People vs Marti

On August 14, 1987, the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes went to Manila Packaging and Export Forwarders to send packages to Zurich, Switzerland. It was received by Anita Reyes and ask if she could inspect the packages. Shirley refused and eventually convinced Anita to seal the package making it ready for shipment. Be-fore being sent out for delivery, Job Reyes, husband of Anita and proprietor of the courier company, conducted an inspection of the package as part of standard operating procedures. Upon opening the package, he noticed a suspicious odor which made him took sample of the substance he found inside. He reported this to the NBI and invited agents to his office to inspect the package. In the presence of the NBI agents, Job Reyes opened the suspicious package and found dried-marijuana leaves inside. A case was filed against Andre Marti in violation of R.A. 6425 and was found guilty by the court a quo. Andre filed an appeal in the Supreme Court claiming that his constitutional right of privacy was violated and that the evidence acquired from his package was inadmissi -ble as evidence against him.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE ILLEGALLY SEARCHED AND SEIZED OBJECTS CONTAINED IN THE FOUR PARCELS.

Appellant contends that the evidence subject of the imputed offense had been obtained in violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure and pri-vacy of communication (Sec. 2 and 3, Art. III, Constitution) and therefore argues that the same should be held inadmissible in evidence (Sec. 3 (2), Art. III).

The Supreme Court held based on the speech of Commissioner Bernas that the Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the state.

The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the en-forcement of the law. It is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals. It will be recalled that Mr Job Reyes was the one who opened the box in the presence of the NBI agents in his place of business. The mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Mr. Reyes into a warrantless search and siezure proscribed by the constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search.

The judgement of conviction finding appeallant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged was AFFIRMED.

Waterous drug corporation v. NLRCFacts:Respondent Antonia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by petitioner Waterous Drug Corporation. She received two memorandums: the Vice President warned her not to

dispense medicine to employees chargeable to the latter’s accounts because the same was a prohibited practice; and not to negotiate with suppliers of medicine without con-sulting the Purchasing Department, as this would impair the company’s control of pur-chases and, besides she was not authorized to deal directly with the suppliers.As regards the first memorandum, Catolico did not deny her responsibility but explained that her act was “due to negligence,” since fellow employee Irene Soliven “obtained the medicines in bad faith and through misrepresentation when she claimed that she was given a charge slip by the Admitting Dept.” Catolico then asked the company to look into the fraudulent activities of Soliven. In another memorandum, the company’s supervisor warned Catolico against the “rush delivery of medicines without the proper documents.”The company’s control clerk noticed an irregularity involving Catolico and Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals(YSP) that under the Purchase order with YSP Sales Invoice purchase of 10 bottles of Voren tablets at P384 per unit when it was showed to be only P320. This was paid to the respondent through a checkCatolico, through her counsel, explained that the check she received from YSP was a Christmas gift and not a “refund of overprice.” She also averred that the preventive sus-pension was ill-motivated, as it sprang from an earlier incident between her and Co’s secretary, Irene Soliven. But, the company’s supervisor notified respondent’s termina-tion.Labor Arbiter-In favor of respondent, because petitioners failed to “prove what [they] al-leged as complainant’s dishonesty. Hence, the dismissal was without just cause and due process.NLRC-affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter on the ground that petitioners were not able to prove a just cause for Catolico’s dismissal from her employment.

Issues:1)Whether or not Catolico erred in applying Section 3, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution2)Whether or not respondent was illegally dismissed.

