hoogenhout grounding providence in the theology of the creator.pdf

7/27/2019 Hoogenhout Grounding Providence in the Theology of the Creator.pdf

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HeyJ XLIII (2002), pp. 119

The Editor/Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, January 2002

GROUNDING PROVIDENCE IN THETHEOLOGY OF THE CREATOR:

THE EXEMPLARITY OFTHOMAS AQUINAS

MICHAEL A. HOONHOUT

The Catholic University of America, Washington, DC

INTRODUCTION: THE PROVIDENCE OF THE CREATOR

The discussion of providence in theology has traditionally been linkedwith the doctrine of God the Creator. Such an association originates withthe Hebrew Scriptures themselves, which, without ever using the wordprovidence, none the less present the God who creates all things ascontinuing to watch over, act in, and care for his work. 1 The people ofthe Mount Sinai covenant who experienced Gods active concern in theirdeliverance from slavery in Egypt came to expect, naturally enough, that

God continues to act with the same loving faithfulness (hesed) for all thegood things he has made (e.g., Psalms 104106, Wisdom 812). Likethe great work of their deliverance, creation too came to be understoodas a divine work worthy of praise not only in its original production butalso in Gods daily providing for all things. The Christian Scripturescontinue this association by insisting that the historical redeemer is noneother than the first-born and beginning of all creation (Col 1:1518), theWord through whom all things were made (Jn 1:13), and the exaltedLord ruling over all creation (Eph 2:2022). According to the Scriptures,therefore, the God who has worked wonders in our history to provide forour good is the same One who is the Creator of all that comes to be.

From its beginning the Christian tradition followed the biblicalexample and discussed providence in terms of God the Creator and theworld as his work and responsibility. The early Church fathers held fastto the belief in a provident Creator as they dialectically appropriated andchallenged Greek philosophical thought.2 From Gentile sources theyfound terms for the foresight the Creator must have to act with ongoing

consistency pronoia in Greek and providentia in Latin. Their apolo-getical works, such as Theodoret of Cyrs On Divine Providence, defendedthe Christian faith and trust in providence on the basis of the Creator


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who made all things, and who was thereby qualified to exercise aneconomia a wisdom to run the house bringing the world to salvationand glory.3 Evidence for Gods providence was found in the naturalorder observable in the world, and in the Christian subordination of

all inequalities and difficulties that humans experience to the ultimategoal of imitating and being united with Christ. These same argumentswere taken up into Latin scholasticism of the high Middle Ages, only thetheological goal was expanded from a defence of the faith to a system-atically ordered understanding of the doctrine itself.

This importance of grounding theology of providence in the charac-teristics of the Creator-God suffered a serious blow, however, with theemergence of nominalism in the fourteenth century. Though it wasprimarily a development in philosophy with its own logic, epistemology

and ontology, nominalism had a theological counterpart which laid greatstress upon the absolute power of the Creator. While its motive was topreserve the transcendent freedom of the Creator, this came at the costof denying the intelligible order and genuine causality in the world.4

This bald emphasis upon the power and indeterminacy of Gods willover and against the world deprived the doctrine of providence of thoseattributes of the Creator (i.e., his wisdom, goodness and exemplarity)and those features of creation (i.e., the order, unity and teleology ofnature) traditionally relied upon to express its intelligibility.

The nominalist reduction of the Godworld relation to Gods absolutewill remained operative in Reformation writers like Martin Luther andJohn Calvin, who emphasized the power and determinations of God overand against the causal responsibility of nature and the human agent.5 As withearlier nominalist theologians like Duns Scotus and William of Ockham,providence is often not given distinct treatment in their thought.6 When itis discussed, as in CalvinsInstitutes of the Christian Religion, the absolutesovereignty of the divine will functions as the controlling theologicalattribute, leaving little acknowledgement of the order intrinsic to creation,produced by divine wisdom so that God and creatures might act togetherfor the good.7 Providence as the expression of the Creator working throughcreation is absent. The net result of this reduction was that theologicalexplication of the mystery of providence lost much of its content and co-herence, as proper emphasis on the wisdom and goodness of the Creator,which give the divine will its character, and the created order its intelli-gibility, waned.

A robust theology of the Creator as the proper foundation for

understanding providence has been less the rule since the appearanceof nominalism. The latters influence remained operative in the moderntendency to reduce the mystery of providence to a problem of recon-ciling the divine causative will with human responsible agency.8 This isbecause as nominalism changed the basic conception of the Creator as aGod of absolute will and indeterminate freedom, not surprisingly the

2 MICHAEL A. HOONHOUT


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conception of the human individual, made in the image of God, followedsuit. Like the nominalist God, the human person was reconceived as anindividual whose defining characteristic was a freedom of indifferencethat lay entirely in the wills capacity to choose among options. This was

in contrast to the earlier conception of human greatness as a freedomfor excellence, in which the will is created as ordered to goodness andfunctionally dependent upon wisdoms discernment of the proper goodto be pursued.9 In short, the human will and its freedom became absolutein its own right, leading to insuperable difficulties of how one mightreconcile two absolutes.10 Discussions of the providential relation betweenthe divine and human wills became battles over the turf of freedom, aquestion of who really determines the act of choice.

As a consequence, the deficiency in theology of creation is the

primary reason why the speciality of providence itself has often becomequagmired in intractable debates attempting to reconcile two sets ofcontraries: Gods eternal causative knowledge and will with genuinehuman freedom and responsibility. Characteristic of this approach isan expectation that the doctrine resolve a problem of how the world canbe what it appears to be despite the greatness of Gods perfections. Itis assumed that God exercising his providence with truly perfect divinewisdom and will means his domination of the created order, to thedegree that images and metaphors which express God as the Lord ruling

over all creation have become inherently problematic and unusable.Presuming Gods unrestrained agency would compete with if not controlnatural and human causality, theologians now speak of God as having tohumble himself and withhold the full exercise of his power in order torelate to the world, practising a kenotic self-debasement in his divinenature and actions.11 The solution to this dilemma generally takes theform of a reduction or revision of the traditional attributes of God, sothat his mind is no longer omniscient, his will no longer perfectly extensiveor efficacious, and his power no longer infinite.12

Yet those who advocate this move do not seem to recognize how itfundamentally revises the meaning ofCreator. Conversely, such a stepwould prove altogether unnecessary if they allowed the full implicationsof the meaning of Creator to challenge the assumption that a perfectlyactive God means a dominating God. Because God is Creator his activeimmanence in the world is not at all on the same level of the naturalorder, so no competition or interference is possible. God acting as God,with full authenticity to the dynamics and perfections of his own essence,

is not the negation of the order of our reality, but the very condition ofits possibility and realization. In other words, God must operate in theworld not in some reduced capacity, but to the fullest extent, as it were,of his nature and powers, if the world is going to be a providential creation.This was the basic attitude, anyway, of pre-nominalist theologies ofprovidence, which worked out the full implications of the fact that the

GROUNDING PROVIDENCE IN THE THEOLOGY OF THE CREATOR 3


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world in its entirety is created ex nihilo by God through his wisdom andwill.

