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HOW CAN GENDERMAKE A DIFFERENCE

TO SECURITYIN OPERATIONS

- INDICATORS -

GENDER TRAINING & EDUCATION

Version 2011

HOW CAN GENDERMAKE A DIFFERENCE

TO SECURITYIN OPERATIONS

- INDICATORS -

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TABLE OF CONTENT

Background 9

Introduction 13

About the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives 17

Method 21

Case studies 25

1. Dutch Military in Kabul 25

2. Canadian PRT in Kandahar 26

3. US FET in Sangin 28

4. Swedish PRT in Mazar-e-Sharif 29

5. UN JPT in the Congo 30

6. EUFOR in Chad 32

Good Practices 37

Factors that influence security in operations 43

Indicators 47

Summary 51

Previous publications 55

Abbreviations 59

BACKGROUND

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BACKGROUND

InthefinaldeclarationoftheLisbonSummitofNovember2010,NATOexpresseditscontinuedcommitmenttotheimplementationoftheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilResolution(UNSCR)1325.Inthisdeclaration,theHeadsofStateandGovernmentslistedtheactionsalreadytakenandthewayforward:“We have today endorsed an Action Plan to mainstream the provisions of UNSCR 1325 into our current and future crisis management and operational planning, into Alliance training and doctrine, and into all relevant aspects of the Alliance’s tasks. We are committed to the implementation of this Policy and Action Plan as an integral part of our work to improve the Alliance’s effectiveness, and today we endorsed recommendations to this end”.

NATO agreed and published an updated Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council(EAPC) policy on “Implementing UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace andSecurityand related resolutions”on27Jun2011.Additionally, theStrategicCommands are reviewing the Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive(COPD)aswellas theBi-SC40-1document“IntegratingUNSCR1325andgenderperspectivesintheNATOcommandstructureincludingmeasuresforprotectionduringarmedconflict”.

Actionplans for the implementationof theResolutionhavebeendevelopedbothbyNATOHeadquarters (HQ),AlliedCommandOperations (ACO) andAlliedCommandTransformation(ACT)indiversedomainssuchasoperations,trainingandpublicdiplomacy.

Totaketheworkforwardatoperationalandtacticallevels,NATOhasestablishedgenderadviserpostsatACOandACTaswellasatNATOHQISAF,ISAFJointCommand(IJC)andHQKFOR.

InsupportoftheDeclarationofNovember2010,andtoassisttheimplementationof gender perspectives in operations, the NATO Committee on GenderPerspectives (NCGP) decided that the topic for their annual meeting 2011wouldbe“Howcangendermakeadifferencetosecurityinoperations?”Theaimofthemeetingwastwofold:firstlytoidentifykeyelementsforsuccessfulimplementationofgenderintomilitaryoperationsandtocomposearepositoryof good and bad practices; secondly to identify indicators to measure theeffectivenessofgenderintegrationintomilitaryoperations.

Inthisbrochure,youwillfindthecompleteworkreportoftheNCGP2011.

INTRODUCTION

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INTRODUCTION

Awarenessandknowledgeofasubjectmatteristhekeytobettersupportandcommitmentofthepartiesinvolved.

InitsworkfortheMilitaryCommittee(MC),theNATOCommitteeonGenderPerspectives(NCGP)haslearnedthatthereisstillalackofbasicknowledgeontheimpactofimplementinggenderperspectiveinoperations.TheNCGPwantstocontributetoincreasinggenderawarenessandknowledgeregardingtheeffectofimplementinggenderperspectivesinoperations.Consequently,in2011theCommitteefocusedonprovidingmoredocumentationonthetopicandonhowgendercanmakeadifferencetosecurityinoperations.

TwoofthemainconcernsforNATOaretoensuresecurityforthetroopsonoperationsandtoincreasesecurityforthelocalpopulationinordertogaintheirsupport.Consequently,theNCGPwantedtodocumentinwhatwayssecuritycouldbepositivelyaffectedbyapplyingagenderperspective.

Thisbrochureinitiallypresentssixcasestudiesaspreliminaryresearchforthemeeting.ThisbackgroundworkwasoutsourcedbytheExecutiveCommittee(EC)oftheNCGPtotheInstituteforInclusiveSecurity(IIS)whichwaslateralsocontractedtofacilitatetheNCGP2011meeting.

The brochure later presents good practices drawn from the case studiesthat, when applied, could positively impact security in operations. Focus isondocumentingtheeffectatboththetacticalandoperationalaswellastheoperationalandstrategiclevels.

Thebrochurealsolistsanumberoffactorsthatinfluencesecurityinoperations.Thesefactorsaretobeconsideredasuniversallyapplicableinalltheatresofoperation.

Finally,andbeforethesummary,youwillfindthe listof indicatorsdevelopedat the NCGP 2011 meeting that, if implemented, could increase security inoperations. They are sorted into categories of Procedures and Directives,Operational,andTrainingandHumanResources.

ABOUTTHE NATO COMMITTEE

ON GENDER PERSPECTIVES (NCGP)

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ABOUT THE NATO COMMITTEE ON GENDER PERSPECTIVES (NCGP)

History

Since1961femaleSeniorWomenOfficersinNATOhaveorganizedconferencesonanadhocbasistodiscussthestatus,organization,conditionsofemploymentandcareerpossibilitiesforwomeninthemilitaryforcesoftheAlliance.On19July1976theNATOMilitaryCommitteeformallyrecognizedtheCommitteeonWomeninNATOForces(CWINF).Since1997asmallofficelocatedinNATOHQhassupportedtheCommitteefunctioningasapermanentrepresentativeand point of contact for a wide range of issues concerning female militarypersonnelinNATOForces.

InMay2009thenamesandTermsofReferenceoftheCommitteeandOfficewere changed to become the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives(NCGP), and the NATO Office on Gender Perspectives (NOGP) in order tosupporttheimplementationoftheUNSCR1325andrelatedresolutions.

Mission

TheNCGPistoadvisetheNATOleadershipandmembernationsongenderrelatedissues,includingtheimplementationofrelevantUNSCRs.

It is an advisory body to the Military Committee on gender related policiesfortheArmedForcesoftheAlliance.Itpromotesgendermainstreamingasastrategyformakingwomen’saswellasmen’sconcernsandexperiencesanintegraldimensionofthedesign,implementation,monitoringandevaluationofpoliciesandmilitaryoperations.