Held1) Yes. As regards the constitutional violation upon which the NLRC anchored its deci-sion, we find no reason to revise the doctrine laid down in People vs. Marti that the Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpe-trated by private individuals. It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citi -zens have no recourse against such assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel ad-mits, such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities.2) Yes. It is evident from the Supervisor’s memorandum that Catolico was dismissed because of an alleged anomalous transaction with YSP. Unfortunately for petitioners, their evidence does not establish that there was an overcharge. It is settled that the bur-den is on the employer to prove just and valid cause for dismissing an employee, and its failure to discharge that burden would result in a finding that the dismissal is unjusti -fied.Here, WATEROUS proved unequal to the task.Despite the memorandum warning Catolico not to negotiate with suppliers of medicine, there was no proof that she ever transacted, or that she had the opportunity to transact, with the said suppliers. Again, as the purchase orders indicate, Catolico was not at all

involved in the sale of the Voren tablets. There was no occasion for Catolico to initiate, much less benefit from, what Valdez called an “under the table deal” with YSP.

Zalueta v. Court of Appeals*Facts: Petitioner Cecilia Zalueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. The petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine. She forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband’s clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between private respondent and his alleged paramours, greet-ings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, private respondent’s passport, and photographs, in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent’s secretary. The docu-ments and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her hus-band. Private respondent brought an action for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against petitioner. The RTC rendered judgment in favor or private re -spondent, declaring him the capital/exclusive owner of properties described and order-ing petitioner to return the properties to him and pay him nominal and moral damages and attorneys fees, and cost of the suit. Furthermore, petitioner and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from using or submitting or admitting as evidence the documents and papers in question. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court.*Issue: Whether or not the documents and papers in question are admissible in evi-dence.*Held: The documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The consti-tutional injunction declaring “the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable” is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself ag-grieved by her husband’s infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional pro-vision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a “lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.” Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained in-admissible “for any purpose in any proceeding.” The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by con-tracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. The law insures abso-lute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other. Petition de-nied.

Gamboa vs ChanFacts: On 8 December 2009, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Admin-istrative Order No. 275 (A.O. 275), “Creating an Independent Commission to Address

