history and international series editor of the essential professor … history... · 2019. 9....

DR JOHN SWEETMAN,historian and author, is Headof the Department of MilitaryHistory and InternationalAffairs at the Royal MilitaryAcademy, Sandhurst, England.

PROFESSOR ROBERT O'NEILL,AO D.Phil, is the ChicheleProfessor of the History of Warat the University of Oxford andSeries Editor of the EssentialHistories. His wealth ofknowledge and expertise shapesthe series content, and providesup-to-the-minute researchand theory. Born in 1936 anAustralian citizen, he served inthe Australian army 1955-68and has held a number ofeminent positions in historycircles. He has been ChicheleProfessor of the History of Warand a Fellow of All SoulsCollege, Oxford since 1987.He is the author of many booksincluding works on the Germanarmy and the Nazi party, theKorean and Vietnam wars.

Essential Histories

The Crimean War

Essential Histories

The Crimean War

John SweetmanOSPREYPUBLISHING

First published in Great Britain in 2001 by Osprey Publishing,

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01 02 03 04 05 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Contents

Chronology 7

Background to war

Panorama of the conflict 9

Warring sides

Opposing forces 17

Outbreak

A just war 22

The fighting

The clash of arms 28

Portrait of a soldier

Captain Lewis Edward Nolan 76

Portrait of a civilian

Women at war 79

How the war ended

Guns fall silent 85

Conclusion and consequences

Counting the cost 90

Further reading 93

Index 94

Chronology

1853 28 February Menshikov missionarrives Constantinople21 May Menshikov leavesConstantinople8 June British fleet leaves Malta foreastern Mediterranean2 July Russian troops cross Pruth riverto invade Moldavia and Wallachia14 October British and French fleetsanchor in the Dardanelles23 October Turkey declares war onRussia30 November 'Massacre' at Sinope;Turkish flotilla sunk24 December Sir James Graham (FirstLord of the Admiralty) calls fordestruction of Sevastopol

1854 3 January British and French fleetsenter Black Sea11 January Russia warned thatwarships in Black Sea must return toSevastopol13 February Cabinet approves LordRaglan's appointment as C-in-C, BritishExpeditionary Force22 February First troops leaveEngland27 February Russia must undertakewithin six days to withdraw fromMoldavia and Wallachia by end of April11 March Baltic fleet leavesPortsmouth26 March First French troops leavefor Turkey27 March France declares war onRussia28 March Britain declares war onRussia30 March Vanguard of BritishExpeditionary Force at Malta ordered toGallipoli8 April British troops at Gallipoli;French already there

10 April Britain and France signtreaty of alliance; Raglan leaves London15 April Turkey formally joinsthe allies22 April Naval bombardment ofOdessa29 April Raglan reachesConstantinople7 May St Arnaud lands at Gallipoli11 May Siege of Silistria starts23 May Britain, France, Austria andPrussia guarantee Turkishindependence25 May French troops sail for Varna29 May British troops sail for Varna22 June British naval squadronblockades the White Sea23 June Siege of Silistria raised2 July Russians recross Pruth river,vacating Moldavia and Wallachia16 July Raglan receives Cabinetdispatch requiring invasion of theCrimea18 July Allied Council of War todiscuss invasion21 July Mouth of Katcha river chosenas landing area10 August Serious fire in Varna delaysinvasion; cholera also prevalent24 August Embarkation commences;bad weather further disrupts timetable31 August Anglo-French navalsquadron attacks Petropavlosk5 September Raglan reaches BalchikBay; French commander (St Arnaud)already gone9 September Raglan carriesout another reconnaissance ofCrimean coast; chooses Calamita Bayfor landings13 September Eupatoria surrenders14 September Allied landingscommence in Calamita Bay; lastuntil 18 September

8 Essential Histories • The Crimean War

19 September Advance onSevastopol commences; skirmish atthe Bulganek river20 September Battle of the Alma23 September Southward advanceresumes; Russian warships sunk toblock Sevastopol harbour entrance25 September Flank marchcommences; Canrobert succeedsSt Arnaud as French C-in-C27 September Siege of Sevastopolbegins29 September St Arnaud dies ofcholera at sea2 October British naval brigade lands13 October Patriotic Fund foundedfor wives and orphans of servicemenlost in the Crimea17 October First Bombardment ofSevastopol25 October Battle of Balaclava26 October Skirmish of LittleInkerman4 November Florence Nightingalereaches Scutari5 November Battle of Inkerman6 November Allied Council of Wardecides to continue siege14 November The Great Storm

1855 2 January Sardinia joins allies5 January Omar Pasha lands in theCrimea with Turkish reinforcements25 January J. A. Roebuck's resolution,critical of the conduct of the war, leadsto resignation of Lord Aberdeen'sgovernment5 February Lord Palmerston PrimeMinister17 February Russian attack onEupatoria24 February More Russian ships sunkat Sevastopol2 March Death of Nicholas I;succeeded by Alexander II5 March Sevastopol Select Committeecommences work4 April Second Baltic fleet leavesEngland9 April Second Bombardment ofSevastopol

3 May Abortive first expedition sailsfor Kertch22 May Kertch expedition relaunched6 June Third Bombardment ofSevastopol7 June Capture of the Quarries andthe Mamelon11 June White Sea again blockaded13 June French troops leave Kertch14 June British troops leave Kertch,Turkish garrison remains17 June Fourth Bombardment ofSevastopol18 June Failed attacks on the GreatRedan and Malakov; report ofSevastopol Committee to Parliament28 June Death of Lord Raglan;succeeded by Sir James Simpson16 August Battle of the Tchernaya17 August Fifth Bombardment ofSevastopol5 September Sixth Bombardmentof Sevastopol6 September Omar Pasha leavesCrimea8 September French captureMalakov; British fail at the Great Redan9 September Allies occupy southernSevastopol7 October Combined force sails forthe Dnieper river17 October Capture of Kinburn onthe Dnieper11 November Sir William Codringtonsucceeds Simpson as British C-in-C15 November Ammunition explosionin French lines25 November Surrender of Kars16 December Austrian peace plansubmitted to St Petersburg

1856 16 January Tsar accepts peace terms29 January Last major Russianbombardment across Sevastopol Bayfrom the north28 February Armistice signed in Paris29 February Opposing officers meetamicably in Crimea30 March Treaty of Paris signed27 April Treaty of Paris ratified12 July Last British troops leaveCrimea

Background to war

Panorama of the conflict

In 1783 Catherine the Great annexed theCrimea, prefacing a series of militaryventures around the shores of the Black Seato further Russia's territorial ambitions.Seventy years on, another violent episodewas about to begin. On 27 March 1854, theBritish Parliament was informed that 'HerMajesty feels bound to afford activeassistance to her ally the Sultan againstunprovoked aggression.' Next day, TheLondon Gazette contained the declaration of a

war that would not formally end until27 April 1856. During the intervening25 months, Britain combined with Turkey,France and Sardinia against Russia as bothsides courted Austria and Prussia, which werehovering on the sidelines.

Three allies. (L to R) Lord Raglan, Omar Pasha andGeneral (later Marshal) Pélissier, commanders ofthe British, Turkish and French land forces in theCrimea, 7 June 1855. General de la Marmora led theSardinian contingent. (Hulton Getty)


Scope of fighting

Many streets, rows of terraced dwellings,official buildings, even children (girlschristened Alma) would be triumphantlynamed after the victories of British soldiers,their first commander and acclaimed heroesduring the Crimean War. The signs of manypublic houses to this day proudly display'Battle of Inkerman', 'Sevastopol Arms', 'TheLord Raglan', 'Cardigan of Balaclava'. TheCharge of the Light Brigade remains astirring example of selfless devotion to dutyand military discipline, the subject of threefeature films and innumerable articles, booksand television programmes.

This lingering impression of unalloyedcelebration masks the realities of a costly,debilitating conflict, whose shortcomings werehighlighted at the time and have been eagerlygnawed by ravenous critics ever since. Withthe Russian fleet bottled up in its principalBlack Sea port, a combined British, French andTurkish force landed in the Crimea just southof Eupatoria, 30 miles (48km) north of itstarget, Sevastopol. The plan for a swift coup demain went badly wrong, and the invaderswere condemned to besieging their quarryfrom exposed upland to the south duringbiting winter conditions, as the ranks of menand horses were decimated by disease andstarvation. A long campaign under suchprivation not having been anticipated, thesupply, transport and medical arrangementswoefully broke down. Before peace settledover the hills, valleys and shattered remainsof Sevastopol, approximately 22,000 British,a minimum 80,000 French, possibly10,000 Turks, 2,000 Sardinians and morethan 100,000 Russians had perished.

However, this was a war with Russia,not merely one of her small, southernpeninsulas. Contemporaries referred to the'Russian War'; soon after its conclusionE. H. Nolan and W. Tyrell respectivelypublished two- and three-volume histories of

Baltic fleet at Spithead, 1854. A powerful British fleet leftSpithead in March 1854, being joined in the Baltic fourmonths later by a French flotilla carrying troops. Itreturned to England in November (Hulton Getty)

'The War with Russia'. It was not quite aworldwide struggle, but the vast territories ofthe enemy dictated far-flung operations. So,Petropavlovsk in the Pacific, the Kolapeninsula and shores of the White Sea in theArctic were attacked. British support went tothe Turks on the Danube and theunsuccessful defence of Kars in Asia Minor.

Major Anglo-French expeditions were sentinto the Baltic in 1854 and 1855 (a third was

Background to war 11

planned for 1856) to discourage Russianwarships at Kronstadt from venturing intothe North Sea and perhaps to entice Swedeninto the allied camp. Both were dispatchedwith great pomp. On 11 March 1854,Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Napier's fleet, led bythe 131-gun Duke of Wellington, was cheeredaway from Spithead by waving thousands onshore and the Queen in the royal yachtFairy. Alfred Lord Tennyson reputedly

penned part of his poem Maud after seeingthis grand example of maritime power: 'It isbetter to fight for the good than to rail at theill,' Napier's 18 ships with 1,160 guns wouldlater be joined by 23 French warships with1,250 guns and troops under Vice-AdmiralP. Deschenes to capture shore installations ina formidable allied armada.

Rear-Admiral Sir Richard Dundas sailed on4 April 1855 with a second expedition,


comprising lines of battleships and frigatessupported by floating batteries, mortarvessels and gunboats, Napier's havingreturned home before the onset of winter.Dundas' warships were all screw, none purelysail; but there were no troops this time withthe French squadron, which joined them on1 June. 'Bomarsund' and 'Sveaborg' wouldappear on memorial obelisks, as mute

recognition of successful actions carried outduring the two Baltic forays.

In truth, though, action beyond the BlackSea has claimed little lasting attention. Toposterity, the battles in the Crimea - theAlma, Balaclava, Inkerman, Sevastopol, theTchernaya - are infinitely more recognisable.What happened between the allies andRussia between 1854 and 1856 is more


readily identified with military activity onand around the south-western corner of thatpeninsula than anywhere else. 'The CrimeanWar', not 'The War with Russia', has becomefirmly established in historical legend.

Furthermore, obsessive concentration bycommentators on publicised disastersoverlooks the multitude of colourful fireworkdisplays, flamboyant military reviews,

Sevastopol. Looking east, with strong fortificationscovering the harbour entrance, naval dockyardmiddle right and old lighthouse in the distance.The northern suburb is left, across Sevastopol Bay.(Author's collection)

musical celebrations and municipal banquetsthat heralded the signing of peace. Citizensof Britain, France, Turkey and Sardiniarejoiced at defeating Russia. Households


mourned the loss of loved ones, but familycorrespondence and the wording on warmemorials showed pride that their sacrificehad preserved national honour andovercome evil. In Britain, this embodied thespirit of the mid-Victorian age.

Press influence

What made this a different kind of conflictwas that the public and politicians at homequickly learnt its graphic details. Extension ofan electric telegraph cable right up to theallied positions before Sevastopol and itsregular use by newspaper reporters on the spotmade this possible. W. H. Russell of The Timeswas the most famous, but not the only, 'warcorrespondent' in the Crimea: representativesof several other journals and newspapers filedreports for domestic consumption. The sheernovelty of the process added enormously toits impact, akin to the impact of television

William Howard Russell (1820-1907). The Times'correspondent in the Crimea, whose reportsshaped public and political opinion in Britain andcontributed to the fall of Lord Aberdeen's governmentin February 1855. (Hulton Deutsch)

Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Napier (1786-1860).Commander of the British Baltic fleet in 1854, whichlacked spectacular success and was replaced for the855 expedition. (Hulton Getty)

news bulletins in the late twentieth century.Eyewitnesses, especially civilians notassociated with the military machine,acquired an aura of authority and measuredjudgement. Their bias and the validity oftheir information were not closelyquestioned. Stories straight from the frontwere presumed to be accurate and authentic.

Clamour for action in editorials duringthe first quarter of 1854 had built up apublic head of steam for war. Exposure ofperceived shortcomings at the frontundermined the reputations of individualslike the British commander Lord Raglan,highlighted inconsistencies in the archaicstructure of military administration, broughtdown a government at Westminster andcreated a favourable climate of opinion forfundamental change in the organisation ofthe army. Successive Cabinet ministers,politically responsible for the conduct of thewar, used press reports to criticise Raglan andhis staff. Lord Panmure declared, for


example, that 'your staff must be changed, atleast that will satisfy the public and thatradically ... I must do something to satisfythe House of Commons'. Members ofParliament gained their information almostexclusively from newspapers and periodicals;Panmure's predecessor, the Duke ofNewcastle, made clear that official reportsfrom the front were sparse and inadequate.

Photographers, too, added a newdimension to warfare, the most celebratedbut by no means the sole practitioner inthe Crimea being Roger Fenton. Theirimpact, though, was more retrospective,less immediate.

Divided command

Unfortunately, civilian reporters wereunschooled in the byzantine nature ofmilitary administration, and thus blamedRaglan and his staff officers for matters overwhich they had no effective control. At theoutset of the war, the artillery and engineerswere responsible directly to the Master-General of the Ordnance, not theCommander-in-Chief at the Horse Guards,

Roger Fenton (1819-69). One of several photographersworking in the Crimea and there for only four months in1855. Fenton produced a series of impressive images oflife at the front. (Hulton Getty)


who controlled the infantry and cavalry.Two legally distinct British armies thereforeexisted. The Royal Navy was, of course, anentirely separate entity as well, answerable tothe Lords of the Admiralty in Whitehall andto nobody in the Crimea. So Raglan couldonly request, not demand, co-operationfrom the naval commander off-shore in thebombardment of Sevastopol and theprovision of sea transport to the Turkishmainland for the sick and wounded. Thecivilian Ordnance Department suppliedmilitary equipment, while the Commissariat(a Treasury department) looked after foodand land transport; Raglan relied onthem without commanding them. Theentire ramshackle structure palpably lackedco-ordination.

Moreover, unlike the Duke of Wellingtonas allied Commander-in-Chief in thePeninsular War, Raglan had no authorityover the other national forces. The Turkish,French and Sardinian contingents had theirown commanders, all independent of oneanother. The press, public and politiciansnever fully appreciated the constraints thatthis put on drawing up strategic plans orexecuting tactical operations against defence

works like the Redan and Malakov in thering of Sevastopol's fortifications.

Turkey or Russia?

One fundamental question persists. Wasthe death of approximately one-fifth ofarmy personnel sent to the Crimea,exclusive of naval and civilian casualties,the acute disruption of domestic life andthe prolonged misery of the woundedand bereaved ultimately worthwhile? In1856 the British, French, Turkish andSardinians celebrated victory. Yet, within15 years, Russia had unilaterally abrogatedthe main provisions of the peace treaty.Looking back and aware that the TurkishEmpire in south-eastern Europe had soondisintegrated in a welter of damaginginternational conflicts, Lord Salisburymused that Britain ought to have sidedwith Russia, not Turkey. He could notknow that in the Balkans the seeds of theFirst World War were already germinating.If the Crimean War had not been fought,would this European catastrophe havebeen avoided?

Warring sides

Opposing forces

In March 1854, for Britain to declare war onRussia in support of Turkey appeared bothwise and necessary. The underlying reasonswere long term, part of the so-called EasternQuestion - the disintegration of the TurkishEmpire, which stretched from the Alps toEgypt. Russia, and in particular her Black Seafleet, represented a menacing unknownquantity in this equation, the Tsar inrepeated conversations with the Britishambassador describing Turkey as ripe for richpicking, 'the sick man of Europe'. For thepast 200 years Russia had been spreadingterritorial tentacles outwards from Moscow,southwards into the Ukraine and in 1783 tothe Crimea. There Sevastopol provided awarm-water port from which the fleet couldsail through the Bosphorus and DardanellesStraits into the eastern Mediterranean,directly to threaten British trade routes withthe Levant and India.

Overland probes in the Caucasus west ofthe Caspian Sea underlined Russian desire foreven further expansion into the Near East.But these advances were too distant toperturb Europe. Incursions across theDanube into the Balkans towardsConstantinople, occupation of which wouldallow Russian warships their free passageinto the Mediterranean, were altogether adifferent matter. Only internationaldiplomatic pressure had halted Russiantroops uncomfortably close to the Turkishcapital in 1829. An even more serious crisisevolved in 1833. With Asia Minor threatenedby the advance of rebel forces into Syriaunder Ibrahim, son of the pasha of Egypt,Mehemet Ali, the Sultan turned to Russia forhelp: 'A drowning man will clutch at a

Nicholas I (1796-1855). Succeeded Alexander I asTsar of Russia in 1826. Reputedly died of a brokenheart on 2 March 1855 following Russian failure torecapture Eupatoria. (Ann Ronan Picture Library)

serpent,' his foreign minister observed.Nicholas I's price for moral and diplomaticsupport, without firing a shot or in any wayactively intervening, was Turkish agreementto close the Straits to foreign warships onRussia's request.