To really see how helpful and vital it is to discuss divine providencein terms of the unique dynamics of the Creatorcreated relation, it is

best to have recourse to an actual example of this approach. The work Iwish to focus upon is the mature theological work of the medieval ThomasAquinas, the Summa Theologiae. It is a work appropriate for our purposesbecause it predates the appearance of nominalism. It also loses nothingof the substance of the provident Creator revealed in the Scriptures, eventhough it employs Aristotelian metaphysics as its primary mode of ex-plication.13 Aquinas discusses the doctrine in a refined systematic way sothat the very order of the presentation helps to express the theologicalmeaning of the mystery. This means that the discussion of providence

found in the Summa Theologiae affords us both methodological andsubstantive elements worthy of recovery and imitation. Perhaps mostimportant for the argument I have been trying to make, the doctrine ofprovidence is worked out as an expression of the Godworld relationthat only a Creator could have.

THE EXAMPLE OF THOMAS AQUINAS, PART I:

HIS METHOD OF DISCUSSING PROVIDENCE

In his mature systematic exposition of theology known as the SummaTheologiae, Aquinas does something rather unusual in his discussion ofdivine providence, something he does not do either for any other doctrinetreated in this Summa, or for any other discussion of providence in hisother systematic expositions of theology. Despite his stated pedagogicalgoal to avoid the repetition of questions which brings weariness andconfusion to students,14 he discusses this doctrine twice, both timesin the first volume of the work, yet each in rather different contexts.The first appearance occurs within the discussionDe essentia Dei onthe essence of God (STI, qq. 226). In an examination of what must betrue of God or better, what cannot be true of him given the necessitythat the world owes its existence to him, Aquinas raises questions ondivine providence (q. 22) and predestination (qq. 2324). The context istheological, for in a real sense the questions are asking whether and howGod is provident. These questions concern the character of God, and areanswered on the basis of what God is and how he acts. Providence is

discussed as an eternal reality in God; it is his own wisdom and willtowards creation which intends and orders to bring the world to its endor final perfection. Providence is not something additional in God or anaspect of his knowledge and will, but, owing to the perfect simplicity ofGod, truly is the wisdom and will of God regarding the good of creation.Aquinas simply uses the termprovidentia to name this distinction in the



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divine mystery, defining it as the type of the order of creation to itsend.15 That is to say, providence in this first, theological, sense, is thepattern of the order of creation to its destiny always present in the divineintelligence and will of God.

The second time Aquinas discusses the mystery of providence is someeighty questions later, when the discussion has moved on to that of thenature of creation. He devotes a series of seventeen questions to thissecond sense, which he calls divine government. It occurs as the thirdand final section (STI, qq. 103119) of the discussion of creation (STI,qq. 44119). The context this time is not theological, but cosmological i.e., in terms of the created order of the universe. No longer discussingthe divine nature or the procession of the divine persons in the Trinity,Aquinas has moved on to an examination of the external procession of

all things from God (cf. q. 44, prologue). In the treatise on creation, thediscussion still involves God, since he is the one who produces all thingsin their existence and diversity, and through the created teleologicalorder guides all creatures to their end. Yet whatis being explained is notGod but creation, and so the understanding sought is that which is inaccordance with the nature of the world as we find it. Thus creation isdefined not so much as the initial productive act on Gods part, but ratheras the real, inherent and abiding relation of all things to God their origin.Likewise, divine government is defined as the execution in time, in our

reality, of the eternal type of the order by which God guides all things totheir ultimate end to nothing other than God himself.16 Given the onto-logical status of the universe through the divine act of creation, divinegovernment not only occurs within created reality, but occurs throughthe contribution of creatures themselves.17 Natural agents participate inthe exercise of divine governance through their own proper and genuinelyresponsible causality, directing other things to their end by helping toproduce in them the greater perfection that God intends for them.Aquinas takes this participation on the part of creatures so seriously thatthe vast majority of the discussion of divine government more than threefourths of the questions is dedicated to explaining the contributive roleof creatures in the unfolding and execution of divine providence.18

Aquinas thus speaks twice of the mystery of providence, placingeach discussion in different contexts, the first theological and the secondcosmological. He has to do this because of his conviction of the funda-mental unequivalency of the terms in the Godworld relation.19 There isno doubt that he considers both God and creatures actively responsible

for how the mysterious ways of divine providence take shape in ourworld. But because he knows that the manner in which God acts is notthe manner in which creatures act, he cannot explain the contributionsof both kinds of agency in one context. For the conditions under whicheither operate and hence the intelligibility of their acting are not thesame. The only condition under which God acts is his own transcendent



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mystery, a perfect wisdom, goodness and freedom which are the equalof him. God acts in accordance with who and what he is in faith-fulness to the divine name, as the Scriptures put it. Yet creatures are notso unconditioned their manner of acting is in accordance with the

actual conditions of our universe, conditions freely created by God so thathe may accomplish his providential designs or purposes in and throughthe conditioned causality of creatures themselves.

This distinguished way of explaining the mystery has several pro-found advantages. First off, though, it should be made clear that byspeaking twice Aquinas is not simply repeating himself, even though henearly duplicates a few of his answers to several questions raised in bothcontexts.20 The two contexts really are of two radically different ordersof intelligibility. Providence in the first context has all the perfections of

God because it is the provident Godbeing discussed; yet providence inthe second context has all the features of this world because it refers tothe providential unfolding that is realized in this world. The first, pro-vidence simply, is eternal that is, simultaneously encompassing thewhole of created reality (all time, all space) in the simple, perfect andunending Now that is God.21 Providence in this sense is also the soleresponsibility of God, since it is the pattern in the divine mind and willfor the work of perfecting creation. The second sense, divine govern-ment, is temporal and the mutual co-responsibility of God and creatures.

Given this non-equivalency, Aquinas could only be accused of repeatinghimself if God and the world were simply the identical reality the veryposition the Christian doctrine of creation forbids outright.

