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WORKING PAPER
Hybrid Governance of Disaster Management in Freetown, Monrovia, and Dar es Salaam
Aaron Clark-Ginsberg, Jonathan S. Blake, and Karishma Patel
Pardee RAND Graduate School
WR-A562-1 June 2020
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Hybrid Governance of Disaster Management in Freetown, Monrovia, and Dar es Salaam*
Aaron Clark-GinsbergAssociate social scientist, RAND Corporation
Jonathan S. BlakeAssociate political scientist, RAND Corporation
Karishma PatelAssistant policy researcher, RAND Corporation
AbstractThis article introduces a hybrid governance perspective to disaster management. Hybrid
governance refers to situations where state and non-state actors collectively provide key services. We argue that hybridity is often the norm rather than exception for disaster management, particularly in developing countries where the state is often weak and may be unable or unwilling to provide essential services. In these instances, risks are addressed by the state and non-state entities—from citizens and NGOs to customary authorities. Because of their important role in risk reduction, disrupting hybrid processes by attempting to bring them under the remit of the state may create rather than reduce risk. To make this argument, we first outline the key tenants of hybridity and their applicability to disasters before illustrating hybridity through three case studies of hybrid risk management in three cities in Africa, Freetown, Sierra Leone, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Monrovia, Liberia.
Key words: hybrid governance, disaster risk reduction, multi-stakeholder, cities, urban risk, resilience, Africa, Freetown, Monrovia, Dar es Salaam
* The authors are grateful to Krishna Kumar for support and guidance and the Pardee Initiative for Global HumanProgress at the Pardee RAND Graduate School for funding.
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Introduction
Over 70% of states “contain significant areas of limited statehood” (Risse and
Stollenwerk, 2018, p. 406), such as remote or sparsely populated areas, borderlands, rebel-held
territory, and informal urban settlements. However, disaster risk reduction is premised on the
assumption of a working government (Walch, 2018). For instance, the UN’s global framework
for disaster risk reduction, the 2015 Sendai Framework (UNISDR, 2015), assumes that a capable
and willing state plays the central role in planning for and responding to disasters (Walch, 2018).
In instances where the state is weak, religious institutions, traditional leaders, local power
brokers, NGOs, international organizations, and other non-state actors are often crucial
contributors to risk management (Walch, 2018, Wilkinson, 2018, Manyena, 2014). Yet in these
cases, solutions to risk management still tend to center on strengthening the state rather than
supporting non-state practices. This is evidenced by the scant attention paid to how non-state
actors actually address risk, from homogenized views of communities (Titz et al., 2018) and
standardized approaches to community disaster risk reduction (Maskrey, 2011), limited attention
to traditional institutions (Manyena, 2014) and the private sector, and the marginalization of
local voices in national and international governmental policy processes (Gaillard and Mercer,
2013, de la Poterie and Baudoin, 2015).
In contrast to this state-centric approach, governance scholars argue that situations of
limited statehood do not necessarily mean that key services go unprovided. This scholarship has
been used to understand how order functions where the state is weak and can provide
policymakers with a direction for investing in and improving such situations. For these scholars,
the absence of a strong, central state does not mean that governance is absent. As Risse and
Stollenwerk (2018, p. 406) comment, areas of limited statehood “are neither ungoverned nor
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ungovernable.” The observation that things do not always just fall apart—as the failed state
paradigm expected—has led to the rise of theorizing about the emergence of social order outside
the bounds of a capable state: “governance without a state” (Risse, 2011, Börzel and Risse, 2010,
Risse and Stollenwerk, 2018) or “governance without government” (Menkhaus, 2007, Peters and
Pierre, 1998, Raeymaekers et al., 2008, Rosenau et al., 1992). The central claim of this
scholarship is that in much of the world, “‘the state’ is only one actor among others” (Boege et
al., 2008, p. 6)). Governance, rather, is provided by a range of actors that include both the state
as well as non-state actors, who in certain circumstances can be more important than the state in
providing collective goods and services to citizens.
This article asks the question: how are disaster risks managed in situations where the state
is unable or unwilling to manage risk? At present, the focus of governance remains an under-
researched area in the field of disasters, and few approaches that provide ways of explicitly
understanding governance dynamics and how they shape risk (Tierney, 2012, Forino et al., 2015,
Lassa, 2012). We propose that drawing on recent work on theories of hybrid governance will
improve analyses and practices of disaster risk reduction. Hybrid governance, building on Post,
Bronsoler, and Salman (2017, p. 953), is a system where the creation and delivery of collective
goods and services involves both the state and non-state actors. Hybrid governance focuses on
the many places that exist between the poles of “no state” and “strong state”, where the state may
not be strong, but neither is it entirely absent. Applying a hybrid governance perspective can
therefore provide new insights into the range of actors, their interactions, and the governance that
they collectively provide to people around the world.
Over the course of this article we show how hybridity is a feature of disaster
management. Following this introduction, we review existing scholarship on disaster risk
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governance, describing its alignment with hybridity, and how hybrid governance can improve
thinking on disaster risk governance. We argue that a hybrid governance perspective offers three
main contributions in the field of disaster risk: it emphasizes the full range of actors that
contribute to governance provision, moving toward a perspective on governance beyond a state-
centric approach; it focuses on the interactions between governance providers, which demands a
focus not simply on the services that those actors provide but on how interactions work together
in a complex system; and it demands that attention is paid on the highly localized impacts of risk
management, which can diverge tremendously depending on the structures of hybrid governance
systems. To illustrate this argument, we then provide three short cases of disaster management in
cities in sub-Saharan Africa—Freetown, Sierra Leone; Monrovia, Liberia; and Dar es Salaam,
Tanzania—that show hybridity at work. Lastly, we conclude with the implications for future
research and practice.