Organisation

The NCGP is composed of delegates of all NATO nations. The Committeeformally meets once a year in Brussels with delegates and observers fromthemember nations.Countries from thePartnership forPeaceprogramme,the Mediterranean Dialogue and other Contact Countries can be invited toparticipate.

The Committee is directed by an Executive Committee, composed of fourelectedfemaleormaleindividualsHowever,itistheonlyNATOCommitteeoftheInternationalMilitaryStaffinNATOthathasafemaleChair.

See http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50327.htm for moreinformation

METHOD

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METHOD

In anticipation of its annual meeting, the NCGP contacted the Institute forInclusiveSecurity(IIS)1whoweremandatedtoconductresearchandfacilitatethemeeting.

Theinitialandpreliminaryresearchaimedattheidentificationofbestpracticesandlessonsidentifiedongenderinmilitaryoperations,primarilyfocussedonspecificNATOoperationsconductedbyNATOnations,butitcouldalsoincludeotheroperationsinordertomakesurethatbestpracticesandlessonsidentifiedcut across institutions. This preliminary research was conducted throughinterviewsandquestionnaireswithkeyNATOstakeholders,andresultedinthedocumentingofsixcasestudies.Additionally,itwaspossibletoidentifyfactorsthatincreasethesecurityofpersonnelandequipmentinNATO’soperations.

Basedonthisresearch,andinadvanceofthemeeting,theIISwoulddraftalistwithindicatorsthatreflectthedifferentthemesidentifiedduringtheresearch.Theproposedindicatorshadtobeclear,practicaland,mostofall,measurable.

During the meeting, the initial list of indicators were discussed, refined andcategorised.

Forthepurposeofthestudy,andasmilitarydoctrinedoesnotprovideasingledefinitionof“securityinoperations”,fortheNCGP2011meetingthisisdefinedasa“reductionofphysicalthreatstopersonnelandequipment”.

1 About the Institute for Inclusive Security Anon-profitorganization,InclusiveSecurityworkswithmilitary,police,andciviliansaroundtheworld.

Throughtraining,advocacy,andresearch,theyidentifyandconveypracticalapproachesforuniformedpersonneltoengageconstructivelywithwomeninthecommunitiestheyserve.Theyalsohelpenablewomenandothercivil society leaders tocommunicateandcooperatemoreeffectivelywithsecurity-sectorprofessionals. Inaddition topastcollaborationwithNATO, InclusiveSecurityhasworkedwiththeOSCE,UN,DCAF,andotherbodies,andregularlyleadstrainingswithseniorUS,Dutch,andothermilitarypersonnel.InclusiveSecurityalsoworkswithnetworksofwomengovernmentandcivilsocietyleadersinAfghanistan,Bosnia,Liberia,theMiddleEast,Pakistan,Sudan,andelsewhere,oftenfacilitatinginteractionbetweenlocalwomenleadersandinternationalforces.(www.inclusivesecurity.org)

CASE STUDIES

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CASE STUDIES 1. Dutch Military in Kabul:

Outreach activities with women create a foundation of confidence between community and troops

NATO gender advisers in Afghanistan piloted a successful initiative toenableAfghanwomentosetupsmallbusinessesinasecureenvironment.Their“AfghanWomen’sBazaar” invited localAfghanwomen,andtheirfamilies,tosellhandicraftstocivilianandmilitaryNATOpersonnelonbaseinKabulwhichprovidedNATOpersonnelwiththeopportunitytoexpandtheir cultural knowledge and build new relationships with communitymembers.

Specific summary of intervention

A Dutch Lieutenant Commander (LCDR) conceived the idea for awomen’s market. In her role as Gender Adviser for ISAF, the LCDRfosteredcontactswiththeAfghanWomenBusinessFederation(AWBF),a large network of small women business owners. After seeing theirproductsdisplayedatashowroominKabulCity,shedecidedtosupportAfghanwomen’sbusinesseffortsbyexpandingtheircustomerbasetoincludeNATOpersonnel.TheAfghanwomensheproposedthistoweredelighted;onesaid,“Thisisadreamcomingthroughforus:amarketforISAF.”

ThefirstmarketwasheldinJanuary2010ontheNATObase.Approximatelythirtywomenparticipated,accompaniedbytwoAfghanAmericanwomenwhotaughtthemaboutentrepreneurshipandinterpretedforthosewhodidnotspeakEnglish.Fromthehoursof10h00to16h00,civilianandmilitary personnel visited the market, bought goods from the Afghanwomen,andconversedwiththeminEnglishwhenpossible.TheAfghanwomenmadeoverUSD10,000.

Afterthesuccessofthefirstone,subsequentmarketswereheldandtheturnoutratebyNATOpersonnelincreasedconsiderably.TheLCDR’shasreplicatedthemodelseveraltimestodate(asofMay2011).OrganizingthemarketsrequiredthesupportoftheBaseCommander(forpermissionandtheidentificationofalocation)andtheForceProtectionCommander(forsecuritymatters).Logisticalarrangementsinvolved:approvingthelistof femaleAfghanparticipants (sent fromAWFB);compiling the licenceplatenumbers,carcolours,anddrivernamesforanytrucksdriventothebase;makingcateringarrangements;andadvertisingtheevent.Securitymeasures required that the Afghan women be picked up outside theBasegates,escortedtothebodyscanarea,andprovidedwithabustothemarketsite.Thegenderadviserssolicitedthehelpoftheircolleagues,whoprovedquiteenthusiastic,tocheckthewomeninattheBasegate,helpthemsetuptheirstalls,andprovidegeneralassistancethroughouttheday.

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What difference did it make to incorporate a gender perspective?

Prior to theAfghanWomen’sBazaar,manyNATOpersonnel had littledirectexposuretoAfghanwomen.InvitingwomentotheBaseprovidedNATO personnel with an opportunity for meaningful exposure to “theother half of the population.” The markets in turn favourably exposedNATOpersonneltothewomenwhobenefitedfinancially,andfrombeingabletopracticetheirEnglishskills.

