ib hl history mr. blackmon - coral gables senior high · 2014-08-11 · ib hl history mr. blackmon...

IB HL History Mr. Blackmon

Getúlio Vargas and the Estado Novo

(The following handout is shamelessly stolen from a number of sources)

I. PopulismA. Vargas is a Populist and a NationalistB. Definition of a Populist regime according to Guillermo O’Donnell: “While there

is considerable variation in the degree to which these systems are competitive anddemocratic, they are clearly ‘incorporating.’ They are based on a multi-classcoalition of urban-industrial interests, including industrial elites and the urbanpopular sector. Economic nationalism is a common feature of such systems. Thestate promotes the initial phase of industrialization oriented around consumergoods. It does so both directly thorugh support for domestic industry, andindirectly through encouraging the expansion of the domestic market forconsumer goods by increasing the income of the popular sector.” (Collier “B-AModel” 24)

C. (From Lambert) Parties of the Populist Type 1. “Since about 1930, . . . parties running on reform platforms but

opportunistic in their actual policy have been in the lead. They tend torally a heterogeneous backing around a prominent figure who has acquiredthe reputation of defending the underdog but whose only ideology isnationalism. . . . .Such parties, bearing the strong personal mark of apolitical figure, are called populist parties.

2. “The forerunner of this type of movement was Hipólito Irigoyen, whoassumed power in Argentina in 1916 with the Radical Civic Union. . . .Irigoyen then renamed his party . . . Union Cívica Radical Personalista. Irigoyen’s regime was characterized by a strong reaction against thecosmopolitan outlook of the Argentine oligarchic regime, which had givenfree rein to foreign, especially English, concerns. His Argentinenationalism manifested itself first by his neutrality in World War I. Another trait of the regime–a basic feature of populism–was ostentatioussympathy for the little man and a show of contempt for the wealthy and thepowerful. . . . After Irigoyen, the Radical Civic Union became a middle-class party and the Peronists became demagogic populists in their place.”(204-205

3. “Like Irigoyen in 1916, Vargas in 1930 found a country dominated by theoligarchy, and, also like Irigoyen, he appealed to nationalism andpresented himself as the advocate of the little man.” (205)

D. Economic Role of Populist Regimes1. “Their most earnest and systematic efforts have been aimed at economic

emancipation by means of industrialization. . . . The oligarchic regime hadbeen cosmopolitan in its outlook, since the economic interests of the rulingclass depended entirely on the exportation of agricultural products, and its

IB HL History Mr. BlackmonNotes on Vargas

culture was that of the European capitals. The populists governmentswished to alienate neither th entrepreneurs nor the workers, and especiallynot the middle classes and the military. Nationalism was the one theme onwhich all of them could agree. At that point in Latin America’s foreignrelations, nationalism, which primarily economic, meant above allindustrialization and nationalization of the large foreign enterprises. Although this economic nationalism often inspired measures of demagogicrather than economic value, populist governments undoubtedly started theera of economic development. . . . . The populist regimes broadened theLatin American body politic.” (207)

E. Political and Social Role of the Populist Regimes1. “”The lack of any economic experience, particularly among military

dictatorships of populist inspiration, rendered the best meant programsutterly ineffectual. . . . For instance, any social policy dictated byopportunism consisted first in courting supporters by multiplying jobopenings, particularly in occupations most easily controlled by the partyand the government: civil service, public utilities, nationalized industries. .. . In order to bring about and justify the proliferation of posts and showtheir social usefulness, the populist governments have given in to thetemptation to orient labor legislation in a direction that slows productivity.. . . In order to maintain their popularity among workers and civil servants,the governments have raised the minimum wages excessively, the resultbeing almost invariably an inflation that has cancelled the raise. Theseregimes have promoted social progress through featherbedding rather thanthrough higher productivity and salaries. Even though party supportershave been disappointed by the stagnation and in some case thedeterioration in living standards, the populist regimes have lost none oftheir popularity. The people’s protectors had given evidence of their goodintentions, and they can always blame any failures on mysterious plots ofpolitical foes and the evil scheming of international capitalism and theUnited States government.” (208)

2. “The greatest harm done by the populist regimes throughout LatinAmerica has been to widen the chasm between a chiefly urban advancedsociety and a chiefly rural archaic one by carrying out reforms in only asegment of each nation. Government by the upper class had preservedarchaic feudal structures in the rural areas until the end of the first third ofthe twentieth century. The populist leader who have followed theoligarchy have paid no attention whatsoever to rural society and have leftits feudal structure untouched, while their reforms have hastened changesin the advanced urban society, thus broadening the gap between the twosocieties instead of narrowing it.” (209)

II. Impact of the Great Depression on Brazil


A. Dominance of São Paulo1. “Under the Old Republic, Brazil enjoyed a virtual monopoly over the

world market, furnishing 70 percent of the coffee consumed. Coffee beansaccounted for about 70 percent of Brazil?s exports during the decade ofthe 1920's. Clearly the well-being of the national economy depended onthe sale of that single export.” (Burns)

2. “It is not surprising therefore, that the three major coffee-producingstates--Sao Paulo, Minas Gerais, and Rio de Janeiro--came to dominateall aspects of the national life. Well before the end of the empire, theyexercised economic control over the country; after the advent of therepublic, they assumed political direction as well.” (Burns)

3. The coup of 1930 represented resentment of the other states over Paulistadominance

B. Election of 19301. Liberal Alliance formed around Minas Gerais and Rio Grande do Sul,

naming Getúlio Vargas as candidate for presidenta. They represented the aspirations of regional elites outside of the

“coffee triangle.” b. A quarrel between the Paulistas and Minas Gerais provided the

wedge to fuse these disgruntled regional elites with one of thecoffee states.

c. It represented a demand for purification of the electoral system andweakening of rural clientalist structures (both ideas whichappealed to the urban population)