Disaster management and hybrid governance
While the concept of governance remains under-developed in the context of disasters, its
need is imbedded in many of the field’s underlying theories of how risks are produced and
managed. Disaster management refers to activities implemented to prepare to, respond to, and
recover from disasters (UNISDR, 2017). Disaster management includes all activities to address
hazards, both natural and human in origin. A hazard, however, is not a disaster; for a disaster to
occur people must be exposed to the hazard and vulnerable to losses. The two main approaches
to disaster management, the hazard paradigm and the vulnerability paradigm, differ on how they
understand exposure and vulnerability and subsequent risk management activities (De Milliano
et al., 2015, Hewitt, 1983). Such differences reflect different conceptualizations of the role of the
state vis-à-vis non-state actors. Under the hazard paradigm, disaster risk is a negative externality
5
attributed to nature to be controlled via top-down technocratic measures (De Milliano et al.,
2015, Hewitt, 1983). This makes the state arguably central to risk management, since it does not
embrace a plurality of knowledge, power, and institutional structures, but rather controls risk
through official disaster management governmental structures advanced by technocratic
scientific expertise.
Non-state actors have a much greater role in managing risk under the vulnerability
paradigm. The vulnerability paradigm emphasizes the socially-constructed origins of risk,
conceptualizing disaster risk as a product of the interactions between an inseparable society and
nature (Wisner et al., 2004). Disasters are reflections of social failings and inequitable processes
that place some at risk of disasters while sheltering others. Under this paradigm, hazards,
vulnerabilities, and exposure are shaped through everyday decisions, meaning that everyone
plays a role in risk creation and reduction. Thus, disaster management encompasses many
constituent elements beyond those of specialized disaster management agencies of the state, from
bottom-up interventions that are cognizant of local differences and top-down interventions that
respond to national and global processes shaping risk. This perspective is reflected in
approaches emphasizing the role of stakeholders outside the state, community-based disaster risk
reduction, which focuses on the role of communities in managing risk (Lavell and Maskrey,
2014, Maskrey, 2011) and participatory approaches to disaster knowledge generation (Clark-
Ginsberg, 2017, Kelman et al., 2012). Indeed, as the UN agency for disaster risk reduction, the
UNISDR, puts it, DRR is “everyone’s business” (UNSIDR, 2018) or the responsibility of all
sectors of society.
While some disaster governance scholarship continues to equate governance with
government, much of it tends to reflect the concept of disaster management found in the
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vulnerability paradigm as “everyone’s business”. For instance, Forino et al. (2015) introduces a
conceptual governance framework for integrating climate change adaptation (CCA) and disaster
risk reduction (DRR), showing how state, market, and social actors can work collectively to
achieve CCA and DRR. Lassa (2012) applies Ostrom’s theories of polycentricity to understand
the multiple and overlapping disaster management regimes in Indonesia. Other scholars (e.g.
(Howes et al., 2015, Frey and Ramírez, 2019, Moynihan, 2009, Galaz et al., 2017)) take similar
approaches, arguing that disaster governance is networked and that multiple spheres of influence
control and shape risk. Indeed, for all of these scholars, disaster risks are created and reduced via
a distributed set of activities conducted by many actors. For them, governance is about aligning
these activities to collectively reduce vulnerability, enhance capacity and resilience, and prevent
disaster risk creation.
Although disaster governance scholarship provides a theoretical foundation for
conceptualizing disasters as “everyone’s business,” it is rarely attuned to the highly localized
and often fraught, fluid, and co-emergent practices of disaster management. Without explicitly
paying attention to this level of action, there is a danger that the local, on-the-ground conditions
that impact how individuals experience disasters will be overlooked. Adequately doing so
requires moving beyond descriptions of governance arrangements to understand how such
arrangements are produced and what types of power they represent.
A hybrid governance perspective extends existing disaster governance scholarship and
sheds additional light on how risks are collectively managed. By hybrid governance, we mean a
system “in which the state and non-state providers both contribute to service delivery” and other
collective goods creation (Post et al., 2017, p. 953). Compared to and other collective goods
creation (Post et al., 2017, 953). Compared to existing perspectives on hybrid governance that
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emphasize the hybrid nature of political authority and control (e.g., (Jaffe, 2013, p. 735)), the
definition we adopt is narrow, focusing solely on service delivery as the object of governance.
But the benefit of limiting the scope of the concept to the service provision aspects of
governance is that it is more concrete, measurable, and directly relevant to disaster risk
management, which can be considered a service to be delivered much like other services.
A hybrid governance approach has three benefits when it comes to understanding disaster
risk management. First, a hybrid governance perspective emphasizes the full range of actors that
contribute to governance provision in a place. The perspective does not assume that the state is
the central provider, rather it widens the lens to reveal the many types of providers that produce
governance.
Second, a hybrid governance perspective focuses on the interactions between governance
providers. By drawing attention to the relationships between the range of actors, this focus
sharpens disaster management analyses and planning in two ways. First, it makes clear that the
nature of the interactions can vary over space and time. State and non-state providers can have
many different relationships, and the structure that a relationship takes is specific to the context.