Not for nine years could Britain engineerthe expulsion of the Egyptians from Syriaand fashion a new agreement whereby theStraits would be closed to all warships intime of peace. Russia's exclusive influencehad therefore been removed, but thisincident re-emphasised the Tsar's designs onthe Straits. Despite his comments aboutTurkey's pseudo-medical condition, in 1844Nicholas I protested to Prince Albert that 'hedid not want an inch of Turkish territory'.Palmerston thought this 'a great humbug ...one is denying the teaching of history if onebelieves that Russia is not thinking ofextending to the south'.

Turkey and the Crimea

18 E

ssential Histories • T

he Crim

ean War

Warring sides 19

Disputed areas

Most of the Sultan's subjects in south-easternEurope, between the Black Sea and theAdriatic, were Christian. Alleged ill treatmentof them by the Turks, whose military andpolitical might was now quite visiblycrumbling, provided a ready excuse forexternal intervention. Aware of Russianaspirations, other European powers needed tobe vigilant. The Tsar, however, counted onlethargy among his potential opponents,whose co-operation, seen to effect in 1829 and1841, might one day fail through inertia orpreoccupation with more pressing problems.

As another diplomatic crisis developed in1852, this seemed likely. Nicholas I lookedfor neutrality at the very least from Prussiaand Austria, both of which had benefitedfrom his help to crush internal liberalrevolutions between 1848 and 1851. Francehad acute troubles at home, having deposedher king in 1848, and experienced the coupd'etat three years later that made LouisNapoleon into Emperor Napoleon III.Britain, the Tsar calculated, was isolated. Hehad not counted on the strength ofcommercial self-interest - in Britain's case,protection of the Indian trade routes; inFrance's, the opportunity for further marketsand financial investment in Turkey.Furthermore, a diplomatic or militarytriumph over Russia would enhance the newFrench Emperor's credentials both nationallyand internationally.

Unresolved disputes in 1852 and 1853between Catholic monks (backed by France)and Orthodox monks (supported by Russia)over guardianship of holy places inJerusalem, then part of the Turkish Empire,were the occasion, not the cause, of theCrimean War. Underlying tensions oflong-standing origin were fundamentallyresponsible. The Tsar refused to acceptTurkish attempts at compromise anddispatched a mission to the Porte withdemands for recognition of Russia'sguardianship over the whole of Turkey's14 million Christian subjects. To PrinceA. S. Menshikov, who led this mission,

Nicholas wrote: 'if Turkey did not yield, thenthe ambassador extraordinary [Menshikov]must threaten the destruction ofConstantinople and the occupation of theDardanelles'. Meanwhile, Nicholas I wasproposing a partition of European Turkeybetween Britain, Austria and Russia, withFrance taking Crete. Reputedly, only firmrejection from Field Marshal I. F. Paskevichstopped the Tsar from using the Black Seafleet to force the Straits and land troops onthe shores of the Bosphorus. So much for noterritorial claim.

Prompted by Britain and France, theSultan rejected Menshikov's demands, andon 8 June 1853 the British Mediterraneanfleet at Malta was ordered to 'the

Napoleon III (1808-73). As Louis Napoleon, exiled inLondon before becoming President of the SecondFrench Republic in 1848. Three years later after a coupd'etat, proclaimed Emperor Keen to gain internationalprestige and recognition in the Crimean War, in 1855he briefly planned to take command personally in thefield. (Ann Ronan Picture Library)


neighbourhood of the Dardanelles ... for theprotection of Turkey against an unprovokedattack and in defence of her independence'.On 2 July, scarcely a month after departureof the abortive mission from Constantinople,Russian troops crossed the Pruth river toenter Moldavia and Wallachia (modernRomania, then two provinces under Turkishsuzerainty). Their orders were to obtain'by force, but without war ... [Russia's]just demands ... [as] various arbitraryacts of the Porte have infringed the rights[of Christians]'. Russia was going 'to thedefence of the Orthodox religion'.

Allied deliberations

Representatives of the major Europeannations met to determine what they shoulddo. As a deterrent, Austria moved forces toher south-eastern border. But after Russiaignored an ultimatum to leave the Turkishprovinces, on 23 October Turkey declaredwar. At this point, no intervention byBritain seemed necessary, for the Turks had100,000 men along the Danube blocking theway south. They soon gave a good accountof themselves. Crossing the river, the Sultan'stroops occupied fortified positions on thenorth bank, and during the opening days ofNovember they drove off determined Russianassaults on Oltenitza.

The situation changed dramatically on30 November. A weak Turkish squadron wassurprised in Sinope harbour on the southerncoast of the Black Sea, 350 miles (560km)east of Constantinople, by a strong Russianflotilla including six ships of the line, twofrigates and four steamers. The Russianstook advantage of poor visibility to destroythe Turkish ships with a reported loss of4,000 men. A lone steamer escaped to carrythe news to Constantinople, whence twoBritish warships set off to render belated aid.Harrowing reports of struggling swimmersraked by Russian cannon, as they lefttheir stricken vessels, provoked massivepro-Turkish public demonstrations in Britain.It emerged that the Russians had used

explosive shells, a lethal invention that wassomehow deemed underhand and unfair.Moreover, the Turkish admiral hadapparently been lulled into a false sense ofsecurity, because Russia had announced thather immediate interests were confined to theDanubian provinces.

The press dubbed what had happened 'afoul outrage ... a massacre'. In London, theMorning Advertiser accused Britain and Franceof interfering diplomatically only 'to betrayunfortunate Turkey'. Members of the Britishgovernment, it claimed, were 'imbecile men,the minions of Russia', adding: 'Has Justiceceased to occupy her throne in the Englishheart? Has the national honour lost its holdon the people of this realm?' The WestminsterReview drew attention to 'our passage toIndia', informing its readers that 'ourmerchants will rue the blind folly indeclining to stop him [the Tsar]'. The Timesproclaimed that 'an aggressive posture wasnot only moral, Christian and patriotic, butself-evidently judicious, businesslike andmanly' - a potent combination ofsentiments. Punch published a cartoon of thePrime Minister, Lord Aberdeen, blacking theTsar's boots. The Spectator referred to 'warwith the most powerful and unscrupulousstate in Europe, or peace on degrading terms'.

Drift to war

Lord Palmerston, the Home Secretary,represented a broad swathe of opinion indeclaring that 'something must be done towipe away the stain [of Sinope]', seen intwenty-first-century terms as a crime againsthumanity. Thus, on 3 January 1854, Britishand French naval squadrons entered theBlack Sea with Turkish connivance. Eightdays later a formal note to St Petersburgdemanded that all Russian warships return toSevastopol, warning too that any furthernaval aggression against Turkey would be metby force. On 27 February, Britain requiredthat within six days Russia undertake towithdraw from the two provinces by the endof April: 'Refusal or silence ... [would] be

Warring sides 21

equivalent to a declaration of war.' The Tsardid not reply. Even before the formaldeclaration of war on 28 March, Britishtroops had begun to leave south-coast portsamid scenes of wild enthusiasm, and Britishand French officers were in Turkey to inspectthe defences of Constantinople and plan forallied intervention.

Prospects for a peaceful solution had notyet altogether gone. British, French, Prussianand Austrian representatives were still indiplomatic conclave, Napoleon wrotepersonally to Nicholas 1, and a Quakerdelegation went from London toSt Petersburg. Aberdeen optimistically,though futilely, held that 'I, for one, deny ...that war is inevitable.' But the British andFrench declarations came almostsimultaneously, and on 10 April the twocountries signed a treaty of alliance (accededto five days later by Turkey). Next day, theTsar in turn declared war on Britain and

Henry John Temple, Lord Palmerston (1784-1865).Home Secretary in 1854, Palmerston was keen toconfront Russia. Benefiting from public dissatisfaction atfailure to take Sevastopol, he became Prime Minister inFebruary 1855. (Ann Ronan Picture Library)

France, protesting that 'Russia fights not forthe things of this world, but for the Faith'.Commenting on British enthusiasm for war,Charles Greville (Clerk to the Privy Council)prophetically wrote in his diary: 'Beforemany months are over, people will beheartily sick of it, as they are now hot uponit.' Years later, the pacifist John Brightobserved: 'When people are inflamed in thatway, they are no better than "mad dogs".'

In the House of Commons, John Ballreflected majority opinion inside and outsideof Parliament in speaking of the need tofight 'for the maintenance in civilisedsociety of the principles of right andjustice'. This was a just war. Unfortunately,the Tsar thought so as well.

Outbreak

A just war

Three months before Britain went to war, on24 December 1853 Sir James Graham (FirstLord of the Admiralty) focused attention onthe Crimea. He argued that command of theBlack Sea, which would preserve the integrityof Turkey and deny Russian warships passagethrough the Straits, could be secured only by'the entire destruction of Sebastopol [sic]with its naval and military establishments'.But the known strength of the port's massiveseaward fortifications, which protected theentrance to the harbour, ruled out asuccessful naval attack without the assistanceof a land force. Graham and the Duke ofNewcastle (Secretary of State for War and theColonies) therefore began to visualise such acombined operation with Sevastopol as theprize. In the wake of public and politicalreaction to the Sinope affair, events movedahead speedily.

Britain

On 7 February, the Master-General of theOrdnance, Lieutenant-General Lord Raglan(soon promoted general and, before the endof the year, field marshal) was verballyoffered the post of 'General OfficerCommanding the Forces eastwards of Malta'.Six days later the Cabinet approved hisappointment. Some reservations wereexpressed about his age (65) and lack ofcampaign experience after the Battle ofWaterloo in 1815. Since 1819 he had held aseries of high-ranking staff appointmentsbut, in truth, he had never commanded inthe field. However, he had served at theDuke of Wellington's side, first as hisaide-de-camp (ADC) then as MilitarySecretary from 1808 to 1815, and he hadbeen on the staff of the British Embassy inParis from 1814 to 1818, besides leading a

FitzRoy Henry James Somerset, Field Marshal LordRaglan (1788-1855). Aged 65, Raglan acceptedcommand of the British Expeditionary Force toTurkey, and ultimately the Crimea, as a matter ofduty. Having no authority over his fellow French,Turkish and Sardinian commanders and exercisinglimited control even over British support services,he was nevertheless blamed for shortcomings inthe field. He died of dysentery and exhaustion inthe Crimea, 28 June 1855. (Hulton Deutsch)

diplomatic mission to Spain in 1823. Heaccompanied Wellington to the Congress ofVerona (1822) and to St Petersburg (1825) forthe coronation of Nicholas I, whose troopshe was set to fight.

In his lengthy career, Raglan had provedhimself adept at dealing with difficult men

Outbreak 23

Lieutenant-General Sir George Brown (1790-1865).Commanded the 1st Infantry Division in theCrimean Expeditionary Force. Fought bravely atthe Alma and Inkerman. where he was seriouslywounded. Led the allied expedition, which capturedKertch in May 1855, but was invalided homeshortly afterwards. (Ann Ronan Picture Library)

and delicate situations, such as threats topublic order in London during presentationof the third Chartist petition to Parliamentin 1848. He was not only familiar withFrance, but also fluent in the Frenchlanguage. This made him an ideal choice fordealing with a touchy ally. His tact would befully extended in dealing with threesuccessive French commanders and a proudTurkish Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C),sensitive to any perceived slight. Diplomacy,as much as military acumen, would berequired for the forthcoming campaign.

Initially, on 8 February, the Cabinet agreedto dispatch 10,000 troops to Malta, althoughNewcastle acknowledged that more would beneeded if 'a trial of strength' with Russia wereto develop. By mid-March, Britain, Franceand Turkey were informally looking tonational contingents of 5,000 with which toinvade the Crimea. Raglan chose his ownimmediate staff (adjutant-general,quartermaster-general and military secretary)and ADCs, but he could only recommendofficers to command divisions and brigades.He did not always get his way. The Cabinetwould not approve Sir George Brown as hissecond-in-command, and Raglan's protests atputting the volatile lords Lucan and Cardiganin close proximity were overridden.

Urbane, thoughtful and courteous, Raglaninspired fierce loyalty in those close to him.But he disliked ostentation - invaluable for acommander in projecting himself to a widerspectrum of his own troops and those of hisallies. A thoroughly decent man whoaccepted command of the ExpeditionaryForce as a matter of patriotic duty, he wasloath to exert his authority, preferring anappeal to reason.

Lieutenant-General Sir George Brown (64)took charge of the Light Division. A strictdisciplinarian, he had fought in the

Peninsular War and since 1815 he had held aseries of senior staff appointments, includingthat of Adjutant-General at the HorseGuards. He had quarrelled, however,with Wellington's successor as C-in-C(Lord Hardinge) and resigned.

Lieutenant-General the Duke ofCambridge, the Queen's 35-year-old cousinwho had never seen action, commanded the1st Division of infantry after royal pressurefor his appointment. He had served inthe Hanoverian Army, briefly led the17th Lancers during the Chartist troubles,then held administrative posts in Corfu andIreland. Lieutenant-General Sir George deLacy Evans (67) had the 2nd Division. Withexperience, like Brown and Raglan, in thePeninsular War, he had also served in Indiaand with the British Legion during theCarlist Wars in Spain. But his radical politicsand tendency to fall out with senior officershad stunted his career.

Major-General Sir Richard England (61),commanding the 3rd Division, had fought inIndia and the Kaffir Wars in southern Africa.The 4th Division went to Major-General theHon. Sir George Cathcart (60), another warveteran from southern Africa. An addedcomplication was that, Brown having been


Lieutenant-General George Frederick Charles, Duke ofCambridge (1819-1904). Queen Victoria's cousin,commander of the 1st Infantry Division. Fought at thebattles of the Alma and Inkerman; played a peripheralpart in the Battle of Balaclava. Invalided home inNovember 1854. (Ann Ronan Picture Library)

vetoed as Raglan's deputy, Cathcart received a'dormant commission' by which he wouldassume command should Raglan beincapacitated; but that was not widely known.

Each of the five infantry divisionscomprised two brigades of three battalions,making a total of about 4,000 men perdivision. The Light and 4th divisionscontained an additional rifle battalion.

The Cavalry Division was under Major-General (soon local Lieutenant-General) LordLucan (54), its Heavy Brigade being led byBrigadier-General the Hon. James Scarlett(55) and the Light Brigade by Lucan'sbrother-in-law, Major-General Lord Cardigan(57). Each brigade comprised five regimentstotalling 1,000 sabres. Of the three cavalry

commanders, only Lucan had battleexperience. Curiously, that had been whenattached to the staff of the Russian force thatcrossed the Danube into the Balkans in1828-29, with some sources placing him incommand of a cavalry formation in thelatter stages of that campaign.

Two field artillery batteries with 6pdr or9pdr guns were attached to each infantrydivision, except the Light, which had onefield battery and one troop of horse artillery.The Cavalry Division had one troop of horseartillery with it. Heavier guns (up to 32pdrs)were allocated for siege purposes, enhancedbefore Sevastopol by naval 68pdrs andrevolutionary, rifled Lancaster guns. Theexperienced Royal Engineer Lieutenant-General Sir John Fox Burgoyne (71) wouldjoin Raglan's staff in an advisory capacitybefore the Crimean landings. Excluding theHeavy Brigade, which did not land withthe main body, officially 26,095 men of allranks invaded the Crimea under Raglan'scommand, supported by 60 guns.

The British fleet in the Black Sea,comprising 16 warships with a total of645 guns, was commanded by Vice-AdmiralSir James Dundas, with Rear-Admiral SirEdmund Lyons in command of its in-shoresquadron. Once it became clear that theRussian navy had been blockaded inSevastopol, a Royal Navy brigade wentashore with guns from several ships to swellthe besieging force.

France

Marshal St Arnaud (52), who had seen activeservice in Algeria and supported LouisNapoleon during his coup d'état in 1851, ledthe French Expeditionary Force. Brownthought him 'a strange, flighty fellow andone it will not do to take at his word'; yearslater Christopher Hibbert declared him'brave, gay, unscrupulous and resourceful'.His force consisted of four divisions, each oftwo brigades with three regiments,commanded by generals F. C. Canrobert (45),P. J. F. Bosquet (44), Prince Napoleon-Jerome

Outbreak 25

(the Emperor's cousin, 32) and E. F. Forey(49). When the French landed in the Crimea,St Arnaud had 25,000 infantry, 2,800 othertroops (some sources put the combined totalat 30,200) and 68 guns, but no cavalry. Thusthe only cavalry available to the alliedcommanders in the first phase of theinvasion was the British Light Brigade.

Under the separate command of Vice-Admiral F. A. Hamelin, though subject togreater control by the land force commanderthan his British counterpart, the French fleetinitially comprised 12 battleships and steamers(totalling 780 guns), increasing to 25 warshipsbefore the landings in the Crimea.