2. Platform was a. Defense of personal freedomb. Amnesty (for the tenentes)c. political reform

3. Vargas did not expect to win due to election fraud4. During the campaign, the Great Depression struck

C. World trade contracts1. Market for coffee collapses

a. “Coffee prices plummeted from 22.5 cents a pound in 1929 to 8cents in 1931. IN the 1920?s, Brazil shipped 805.8 million poundsof coffee abroad, in the 1930?s, only 337 million pounds weresold. By 1930, Sao Paulo?s warehouses groaned under the weightof 26 million bags of coffee beans--more than the world consumedin an entire year.” (Burns)

2. Huge drop in foreign earnings3. The coffee planters had already begun to rely on state subsidized profits

for coffee.4. Guaranteed profits led them to expand production by taking out high


interest loans5. The Depression caused a sharp drop in world coffee consumption.6. The collapse of prices could not therefore be made up from increased

sales.7. President Washington Luis held to “hard money” policies, to maintain the

convertibility of the mil reis into gold.a. The result of this is rapid exhaustion of gold reserves

8. Government should have suspended convertibilitya. Luis is influenced by his desire to satisfy foreign creditors in an

economy traditionally dependent upon exportsb. Luis’ policies have no support from any segment of Brazilian

societyIII. Military coup of 1930

A. Getúlio Vargas put into power by the military1. The heart of the coup were young members of the Liberal Alliance and the

tenentes., who although they had been defeated in the 1920's, retainedquite a lot of prestige within the military

2. This is not a revolution3. Vargas named provisional president.4. There was no legislature, so Vargas could rule by decree.5. Vargas had no clear cut ideology; he tends to be opportunistic6. There is a change in who holds power, however. From here on, the

traditional oligarches will be replaced by military men, technocrats, youngpoliticians and industrialists

B. “A new type of state was born after 1930. It differed from the oligarchical statenot only owing to its centralization and its greater degree of autonomy, but alsobecause of other factors: (1) economic policy slowly turned toward the promotionof industrialization; (2) social policy tended to provide some sort of protection forurban workers, who were soon gathered into a working-class alliance supportedby the state; (3) the armed forces, in particular the army, were given a central rolein support of the creation of an industrial base and in maintaining internal order.”(Fausto 196)

C. Political Centralization1. Vargas replaced the governors of 19 of 20 states with his own men, called

“interventor”2. Many were former tenentes3. The Interventors Code restricted state power

a. States could not contract a foreign loan without federal permissionb. States could not spend more than 10 % of their budget on state

policec. State police could not be armed with heavy weapons

4. This is a blow to the local oligarchies which had generally run Brazil


5. The Electoral Code of 1932 provided for mandatory voting, secret ballot,and suffrage for working women (illiterates, who were still a majority ofthe population, could not vote)

6. The press was strictly censored by the DIPD. Economic Centralization

1. Vargas did not abandon the coffee economy2. The National Department for Coffee (DNC) was created

a. The government bought part of the unsold coffee stocks withmoney from export taxes and destroyed it in order to reduce supplyand help prices. (Note the similarity to part of FDRs AAA)

b. Between 1930 and 1944, Brazil destroyed the equivalent of threeyears of the world’s consumption of coffee.

3. He also sought bilateral agreements to sell coffee.4. Payments on foreign debts were suspended in 19315. Labor policy

a. Vargas is quite corporativistb. “One of the more coherent aspects of the Vargas administration

was its labor policy. . . . Its main objectives were to repress effortsof the urban working class to organize outside the aegis of the stateand to incorporate the working class into the government’s array ofsupporters.” (Fausto 200)

c. The PCB (Brazilian Communist Party) was repressed.d. Coopting the unions

(1) A Ministry of Labor, Industry and Commerce wascreated

(2) Bureaus of Reconciliation and Arbitration were createdto mediate disputes between workers and employers.

(3) Decrees defined unions as consultative bodies whichworked with the bureaucracy.

(4) One trade union was given exclusive jurisdiction over itscraft

(5) A representative from the Ministry of Labor had to bepresent at all union meetings, and ministry recognition wasnecessary for the union to be legal.

6. Centralization in Educationa. One objective was to create a larger trained elite.b. A Ministry of Education and Health created in 1930c. The education system was authoritarian

(1) Philosophies taught were hierarchical values and Catholicconservatism

d. Francisco Campos (Minister of Education from 1930-1932)instituted the Campos Reform which provided a sequenced


curriculum and required both mandatory attendance and a highschool diploma to enter university

e. New universities were founded to make them modern centers ofteaching and research(1) University of São Paulo 1934(2) University of the Federal District 1935

f. Minister of War Eurico Dutra: “The principal objective ofeducation is to create a national consciousness,” (Burns)

E. The tenente movement1. Tenentismo arose in the 1920s among middle level officers who were

frustrated at the corruption of the traditional ruling oligarchy and whowere critical of senior officer’s complacency.

2. There were revolts in 1922 and 1924, one led by Luíz Carlos Prestes, wholater converted to Marxism and led the Brazilian Communist Party

3. Called for fair elections and honest government in late 1920s4. The tenentes lacked widespread public support and were suppressed by the

police, but their willingness to sacrifice for the sake of the nation broughtthem prestige within the army

5. The coup of 1930 brought the tenentes into the government.6. In order to achieve industrialization and improvements in communication

and transportation, the tenentes needed a stable and strong centralgovernment.

F. Separatism: The São Paulo War1. The Vargas interventor in São Paulo, João Alberto, tenente, alienated the

Paulista elites (by advocating a 5% pay increase for workers), leading toarmed rebellion.