They can coordinate in some contexts and compete in others. The second benefit of the
interactive focus is that it highlights the emergent nature of governance that can be found across
a variety of contexts, including weak states (see (Jaffe, 2013, p. 735)) and elsewhere. The
governance structures and services that emerge from the actions and interactions of all the
providers are not the linear additions, but rather the nonlinear and complex outcomes of the total
actions of various providers of risk management.
Third, a hybrid governance perspective’s attention to the wide range of state and non-
state actors and the many ways that their interactions can be structured suggest a final
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contribution for disaster risk reduction: the importance of local specificity. In contrast,
conventional views of governance come with a pre-programmed list of relevant actors, including
most importantly the state, but often also including international organizations (e.g., UN and
World Bank) and international aid organizations (e.g., MSF), and (what tends to be a
homogenized conceptualization of) ‘community’ (Titz et al., 2018). Yet even when conventional
approaches consider some non-state actors, others, such as ethnic networks, private firms,
militias, and gangs, are often ignored. Determining the relevant or important governance
providers, then, is an empirical question, to be answered for each specific site of interest, and
allows researchers and practitioners to carefully consider the whole spectrum of providers that
work in a given context.
These insights suggest a different approach to the study and practice of disaster
governance. Instead of automatically trying to implement activities that support the state and
viewing nonstate actions as merely creating risk or undermining disaster management,
organizations need to identify the de facto service providers (which may or may not include the
state) without prejudice to non-state providers. Interventions aiming to reduce risk in weak states
need to account for the specific local constellations of hybridity. Thus, interventions must be
highly differentiated, and interveners must move beyond the one-size-fits-all approach to
emphasize how different forms of hybridity work in practice and what risks they reduce and also
create. This conclusion is not unique to the hybrid governance approach, and so we join a chorus
of others who call for more locally-attuned disaster risk reduction interventions (Heijmans, 2009,
Titz et al., 2018, Wisner et al., 2004).
In the following sections, we demonstrate how applying a hybrid governance approach
enhances our understanding of governance of disaster risks in cities in sub-Saharan Africa.
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Examples of hybrid governance for disaster management in cities in
Africa
Cities in sub-Saharan Africa provide a unique set of opportunities and challenges for
addressing disaster risk, in part because of their hybridity. Cities—understood as areas with high
settlement densities, a diverse mix of economic structures, large populations, and complex
administrative arrangements—are the quintessential complex systems (Rydin et al., 2012, Duhl
and Hancock, 1988). With their mix of formal and informal institutional structures, high
prevalence of informal settlements, and large number of transnational service providers
(international NGOs, UN agencies, and diaspora populations), cities in sub-Saharan Africa have
many features of hybrid governance. Informality pervades these cities, and rather than being
oppositional to the state, it is often enmeshed within state structures, both creating and being
created by state actions (Myers, 2010a, Rigon et al., 2018, Muggah, 2014).
The risks in sub-Saharan African cities often derive from state and non-state sources. The
mix of formal and informal systems and wide variety of actors operating in cities in sub-Saharan
Africa means that risks are often not the product of any single stakeholder, but the collective
outcomes of multiple stakeholders. This can result in a particularly fractured or splintered
cityscape wherein the risks an individual is exposed to and how they manage them are highly
hybrid, unique, and extremely complex (Marks and Elinoff, 2019, Graham and Marvin, 2002).
To address risk, efforts are therefore needed to understand the potential peculiarities of
the sub-Saharan African cityscape and its hybrid governance context. Current urban development
processes tend to downplay the hybrid nature of cities. Existing approaches to planning and risk
10
management tend to focus on the development of formalized top-down “paper plans” that are
selectively enforced and do little beyond criminalizing elements of informality (Rakodi, 2001).
Instead of such top down planning processes, some argue an integration of formal and informal
structures, such as through alternative planning procedures that incorporate the lived informality
of residents in cities (Myers, 2010b, Mustafa et al., 2011, de Boer et al., 2016). Indeed,
developing models of governance that account for the formal and informal has been proposed as
a potential solution for urban development in African cities (Adelekan et al., 2015, Mbembe and
Nuttall, 2008, Myers, 2010a), and may have potential for improving how risks are managed.
However, it remains unknown whether such hybrid modes of governance actually represent a
viable mode of urban development in Africa (Trefon, 2009, Myers, 2010a). Instead of offering
an escape from poverty and vulnerability, reliance on informality may reflect little more than
survival of the poorest residents of the city (Myers, 2010b).
The next section we focus on elements of hybridity in three cities, Freetown, Sierra
Leone; Monrovia, Liberia; and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Rather than providing a complete
picture of the hybrid disaster context for each city—which would require more detail than
available in this article—the cases are designed as illustrative examples of how hybridity works
and demonstrate the utility of a hybrid governance conceptualization for disaster researchers.
The first case illustrates how hybridity as a result of a weak state shapes floods risks in Freetown
slums; the second demonstrates how hybridity may have been an essential form for the total
response to an Ebola outbreak in Monrovia; and the third explores how an intentional
management of hybridity could contribute to more resilient urban development in a fast-growing
Dar es Salaam.
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Hybridity in mitigation: flooding in the slums of Freetown
Flooding in the slums of Freetown, Sierra Leone is an example of the centrality of
hybridity in mitigating disaster risk and shows how deploying state-centric approaches can
undermine hybrid governance. Flooding is one of the main hazards that residents of the slums of
Freetown are exposed to (others include fires, landslides, and disease, such as cholera and
malaria). Several interacting human derived factors exacerbate flooding, including inadequate
drainage throughout the city, drainage clogged with solid waste, upstream deforestation and
other forms of environmental degradation, and extreme poverty and lack of access to basic
services (Clark-Ginsberg, 2017). The city’s hybrid governance structure—which arises in part as
an outcome of a state that is both unable and at times seemingly unwilling to fulfil its risk
management duties—shapes how flood risks are both created and mitigated. Yet for the state,
hybridity is mainly the cause of risk rather than a solution to managing risk.