One gender adviser reported that she perceived the women becamemoreconfidentaboutthemselvesandtheirabilities.ShealsoexplainedthatNATO/ISAFpersonnelwerenolongerperceivedbythemtobe“theenemy.”Inaddition,theGenderAdviser’srolebecameelevatedthroughenhancedvisibilityacrosstheBase.Themarketsraisedgenderawarenesswithpersonnelanddevelopednewalliesforthegenderadviseracrossspecialtiesandunits.

What impact did the intervention have on operational security and effectiveness?

The threegenderadvisersconsulted recommended themarketmodelasarelativelysimplewaytoengagethelocalcommunity,bolsterAfghanwomen’sincomesandenhancecommunityknowledgeofISAF.Whiletheimpactonsecurityandoperationaleffectivenesswasindirect,accordingto the gender advisers, the markets contributed to the objective of“winningheartsandminds.”ByappealingdirectlytofemaleAfghans(andtheirhusbandswhoparticipated in themarket) they leveragedAfghanwomenaswieldersof familial influenceand increasedthe likelihoodofsupportforNATOobjectives.

2. Canadian PRT2 in Kandahar: Sustained engagement with women fosters relationships and

information exchange with military personnel

Recognizing that women are vital to the reconstruction and stabilitythat NATO seeks in Afghanistan, the Canadian-led PRT in KandaharregularlyengagedwithAfghanwomentoimproveitsoperations.Riskingtheirownlives,AfghanwomenprovidedkeyintelligenceandcontextualinformationtohelpNATOshapemoreeffectiveoperationsandpolicies.They provided timely information on critical security situations, verifiedprogress on development projects in areas where NATO troops hadlimitedphysicalaccess,andinformedNATOofcorruptpracticesrelatedtoNATO-providedinfrastructureandservices.


The PRT’s collaboration with Afghan women started with one Afghanwoman who frequently visited the NATO Base in Kandahar to sell

2 ProvincialReconstructionTeam

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handicrafts.Uponlearningaboutherenterpriseemployinglocalwomanartisans, femaleCanadianmilitarypersonnelexpressedtheir interest inconversingwithAfghanwomen.Thelocalfemalecounterpartidentifiedand convened a variety of women - including doctors, farmers, andstay-at-home mothers - who she organized into groups of literateprofessionalsandilliteratewomen.SheworkedwithaCanadianCaptain,aNATOpublicinformationofficerattheKandaharAirbase,toorganizeand facilitate more than a dozen meetings over a six-month periodbetweenPRTofficials(generallytwofemaleNATOofficers)andAfghanwomen(typicallyfivetosevenpermeeting).ThemeetingswereheldinaprivateroomatKandaharInternationalAirport.Forsecurityreasons,thePRTnotifiedwomenofthemeetingdatesandtimesonlyadayortwoinadvanceand transported them there througha trustedmaledriver;women also wore burqas to and from the meetings. While the localfemalecounterpartactedastheinterpreter,theNATOofficersmoderatedthediscussions,generallyopeningmeetingswithbroadquestionsandallowing more specific security information to emerge naturally in thecourseoftheconversation.


Engaging localwomenprovidedNATOwithabetterunderstandingofthe local context in which it operated. Women helped identify priorityinfrastructureandhumandevelopmentneedsthatdifferedfromtraditionalmale community leaders by focusing more on familial and communitywell-beingandlonger-termsustainability.Atthesametime,contributingtodecision-makingprocessesprovidedtheAfghanwomenwithasenseof ownership over Afghanistan’s reconstruction. They gained greaterawarenessofPRTpolicies,discussedthenatureoftheinputsoughtbyNATO forceswith their familiesandcommunities,andspokehighlyofNATO personnel. As the women became more committed to NATO’ssuccessthroughtheircollaboration,theyevenreportedthatthisledthemtodiscouragetheirsons’sympathiestowardsinsurgents.


The female participants in this initiative improved intelligence withinthePRTbysharing insightonpeople,programmes,andorganizationsthat affected operations. They pointed out corrupt practices in whichindividualsentrustedbyNATOwithcontracts tobuild infrastructureordeliverserviceswerenothonouringtheagreements;namedindividualswho were purporting to collaborate with NATO officials while secretlyorganizinginsurgentactivities;andverifiedprogressinareaswhereNATOtroops had limited physical access. Further, women provided timelyinformationoncriticalsecuritysituations.Forexample,wheninsurgentsattackedKandaharprisonandattempted to freenearly700detaineesinJune2008,oneoftheconsultationparticipantscalledtheCanadian

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Captaintoinformherofthebreak-in.TheCaptainwasthefirstpersonontheNATOBasetolearnoftheattack,newsshereceivedtenminutesbeforeanyoneelseinthemission.

3. United States Female Engagement Teams in Sangin: Female military personnel serve as successful interlocutors with

local men

Femalemilitarypersonnelarenotonlyeffective interlocutorswith localwomenbutalsowithlocalmen.TheuseofFemaleEngagementTeams(FETs)inAfghanistanincreasesthenumberoftrainedfemalemilitaryonpatrolwhoengagedirectlywithlocalcommunities.NearSangindistrictinHelmandprovince,AfghanistaninAugust2010,aFETmemberwiththeMarineExpeditionaryForce I (MEF)was theonly interlocutoracceptedbyamaleinformantwhosharedlifesavinginformationaboutthelocationof Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) and the identities of Talibansupporters.


Inmid-2010,Sangindistrictwasheavywithinsurgentactivityandcalledone of the most dangerous areas of Afghanistan. Working alongsidean infantry unit, a US Corporal was one of two members of a FETvisitingavillageinSanginthathadnotyetbeenpatrolled.TheCorporalapproachedamalefarmerandtheybeganalengthyconversationabouthiscrops.TheFETestablishedexcellent rapportwith themale farmer,whowasthrilledtobetalkingtosomeonewhosharedhisenthusiasmforhis favourite crop:watermelon.The farmerwalked theCorporal tohisfieldandgavehertwowatermelonsasagift.Sheacceptedthegiftandastheycontinuedtalking,themanrevealedthathehadinformationabouttheTalibanandsecuritythreatsinthearea.TheCorporaltoldthemanthatshewouldalerthercolleaguesandthattheywouldreturntospeakwithhim.