2. Their defeat in 1932 helps discredit separatismG. The Constitution of 1934

1. More centrist but not radically different from previous Constitution2. Provisions were included for the nationalization of mines, mineral deposits

and waterfalls.3. Labor provisions

a. Different pay for the same work (whether for age, sex, nationality,or marital status) was prohibited

b. Minimum wagec. Regulations on children’s and women’s labord. Weekly days offe. Paid vacationsf. Compensation for unjust firing

4. Family, Education and Culturea. Free primary educationb. Compulsory attendance


c. Religious education would be elective and open to all religions.5. National Security

a. A High Council on National Security createdb. Military service is made obligatory

6. Vargas elected to a 4 year termIV. Vargas: To the Estado Novo

A. Growth of Integralism (the AIB or Brazilian Integralist Movement)1. Founded in 1932 by Plínio Salgado2. Influenced by Fascism3. Dogma was Christian, nationalist, and traditionalist: “God, Fatherland,

and Family”4. Identified liberalism, socialism, Masons and international finance

capitalism (which they believed was controlled by Jews) as their enemies.5. Paramilitary style (the Greenshirts) with the Greek sigma (E) as a symbol6. Drawn mostly from middle class7. Had support from some officers, especially in the navy

B. National Liberation Alliance (ANL)1. Popular Front organization coordinated by the Comintern to organize

leftist opposition to Vargas and the Integralistsa. Moscow had ordered the Comintern to order Communist parties

around the world to cooperate with other groups in opposition toFascists

2. Luíz Carlos Prestes was one of the leaders3. Program was nationalist

a. Suspension of payment on foreign debtsb. Nationalization of foreign businessesc. Agrarian reformd. Guarantees on individual rightse. A “democratic” government

C. The Authoritarian alternative1. The Integralists and ANL began fighting in the streets in a way similar to

Nazis and KPD in Germany2. In response, authoritarian rule seemed to hold attractions.3. “Authoritarianism was and is a trait of Brazil’s political culture. . . . The

authoritarian current took on . . . the point of view known as ‘conservativemodernization.’ That is, authoritarians believed that in a loosely knitcountry such as Brazil, the state had the responsibility to organize thenation and to promote an orderly economic development and generalwell-being. In the course of events, the authoritarian state would put anend to social conflict, partisan politics, and excess freedom ofexpression–all of which weakened the country.

4. “There were traits common to the authoritarian current and to totalitarian


Integralism, but they were not the same. Integralism sought its objectivesthrough a party that would mobilize the disgruntled masses and storm thestate. The authoritarian current put its money not on the party, but on thestate. It did not believe in large-scale social mobilizations; it believed inthe clairvoyance of a few men.” (Fausto 210 emphasis added)

D. Conflict between Integralists and ANL1. 1935 the government cracked down on the ANL2. The Law of National Security banned strikes by civil servants and

outlawed organizations attempting to subvert the social and political orderby illegal means.

3. ANL fomented a barracks revolt in Rio Grande do Norte, Rio and Recife,which was crushed.

E. Vargas declared a “state of siege”1. ANL leaders arrested, tortured, and summarily tried2. It might be noted that Moscow had sent some foreign cadres to assist in

the coupF. The National Commission for Stopping Communism is formed in 1935G. The National Security Tribunal was created to investigate individuals.

1. Remains in place throughout the Estado NovoH. The Integralists expected to win the election of 1938

V. The Estado Novo (1937-1945)A. 1937 Vargas cancelled the election, and tore up the old constitution and imposed a

new one1. The Estado Novo was modeled after Salazar’s Portugal and Mussolini’s

Italy2. Authoritarian, not totalitarian, with no attempt to mobilize mass support

B. Integralist coup1. The government banned all paramilitary organizations in 19382. The Integralists responded with an inept coup at the presidential palace3. The government crushed them, and Salgado went into exile.4. Vargas no longer faced organized internal opposition

C. “Socioeconomically, the Estado Novo reflected an alliance between the civilianand military bureaucracy and the industrial bourgeoisie. Their immediatecommon objective was to promote Brazil’s industrialization without causing largesocial upheavals.” (Fausto 217)

D. Vargas “introduced, for the first time in Latin America, mass propaganda andindoctrination of the style recently invented by European fascist states. . . . [T]heyaimed to create a central state powerful enough to carry out integrating functionsat which the oligarchical republic had so egregiously failed.” (Donghi 233)

E. The growth of (state censored) newspapers and of the radio industry helped himcommunicate with the country and helped generate a national consciousness.

F. The Depression highlighted Brazil’s economic vulnerability so long as the


economy was dominated by a single product.1. The solutions were

a. Diversify the economyb. Accelerate industrializationc. The two were complementary and would require government

participation.G. Economic Nationalism: “The nationalists insisted that only through economic

development could Brazil become truly independent. . . . The nationalistsrealized that Brazil in fact still retained its colonial status, that colonial economicinstitutions and patterns survived. A rural oligarchy, in alliance with foreigncapital, perpetuated the mercantilist system, and the vestiges of colonialismarrested the nation?s development. Beginning in the 1930?s, therefore, Braziliannationalism, like that flourishing in the rest of Latin America and in otherunderdeveloped areas, became increasingly characterized by resentment offoreign capital and foreign personnel, suspicion of private enterprise, a growingpreference for state ownership, emphasis on industrialization, encouragement ofdomestic production, and a desire to create or nationalize certain key industriessuch as oil, steel, power, and transportation.” (Burns, emphasis added)

H. Import Substituting Industrialization (ISI) program begun in earnest in 19371. The Great Depression stimulated industrialization in Brazil because if she

could not manufacture many consumer products herself, she would have todo without.

2. World War II further strengthened this trend because traditional suppliersof consumer goods were devoting their industry to war time production.

3. Methods used to foster ISI were “through exchange controls, importquotas, tax incentives, lowered duties on imported machinery and rawmaterials, and long-term loans at low interest rates. “ (Keen)

4. In 1940, the government produced a Five Year Plan to expand heavyindustry, generate hydroelectric power, and expand the rail system.

5. State sponsored companiesa. National Oil Company 1938b. National Council of Hydraulic and Electrical Energy 1939c. National Steel Company 1941 to exploit the “iron mountain” of

Itabira d. National Motor Company 1946

6. Oil (and a look ahead to his second administration: “But the symbol ofeconomic nationalism, for Brazilians as well as for all Latin Americans,was petroleum. The nationalists believed that the discovery of oil was notonly economically desirable but would guarantee Brazil?s achievement ofworld power status. At first, Vargas understood the importance ofpetroleum purely as an economic matter. He established the NationalPetroleum Council to coordinate and intensify the search for oil, and in


1939, the first successful well was drilled: oil gushed forth from theBrazilian soil. The nationalists-who were unwilling to see the oil, or theprofits from its exploitation, siphoned off to foreign countries-then calledfor the creation of a national oil industry. Oil soon came to dominate theirthoughts, and in the words of one contemporary nationalist, it became “thebackbone of nationalism.” In time, Vargas came to see the emotionalsignificance of oil to the nationalists, and he duly paid homage to thesymbol. “Whoever hands over the petroleum to foreigners threatens ourown independence,”he remarked.

