hizballah and the arab revolutions: the contradiction made apparent?

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Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 16, No. 1 (March 2012) 1

HIZBALLAH AND THE ARAB REVOLUTIONS:THE CONTRADICTION MADE APPARENT?

By Jonathan Spyer*

Since the 1990s, Hizballah has defined itself along a number of parallel lines, each of which prior to

2011 appeared to support the other. The movement was simultaneously a sectarian representative of

the Lebanese Shia, a regional ally of Iran and Syria, a defender of the Lebanese against the

supposed aggressive intentions of Israel, and a leader of a more generically defined Arab and

Muslim resistance against Israel and the West. As a result of the events of 2011, most important

the revolt against the Asad regime in Syria, these various lines, which seemed mutually supportive,

began to contradict one another. This has diminished Hizballah's position, though it remains

physically unassailable for as long as the Asad regime in Syria survives.

The year 2011 witnessed a series ofupheavals and revolutions, which launched along-awaited process of change in some of thestagnant polities of the Arab-speaking world.It is too soon to draw any definitiveconclusions regarding where these changesmay lead or what the Arab world will look likewhen the storm has passed. Nevertheless, thetransformations that have already taken placeare presenting established political playersacross the Middle East with new and

unfamiliar questions and dilemmas.Prominent among those existing political

forces facing new challenges as a result ofregional changes is the Lebanese Shii IslamistHizballah movement. Since the early 2000s,the Middle East has been dominated by acompetition between the U.S.-led regionaldispensation and a challenge to this hegemonyundertaken by Iran and its allies.1 Hizballahwas and remains a key component of the Iran-led alliance, also constituting a centralsectarian player in the Lebanese context and achampion of the idea of resistance againstIsrael and the United States. The emergingnature of the regional upheavals are posingdifficulties for Hizballah on all three levels ofits identity--as an Iran-aligned force, a Shiipolitical player in the Lebanese context, and asthe self-proclaimed champion of regionalresistance. This article will consider the

origin and emergence of these difficulties andtheir likely implications for Hizballah's future.

The most urgent and central issues facingHizballah of course relate to the uprising inSyria. Prior to the outbreak of the revoltagainst the Bashar al-Asad regime, Hizballahwas able to adopt a stance of vociferoussupport for the uprisings. This was because intheir initial phase, the revolts all took place instates aligned with the United States and theWest--Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain and Yemen.

In mid-March 2011, however, a revoltbroke out in the southern Syrian town ofDar'a.2 Many analysts initially expected thatthe Syrian regime's near matchless capacityfor brutality would enable it to crush theuprising swiftly. This has not proven to be thecase, which has placed Hizballah in a difficultsituation.

This article discusses Hizballahs positionimmediately prior to the Arab Spring. It tracesthe trajectory of the movement's response tothe events of 2011, seeking the logic behindHizballah's stance on Syria, Bahrain, and otherpivotal locations. It concludes by asking whatimplications the events of 2011 and thebroader changes under way in the Middle Eastare likely to have on Hizballah's future. It isargued that among its many other effects, theArab Spring has served to tease out thecontradictions apparent in the various


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Jonathan Spyer

2 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 16, No. 1 (March 2012)

components of Hizballah's identity. Inparticular, the uprising in Syria has madeapparent the central contradiction betweenHizballah's claim to represent and support thewill of the peoples of the Arab world againsttyranny and oppression. It has also made clear

the movement's status as a component of aregional strategic alliance centered on theIslamic Republic of Iran and including Asad'sSyria.

HIZBALLAH ON THE EVE OF THE

ARAB SPRING

On the eve of the Arab Spring, Hizballah'sposition appeared relatively secure. The issueof the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL)investigating the 2005 murder of former

Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri wasthe main dark cloud on the movement'shorizon. Evidence had emerged implicatingsenior Hizballah members in the killing.3 Inlate 2010, Hizballah broke up the governingcoalition in order to secure the establishmentof a government that the movement believedwould take a firm stance against the STL.4 Apro-Syrian prime minister, Najib Mikati,replaced the March 14 leader Saad Hariri asprime minister.