Upon returning to the Forward Operating Base (FOB) and sharinginformationabout thesituation, theunitCommander, intelligencestaff,andothersreturnedtospeakwiththefarmer.ThefarmerreceivedthemandtheysatinhisfieldforsometimeexchangingpleasantriesuntilthefarmerrevealedthathewouldnotsharetheinformationunlessthefemaleMarinereturned.WhileFETsarenotdesignedtohaveadirectintelligencegatheringpurpose,theCorporalwassentforandaskedtoparticipate.ShejoinedtheconversationwiththefarmerwhorevealedthelocationofseveralIEDbeltslaidinthearea,aswellaskeyTalibanconspiratorsinthearea.Theinformationwasverifiedascorrect.


Significant information about local security threats was collected as a

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resultofaFETmemberengagingdirectlywithmen.Femalepersonnelcanworkwithinstereotypestoexploitgendernormstowardsachievinga desired end. The FET Commander in Sangin perceived that femalemilitarypersonnelchangedthedynamicwhenindialoguewithmen.


Theinformationprovidedbythemalefarmertofemalemilitarypersonnelhaddirectimplicationsonforceprotection.ThesaferemovalofseveralIEDbeltssavedthelivesofmilitarypersonnelandcreatedasaferenvironmentforthelocalpopulation.Beyondsituationalawareness,detailsabouttheidentitiesofTalibansupportershelpedadvanceintelligencegatheringtoinformoperations.

4. Swedish PRT in Mazar-e-Sharif: Local women’s perspectives strengthen situational awareness

By increasingdirectengagementwith localwomen, theSwedishPRTin Mazar-i-Sharif, Afghanistan, was able to strengthen its situationalawarenessandavoidamisunderstandingthatwouldhavehadnegativeimplications for mission security. Soldiers benefited from the technicalexpertiseofagenderfieldadviserwhoserecommendationsonpatrollingpatternsledtothecollectionofcriticalinformationfromalocalfamily.


Duringthesummerof2009,anall-maleriflepatrolwithin theSwedishPRTapproachedthePRT’sgenderfieldadvisertolearnwhythepatrolneversawAfghanwomeninpublic.ThePRTCommanderandChiefofStaffhadbeenvocalabout their interest inengaging“theotherhalfofthepopulation”andanextensivesystemofgenderfocalpointsineachmilitaryunithadincreasedawarenessofgenderissuesacrossthePRT.Thegenderadviserworkedwiththeteamtounderstandexactlywherethemalesoldierswereregularlypatrolling.

Upon reviewing a map of their typical routes, the gender field adviseridentifiedthatthesoldierswereonlytravellingonlargestreetsfrequentedbymen.Shesuggestedthattheyventureintosmaller,lessbusystreetsto find more women. The rifle patrol implemented the advice andcomplemented itspatrol ofmajor thoroughfareswith trips into smallerstreetsandalleys.Thepatrolwaspleasedwhenitbegantoencounterlocal women. They were surprised when women approached their allmaleteam,includingamaleinterpreter,andwantedtospeak.

Inoneinstance,severalwomenapproachedthepatroland,afterabriefconversation,invitedthemtomeettheirmalefamilymembersathome.Atthewomen’shomes,thesoldierswereintroducedtothemalefamily

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members.Aconversationensuedoverteaandthetopicof“whattheyeachwerelookingforwardto”cameup.Thewomenexplainedthattheywere looking forward toa largewedding thatwasgoing to takeplaceinthetownintwodays.Severalhundredfamilymembersandrelativesweregoingtodescendonthetownforthecelebration.Noneofthemenhadsharedthisinformation.


Womenprovidedinsightsaboutaforthcomingeventthatwascriticaltoenhancingthesoldiers’situationalawareness.Whenhundredsofpeopledescendedonthetown48hourslater,theMissionwasexpectingthem.Additionally,thatmalesoldiersandinterpreterscouldengagedirectlywithlocalwomenhelpednotonlyextendtherangeofpossibleengagementsintheirspecificareaofoperationbutprovedthefluidityofculturalnormsarounddialoguewithwomen.


Theinformationfromthewomenaboutaforthcomingmajoreventinthetownallowed thePRTtime tocreateaplan formonitoring theflowofpeople andhelped redirectmissionassets andpersonnel. Thedetailsabout the wedding also prevented a potential escalation of tensionswhen the international military presence was met with an unexpectedwave of movement into the town. The information helped the forceavoidcircumstancesinwhichmilitarypersonnelwouldbesurprisedandoverwhelmedbyhundredsofpeoplearrivinginthearea.Withoutabenignexplanation, personnel could interpret the movement as an insurgenttacticandviolencecouldensuewhichcouldleadtoimmediatesecurityrisksaswellaslongertermriskstotheforcefromaresentfulcommunity.

5. United Nations Joint Protection Teams in the Congo: Increased female personnel strengthen protection of civilian

efforts

Joint Protection Teams (JPTs) are small ad-hoc teams of UN civilian,military, andpolicestaffwithdiverseexpertise thatdeploy tohigh-riskareas inordertomakerecommendationsfor theprotectionofciviliansandfostergoodrelationswith localcommunities.JPTs investigateandassess protection risks in emergency situations and generate specificprotection recommendations that highlight mission priorities andcontingency plans for liaising with local leaders in the event of armedattacks.TheuseofJPTsintheUnitedNationsOrganizationStabilizationMissionintheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongo(MONUSCO)offersaparticularlyencouragingmodel for increasingprotectionbycivil-militaryactors,advancingengagementwith localwomen,and improving forceprotectionthroughincreasedsituationalawareness.

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Specific summary of intervention with women

JPTs enhance the ability of military peacekeepers to engage directlywithlocalwomenbyincreasingthenumberoffemalestaffonmissions.MONUSCOestimatesthatatleast15to30percentofJPTshavefemalemembers, while only three percent of MONUSCO military and policepeacekeepers were women as of March 2010. JPTs have facilitatedengagement with local women to combat sexual violence; promotedcontact between peacekeepers and the local community leading toincreasedsituationalawareness;enhancedtheabilityofcivilianexpertsto reach hard-to-access areas; and increased the number of womeninvolvedinprotectionefforts.