The state tends to frame flooding in Freetown as a problem of state control and attempts
to reduce risk by enhancing control through solutions such as enforcing regulations and enacting
city-wide development plans. For instance, in the city’s 2019-2022 strategic plan, Transform
Freetown, describes Freetown as an “environmental timebomb” that is “threatened by a lack of
city planning” (Freetown City Council, 2019). The plan calls for “strictly enforcing zonal plan
and other appropriate regulations” (Ibid.) including building codes, settlement zoning plans,
logging and forestry regulations, and laws prohibiting illegal dumping. Thus, risk creation is
framed as caused by a lack of state control, with risk reduction involving enhanced state control
and moving toward formalized state-centered risk management approaches.
Freetown’s slums are the embodiments a lack of state control. These unplanned and
illegally constructed communities house an unknown number of the city’s residents, who eke out
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a precarious living in what are often highly hazardous locations. Their livelihoods, the services
they rely on, and the locations where they live are often products of actions outside the state,
rather than solely governed or conditioned by the state. Over the years the state has repeatedly
attempted—and often failed—to relocate residents living in slums that it designates ‘high risk’,
arguing that because of these risks, relocation to formalized settlements is the only real solution
to risk reduction. As a report written as part of the Freetown City Council’s EU funded 2011-
2014 Planning Project argues, settlements under four meters above sea level “must be resettled
as soon as possible” and that “Freetown City Council and the responsible national authorities
have to enforce development control” across the city (Frazer-Williams, 2014).
However, rather than merely being a feature in risk creation, informality is what allows
both the slums and the city of Freetown to function. Informality permeates the city as a whole:
upwards of 75% of residents of the city lives in informal settlements, informal labor accounts for
70% of labor force, and residents rely heavily on informal providers for key services such as
health (Macarthy and Conteh, 2018, Government of Sierra Leone, 2015). In what is a classic
form of hybrid interdependency, informal processes are integrally linked to formal systems,
creating a highly entangled system of formality and informality (Koroma et al., 2018).
Flood mitigation is also a hybrid mix of state and non-state actions, with households
relying not just on the services provided by the state but those of their friends and family,
neighbors, private sector companies, and NGOs. At household level residents of flood prone
areas engage in their own strategies to reduce risk, such as reinforcing walls and strengthening
the roofs of their homes, and controlling the water flows and relocating assets when floods hit
(Macarthy, 2012). At neighborhood level they participate in local risk management organizations
CODMERT, a community-based organization focused on disaster management (established by
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slum residents and the international NGO Concern Worldwide), and volunteer their time and
donate money for various mitigation projects (like cleaning waste from drainage channels).
When aligned with the formal laws and mandates of the state, these efforts are often supported
by other organizations including community-based organizations, national and international
NGOs, donors, the state itself.
The hybrid structures governing risk lead to highly differentiated risks for Freetown’s
residents. In the area of solid waste management, an issue crucial to flooding because of the
drainage problems that illegal dumping causes, higher density and high-income areas are served
by waste management companies, low density are served by private collectors, and low income
areas are not served. As a result, only approximately 20% waste is collected and disposed of
through official channels. It is the lack of formal waste collection that “encourages inhabitants to
dispose of their wastes in water courses, the ocean, drainage channels, vacant land and alongside
roads” (Abarca and de Vreede, 2013). However, informal waste disposal also permeates beyond
the realm of formal state practices, and is used for activities like land reclamation efforts in
coastal areas (Macarthy et al., 2018), which provide a highly-precarious but inexpensive place to
live close to livelihoods.
Minimizing the positive elements of hybridity in favor of state structures undermines the
role of non-state structures in mitigating risk and can contribute to flood risk, particularly for the
poorest residents of the slums who disproportionately rely on informal services. The state’s
efforts to relocate slum dwellers shows how attempts to move away from hybridity can create
risk. The state has identified an area on the outskirts of the city for relocation and justifies
relocation due to the high risk of certain slums and their illegality. Residents are opposed to
relocation and describe it as the greatest risk that they face because it can separate them from the
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livelihoods that they depend on (Clark-Ginsberg, 2017). Designating the slums as illegal and
high risk also allows for the denial of the provision of basic services in those areas, with the
argument being made that providing services only serves to incentivize settlement (Macarthy et
al., 2018, Clark-Ginsberg, 2017). As such, it is the lack of acknowledgement or perception of
hybridity that drives risk, with the illegality of the settlements and their informal relation to the
state as the major risk and driver.
The weaknesses of the state means that state-centric approaches are rarely successful.
With a budget of $22,000 per year, the city’s waste management is severely underfunded and
there is not enough manpower and resources to provide basic services. It is also highly unstable,
having transitioned through four different administrative structures since the end of Sierra
Leone’s civil war in 2004 (Gogra et al., 2010). It is currently incarnated as a public-private
partnership, in part due to budgetary limitations, but disputes between the state and private
service providers have disrupted waste management in the past (Sierra Express, 2017). Issues of
corruption and problems with transparency lead to high levels of distrust (Macarthy et al., 2018),
and can stymie attempts to raise additional tax revenue for waste management. Reflecting this
distrust, one slum resident involved in disaster management described how corruption was
“institutionalized into the culture” of the country. With these weaknesses, relying on both state
and nonstate actors appears to be the only viable strategy currently available for mitigating risk
in the city.