Yet the STL notwithstanding, Hizballah'sposition appeared secure. With Iranian help,the movement had rebuilt much of the damageinflicted by Israel on its South Lebanese andsouth Beirut heartland in the 2006 LebanonWar. The movement's military infrastructurehad also been repaired, replenished, andsignificantly expanded.5

In the May 2008 events, Hizballah hadproved that no other political force in Lebanonwas capable of mounting a physical challengeto its extensive, independent military and

communications infrastructure. Thus, on theeve of the Arab Spring, Hizballah's positionlooked secure--indeed virtually unassailable--from the point of view of its physical powerwithin Lebanon. Regarding the possibility ofrenewed conflict with Israel, considerableevidence emerged suggesting the war-weariness of the Shii population of SouthernLebanon--Hizballah's core base of support--

and their fear of renewed conflict.6 Themovement would doubtless need to take thisinto account when considering the option ofrenewed aggression against Israel.

Hizballah is an ideological movementdeeply committed to the strategic goal of the

destruction of Israel.7

It also discovered a newcasus belli for its war against Israel in theShab'a Farms area, after the Israel DefenseForces (IDF) withdrawal from SouthernLebanon in May 2000. The movement claimsthat this area, captured from Syria by Israel in1967, in fact constitutes Lebanese territory.8

Yet while the long war against Israel is thecentral focus for Hizballah, there was noimmediate or urgent reason for Hizballah toseek renewed conflict with the Jewish state in2011. The 2006 war erupted as a result of an

operation to kidnap IDF soldiers in order tosecure the return of a number of Lebanese heldin Israeli jails. These individuals, along withHizballah prisoners captured in the war, werereleased by Israel in 2008, in exchange for thecorpses of two kidnapped IDF soldiers. Sincethe 2006 war, Hizballah had endeavored tokeep the border with Israel quiet.9 Themovement portrayed the war of 2006 as adivine victory for itself. Its propagandacontinued to focus on the long strategiccontest with Israel. Its cadres, according toreports, believed that the next war between themovement and the Jewish state would result inthe latter's destruction.10 In the meantime,however, Hizballah preferred to keep theborder in a state of unaccustomed quiet.

Thus Hizballah's internal enemies had beenintimidated militarily in May 2008. It hadappeared also to have reached a tense butstable equilibrium with its main externalenemy. In terms of hard power and coerciveability, then, Hizballah's position seemed

secure on the eve of the Arab Spring. Inpolitical terms, however, and in terms of themovement's perceived legitimacy withinLebanon, the situation was less positive for themovement. First, the decision to turn itsweapons on fellow Lebanese in May 2008 haddeeply tarnished Hizballah's image as a pan-Lebanese resistance group that carriedweaponry only for use against Israel.


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Hizballah and the Arab Revolutions: The Contradiction Made Apparent?


Many Lebanese commentators considerthat the political system in Lebanon has abuilt-in regulating mechanism, which acts toprevent any single confessional grouping fromamassing too much political power at theexpense of other groups.11 By the end of 2010,

Hizballah, with the help of Iran, appeared tohave transcended this process. It had done so,however, without the consent of its rivals, butrather by coercion. This meant that it was ableto maintain its position only through theimplicit threat of its arms, and in the face ofthe resentment of other parts of the population.This was a tenable position--for as long as thesuperior strength was there. This superiorstrength, in turn, was dependent on thecontinued support of Iran and Syria.

In addition, by 2011, considerable evidence

had emerged to suggest that Hizballah waslosing the image of Shii Islamist purity andintegrity that had characterized it in the past. Awidely-noted financial scandal erupted in2010, featuring Salah Ezz al-Din of the SouthLebanese village of M'aroub.12 Ezz al-Din, aLebanese Shi'a in his fifties, was accused ofembezzlement and defrauding investors ofhundreds of millions of dollars. He hadpromised quick returns on investments in whathe claimed were construction, oil, and gasprojects outside of Lebanon. Ezz al-Dinguaranteed investors 20 to 25 percent profitswithin 100 days on certain investments. YetEzz al-Din was running a Ponzi scheme--paying clients with funds gleaned from newerinvestors. He is believed to have defraudedinvestors of around $500 million.