Information collected by female personnel from local women aboutsexualviolenceandhumanrightsviolationshasbeencriticaltoinformingUN protection operations. For example, as a result of JPT activitiesinSouthKivuhuman rightsofficerswereable to visit the inaccessiblevillageofMatiliwherehumanrightsattacksandsexualviolencehadbeenreportedinordertoinvestigatethecharges.Theyinformedlocalwomenabout a legal clinic in Shabunda specializing in sexual violence casesandmaintainedamotorbike for thecommunity to transportvictims toShabundaandhealthandlegalexpertstotheruralareas.


Local women provide valuable details about their communities thatenhance situational awareness and promote mission protectionobjectives. For example, through a meeting organized in North Kivuwithlocalwomen,UNstafflearnedhowtensionsamongfamiliesoftheForcesArméesdelaRépubliqueDémocratiqueduCongo(FARDC)andlocal populations were leading to hostility and violence. In response,MONUSCOorganizedaseriesofdialoguestopromotecommunicationandreconciliationbetweenFARDCfamiliesandlocalpopulations.JPTsin the DRC also learned about times and areas where women weremorevulnerabletosexualviolencewhichresultedintheestablishmentofpeacekeepingpatrolsatspecificdaysandtimestoensuresaferpassageforwomen.


JPTscapitalizeonthemilitarypresenceinhigh-risklocationstofacilitatecivilianexperts’movementsandbringmulti-disciplinaryperspectivesthatcontributetoamoreholisticunderstandingofpeacekeepingmissionsinoperatingzones.Theyenhanceprotectioninavarietyofspecificways,including:marketandfieldescortsbypeacekeepers;provisionofhealthservicesindifficult-to-reachareas;prosecutionofhumanrightsabuses;creationandimplementationofprotectionplans;accesstolegalservicesforvictimsofsexualviolence;andadherencetointernationalhumanitarian

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law. The more effectively missions can protect local populations, thegreater(a)generalstabilitytheycanpromote,and(b)likelihoodthatlocalpopulationswill associatepeacekeeperswithprotectionand turn theirallegiancestowardsthemratherthaninsurgentsandarmedcombatants.

6. European Union Force (EUFOR) in Chad: Visible presence of women in the military and dialogue with local

women increases force acceptance

By increasingdirectengagementwith the local femalepopulation, theEuropeanUnionForceChad/CAR (alsoEUFORTchad/RCA)wasabletoachieveitsmandatetoprotectciviliansmorefully,facilitatedeliveryofhumanitarianaid,andensurethesafetyofUNpersonnel.Dialoguewithlocalwomencreatedamorecomprehensiveviewofsecuritythreatsintheareaandincreasedforceacceptance.


Upon its2008deployment, theEUForce inChadwasmetwith localhostility.Localsaccusedthe forceofstealingthebestagricultural landandperceiveditasacolonistholdover.Asaresult,communitymembersrefusedtoengagewithEUpersonnelandwereoutwardlyaggressivetopatrolsandconvoys;stoneswereregularlythrownattroops.ThemissionattemptedtoraiseawarenessoftheEUFORassignmentthrough“bushmovies” and information sharing sessions,but audiencesweremostlymaleandtensionsstillranhigh.

Eager to increase force acceptance and thereby contribute to forceprotection,, EUFOR personnel organized meetings with women inOctober2008.Thegenderadviserobtained approval from theForceCommanderforthemeetingsbyreportingentirelynewinformationaboutthelocalareashehadgatheredthroughconversationswithlocalwomen.Sheassertedthatmeetingshadthepotentialtonotonlyincreaseforceacceptance,butalsoenhancesituationalawarenessforthemission.

IntheSouthern,predominantlyChristian,partofChadinformationaboutthemeetingswasbroadcastvialocalradio.Sessionswereheldinaneutrallocationoutsideoftheforcecompound,typicallyinschoolsandduringtheafternoontodecreasesecuritythreatsforthewomen.Themissionprovidedasmallsecuritydetail.Themeetingswereflexiblystructured,allowing the50-60participants tocomeandgoasneededsoasnottodisturb their normal activities. The three femalemeeting facilitators,including the mission Gender Adviser and a Civil-Military Cooperation(CIMIC)officer,wereinterestedinthelocalsecuritysituation,buteasedinto discussions about specific security threats by asking first aboutwomen’sfamiliesandlivelihoods.Alocalfemale interpreter,affiliatedtotheradiostation,facilitatedthesessionusingthelocalArabicdialectandFrench.

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IntheNorthern,predominantlyMuslim,partofthecountry,ratherthandirectly advertising the meetings, CIMIC teams worked through localNGOcontactstoidentifymeetingparticipants.Adheringtolocalcustom,planswerediscussedwiththelocalSultanorPrefect.Earlierstatementsabout“nothavinganycontactwithourwomen”wereclarified;theelderswishedonlythatthewomenwerenotdisrespected.Anall-femaleEUFORteamwithfemaleinterpreterswasstoodupwithinthePolishcontingenttoensuretherewouldbeonlyfemalepersonnelaspartofthedialogue.Afirstmeetingwasheldinsideaprivatehome.Afemale,MuslimArabicinterpreterwasdeemedculturallyappropriateforthegroupandincreasedthe women’s level of acceptance of the interaction. The women weregratefultooffertheirperspectivesonsecurityandcommunitypriorities;noonehadaskedthemthesetypesofquestionsbefore.


Theforcecollectedcriticalinformationfromwomenaboutlocalsecuritythreatsthatpromptedittoadapt itsoperations.Thewomenexplainedthatlocalpoliceregularlyrobbedthemwhentheyreturnedfromcollectingfirewoodorwateroutsideoftown.AsEUFORwascooperatingwiththedefenseandpoliceforce,thepublicconfused(?)theEUFORtroopswiththe localpolice.EUFOR therebyneeded toaddresspolicecorruption,butalsothecommunity’sassociationofEUFORwiththecorruptpolice.

Inanothermeeting,security informationwasrevealed inconversationswithwomenabouthowtheycollectedwaterandfirewood.Thepresenceofarmedgroupsinnearbymountainswascausingthewomentocollectinother locations.Nomen travelled regularly to themountains; itwasonlywomenwhowereprivytothisinformation.ACIMICgroupensuredthatthelocalbasewasawareofarmedelementsnearbyandthatpatrolswereorganizedinthearea.