Marshal Armand Jacques Leroy de St Amaud (1801 -54).After supporting Napoleon Ill's coup d'état.St Amaud was appointed C-in-C of the FrenchExpeditionary Force in 1854. Unsuccessfully attemptedto secure overall command of the English force andto dominate allied strategy. Surrendered commandto Canrobert on 25 September; died four days later.(Ann Ronan Picture Library)

General Omar Pasha (1806-71). As Turkish C-in-Cin the Balkans, he fiercely resisted Russian besiegersof Silistria in 1854. Established a close workingrelationship with Lord Raglan. After the fall ofSevastopol, led a relief column that failed to saveKars. (Ann Ronan Picture Library)

Turkey

The Turks landed 7,000 infantry andattached them to the French for the marchsouth. Their C-in-C, Omar Pasha, remainedat Shumla with a large force in reach of theDanube, deeply suspicious that a renewedadvance into the Balkans might takeplace once the allies had been committedto the Crimea, Eventually, some30,000-35,000 Turks would serve on theCrimean peninsula, mainly in defence ofEupatoria or in the siege lines beforeSevastopol. Omar Pasha spoke French,German and Italian, though heavilyaccented, and his background wasextraordinary. Formerly a Croat namedMichael Lattas, he had left the Austrian forthe Turkish army, converted to Islam, thenacquired a new name and a fierce reputationfighting anti-Turkish rebels in the Balkans.The Turks had 11 sail and steam ships undertheir own admiral in the Black Sea.


Russia

Aware of the problems associated with adivided allied command, Bosquet remarked:'The Russians have one enormous advantageover us: their army has only one chief.' Thatwas an illusion. The Crimean peninsula hadtwo Russian commanders-in-chief: in thewest, Prince A. S. Menshikov; for easternCrimea and north-west Caucasus, GeneralP. F. Khomutov, who controlled 12,000 menand the supply route into Sevastopol fromthe Sea of Azov via Kertch and Theodosia.

Menshikov had no authority overKhomutov and, although his commandincluded the Black Sea Fleet as well as landforces, several more junior officers hadeffective autonomy beneath him. Vice-

Admiral V. A. Kornilov, chief of staff to theBlack Sea fleet and an excellent organiser,commanded the garrison of Sevastopol withhis subordinate naval commander, Vice-Admiral P. F. Nachimov (victor at Sinope,senior to Kornilov but reluctant to take thegarrison post). Lieutenant-General F. F. vonMoeller, Menshikov's most experienceddivisional commander, acted in a similar

General Prince Alexander Sergeevich Menshikov(1781-1869). Nominally C-in-C, Western Crimea, buteffectively commander of the forces resisting the alliedinvasion, he lost the Battle of the Alma through poordeployment of troops in a strong defensive position.After establishing a field army on the flank of alliedtroops besieging Sevastopol, he failed to use it effectively.Dismissed after the abortive Russian attack on Eupatoriain February 1855. (Ann Ronan Picture Library)

Outbreak 27

capacity for the army. Lieutenant-ColonelF. E. I. Todleben, a 37-year-old engineer, wasin charge of making the port's landfortifications effective.

An accomplished linguist and well read,Prince A. S. Menshikov had wide civil andmilitary experience. He had served in theNapoleonic Wars, been seconded to theForeign Ministry, held naval rank andappointments including Chief of the NavalStaff, been Minister for the Navy andGovernor-General of Finland. The yearbefore Britain and France declared war, thediplomat General B. D. A. de Castelbajacreferred to Menshikov's 'simple and polishedmanners', love of 'women, gambling, horses,good and bad company ... witty and causticrepartee'. Menshikov's disdainful treatmentof the Sultan during his mission toConstantinople in 1854, which Nicholas I'sphysician believed 'simply furnished himwith a fresh excuse for witticisms and jokes',underlined his aristocratic demeanour andintolerance of those he considered inferior.Critics held that he rarely, if ever, consultedothers, although he was careful to cultivatethe Tsar. A Russian academic, Professor Tarle,has concluded that Menshikov viewed allappointments as his due. Flexibility ofoutlook and self-criticism were anathema tohim. They were qualities much needed inthe months ahead.

When the allies landed on 14 September1854, excluding Khomutov's commandand units still in transit from Bessarabiaand mainland Russia, Menshikov had38,000 soldiers and 18,000 seamen at hisdisposal. The previous day, 600 Congreverockets had arrived to enhance his artillerycapability. When 11 French foragers were

captured on 15 September and revealed thatthe allied force exceeded 50,000, Menshikovasked Khomutov for another Cossack cavalryregiment, the Moskov infantry regiment andan additional field battery.

Until now, he had suspected that thelandings near Eupatoria were a feint todraw troops away from Sevastopol and layit open to a coup de main. Not including5,000 civilian workmen, the total of strengthof the Sevastopol garrison once the siegedeveloped was later known to be 30,850 - amixture of militia battalions, one regularbattalion of infantry, artillery and marinepersonnel, supplemented by seamen fromwarships withdrawn into harbour from theBlack Sea. However, when the allies landednear Eupatoria estimates of the number ofRussian troops on the Crimean peninsulavaried wildly. For the Russians, work rapidlytook place to strengthen the defences ofSevastopol, and within a fortnight of theinvasion 172 guns (many of them heavierthan those of the besiegers) were in placeto combat an assault from the southernupland. Eastwards across the Tchernaya,at the end of September Menshikov had afield army of approximately 30,000 men(including regiments withdrawn fromSevastopol), which would be furtherreinforced via the Perekop peninsula inthe north and Sea of Azov to the east.

The numbers on both the allied andRussian sides would vary greatly duringthe forthcoming hostilities, due to battlecasualties, disease and reinforcements.But when the allies invaded on14 September 1854, the forces facingone another on the peninsula were eachabout 60,000 men.

The fighting

The clash of arms

After a farewell audience with the Queen,Lord Raglan left London by train for Doveron 10 April 1854. Arriving in Paris thefollowing morning, during the ensuing weekhe had discussions with St Arnaud, othersenior officers and Napoleon III. Leaving theFrench capital on 18 April, travelling viaMarseille, Malta and Gallipoli, he reachedConstantinople 11 days later.

Meanwhile, British warships had 'openedthe ball with Russia'. Seeking to evacuate theBritish and French consuls from Odessa,Furious had been fired on by shore batteries,and naval reinforcements were summoned toavenge this outrage. A ten-hourbombardment on 22 April devastatedOdessa's military installations and caused1,100 casualties. However, five British shipswere also damaged. Battle had been joined.

On land, during February Sir JohnBurgoyne and the French engineer ColonelArdent had begun inspecting the defences ofConstantinople, as other officers surveyedTurkish positions on the Danube. Thefirst British troops left Southampton on22 February and frequent departuresoccurred thereafter from that port,Portsmouth, Plymouth and Liverpool. Largecrowds waved away the early departures, butby the time the 8th Hussars left Plymouth on25 April the fuss had died down. Stoppingonly briefly at Gibraltar, the early troopshipsberthed at Malta for troops to enjoy themild climate and cheap wine. At thisstage, peace might yet prevail. On 30 March,however, orders were issued to proceedto Gallipoli under Sir George Brown,pending Raglan's arrival.

Landing on 8 April, the British found thattheir French allies had preceded them andlaid claim to the best accommodation andfood. By the end of May, some 18,000 Britishand 22,000 French were in the vicinity.

Several British units moved further north toScutari, where conditions were scarcely better.It was with considerable relief therefore thatin June, apart from a small garrison atGallipoli and a transit depot at Scutari, troopswere ordered to Bulgaria through the port ofVarna. Once more, though, Britain's ally beatthem to the best billets and supplies.

French troops at Gallipoli. The first location occupiedby allied forces and soon overcrowded. By June 1854.it retained only a small garrison as the bulk of theunits moved on. (Ann Ronan Picture Library)

The fighting 29

Grenadier Guards leave London. A contemporaryprint showing the Grenadiers marching to WaterlooStation, cheered by an enthusiastic crowd of men,women and children. (Author's collection)

Bulgarian summer

In the early summer of 1854, the Russianswere still occupying Moldavia and Wallachiaand threatening Turkish positions along theDanube, especially the fortress of Silistria onits southern bank. If this fell and enemytroops poured into the Balkans, the allieswould need to bolster the Turks in Bulgaria;hence the advance to Varna. But beforeRaglan left England, Newcastle hadinstructed him that, although his 'first duty'was to protect Constantinople, if the enemymade no 'onward movement it may become


Silistria. Fortress south of the Danube, besieged byRussian forces in 1854. Fears that it would fall resultedin allied troops moving into Bulgaria. The Russianswithdrew on 23 June, leaving the allies free to invadethe Crimea. (Ann Ronan Picture Library)

essential for the attainment of the objects ofthe war that some operations of an officialcharacter should be undertaken by the Alliedarmies ... No blow ... struck at the southernextremities of the Russian Empire would beso effective for this purpose as the taking ofSebastopol [sic].'

So the prospect of an allied invasion ofthe Crimea was always in Raglan's mind.However, it would not be easy to organise.St Arnaud, in command of the larger Frenchforce, tried to gain control of the two armiesand to dictate their deployment in Bulgaria.Only firm action by Raglan, including apersonal appeal to the Sultan with detailedreference to the tripartite agreementguaranteeing independent, nationalcommands, avoided major confrontation.However, Raglan quickly established agood working relationship based on mutualrespect with Omar Pasha, whom he visitedat his headquarters in Shumla.

The neighbourhood of Varna rapidlybecame overcrowded, and the British movedfurther inland to the valleys of Devna andAladyn. There cholera struck in addition todebilitating dysentery and fevers. Relocationof the camps did not noticeably stem theflow of fatalities: during July, 600 died in afortnight. Serious deficiencies in the hospitalservices, which relied heavily on recalledmilitary pensioners gathered into anoptimistic Hospital Conveyance orAmbulance Corps, were cruelly revealed. Sowere supply problems. Some troops stillcarried the smooth-bore Brown Bess musket,instead of the new Minié rifled version;on 15 June, Raglan complained that the3rd Division lacked 1,300 promised Miniés.

Ten days later, Raglan informed Newcastleof a deficiency that would never besatisfactorily solved during the entirecampaign: 'The means of [land] transportform our principal want and a most seriousone.' Under a system named 'waggons of the

country', carts and drivers would be recruitedon contract in the area of operations. Thisproved totally unrealistic in Bulgaria, andlater in hostile Crimea. Regular provision offood became difficult, too. St Arnaudcomplained to Raglan that British andFrench commissaries were bidding againstone another for local produce, and one ofRaglan's ADCs wrote that 'bread is ourgreatest difficulty here as it is all sour'.

In the midst of this administrativequagmire, the strategic situation dramatically

The fighting 31

changed. During the night of 22/23 June, theRussians raised the siege of Silistria, and by2 July they had withdrawn completely fromMoldavia and Wallachia. However, politicaland public opinion in London and Parisdetermined that Russia must be taught alesson and deterred from ever againthreatening the Balkans or the Straits.

A. W. Kinglake, author of a detailedaccount of the war, would allege that thedecision to invade the Crimea was taken bya sleepy Cabinet on 28 June. In reality, the

venture had been discussed in politicalcircles since at least December 1853 andwidely aired in the press during the threemonths following. A variety of militaryfigures (including Captain J. R. DrummondRN, who visited Sevastopol in January 1854,and Sir John Burgoyne) had alreadyproduced reports and recommendationsabout the feasibility of such an operation.Cabinet endorsement was a mere formality;Raglan had been warned to prepare for thiseventuality before leaving London. The


British commander could not therefore havebeen entirely surprised when on 16 July hereceived a dispatch (dated 29 June) fromNewcastle: 'The fortress [Sevastopol] must bereduced and the fleet taken or destroyed:nothing but insuperable impediments ...should be allowed to prevent the earlydecision to undertake these operations.'

Raglan consulted Sir George Brown, notonly an experienced soldier but alsosomebody with whom he had worked closelyat the Horse Guards and had wanted as hissecond-in-command. Brown's response, thatthey should consider what Wellington ('thegreat Duke') would have done under the

circumstances, has often been misinterpreted.There were serious military objections toinvading the Crimea: it was already late inthe year and, once ashore, success would benecessary before the onset of winter; noreliable information was to hand abouteither the strength (estimates varied between45,000 and 120,000) or disposition of Russiantroops on the peninsula; given the problemsencountered during the move to Varna andsubsequent time in Bulgaria, rapid agreementbetween the three allies could not beguaranteed; neither land nor sea transportwere readily available; above all, no invasionplan existed. However, Brown recognised that

The fighting 33

their political masters were intent on landingin the Crimea and seizing Sevastopol. Hisobservation therefore was not military, butpolitical. Wellington held that officers wereconstitutionally subject to the wishes ofgovernment ministers.

Newcastle's dispatch on 29 June remindedRaglan that he had been forewarned on10 April, and the Secretary of State lateracknowledged that the British commanderhad obeyed the government, contrary to hisown professional judgement. In a separateletter, Newcastle emphasised that 'unless wedestroy Russia's Black Sea fleet I do not seemy way to a safe and honourable peace'.

Others on the spot expressed their doubts,once the decision to invade the Crimeabecame known. Burgoyne focused on theproximity to winter, Brigadier-GeneralW. B. Tylden, Raglan's CommandingEngineer, thought it 'a very rashundertaking'; Lieutenant the Hon. HenryClifford believed the whole idea dangerousin view of its open discussion even beforethe troops left England: 'The least sanguinelook upon the plan as that of a madman andthe taking of the place as impossible.' Notmuch enthusiasm there.

The Adjutant-General of the BritishExpeditionary Force, Major-GeneralJ. B. Estcourt, thought supply and transportstill 'very defective ... there is a want oforganisation'; and in England The Daily Newsblamed deficiencies on 'our absurd system ofthrowing aside in peace the machinery weare compelled to make use of in war'.Quite possibly. But an invasion had to beorganised. Thus, on 18 July a Council of Wardecided that steps should be taken to find alanding beach sufficiently large toaccommodate the combined force, notdominated by enemy guns and withinreasonable distance of Sevastopol.

Three days later, sailing along the westcoast of the Crimea in Fury Brown and theFrench divisional commander Canrobertchose the mouth of the Katcha river, 7 miles(11km) north of Sevastopol. All had not beensettled, though. On 28 July, Raglan neededto deal firmly with a French suggestion thatthe allies stay in Bulgaria to counter anyrenewed military threat to the Danube andultimately Constantinople, by pointing tothe declared policy of the British and Frenchgovernments. Then, half-hearted attemptswere made to convince the enemy that theobjective was Odessa or the Caucasus.

The Russians were not fooled. Even astroops sailed down the Channel from

The armada leaves Varna. Plans to leave Varna andconcentrate 15 miles (24km) north in Balchik Baywere disrupted by bad weather By 9 Septemberthe allied warships, many towing transports full oftroops, were strung out across the Black Sea.(Ann Ronan Picture Library)


English ports in February 1854, Field MarshalI. F. Paskevich drew Nicholas I's attention tothe bellicose outpourings of the British pressabout attacking Sevastopol. He believed itlikely that an expedition would try to landin the Crimea. On 11 July, Menshikovsimilarly warned the Tsar of 'an attemptagainst Sevastopol and the Black Sea fleet'.However, on 12 September the C-in-C WestCrimea concluded that it was now too late inthe year for such an enterprise. Not his lastmistake that year.

Meanwhile, preparations for the alliedinvasion were slowed down by a majorfire in Varna on 10 August which destroyed avast quantity of stores (including11,000 pairs of boots) and, perhapsmaliciously, was ascribed to Greek saboteursin Russian pay. Yet more delay occurred

Landing in the Crimea. Despite problems of initialdispersal, the allied armada gathered off Cape Tarkanand on 13 September approached the Crimeancoast in good order. After capturing Eupatoria, thefollowing day troops commenced landing inCalamita Bay. (Ann Ronan Picture Library)

through the need to assemble sufficienttroop transports, prepare adequate siegeequipment and finalise the landing andassault plans. To make matters worse, cholerawas still raging. In the first week of August,8 per cent of the British land force wassuffering from it. Nor did the fleet escape:Britannia lost 139 from a ship's company of985. The French, too, were heavily affected,although estimates of 5,000-9,000 deathswere possibly exaggerated. St Arnaud did,however, theatrically observe, '1 am in themidst of a great sepulchre.'

The fighting 35

Area of operations

At length the cholera abated, and on20 August final arrangements were made forthe troops, horses and equipment to beconveyed either in steam vessels or in sailingships towed by steamers. Departure would beon 2 September, with embarkationcommencing on 24 August. Most of theFrench and Turkish troops were to beconveyed in their own naval vessels, which

could not therefore easily clear for action.However, in view of its inactivity after Sinope,it was assumed that the Russian fleet wouldnot interfere. In Raglan's words, 'the greatexpedition' was about to begin. Still pointingto the 'terrible' risk so late in the year, theDuke of Cambridge unfairly added, 'but thegovernment insists on it and the commandershave not got the courage to say no'.


Invasion

After embarkation had been completed,the armada aimed to concentrate in BalchikBay, 15 miles (24km) north of Varna, but'a strong breeze for several days' disruptedthe programme. When Raglan arrived atBalchik on 5 September, St Arnaud hadalready left. Not until three days later did thetwo vessels carrying the French and Britishcommanders meet at sea. By then theinvasion fleet was strung out over analarming distance.

That afternoon, an allied conference onboard Ville de France, St Arnaud's ship, learntthat the French now favoured landing on the

Skirmish at the Bulganek. 19 September 1854. Afterallied troops began marching southwards towardsSevastopol, the light cavalry encountered enemycavalry across the shallow Bulganek river Massed Russianinfantry were then detected in dead ground ahead,and the vanguard extricated from the planned ambushunder cover of artillery fire. (Author's collection)

south coast of the Crimea at Kaffa, 100 miles(160km) east of Sevastopol and separatedfrom it by mountainous terrain. Reconvenedthe following day on Caradoc, Raglan'ssteamer, the conference rejected Kaffa, butexpressed unease about the proximity of theKatcha to Sevastopol, from which the enemycould quickly bring up troops and artillery.