Ezz al-Din was no ordinary financier. Heenjoyed close links to Hizballah. He ran avariety of enterprises associated with thegroup. Most important was the Dar al-HadiPublishing House, named after Hadi

Nasrallah. Hadi Nasrallah was Hizballahleader Hassan Nasrallahs son, who was killedfighting the IDF in Southern Lebanon and issomewhere near the top of the movement'spantheon of "martyrs." The publishing housethat bore his name was responsible for thepublication of a number of books by seniorHizballah officials.

The perception of Hizballah patronage wasa major factor in encouraging investors toplace their trust in Ezz al-Din. As onedisappointed client put it, "People put moneywith him because he was wearing theHizbullah cloak."13 The affair, additional

revelations concerning the alleged personalwealth of Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah,14and the alleged activities of the sons of anumber of prominent movement figures15 allserved to detract from Hizballah's stern,carefully cultivated image.

The result was that on the eve of the Arabupheavals of 2011, Hizballah found itself in acurious position. On the one hand, its strengthseemed unassailable--it had emergedhonorably from a war with its most powerfulfoe; it had brushed aside the threat of its

internal enemies; and it was allied withpowerful anti-Western, anti-Israel countries(Iran and Syria). On the other hand, itsposition was maintained because its internalenemies had been intimidated, not becausethey had given their consent. The image thatthe movement had built of a Shii Islamistgroup with integrity acting in the defense of allLebanese, meanwhile, was also lookingsomewhat frayed.

HIZBALLAHS RESPONSE TO THE

ARAB SPRING

The series of upheavals given the collectivename of the Arab Spring erupted in a regionalready in a state of acute political tension. Acold war was dividing the Middle East,pitting the United States and its allies in theregion against a challenge from Iran and itsclients, including Hizballah. The upheavalsdid not end this cold war-style standoff,though they succeeded to divert Western

media attention from it for most of 2011.From Hizballah's point of view, as a leadingmember of the pro-Iranian alliance, thequestion of the relative power of the two blocsis the key to understanding its response.

The first two leaders to fall in 2011 werePresident Zine al-Abidine Bin Ali of Tunisiaand President Husni Mubarak of Egypt. Both,in addition to being authoritarian rulers, were


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Jonathan Spyer


important clients of the United States in theMiddle East. Hizballah thus enthusiasticallysupported the uprising that brought theserulers down. Mubarak in particular was hatedby the movement because of his strongopposition to Iran and the arrest by the

Egyptian authorities of a Hizballah-ledparamilitary network operating in the countryin 2009. (Sami Shihab, a Hizballah operativewho led the cell, was reported to have escapedfrom jail in the chaotic period that followedthe fall of Mubarak.)16

Thus, Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallahspoke to a festival in Beirut backing theuprisings in Tunisia and Egypt. Nasrallahdescribed the revolution in Egypt as theproduct of the peoples will anddetermination a complete revolution for the

poor, the free, the students, and freedom. It isa political humanitarian revolution againsteverything, especially the regimes policiestowards the Arab-Israeli conflict.17

Nasrallah placed his praise for therevolutions in a very specific context--namely,what he portrayed as their anti-American andanti-Israeli nature. In this regard, he likenedthe revolts to the 1979 Islamic Revolution inIran:

Ayatollah Khomeini was loyal to theaspirations of the nation and not anAmerican ally and this is the case of theTunisian and Egyptian people. TheAmericans tried to contain the revolution toimprove their image in the Arab world. TheU.S. does not care if an Islamist or asecularist assumes power. Its only concernis the substitutes political approach andwhether it will be in its and Israeliinterests.18

This understanding of the revolutions inEgypt and Tunisia resembled the analysisemerging from Iran, Hizballah's patron.Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah AliKhamenei described the Arab upheavals as anIslamic Awakening19 (a description widelyderided at the time, which in retrospect, givensubsequent events, appears to have been farmore prescient than much Western analysis.)