Engagement with women in the North unintentionally provided anopportunity for community building. When asked to participate in themeeting, the women designed a system of appointing one individualfromeachvillagetorepresenthercommunity.Apositiveconsequenceof themeetingwas thecreationofanetworkofwomenacrossareasoftraditionalrivalry.Giventhecompetitionforresources intheregion-land,firewood,etc.,-thewomenvowedtocontinuetheirnetworkasaninformaldisputeresolutionforum.

Two weeks after the initial meeting, the women contacted the Polishtroops forasecondmeeting -aseachange fromprevioushostility tothe EUFOR troops. The women had learned more about the EUFORmissionandwereabletosharethat informationwiththeir familiesandcommunities. The men in the area witnessed that the force was notthere toharm thewomen therebycreatingamorepositive impression

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oftheforce.Lastly,theEUFORmissionhadabettersenseoftheuniquesecurityneedsofmenandwomeninthelocalarea.


Womenprovided important information thatserved toenhanceEUFOR’ssituationalawarenessinChad.Womenpointed out police corruption and shared communityprioritieswhichhadnotbeensharedbymen.As inthecaseofwomenreportingthepresenceofnearbyarmedgroups, the information sharedhaddirect implicationsonforceprotection.

ThemeetingsalsoprovidedanopportunityforEUFORto educate women about the mission mandate andanswer specific questions. The women shared this

informationwiththeirfamiliesandcommunitieswhohadmanymisconceptionsaboutthetrooppresence.Whenthe

communityhadmore informationabout the force, throughfemale interlocutors, relations improved, force acceptance

increasedandEUFORwasbetterabletofulfillitsmandate.

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GOOD PRACTICES

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GOOD PRACTICES In incorporating Gender Perspectives into Operations

The following section draws from the case studies and additional researchhighlightingkeypracticesthat,whenapplied,couldpositivelyimpactsecurityinoperations.Recommendationsareorganizedbylevelofimplementingactors(field-basedimplementersatthemostlocallevelofdeploymentvs.implementersat the regional or headquarter level). When appropriate, implementationexamplesarecited.Unlessotherwisenoted,examplesweregatheredduringpersonalinterviews.

Tactical and OperationalStaffing

• Increase deployment of female soldiers serving in civil-militaryengagement, civil affairs, human terrain assessments, and intelligenceextractioncapacitiesinallmissionsandforwardoperatingbases.

• Require inclusion of female soldiers and officers in outreach unitsand patrols. This is of special importance for Civil Affairs/Civil-MilitaryCooperation(CIMIC),PsychologicalOperations,(PSYOPS)andHumanIntelligence(HUMINT).Teamsmaybeallfemaleormixed,reflectinglocalneedsandcircumstances.

• Ensureadequatenumbersoffemaleinterpreterswithknowledgeoflocalcustomsandcircumstances.Specificactivitiesmayincludeacceleratedinterpretertrainingforwomenincountryorexpandedlanguagetrainingforfemalesoldiersservinginoutreachunits.

• Requirethateachunithasagenderfocalpointwholiaiseswithagenderfield adviser. For example, the Swedish PRT in Mazar-e-Sharif hasbetween20and25genderfocalpointsacrossitsunits.Acommander’sorderrequiredcontingentstoidentifyfocalpoints.

Planning

• Implementparticipatory,gender-sensitiveneedsassessmentsprecedingall stabilization interventions to ensure that the needs of women areincorporated into all direct community assistance delivered throughNATOentities.

• Mandate thatall conceptsofoperation (CONOPS)at thebrigadeandbattalion level include attention to gender, specifically plans for directengagement with local women, and gender-sensitive informationoperationscampaigns.

• Implementpracticaloperationaltools(suchaschecklists)forpersonneltoincorporategenderintoplanning.Forexample,thegenderadviserof

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NATO’sKosovoForce(KFOR)iscurrentlyimplementinguseoftheNATOBi-SCDirective40-1operationalplanningchecklistacrossthemission.

Training and Education

• Ensureallpersonnel, includingunitcommandersandpatrolmembers,have overall basic training and in-theatre training on gender issues.Trainingshouldbepractical,relatedtolocalcircumstancesandfocusedonTactics,Techniques,andProcedures(TTPs),ratherthanemphasizingtheory.WhiletrainingonStandardsofBehavior,CodeofConduct,andSexualExploitationarecritical,thesesubjectsareinherentlydifferentfromhowtoengagewithlocalwomen.Trainingonconductingabasicgenderanalysisofanareaofoperationshouldbeincluded.

• Design creative solutions for providing training to ensure maximumexposure.Forexample,during theEUFORTChad/RCAoperation, thegenderadvisertrainedgenderfocalpointsineachunitwhointurnbriefedotherteammembers.3

Operations

• Consultregularlywithlocalwomeninthetheatreofoperations.Structuresdesignedtopromotesustained,repeatedcontactwithwomenshouldbeprioritizedtopromoteconfidencebuilding.Meetingdesignshouldreflectlocal circumstances and preferences of local women per examplesprovidedinthecasestudies.

• Promoteoutreachactivities that involvewomenand their families. Forexample,bazaarsforwomentosellmerchandise,heldregularlybytheDutch PRT, provided obvious financial benefit to the women but alsoservedasanopportunityforrelationshipbuildingbetweenpersonnelandthelocalpopulation.

• Ensureallreportingrequirements,fromweeklyreportingtoAfterActionReviews,includeattentiontogenderissues.Adaptingcurrentformattingispreferabletodevelopingadditionalreports.Forexample,datacollectedfromFemaleEngagementTeamsisincorporatedintoexistingreportingvehicles.

• Devisedatabasesspecificallyfortrackingfemalecontacts.Forexample,theDutchArmedForcescomplementedexisting“red”and“white”platedatabases listing individuals alliedwith the force and those viewedashostile,witha“pinkplate”databasespecificallyforfemalekeyleaders.

• StrengthencoordinationwithinternationalandlocalNGOswithlocalAreaofOperation (AO)so that troopsareawareof resources forwomen inthecommunity.Forexample,EUFORCongotroopsdevelopedareferral

3GenderAnnextoEndofMandatereport,EUFORTChad/RCA,July2008.