While state-centric approaches to managing risk have been the dominant approach,
contributing to disastrous accumulation of hazards and vulnerability for Freetown’s poorest
citizens, there appears to be growing movement toward hybridity. City officials also appears to
be moving toward a hybrid approach to risk management: while Freetown’s 2019-2022 strategic
15
plan identifies lack of formal control as a key risk driver, developing the plan involved extensive
consultation with stakeholders across Freetown and implementing the plan gives citizens a
central role. Freetown’s mayor, Yvonne Aki-Sawyer, has described how if “it’s new drains being
built, they’re providing the labor, if it’s carpentry and they have carpenters they’re doing the
carpentry work, anybody with the skills in that community gets involved in it” (Bagnetto, 2019).
Similarly, Sierra Leone’s president has enacted a nation-wide executive order to establish
monthly program 2018 that involves citizens in the cleaning process as part of broader efforts to
mitigate waste. Yet questions remain of to what extent these initiatives will fully engage with
hybrid structures shaping city life and place non-state forces at equal level with the state. Efforts
appear to fall back on top down centralized approaches that have been ineffective, short term,
and may disrupt current informal management efforts or create risk: failures to engage in waste
management efforts result in fines, and the mayoral efforts to mitigate risk appear to enlist locals
but do not address broader regulatory issues associated with designating the slums as illegal that
inhibit mitigation. As a result, while these initiatives might have immediate impact in the issues
that they seek to address, their long term sustainability is questionable, as is their ability to
mitigate the chances of creating harm elsewhere. While capitalizing on certain benefits of risk
reduction outside the state, such partial hybridity may still compromise existing hybrid processes
reducing risk in the city.
Hybridity in emergency response: Ebola in Monrovia, Liberia
When Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) reached Liberia’s capital city in 2014, the 1.2 million
residents of Monrovia could not rely on the state to protect them from contagion or treat them if
they fell ill. Liberia was (and remains) one of the world’s poorest countries and had one of the
16
world’s least functioning health systems (Downie, 2012). It was only 11 years since the end of
Liberia’s destructive 14-year-long civil war, and the country simply had nothing near the
capacity to prevent or respond to a pandemic. At the time the outbreak began, the West African
nation of 4.5 million people had only 90 doctors (Downie, 2012, p. 10). In fact, Liberia’s fragile
state is widely recognized as a primary cause of the epidemic (Quinn, 2016, Shoman et al., 2017,
Moon et al., 2015, Piot, 2014).
With such a weak health system in such a weak state, any successful response to the
EVD outbreak would necessarily involve many actors in addition to the Liberian government.
And, indeed, the response that did ultimately contain and eliminate the disease was a hybrid
effort involving the provision of treatment, supplies, prevention education, training, and other
goods and services from a wide range of actors representing multiple sectors, countries, and
scales. This case study briefly reviews some of the many actors that were involved in the
response to the pandemic in Monrovia, including the state, international NGOs, foreign
governments, and local leaders and communities.
Despite the severe weakness of the Liberian state, the Government of Liberia was “the
leader of the response” to EVD within its borders (Kirsch et al., 2017, Nyenswah et al., 2016).
Central to the government’s leadership was its responsiveness to the outbreak and willingness to
adapt state structures to meet the numerous challenges posed by the disease. For example, the
government’s response included existing bureaucratic organizations, such as the Ministry of
Health and Social Welfare (MOHSW), and the creation of new ones. The evolution of the newly
created structures reveals the government’s ability to adapt to the circumstances. MOHSW
established a national taskforce for Ebola response as a central coordination body. But once it
became clear that the outbreak was growing beyond the capacity of the actions of usual
17
government agencies, Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf established an incident
management system (IMS) to manage what was becoming a wide-ranging international effort
(Nyenswah et al., 2016). When it was further recognized that the response needed
decentralization to account for local conditions, the government created county-level Ebola
taskforces in each of Liberia’s fifteen counties, as well as an IMS with an emergency operations
center at the county level for Monrovia (Kirsch et al., 2017, p. 207-8). Yet the government’s role
in the response was not merely as a coordinator: it also provided direct services, such as
managing Ebola Treatment Units, which were often funded and/or built by other actors, and
training community-based educators. Finally, the Liberian government took steps that states are
uniquely suited to do, including sealing the country’s borders, closing all schools, quarantining
affected areas, and securing international financial commitments (Kirsch et al., 2017, p. 207-8).
The government’s response, however, was not nearly sufficient to deal with the scale of
the outbreak, and its capacity to provide health services was quickly overwhelmed. As a result,
much of the medical treatment was provided by international NGOs. One of the most important
providers, especially in the early months of the outbreak, was the international humanitarian
organization Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF). In addition to treating patients and working to
prevent EVD’s spread, MSF was the loudest voice of alarm trying to alert the international
community to the severity of the outbreak. Over time, many other international NGOs joined
MSF in Liberia, including Samaritan’s Purse, Mercy Corps, Save the Children, and International
Medical Corps, and established, supplied, and operated ETUs; trained health workers and
educators; organized community mobilization campaigns; and much more (Health
Communication Capacity Collaborative (HC3), 2017, Kirsch et al., 2017).