In this first phase of the Arab upheavals,Syrian President Bashar Asad expressedhimself in a similar way. In an interview withthe Wall Street Journal, Asad predicted thatthe unrest would not reach Syria, because ofthe regime's support for the Palestinian cause

and for resistance across the region.20

Thiswas the shared view of the self-proclaimedResistance Axis in the region, led by Iran, ofwhich Hizballah is a senior member. This axiswas expecting in the first months of 2011 tosee members of the rival bloc falling topopular unrest, while themselves remainingimmune.

The outbreak of a revolt in Bahrain inFebruary 2011 provided further cause forenthusiasm on the part of Hizballah. Thisseemed a situation tailor-made for the

propagandists of Iran and its allies. A Shiimajority population, situated in the vicinity ofIran (in an area often referred to by Iran as itsfourteenth province)21 and its archrivalSaudi Arabia were in revolt against its Sunni,Western, and Saudi-aligned ruler.

Hizballah offered vocal condemnations ofthe Bahraini authorities. In particular, it spokeout against the repression of the PeninsularShield Force, which intervened to crush therevolt on behalf of the monarchy. Nasrallah, ina speech, called the events in Bahrain aspecial injustice.22 According to theBahraini monarchy, the support also wentbeyond the merely verbal. In a documentexposed by Wikileaks preceding the 2011revolt, Bahraini King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa claimed that opposition groups werereceiving training from Hizballah in Lebanon.U.S. officials concluded, however, that noclear evidence had emerged to support theseclaims.23

Hizballah's verbal and possibly additional

support for uprisings against Arab rulers madesense in the cold-war context through whichthe movement sees the region, and, in a morenebulous way, in terms of the resistance imagein which the movement likes to clothe itself.Yet the outbreak of an uprising in Syria onMarch 15, 2011, disturbed the picture. Syriaforms a vital link in the Iran-led regional


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alliance of which Hizballah is a part, and alsoa vital ally for Hizballah itself.

In terms of the former, Syria is the onlysignificant Arab state ally that Iran possesses.With the emergence to power of a Shiigovernment in Iraq, the Iranians had hoped to

achieve a contiguous line of pro-Iranian statesstretching across Iraq and Syria to Hizballah-dominated Lebanon.24 Hence, the survival ofthe Asad regime has been a matter of centralimportance to the Iranians, who have beenactively involved in the defense of the Asadregime since the outset of the uprising.

For Hizballah specifically, the survival ofAsad was no less vital. Syria formed a keyconduit for the transfer of weapons to themovement from Iran. Syrias support forHizballah was also a vital element in the

political balance of power within Lebanonitself, which underlay Hizballah's intimidationof its enemies and domination of the country.Were Asad to fall and be replaced by a regimedominated by Syria's Sunni-Arab majority,this could portend a strategic shift in favor ofthe Sunni-dominated bloc opposing Hizballahin Lebanon.

Hizballah thus began to offer verbalsupport to the Asad regime, in stark contrast toits support for uprisings elsewhere. It is worthnoting that there was a lull of two monthsbetween the outbreak of the uprising in Syriaand the first public statements by HassanNasrallah in support of the regime. This lullmay be attributed to Hizballah's awareness ofthe obvious dissonance between its previoussupport for the uprisings and its pro-Asadposition. Clearly, the movement had hopedthat Asad would rapidly crush the oppositionto him, in line with the expectations of manyanalysts.

By May 2011, it was clear that this was not

going to happen. Hence, on May 25, Nasrallahissued his first clear comments in support ofthe Asad regime. Nasrallah's remarks againsought to locate the logic of his movement'sposition within the broader conflict against theUnited States and Israel. In a speech given tomark the eleventh anniversary of the Israeliwithdrawal from Southern Lebanon, Nasrallahtold his audience, Overthrowing the regime

in Syria is in the American and Israeliinterest.25

In the same speech, Nasrallah praised theoverthrow of the regimes in Tunisia, whileclaiming that Asad in Syria wanted toimplement reforms, but in a calm and

responsible manner.26

Hizballah has notsubstantively deviated from this line in anyfurther public statements by its leaders andactivists on the crisis in Syria. Significantevidence has also emerged that themovement's support for the Asad regime hasnot been limited to declarations alone.