So on 9 September, protected by threewarships. Raglan and 11 British and Frenchofficers sailed in Caradoc to re-examine thewest coast of the Crimea. They returned tothe allied ships, which had gathered at therendezvous 40 miles (64km) west of CapeTarakan, and announced that the landingarea would now be in Calamita Bay, justsouth of the small port of Eupatoria and30 miles (48km) north of Sevastopol. Raglanestimated that 20,000-25,000 enemy troopshad been seen in camps during thereconnaissance, in addition to the garrisonof Sevastopol and others hidden inland atSimpheropol, Batchi Serai and elsewhere.

The fighting 37

The armada resumed its passageeastwards, and on the evening of12 September Eupatoria came into sight.Next day it was occupied and the allied forcesailed on south to the landing beaches,characterised by the ruins of an old fort.Menshikov received intelligence that theallied armada was at sea while attending theBorodin regiment's ball on 11 September,and confirmation of the impending landingsarrived two days later during an eveningperformance of Gogol's play The GovernmentInspector in Sevastopol. When the newscirculated among the audience, the theatrerapidly emptied.

The unopposed invasion commenced on14 September, but stormy weatherinterrupted the landings, which were notcompleted for four days. Then a total ofapproximately 63,000 men and 128 gunswere ashore. St Arnaud wrote confidently:'The troops are superb ... we shall beat theRussians.' On the morning of 19 September,the march south started: four rivers had tobe crossed before reaching the Bay ofSevastopol, which divided the northernsuburbs of the naval port from its southerndockyard. The British protected the exposedleft flank as the French and Turks advancedadjacent to the coast on the allied right. Tworegiments of light cavalry rode ahead of theBritish force, two covered the flank and afifth the rear. Cardigan, as brigadecommander, went with the two leadingregiments, but Lucan had insisted onaccompanying the invading force despiteabsence of the Heavy Brigade and Raglan'sreluctance, because the two brothers-in-lawhad already clashed in Bulgaria.

Reaching the small Bulganek river, whichwas the first of the water obstacles, duringthe afternoon of 19 September, Raglanspotted Cossacks beyond. He sent thecavalry advance guard over the stream toinvestigate. As they did so, the sun flashedon the bayonets of massed infantry drawnup in ambush. Covered by 6pdr and9pdr field guns, the cavalry skilfullywithdrew; and the first skirmish on Crimeanterritory had taken place.

Battle of the Alma

The march resumed on the morning of20 September. Kinglake, the chronicler whorode with the army, wrote that it 'was likesome remembered day of June in England forthe sun was undaunted, and the soft breezeof the morning had lulled to a breath atnoontide'. Five days earlier, naval reportshad warned Raglan that the Russians weregathering in strength south of the Alma (thesecond river), which ran into the Black Seaacross the allies' front 5 miles (8km) beyondthe Bulganek. The ground on its northern(right) bank, across which the Allies mustapproach, sloped gently towards the river.The south bank, however, rose steeply inplaces to 15ft (4.5m) and above it 300 to500ft (90-150m) undulating downspresented an ideal position from which todominate the river and its approaches. At theextreme western end of the 5.5 miles (9km)of rolling countryside, a 350ft (105m) cliffabutted the Black Sea, where an old Tartarfort overlooked the river-mouth. A ford atthe village of Almatamack (a mile [1.6km])inland and, like Bourliouk and Tarkhanlar,on the north bank) led to a wagon tracksuitable for artillery; three other pathsfurther east were less accessible.

Three miles (5km) inland, the post roadfrom Eupatoria to Sevastopol passed close tothe village of Bourliouk, crossed a woodenbridge and climbed through a gorgeoverlooked to the east by Kourgane Hill(450ft, 135m), to the west by TelegraphHeight. Menshikov discounted any seriousattack west of Telegraph Height, identifyingthe post road as the crucial point. Hefortified Kourgane Hill (site of hisheadquarters) with the so-called Great andLesser redoubts, respectively armed with12 and nine cannon. In reality, these'redoubts' were low breastworks 3—4ft(1-1.2m) high. Nevertheless, the largerone on the lower slopes of the hill,300yds (275m) from the river, constituted aformidable position. The smaller work facednorth-east to deter a flank assault, but couldprove troublesome for frontal attackers. The

The B

attle of the Alm

a, 20 Septem

ber 1854, 9.00 am

38 E


he Crim

ean War

The fighting 39

third village, Tarkhanlar, 1.25 miles (2km)east of Bourliouk, played no part in theensuing battle and is omitted from mostBritish maps and accounts.

At the Alma, Menshikov had GeneralP. D. Gorchakov commanding 6 Corps(Lieutenant-General D. A. Kvintsinsky's16 Infantry Division and Lieutenant-GeneralV. Ia. Kiriakov's 17 Infantry Division) plusone brigade from 14 Infantry Division; ahussar brigade and two Don Cossackregiments of cavalry; four 13 InfantryDivision infantry battalions (two from theBelostok and two from the Brest regiments);one rifle battalion; one naval battalion; andone engineer regiment. In all, therefore, hehad 42 infantry battalions, 16 squadrons oflight cavalry, 11 squadrons of Cossacks and84 guns. An indeterminate number ofpatriotic civilian volunteers, hastily enrolled,temporarily swelled the ranks and promptly-vanished once the shooting started.

Believing that the steep track on to theheights close to the sea was impassable formilitary purposes, Menshikov deployed asingle battalion of the Minsk regiment withhalf a battery of field guns near Ulkul Akles, amile (1.6km) south of the river-mouth. Itspurpose was predominantly to warn of undueactivity at sea, with one company forward inthe Tartar fort to observe allied movementfrom the north. Menshikov appears not tohave ridden over ground himself, but reliedon reports from staff officers.

Convinced that the allies could notembarrass him west of Telegraph Height,Menshikov did not position defenders alongthe Alma until about 2,000yds (1,830m)from the sea, just east of Almatamack.Between there and Telegraph Height(approximately 2,500yds [2,285m]) he placedthe four battalions of the Brest and Belostokregiments, with the Tarutin regiment inreserve. Supported by two field batteries ofartillery, the Borodin regiment heldTelegraph Height, with the Moskov regiment(sent by Khomutov from eastern Crimea) inreserve. These units west of the post roadwere evidently under Kiriakov, but inretrospect confusion appears to have

occurred over direction of the Borodinregiment, administratively part ofKvitsinsky's 16 Division. An addedcomplication was that Kiriakov was placedunder Menshikov's direct command, notthat of Gorchakov, his corps commander.Some accounts maintain that Menshikovkept personal control of all the reserves.

Kvitsinsky, still responsible to Gorchakov,exercised tactical command of Kourgane Hill,where he deployed the Kazan regiment indirect support of the two redoubts, holdingthe Vladimir and Uglit regiments with twoDon Cossack field batteries in reserve.Guarding the flank were the Suzdal regimentand two Don Cossack regiments. Astride thepost road, 2,000yds (1,830m) south of theAlma, Gorchakov had seven infantrybattalions in reserve (the Volyn regiment andthree battalions of the Minsk) with a hussarbrigade (two regiments) and a light horsebattery. Even more cavalry were waitingsouth of Kourgane Hill.

Vineyards north of the river had beencleared to remove cover for the allies andexpose an unhindered field of fire for theRussians. Cavalry patrols scouted towards theBulganek and riflemen were placed inAlmatamack and Bourliouk. Apart from thefew dedicated riflemen, the Russians hadunder 100 rifles to each infantry regiment.Reliance on the short-range, smooth-boremusket meant that artillery had to cover theriver crossings. The newly arrived Congreverockets proved useless because no launcherframes had been sent with them.

Nevertheless, Menshikov had33,000 infantry, 3,400 cavalry, 2,600 gunnersand 116 guns at his disposal and a powerfulnatural position to defend. Including reserves,approximately 20,000 men and 80 guns wereeast of Telegraph Height, covering the gorgeand Kourgane Hill, the remaining 13,000 menand 36 guns from Telegraph Height to the sea.Menshikov aimed to delay the allies for threeweeks to allow time for reinforcements toarrive. Confident of success, he permittedspectators from Sevastopol to take position onTelegraph Height, where hastily abandonedparasols and bonnets were later found. In


Battle of the Alma. 20 September 1854. Theentrenched units, supported by field batteries andtwo redoubts on the dominant Kourgane Hill (centre)covered the post road, faced by the British on theallied left. When the French and Turks failed to makeenough progress closer to the sea (beyond right),Lord Raglan launched his men against Kourgane Hillin the face of fierce fire. Artistic licence has increasedthe height of the hills, which were neverthelessformidable. (Ann Ronan Picture Library)

Sevastopol, Kornilov wrote in his diary: 'The[Alma] position selected by the prince isparticularly strong and we are therefore quitecontent... God does not abandon therighteous and we therefore await the outcomecalmly and with patience.'

On the allied right, 37,000 French andTurkish troops were supported by 68 fieldguns and the fire of steamers off-shore. Thetwo brigades of Bosquet's 1st Division wereseparately to use the steep coastal path andthat near Alamatamack. To Bosquet's left,Canrobert's 1st Division would scale theheights via other identified tracks, withNapoleon's 3rd Division attacking TelegraphHeight frontally. Forey's 4th Division inreserve would back up Napoleon as andwhen required. Raglan, on the left,nominally had 26,000 men (including1,000 cavalry) and 60 guns, was out of rangeof naval gunfire and faced the strongest partof the enemy position.

At about 11.30, the main allied bodyhalted 1.5 miles (2.4km) from the Alma, asBosquet continued to advance. Naval gunfirein his immediate support commenced atnoon. The overall plan provided for Bosquetto climb the heights to engage and distractthe enemy, then Canrobert and PrinceNapoleon, supported by Forey, would takeTelegraph Height. Only after this wouldRaglan attack Kourgane Hill.

When Bosquet's force approached, theRussian company in the Tartar fortwithdrew, and by 1 pm the French wereon the heights close to the sea. At almostprecisely the same moment, 4.5 miles(7.2km) further inland and still north of theriver, the British resumed their advance.After half an hour, they halted again,deployed into line and lay down to await

French success against Telegraph Height.They were now within enemy artilleryrange. One officer wrote: 'I think theworse part of the whole affair was lyingdown in lines before we received the orderto advance ... The shells bursting over usand blowing men to pieces, arms, legsand brains in all directions.'

An hour and a half later, the French hadnot taken Telegraph Height because theywere unable to get sufficient artillery on tothe high ground to support their infantry, asFrench doctrine required. Far to the alliedright, Bosquet was in no position to assist.

The fighting 41

Raglan realised, however, that the exposedBritish were taking heavy casualties on thenorthern slope, so at 3 pm he ordered hismen forward. The Light Division was on theleft of the front line, with the 2nd on itsright straddling the post road facingBourliouk village, to which Russianskirmishers had set fire. Behind the Lightand 2nd divisions respectively were the1st and 3rd with the 4th in reserve, as thecavalry guarded the flank.

Having issued his orders, with his staffRaglan crossed the river just west ofBourliouk under the lee of Telegraph Height

to a position where he could see clearly bothKourgane Hill and the Russian reserves.Realising that the enemy might be enfiladedfrom this spot, he sent back for a brigade ofthe 2nd Division and field artillery to joinhim. Meanwhile, the Light Division hadtaken the Great Redoubt ('up the hill wewent, step by step, but with a fearfulcarnage', in the words of one survivor), onlyfor an unidentified staff officer to orderwithdrawal because he mistook advancingRussian columns for French.

At 3.40, two 9pdr guns reached Raglanand began to harass the enemy on Kourgane


Major-General Sir Colin Campbell (1792-1863).Led the Highland Brigade at the Battle of the Alma,commanded the defences around Balaclava, wasdirectly involved in the Thin Red Line' action andlater in the war took charge of the newly formedHighland Division. (Ann Ronan Picture Library)

Hill, as the 1st Division in the wake of theLight crossed the river and retook theredoubts; the Highland Brigade the Lesser,the Guards Brigade the Great. Ordering hiscommand forward, Major-General Sir ColinCampbell called: 'Now men, the army iswatching us. Make me proud of theHighland Brigade.' In his detached eyrie,Raglan observed with admiration: 'Look howthe Guards and the Highlanders advance.'

With Kourgane Hill in British hands, andthe French now on Telegraph Height, at 4.30the battle was won. Lucan sent the LightBrigade in pursuit of the fleeing Russians, butRaglan recalled them. He knew that around3,000 Russian cavalry had not beencommitted to the battle and loss of his ownsmall force would have vastly hamperedfurther allied movement. Kiriakov had alsorallied infantry and 30 guns, 2 miles (3.2km)south of Telegraph Height.

As rockets sped the fleeing enemy on theirway, Raglan asked St Arnaud to take up thepursuit, as he had suffered fewer casualties:the British lost 362 (including 25 officers)with another 1,640 wounded or missing. Butthe French commander declined, as theknapsacks of his troops had been left onthe northern bank. The French reported1,243 casualties (more conservative estimatesthought 63 killed and about 500 wounded,the larger figure having included choleradeaths); the Russians incurred5,511 casualties (including 1,810 dead).

When he heard that the French hadscaled the downs further west, Menshikovhad left Kourgane Hill and fruitlessly riddenback and forth, unable to decide when orwhere to commit his reserves. Returningeastwards, after the battle had been lost, hefound a distraught, dismounted Gorchakov.Angrily asked why he was in such a state,Gorchakov replied: 'I am alone because all

The fighting 43

my aides-de-camp and the officers of myStaff have been killed or wounded. I havereceived six shots.' During a later truce, aRussian officer admitted: 'Yes, gentlemen,you won a brilliant victory at the Alma.'

It was also critical. Failure on20 September would have brought theCrimean campaign to a premature,ignominious conclusion. However,Menshikov should never have beendriven from such a strong position,which he had ample time to prepare.His over-confidence, which encouragedspectators to view the anticipated slaughter,played a major part in the battle'sultimate outcome.

The Flank march. Faced with formidable Russiandefences north of Sevastopol Bay. on 25 September1854 the allies marched round them to the eastThe following day, invading troops poured across thePlain of Balaclava on to the Chersonese plateau tobesiege Sevastopol. (Author's collection)

Flank march

Possibly because he was terminally ill, butallegedly because his men were fatigued,St Arnaud refused to move on during thefollowing two days. Meanwhile, the deadwere buried and Russian wounded evacuatedto Odessa. The allied march did not resumeuntil 23 September, to the chagrin ofAdmiral Lyons, who firmly believed that 'agolden opportunity' had been lost to snatchSevastopol before the Russians couldreorganise. Yet, how Sevastopol was to beattacked had still not been decided: seizureof the northern half then bombardment toinduce surrender of the southern dockyarddistricts; or, alternatively, a march roundSevastopol to the east and a siege of theport from upland to the south. High groundand two more rivers (the Katcha and Belbec)lay ahead, though, before Sevastopol cameinto sight.


Unknown to the allies, Menshikov hadmade a decision that would fundamentallyaffect the course of the campaign. On23 September, he sent Kiriakov with acovering force to the Belbec river, ensuredthat warships were sunk across the entranceto Sevastopol to prevent penetration by theallied fleets, left a garrison in the port(supplemented by sailors from the sunkenships), marched surplus regiments over theTchernaya river to the east and began togather a 30,000-strong field army on highground beyond. From there, he couldthreaten the flank of the invaders and keepin touch with reinforcement routes from thenorth and east.

24 September was a pivotal day for theallies. Intelligence was received that'yesterday' the Russians had sunk sevenwarships across the entrance to Sevastopolharbour and built a new earthwork near the

Lieutenant-General Sir John Fox Burgoyne (1782-1871).A distinguished Royal Engineer before war was declared,he surveyed the defences of Constantinople. In August1854. he joined Lord Raglan's staff as an adviser Recalledto London in March 1855. (Ann Ronan Picture Library)

Rear-Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons (1790-1858).Second in command of the Black Sea fleet, incharge of the in-shore squadron and naval liaisonofficer at Lord Raglan's headquarters; succeededVice-Admiral Dundas as C-in-C in January 1855.(Ann Ronan Picture Library)

mouth of the Belbec. Sent ahead to scout,Cardigan reported that an 'impracticable'marsh lay beyond the Belbec, whosecauseway was dominated by enemy guns andinfantry (Kiriakov's force). That evening adecisive conference took place in camp onthe Belbec. The preferred option of takingthe northern suburbs preparatory to abombardment and assault across the bayon the southern dockyard paled. Theoctagonal Star Fort (its guns capable of4,000yds [3,660m]) range) had beenstrengthened by construction of twobatteries nearby and support by entrenchedinfantry. A Polish deserter also claimed thatthe area had been mined. Sir John Burgoyne'strongly' favoured marching roundSevastopol to mount a regular siege from thesouth. The French, worried about thestrength of the northern defences, agreed.

The fighting 45

So with Cathcart's 4th Division and the4th Light Dragoons left at the Belbec tomaintain communication with the fleets, theflank march began on 25 September; 'thisbold and extraordinary movement, whichclaims rank with the greatest efforts ofmilitary science', according to The UnitedService Magazine. During its course, his escorthaving temporarily lost its way, Raglan verynearly rode into the rearguard of the Russianfield army making its way out of Sevastopol.During the morning of 26 September, theBritish commander crossed the Tchernayariver and entered the village of Kadikoi1.5 miles (2.4km) from Balaclava.Approaching the chosen British supply portthrough a narrow gorge and having beenassured of a friendly reception, Raglan wasfired on from an old castle at the harbourentrance, which rapidly surrendered.