The real advantage of discussing providence twice, once as a divinereality and once as a created reality, is that it avoids the pitfalls of con-fusion which result when one approaches the doctrine as a problem ofreconciling opposed terms. For certain things must be said about provid-ence because the mystery belongs and applies to God, while other claimsmust be made about it because it occurs in this world. Only with thistwofold sense a double affirmation of the authenticity of God andthe integrity of the world does one avoid conflating the attributes ofone term with the other, and denying some quality or aspect of the onebecause of the logic of understanding the other. Only by discussingprovidence in two different contexts once in accordance with the in-telligibility and dynamics of God, and once again in accordance with theintelligibility, dynamics and conditions of our universe does one respectthe uniqueness of the Creatorcreated relation. Only in such a dis-

tinguished approach does one hold firm to the mystery of the Godnessof God and the integrity of creatures, seeing both acting in a uniqueconcursus.22

The challenge in such an approach is the risk of a theological double-speak appearing simultaneously to hold and state seemingly contradictorypositions. To say, for example, that providence is both eternal and temporal,



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or perhaps even more inconsonant, that divine providence is perfectlyefficacious and infallible, and yet employs truly contingent causes togenerate truly chance outcomes. But I do not think that in discussingdivine providence this way the theologian speaks with a forked tongue.

For we should expect as much, when we remember to approach provid-ence not as a knotty problem we must solve, but as a mystery whosemeaning transcends us as it encompasses us.23 Double affirmationswhich seemingly contradict each other are to be expected if the integrityof each term is distinguished and respected. For there can be no realcontradiction when the terms are of entirely different orders of intelli-gibility; attributes proper to one are improper to the other because Godand world are not in some common genus, called reality as we knowit. So an affirmation, say, of perfect divine omniscience, because such

is the nature of the Creator, does not have to imply a denial of the trueunpredictability of future events, because such is the nature of this worldwith its random interaction of causes.24 The mystery of providence remains,and an unhelpful conflation is avoided, only when the theologianrecognizes the radical non-equivalency of the terms God and worldthat is the core implication of the Christian doctrine of God as Creator.

THE EXAMPLE OF THOMAS AQUINAS, PART II:

HIS UNDERSTANDING OF DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND GOVERNMENT

The distinction in the Summa Theologiae between providence and divinegovernment, therefore, is methodologically exemplary; its contemporaryrelevance lies in the fact that it approaches the Godworld relation withdue respect for the different dynamics of the Creator and creation. Yetthis methodological clarity is not the only evidence of how Aquinasgrounds providence in the doctrine that God is Creator and the world hiscreation. When one examines what he has to say substantively in eachof the discussions of divine providence and divine government, one alsofinds suggestions for how the mystery of providence can be intelligiblyexpressed today, given our enhanced understanding of the world. Let uslook at each discussion in turn in order to see what deserves retrievalbecause it is grounded in the doctrine of creation.

Divine providence in God

When Aquinas first raises the theological issue of whether God isprovident (ST I, q. 22), the immediate context for this discussion isthe wisdom (q. 14) and will (q. 19) of God. He raises the question ofprovidence after and in explicit relation to the discussion of both ofthese divine operations.25 Because the order of questions in the SummaTheologiae is so carefully determined according to a systematic



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arrangement in which the more fundamental questions are discussedfirst this order of treatment suggests some key points about howprovidence in God is to be understood. Significantly, Aquinas does notsee providence simply as a question of the will of God. Rather, it has as

much a relation to divine intelligence as it does to divine choice. Indeed,because Aquinas discusses divine knowledge before he discusses divinewilling, he does not ever consider the will whether divine or human to be without relation to intelligence and truth. The will for him is anintellectual appetite; its nature is to desire and enjoy the good as known.26

Its most fundamental characteristic therefore is not its arbitrariness (i.e.,that it is not determined to any specific possibility), but that throughwisdom it is ordered to the truly good. Yes, a voluntary agent is free, butthat freedom is expressed not in mere choice but in the agent choosing

well, an act of the will that presupposes the intelligent grasp of what istruly worth while and good.

In the case of divine providence, we see how the determinations of thedivine will are characterized by divine wisdom and goodness whenAquinas insists that the powerful and infallible efficacy of the divinewill is no justification for saying that all events in creation happen neces-sarily. Rather, he says that efficacy of the divine will actually serves asjustification for upholding genuinely contingent outcomes in the world,on account that God acts not only to cause something to happen, but also

acts to establish the way it happens.

Since then the divine will is perfectly efficacious, it follows not only that things aredone, which God wills to be done, but also that they are done in the way that he wills.Now God wills some things to be done necessarily, some contingently, to the rightordering of things, for the building up of the universe (STI, q. 19, a. 8).

The right ordering of things is attributable to Gods wisdom, andthe building up of the universe refers to the good that God intends inwilling this world. The reason for either cannot be reduced to theabsolute freedom and power of the divine will. Indeed, the divine choiceto create fallible causes which may or may not produce their effect makesno sense in terms of mere power and will, since the failure of a true goodto occur in creation can readily seem to indicate that Gods will has beenthwarted. Upholding the infallible power of God cannot be the only theo-logical concern. Appeal must be made to the divine perfections of wisdomand good purpose if the actual conditions of this world are to berespected and given their place within the plan of the Creator.

Hence, providence is not to be understood primarily in terms of Godspower. This is confirmed in that Aquinas raises the question of pro-vidence before he discusses divine power (q. 25), the very sequence ofquestions again being significant. What this systematic priority of divineprovidence over divine might indicates is that one must understand Godspower in the context of divine providence. The divine wisdom to be



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benevolent to creation is the appropriate presupposition for the exerciseof divine power. This means that the more fundamental theologicalquestion is not what God can or cannot do, but the providential purposeof what God does. It signifies that the question of divine causality or

responsibility in the world is not a naked question, for one must alsoraise the manner in which God has providently arranged for the effect tooccur. More fundamental and important are the wise ways God accom-plishes the further goods in creation, than the freedom and power of Godto do anything he wishes because of his almighty will.

Thus for Aquinas, the meaning and characteristics of Gods providenceare best expressed in terms of the wisdom and goodness of God, not inmere will or naked power. What all this excludes is any possibility of anominalist understanding of Gods providential relation to the world, in

which the intelligibility or wisdom which informs and gives character toGods will and power is disavowed in the name of the transcendent free-dom of the Creator. Divine wisdom and benevolence, not omnipotence,are the most illustrative characteristics of the provident God. Con-sequently, providence is best defined as an order to end, the notion oforder expressing the wisdom of the Creator, and the notion of end orgreater goodness expressing the benevolent will God has for creation.Providence in God is his wisdom and will to order creation to the bestgood, the most fitting end nothing less than the greatest possible par-

ticipation in the goodness of God himself (STI, q. 103, a. 2). The bestanalogy for providence in God is the legislative prudence (not thepower) of the virtuous governor, the practical wisdom lawmakers needto make good, effective laws which order well all the citizens to thecommon good of the society.27

Divine government in creationFrom the first discussion of providence in the Summa Theologiae wehave now seen the contribution its rich and substantive theologicalportrait of the provident God can offer to contemporary explication ofthe doctrine. Further insights and suggestions can be gleaned from theSummas second treatment, on divine government. Because this discus-sion occurs within the treatise on creation, Aquinas is clearly still fol-lowing the foundational approach in Scripture and the early tradition ofdiscussing providence in the light of God the Creator of the world. In thiscase it means understanding all of reality as created, as fundamentallyrelated to God as to its origin and end. For Aquinas, creation is this

relation to God its origin (ST I, q. 45, a. 2). Yet this universe cannotbe created by God unless it is ordered back to him, back to the divinegoodness (q. 44, a. 4). This is why Aquinas cannot complete the treatiseon creation without including the discussion of divine government.One can say that divine government is the ongoing realization of therelation creation has to God its end.