the Alleged Existence of Private Armies in the Country.”7 The body, which was later on referred to as the Zeñarosa Commission,8was formed to investigate the existence of private army groups (PAGs) in the country with a view to eliminating them before the 10 May 2010 elections and dismantling them permanently in the future.9Upon the conclu-sion of its investigation, the Zeñarosa Commission released and submitted to the Office of the President a confidential report entitled “A Journey Towards H.O.P.E.: The Inde-pendent Commission Against Private Armies’ Report to the President” (the Report).Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP–Ilocos Norte) conducted a series of surveillance operations against her and her aides, and classified her as someone who keeps a PAG. Purportedly without the benefit of data verification, PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded the information gathered on her to the Zeñarosa Commis-sion, thereby causing her inclusion in the Report’s enumeration of individuals maintain-ing PAGs.ABS-CBN broadcasted on its evening news program the portion of the Report naming Gamboa as one of the politicians alleged to be maintaining a PAG, and as a result, she claimed that her malicious or reckless inclusion in the enumeration of personalities maintaining a PAG as published in the Report also made her, as well as her supporters and other people identified with her, susceptible to harassment and police surveillance operations.Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and de-stroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition dated 9 July 2010 for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against respondents in their capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte. In their Return of the Writ, respondents alleged that they had acted within the bounds of their mandate in conducting the investigation and surveillance of Gamboa. The information stored in their database supposedly pertained to two criminal cases in which she was implicated, namely: (a) a Complaint for murder and frustrated murder and (b) a Com-plaint for murder, frustrated murder and direct assault upon a person in authority, as well as indirect assault and multiple attempted murder. Respondents likewise asserted that the Petition was incomplete for failing to comply with the following requisites under the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data: (a) the manner in which the right to privacy was vi-olated or threatened with violation and how it affected the right to life, liberty or security of Gamboa; (b) the actions and recourses she took to secure the data or information; and (c) the location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information. They also con-tended that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Data, being limited to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, was not the proper remedy to address the al -leged besmirching of the reputation of Gamboa. The RTC nevertheless dismissed the Petition on the ground that Gamboa failed to prove through substantial evidence that the subject information originated from respondents, and that they forwarded this data-base to the Zeñarosa Commission without the benefit of prior verification. The trial court also ruled that even before respondents assumed their official positions, information on her may have already been acquired. Finally, it held that the Zeñarosa Commission, as the body tasked to gather information on PAGs and authorized to disclose information on her, should have been impleaded as a necessary if not a compulsory party to the Pe-tition. Gamboa the filed an Appeal by Certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in ruling that the Zeñarosa Commission be im-pleaded as either a necessary or indispensable party; 2. The trial court erred in declaring that [Gamboa] failed to present sufficient proof to link respondents as the informant to the Zeñarosa Commission; 3. The trial court failed to satisfy the spirit of Habeas Data; 4. The trial court erred in pronouncing that the reliance of the Zeñarosa Commission to [sic] the PNP as alleged by [Gamboa] is an assumption; 5. The trial court erred in making a point that respondents are distinct to PNP as an agency.Held: In determining whether Gamboa should be granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data, this Court is called upon to, first, unpack the concept of the right to pri -vacy; second, explain the writ of habeas data as an extraordinary remedy that seeks to protect the right to informational privacy; and finally, contextualize the right to privacy vis-à-vis the state interest involved in the case at bar.The Writ of Habeas DataThe writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy.49 It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.50 It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data reads: Habeas data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omis-sion of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.The notion of informational privacy is still developing in Philippine law and jurispru-dence. Considering that even the Latin American habeas data, on which our own Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data is rooted, finds its origins from the European tradition of data protection,51 this Court can be guided by cases on the protection of personal data decided by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). In the case of Leander vs Sweden, the ECHR ruled that the storage in the secret police register of information re-lating to the private life of Leander, coupled with the refusal to allow him the opportunity to refute the same, amounted to an interference in his right to respect for private life.57 However, the ECHR held that the interference was justified on the following grounds: (a) the personnel control system had a legitimate aim, which was the protection of national security,58 and (b) the Personnel Control Ordinance gave the citizens adequate indica-tion as to the scope and the manner of exercising discretion in the collection, recording and release of information by the authorities. Leander illustrates how the right to infor-mational privacy, as a specific component of the right to privacy, may yield to an over-riding legitimate state interest. In similar fashion, the determination of whether the privi -lege of the writ of habeas data, being an extraordinary remedy, may be granted in this

case entails a delicate balancing of the alleged intrusion upon the private life of Gamboa and the relevant state interest involved.The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and other armed groups not recognized by the duly constituted authority.60 It also provides for the estab-lishment of one police force that is national in scope and civilian in character, and is controlled and administered by a national police commission.61Taking into account these constitutional fiats, it is clear that the issuance of A.O. 275 articulates a legitimate state aim, which is to investigate the existence of PAGs with the ultimate objective of dismantling them permanently. To enable the Zeñarosa Commission to achieve its goals, A.O. 275 clothed it with the powers of an investigative body, including the power to summon witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the in-vestigation and use compulsory processes to produce documents, books, and records.62 A.O. 275 likewise authorized the Zeñarosa Commission to deputize the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the National Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Justice, the PNP, and any other law enforcement agency to assist the commission in the performance of its functions.This Court holds that Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish that the data contained in the Report listing her as a PAG coddler came from the PNP. Contrary to the ruling of the trial court, however, the forwarding of information by the PNP to the Zeñarosa Com-mission was not an unlawful act that violated or threatened her right to privacy in life, lib-erty or security. The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share intelligence re-garding PAGs with the body specifically created for the purpose of investigating the ex-istence of these notorious groups. Moreover, the Zeñarosa Commission was explicitly authorized to deputize the police force in the fulfillment of the former’s mandate, and thus had the power to request assistance from the latter. In this case, respondents admitted the existence of the Report, but emphasized its con-fidential nature. That it was leaked to third parties and the media was regrettable, even warranting reproach. But it must be stressed that Gamboa failed to establish that re-spondents were responsible for this unintended disclosure. In any event, there are other reliefs available to her to address the purported damage to her reputation, making a re-sort to the extraordinary remedy of the writ of habeas data unnecessary and improper. Finally, this Court rules that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial evidence that her inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs made her and her support -ers susceptible to harassment and to increased police surveillance. In this regard, re-spondents sufficiently explained that the investigations conducted against her were in relation to the criminal cases in which she was implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the presumption of regularity, which she failed to overcome. It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when the col-lection and forwarding by the PNP of information against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data must be denied.