Syrian opposition sources tended to dismissearly claims that Hizballah men were takingan active part in repressing thedemonstrations. They argued that Asad had noshortage of thugs able and willing to kill, and

therefore the regime was unlikely to needHizballah's help in this regard. However, anumber of analysts have since suggested thatHizballah personnel were playing an activerole in the effort to suppress the uprising--specifically in efforts to infiltrate and subvertopposition circles. There have also beenallegations of direct involvement of Hizballahfighters in the suppression of protests.27

More tangibly, Hizballah activistsalongside Lebanese state security personneltook part in the harassment of Syrian (mainlySunni) oppositionists who sought refuge inLebanon. In November 2011, for example, anattempt by Hizballah to arrest a Syrian (whowas either a dissident or a smuggler) in theSunni border town of Arsal resulted in apitched battle between armed local residentsand Hizballah operatives. The latter had to beevacuated by Lebanese Armed Forcestroops.28

Hizballah operatives themselves haveadmitted that this activity on behalf of the

Syrians is taking place, though they claim thatthey are looking only for weapons dealers, alQaeda members, and those who woulddestabilize Lebanon.29 Thus, Hizballah isboth actively and verbally engaged in theefforts to keep the Asad regime in power inSyria. This is an unambiguous position, fromwhich the movement has not deviated in anydetail.


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EXPLAINING HIZBALLAHS

RESPONSES: THE CONTRADICTION

MADE APPARENT?

It is not difficult to understand the

contradictory position adopted by Hizballahvis--vis the Arab upheavals, once themovement's priorities and key loyalties areunderstood. At the outset, this article notedfour aspects of Hizballah's identity: It is anIran-aligned force, a representative of theLebanese Shia, a regional Shii Arab force,and a representative of a self-proclaimedresistance trend in the wider Arab andMuslim worlds. The movement's response tothe Arab upheavals, however, indicates theorder of importance of these aspects. The

alignment with Iran, and the movement'sdominant position in Lebanon predictably,over-rode any other considerations.

When a dilemma emerged, Hizballah didnot hesitate to adopt a position in obviouscontradiction to its earlier claims to supportthe rights and demands of the peoples of theregion, in order to line up alongside its patron--Iran--and fellow client--the Asad regime. Ofcourse, it would be nave to be surprised bythis. History is replete with examples of thetruism that power politics trumps ideology.Yet in Hizballah's case, the contradictionbetween its early support for the uprisings andits defense of Asad was particularlypronounced. It hinged, of course, on theprimary loyalty to the alliance of which themovement is part.

Hizballah was established under theauspices of the Quds Force of the IranianRevolutionary Guards Corps. It receivesbetween $100 million and $200 million peryear from Iran.30 Iran and Syria supply the

weaponry that has enabled the movement tooutgrow its early context as a Lebanesesectarian militia. Hizballah is in no position toturn against any of this, even if it had thedesire to do so--of which there is no evidence.Its response in 2011 has been that of a loyalcomponent of a regional bloc.

Hizballah has sought to justify its stances interms of anti-Western and anti-Israeli power

politics, entirely ignoring the will of theSyrian people, as demonstrated by the ongoingdemonstrations and rallies against the Asaddictatorship. In so doing, Hizballah has paid asignificant price in terms of its popularity andlegitimacy across the region. This is of less

importance to it than the preservation of thevital strategic asset of the Asad regime. Yetits importance, as well as the larger negativesignificance of the Arab upheavals of 2011 forHizballah and the bloc of which it is a part,should not be underestimated.

CONCLUSION: HIZBALLAH, THE

RESISTANCE BLOC AND THE EVENTS

OF 2011

The resistance ideology, and indeed the

Iran-led bloc have emerged as significantlosers as a result of the 2011 Arab upheavals.31This is so for two central reasons. First, theearlier, rights-based language emerging fromthe protest movements in Tunisia focused onissues about which the movement and itsIranian patrons have little or nothing to say.Iran and Hizballah locate the central problemsfacing the Arab and Muslim worlds asexternal--above all, the threat supposedlyrepresented by the existence of Israel and thedesigns of the United States.