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Foreign governments, particularly the United States, played a crucial role in responding
to Ebola. During the outbreak, the U.S. government provided $1 billion in emergency aid to
Liberia. Most important, however, was the manpower that the U.S. supplied. Experts from U.S.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention took part in response activities such as disease
surveillance, epidemiological analysis, laboratory verification of infection, and providing
technical support to the Liberian government (Kirsch et al., 2017, p. 207). The U.S. military also
played a vital role. According to one assessment, “a full catastrophe was only averted” by the
actions of the U.S. military (Morrison and Streifel, 2015). In what was the first major military
deployment for disease control during peacetime (Piot et al., 2014), nearly 3,000 U.S. troops
built Ebola Treatment Units and trained Liberian health workers. While it eschewed direct
medical care, the military’s logistical capabilities in a crisis zone were unparalleled and the U.S.
military presence was symbolically important and provided a much-needed moral boost
(Kamradt-Scott et al., 2015, p. 13-14).
Yet, despite the attention given to international military and civilian personnel who
came to Liberia to treat Ebola and stop its spread, the outbreak would not have ended without the
efforts of the local communities affected by the disease (Abramowitz et al., 2015, Health
Communication Capacity Collaborative (HC3), 2017, Kirsch et al., 2017, Quinn, 2016).
Government and international responders learned this themselves after many of their initial
strategies failed to gain support among a population that, after years of violence and misrule, was
deeply distrustful of state institutions (Blair et al., 2017). Thus the response turned toward using
local communal organizations and local leaders, including traditional leaders, to gain buy-in
from citizens. Community leaders and community-based health educators, with the support of
the government and/or NGOs, worked to raise awareness of EVD among community members
19
and teach people the proper procedures to prevent infection and stop its spread. Success,
however, required that community members themselves comply with stringent and often onerous
behavioral changes, such as safe burial procedures that disrupted traditional mourning rituals.
This individual behavioral change, which was increased significantly by community-led
mobilizations, was crucial to ending the outbreak (Kirsch et al., 2017).
In some localities, community and individual responses were, in fact, the only option
available. Abramowitz et al. (2015, p. 3). describe the stark reality: “In a context in which health
surveillance systems had failed, healthcare workers were experiencing disproportionately high
mortality rates due to Ebola infection, clinics and hospitals across Liberia were shut down, and
the construction of hospitals and Ebola Treatments Units could not keep pace with demand,
communities were compelled to generate solutions of their own.” The Monrovia neighborhoods
in their study, for instance, established their own methods for EVD prevention, including
excluding outsiders from entering, forming local task forces to ensure that outsiders do not enter,
and establishing block watch teams to monitor and report on health conditions in a set of
households. Importantly, Abramowitz et al. (2015, p. 9) emphasize that these efforts “must not
be mistaken as an indication of community political, medical, or social empowerment or
institution-building.” While many accounts of community-led service provision view it as a way
to rebut marginalization, the authors argue that, at least in the case of EVD in Monrovia:
“The communities were not empowered, they were desperate and often
abandoned. They found resources from within their communities to compensate
for the collective failure of state and international institutions to implement
systems of surveillance, treatment, and response. What we are observing here is a
20
community-based response to a condition of medical statelessness and structural
violence.”
The total response to the Ebola outbreak in Monrovia and throughout Liberia was hybrid
to its core. It was the joint effort of institutions, organizations, and individuals from many
different sectors and countries—“truly global” and characterized by an “unprecedented level of
international collaboration and cooperation” (Coltart et al., 2017, p. 18). These various actors—
state and non-state, domestic and international—contributed their skills, knowledge, and
resources toward ending the epidemic in West Africa. And while some of the efforts were more
impactful than others, one evaluation concludes, “It seems likely that interventions had
reinforcing effects on each other” (Kirsch et al., 2017, p. 212).
Hybridity in disaster risk creation and mitigation: urban development in Dar es Salaam,
Tanzania
The settlement of the Msimbazi River Basin in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania illustrates two
forms of hybrid governance arrangements that have resulted in somewhat opposing trajectories
for risk over time, demonstrating how state and non-state actors can orient and reorient to affect
different risk outcomes. First, since the 1980s, an unintended gradual hybridity in land use has
contributed to risk creation as settlement in the region has occurred alongside poor planning and
weak regulation by formal actors, such as the state. Second, since 2017, an urban resilience
program in response to unusually severe flood events has initiated intentional management of
hybrid governance structures as a central framing for planning risk mitigation. We will examine
the sequential hybrid arrangements by tracing interactions between different actors, decision-
making processes, and risk trajectories through the history of settlement in the region.
21
Comparing different features and context for the two arrangements helps understand the
significance in how trajectories and outcomes play out. Unique to the other cases, this case
demonstrates an eventual intentional coordination of hybridity.
Dar es Salaam is currently the second fastest growing city in Africa with a rate of
urbanization that has increased from 5% in the 1960s to 33% in 2017 (SHLC, 2018). Policies in
the 1970s emphasized rural, almost anti-urban, village development, until the global economic
crisis of the 1980s stirred economic structural adjustments and liberalization, paving a way for
urbanization (Peter and Yang, 2019). While other regional capitals began attracting migrants in
the 1990s, it was not until the 2000s that Dar es Salaam started to absorb the majority of urban
populations (Ibid.). With that, the city’s dramatic growth can partly be attributed to a massive
and recent rural-to-urban migration as people have been responding to insufficient services and
low agricultural productivity in rural areas with an expectation of finding economic opportunity
and a better quality of life in urban areas (SHLC, 2018). Despite this trend, little has been done
to integrate migrants into the city and accommodate population growth, giving rise to “turbo-
urbanization,” or rapid and unregulated urban growth (Muggah, 2015).