The choice of Balaclava seemed strange.On the left of the line, the British couldlegitimately have wheeled on to the uplandbefore Sevastopol and made use of thenearby ports of Kamiesch and Kazatch. ButBurgoyne and Lyons urged Raglan to secureBalaclava and the new French commander,Canrobert, agreed. On 25 September,Canrobert had succeeded St Arnaud, whodied at sea four days later.

So on 27 September, the allies deployedon the high ground south of Sevastopol withthe French on the left and British on theright. The Chersonese upland, shaped ratherlike a heart, had an eastern escarpment (theSapoune Ridge) 700ft (210m) highoverlooking the Plain of Balaclava. A breakin the south-eastern corner (the 'Col') gaveaccess to Balaclava via a steep track. Thiswould be used to transport the Britishsupplies. The boundary between the Britishand French areas of responsibility was the'Man of War Harbour', a deep inlet fromSevastopol Bay known to the Russians asSouth Bay.

The French put their 3rd and4th divisions under Forey in the siege lines,the 1st and 2nd in a Corps of Observationcommanded by Bosquet in reserve behindthe British in the south-eastern quarter of

General Francois Certain Canrobert (1809-95). Adivisional commander with the French ExpeditionaryForce, he succeeded St Arnaud as C-in-C in September1854. In May 1855 he resigned in favour of GeneralA. J. J. Pélissier. taking over his corps and remaining inthe theatre of war (Ann Ronan Picture Library)

the plateau. The British 3rd and 4th divisionswere placed immediately east of the GreatRavine, the southward extension of Manof War Harbour, with the Light Divisionin its rear. The 2nd Division held theextreme right in the area later known asMount Inkerman, with the Brigade of Guardsfrom the 1st Division supporting it. TheFrench, therefore, faced the Old Town,containing the artillery and engineerstores; the British, the newer, easternKarabel suburb with the naval barracks,dry docks and main dockyard area.

At the outbreak of hostilities, the civilianpopulation comprised approximately38,000 Russians, Armenians, Jews, Tartarsand Greeks, many of them traders. Thenorthern Severnaia suburb, across the bay,had industrial buildings and supply depots.Below the Sapoune Ridge, principally withthe Highland Brigade of the 1st Division, theBritish guarded the exposed allied flankagainst the Russian field army, which alsothreatened Balaclava across the Plain.

Battle of Balaclava, 25 October 1854

46 E


he Crim

ean War

The fighting 47

The siege opens

As the allies settled on the upland on27 September, a semicircle of fortificationscould be seen facing them, supported byunsunken warships firing long-range fromSevastopol Bay. Apparently, only 23 of theRussian guns on land were effective, but thiswas not evident to the allies, who believedthat 20,000 men were defending the navalport in addition to the field army in the east.In fact, later evidence suggests that, includingmilitia, marines and disembarked sailors butexcluding 5,000 workmen, the garrisonactually totalled 30,850 men at this time.

Neither Burgoyne nor the Frenchsupported an assault without preliminarybombardment, so preparations for one werebegun. Answering a request from Raglan, on2 October Admiral Dundas agreed to land1,000 marines with a complement of fieldguns in addition to a naval brigade of

1,040 officers and men with heavier cannon.The Royal Artillery disembarked its siegetrain, dragging it almost 8 miles (13km) tothe heights. The British troops wereentrenched 2,300yds (2,100m) away fromthe enemy, and assaulting across such a wideexpanse of open ground would be suicidalwithout total reduction of the fortificationsahead. On the left, the French put batterieson Mount Rodolph; the British similarly didso on Green Hill and Woronzov Height,1,300-1,400yds (1,190-1,280m) fromSevastopol, with the Lancaster guns situatedin two 'half-sunken batteries' 2,800yds(2,560m) from the enemy. As preparationsfor the bombardment went ahead, sicknessamong the troops mounted, and towards the

Gun batteries in action. Heavy mortars and siegeartillery fire on the Russians before Sevastopol. TheWoronzov metalled road from Yalta is extreme left,the Malakov defence work far right, Sevastopol Bayand harbour entrance in the distance.


Sevastopol from the trenches. The extreme right ofthe allied line. Note the extent of the naval port andthe position of anchored Russian ships, able to fireon to the southern upland. (Author's collection)

end of October Raglan could muster only16,000 fit men.

What became known as the FirstBombardment by 126 British and Frenchguns began at dawn on 17 October. TheRussians (now with an estimated 220 guns,including those of steamers in the Bay)forestalled this by opening fire earlier, andthere is some suggestion that allied batteriesresponded prematurely and piecemeal. Nonethe less, the naval 68pdrs in particular provedextremely effective, and Paymaster HenryDixon of the 7th Royal Fusiliers pleaded tohis father that 'you must excuse much as therow [sic] is too great to write a line'.

At 10.30, two hits on ammunitionmagazines silenced the French. Thereafteronly 41 British guns were engaged. Moreover,the planned simultaneous navalbombardment did not actually commenceuntil 1.30 pm, achieved little and obliquelyproved that the fleets at sea could contribute

nothing tangible to the siege with theirguns. On land the British seriouslydamaged the Malakov and Great Redanworks and theoretically opened a way for aninfantry assault. But the French were unableto attack the Flagstaff bastion in front ofthem and Raglan rightly decided that, unlessthey could do so, his men would be liable to

Vice-Admiral Sir James Whitley Deans Dundas(1785-1862). Commander of the British fleet offthe Crimea, which he controlled independent ofLord Raglan. Dundas initially led his warships into theBlack Sea in January 1854. With a haughty manner andacutely aware of aristocratic family connections, hewas sensitive to perceived slights. (Hulton Getty)

The fighting 49

heavy losses from flank fire. The Russianswere therefore able to repair theirfortifications overnight under the direction ofthe able engineer Lieutenant-Colonel F. E. I.Todleben.

Although the French did reopen firethe following day and the bombardmentcontinued for a further week, it endedin failure. The Russian commander ofSevastopol, Vice-Admiral Kornilov, wasmortally wounded, however, anddirection of the military and navalforces devolved separately onLieutenant-General von Moeller andVice-Admiral Nachimov.

Battle of Balaclava

Even while the bombardment was inprogress, Raglan became concerned aboutthe vulnerability of Balaclava. On18 September, warned by patrols ofmovement across the Tchernaya, he rode tothe Sapoune Ridge but discerned noimmediate danger. Nevertheless, Russiantroops had already probed towards the lineof redoubts constructed along the Woronzov(or Causeway) Heights, which divided thePlain of Balaclava into two valleys.Further abortive alarms occurred on 20 and22 October.


Adjacent to Balaclava, to the east, layMount Hiblak (dubbed Marine Heights),beyond it the village of Kamara and stillfurther east the Baidar Valley. Kadikoi,through which Raglan rode on 26 September,was 1.5 miles (2.4km) north of Balaclava andacross its front at right angles lay SouthValley, 4 miles (6.4km) west to east and 1 mile(1.6km) north to south. Dividing the Southand North valleys, which comprised the Plainof Balaclava, lay the 300ft-high (90m)Woronzov Heights, along which the metalledWoronzov Road from Yalta ran beforeclimbing the escarpment into Sevastopol. TheNorth Valley, stretching 3 miles (5km) west toeast from the Sapoune Ridge to the Tchernaya

The Admiralty Building, Sevastopol, before damageby allied shells. From here Admiral P. S. Nachimovcommanded the Russian Black Sea fleet, directedits withdrawal into Sevastopol Bay (background) andthe sinking of the naval vessels anchored across theharbour entrance. His Chief of Staff, Vice-AdmiralV. A. Kornilov. led the defence of Sevastopol untilkilled close to the Malakov fortification on17 October 1854. (Author's collection)

Lieutenant-Colonel F. E. I.Todleben (1818-84).Russian engineer responsible for strengthening thedefences of Sevastopol, which defied the allies foralmost a year Advised against attacking French andSardinian troops, which led to Russian failure atthe Battle of the Tchernaya in August 1855.(Ann Ronan Picture Library)

river, was 1.5 miles (2.4km) wide, with theFedioukine Hills on its north side parallel tothe Woronzov Heights. The Russian fieldarmy lay in the area of Chorgun, north-eastacross the Tchernaya and due east of theWoronzov Heights beyond Kamara.

Enemy troops could advance over TractirBridge and other bridges across the river andthe aqueduct, which carried Sevastopol'swater supply, at the end of the North Valleyto menace six redoubts constructed underRaglan's orders along the Woronzov Heights.These had frustrated Russian patrols so far;but these enemy sorties could be seen fromSapoune Ridge. An attack from distantKamara was potentially more dangerous andcould be detected only by forward pickets.

The redoubts, furthermore, were not quiteso strong as expected. Numbered 1-6 east towest, five were spread over 2 miles (3.2km),roughly 500yds (455m) apart, while the sixth(No. 1) was on the detached Canrobert's Hilll,000vds (915m) south-east of No. 2. Only

The fighting 51

Battle of Inkerman, 5 November 1854


four were armed with 12pdr naval guns;three in No. 1, two each in the next three.On 25 October, Nos 5 and 6 redoubts wereunfinished. No. 1 had 600 Turkish militiain and around it; Nos 2-4, approximately300 each. A British artillery NCO was incharge of each of the four completedredoubts. These 1,500 men with their nineguns formed the outer defences of Balaclava.

Around Kadikoi were six companies of the93rd (Sutherland) Highlanders, a battalion ofTurks and a six-gun field battery. Togetherwith 1,200 Marines on Mount Hiblak and atotal of 26 guns, these formed the innersemicircle of defences under Sir ColinCampbell. On the upland above the plainwere the five British infantry divisions andBosquet's French Corps of Observation.Aware of the threat from Kamara, Raglan hadposted the Cavalry Division (1,500 sabres)

Charge of the Heavy Brigade. 25 October 1854.As some 2,000 Russian cavalry crested the WoronzovHeights on the brigade's left flank, its commanderBrigadier-General Sir James Scarlett, wheeled toface them and bravely led his squadrons uphill todrive back the enemy, at a cost of 78 British casualties.(Hulton Getty)

below No. 6 redoubt at the western endof the South Valley, 1.5 miles (2.4km)north-west of Kadikoi. Lucan commandedthe two brigades, supported by the divisionaltroop of horse artillery, independent ofCampbell but specifically tasked to watchthrough forward patrols for movementfrom the Baidar Valley.

Excluding the cavalry, Balaclava's defenceforce comprised some 4.500 men. Across theTchernaya, Menshikov had 20,000 infantry,3,400 cavalry, 2,300 gunners and 78 gunspoised to advance via Kadikoi, which heconsidered the key to Balaclava. Loss of thesupply port might persuade the British toabandon the siege.

An hour before dawn on 25 October, theCavalry Division stood to as Lucan, his staffand Lieutenant-Colonel Lord George Paget,commanding the Light Brigade in Cardigan'sabsence, cantered eastwards across SouthValley. Suddenly flags were seen flying oneabove the other over No. 1 redoubt - thesignal for 'enemy advancing'. Campbell joinedLucan, as an ADC rode back to divisionalheadquarters, and the two generals decidedthat a serious situation was developing.

The fighting 53

Campbell went towards Kadikoi. Lucandispatched Captain Charteris to warn Raglanand himself returned to his division. Placingthe Light Brigade in reserve, he took the HeavyBrigade eastwards into the valley as a deterrentand sent Captain G. A. Maude's field batteryon to the Woronzov Heights close to No. 3redoubt, because enemy units were reportedconverging from the north as well as east.

It was all to no avail. At 6 am Nos 2 and 3redoubts came under artillery and infantryattack, Maude was wounded and his batterysoon withdrawn through lack ofammunition. A Turkish battery on SapouneRidge and heavy guns near Balaclava lackedthe range to unsettle the enemy, whoseinfantry overran No. 1 redoubt at 7.30. Thefield battery with Campbell had deployed onthe Heights close to Maude's troop of horseartillery, but had to fall back on Kadikoi.

Shortly afterwards, under heavy artilleryand infantry attack and outflanked by theloss of No. 1, the defenders of Nos 2-4redoubts fled, according to Kinglake, crying'Ship! Ship! Ship!' Near Kadikoi, they werejeered, and in some cases physically beaten,by angry soldiers' wives; CaptainC. M. Shakespear observed that 'oursailors kicked their seats of disgrace'. But, intruth, the militiamen were overwhelmed bysuperior enemy forces. Having dismantledNo. 4 redoubt, the Russians concentratedaround Nos 1-3, preparatory to cavalry-sweeping over South Valley towards Kadikoiand, ultimately, Balaclava.

Warned by Lucan's ADC, soon after 7 amRaglan was on Sapoune Ridge, from whichhe overlooked the whole plain. Althoughconcerned that the Russians might bepractising an elaborate feint to draw troopsaway from the siege lines, he put the3rd Division on alert and ordered Cathcart's4th Division down the Woronzov Road intoNorth Valley, and Cambridge's 1st Divisionvia the Col into the South Valley. Assessingthe situation independently, Bosquet senttwo French infantry brigades and eightcavalry squadrons down the Col to thewestern end of South Valley at the foot ofthe ridge. Raglan, however, became

concerned about the vulnerable position ofhis Cavalry Division and sent CaptainWetherall with what was later known as theFirst Order: 'Cavalry to take ground to theleft of the second line of redoubts occupiedby the Turks'; with Nos 5 and 6 virtuallyforming a second line, this meantwithdrawing west of No. 6.

At 8.30 am the second phase of the Battleof Balaclava began. As 2,300 Russian cavalrysupported by 26 field guns advancedwestwards along North Valley, foursquadrons (400 men) wheeled over theWoronzov Heights close to No. 3 redoubttowards Kadikoi. In the area of a knoll northof the village, they were driven back by700 British and 1,000 Turkish troops plusCaptain G. R. Barker's field battery in anaction known as 'The Thin Red Line'. By9 am the second phase of the battle wasover. So far, one phase to each side.

However, the main Russian body was stillin the North Valley. Its fate would be decidedby Raglan's Second Order, framed to combatthe squadrons effectively seen off byCampbell. The British commander sentCaptain Hardinge to Lucan: 'Eight squadronsof Heavy Dragoons to be detached towardsBalaclava to support the Turks, who arewavering.' By the time that Scarlett and thisbody was under way, 'The Thin Red Line'had prevailed. Then a greater menaceappeared on Scarlett's left flank: almost2,000 Russian cavalry bearing down in thevicinity of the unoccupied No. 5 redoubt.Calmly turning his regiments to face theenemy, Scarlett led them uphill in twowaves, although heavily outnumbered. Forsome reason the enemy mass halted and,incredibly, the Heavy Brigade drove themback over the Woronzov Heights towards theTchernaya in confusion. The Times'correspondent, W. H. Russell, recorded that'a cheer burst from every lip - in theenthusiasm officers and men took off theircaps and shouted with delight'. In hislater dispatch, Raglan referred to theHeavy Brigade Charge (in which a mere78 casualties were incurred) as 'one of themost successful I ever witnessed'.


There was a bitter postscript. The LightBrigade had sat motionless on Scarlett's leftas he charged. Cardigan claimed that Lucanwarned him to act only if the enemyattacked; Lucan insisted that he urged himmerely to 'be careful of columns or squaresof infantry'. Once more the brothers-in-lawwere at loggerheads, a state of mind whichwould have even more serious consequenceslater that morning. It was still only 9.30 am.

Above the plain, Raglan could see thebeaten enemy cavalry milling around the farend of North Valley, leaving infantryexposed on the Woronzov Heights andFedioukine Hills. The enemy was wavering;the time ripe for decisive action. At 10.15 amhe sent the Third Order to Lucan: 'Cavalry toadvance and take advantage of anyopportunity to recover the Heights. They willbe supported by the infantry which havebeen ordered. Advance on two fronts.' Lucanhad been in the South Valley all morning:the 'Heights' could only mean the WoronzovHeights, where the Russians were inpossession of Nos 1-3 redoubts; 'two fronts'the North and South valleys. Lucan'simmediate action suggests that he didunderstand the order: he moved the LightBrigade into the North Valley, kept theHeavy Brigade in the South Valley andhimself took post at the end of theWoronzov Heights between them. But theinfantry were delayed and by 10.30 am werenot on the plain.

Raglan could see Russian artillerymenpreparing to tow away the guns captured inthe redoubts. Although spiked, they could berepaired and used against the allies. At about10.40 am, he therefore dictated the fatefuland controversial Fourth Order, which hisQuartermaster-General, Richard Airey, copieddown: 'Lord Raglan wishes the cavalry to

Charge of the Light Brigade, 25 October 1854.Recreated view from the Fedioukine Hills, with Russiantroops near the captured redoubts on the WoronzovHeights, centre, Balaclava in the distance. The cavalrylines are too regular. Two regiments (four squadrons)formed the first line, one regiment the second. Afurther two comprised the third line, but theyseparated during the charge. (Hulton Getty)

advance rapidly to the front, and try toprevent the enemy taking away the guns.Troop of horse-artillery may accompany.French cavalry is on your left. Immediate.'As Airey's ADC, Captain L. E. Nolan, left theridge with the order, Raglan called after him,'Tell Lord Lucan the cavalry is to attackimmediately.' What then happened betweenLucan and Nolan will never be known.Undoubtedly, Raglan intended his third andfourth orders to be read in conjunction withone another, the cavalry to move on theredoubts without waiting for the absentinfantry. Lucan later maintained that, whenquestioned by him, Nolan pointed to the

The fighting 55

end of the North Valley, where Russian fieldguns were drawn up to protect the Tchernayariver crossings.