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systemtoshareinformationaboutlocalgender-basedviolenceservicesforwomen.4

Operational and Strategic Staffing

• Request that TroopContributingNations (TCNs) includemorewomeninoutreachunitsaspartofForceGenerationprocesses.TheHeadofMission for the EUFOR TChad/RCA operation, General Patrick Nash,sentalettertoallmemberstatestofindmorefemalepersonnelforthemission.5

• Harmonize the distribution of female personnel across militaryoccupational specialties through targeted recruitment techniques andtransition opportunities. For example, the Dutch military has tried tochannelwomenfromAdministrationandLogisticstootherspecialties,

• Positiongenderadvisersstrategically in thecommandstructure,closeto the operation or mission management, ideally reporting directly toOperational or Force Commanders. Gender advisers from differentNATOmissionscontendthatdirectaccesstoseniorleadersiscriticaltoelevatingtheirwork.

• Strengthencommunicationbetweengenderadvisersonceintheatreaswellaspre-deployment.Forexample,theSwedishArmedForcesrequireatwo-weekoverlapofgenderadviserstoensureconsistencyofactivities.

• Ensurethatgenderadvisersarenot“dual-hatted”andcandedicatetheirfullattentiontoadvancingattentiontogenderissues.

Planning

• Include individuals with gender expertise on the planning team for anoperation or a mission. For example, upstream planning allowed theinclusion of human rights and gender training in EU Training Mission(EUTM)Somalia’ssyllabus.6

Training and Education

• Enhancepre-deploymentgendertrainingopportunitiesforallpersonnelandprovidetrainingtogenderfocalpoints.

• Offer opportunities for Commanders to hone knowledge of genderissues,specificallyhowtoeffectivelyusegenderadvisers.Forexample,

4Gya,Giji,CharlotteIsakssonandMartaMartinelli,“ReportonESDPmissionsintheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongo(DRC),”BackgroundPaper,September2008,p.2.

5Gyaetal,2008,13.6CounciloftheEuropeanUnion,“LessonsandBestPracticesofMainstreamingHumanRightsandGender

intoCSDPMilitaryOperationsandCivilianMissions,”17138/1/10Rev1,November30,2010,p.12.

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Genderforce offers the Swedish Armed Forces a “gender coaching”programmeforBrigadierGenerals.

• Create opportunities for sharing operational best practicesandlessonslearnedrelatedtogender.Forexample,EUMilitary

Staff (EUMS) have developed an internal database, EUMSLessonsManagementApplication, forentering,actingon,followingup,andretrievinglessons“observed”formilitaryoperations. It includes six lessons learned on genderdimensions from EUFOR DRC. Additionally, AlliedCommandTransformation(ACT)iscurrentlypopulatinganunclassifieddatabaseoflessonslearned.

Operations

• Incorporate knowledge of, and attention to,gender as a component of all job descriptions andsubsequentperformancereviews.

• Require all field data collected to be genderdisaggregated, and adapt data collection systems and

reporting formats accordingly. For example, Period MissionReviews through SHAPE/NATO count the number of female

personnel,includingthoseinleadershippositions.

FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE

SECURITY IN OPERATIONS

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FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE SECURITY IN OPERATIONS

Numerouselementsimpactthesecurityofpersonnelandequipment.Thefollowinglistisnotexhaustive.

Thefactorsoutlinedareuniversallyapplicableinalltheatresofoperation.Whatmayincreasesecurityinonecontextmaydecreasesecurityinanother.

Situational Awareness

Thorough informationon the theatreof operations including,but not limitedto,physical terrain, threats, locationofenemycombatants, identitiesof localpowerbrokers, kinship and patronage networks, community interests andneeds,andtheimpactofmission-ledoperationsoncivilianpopulationscanincrease preparedness and capacity to effectively leverage social networkstowardsaccomplishmentofmissionobjectives.

Unit Cohesion

Knowing how your unit will respond to an immediate threat can increasethe likelihoodof aneffective, coordinated response.This consideration isofparticularconcernwhenavarietyofNATOcountriescometogethertoformasingleunit.

Training

Effectivepre-deploymentandin-theatretrainingcanensuremaximummentalandphysicalreadinesstorespondtothreatsandcanalsoimproveunitcohesion.

Force Acceptance

Trustandconfidencebetweencivilianpopulationsandtheforcecanincreasecivilian engagement in the achievement of mission objectives and decreaseanimositytowardstheforcethatcouldtranslateintoaphysicalthreat.Variousoperationsandactionscontributetoforceacceptanceincluding:

• Civil-militarycooperationandcivilaffairs

• Strategiccommunicationsandlocalmediaoutreach

• Minimizationofcollateraldamage

• Demonstrationofunderstandingandrespectforthelocalculture

Local Government Partners

Strong and capable local governing bodies can assist in cultivating forceacceptance among their constituents, implementing stabilization operations,andsharingvitalinformation.

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Mandate and Rules of Engagement

Sharedunderstandingofaclearmandateandrulesofengagementcanincreasetheknowledgeofparametersforrespondingtothreatsand

theprobabilityofalegally-sound,coordinatedresponse.

Equipment

Functioningequipmentthat isappropriatetothephysicalthreatsandterrainoftheenvironmentiscriticalforeffectiveexecutionofoperationsanddefensiveresponse.

Secure Channels of Communication

Communication breaches can jeopardize operationsby,amongotherthings,alertingenemycombatantstoforcepositions.Access to,anduseof, theequipmentnecessaryforsecurecommunicationscandecreasethisthreat.

Defensive Physical Security Measures

Physicalsecuritymeasuressuchascheckpointsanddefensivewalls that are designed according to appropriate situational

analysiscanstemphysicalthreats.

Kill or Capture

The presence of firepower and the use of Special Forces to kill or captureirreconcilablescandiminishphysicalthreatspresentedbyinsurgentgroups.

National Security Forces

Effective national security forces in host countries can improve the generalsecurity environment by maintaining localized security and management ofcriminalactivity.Strongrelationshipswiththeseforcescanpresentsynergiesforjointpatrolandinformationsharing.

Economic Development

Jobcreationandincreasesinhouseholdincomegenerationcanmitigatetheeconomicincentiveforjoininginsurgentgroupswhichwilllimittherecruitmentcapacitiesofinsurgentleaders.