7. “During his second administration (1951-54), Vargas exploited thatsymbol in a bid for wider support. In 1951, he proposed the creation ofPetrobras, a state monopoly on all activities connected with theexploration and development of petroleum resources. Its creation, in1953, followed a national campaign in which the cry “O petroleo enosso!”(“The Oil is Ours!”) echoed throughout the land. Theestablishment of Petrobas was a victory for the nationalists. They hadtriumphed over those who argued that it would be more economical forexperienced foreign companies to drill for oil and pay Brazil a royalty onwhatever was pumped out. The nationalists would have none of thatargument. At any rate, the question was an emotional, not economic, one. In the words of one nationalist, “the Brazilian people . . . struggled for thecreation of a state monopoly because they believed that in that strugglethey were defending national sovereignty.” The confessed goal ofPetrobas was to contribute to the economic independence of Brazil:Vargas’ own phrase was “to create national liberty.” The nationalistssucceeded in convincing the masses that a national oil industry representedsovereignty, independence, power, and well-being. For the first time, theystirred up popular support for a nationalist cause. Petrobas remains themajor single permanent achievement of the nationalists. The emotionsaroused by its creation recall the dramatic nationalization of the oilindustry in Mexico, in 1938.” (Burns)

8. “During the years 1934-37, Brazil operated under a barter agreement withGermany. Locomotives, iron, coal, dyes, and chemicals were exchangedfor Brazilian coffee, cotton, tobacco, and oils. By 1937 Germany wasselling twice as much as Brazil as was Great Britain, half as much as theUnited States. After 1937 German trade fell off and the Americanincreased.” (SHerring)

I. The Labor Charter 1937 codified the labor provisions already in place1. Imposed a union tax to finance the union bosses2. Labor Court is established3. Broader legislation with Consolidation of Labor Laws4. Vargas used radio to portray himself as the father of the people (“O


Paizinho do Povo”)J. The Department of Press and Propaganda (DIP) censored the pressK. “The Estado Novo persecuted, arrested, tortured, and forced politicians and

intellectuals into exile.” (Fausto 225)L. Administrative Department of Public Service reformed the bureaucracy by making

promotion based on merit.VI. The Estado Novo and World War II

A. Vargas’ sympathies when World War II broke out were not clear. Many of the oldtenentes admired the Germans, the Estado Novo certainly had aspects of a fasciststate. However, many Brazilians clearly saw the Allies as the side to support.1. The DIP enforced a pro-Axis view. A popular saying became: “Don’t

speak; Getulio will do it for you--don’t think; the DIP will do it for you.”(SHerring)

2. All of this worried Washington considerably3. Foreign Minister Aranha however was very pro-Allies, and the US

Ambassador to Brazil, Jefferson Caffery an able negotiator.B. Vargas aligned Brazil to gain maximum benefit from World War II

1. “Vargas adroitly exploited Great Power rivalries to secure financial andtechnical assistance from the United States for the construction of the hugestate-owned integrated iron and steel plant at Volta Redonda. U.S.companies and government agencies were notably cool to requests for aidfor establishing heavy industry in Latin America. But Vargas? hints thathe might have to turn for help to Germany removed all obstacles. A seriesof loans from the Export Import Bank made possible the completion of theVolta Redonda plant by 1946. By 1955 it was producing 646,000 tons ofsteel, a major contribution to Brazil?s industrial growth. Volta Redondawas a great victory for the Vargas policies of economic nationalism andstate intervention in economic life. In return for American assistance,Vargas allowed the United States to lease air bases in northern Brazil evenbefore it entered the war against the Axis. In August 1942, after Germansubmarines had sunk a number of Brazilian merchantmen, Brazil declaredwar on Germany and Italy. A Brazilian expeditionary force of sometwenty-five thousand men participated in the Allied invasion of Italy in1944 and suffered relatively heavy losses in the fighting.” (Keen)

C. At the Rio Conference in 1942, Brazil came out solidly on the Allied side (whileArgentina still balked.

D. A Department of Coordination of Economic Mobilization was created in 1942 torun the economy.

E. During the war, there was major growth in textiles, chemicals, and paper.F. Brazil also exported foodstuffs

VII. The End of the Estado NovoA. (A sympathetic view): Simon Collier,ed.,et al - The Cambridge Encyclopedia of


Latin America and the Caribbean, 270-2721. “The end of the Estado Novo was brought about by external

events--notably the entry of the United States into the Second World War. Brazil, as usual, followed the North American lead, and benefitted fromlarge amounts of aid; in return Brazil patrolled the South Atlantic and sentan expeditionary force to Italy. But it was obviously incongruous for anauthoritarian regime to be fighting for democracy, and Vargas began (withhis usual pragmatism) to propose a return to constitutional government. From 1942 he began to encourage the organization of the new skilledworking class into government-run trade unions, which provided benefitsfor their members and some degree of protection (although independentworkers? action was deterred). This was supplemented by moretraditional patronage in the form of gifts to the unorganized poor and thepromotion of a cult of Vargas among the unsophisticated. In 1945 thepresident announced elections for a constituent assembly, and beganto build a new political machine. This consisted of two political partiesappealing to different bases of support. The Social Democrat Party(PSD) belied its name; it was a conservative coalition of pro-Vargaslandowners, who still controlled the rural vote, and businessmen who hadbenefitted from the expansion of the Estado Novo. The electorate nowincluded a large block of skilled urban workers; Vargas appealed to themthrough the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB), based on his trade unions. There were also opposition parties, the most important being the NationalDemocratic Union (UDN), a “liberal” coalition of anti-Vargaslandowners and middle-class people who believed in human rights andhonest government and saw Vargas as a dictatorial demagogue.