So, shortly after 11 am, Cardigan led673 men from the Light Brigade plus Nolan,who secured permission to ride with it, upthe 1.25-mile-long (2km) valley to beimmortalised in Tennyson's epic poem.Twenty minutes later, the shatteredremnants returned: 113 men had been killedand 247 badly wounded, 475 horses killedand 42 injured. French cavalry cleared theFedoukine Hills to protect their right flank asthe survivors came back; Lucan waswounded leading the Heavy Brigade to cover

them; Nolan was killed shortly after thebrigade commenced its advance. He died infront of Cardigan, waving his sword in theair. Quite what he meant by this actionremains in dispute. Perhaps he was trying toredirect the brigade towards the redoubts, asA. W. Kinglake later concluded and countlesswriters since have repeated.

Scarcely had the last trooper dismountedunder the Sapoune Ridge thanrecriminations started. Raglan censuredCardigan, who pointed to an order fromLucan ('my superior officer'), and thedivisional commander laid the blame onNolan, who could no longer defend himself.


Meanwhile, the two infantry divisions had atlength reached the plain, but onlyexchanged intermittent fire with theRussians during the afternoon. The enemyremained on the Woronzov Heights inpossession of the redoubts and the guns weretowed away.

However, for all the mistakes andshortcomings of the day, Balaclava had notfallen. Overall, Raglan could claim victory,but few in the Crimea or at home would seethe outcome that way; nor would posterity.To most people the Charge was the Battle ofBalaclava and that was patently disastrous.Yet in December, the Russians withdrew fromthe Woronzov Heights. It was as if the battlehad never been fought - not, though, for theparticipants, especially Lucan and Cardigan,for whom it once more stoked the fires ofantagonism. In total, the Battle of Balaclavacost the British 480 dead officers and men.

The very next day (26 October) a Russianforce moved out of Sevastopol against theBritish on the right of the siege lines in theskirmish of Little Inkerman. De Lacy Evans's2nd Division, supported by the GuardsBrigade and artillery, successfully drove themoff in an action lasting approximately threehours. It cost the British 89 casualties (tenkilled), the Russians 350 (includingprisoners). Significantly, Bosquet hurried upFrench reserves in case they were needed -another example of the inter-alliedco-operation seen on 25 October.

Battle of Inkerman

This clash was something of a dress rehearsalfor a much more serious clash on5 November. The north-eastern corner ofthe plateau occupied by the allies beforeSevastopol featured an area of high groundabout 1.5 by 0.75 miles (2.4 by 1.2km). Itwas known to the British as MountInkerman and the Russians as CossackMountain, was bordered on the west by thedeep Careenage Ravine, and to the east bythe escarpment of Sapoune Ridge. Twogullies (the Miriakov and Wellway) branched

eastwards from the Careenage Ravine andthree ravines (Georgievski, Volovia andQuarry) south of the Sapper Road, which ranparallel to the bay between Tractir Bridgeand the port, gave access to the plateau.

Roughly in the middle of MountInkerman and 2,000yds (1,830m) south-eastof Sevastopol stood Shell Hill, approximately600ft (180m) above sea level, with twoextensions, East and West Gut. About aquarter of a mile (0.4km) from the southernend of the Quarry Ravine, 1,200yds(1,100m) from Shell Hill and 30ft (9m)higher than it, was the L-shaped HomeRidge. This would be the focal point ofthe forthcoming battle and was where6,500 'muffin caps' of Russian infantry withfour field guns had been repulsed during theskirmish on 26 October.

On Mount Inkerman, which comprisedrocky scrubland, were two small defenceworks. Just north-east of Home Ridge was theSandbag Battery - an empty 9ft-high (3m)position with embrasures cut for two guns tocover the Tchernaya river below, but nobanquette for small arms. In front of HomeRidge, where the old post road emerged fromthe Quarry Ravine on to the plateau, stood a4ft-high (1.2m) heap of stones known asThe Barrier. Another 2ft-high (0.6m)rampart, called Herbert's Folly, on HomeRidge offered some protection for gunners.There were no entrenchments, only thesemeagre protective walls.

In this area, the British 2nd Division,commanded by Major-GeneralJ. L. Pennefather in place of the sickde Lacy Evans, deployed approximately3,000 men either south of Home Ridge orthrown forward in pickets. About a mile(1.6km) to the south, the Brigade of Guardswas encamped with a troop of horse artillery,but also had a forward picket overlookingthe Careenage Ravine. Bosquet's Corps ofObservation was yet a further mile south onthe upland. The other British divisions wereto the west, cut off from Pennefather by anumber of ravines; the 3rd, 4th and Lightdivisions were respectively 3, 2.5 and1.5 miles (5, 4 and 2.4km) away. Reinforcing

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Pennefather in an emergency would not,therefore, be easy.

For Prince A. S. Menshikov, the Russiancommander, the episode of Little Inkermanhad been no more than a reconnaissance inforce. On the basis of what he learnt, hedrew up a plan to drive the British fromMount Inkerman and disrupt theircommunication with Balaclava. GeneralP. D. Gorchakov, with 22,000 troops and88 guns, would advance across the Tchernayatowards the Fedioukine Hills, 'to support thegeneral attack, distracting the enemy forces... trying to secure the approach to theSapoune, the dragoons being ready to scalethe heights at the first opportunity'.Lieutenant-General F. I. Soimonov, with19,000 men and 38 guns, was to emergefrom Sevastopol at 6 am to cross theCareenage Ravine and advance along the twogullies on to the plateau. Lieutenant-GeneralP. Ia. Pavlov, leading 16,000 men and96 guns, would leave the Mackenzie Heightsat 5 am, descend to the Tchernaya and cross

Tractir Bridge and the aqueduct to attainthe heights from the north-east via thethree ravines.

These two columns were to meet in thearea of Shell Hill at 7 am, where the 4 Corpscommander, General P. A. Dannenberg,would take tactical charge of the operation.Lieutenant-General F. F. von Moeller,commanding the land forces in Sevastopol,was to cover the attackers with his batteriesand make a demonstration on the allied leftto discourage the French from reinforcingMount Inkerman. The attacking force thatwas ordered to 'seize and occupy the heights',exclusive of Moeller's troops, thereforetotalled 57,000 men and 222 guns, withanother 4,000 men and 36 guns in reserve onMackenzie Heights.

Battle of Inkerman, 5 November 1854. Major-GeneralJ. L Pennefather (mounted centre), temporarily leadingthe British 2nd Division in place of its sick commanderLieutentant-General Sir Geory de Lacy Evans, watchesBritish infantry repulse Russians (right), asreinforcements approach (left). (Author's collection)

Battle of Tchernaya, 16 August 1855

58 E

ssential H

istories • The C

rimean W

ar

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Fortunately for the British, Pavlov andSoimonov did not achieve the requiredco-ordination, Pavlov being delayed for twohours at the Tchernaya by bridge repairs.Perhaps, even more fortunately,Dannenberg's plan for Soimonov to keepwest of Careenage Ravine to clear VictoriaRidge on Pavlov's flank was not followed.Still more galling for the Russians,Gorchakov inexplicably left the bulk of hisforce east of the Tchernaya, and Bosquetquickly realised that his threat was notdangerous. This allowed the French corpscommander readily to support Pennefather.

Heavy rain on 4 November persisted wellinto the night and at dawn light rain andthick mist still cloaked Mount Inkerman,concealing the Russians' advance. Shortlyafter daybreak, forward pickets gave warningof their movement, and Raglan reachedHome Ridge from his HQ, 4 miles (6.4km)south of Home Ridge, at about 7.30 am. Helearnt that Soimonov's troops were makingtheir way on to the plateau, and recognisedthe threat to the whole Mount Inkermanposition. Ordering England's 3rd Division tobe vigilant on the British left, he toldCambridge (with the Guards Brigade) andCathcart (4th Division) to support the2nd Division. He discovered that Brown haddeclined Bosquet's offer of help, butpromptly welcomed it. Crucially, as ittranspired, he feared the range of the Russianartillery, which could reach the Britishencampments from Shell Hill. Raglantherefore ordered up two 18pdr guns fromthe siege park.

Soimonov did get 22 12pdr guns on toShell Hill and West Gut, from which tobombard Home Ridge and the 2nd Divisioncamp beyond. Under cover of their barrage,the Russian infantry advanced south to bemet by troops sent forward by Pennefathertowards the Sandbag Battery on the right,The Barrier in the centre and Miriakov Gullyon the left. As British battalions deployed tomeet them, two 9pdr field guns fired overtheir heads into the gloom. Another six-gunbattery went up to the head of the Miriakov,was engulfed by enemy troops debouching

from the gully and lost three guns. Adetermined counter-attack by the88th Regiment saved the day and more fieldguns arrived to raise the number on andaround Home Ridge to 36. At the Wellway,the 77th drove back another grey mass; 'noorder could be given owing to the fog. All wecould do was to charge them when theycame in sight,' wrote Lieutenant theHon. Henry Clifford. By 8 am, Soimonov'sinfantry were on their way back to Shell Hill.Pavlov had not yet appeared.

When Pavlov's men eventually debouchedfrom the ravines at about 8.30, fiercefighting was renewed, particularly aroundthe Sandbag Battery, which changed handsseveral times and where French troops wereheavily engaged. Not until 11 am was thisposition finally secure. Seeing bodies piledaround the defence work, Bosquet pithilyremarked: 'Quel abbatoir!' Meanwhile, as themist lifted, Raglan had seen that the enemywas close to breaking through between TheBarrier and Sandbag Battery, where Britishtroops were fighting desperately at closequarters to protect Home Ridge. Raglan sentword for Cathcart urgently to assist theBrigade of Guards there, but the 4th Divisioncommander decided independently toadvance on the extreme right and turn theRussian left. In doing so, tragically he led thetroops with him down a gully and paid forthe error with his life. His last wordsallegedly were 'I fear we are in a mess.'

Although the Guards were successfully-reinforced, the Home Ridge remained indanger. With Soimonov dead and his divisioneffectively out of the line, Dannenberg hadtaken command; 9,000 of Pavlov's men werestill uncommitted and he now launchedthem towards The Barrier. Only determineduse of bayonet saved the day. One observerrecorded that the dead in the area were 'asthick as sheaves in a cornfield'.

At 9.30 am the 18pdrs came into action,while French, British and Russian troopsfought bitterly near the Sandbag Battery onthe far right. Kinglake later referred to 'thetyranny' of the 18pdrs and Dannenbergacknowledged the 'murderous fire of the


enemy artillery'. Undoubtedly, their abilityto silence enemy guns on Shell Hill provedimportant, possibly even decisive. As theRussians streamed away from The Barrier andSandbag Battery, Raglan sent men to clearShell Hill to prevent Dannenberg fromentrenching on it. Realising that the day waslost, the Russian corps commander ordered ageneral retreat behind a covering force. By2.30 pm, the enemy had fallen back fromShell Hill and half an hour later Raglan andCanrobert together watched them recross theTchernaya in disarray.

The Battle of Inkerman had been won -at a price. Surveying the field of carnage,Captain Temple Godman remarked: Thefield of battle is a terrible sight.' In all,

18pdr guns at Inkerman. 5 November 1854. Sent for byLord Raglan, two long-range 18pdr guns arrived on thefield at 9.30 am. decisively to disrupt the enemy attack.Their protection shown here is too substantial, thevisibility less clear on the day. (National Army Museum)

10,729 Russians were killed (includingSoimonov), wounded or taken prisoner (afigure rising to 11,974 if casualties from theSevastopol garrison and Gorchakov's forceare added). The British suffered 2,357casualties, 597 of them killed (including39 officers, two of them generals). Frenchcasualties amounted to 1,743 (175 dead,including 25 officers).

Winter turmoil

In the immediate aftermath of victory,Pennefather exclaimed: 'I tell you, we gave'em a hell of a towelling.' A coolerappreciation of the allied position was,however, required. A Council of War thefollowing day acknowledged that Sevastopolwould not fall before winter. De Lacy Evanswas among those who favoured raising thesiege and withdrawal from the Crimea.

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Raglan realised that this would signal abjectfailure, successful re-invasion of thepeninsula being highly unlikely. Hepersuaded the doubters that the siege mustcontinue. Frantic requests now went toEngland for building material to construct'sheds', more entrenching tools, sandbags,engineers and artillery. In the short term,Dundas agreed to off-load further naval gunsand bring up heavy mortars from Malta.Despite the doubts and disputes, the Battleof Inkerman was heralded as another alliedvictory; and in its wake Raglan became afield marshal.

A 'fearful gale' (to many 'a hurricane') on14 November swept away tents andequipment and sank 21 British vessels fromthe Katcha to Sevastopol, including severallike Prince carrying much-needed supplies. Inthe words of Corporal W. McMillan, it was'one of the roughest days that ever man wasout in'. Continuing losses of horses and men

through disease and wounds made mattersinfinitely worse. It was totally unrealistic fora new arrival, Captain Hedley Viccars, towrite: 'We are anxiously waiting for LordRaglan to storm Sebastopol [sic]; for, thoughwe must lose many in doing it, yet anythingwould be better than seeing our soldiersdying there daily.' Raglan did not haveenough men to storm the port, anddisagreement between the allies over thefocal points of the Russian defences did nothelp either. Burgoyne argued that theMalakov on the allied right was the keyfortification; the French, the FlagstaffBastion west of Man of War Harbour.

So weak was the British situation thatRaglan pleaded for not only more men butalso urgent replacement of officers: threegenerals had been killed at Inkerman, threeinvalided home and three more seriouslywounded, numbers that included fourdivisional commanders (Cathcart,

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The Great Storm. 14 November 1854. The 'GreatStorm' tore down tents, devastated the encampmentsbefore Sevastopol and sank 21 ships outside Balaclavaharbour (shown here). (Author's collection)

Cambridge, Evans and Brown). Cardiganwent home sick to a hero's welcome, whilestill at the front Lucan erupted in a welter ofself-righteousness when Raglan's dispatch onBalaclava became known. In it Raglancriticised the Cavalry Division commanderfor believing that he must 'attack at allhazards' and further pointed out to Lucanthat 'attack' appeared nowhere in therelevant order. The acrimonious disputebetween field marshal and lieutenant-generalwould rumble on until February 1855, whenLucan was recalled by the government topreserve military discipline.

Meanwhile, towards the end of January,the French with their superior numbers hadtaken over the extreme right of the line infront of the Malakov and Mamelon defenceworks, while the British concentrated onthe Great Redan. At least this solved thestrategic problem: the area east of Man ofWar Harbour was now recognised as thecritical point.

Raglan had insufficient men to makeadequate roads, and supplies were sadlydeficient: 'such roads ... such ground ... such

a depth of mud,' Estcourt exclaimed. Duringthe bitterly cold days of December, the fuelration was reduced and, although more foodreached Balaclava, the means to convey it tothe siege lines was lacking; the landtransport system virtually non-existent. On14 December, Raglan tersely wrote toCommissary-General William Filder:'Something must really be done to place thesupply of the army upon a more satisfactoryfooting or the worst consequences mayfollow.' But Raglan had no direct controlover Filder and the Commissariat, evenwhen responsibility for that departmentpassed from the Treasury to the Secretary ofState for War ten days later.

Raglan suffered similar frustration withthe medical services, which owed allegianceto the Army and Ordnance MedicalDepartment in London. Dr J. (later Sir John)Hall blandly rejected Raglan's complaintsabout lack of hospital orderlies: 'I consideredthem sufficient ... and I do still.' FlorenceNightingale, who had arrived at Scutari on4 November 1854 with 38 female nurses dueto public and political dismay at reportedmedical shortcomings, penned a furiousletter to Sidney Herbert, Secretary at War inLondon, about lack of hygiene: 'The verminmight, if they had but "unity of purpose",

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carry off the four miles of beds on theirbacks and march with them into the WarOffice and Horse Guards.' Like Raglan, shewas facing the inbuilt inertia and vestedinterests engrained in a long-standingadministrative system. In January 1855,Miss Nightingale gauged that over50 per cent of the British troops in theCrimea were sick. Captain C. F. Campbellrecorded that on one day in that month, the63rd Foot could parade only seven fit men.

New plans

Plans to renew the siege in earnest quickenedin February 1855, especially after the Russianssank six more ships across the entrance toSevastopol harbour, destroying any hope thatthey might give up the fight. During thewinter's lull in operations, they hadstrengthened the dominant Malakov defencework and the Mamelon in front of it, nowfaced by the French on the allied right.

Sickness and casualties, incurred inoccasional sorties and exchanges of artilleryfire, had reduced the effective Britishfighting strength to scarcely more than12,000. Despite this deficiency in men,however, Raglan faced an elaborate Frenchplan to complete the siege of Sevastopol bytaking the Star Fort in the north and using50,000 troops to storm the field army onMackenzie Heights. Fortunately, the Britishcommander was ignorant of further Frenchproposals to concentrate their reserves atConstantinople. Nor did he know that theCabinet had needed to reject the idea thatBritish forces should be brought underFrench control, something attempted bySt Arnaud when the allies were in Turkey. Inthe Crimea, the French now had eightinfantry divisions divided into two corps,commanded by Pélissier and Bosquet.