INDICATORS

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INDICATORS

ThefollowingproposedindicatorsaimtobroadenandstrengthenimplementationofactionsthatwillincorporategenderperspectivesinNATO-ledoperations.InadvanceoftheNCGPmeeting,InclusiveSecurityproposedasetofpracticaland simple indicators to track elements and activities that, if implemented,could increase security in operations. During the meeting, NCGP membersrefinedandprioritizedtheseindicatorsandsuggestedpossiblenewones.

Indicators related to Procedures and Directives

1. NumberandpercentageofallgenderadviserswhoreportdirectlyandhaveaccesstotheChiefofStafforCommanderorwhoareincludedinthecommandgroup.

2. Percentageofunitsthatincludefemalepersonnel(includingCivilAffairs/CIMIC,Intelligence,PSYOPS,PublicAffairs,J1throughJ9.)

3. ThepresenceofaparagraphaddressinggenderincludedineachNATOComprehensiveOperationalPlanningDirective.(NumberandpercentofConcepts of Operations (CONOPS), Operational Orders, FragmentaryOrders(FRAGOs),Tactics,Techniques,andProcedures(TTPs)etc.thatincorporateanapproachforengagingwomen).

4. NumberandpercentageofoperationsplannedusingtheBi-SCDirective40-1operationalplanningchecklist.

5. Number and percentage of final mission reports that includedocumentation of engagement with women and outcomes of thoseengagementactivities

Indicators related to Operational Impact

1. Numberandpercentageofunitstaskedwithengagingcivilianpopulationswithaccesstofemaleinterpreters.

2. Number and percentage of women consulted who initiate or allowsubsequentengagementbyNATOpersonnelwithinxperiodoftime.

3. Number and percentage of NATO-led needs assessments related todevelopmentprojectsthatincludeconsultationswithwomen.

4. Number and percentage of patrol reports that include documentationof engagement with women and the outcomes of those engagementactivities.

5. ThenumberandpercentageofengagementsbyNATOpersonnelwiththelocalpopulationthatdirectlyreducedphysicalthreatstoNATOpersonnel

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andequipment.(collectionofthisdatawouldneedtobedisaggregatedbysex).

Indicators related to Training

1. Number and percentage of deployed personnel whomay be in contact with the local population who receive

theatre-specific training on how to engage local womenandincorporategenderperspectives.

2. Number and percentage of gender advisers,gender field advisers, and gender focal points whoreceivespecifictrainingforthatrole.

3. The number and percentage of personnel inhost-countrysecurityforceswhoaretrainedongenderandhumanrights(inNATO-ledmissionswithamandate

totrainthoseforces).

4. NumberandpercentageofnationsinNATO-ledmissionswithgendermodulesintheirpre-deploymenttraining.

Indicators related to Human Resources

1. Number and percentage of Gender Focal Points, GenderAdvisers,andGenderFieldAdvisersineachNATO-ledmission.

2. Thenumberandpercentageofpersonneldeployed ineachNATO-ledmissionoveroneyearthatisfemale.

Remark:

During the discussions, committee members identified the need to clearlydefinetheterms‘unit’and‘engagement’foradditionalclarity

SUMMARY

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SUMMARY

TheNCGP2011focusedondocumentinghowgendercanmakeadifferencetosecurityinoperations.

Thisbrochure reflectsall theworkwith regard toNCGP2011andpresents5casestudies fromoperationswhereagenderperspectivehasbeenused;itpresentsgoodpracticesfromthecasestudiesthatcouldpositivelyimpactsecurity in operations; it lists universal factors that can influence security inoperationsanditlistsindicatorsdevelopedattheNCGP2011meetingthatwillincorporategenderperspectivesinNATO-ledoperations.

Theproposedindicatorsarebasicandgeneric.Tobeuseful,theyneedtobeadaptedtoaspecificsituationormission.

For this reason, the NCGP decided to organize an Ad-Hoc Working Groupmeeting on Indicators (AHWGI), inviting all interested nations, StrategicCommandsandtheactivegenderadvisorsworkinginNATO’smissionsinISAFandKFOR.TheaimoftheNCGPAd-HocWorkingGroupmeetingistoadapttheindicatorstotheparticularitiesofthemissions.TheresultsofthisAHWGIwillnotbemadepublic.

PREVIOUSPUBLICATIONS

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PREVIOUS PUBLICATIONS

AvailableontheofficialCommitteewebsite:http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50327.htm

1. CWINF Guidance for NATO Gender Mainstreaming -publishedin2007;

2. Best Practices to improve Gender Balance -publishedin2008;

3. Gender Training and Education -publishedin2009

4. Template for Pre- Deployment Gender Training -publishedin2010

ABBREVIATIONS

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ABBREVIATIONS

ACO AlliedCommandOperationsACT AlliedCommandTransformationAHWGI AdHocWorkingGrouponIndicatorsAWBF AfghanWomenBusinessFederationBi-SC Bi-StrategicCommandCIMIC Civil-MilitaryCooperationCONOPS CconceptsofOperationCOPD ComprehensiveOperationsPlanningDirectiveCWINF CommitteeonWomeninNATOForcesDRC DemocraticRepublicofCongoEAPC Euro-AtlanticPartnershipCouncilEU EuropeanUnionEUFOR EUForceEUMS EUMilitaryStaffEUTM EUTrainingMissionFARDC ForcesArméesdu(ArmedForcesof)DRCFET FemaleEngagementTeamFOB ForwardOperatingBaseFRAGO FragmentaryOrdersHUMINT HumanIntelligenceIDF InternallyDisplacedPersonIED ImprovisedExplosiveDevicesIIS InstituteforInclusiveSecurityIJC ISAFJointCommandISAF InternationalSecurityAssistanceForceJPT JointProtectionTeamKFOR KosovoForceMC MilitaryCommitteeMEC MarineExpeditionCorpsMONUSCO UNOrganizationStabilizationMissionintheDRCNCGP NATOCommitteeonGenderPerspectivesPSYOPS PsychologicalOperationsPRT ProvincialReconstructionTeamTCN TroopContributingNationsTTP Tactics,TechniquesandProceduresUN UnitedNationsUNSCR UnitedNationsSecurityCouncilResolution

More information related to the Committee on Women in the NATO Forces can be found on the web page:

http://www.nato.int/issues/women_nato/index.html

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