2. “The PSD PTB coalition won the 1945 elections but, ironically, it did nothelp Vargas; he was at this point overthrown by the army, whosecommanders suspected that he intended to keep himself in power yetagain; they also feared his appeal to the masses. Nonetheless the electionshowed the huge changes which had occurred in Brazil since 1930. Thenthe electorate had been 2 million; now it was 7.5 million. Then most ofthe electors had voted at the command of the landowners; now there werenational political parties (at least in name), and the opposition got 40 percent of the vote. Large areas of the interior remained politically andeconomically backward, but leadership had passed to the cities, with theirEuropean-style middle and working classes. Like Peter the Great inRussia, Vargas had not totally modernized his country, but he hadgiven it a decisive push forward.

3. “Brazil?s experiment with modern democracy lasted eighteen years, andwas stormy as well as short. Only two presidents, Dutra (1946-1951) andKubitschek (1956-1961) completed their terms at the appointed time:


Vargas (1951-1954) ended his second term by committing suicide, CaféFilho (1954-5) and Quadros (1961) resigned, and Goulart (1961-4) wasdeposed. The reason for this, apart from the incompetence of theincumbents, was that the Brazilian political system had become lesscontrollable. In the first republic the quarrels of the state elites hadbrought about the revolution of 1930; the landowners were still a powerfulforce, and they had been joined by the middle classes and the skilled urbanworking classes. By the 1960s the unskilled urban workers and thepeasants, hitherto voiceless, were also making demands on the system. Ina society that ran on patronage the presidency could only hope to satisfy somany demands when the economy was booming; when resources werescarce the flimsy facade of constitutional government was torn to piecesby the conflicting demands of the different interest groups.

4. “The presidency of Eurico Gaspar Dutra, a conservative general(1946-1951), was relatively quiet; the political system had not fullydeveloped and Brazil was prosperous as the result of the Second WorldWar. The two main developments were the banning of the CommunistParty, which had shown surprising strength by gaining 9 percent of thevotes in 1946, and the consequent growth of the PTB under Vargas, whobegan to campaign for a second term in office in 1948. Vargas appealed tothe electorate on the social achievements of his last years in office, andwon the 1950 presidential elections by effective use of public relations forthe first time in Brazil. . . .

5. “Vargas?s second presidency was a failure. The complexity of politicallife had vastly increased since 1945; the post-war boom was over; thepresident himself was nearly seventy and his political grip was weakening. Vargas made two major mistakes; he alienated everyone by hismismanagement of the economy (inflationary wage increased followed bya stabilization plan), and he angered his political supporters by hispromotion of his protege Joao Goulart, who he made Labor Minister andput in charge of the trade unions with all their opportunities for patronage. But Vargas?s final downfall was due to his resentment of opposition. InAugust 1954 an assassination attempt was made on a muckrakingjournalist, Carlos Lacerda; violence at national level broke the unwrittenrules of Brazilian politics, and the armed forces were also angered, sincean Air Force major had been killed trying to protect Lacerda. Investigations showed that the killing had been ordered by the president?schief bodyguard; senior officers demanded the president?s resignation,and Vargas responded by committing suicide. His death, and the willsissued in his name, created a “Vargas legend”; he was supposed to havedies as a “sacrifice” protecting the “poor and humble.” At any rate he hadtaken vital steps towards modernization and created both a middle class


and a skilled proletariat. 6. “. . . Vargas’ political machine showed its durability by winning the 1955

elections, with Juscelino Kubitschek of the PSD gaining the presidencyand Goulart of the PTB the vice presidency, but the armed forces had tointervene again to prevent any anti-Vargas factions from staging a coup. The running of Brazil was becoming increasingly dependent on themilitary. “ [all emphasis added]

B. (A sympathetic, anti-American view) Benjamin Keen - A Short History of LatinAmerica, 448-3561. “The paradox of Brazil?s participation in an antifacist war under an

authoritarian regime was not lost on Brazilians; the demands for an end tothe Estado Novo grew stronger as the defeat of the Axis drew near. Eversensitive to changes in the political climate and the balance of forces. Vargas responded by promising a new postwar era of liberty. In January1945,, he announced an amnesty for political prisoners, promulgated a lawallowing political parties to function openly, and set December 2 as thedate for presidential and congressional elections.

2. “A number of new parties were formed to fight the coming elections. Twowere created by Vargas himself. They were the Partido SocialDemocratico (Social Democratic Party, of PSD) and the PartidoTrabalhista Brasileiro (Brazilian Labor Party, or PTB). The PSD, thelargest of the new parties, united pro-Vargas industrialists and ruralmachines, above all. The PTB had its base in the government-controlledtrade unions and appealed to workers with a populist rhetoric proclaimingVargas the “Father of the Poor.” The Uniao Democratica Nacional(National Democratic Party, or UDN) was the most conservative andchiefly represented neocolonial agrarian and commercial interests; it wasstrongly pro-American. Its position with respect to economic policy wasthat “it is necessary to call on foreign capital for the exploitation of ouridle natural resources, assure it just treatment, and allow it to repatriate itsproceeds.” Of the other national parties, the most important was theCommunist party, led by Prestes, which emerged from the under groundwith considerable prestige and strength.

3. “Vargas announced that he would not run for president but set the stage fora well-organized campaign by his supporters, called queremistas (from thePortuguese verb querer, “to want”), who wanted Vargas to declare himselfa candidate in the forthcoming election. Soon after issuing the decreesrestoring political freedom, Vargas moved to the left in economic policy. In June he authorized the expropriation of an organization whose practiceswere harmful to the national interest; the decree specifically namedHnational or foreign enterprises known to be connected with associations,trusts, or cartels.F


4. “The authorization decree, which was aimed at keeping down the cost ofliving, inspired alarm in conservative foreign and domestic circles. TheAmerican ambassador, Adolph A. Berle, Jr., made no effort to conceal hissuspicion of Vargas’ aims. Senior military officers also regarded Vargas’spolitical maneuvers and leftward move with growing uneasiness. Thewartime alliance with the United States had accentuated their inherentconservatism and made them ready to accept the gospel of free enterpriseand American leadership in the cold war against the Soviet Union andworld communism.