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In Aquinass perspective, divine government, or providence in theworld, takes the form of the ordered activity of all creatures for the sakeof emergent greater goodness. The way all things in this world actexhibits an order which dynamically unites cause and effect, means to

end, part to greater whole, individual creature to good of the species, andthe entire diversity of creatures unto one common good, the fullnessof the universe. This good is to be realized through the actions of allcreatures in pursuit of their own proper perfection, and through highercreatures, endowed with greater faculties, acting as ministers in divinegovernment to promote the good of lesser creatures. Gods glory isdemonstrated in the world by creatures fulfilling their potential, and inbecoming more truly like God by acting as the true cause of anothersgood (STI, q. 103, a. 4). In this way the greater good to be realized in

creation is ordained unto Gods own goodness, who proves how goodhe is to creation when, to the greatest degree possible, it imitates andparticipates in Gods own transcendent goodness.

Now this realization of the greater goodness of creation requires divinedirecting that is, a Governor who acts to guide creatures to their greatergood (STI, q. 103, a. 1). It is by acting to ensure such an attainment thatGod proves himself a true steward of his creation by successfully com-pleting the work he has begun in creating. Two points, however, mustbe made clear about how this divine guidance comes about. First, divine

government is not that there might be an order to creation, but is theresult and realization of a universal order God himself creates.28 God doesnot bring about unity and harmony by managing many disparate agentsto work together; divine government is not the herding of individualthings into a cohesive unit. Rather, God governs through the one universalorder to creation that is prior to, or, better, underlies, the nature andactivity of all creatures. Because everything has been made in the lightof the good of the whole, when anything acts in accordance with its ownindividual dynamics, it thereby contributes to the good of others and theperfection of the whole. In this way all things work together on accountof the one order God has created.29

Second, there is no hint anywhere in this treatise that God guidesby controlling by influencing individual things from the outside.Gods guidance and direction arises from the very being of things, in theconcrete way they act in accordance with the intelligibility of theirnatures. Providence advances through the ordered activity of creatures,not by constant divine interventions.30 It is because natural causes act

repeatedly for specific, good results that Aquinas says their activity isguided or directed by God.31 Such regular patterns of activity, productiveof better states of existence, are part of the fundamental intelligibility ofnature that science finds so investigable. But considered theologically that is, in the light of the goodness of God these specified resultsindicate wisdom and purpose on Gods part, who has arranged it that



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some further good comes about precisely through that natural activity.Creatures are responsible for what they accomplish, but that theseresults are good for them and for others is not their doing; it is theplanning of God. In acting for the good they fulfil that plan, and confirm

that God has guided them to a natural result established by him on theirbehalf. In this way God accomplishes his providence through the activityof creatures.32

Thus, God as Governor continues the work begun by him as Creator.God has given all creatures a nature dynamically oriented towardsgreater good, and therefore the world cannot be reduced simply to whatGod has initially made it to be. By endowing creatures with the facultiesand power to achieve a greater perfection, God grants them a greaterdignity than they could have simply as passive recipients of divinely-

wrought goodness. Creatures gain a greater likeness to God when theyact as causes, becoming truly responsible for the further good of othercreatures and gaining a share in the ministry of divine government.33 Forthese reasons, divine government implies that the good of every creatureis not fully realized simply by its existence. A creatures true perfectionis what it can actively become, including an agent that can bringabout good in another. What the Creator has done is create everythingunfinished, as it were, with the natural orientation to realize a greatergood that comes only through created activity.34

Clearly, Aquinas explains divine government in terms of an orderunto goodness, metaphysically understood. It is the created order whichserves as the intermediary for explaining the relation between the activityof God (the concern of the Scriptures) and the activity of individualcreatures (the concern of modern science). The dynamics of this orderis best explained in terms of the causal categories of metaphysics, notscience, because the order underlies natural agency. In giving expressionto the fundamental order of the universe, metaphysics refers to theintelligible ground science presupposes, not the particular mechanics ofnatural causes which science examines. The created order as the nexusbetween divine and created agency is explained metaphysically in thatall natural agency occurs as secondary causality made actual by God thefirst cause. This nexus is also metaphysical in that through the createdorder God acts as the final cause, so that the resultant specificity orfinality of any secondary causal action is always a participation in thesupreme goodness of God. Conceiving God as the universally active firstand final cause of creation is to employ a metaphysical understanding of

causality, not a scientific one.It is important to gain some appreciation for the explanatory value ofmetaphysics, not just because the propriety of its usage has often beenquestioned, but primarily in order to see how in Aquinass thoughtit serves to express an understanding of this world as a created andprovidential reality. In making use of the thought of Aristotle, Aquinas



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accepted his arguments rejecting determinism that not everything wasnecessarily caused, nor even that every effect had a proper cause. As aconsequence, his theological task became how to show that God hasbiblically revealed universal providence over a world of contingent and

casual events.35

In this regard, Aquinas goes beyond Aristotle, who onthe basis of theper accidens of earthly events concluded that God couldnot have perfect providence over all things.36 Aquinas did this by modify-ing and supplementing Aristotelian metaphysics, namely by laying pri-mary emphasis not upon Aristotles form and matter but upon the act ofexistence, a ubiquitous fact that Aristotle took for granted, but Aquinas,in light of the revelation of the worlds creation, could not. This changein focus allowed Aquinas to express metaphysically how the God of theScriptures acts in relation to the world. Instead of Aristotles unmoved

Mover who is neither Creator of the world (for prime matter was neces-sary and without origin) nor much exercised over its outcomes, Aquinasunderstands God as the pure Act of existence, always freely extendingor diffusing to creation a participation in his existence and goodness.