OPOSA VS FACTORAN

In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of “inter-generational responsibility” and “inter-generational justice.” Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to “prevent the mis-appropriation or impairment” of Philippine rainforests and “arrest the unabated hemor-rhage of the country’s vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth.”FACTS:the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents, and the philippine ecological network Inc. (Peni) a domestic, non stock and non profit corporation and engage in the activities of promoting the protection of our environ-ment and natural resources. The complaint was instituted as a tax payer’s class suit and alleges that plaintiffs “are all citizens of the republic of the philippines, taxpayer, and en-titled to the full benefit, use and employment of the natural resource erasure that is the country’s virgin tropical forest”.Petitioner prayed for that judgement be rendered ordering defendant to Cancel all exist-ing timber license agreements in the country; Cease and desist from receiving, accept-ing, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs, and granting the plaintiffs such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises. The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be found. These rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and flourished since time immemorial. Scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses. The distortion and disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmentaltragedies. And that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and defor-estation in the Philiipines are socapable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial noticethe original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government. On 18 July 1991, Makati RTC is-sued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss. In the said order, not only wasthe defendant's claim : that the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question. sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is pro-hibited by the fundamental law of the land.Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Re -vised Rules of Court and asked the Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order

on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action.Issue:WON the petitioners have a cause of action to prevent the impairment of the Philippine rain-forests and arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country’s vital life support sys-tems and continued rape of mother earth.WON the original prayer of plaintiff result in the impairment of contracts.HELD:The complaint focuses on one fundamental legal right “the right to a balanced and healthful ecology” which is incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The said right carries with it the duty to refrain from impairing the environment and implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the DENR to be the primary govern-ment agency responsible for the governing and supervising the exploration, utilization, development and conservation of the country's natural resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is also substantially re-stated in Title XIV Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's duty to protect and advance the said right.The case at bar is a common interest to all Filipinos. the right to a balnced and healthful ecology which carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environ-ment. A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obli-gation to respect or protect or respect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petition-ers maintain that the granting of the TLA, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balance and healthful ecology. Hence, the full pro-tection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.**The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which the state regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. It is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause thus, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked. It can be validly withdraw whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case. The granting of license does not cre-ate irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights.Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limit by the exercise by the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare. In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the State.

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL. FACTS:

Towards environmental protection and ecology, navigational safety, and sustainable de-velopment, Republic Act No. 4850 created the "Laguna Lake Development Authority." This Government Agency is supposed to carry out and effectuate the aforesaid declared policy, so as to accelerate the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces, cities and towns, in the act clearly named, within the context of the national and regional plans and policies for social and economic de-velopment.Then Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991 was enacted. The municipalities in the Laguna Lake Region interpreted the provisions of this law to mean that the newly passed law gave municipal governments the exclusive jurisdiction to is-sue fishing privileges within their municipal waters. Municipal governments thereupon assumed the authority to issue fishing privileges and fishpen permits. Big fishpen opera-tors took advantage of the occasion to establish fishpens and fishcages to the conster -nation of the Authority. Unregulated fishpens and fishcages increased. The implementa-tion by the lakeshore municipalities of separate independent policies in the operation of fishpens and fishcages within their claimed territorial municipal waters in the lake and their indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits have already saturated the lake area with fishpens, thereby aggravating the current environmental problems and ecological stress of Laguna Lake.In view of the foregoing circumstances, the Authority served notice to the general public that all fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in the Laguna de Bay Re-gion, which were not registered or to which no application for registration and/or permit has been filed with Laguna Lake Development Authority are declared as illegal. The owners of these illegal fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures shall have one (1) month on or before 27 October 1993 to show cause before the LLDA why their said fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures should not be demolished/dismantled.One month, thereafter, the Authority sent notices to the concerned owners of the ille-gally constructed fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising them to dismantle their respective structures within 10 days from receipt thereof, otherwise, de-molition shall be effected.Reacting thereto, the affected fishpen owners filed injunction cases against the Author-ity before various regional trial courts. The Authority filed motions to dismiss the cases against it on jurisdictional grounds. The motions to dismiss were invariably denied. Meanwhile, temporary restraining order/writs of preliminary mandatory injunction were issued enjoining the Authority from demolishing the fishpens and similar structures in question.Petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction were filed by the Authority with the Supreme Court. By SC’s resolution, the Authority's consolidated petitions were referred to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed the Authority's consolidated petitions, the Court of Appeals holding that: (A) LLDA is not among those quasi-judicial agencies of government whose decision or order are appealable only to the Court of Appeals; (B) the LLDA charter does vest LLDA with quasi-judicial functions insofar as fishpens are concerned; (C) the provisions of the LLDA charter insofar as fishing privi-leges in Laguna de Bay are concerned had been repealed by the Local Government

Code of 1991; (D) in view of the aforesaid repeal, the power to grant permits devolved to and is now vested with their respective local government units concerned.ISSUE:I. Which agency of the Government — the Laguna Lake Development Authority or the towns and municipalities comprising the region — should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery privileges is concerned?II. Whether or not LLDA is a quasi-judicial agency?HELD:I. We hold that the provisions of Republic Act No. 7160 do not necessarily repeal the aforementioned laws creating the Laguna Lake Development Authority and granting the latter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake region.It has to be conceded that the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority con-stitutes a special law. Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, is a general law. It is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation which is a general law cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, the special statute should pre-vail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general statute. The spe-cial law is to be taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of special cir -cumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. This is because implied repeals are not fa-vored and as much as possible, effect must be given to all enactments of the legisla-ture. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication. Considering the reasons behind the establishment of the Authority, which are environ-mental protection, navigational safety, and sustainable development, there is every indi-cation that the legislative intent is for the Authority to proceed with its mission.The power of the local government units to issue fishing privileges was clearly granted for revenue purposes. This is evident from the fact that Section 149 of the New Local Government Code empowering local governments to issue fishing permits is embodied in Chapter 2, Book II, of Republic Act No. 7160 under the heading, "Specific Provisions On The Taxing And Other Revenue Raising Power Of Local Government Units."On the other hand, the power of the Authority to grant permits for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures is for the purpose of effectively regulating and moni-toring activities in the Laguna de Bay region (Section 2, Executive Order No. 927) and for lake quality control and management. It does partake of the nature of police power which is the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of all State powers including the power of taxation. Accordingly, the charter of the Authority which embodies a valid exercise of police power should prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.There should be no quarrel over permit fees for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-cul-ture structures in the Laguna de Bay area. Section 3 of Executive Order No. 927 pro-vides for the proper sharing of fees collected.Thus, the Authority has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities situated therein and the authority to exercise such powers as are by its charter vested on it.

II. Pursuant to Section 4 of Republic Act No. 4850 and Section 4 of Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, while it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an ad-ministrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers. In the exercise, therefore, of its express powers under its charter, as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease and desist order" is, perforce, im-plied.WHEREFORE, the petitions for prohibition, certiorari and injunction are hereby granted, insofar as they relate to the authority of the Laguna Lake Development Authority to grant fishing privileges within the Laguna Lake Region.