5. “On October 29, 1945, Generals Goes Monteiro and Eurico Dutra staged acoup, forced Vargas to resign, and entrusted the government to JoseLinhares, chief justice of the Supreme Court, until after the election. Thenew government promptly indicated its tendency by repealing Vargas?santitrust decree and launching a suppression of the Communist party. Ostensibly, the military had acted to defend democracy by preventingVargas from seizing power as he had done in 1937. But its democraticcredentials were more than dubious; Goes Monteiro and Dutra were, afterVargas, the chief architects of Estado Novo and had supported Vargas?smost repressive measures. Vargas, says Richard Bourne, “was right tosuspect that behind the concern for democracy there was also a hostility tostate economic intervention of the sort that was building the VoltaRedonda steel plant and a lack of sympathy for his labor and welfarepolicies.”

6. “The military coup insured that Brazil would return to the parliamentarysystem under conservative auspices, with two generals as the majorpresidential candidates, Eurico Dutra for PSD and Eduardo Gomez for theUDN. Dutra won, while Vargas had the satisfaction of winning election assenator from two states and congressman from six states and the FederalDistrict. The newly elected Congress, sitting as a constituent assembly,framed a new constitution that retained both the federal system andguaranteed civil liberties and free elections, but it still denied the vote toilliterates and enlisted men in the armed forces--more than half the adultpopulation.

7. “Under the mediocre, colorless President Eurico Dutra (1946-1951),neocolonial interests regained much of the influence they had lost underVargas. In his foreign and domestic policies, Dutra displayed a blindloyalty to the anticommunist creed propounded by Washington. Vargas,wishing to broaden Brazil’s economic and diplomatic contacts, hadresumed diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union; Dutra found a pretextfor severing those relations. Alarmed by the growing electoral strength ofthe Communist party, Dutra outlawed the party, and Congress followed hislead by expelling the party’s elected representatives, seventeen


congressmen and one senator. Dutra exploited the resulting witch hunt tosmash the independent, left-led labor movement; the Workers’ Federation,organized in 1946, was declared illegal, and the government intervened ina large number of unions to eliminate “extremist elements.” Theimposition of a wage freeze and the failure to raise the officially decreedminimum wage caused the real income of workers to drop sharply.

8. “With respect to economic development, Dutra pursued a laissez fairepolicy that meant the virtual abandonment of the Vargas strategy of astate-directed movement toward economic independence. Dutra?sfinance minister, Correia e Castro, openly declared the government?s biasin favor of the neocolonial relationship when he described Brazil as“essentially an agrarian country,’ adding the “the essence of the LatinAmerican economy, and Brazil is an integral part of this area, is a certainconcentration of effort in the export of primary products and foodstuffs, aswell as in the import of a wide variety of manufactured goods andprocessed foodstuffs.” In conformity with this point of view, the Dutragovernment removed all import and exchange controls and allowedthe large foreign exchange reserves accumulated during thewar--reserves that Vargas had proposed to use for reequippingBrazilian industry--to be dissipated on imported consumer goods,luxury goods in large part.

9. “Attracted by the new economic climate, foreign capital flowed intoBrazil. Direct investments by the United States rose from $323 million in1946 to $803 million in 1951. Meanwhile, seeking to curb inflationaccording to the prescription of American advisers, the governmentpursued a restrictive credit policy harmful to the Brazilian entrepreneursand industrial growth. In 1947, after the negative results of these policieshad become apparent and the foreign exchange reserves had almostdisappeared, the Dutra government set up a new system of importlicensing, with a scale of import priorities according to need, and adoptedan easier credit policy. Thanks to these measures, the last two years of theDutra regime saw a revival of economic growth.

10. “In 1950, having assured himself of the neutrality of the armed forces,Vargas ran for president with the support of the PTB and a broad coalitionof workers, industrialists, and members of the urban middle class. Hiscampaign concentrated on the need to accelerate industrialization andexpand and strengthen welfare legislation. Defending his past record,Vargas affirmed that his whole effort had been to “transform into anindustrial nation” a country “paralyzed by the myopia of rulers wedded tothe existing monoculture and to the simple extraction of primarymaterials.” Riding a wave of discontent with the economic and socialpolicies of the Dutra regime, Vargas easily defeated his two opponents.


11. “Vargas inherited a difficult economic situation. After a brief boom incoffee exports and prices in 1949-1951, the balance of trade again turnedunfavorable, and the inflation rate increased. In the absence of othermajor sources of financing for his developmental program, Vargashad to rely largely on the massive increase in the money supply, withall its inevitable social consequences. Meanwhile, his national programof state-directed industrialization, using state corporations as its majorinstrument, encountered increasing hostility from neocolonial interests athome and abroad. In the United States, the Eisenhower administrationdecided that the Vargas government had not created the proper climate forprivate investment and terminated the Joint United States-BrazilianEconomic Commission. Within Brazil, despite his sweeping victory in theelection of 1950, Vargas’ program faced sabotage at the hands of the ruralforces that continued to dominate the majority of the state governmentsand Congress. This hardening of attitudes signified that Vargas’ optionsand his capacity for maneuvering between different social groups weregreatly reduced.

12. “In December, 1951, Vargas asked Congress to approve a bill creating amixed public-private petroleum corporation to be called Petrobras, whichwould give the state a monopoly on the drilling of oil and new refineries. Petrobras illustrated Vargas? belief that the state must own thecommanding heights of the economy, it also represented an attempt toreduce the balance of payments deficit be substituting domestic sources ofoil for imported oil. Vargas sought to appease domestic and foreignopponents by leaving the distribution of oil in private hands and allowingexisting refineries to remain privately owned, but almost two years passedbefore Congress, under great popular pressure passed the law creatingPetrobras in October 1953. However, Vargas? proposal to create a similaragency for electric power to be called Electrobras, which wouldsupplement the power production of foreign-owned public utilities,remained bottled up in Congress. The depth of nationalist feeling arousedby the debate over Petrobras and Electrobras convinced foreign anddomestic conservatives that Vargas was traveling a dangerous road.