The early protest movements were notedfor the absence or minor presence of anti-Israeli and anti-American rhetoric. Rather, thedemonstrators sought to focus attention on theglaring political and social problems affectingtheir countries. Unlike anti-Israeli and anti-American anger, this kind of sentiment is notavailable for exploitation by the resistancebloc, because this bloc itself pursuesauthoritarian and non-democratic politics, andit has signally failed to develop successful

economies or civil societies wherever it hasheld power. It has nothing to say regarding anArab politics turned toward internaldevelopment and reform. Thus, as notedabove, the resistance bloc avoided anyreference to these aspects. Instead, AyatollahKhamenei referred to the uprisings as anIslamic Awakening, and Iran and Hizballah


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supported or opposed them based on thepower political interests of the Iran-led bloc.

Yet a potentially more significant setbackhas been suffered by the Iran-led bloc, as thenature of the changes under way has becomemore apparent. The beneficiaries of the 2011

toppling of long-standing dictatorial regimesin the Arab world have been Sunni Islamistmovements. Hizballah in its language hasoften claimed to represent a general Muslim orArab interest. However, it is a Shiiorganization. It is also part of a regional powerbloc led by Iran. This bloc, while it toosometimes speaks a pan-Islamic language,overwhelmingly consists of Shii (or at leastnon-Sunni) elements. The key members of thebloc are Iran itself, the Alawi-dominatedregime in Syria, Hizballah, and the Sadrist

movement in Iraq.This fact may on occasion have been

overlooked by non-Shii parts of the region--inparticular when Hizballah was engaged incombat with Israel, which is an object ofhatred for Sunni and Shii Arabs alike. Yetthe main tangible effect of the Arab upheavalsso far has been to raise the real possibility ofSunni Islamist regimes in Egypt, Tunisia,Libya, and--most worryingly from Hizballah'spoint of view--Syria.

Should such regimes emerge, they arelikely to align either with each other or withexisting Sunni powers in the region. They arehighly unlikely to ally with the Iran-led bloc.Hizballah, for a while, was the emblem andsymbol of Iran's resistance project in the Arabworld. Should the Asad regime in Syria fall,this would constitute a very significant blow toHizballah, and to its patron. Yet the larger andmore profound challenge to Hizballah and itsallies set in motion by the events of 2011 maywell be the emergence of Sunni Islamism as a

contender for or holder of political power in anumber of different Arab countries. This islikely to introduce a more openly sectariantone to intra-Arab power politics, which willconstitute a potentially deadly blow toattempts by Hizballah and their Iranian alliesto present themselves as representing thegeneral Arab or Muslim interest.

Should Sunni-Arab Islamists in the futurewish to point to evidence regarding thehollowness of claims by Hizballah and itsallies to represent interests outside of that ofthe Shia, meanwhile, a central item ofevidence they are likely to present will be the

stance of Hizballah vis--vis the Syrianuprising of 2011 and the uprisings thatpreceded it. They will note, accurately, that inits response to the threat to the Asaddictatorship, Hizballah elected to shed anyecumenical pretenses, preferring to offer itsfull support to efforts to keep the dictatorshipin place. This may well have included directHizballah violence against Syrian civilians.This took place at a time when the Asaddictatorship was engaged in a frontal struggleagainst a largely Sunni uprising against its

rule. By doing so, Hizballah demonstrated itsstatus as above all a client of the Iran-ledregional bloc, and on a secondary level aLebanese Shi'i sectarian force--withpretensions toward leading a general regionalresistance relegated to a distant, rhetoricalthird place.

* Dr. Jonathan Spyer is a senior researchfellow at the Global Research in International

Affairs (GLORIA) Center, Interdisciplinary

Center (IDC) Herzliya. His first book, TheTransforming Fire: The Rise of the Israel-Islamist Conflict, was published in 2010.

NOTES

1 Daniel Pipes, "The Middle Eastern ColdWar," Jerusalem Post, June 17, 2009,http://www.danielpipes.org.2 Lina Sinjab, "Silence Broken in Syria,"BBCOnline, March 19, 2011,http://www.bbc.co.uk.3 "Tribunal Publishes Hizballah MurderIndictments," Investigative Project onTerrorism, August 17, 2011,http://www.investigativeproject.org.4 Hezbollah and Allies Topple LebaneseUnity Government," BBC Online, January 12,2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk.