As a consequence, Aquinas changed the criteria for consideringwhether something was subject to divine providence. Whether an eventwas providential was not dependent upon how it came about (if by propercause, yes; if by accidental cause, no), but simply thatit came about. Bythe writing of the Summa Theologiae Aquinas maintains that to the

extent that a thing exists, to that extent it is subject to Gods providence(STI, q. 22, a. 2). This is because he knows that absolutely nothing canexist apart from the Creators wisdom and good will, which must actprudently and purposefully. Merely the fact of existence, not its havinga necessary or proper natural cause, is sufficient indication in itself thatan event falls within the one providential order established by the Creator,to whom all things must ultimately be related. Aquinass metaphysicalexplanation of God as first and final cause is his way of expressing thisuniversal reach of Gods providential agency manifested through theubiquity of existence. Thus, Aquinas employs a metaphysical understand-ing of divine agency precisely in order to convey the Judaeo-Christianteaching that God is the Creator of the entire world, who remains every-where active in it, and whose authority and governance extends universallyto every single detail in it.37

The advantage of using metaphysics in explaining Gods providentialactivity remains for today because modern science has only confirmedthe ordered, non-deterministic and at times random character of the

natural world. This is to be expected, because in finding the world to bea combination of order and contingency, or non-necessary intelligibility,science verifies what the doctrine of creation implies.38 Now althoughAquinas did not have the cosmology of modern science, his meta-physical explanation of providence is fully recognizant of contingencyand even chance outcomes in the world.39 His challenge to link the biblical



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God of universal agency with a dynamic and contingent universe is thesame one facing a contemporary theology of providence. Here meta-physics can still prove helpful, since by being distinct from scientificexplanation, it can give expression to divine agency in a manner that

does not make it equivalent to a kind of natural agency. When properlyunderstood and employed, this philosophy of being can still express howthe God of the Scriptures, who is providentially active everywhere in hiscreation, acts in the world without dominating that world or manipu-lating its causes. With its notions of first and final causality, metaphysicsoffers a way to explain how Gods ongoing activity in the world, the cruxof the Scriptural portrait of God, is the true and necessary foundationfor the genuine integrity of natural causality, the sine qua non of modernscientific cosmology.40

Thus, appeal to the universal order of creation proves indispensablefor developing a contemporary understanding of providence becausedivine activity can be expressed in a manner consistent with, but notreducible to, modern scientific explanations of natural activity. Further-more, precisely because the explanatory framework is an order untogoodness, it transcends scientific talk that limits itself to material andefficient causality. This keeps a contemporary theology of divine provid-ence, consonant with the discoveries of modern science, from the dangerof becoming restricted to the intra-worldly categories and concepts

science allows. These will always be insufficient to express the wisdomand good purpose of the divine Agent, as well as the transcendent hopethat is beyond science but not the human heart. Only the notion of auniversal, teleological order to creation permits the theologian to speakintelligibly of things and events in this world in a way the scientist neverdoes: namely, as good, not just as caused. While acknowledging eventsas indeed conditioned by the immanent, providence must go further thanscience to indicate how events are ordered to the transcendent. Therefore,if a contemporary theology of providence is to point men and women totheir ultimate destiny, it must also employ the language of philosophy togive intelligible expression to the ordered goodness of reality. It mustagain have the perspective of the Creator who, reviewing everythinghe had made, knows it to be very good (Genesis 1:31). In so doing, thedoctrine of providence can once again challenge a truncated cosmologythat assumes the world is explainable in its own terms, and expectshuman beings to content themselves with wholly natural destinies.

CONCLUSION

In contrast to post-nominalism theologies of providence which tended,in deference to the absolute power of the divine will, to discount the truecausal responsibility of natural and human agents, Aquinas accepts the



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evident ways of the world which constitute the data of modern scientificinvestigations. Not only does he give secondary causality, natural andhuman, an important theological justification divine magnanimity healso gives it a theological character: created causality is the medium by

which God accomplishes the designs of his providence. And yet unlikecosmologists beholden to scientism and natural materialism, Aquinas isnot at all inclined to assume that the genuine integrity and responsibilityof natural causality completely excludes any activity on Gods part. Whatresults from natural processes and genuine human agency is neitherindependent of God who is its first and universal agent, nor withoutrelation or reference to God who is its ultimate and most desirable end.Gods role is vital, ongoing and necessary because all natural causes andconditions in this universe are createdrealities. As created, they depend

upon the act of God not only to come into existence, but also to remainin existence, to actually cause, and to act with order, that is, productively.Thus, because they are created realities, they require Gods providentialgovernance to remain what they are and do what they can do.

In upholding the relatedness of all things to their Creator and Governorin a manner which affirms their causal responsibility, Aquinass theologyof providence is biblically rooted and yet congenial to current cosmology.This double resonance requires above all else a clear distinction betweenhow God is understood and how the world is understood, in order to

avoid conflating divine and natural agency, while preserving the dynamicsof each. God acts in a manner reflective of his greatness, in order thatcreatures act with genuine integrity, so that together they further thedesigns of providence in and through the actual conditions of this world.As the doctrine of creation requires, God and the world are distinguishedin order to relate them properly, in a unique manner that is not at allcomparable to any Triune relation within God or any causal relationwithin the world. In order to give true expression to this unique relationof distinct but linked terms, the theologian is wise to follow the stillexemplary method of Aquinas, and discuss the questions of divine pro-vidence, or the dynamics across that relation, in two separate contexts.By discussing the provident God theologically, and the realization ofprovidence cosmologically, the theologian prolongs the veritable Christiantradition of explaining the mystery of divine providence upon the basisof the theology of God the Creator.41

Notes

1 For a discussion of creation and providence in the Scriptures, see Leo Scheffczyk, Creationand Providence (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970), pp. 346.

2 For a discussion of divine providence in patristic thought, see G. L. Prestige, God in PatristicThought(London: SPCK, 1936), pp. 5575; and Scheffczyk, Creation, pp. 47105.

3 For a representative example of the patristic defence of the doctrine of providence, see Theodoretof Cyrus on Divine Providence [Ancient Christian Writers, vol. 49], trans. by Thomas Halton (NewYork: Newman Press, 1988).



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4 Edward Grant, Science and Theology in the Middle Ages in David C. Lindberg and RonaldL. Numbers (eds.), God and Nature: Historical Essays on the Encounter between Christianity andScience (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 1986), pp. 4975. For nominalismsreconception of the doctrine of creation, see Scheffczyk, Creation, pp. 15471.

5 As a result of their belief in the radical sovereignty of God, the Reformers rejectedAristotles view of nature as having intrinsic powers. In place of the Aristotelian definition of nature

as the principle of motion and change, the Reformers conceived of nature as entirely passive. Forthem the Word or command of God is the only active principle in the world (Gary B. Deason,Reformation Theology and the Mechanistic Conception of Nature in Lindberg et al., God and

Nature, pp. 16791, at p. 177).6 Providence, as a theological concept, has no part to play for Luther, it lacks all vibrancy and

vitality (W. Koehler,Dogmengeschichte als Geschichte des christlichen Selbstbewusstseins, 1951,II, p. 150; quoted in Scheffczyk, Creation, p. 177, n. 13). It is also not important for Melanchthon(ibid., p. 176), just as it had been neglected earlier by Duns Scotus (ibid., p. 160) and William ofOckham: Naturally enough, Ockham is uninterested in any separate treatment of Gods Providenceand governance of the world. When all that counts is Gods omnipotence, Providence can only bea minor part of that tremendous will (ibid., p. 168).