Formal land management in Dar es Salaam is extremely centralized by the Ministry of
Lands, which has not been able to keep up with the demand for land management as people
move to the city (Wolff et al., 2018). In addition, according to government statistics, there are
only 2.6 million formal jobs for the 60 million people across Tanzania, and more than half of
those workers cannot afford to live in formal housing (Rosen, 2019). Residents of Dar es Salaam
have responded to these circumstances by creating and engaging in alternative forms of land
transactions (Wolff et al., 2018, Kironde, 2016). More than 75% of residents in Dar es Salaam
currently live in informal settlements. The role of the state has been curtailed in how and what
22
land has been settled, essentially limiting its options for managing this land to the thorny task of
repossession through eviction and demolition campaigns (Kironde, 2016). Settlement
development has, therefore, manifested in unchecked crowding, low economic density, and vast
informality.
A set of such settlements can be found in the Msimbazi River Basin section of Dar es
Salaam, which is home to 22% of the city’s residents and suffers some of the most severe
flooding in the city (World Bank, 2019). Seven out of the last ten years since 2009 have
witnessed rainy seasons in which residents experienced unusually high amounts of flooding
(World Bank, 2018). In response, in 2018 the Government of Tanzania, with support from the
World Bank and the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development, undertook a
participatory design process to understand the complexity of the flood risk, how individuals and
communities were responding, and develop a plan for reducing and managing risk, initiating the
Tanzania Urban Resilience Program. Demonstrating elements of hybrid governance, the design
process and implementation of this program appear to emphasize roles, responsibilities, and
collaboration across several kinds of actors. These include national and local government
agencies, NGOs, private sector investors and consultants, Ardhi University, the World Bank, and
slum residents and communities themselves.
Even before implementation, the Tanzania Urban Resilience Program uncovered the
strength of governance mechanisms and social networks in the settlements, particularly among
those that have lived in the settlements for longer periods of time. One study found community
participation in local government is high with “dense areas networks of mutual aid,” including
ujirani mwema community groups and upatu microfinance associations (World Bank, 2018).
These networks appear to play a crucial role in flood mitigation. For instance, of the households
23
affected by the October 2017 flood, 36% self-reported an inability to recover a year later (World
Bank, 2018). Compared to other households, these unrecovered households moved to the area
more recently. This could imply an effect by fewer social connections and resources and
information to prepare and navigate the effects of the disaster.
While informal governance and social networks have been important features in the local
context and dynamics of the settlements, the program also found that community leaders have
not felt fully equipped to manage and mitigate risk in the Msimbazi (World Bank, 2018). In
some cases, for example, social networks themselves have been vulnerable as flood impacts have
separated families in resettlement affecting mental wellbeing In some cases, for example, social
networks themselves have also been vulnerable to disaster, as flood impacts have separated
families in resettlement affecting mental wellbeing (University College London, 2017, John,
2011, Gastinger et al., 2017). In addition, community responses to floods have been relatively
simple, and vary based on their unique perceptions of risk. For example, one World Bank survey
found that “when water is below the knee, actions tend to involve safeguarding possessions and
facilitating the flow of water, [and when] water is above the knee, temporary evacuation is the
preferred response” (2018). Flood events disrupt the already precarious nature of lives in the
settlements, affecting mobility and connectivity to jobs, schools, and services (Centre for
Community Intiatives, 2016, John, 2011, Gastinger et al., 2017); causing injuries, high
incidences of water-borne illnesses, and deaths (Centre for Community Intiatives, 2016, Leal
Filho et al., 2018, Mboera et al., 2011); and damaged infrastructure and housing (Centre for
Community Intiatives, 2016, Leal Filho et al., 2018, Mboera et al., 2011). An inherent lack of
critical resources and education also influence residents to resort to improper watershed
management by partaking in deforestation and clogging drainage systems with poor habits for
24
waste disposal. These activities are leading to increased flood hazards (Sakijege et al., 2012). In
this way, factors that make households vulnerable to the effects of flood are also contributing to
the growth of flood hazards around the informal settlements.
The Tanzania Urban Resilience Program emphasizes concepts of hybridity in its efforts
to study local context and engage with actors at all levels in the creation of disaster risk
knowledge for the Msimbazi. For example, to understand the morphology of the river,
consultants hired by the program use participatory risk assessment techniques engage locals in
data collection and raise awareness about risks. Further, the program developed a digital
elevation model for flood-hazard mapping, using surveys from the Ministry of Lands and
geospatial data in collaboration with the European Space Agency. With the help of slum
residents and the humanitarian NGO OpenStreetMap Team, these maps are being made useful
for various stakeholders, including for residents and various levels of government for everyday
use and for external partners in case of future emergencies (World Bank, 2018). By locating
critical facilities, such as health centers, the maps are intended to make it possible to track
patients back to contamination sources of cholera and waterborne diseases that have otherwise
historically been challenging to control in past flood seasons, providing partners such as the
Ministry of Health with valuable information to respond to and mitigate risk (Ibid.). In addition
to maximizing its understanding of local context, the program is enlisting a range of actors to
increase local capacity to reduce risk, as well as spread benefits to more actors.
The resilience initiative in the Msimbazi Basin is ongoing and has encountered political
and social challenges in its first two years related to balancing top-down and bottom-up input
and central and marginal voices. For example, with the Ministry of Land, the resilience
program’s implementers are making a concerted effort to work to ensure that plan
25
development will align with the ministry’s plans for the Msimbazi special planning zone (World
Bank, 2018). The hybrid approach offered by the resilience program, therefore, has the potential
to offer an opportunity for state actors to understand and re-engage with the local non-state
actors, despite past exclusionary decision-making processes. Further, relationships between the
formal and informal actors can change over the course of the project, with the second hybrid
approach an emergent outcome of the first.