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5 Michael Eisenstadt, "Potential IranianResponses to NATO's Missile DefenseShield," Policywatch, No. 1772, WashingtonInstitute for Near East Policy, November 19,

2010, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org.6 Hanin Ghaddar, "The Shia, Between Dignityand Survival," Now Lebanon, February 22,2008, http://www.nowlebanon.com. See alsoMona Yacoubian, "Hezbollah After Assad,"Foreign Affairs, December 1, 2011,http://www.foreignaffairs.com.7 Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, Hizbullah: Politicsand Religion (London: Pluto Press, 2002), pp.142-51.8 "In Focus: Shabaa Farms,"BBC Online, May25, 2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk.9

"Quiet Holds Five Years After Israel-Hizballah War," Agence France Presse, July12, 2011, http://www.khaleejtimes.com.10 Bilal Y. Saab and Nicholas Blandford, "TheNext War: How Another Conflict BetweenHizballah and Israel Could Look and HowBoth Sides Are Preparing for It," AnalysisPaper, No. 24, The Saban Center for MiddleEast Policy at Brookings, August, 2011,http://www.brookings.edu, p. 33.11 Michael Young, "Is Hizballah LosingControl?" Now Lebanon, January 6, 2012,

http://www.nowlebanon.com.12 Yara Bayoumy, "Trust in LebaneseFinancier Shakes Hezbollah's Image," Reuters,September 21, 2009, http://blogs.reuters.com.13 Jonathan Spyer, "Hizballah's Brand IsTarnished," Jerusalem Post, September 26,2009, http://www.jpost.com.14 Doron Peskin, "Hezbollah's NasrallahWorth $250 Million?" Ynet News, December29, 2011, http://www.ynetnews.com.15 Jonathan Schanzer, "Pious Coke Dealers?"

New York Post, January 3, 2012,http://www.nypost.com.16 "Sami Shihab, a Hezbollah Operative WhoEscaped from an Egyptian Prison, Participatedin a Hezbollah Rally in Beirut," The MeirAmit Intelligence and TerrorismInformation Center, February 20, 2011,http://www.terrorism-info.org.il.

17 "Hezbollah Chief Praises Tunisian,

Egyptian Protests, Attacks US," Ya Libnan,February 7, 2011,http://www.yalibnan.com.18 Ibid.19

"Islamic Awakening ConferenceInaugurated, Imam Khamenei Speaks," al-

Manar News, September 17, 2011,http://www.almanar.com.lb.20 Interview with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, Wall Street Journal, January 31,2012, http://online.wsj.com.21 Mitchell A. Belfer, "Iran's BahrainiAmbitions," October 6, 2011,http://online.wsj.com.22 "Nasrallah Salutes Arab Uprisings,Dismisses March 14 Anti-Arms Campaign,"

Now Lebanon, March 19, 2011,http://www.nowlebanon.com.23 "Wikileaks: Bahrain King ClaimsOpposition Trained by Hezbollah," Haaretz,February 19, 2011, http://www.haaretz.com.24 Edward Luttwak, "Revenge of the Sunnis,"Foreign Policy, December 7, 2011,http://www.foreignpolicy.com.25 "Hizballah Leader Stands Firm BehindSyria," Associated Press, May 25, 2011,http://www.dawn.com.26 Ibid.27 Conversations with Syrian oppositionactivists, January 2012.28 "Mustaqbal MPs: Army Intelligence:Hizbullah Tried to Nab Syrian from Arsal,"

Naharnet, November 22, 2011,http://www.naharnet.com.29 Mitchell Prothero, "Assad's LebaneseInvasion," Foreign Policy, December 22,2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com.30 "Report: CIA Forced to Curb Spying inLebanon, Iran," Associated Press, November21, 2011, http://www.ynetnews.com.31 Luttwak, "Revenge of the Sunnis."

hizballah and the arab revolutions: the contradiction made apparent?

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