7 In accordance with his conception of God as chiefly majestic and austere (ChristianInstitutes III, Bk. 20, ch. 17), Calvins doctrine of creation exalts the might and condescension ofthe Creator rather than the grandeur of what he makes. Impressed as he is by the utter majestyof God, Calvin also makes much of the power of his will: God could have created men as dogs hadhe pleased. This idea of God sets the tone of the doctrine on providence, which is closely bound upwith creation but at the same time is seen in terms of faith. Here too the might of Gods will is suchas to exclude any autonomy for secondary causes, and sin is said to accomplish the divine will(Scheffczyk, Creation, p. 177). Calvin discusses providence in Bk. 1, chs. 5, 1618, and predestina-tion in Bk. 3, chs. 2124. With him there is a certain arbitrariness of the divine will vis--vis theworkings of nature: [I]n overruling all things, [the Providence of God] works at one time withmeans, at another without means, and at another against means (Bk. 3, ch. 17, 1;Institutes of theChristian Religion, vol. 2, trans. by Henry Beveridge [Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1966],

p. 183).8 Such reductions occurred in the de auxiliis controversy among Catholics, and the issues ofpredestination and irresistible grace among Protestants.

9 These classifications are taken from a very suggestive argument on how nominalism broughtabout a fundamental reconception of human freedom and ethics, found in Servais Pinckaers,The Sources of Christian Ethics, trans. by Mary Thomas Noble (Washington, D.C: Catholic Univ.of America Press, 1995), pp. 32753.

10 The will of an all-knowing and all-powerful God came more and more to be regarded as athreat to true human autonomy, serving to justify the claims by nineteenth-century atheistic philo-sophers for an emancipation of human self-identity from the very idea of God. This shift toward ananthropology of radical autonomy helped foster modernitys pervasive secularism, in which theworld has lost the theonomous character that the Christian doctrine of providence traditionally

supplied. Cf. Walter Kasper, The God of Jesus Christ, trans. by Matthew J. OConnell (New York:Crossroad, 1997), pp. 1646.

11 This ironically makes the kenosis of the Incarnation rather pointless, for if in relation to theworld God cannot be great in his divinity, one wonders why a further humiliation is required in hisbecoming human.

12 A recent work on providence which exemplifies this tendency to see providence as a problemof reconciliation, resolved by upholding the autonomous integrity of the world at the cost of the trueattributes of God the Creator, is The God Who Risks: A Theology of Providence by John Sanders(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1998). He discounts divine omniscience and universalsovereignty in order to preserve natural causality and human responsibility. The conclusions of thatwork are based upon a false premise that affirmations of the traditional attributes of God must involvenegations of the true integrity and characteristics of the natural order, an assumption I find ultimately

traceable to nominalisms corrosion of the true meaning and dynamics of the Creatorcreated relation.13 St Thomas has been accused, indeed, of presenting mere unscriptural metaphysics, in

particular a doctrine on creation that is largely natural theology. But to bring such charges is to failto see beneath the surface. It is perfectly true, of course, that Thomas translated the biblical truthof Creation into more decidedly Aristotelian terms than anyone had done before. No one can allegethat the translation diminished the basic truths concerning Creation that have been revealed to us(Scheffczyk, Creation, pp. 1501). [For more on this point, see pp. 11ff.] Scheffczyk does express



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a dissatisfaction, however, with using metaphysical language to express the doctrine, but his chargethat in the Thomist presentation the doctrine of creation is not seen in terms of saving history,within a wider perspective [of] redemption and the consummation of the world (p. 151) isaccurate only if one ignores the whole schema of the Summa Theologiae itself. No mention of thesethemes is made explicitly within the treatise on creation itself, but as its treatment lays thegroundwork for the discussion of human destiny and salvation which follow, the interrelation of

these doctrines is implied in the very structure of the work.14 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae [ST], 5 vols (Ottawa: Studii Generalis O. Pr., 1941)

[Piana text of 1570 with some Leonine variants], Prima pars [I], opening prologue. English trans-lation: Summa Theologica, 3 vols, trans. by Fathers of the English Domincan Province (New York:Benzinger Brothers, Inc., 1947).

15 STI, question [q.] 22, article [a.] 1: Ratio autem ordinandorum in finem proprie providentiaest. This notion ofratio or type serves to indicate what is found in the intelligence of an agentwho acts with wisdom and purpose that is, intelligently. Examples of this intelligent fore-typedetermining the action would be the blueprint conceived by the architect for the building of the house,or the artists creative idea which comes to realization only in the actual production of the paintingor sculpture. These are examples of creative or artistic types, but the kind Aquinas means here is aprovidential or prudential type the predetermination of a wise way of acting that is successful insecuring the end desired such as a business plan or travel itinerary. But in either case, one shouldrealize that these created examples are at best only analogies for the types found in the divineintelligence, for they have certain inherent limitations or imperfections that do not apply to God e.g., the element of temporal precedence by which the plan exists before its execution. For thelimitations of considering divine providence as a plan, cf. John H. Wright, The Eternal Plan ofDivine Providence, Theological Studies 27 (1966), pp. 2257. It should be stated that, for Aquinas,providence as an eternal type in no way prevents the real contributions of creatures in divinegovernment, contributions that occur according to the conditions and dynamics found in this world,including chance, contingency and, for human agents, freedom.

16 STI, q. 103, a. 3: gubernatio nihil aliud est quam directio gubernatorum ad finem, qui estaliquod bonum: government is nothing but the directing of the governed to the end, which is

some good. That this good is the divine goodness of God himself, see q. 103, a. 2.17 STI, q. 103, a. 6 (cf. I, q. 22, a. 3).18 STI, qq. 10619. This amounts to 13 out of the 17 questions in the whole treatise, or 76%.19 In order to maintain a consistency of expression I will continue to use the phrase Godworld

relation even while explaining Aquinass theology of providence. Aquinas denied, of course, thatGod had a real or necessary relation to the world (cf. STI, q. 6, a. 2, reply to first objection [ad 1];q. 13, a. 7; q. 28, a. 1, ad 3; q. 45, a. 3, ad 1). I subscribe to this metaphysical judgement whichrecognizes that God and creation are not of the same order of reality or intelligibility (q. 13, a. 7),and therefore cannot be said to relate to each other in the same way. The ultimate point of this denialis simply to preserve the transcendent freedom of the Creator who does not need the world to beGod. Yet Aquinas also holds that creation has, or, better, is, a real and necessary relation to God(ST I, q. 45, a. 3), for without God creating it and sustaining it in existence, it is nothing. This

relation is a one-way dependence of creation on God; it is not mutual or co-defining. And yet, thevery dependence of creation upon God implies that there must be a corresponding extension orapplication of Gods Act to creation. Thus, the denial in God of a real relation to creation does notat all imply an absence of divine regard or involvement vis--vis creation. In fact, the denial of anecessary relation in God to creation and the affirmation of a necessary relation in creation to Godcan only mean that God is the apogee of activity in relation to the world. What I mean, therefore,by Gods relation to the world is this creative, sustaining and directing activity that has theproduction, ongoing existence, and ultimate good of creation as its term.

