D)(E)(F)
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Generator protection functions with same trip / shutdown modes are grouped together
Operated by protective functions, auxiliary lockout relays, 86G (usually hand-reset), perform most tripping
Where possible, primary and backup relays trip via separate paths / lockouts
Includes tripping of all electrical and mechanical power sources
Provides fastest way to isolate generator
Does not shut down prime mover
Used when abnormality can be corrected quickly allowing fast reconnection
Only trips generator breaker(s)
Used when disturbance is on system and it is desired to have generator run its own auxiliaries
Used to prevent overspeed when delayed tripping of breakers is not detrimental –following a prime mover trip, planned or unplanned, breakers are tripped after reverse or low (hydro) power is detected
Not used for clearing faults
Much tripping philosophy depends on ability of generating unit to continue operating after disconnection from system (full load rejection)
If unit cannot support its own auxiliaries, then a tripping mode that transfers auxiliaries should be incorporated
Table II provides suggested steam unit trip logic by IEEE protective function numbers
Some functions are alarmed only
In general, G means “generator” and Nmeans “neutral” or “ground”
21 or 51V2432404650/2750/51G51TG250/51 UAT59
59G6363UAT67N7887G87GN87T87T UAT87O
51TG1 and 81 are examples of functions set to trip in unit separation mode
Table III provides typical tripping for hydroelectric units
Trip requirements are similar to thermal generators but may need slightly different slip / shutdown operations
Slower rotation devices
Different mechanical control devices
A generator disconnect switch is often used when tie to transmission system is dual-breaker arrangement
Sometimes generator protective functions are enabled / disabled by utilizing auxiliary switch contacts based on position of disconnect switch
Be cautious about bad or incorrect disconnect position status leaving generator unprotected