The French plan for the investment ofSevastopol rested to some extent onaggressive action by Omar Pasha fromEupatoria, where on 11 February hecommanded 26,000 infantry, two batteries ofhorse artillery with a third battery about to

land. Six days later, the Russians launched adetermined assault on Eupatoria, which theTurkish C-in-C drove off. This action didunderline the importance of the small portand raise the question of whether the Turksshould move against the Russian supply linesfrom the Perekop peninsula into Sevastopolrather than seek to attack the naval port'snorthern suburb. An allied strategy was noteasy to agree, with all three nationalcommanders now in the Crimea. The Frenchundoubtedly had the largest contingent oftroops, but the relationship forged betweenRaglan and Omar Pasha in Bulgaria endured.

A change of government in London inFebruary 1855, with replacement ofAberdeen and Newcastle as Prime Ministerand Secretary of State for War respectivelyby Palmerston and Panmure, brought anintensification of criticism. Panmure swiftlyinformed Raglan: 'I see no reason ... toalter the opinion which is universallyentertained here of the inefficiency ofyour general staff.' The Commander-in-Chiefat the Horse Guards in London, LordHardinge, referred to complaints from'officers of rank' and The Times thundered:'Their [the troops'] aristocratic generals,and their equally aristocratic staff view thisscene of wreck and destruction with agentleman-like tranquillity ... [they would]return with their horses, their plate andtheir china, their German cook and severaltons' weight of official returns, all inexcellent order, and the announcementthat the last British soldier was dead.'

Raglan vigorously defended his staff, butBurgoyne had been sent out by thegovernment to be his adviser and wasrecalled as the ritual scapegoat, leaving theCrimea on 20 March. Without consultingRaglan, the government sent out Lieutenant-General Sir James Simpson as his Chief ofStaff 'to inquire into the manner in whichthe Staff Officers perform their duties' andto ensure that the British commander'sorders were quickly carried out. Panmurepleaded: 'I must do something to satisfy theHouse of Commons.' Meanwhile, Raglan hadto fight a war.


In February, too, a Commission of Inquiry-went to the front under Dr A. Cumming toinvestigate the medical services, 'found thepatients in the field hospitals generally in afilthy condition' and contrasted the Britisharrangements unfavourably with those of theFrench. Palmerston immediately dispatched amore powerful Sanitary Commission ofMr R. Rawlinson, Dr J. Sutherland andDr H. Gavin, charged with putting not onlythe field hospitals in the Crimea, but alsothose at Scutari 'into less unhealthycondition'. This Commission was rapidlyfollowed by Sir John McNeill and ColonelAlexander Tulloch 'to inquire into the wholemanagement of the CommissariatDepartment'. Although the departmentssubject to investigation by these variousbodies were not under Raglan's command,the impression of incompetence affectedperceptions of his inefficiency by thoseunfamiliar with the tortuous administrativesystem. On 24 February, Lucan finally left theCrimea in high dudgeon at being recalled,but in truth his continual sniping at Raglanabout Balaclava had become intolerable.

As the weather improved in March, thesiege lines edged closer to the Sevastopoldefences, raising hopes of an early assault. Anallied conference on 25 March set 2 April asthe date for renewal of the bombardment.According to the Quartermaster-General, Airey,only Raglan's patient 'conferring' persuadedthe French to support a combined groundattack in the area of the Mamelon/Malakovand Great Redan after the bombardmentwithout simultaneous action west of Man ofWar Harbour. In the event, the long-awaitedSecond Bombardment by 501 guns (101 ofthem British) did not occur until 9 April, inpoor visibility through mist and rain.

Meanwhile, in March, Nicholas I had diedto be succeeded by his son, Alexander II.Menshikov had paid the price for failureat Eupatoria, being replaced by PrinceM. D. Gorchakov from Bessarabia. Fearingencirclement south of Sevastopol Bay,Gorchakov soon began surreptitiouspreparations for withdrawal to the northernsuburb across a pontoon bridge of boats.

At a meeting of the three alliedcommanders on 14 April, Raglan securedagreement to continue the currentbombardment less intensely to conserveammunition, but all decided that a groundassault was out of the question. Shortlyafterwards, the full extent of the ambitiousFrench plan for future operations becameclear. Having deducted those in hospital anddetached on support tasks, Canrobertestimated that the French had 90,000 menavailable in the Crimea; the British, similarly,20,000. The Sardinians (formally committedto the alliance in January 1855) hadpromised to send 15,000 men and OmarPasha could put 25,000 in the field exclusiveof Turks defending Eupatoria. This overalltotal of 155,000 could be divided into90,000 to contain Sevastopol and 65,000 toact as a field force. Omar Pasha, however,still favoured an advance from Eupatoriaagainst the northern suburb, and there thematter rested for the moment. The SecondBombardment, in the meantime, petered outwith no assault on the defences.

Unknown to the commanders in theCrimea, an even more bizarre plan instigatedby Napoleon III had actually been agreed inLondon. Omar Pasha would continue tohold Eupatoria with 30,000 Turks, as afurther 30,000 combined with 30,000 Frenchunder Canrobert maintained the siege fromthe southern upland. Including artillery andcavalry, the 20,000 British would bewithdrawn from the siege to join15,000 Sardinians (who reached the frontunder General A. La Marmora in May),5,000 French and 10,000 Turks to form afield army under Raglan. This force wouldcross the Tchernaya to the MackenzieHeights. An exclusively French second fieldarmy, comprising the 25,000 reserves atConstantinople and 45,000 from the siege ofSevastopol, would concentrate at Aloushita,east of Balaclava, then march northwards tolink up with Raglan and complete theinvestment of Sevastopol.

Neither the logistics of this complicatedexercise, nor the mountainous nature of theterrain, seem to have been closely

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considered. Burgoyne, back in England andpresent at the relevant meetings, evidentlyraised no objection. Almost certainly, hecalculated that practical difficulties wouldkill the idea, not least because the number ofavailable Turkish troops had been grosslyexaggerated. It also emerged that NapoleonIII envisaged taking command of theAloushita force in person. Then he decidednot to journey to the east, and the wholescheme gently faded away. The allieswere left to press the siege as best theycould. That meant renewed bombardment,followed by an assault on the defencesof Sevastopol.

In England, a Parliamentary SelectCommittee, chaired by J. A. Roebuck, hadbegun to inquire into the British experiencesand became known generally as 'TheSevastopol Committee'. Part of the placebofor political and public angst, which also ledto the fall of Aberdeen's government, itconcerned itself with Christmas past,provided a platform for the disaffected likeLucan and made no useful contribution tothe current position at the front. None theless, news of its proceedings unsettled thoseconducting operations in the field.

The month of May proved turbulent forthe allies. The bombardment was notrenewed, though a series of fierce clashesoccurred around the siege lines. Omar Pashathreatened to resign because his troops wereconsigned solely to defensive duties and theTurkish government had agreed to some ofhis men being placed under Raglan.Canrobert did resign in favour of GeneralA. J. J. Pélissier, remaining in the theatre ofwar to take over his successor's corps.

A bold change of strategy, dictated by thecontinued free passage of men and suppliesto enemy forces in and around Sevastopolfrom the east, launched an Anglo-Frenchexpedition under Sir George Brown againstKertch at the mouth of the Sea of Azov on3 May. However, extension of the telegraphto the Crimea had its drawbacks for fieldcommanders. Politicians could quicklyinterfere with operations, and this was nowpainfully underlined. After repeated messages

from Paris, the following day the Frenchcontingent was ordered back to Sevastopoland the enterprise collapsed.

Fifteen days later, now in command,Pélissier galvanised the French into clearingthe Russians from the Fedioukine Hills andall ground west of the Tchernaya, besidesmaking aggressive probes on the upland. Hedisagreed with grandiose plans for fieldoperations or attacking the northern suburbfrom Eupatoria. Vigorous pursuit of existingsiege operations was the only option. Heagreed that the Malakov and Great Redanwere the keys to success and that theMamelon and Quarry positions respectivelyin front of them must be the preliminaryobjectives. Furthermore, the Kertchexpedition would be remounted.

On 22 May, therefore, Brown once moresailed in command of a combined British,French and Turkish force of 15,000 men,with engineer and light cavalry support. Thistime the immediate objective was seized plusnearby Yeni Kale, as worships destroyedinstallations and shipping in the Sea of Azov.Before Sevastopol, fine weather raisedmorale, horse races and sports' days wereorganised on the Plain of Balaclava and alavish Queen's Birthday Parade was staged.

Renewed bombardment

At the beginning of June, the garrisonof Sevastopol officially numbered53,000, including 9,000 naval gunners. Onthe Mackenzie Heights and in camp at theBelbec were a further 21,000 men and100 field guns. The allies' ThirdBombardment eventually got under way on6 June and at dawn the following day theFrench advanced on the Mamelon, while theBritish assaulted the Quarries. 'It was',according to one observer, 'one of thegrandest and most soul stirring sights everseen,' as both of these objectives were takenand held against determined counter-attacksat a cost of 5,444 French casualties,671 British (including 47 officers). The higherFrench losses were explained by a rash, failed


attempt to carry on to the Malakov. Despitethe undoubted gains, that formidablefortification and the Great Redan still lay-ahead. And the French had to some extentbeen disrupted by a furious dispute betweenPélissier and Bosquet, which led to Regnaudde St Jean d'Angely taking over Bosquet'scorps on the eve of renewed assault on theRussian defences.

The Fourth Bombardment commenced on17 June, with 600 allied guns firing alongthe line from the Quarantine Fort in thewest to Point Battery in the east. The shellsof 114 French and 166 British cannon fell onthe Karabel suburb. After a pause overnight,this aerial onslaught was to recommence at3 am on 18 June, with infantry attacks goingin three hours later. Suddenly Pélissierdecided to attack at 3 am withoutpreliminary artillery fire and Raglan hadhastily to amend his orders. 'Nothing butconfusion and mismanagement' thusprevailed among the allies, in the words ofthe Hon. Somerset Calthorpe, Raglan's ADC.

The enemy, not for the first time,pre-empted the allies. Then the trail from anenemy shell fuse was mistaken for theexecutive rocket, and General Mayran onthe French right launched his assaultprematurely. In the centre and left, generalsBrunet and d'Autemarre waited until theagreed signal, so this part of the allied attackwent in piecemeal and predictably met fierceresistance. Seeing the French predicament,Raglan sent his men over 400yds (365m) ofopen ground against the Great Redanwithout further bombardment. His noblegesture predictably failed, even though a fewFrench and British did temporarily reach theoutskirts of Sevastopol. During this action,the British incurred 1,505 casualties, theFrench 3,500 and the Russians 5,500 (somelater Russian accounts claim 3,950). TheMalakov and Great Redan, though, remainedin Russian hands.

There were, too, wider implications.Captain C. F. Campbell remarked that 'theentente cordiale is not at all improved by thisdisaster'; Paymaster Henry Dixon wrote:'Everyone seems almost dumbfounded - it is

General Prince Mikhail Dmitrievich Gorchakov(1795-1861). Commander of Russian forces on theDanube. 1853-54. in February 1855 succeeded PrinceMenshikov as C-in-C. Western Crimea, to directresistance to the allies. (Ann Ronan Picture Library)

really the first regular reverse we have had.'The costly setback undoubtedly deeplyaffected Raglan and may well havecontributed to his death on 28 June, whenhis weak frame succumbed to dysentery. Hewas succeeded in command by Sir JamesSimpson, who had come out as his Chief ofStaff and quasi government inspector.

The British Expeditionary Force nowcomprised six infantry divisions (1st, 2nd,3rd, 4th and Light, with a separate HighlandDivision) and a Cavalry Division of Light,Hussar and Heavy brigades. With theirlimited numbers and cholera again prevalent(the French also lost 1,600 men in June), theBritish were confined to a narrow section ofthe siege lines overlooking Man of WarHarbour and, in co-operation with the Turks,defending Balaclava. The French had thewhole of the siege lines west of Man of WarHarbour, besides Mount Inkerman and alongthe Sapoune Ridge.

Mortally wounded in Sevastopol on theday of Raglan's death, 28 June, Vice-Admiral

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Nachimov died two days later. DuringJuly, the Russian commander, PrinceM. D. Gorchakov, came under increasingpressure from Alexander II to attack the alliesbefore their expected reinforcements arrived.The Tsar expressed particular concern at thecontinuing daily toll of 250 casualties inSevastopol. On 3 August he wrote of 'thenecessity to do something decisive in orderto bring this frightful massacre to a close'.Gorchakov prevaricated and called aCouncil of War. To his dismay, it opted foran assault on the Fedioukine Hills by thefield army across the Tchernaya. Todleben,convalescing from wounds, strongly arguedagainst such a venture, which he held hadno strategic justification and would not raisethe siege. It would be expensive inmanpower and utterly pointless.

Battle of the Tchernaya

The Fedioukine Hills lay 1,000yds (915m)from Sapoune Ridge and comprised threeseparate features scarred by deep ravines,which impeded easy movement. To reachthem from the Mackenzie Heights, theRussians needed to cross the Tchernaya,25ft (8m) wide, 6ft (2m) deep and edgedwith treacherous marshland, besidesnegotiating in front of it an aqueduct (canal)with steep masonry sides. Defending theFedioukine Hills, the French had 18,000 menwith 48 guns under General Herbillondeployed each side of the road from TractirBridge across the Plain of Balaclava, and theyestablished a bridgehead east of theTchernaya protected by earthworks.

On the French right flank, some2,000yds (1,830m) further south and3,000yds (2,745m) from the escarpment, layhigh ground at right angles to the WoronzovHeights, overlooking bridges across theTchernaya and the aqueduct. This tongueand its vicinity were occupied by9,000 Sardinians and 36 guns, with aninfantry and artillery detachment overthe river on Telegraph Hill. A further50 squadrons of French and British cavalry

were in the area between the Fedioukine Hillsand Kadikoi; 20 squadrons of French cavalry,two infantry divisions and 12 guns in theBaidar Valley. Ten thousand Turkish infantryand 36 guns formed additional reserves.

The allies knew that Russians wereconstructing portable bridges for the river andaqueduct; in turn, Gorchakov was aware thatthe allies expected an attack. Nevertheless, hewas committed to mounting one. On theRussian right, General-Adjutant N. A. Readwith two infantry divisions was ordered 'toengage the Fediukin [sic] by artillery fire andprepare to cross the river' in the area of TractirBridge, but not to do so without Gorchakov'sspecific permission. On Read's left,Lieutenant-General P. P. Liprandi, also withtwo divisions, was similarly to seize TelegraphHill with one division and await furtherorders. His second division would movetowards Chorgun and the Baidar Valley.

Herbillon, alerted by reports of unusualmovement on the Mackenzie Heights during15 August, was ready when Russian artilleryopened up at dawn the following day.Whether Read did so at Gorchakov's behestor independently remains uncertain. But, aspart of Liprandi's 6th Division demonstratedtowards the Baidar Valley, he sent his troopsacross Tchernaya under cover of mist shortlyafter 5 am. Soon they were engaged in bitterclose-quarter fighting. Made aware of theirpredicament, Gorchakov brought up hisreserve 5th Division, but like Menshikov atthe Alma, he could not make up his mindwhen or where to commit it. When the mistlifted, the French artillery devastated Read'sbattalions, as Pélissier ordered forwardinfantry reinforcements. By 7.30 am, with itscommander killed, Read's corps had beenchased back over the Tchernaya.

Riding on to the field at about 8 am,Gorchakov ordered eight battalions fromLiprandi's force, which had taken TelegraphHill, to attack north-westwards towards theFedioukine Hills instead of advancing totheir front as planned. In doing so, theywere enfiladed by the Sardinians and fellback in confusion. Leaving a rearguard onTelegraph Hill, at 10 am Gorchakov signalled

Fall of Sevastopol, 7 June- 8 September 1855

70 E

ssential Histories • The C

rimean W

ar

The fighting 71

Battle of the Tchernaya, 16 August 1855. Russiantroops from the Mackenzie Heights (background)cross the Tractir Bridge (centre) and a narrow bridgeover the aqueduct (foreground) to be driven backfrom the Fedioukine Hills by French units includingZouaves. (Author's collection)

a general retreat. The Battle of the Tchernaya(Chernaia Rechka to the Russians) on16 August had lasted five hours. It cost theFrench 1,800 casualties; the Russiansan estimated 8,000 (2,273 killed); theSardinians 28 killed.

As Todleben foresaw, the last hurrah ofthe Russian army during the Crimean Warhad proved as disastrous as it was fruitless.To Alexander II, Gorchakov blamed the deadRead for not carrying out 'my orders to theletter' - orders that at the time were open todifferent interpretations and, even inretrospect, remain obscure. Major-GeneralP. V. Veimarn, Read's chief of staff, believedthat even if the Fedioukine Hills had beentaken, the weight of allied reserves wouldhave prevented any assault on SapouneRidge and obliged the Russians to abandontheir gains by nightfall. Field MarshalPaskevich concluded that the battle was'without aim, without calculation,

without necessity and most of all finallyeliminated the possibility of attackinganything thereafter' - a damning, butjustified, indictment of Gorchakov andhis surrender to pressure from Moscow.Four divisions had been used piecemeal;most of Liprandi's force and the reservedivision saw no action at all.

Fall of Sevastopol

On 17 August, 704 allied guns opened theFifth Bombardment on Sevastopol. Lastingfour days, it was not, however, followed bythe expected renewed assault on theMalakov and Great Redan. That occurred on8 September after three days of furtherbombardment (the Sixth) by 775 British andFrench guns, 57 of them from the RoyalNavy, 126 from the Royal Artillery. In theLittle Redan, 200 of the 600 defendersbecame casualties in 12 hours.