Mmda vs concerned residents of Manila bayFacts:- resp filed a complaint before the Rtc imus cavite against pet for clean up, rehabilitation and protection of the Manila bay- complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila bay had fallen way below the al -lowable standards set by law specifically pd 1152 or ph environment code - prayed that pet be ordered to clean the Manila bay- Rtc ordered pet to cleanup and rehabilitate Manila bay- pet argue that the pertinent provisions of the environment code relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in generAl and that the cleaning of the Manila bay is not a ministerial act which can be compelled by man-damus- ca sustained Rtc; stressing that tc's dec did not require pet to do tasks outside of their usual basic functions under existing lawsIssue:1. Can pet be compelled by mandamus to cleanup and rehabilitate the Manila bay?2. Do secs 17 and 20 of pd 1152 envisage a cleanup in general or are they limited only to the cleanup of specific pollution incidents?Held:1. The cleaning or rehabilitation of Manila bay can be compelled by mandamus - pet's obligations to perform their duties as defined by law on one hand and how they are to carry out such duties on the other are two different concepts. While the imple-mentation of the mmda's mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the en-forcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministe-rial in nature and can be compelled by mandamus-mmda's duty to put up an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal systems is ministerial, its duty being a statutory imposition. - any suggestion that the mmda has the option whether or not to perform its solid waste disposal-related duties ought to be dismissed for want of legal basis 2. Secs 17 and 20 of the environment code include cleaning in general- pet contend that sec 17 and 30 concern themselves only with the matter of cleaning up in specific pollution incidents as opposed to cleanup in general. They maintain that the application of sec 20 is limited only to "water pollution. Incident" which are situations

that presuppose the occurrence of specific, isolated pollution events requiring the corre-sponding containment, removal and cleaning operations. - sec 17 does not in a way state that the govt agencies concerned ought to confine themselves to the containment removal and cleaning operations when a specific pollu-tion incident occurrs. It requires them To act even in the absence of a specific pollute in-cident as long as the water deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage - sec 20 indicated that it is properly applicable to a specific situation in Which the pollu-tion is caused by polluters who fail to clean up the mess they left behind. The concerned agencies shall undertake the cleanup work for the polluter's account - agencies concerned are so undermanned that it would be almost impossible to appre-hend the numerous polluters of the Manila bay- impossibility extends to pinpointing with reasonable certainty who the polluters are- pet denied

In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946)Facts:Near the end of World War II, General Tomoyuki Yamashita commanded the Imperial Japanese Army’s Fourteenth Army Group, which was stationed primarily in the Philip-pine Islands. His troops there “committ[ed] brutal atrocities,” raping, torturing, and killing thousands of Filipino citizens between October 9, 1944, and September 2, 1945. These atrocities allegedly occurred as part of Yamashita’s “deliberate plan and purpose to massacre and exterminate a large part of the civilian population of Batangas Province, and to devastate and destroy public, private, and religious property.” On September 3, 1945, Yamashita surrendered to United States forces and subse-quently became a prisoner of war. The United States charged Yamashita with violating the laws of war by “disregarding and failing to discharge his duty as commander to con-trol the operations of members of his command” by allowing them to “commit brutal atrocities against people of the United States and of its allies and dependencies, partic-ularly in the Philippines.” U.S. General Styer, the commanding general of the United States Army Forces for the Western Pacific, appointed a military commission of five Army officers to try Yamashita. Yamashita’s attorneys argued that Yamashita was unaware of and did not order his subordinates’ acts and that neither United States military law nor the international laws of war recognized command responsibility in such a situation. Therefore, his attorneys concluded, the military commission lacked jurisdiction because Yamashita’s charges were not violations of the laws of war. The commission rejected Yamashita’s argument of ignorance, relying on the widespread nature of the atrocities to impute knowledge to Yamashita.Yamashita’s case proceeded to trial, which lasted two months, from October to Decem-ber 1945, and involved the testimony of more than 286 witnesses. The military commis-sion found Yamashita guilty on December 7, 1945, and sentenced him to death by hanging. Yamashita petitioned the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands for a writ of habeas corpus, which was denied on limited jurisdictional grounds. He then sought review in the