The case of the risk management in the Msimbazi River Basin demonstrates how
different forms of hybrid governance have the potential to create or reduce risk. These different
forms of hybrid governance contrasted in their mechanisms for interaction across actors, the
nature of competition or cooperation among actors, and how risk is or is not intentionally
managed. In the past, unstructured hybrid governance has resulted in unplanned, informal
development that has gradually contributed to the risk that exists in these settlements today. As
the Tanzania Urban Resilience Program unfolds, however, there is an attempt to pursue another
kind of hybrid governance by harmonizing old and introducing new actors and with an explicit
intention of reducing risk.
Discussion and conclusion
In this article, we provide a basis for applying hybridity in the field of disasters. Using a
combination of literature review and case studies, we show why a hybrid governance perspective
matters for disaster scholarship. Among the reasons for its application is, first, hybridity is a
common phenomenon. Particularly but not exclusively in places where the state is weak,
governance related to the provision of goods and services is a hybrid product of formal and
informal processes. Approaching such situations with a hybrid governance framework in mind
illuminates crucial aspects of this ground-level reality. For instance, it highlights the broad
26
spectrum of providers that local populations rely on, from state entities to nonstate actors like
NGOs and customary authorities.
Second, a hybrid governance perspective helps emphasize the interactions of the many
actors down to the local level. In some cases, these interactions can increase risk, while in others
they might decrease risk. Such understanding that risk is an outcome of highly localized
activities amount to a methodological implication for understanding disaster governance: the
importance of contextual knowledge of local systems and processes. It is not enough to make
broad statements on the role of the state, communities, and NGOs; instead the roles of these
entities must be understood in context, both to each other and to the broader environment.
Altogether, the hybrid governance framework offers disaster scholars and managers a way to
better approach the actually existing governance provisions in the places they work or intervene.
The cases studies illustrate elements of hybridity in action in three urban settings in sub-
Saharan Africa. Across the cases, the state is either unwilling or lacks the capacity to implement
robust disaster management. From this hybridity transpires as state and non-state actors – local
individuals and communities, international organizations, NGOs – converge to shape risk. The
relationships between state and non-state actors across are incredibly varied across the cases and
change over the course of time. In some instances, the state works closely or even relies on non-
state actors to reduce risk, while in others it seeks to impose a state-centric order, emphasizing
how non-state activities, often those that are undertaken by local individuals and communities, as
a source of risk. However, in all three cases, nonstate actors and their informal activities play an
important role in addressing risk. When their activities are ignored or attempts are made to
subsume them into formal institutional structures in attempts to reduce risk, those attempts can
27
compromise existing risk management processes upon which local populations otherwise rely on
to mitigate vulnerability and reduce hazards.
The fact that interventions in hybrid situations can fail if they do not account for
hybridity points to the need to apply a hybrid governance framework when seeking to identify,
plan for, and manage disaster risk. While the UN describes disaster risk reduction as “everyone’s
responsibility” and FEMA focuses on a “whole of community approach” to risk management,
there is a need to deeply engage with what localized contexts mean and how state and local non-
state actors relate in particular places. Governance structures are not monolithic but are rather
heterogeneous and highly site specific, with different residents experiencing different levels of
hybridity and being exposed to risk creation and reduction in different ways. To that end, rather
than assuming that hybridity is everywhere and functions universally in the same way (e.g., the
reverse of governance as government assumptions about the universality of the strong state)
efforts should focus on uncovering and cataloging the localized conditions under which hybridity
occurs, and how it functions to reduce or address risk (see, e.g., (Post et al., 2017)). This requires
broad theorization and further empirical inquiry.
While we argue that hybridity is prevalent across disaster management, there is still
ambiguity as to how to reduce risk in hybrid contexts. When hybridity was engaged with and
supported in our three cases, stakeholders seemed to be able to reduce risk. However, these
might be examples less of successful risk reduction, and more of efforts to support the survival
of marginalized individuals, since, across the three cases hybridity emerged as a response to
extreme marginalization and vulnerability. Since these three cases are examples of hybridity in
response to the abandonment or a lack of provision of services by the state, it is unclear whether
hybridity can be capitalized on and used for empowerment and thriving, or if it merely represents
28
another tool for survival. Future work should focus on how to govern and work within hybrid
structures to reduce risk, the tools that could provide use for governing hybrid spaces, and the
conditions that are needed for hybrid modes of governance to effectively reduce risk and prevent
disaster creation.
Hybrid governance is a global phenomenon that features in many places, not just cities in
sub-Saharan Africa. Given that hybrid governance is often a response to a lack of robust state
structures, it likely exists in the 70% of states that contain significant areas of limited statehood
(Risse and Stollenwerk, 2018, p. 406). But the hybrid provision of services even takes place in
wealthy societies and strong states. In the United States, for example, some wealthier citizens are
supplementing state-run fire departments with private fire fighters to combat wildfires (Madrigal,
2018), and most critical infrastructure is owned and operated outside the state and is often
governed through a combination of formal and legally binding regulations, private sector
regulations driven by industry, and cultural norms and practices (Clark-Ginsberg and Slayton,
2018). Additional research should explore issues of hybrid governance around the world and
examine how it arises and is managed, and what effect it has on the creation and reduction of risk
in these different contexts.
29
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