13. “Vargas’ labor policy became another political battleground. UnderVargas, labor regained much of the freedom of action that it had lostduring the Dutra years. In December 1951, the government decreed a newminimum wage that only compensated for the most recent price rises. In1953, three hundred thousand workers went on strike for higher wages andother benefits. In June of that year, Vargas appointed a young protege,Joao Goulart, minister of labor. Goulart, a populist in the Vargastradition, was sympathetic with labor’s demands. In January 1954,observing that “it is not wages which raise the cost of living; on the


contrary it is the cost of living which require higher wages,” Goulartrecommended to Vargas a doubling of the minimum wage. Thisrecommendation evoked a violent “manifesto of the colonels,” in which agroup of officers charged that the government was penetrated bycommunism and corruption, that the armed forces were being neglected,and that the recommended new minimum wage would demoralize thebadly underpaid officer class. Under military pressure, Vargas dismissedGoulart, but in a May Day speech to workers he announced that theincreased minimum wage would be enacted and even praised the fallenminister of labor.

14. “The battle lines between Vargas and his foes were being drawn ever moresharply. In speeches to Congress, Vargas attacked foreign investors foraggravating Brazil’s balance of payments problem by their massiveremittances of profits and claimed that invoicing frauds had cost Brazil atleast $250 million over eighteen-month period. Meanwhile, attacks onhim by the conservative dominated press and radio grew even more bitter;especially vituperative were the editorials of Carlos Lacerda, editor of theultraconservative Tribuna da Imprensa.

15. “An effort to silence Lacerda presented Vargas’ enemies with a goldenopportunity to destroy him. Unknown to Vargas, the chief of thepresident?s personal guard arranged for a gunman to assassinate Lacerda. The plot miscarried, for Lacerda was only slightly wounded, but one of hisbodyguards, an air force major, was killed. The resulting investigationrevealed the complicity of palace officials and uncovered the existence oflarge-scale corruption in the presidential staff. The chorus of demands forVargas? resignation was joined by the military, which informed him onAugust 24 that he must resign or be deposed. Isolated, betrayed by themen he had trusted, the seventy-two-year-old Vargas found the way out ofhis dilemma by suicide. But he left a message that was also his politicaltestament. It ended with the words:

16. “”I fought against the looting of Brazil. I fought against the looting of thepeople. I have fought bare-breasted. Hatred, infamy, and calumny didnot beat down my spirit. I gave you my life. Now I offer my death. Nothing remains. Serenely I take the first step on the road to eternity andI leave life to enter history.”

C. (A less anti-American view) Hubert Herring - A History of Latin America,759-768. The Dictatorship of Getulio Vargas, 1930-451. “By the first days of 1945, there were clear signs of discontent with the

dictatorship. Many politicians, generals, and professional people began toshow their hands. For some, the stand reflected prudence; they knew thata dictator-bossed Brazil would have scant welcome at the peace tables. For others, it was simply a personal play for power. For many, it was a


deeply rooted desire for democratic rule. In February came the“democratic break through.” Two newspapers suddenly began to talk ofthe election Vargas had promised, of the need for free discussion, and infavor of the candidacy of Air Brigadier Eduardo Gomes. The DIP did notsilence them; the inference was that Vargas had decided to loose his hold. The news papers, such as were not owned by the government or theCommunists, published vigorous discussions of Brazil’s future.

2. “National political parties took form. The National Democratic Unionnominated Gomes, it had the support of most moderate Liberals, manyConservatives, and others intent upon striking at Vargas. The SocialDemocratic Party, backing Eurico Dutra, Vargas’ minister of war, made itschief appeal to those of the extreme right--with Vargas’ blessing, theythought. The Communists, led by Luiz Carlos Prestes, finally releasedfrom prison, entered the contest. As the year wore on, it became clear thatVargas was not to be easily deposed. A mysterious movement sprang upwith the slogan “Queremos Getulio,” “We want Getulio”; Brazil wasplastered with the slogan on billboards, in the press, in pamphlets. It wasthen revealed that the promoter of this ostensibly spontaneous outburstwas paying his printing bills from a loan of $14,000,000 granted by thenational Banco do Brasil (that is, Vargas).

3. “Meanwhile, elections were scheduled for December 2. By Septemberpolitical prophets knew that Vargas had no intention of quitting. Rumorsspread that a military coup was planned, that prisons were readied. Nowthe American ambassador, Adolf A. Berle, Jr., took a hand. Berle hadcome to Brazil in January, 1945, and had made friends of those in powerand in the opposition. Berle now decided to speak and on September 29held a press conference for Brazilian reporters; he spoke eloquently of thelong friendship between Brazil and the United States, and said that “thepledge of free Brazilian elections, set for a definite date, by a governmentwhose word the United States has found inviolable, has been hailed withas much satisfaction in the United States as in Brazil itself.” His point wasclear; he hailed the election, knowing full well that Vargas proposed tocontinue himself in power. Berle’s speech has been cited as anotherinstance of American intervention in Latin Americas internal affairs--if so,it was gentle and effective.

4. “In October Vargas dismissed the capital?s chief of police and installedhis brother, Benjamin Vargas (nicknamed O Beijo, “The Kiss”), who wasnotorious for his pilferings and exploitation of prostitution and gambling. This affront to the dignity of the nation offended the generals, whodemanded Vargas’ resignation. Forthwith, tanks, funs, and troopssurrounded public buildings. On October 29 Vargas resigned and flew tohis farm in Rio Grande do Sul. Chief Justice Linhares of the Supreme


Court, who became provisional president, appointed an able cabinet. Thepolitical campaign continued. The queremistas were noisy, Vargas nowordered them to support Dutra. The election was held on schedule onDecember 2. Dutra won, two to one, over Gomez. The Communistspolled 10 percent of the votes.”