United States Supreme Court, which held that the military commission had authority to try Yamashita for command responsibility.Following the United States Supreme Court’s decision, Yamashita turned to President Harry Truman for clemency, but President Truman decided not to intervene. Yamashita was hanged in the Philippines in February 1946. Two and a half years later, the Interna-tional Military Tribunal for the Far East found Yamashita’s Chief of Staff, Akira Muto, to “share[] responsibility for these gross breaches of the Laws of War” because Muto was “in a position to influence policy.” Like Yamashita, Muto was hanged.Issue:Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Stone addressed two questions: whether the mili -tary commission was lawfully established and, if so, whether the commission could law-fully try Yamashita after hostilities had ceased for his failure to stop his subordinates from committing violations of the laws of warHolding:1) The majority held that the military commission was lawfully established by the Presi-dent and Congress, relying heavily on Ex Parte Quirin (LINK). The President had in-structed his commanders to “proceed with the trial, before appropriate military tribunals, of such Japanese war criminals ‘as have been or may be apprehended.’” General Styer, who had command over the Philippines, had validly ordered the creation of the military commission. Congress had constitutional power to “define and punish . . . Offenses against the Law of Nations,” and by enacting the Articles of War (LINK TO 10 U.S.C. §§ 1471–1593), Congress had exercised its Define and Punish Power by statutorily autho-rizing the trial of enemy combatants via military commissions for violations of the laws of war. Yamashita’s military commission was therefore authorized by both the President and Congress.Moreover, the commission did not lose its authority to try Yamashita simply because hostilities had ended. The majority held that Congress’s “war power, from which the commission derives its existence, is not limited to victories in the field [of battle], but car-ries with it the inherent power to guard against the immediate renewal of the conflict and to remedy . . . the evils which the military operations have produced.” To hold otherwise would, the majority recognized, undermine the “practical administration of the system of military justice under the law of war” because the vast majority of offenders would not be apprehended and subjected to trial until after the cessation of hostilities. Conse-quently, Congress and the President had the constitutional authority to prosecute viola-tions of the laws of war via military commission, at least until peace is “agreed upon or proclaimed.”The majority further held that the military commission had authority to try Yamashita for his failure to prevent his subordinates’ violations of the laws of war. The military com-mission’s authority was limited to trials for violations of the laws of war. 2)“The question, then, is whether the law of war imposes on an army commander a duty to take such appropriate measures as are within his power to control the troops under his command for the prevention of [his troops’ violations of the laws of war], . . . and whether [the commander] may be charged with personal responsibility for his failure to take such measures when violations result.” The majority answered that question in the affirmative. The majority reasoned that “the law of war presupposes that its violation is

to be avoided through the control of the operations of war by commanders who are to some extent responsible for their subordinates.” Yamashita could thus be tried for his failure to prevent his troops’ atrocities. But the Court did not decide whether the military commission correctly found Yamashita guilty. Rather, the majority limited its inquiry to the authority of the military commission to pro-ceed; because it did have such authority, its verdict was “not subject to judicial review merely because [the commission may] have made a wrong decision on disputed facts.” “[C]orrection of [the military tribunal’s] errors of decision is not for the courts but for the military authorities which are along authorized to review their decisions.”Lastly, the Court held that the evidentiary and procedural protections guaranteed by the Geneva Conventions, Congress’s Articles of War, and the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution did not apply to Yamashita’s trial. The Articles of War applied only to trials of American personnel, and the relevant portions of the Geneva Conven-tions applied only to trials for crimes committed after capture. And in any event, the ma-jority concluded that “the commission’s rulings on evidence and on the mode of con-ducting [its] proceedings against [Yamashita] are not reviewable by the courts, but only by the reviewing military authorities.” Based on this assessment, the Court declined to consider whether the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of due process applied to Ya-mashita’s trial.