20 The most nearly identical answer found in both treatises is that given to explain the basis forthe twofold discussion. Aquinas argues that God has immediate providence over all things, in thesense that he alone is responsible for the planning of creations order to end; but God realizes thisplan in a mediatedmanner that is, he exercises his government through the mediation of creatures.

The explanation of this distinction occurs in both discussions: STI, q. 22, a. 3 and I, q. 103, a. 6.21 STI, q. 22, a. 1; cf. I, q. 10, aa. 1 & 2.22 Elizabeth A. Johnson, Does God Play Dice? Divine Providence and Chance, Theological

Studies 57 (1996), pp. 318, at p. 13. This article presents a fine summary of Aquinass under-standing of how God and creatures act together in the world as a concurrence of first and secondarycausality. Yet I disagree with her overall argument calling for a reconception of providence,away from that of God as a sovereign Governor realizing through divine foresight his transcendent



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purpose for the world. Her suggestion, that in his providence God is like a master theatricalimprovisor and risk-taking cosmic gambler who awaits to see what novelties appear in creation,is problematic precisely because God has no greater end to accomplish, and hence no guidance ordirection to give. She advocates this revision on account of the new cosmology developed bymodern science, which has shown the world to develop by random and thus inherentlyindeterminate processes. Yet though Aquinas did not have the cosmology of recent science, none

the less he did acknowledge that chance or casual outcomes did occur in the world. But unlikeJohnson, he never considered an indeterminate chance outcome, unintended by any natural cause,to mean that it must also be unintended and not foreknown by God in his providence (cf. ST I,q. 22, a. 2, ad 1). For given the distinction and non-equivalency of God and the world, an inescapablelimitation in the created order none the less implies no restriction to the divine perfections by whichGod relates to the world. In other words, if Johnson remained consistent to the Thomist principleshe herself appropriates, that the divinecreated concursus means that the divine Agent and createdagent operate on completely different levels (p. 12), she would not need to argue that genuineindeterminacy in the world prevents God from acting purposefully.

23 For more on the significant differences between these divergent approaches, see GabrielMarcel, The Mystery of Being, 1: Reflection and Mystery [The Gifford Lectures, 1949], trans. byG. S. Fraser (Chicago: H. Regnery, 1960), pp. 20419. Far from excusing the task of theologicalexplanation, this proper acknowledgement of mystery increases the amount of work the theologianmust do. For the mystery of providence lies in the uniqueness of the Creatorcreation relation,where two radically different realities exercise a relation of co-operation, each in a mannerconsistent with its own proper dynamics. Thus the theologian has to explain without conflationwhat is meant by God and what is meant by creation, before he or she can expect to do justice tohow the two stand in the dynamic relation expressed by the doctrine of providence.

24 For Aquinas, Gods knowledge of the whole of creation, from its beginning to its completion,from its general laws to its intricate particularities, is utterly perfect and complete (ST I, q. 14,aa. 6, 912). What is more, since everything in creation must be in some sense willed by God orit would not exist, God, in freely deciding to will this creation, eternally wills all things in it, eitherdirectly, as contributing to something greater, or by permission, because he can bring greater good

from it. Yet that all things are known by God and in some sense willed by him does not mean thatGod is the exclusive determiner of all that occurs, because he has granted to creatures true causaldetermination of their effects. What every effect will be truly depends upon its causes to holdotherwise is simply to disparage the wisdom and benevolence of the Creator to order and bestowsuch responsibility (STI, q. 22, a. 3). None the less, Gods knowledge of any effect is not attendantupon its determination by the secondary cause, for two reasons. First, because time is Godscreation, not condition, so his knowledge is not sequential and incremental, but simultaneous andwhole (STI, q. 10, a. 1; q. 14, aa. 7 & 9). In his eternity all things are present to God in their presentactuality, and thus God is always knowing every determination produced by every cause, notbeforehand, not after the fact, but in its very occurrence. Secondly, and more fundamentally, Godis the author, not the observer, of every cause, as well as the creator of the whole interactive causalnetwork which is the universe. He knows all the conditions, all the contributors, all the com-

binations knowledge not possible to any knower within the system. Their existence and operationare grounded in his omniscience because all things could not possibly function in so ordered amanner as they evidently do unless God knowingly produced the universe, with full foresight of notjust the possibilities but the actual outcomes (since later possibilities depend upon previousdeterminations). Created reality is the effect, not the cause, of Gods knowledge (STI, q. 14, a. 8).To hold otherwise is to condition God, limit the foresight essential to his providence, and to denythat God is the Creator ofall things, since then outcomes unknown to him and his creative intentionhave come to be (cf. STI, q. 15, a. 2; q. 22, a. 1).

25 STI, q. 22, prologue: Having considered all that relates to the [divine] will absolutely, wemust now proceed to those things which have relation to both the intellect and the will, namelyprovidence

26 Even more so, the greatest desire the will of an intelligent being can have is the desire for the

good of knowing intelligible truth, the desire to know and rest in the knowledge of what is true.Good and truth are convertible, transcendental, terms for Aquinas; not only is everything goodto the extent it is true, but everything that is true is for that reason good and desirable.

27 ST I, q. 22, a. 1. For more on the nature of human prudence and its various kinds, cf.STII-II, qq. 4951. In the light of these two references, as well as that of discussion of Gods eternallaw (STI-II, q. 91, a. 1 & q. 93), it becomes clear that the best analogy for divine providence inGod is regnative (kingly, sovereign) or legislative prudence in the governor or lawmaker.



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28 In created things good is found not only as regards their substance [i.e., their intrinsic orderor constitution], but also as regards their order towards an end and especially their last end, which,as was said above [q. 21, a. 4], is the divine goodness. This good of order existing in things created,is itself created by God (STI, q. 22, a. 1; cf. q. 15, a. 2).