D. (A more judicious view) Bradford Burns, Nationalism in Brazil: A HistoricalSurvey, 72-89 Getulio Vargas and Economic Nationalism1. “The Brazilians sardonically noted that they supported the Allied effort to

eliminate dictatorship in Europe while living under their own dictator athome. By late 1944, their desire to return to a democratic system wasunmistakably clear. Vargas, acceding to the mounting pressure, agreed tohold elections in December, 1945. The government relaxed its politicalcontrols, and a variety of political parties emerged. Three of themachieved national importance and, despite their weaknesses, can beregarded as the first nationwide democratic parties in Brazilian history. The Partido Social Democratico (Social Democratic Party, of PSD),founded by Vargas himself, represented urban, moderate, middle-classinterests. The Uniao Democratica Nacional (National DemocraticUnion, or UDN), founded by the opposition to Vargas, tended to supportconservative doctrines and to favor the interests of the traditionaloligarchy. The Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (Brazilian Labor Party,or PTB), also founded by Vargas, appealed to the workers and expressed aleftist ideology. The leadership of the PTB was predominatelymiddle-class in origin and was vociferously nationalistic. The three partieswere to contribute significantly to the growth of Brazilian democracy.

2. “As the date for the elections approached, Vargas hinted that he might liketo continue in office. Rumors spread that the President was once againgoing to cancel an election. In late October, 1945, the military intervenedto depose the President and guarantee the elections. The candidate of thePSD and the PTB, General Eurico Dutra, was elected and took office in1946 for a five-year term. Dutra proved to be not unsympathetic toVargas, who at the last moment had given the General his endorsement,and his administration continued many of the Vargas policies. Dutra?sproposed five-year development plan also pleased the nationalists, whosaw their hopes for an industrialized Brazil beginning to be realized.

3. “In the elections of 1950, Vargas was returned to office as democraticallyelected president. If anything, he was more nationalistic in both hispronouncements and his actions during his second administration than inhis first. As we have seen, it was during this administration that he createdPetrobras and attempted to extend government control over energy andpower resources; he also inaugurated his own five-year plan forindustrialization.


4. “Ironically, much of Brazil?s remarkable industrial progress duringthese years was due to the mounting investment of foreign capitalists,whom the nationalists, as always, suspected of a variety of evilmotives. Vargas became even more outspoken in his criticism of foreignownership of industry, and he launched a bitter attack against foreigninvestors, accusing them of Hbleeding Brazil.F The nationalists cheeredeach pronouncement. Yet funds continued to flow in from abroad, andindustrialization expanded at a rapid pace.

5. “Clearly, Vargas had mastered the rhetoric of the nationalists and adaptedit to his own purposes. He relied upon the popular appeal of nationalismmore than he had in the past, and these nationalist feelings strengthenedhis second administration which was less stabley anchored than his first.

6. “Yet after two years in office, the aging President found himself in gravedifficulties. The increasingly complex social and economic problemsfacing Brazil puzzled him. He had also lost some of his flexibility andadroitness. Showing an inability to govern within the framework ofthe democratic system, he resorted to some of his former strong-armtactics. Corruption surrounded the presidency, although Vargashimself was apparently an honest man. When the attempted assassinationof a persistent critic was traced to Vargas’ personal bodyguard, the armystepped in once again and demanded his resignation. Vargas replied bycommitting suicide, on August 25, 1954. He left behind suicide note(over which there has been speculation as to its authenticity), whichechoed his nationalist sentiments. He wrote of “years of domination andlooting by international economic and financial groups” and of “asubterranean campaign of international groups joined with the nationalgroups revolting against the regime of workers’ guarantees,” and boasted:“I fought against the looting of Brazil.” The note has become anationalistic document, and nationalists have not hesitated to use it inattacking their enemies both at home and abroad.

7. “An era ended with the death of Getulio Vargas. For nearly a generation,he had guided, directly or indirectly, the course of Brazilian development. During those years Brazilian nationalism began to follow a moreeconomically oriented course, its leadership passed from the hands of theintellectuals to the government, and its base of support expanded. In themeantime, an entirely new school of nationalists, imbued with theideology of economic development and accustomed to the government?srole in fostering and directing nationalism, had emerged. “


Works Cited

Burns, Bradford, Nationalism in Brazil: A Historical Survey, 72-89 Getulio Vargas and EconomicNationalism.. CompilerDanielW.Blackmon.CD-Rom.September2002. CoralGables, FL:CoralGablesSr.,2002.

Burns, E. Bradford. A History of Brazil. 2nd Edition. NY: Columbia University Press, 1980.

Collier, David. “Overview of the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Model.” The New Authoritarianism in LatinAmerica. Ed.David Collier. Princeton:New Jersey:PrinctonUniversityPress, 1979. Pp. 19-33.

Collier, Simon, ed.,et al. The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Latin America and the Caribbean, Compiler Daniel W. Blackmon. CD-Rom. September 2002. Coral Gables, FL: CoralGables Sr., 2002.


Donghi, Tulio Halperin. The Contemporary History of Latin America. Edited and Translated John Charles Chasteen. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993.

Fausto, Boris. A Concise History of Brazil. Translated by Arthur Brakel. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Hubert Herring - A History of Latin America, 759-768 The Dictatorship of Getulio Vargas, 1930-45. Compiler Daniel W. Blackmon. CD-Rom. September 2002. Coral Gables, FL:Coral Gables Sr., 2002.

Keen, Benjamin. A Short History of Latin America. Compiler Daniel W. Blackmon. CD-Rom. September 2002. Coral Gables, FL: Coral Gables Sr., 2002.

Lambert, Jacques. Latin America: Social Structure and Political Institutions. Translated Helen Katel. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967.

Skidmore, Thomas and Smith, Peter H. Modern Latin America. 4th Edition. NY: Oxford University Press, 1997.

ib hl history mr. blackmon - coral gables senior high · 2014-08-11 · ib hl history mr. blackmon...

Documents