29 For Aquinas, even contrary natural results (e.g., hot or cold, generation or dissolution, etc.),though opposed to one another, demonstrate one common order (STI, q. 103, a. 3, ad 2). They do

so in that every cause seeks its own determinate effect, and those effects cumulatively contributeto the diverse fullness of the universe, and individually participate in the one supreme goodness ofGod which can be most fittingly reflected only by a created diversity that includes inequality andcontraries (STI, q. 22, a. 4; q. 44, aa. 1 & 2). The dissimilarity of movements [changes] is causedby the diversity of things moved, which diversity is essential to the perfection of the universe (STI,q. 103, a. 3, ad 1). Thus, agents and effects which are contraries in relation to one another are nonethe less complementary in relation to the one common order and ultimate goodness of the universe.

30 There is a fundamental difference between the views of St Thomas and of later theologianson the certitude of divine providence. To the latter, providence was certain in all cases because itwas certain in each, because each and every action of the creature required some special divineintervention. But to St Thomas providence was certain in each case because it was the cause of allcases: the mover [i.e., cause] moves the moved [i.e., effect] if the pair are in the right mutualrelation, disposition, proximity; the mover does not, if any other cause prevents the fulfilment ofthis condition; but both the combinations that result in motion and the interferences that prevent itmust ultimately be reduced to God who is universal cause, and therefore divine providence cannotbe frustrated. The ground of this evident difference lies in the fact that, while later theologianswere preoccupied with divine control of free will, St Thomas was preoccupied with the Aristoteliantheorem that all terrestrial activity is contingent (Bernard J. F. Lonergan, Grace and Freedom:Operative Grace in the Thought of St Thomas Aquinas [New York: Herder and Herder, 1971],pp. 767).

31 STI, q. 2, a. 3 (the fifth way taken from the governance of the world). All results thatarise from change are specified (or else they would not be, nor be intelligible). They are also good(even when the result, relative to us, is harmful), because that which was not now is, precisely

because of that causal activity. Whatever exists, is in that sense good, since existence is better thannon-existence, and conversely, whatever is good is so precisely in that it is actual ( STI, q. 5, a. 3).In the created order, neither of these statements is tautological, because there is no intrinsic neces-sity whatsoever why anything should exist at all, as well as why any outcome should always in someway prove beneficial or advantageous. It is all too easy to take for granted that nature is intelligible,as science presupposes, but that does not mean that such ubiquitous intelligibility does not itselfdeserve explanation. Likewise, natural activity is productive of better states (for why else would theagent bother?), yet the very fact that natural causes are not themselves intelligent or intentional intheir acting is also indicative that a further explanation is wanting.

32 There can never be a conflict between divine first and created secondary agency because thelatter is entirely dependent upon the former. Not only does no creature exist apart from God creat-ing and sustaining it (STI, q. 104, a. 1), so also no creatures operation exists apart from God moving

that creature to its act (q. 105, a. 5). Additionally, no creatures operation can be outside of the orderof the universe established by God (q. 103, aa. 7 & 8), and hence, apart from Gods guidance asfinal cause. Given that the very natures of all things are grounded in this order produced by divinegoodness, for a creature to act apart or outside this order would be as possible as a creature to act apartfrom its own nature (in which case scientific knowledge would cease).

33 ST I, q. 22, a. 3; cf. q. 103, a. 6. To make creatures truly responsible for anothers goodmeans, of course, that God knows and in some sense wills that some goods will fail to arise becauseof the weakness or irresponsibility of the mediating secondary cause. In planning to make creaturescausally responsible for the good of others, God has intentionally chosen fallible instruments of hisprovidence. It would seem, then, that God has handicapped himself accordingly. But this is not howAquinas sees the matter. For in seeing divine government as worked out through the one universalorder of creation, he understands that God intends the good of the whole universe over any par-

ticular good. What this allows is that since the goodness of the whole is served by a great diversityof kinds of causes and effects, both the successes and the failures of particular causes contribute tothat end. For whenever any particular cause fails, it is only because another, contrary cause, hassucceeded. Gods providence is not thwarted by the failure of any created secondary agent, since inhis wisdom he has arranged that that failure occur because of the success of an interfering cause,whose effect God also wills (cf. q. 103, a. 7). Since contingent effects occur only when conditionsare favourable, the various patterns of causal facilitation or inhibition generate tremendously diverse



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possibilities within the one created order and indicate Gods seriousness in giving each agent agenuine contribution to the full actuality of the universe.

34 None the less, God is very much indeed active in all that happens, as the first cause of allcausality i.e., the ongoing creating condition for the very possibility of anything acting. He is alsooperative as the ultimate good or end which all things seek, the point of it all which makesanything ultimately intelligible. Thus what results from natural processes and genuine human agency

is not independent of God in two senses: God as the first and universal agent of every secondaryagent, and God as the ultimate and most desirable end that makes anything worth while andeverything ordered.

35 In a study on how Aquinass thought on providence developed from his early to later writ-ings, Bernard McGinn shows that from the beginning Aquinas had always accepted contingencyand chance in the world, but that only towards the end did he affirm without qualification that divineprovidence extends over all events (The Development of the Thought of Thomas Aquinas on theReconciliation of Divine Providence and Contingent Action, Thomist 39 [1975], pp. 74152);cf. also note 30 above. By the writing of the Summa Theologiae Aquinas maintains that to the extentthat a thing exists, to that extent it is subject to Gods providence (STI, q. 22, a. 2).

36 McGinn, Development, pp. 7412, 752.37 Cf. STI, q. 22, a. 2, and q. 105, a. 5.38 Cf. Thomas F. Torrance,Divine and Contingent Order(Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1981),

ch. 3, Theological and Scientific World-Views, pp. 6284.39 On providence and contingency, cf. ST I, q. 22, a. 4 and q. 103, a. 7; on providence and

chance, cf. STI, q. 22, a. 2, corpus & ad 1, and q. 103, a. 5, ad 1 & a. 7, ad 2.40 Of course, any form of theological explanation, no matter how sophisticated, falls short in

elucidating divine mysteries; using metaphysics to explain Gods providence is no exception. Whilemetaphysics preserves the distinct and non-equivalent dynamics of divine and created agency bygiving expression to the one universal created order which functions as the intermediary betweenthem, it cannot by itself be adequate in explaining the mystery of providence, for two reasons. Thefirst is that expressing Gods ways of acting vis--vis creation as the first and final cause is betterable to refute arguments denying the perfection and universality of the Creators providence than

it is in shining light upon the unfathomable ways of God. Since the whole approach is one whichappeals to Gods transcendent greatness as the guarantee that divine providence includes all andordains all to the good, any positive understanding is precluded outright by that very appeal.Secondly, the mystery of divine providence must also be expressed in more purely theologicalterms: namely, in that of Christology and soteriology. While providence must be properly groundedin a theology of the Creator, and metaphysics proves indispensable for expressing this foundation,a theology of providence must also refer to the paschal mystery of Christ if anything like a properprovidential context to the problem of moral evil and suffering is to be attained.

41 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the November 2000 conference of theAmerican Academy of Religion (AAR).


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