West of Man of War Harbour, two Frenchdivisions were to attack the Central andFlagstaff bastions, while GeneralM. E. P. M. MacMahon's division stormed theMalakov, Dulac's the Little Redan and that of

The fighting 73


la Motterouge the Curtain Battery. Each ofthese divisions would be supported byengineers, artillerymen to spike capturedguns or turn them on the enemy and,critically, men with scaling ladders. Troopsof the British Light and 2nd divisions,commanded by Lieutenant-General SirWilliam Codrington and Major-GeneralJ. Markham respectively, attacking the GreatRedan were to be similarly supported andpreceded by skirmishers briefed to pick offenemy gunners, making a grand total of1,900 men. Fears of another debacle like thatof 18 June prevailed, especially as theexposed area short of the objective remainedsubstantially the same. Brigadier-General C.A. Windham, who would distinguish himselfon the day, wrote pessimistically to his wife:'This may possibly, ay and probably will be,the last letter you will ever receive from me.'

Gorchakov believed that the French werewaiting for heavy mortars and would not yetattempt an assault. Noon, when the enemypickets changed, was designated zero hour,but the British and French left were not toattack until a flag signalled capture of theMalakov. Having taken their trenches towithin 30yds (27m) of the Malakov, thesudden surge of MacMahon's division caughtthe Russians by surprise and they werequickly overrun. Cannon in the CurtainBattery, which could have ranged on theMalakov once captured, were spiked, butFrench troops were driven back from theLittle Redan. Pélissier therefore decided toconcentrate on holding the Malakov instrength against inevitable counter-attacks.MacMahon told a British officer: 'I'm here,and I shall stay here,' proceeding to beat offthe Russians five times.

French troops on the allied left attacked at2 pm and suffered heavy loss without takingeither the Central or Flagstaff bastions. Dueto the rocky terrain, the British had beenunable to advance their trenches muchcloser than 400yds (365m) from their

Fall of Sevastopol. Following withdrawal of the Russiansfrom southern Sevastopol, fall of the city was greetedwith jubilation in England. (Ann Ronan Picture Library)

objective, and as on 18 June were enfiladedby withering fire from the Gervais, Barrackand Garden batteries. Although a few bravemen (including some from the NavalBrigade) managed to get into the defence-work, they quickly became casualties orwere driven out. For the second time anattack on the Great Redan had failed. It cost2,610 British casualties, 550 of them dead,including 29 officers.

However, as Burgoyne had predicted, theMalakov proved the pivotal fortification. Inthe final assault on it, the French suffered7,567 casualties (1,634 killed); Russiancasualties were put at 12,000 (3,000 killed).With loss of the Malakov, Gorchakov decidedthat the southern part of Sevastopol was

The fighting 75

untenable. During the night of8/9 September, leaving their woundedbehind, the Russians blew up fortificationsand important buildings in the port andcrossed the prepared pontoon of boats,which they burnt behind them, to thenorthern suburb.

Next day the allies triumphantly tookcharge of the dockyard and its environs,claiming that Sevastopol had fallen. ButCaptain the Hon. Henry Clifford did notrejoice; '1 stood in the Redan more humble,more dejected and with a heavier heart thanI have yet felt since I left home ... I lookedtowards the Malakov, there was the Frenchflag, the Tricolour, planted on its parapet ...no flag floated on the parapet on which I

stood.' He might have reflected, though, thatif enemy fire had not been directed at theGreat Redan, the French in the Malakovwould have been bombarded from batteriesnot required to engage the British. Thus, on9 September, the tricolour might not havebeen flying over the Malakov either. Captureof the main, southern part of Sevastopolwith its dockyard and arsenals was truly anallied effort, especially as Turks andSardinians were in the siege lines.

Windham's fate provides an interestingpostscript. Despite his forebodings, hesurvived the Redan debacle, became Chief ofStaff to the British C-in-C in the Crimea, waslater knighted and advanced to the rank oflieutenant-general.

Portrait of a soldier

Captain Lewis Edward Nolan

'Attack, sir! Attack what? What guns, sir?'Flinging his arm towards the end of thevalley, Captain Nolan replied: 'There is yourenemy! There are your guns!' According toLord Lucan, commanding the CavalryDivision, these comprised the final, fatefulwords between the two men, which sent theLight Brigade to destruction. But by the timethat he recalled them, Lucan had beenaccused by Lord Raglan of losing the brigade,and having been killed at its outset, Nolancould no longer defend himself.

Early life and career

A slim, dark-haired figure with a trimmoustache, Lewis (or Louis) Edward Nolanwas an unusual junior officer. He spoke fiveEuropean languages and several Indiandialects. An outstanding horseman, he hadserved in a foreign army and published twobooks about the cavalry, acting as model fortheir illustrations. He had also designed acavalry saddle to the satisfaction of the Dukeof Cambridge. Born in 1818 in Canada, thesecond son of an infantry captain, JohnBabington Nolan, his grandfather, BabingtonNolan, had been a light cavalryman. Lewistherefore had a strong military background.

After returning from Canada and livingfor a short while in Scotland, the familymoved to Milan, then part of the AustrianEmpire, where now on half-pay Lewis'sfather became British vice-consul. At the ageof 14, as a cadet Lewis joined the10th Imperial and Royal Hussars, aHungarian unit in the Austrian Army, wherehe was known as Ludwig. Tutored by arenowned riding instructor, Colonel Haas, atthe Engineer School near Vienna, he wenton to serve with his regiment in theHungarian and Polish provinces, earning

Captain Lewis Edward Nolan (1818-54). Asaide-de-camp to the Quartermaster-General inthe Crimea, he carried the fateful order that ledto the Charge of the Light Brigade, in whichNolan was killed. (Ann Ronan Picture Library)

official praise for his expert swordsmanshipand riding ability. While in England during1838, he took part in Queen Victoria'scoronation celebrations, and the followingyear he returned to his family in Scotland,ostensibly on sick leave. Nolan never wentback to Austrian service.

Portrait of a soldier 77

On 15 March 1839, he purchased acommission in the 15th Light Dragoons ofthe British Army and sailed with thatregiment to India. His stay there was short.In March 1840, he obtained two years' sickleave, though there is no evidence of illness.Back in England, in June 1841 he purchasedadvancement to lieutenant and in March1842 was posted to the cavalry depot atMaidstone for a riding master's course.There he impressed Sergeant R. Henderson,an instructor, with his 'thoroughly amiabletemper, kindness of disposition and reallyfascinating manner', besides a transparentdevotion to soldiering. Nolan returned toIndia in May 1843 and the following yearbecame riding master of the 15th LightDragoons. His 'active and zealous' workbrought commendation from an inspectinggeneral. Socially, he was being noted as anaccomplished competitor at military racemeetings and a conscientious attender atlevees, balls and reviews. Appointmentas ADC to the Commander-in-Chief inMadras was followed by that of extra ADCto the Governor.

At 31 Nolan had clearly made a name forhimself, but he had so far seen no action andwould not do so until the Crimea. In March1850, two months after his father's death, hepurchased a captaincy and in January 1851again secured two years' nominal sick leave.He stayed in Britain a few months beforetravelling on the continent of Europe toobserve cavalry manoeuvres in Russia,Sweden and Prussia. Command of the15th Light Dragoons' depot troop atMaidstone and of the regiment's detachmentat the funeral of the Duke of Wellingtonfollowed in 1852. Whilst at Maidstone forthe second time, he published his two books:The Training of Cavalry Remount Horses, ANew System (1852) and Cavalry: Its Historyand Tactics (1853). The Illustrated LondonNews proclaimed the latter 'a capital book,written with full knowledge of the subject,both practical and theoretical', and theAmerican Major-General G. B. McClellanpraised Nolan's analysis, based on anexhaustive study of military history.

The Crimea

Raglan's ADC and great-nephew, SomersetCalthorpe, considered Nolan 'an officer who,most justly, is very highly thought of by theauthorities'. Such was his reputation that hewas sent in advance of the ExpeditionaryForce's arrival in Turkey to buy horses for thecavalry in that country and Syria. He wasappointed ADC to Brigadier-General RichardAirey, commanding the first brigade of theLight Division, and went with Airey when hemoved to Raglan's headquarters asQuartermaster-General.

The day after the allied armiescommenced their advance southwards fromthe landing beaches in the Crimea, 'thebrave and daring Captain Nolan' came underfire during the skirmish on the Bulganekriver, reputedly remarking that 'The Russiansare damn'd bad shots.' 'The impetuousNolan,' according to one contemporary,carried messages and orders back andforth during the Battle of the Alma on20 September. Afterwards, to The Times'correspondent W. H. Russell, Nolan angrilydenounced Lucan for not sending cavalryafter the fleeing Russians.

He accompanied the allied force as itmarched round Sevastopol to besiege thenaval port from the southern upland. ThereNolan continued to decry unimaginative useof the cavalry arm, especially the lightcavalry. He considered its traditional role offoraging, pursuing beaten enemy troops aftera battle and carrying out reconnaissanceforays far too restricting. Years later, SergeantHenderson recalled: 'I remember, strange asit may appear, that in putting a casehypothetically of cavalry charging in a plain,Captain [then Lieutenant] Nolan drew with apiece of chalk on the wall of theQuartermaster's store in Maidstone barracks arough sketch which as nearly as possiblerepresented the relative positions of theRussian artillery and the British light cavalryat the Battle of Balaclava; the only thing hewas not quite right in was the result. Heassumed in such a case the certain captureof the guns.'


Nolan believed that, after the firstdischarge, the slowness of artillerymenrearming muzzle-loading cannon wouldallow charging cavalrymen to overrun abattery. Not aware of this, but irritated byNolan's criticisms in the field, Lord GeorgePaget, Cardigan's second-in-command,observed disparagingly: 'He writes books andwas a great man in his own estimation andhad already been talking very loud againstthe cavalry.'

Battle of Balaclava

Throughout the morning of 25 October1854, Nolan sat above the Plain of Balaclavaand saw the inaction of the Light Brigade onthe flank of the heavies, when they sweptthe Russian squadrons back over theWoronzov (Causeway) Heights. His volatilenature and anger at Lucan's perceivedincompetence were a dangerouscombination, as he plunged down the slopewith the decisive Fourth Order. Before herode off with the message, 'to prevent theenemy taking away the guns', Nolan received'careful instructions' from Raglan and hisimmediate superior, Airey. It is inconceivablethat either of them briefed him that thebrigade was to advance up the valley toattack the Russian guns at its far end.Situated between his two brigades,themselves divided by the WoronzovHeights, Lucan could see neither theredoubts nor the guns at the head of thevalley. Hence the reputed sharp scenebetween him and Nolan.

Having delivered the order, Nolan joinedthe 17th Lancers and rode with them behindLord Cardigan, the brigade commander.Before the advance had gone far, he gallopedbeyond Cardigan, shouting and waving hissword as he looked back towards the brigade.Almost at once he was killed by a shell burst,and his intentions will never be known. Ithas always been assumed that he suddenlyrealised Cardigan was moving towards thewrong guns. But, according to Henderson,Nolan thought that light cavalry charging

guns at speed could succeed in carryingthem. This leaves the intriguing possibilitythat, when he died, Nolan was not trying toredirect the Light Brigade, but attempting toget Cardigan, inexperienced in warfare andfollowing the text-book procedure ofgradually building up speed, to go faster.

Like the precise content of the exchangesbetween him and Lucan, the truth can nevernow be known. Initially, Lucan blamedNolan for the ensuing debacle. He may havebeen right, after all. Perhaps justifiably,therefore, a memorial in Holy Trinity church,Maidstone, would record that Nolan 'fell atthe head of the light cavalry brigade in thecharge at Balaklava [sic]'.

George Charles Bingham, Lieutenant-General Lord Lucan(1800-88). Commander of the Cavalry Division in theBritish Expeditionary Force, he misinterpreted Raglan'sorder and sent the Light Brigade to destruction duringthe Battle of Balaclava. He vigorously objected to Raglan'scriticism of his action and was recalled from the Crimeain February 1855. (Ann Ronan Picture Library)

Portrait of a civilian

Women at war

In the first half of the nineteenth century,soldiers and their families were harshlytreated. A few blankets slung on a ropeacross the width of a long barrack-room forflimsy privacy divided the single and marriedaccommodation. There were no quartersoutside barracks, nor was special provisionmade for those left behind once a regiment

went on campaign. Six women per regimentwere officially then taken on strength to gowith the troops. Faced with evidence that upto 30 went with some regiments to Turkey,

Woman in 4th Dragoon Guards Camp. Eachregiment was allowed to take six women on strengthfor duties such as cooking and washing. (Corbis)


but were left to make 'their own way on'from there, the Duke of Newcastle (Secretaryof State for War and the Colonies in 1854)'believed that the soldiers would bedissatisfied if they had not got theirassistance for washing and other purposesfor which the women generally go with thearmy'. Although their life would be bothonerous and dangerous, the competition toaccompany a regiment was keen. Those leftbehind were likely to endure a squalidexistence in penury, reliant on the mercy ofunsympathetic poor law commissioners.

Ellen (Nell) Butler

The lot of those chosen to accompany theExpeditionary Force is illustrated by theexperiences of a 24-year-old Portsmouthwoman, Ellen (Nell), wife of Private MichaelButler of the 95th, who sailed with theregiment from her home port on 7 April1854. For most of the stormy passage toTurkey, she and the other women werebattened below, and Nell burst into tearswhen allowed freely on deck at theirdestination. There was little time to rest.Wrapping her scant belongings in a singleblanket, she soon joined the march inland,occasionally getting a lift on a bullock cart.

The first night ashore, Nell and herhusband unknowingly pitched tent on anant-hill and woke to discover that most oftheir rations had been devoured by itsoccupants. When the armies invaded theCrimea, Nell went on the regimentaltroopship, but did not immediately land.Unsuccessfully, she tried to spot her husbandon the beach through a borrowed telescope.When the sick and wounded began to comeon board, the women were again sentbelow. One night, Nell heard a shout fromabove to a boat alongside: 'Just send up thelive ones, you fool! There were three dead inthe last batch.'

At length, she heard that Michael was atBalaclava, sick with fever. Having managedto reach there by steamer, in vain shesearched the crowded hospital ships in

harbour, getting more and more desperate:'The sights I saw there blinded my eyes withtears,' she noted. Suddenly she heard ashout: 'Nurse, come here and hold down thisman's hands while I take his leg off.' Despitea flask of brandy, the only availableanaesthetic, the wounded soldier remainedconscious throughout his ordeal. Nellrecalled with horror: 'The doctor took a longbright knife and a saw. I lost feeling andhung on to the man's hands as much to helpmyself as him. I could hear the grating of thesaw.' Understandably, she fainted and wasroundly cursed by the doctor when sherevived, 'I wasn't able to sew up that arteryproperly,' he raged, seeking quickly to repairthe damage.

Thereafter, she became a nurse by defaultand thus at length discovered Michael. Hewould recover enough to rejoin his regiment,but never to regain full strength. Meanwhile,as casualties rose, medical supplies ran short.In her new work, Nell tore up her petticoatsfor bandages and used old biscuit sacks forpoultices. She waxed packthread with amixture of pitch and fat to prevent it rotting,when surgeons were reduced to using that torepair wounds. During the severalbombardments on Sevastopol and attacksagainst Russian fortifications like the Redan,the ground shook beneath the operatingtables. Once a shell landed scarcely10yds (9m) from Nell, but she wentunscathed. However, she did not escapefrostbite in her right arm during the bitterwinter of 1854-55, and she also suffered fromscurvy. When Michael was invalided homewith a serious wound, Nell went with him.

They returned to neither a hero's welcomenor financial security. After months ofsearching, Michael did find a job inPortsmouth Dockyard, but his health gaveout and he died prematurely. By now Nell'sfrostbitten arm had withered, but she gamelytook in sewing to supplement the2s (10p) a week outdoor poor relief. Thecommittee of the national Patriotic Fund,established to assist war widows and families,ruled that 'there is not sufficient evidence toshow that Private Butler died from the effects

Portrait of a civilian 81

of the Russian War'. Made of stem stuff, Nelldid not give up and actively joined others inpressing for justice. At length, Parliamentagreed that surviving war widows shouldreceive 5s (25p) a week. When Nell wasnearly 80, even that was taken away fromher. A month before she died, she wrote: 'Ioften dream and awake frightened, havingseen Michael twice the last month. He wascalling me, saying "Nell, Nell, come away orthey'll break thy heart".' In 1909, aged 79,she passed away and was buried in her hometown with military honours. The coffin borea brass plate: 'Ellen Butler, Crimean Veteran'.

Frances (Fanny) Duberly

The experiences of another woman whowent to the Crimea were quite different. NellButler had scribbled her memories in a linedexercise book, later kept in a sideboarddrawer. Mrs Frances (Fanny) Duberly kept adetailed journal, which was printed andpublished. At the age of 20, she marriedCaptain Henry Duberly, ten years her seniorand paymaster of the 8th Royal Irish Hussars.A passionate and accomplished horsewoman,Fanny quickly gained popularity withregimental officers as a 'cavalry wife', whofollowed her husband on campaign at herown expense. Fanny's background thereforediffered starkly from that of Nell Butler. Theonly similarity was that they both went tothe Crimea.

With other officers' wives, Fanny set offfrom Devonport in the sailing ship ShootingStar on 25 April. The horses, includingFanny's grey, were held below, each grippedround the belly by a canvas sling secured tothe deck above. Placed in two ranks facingone another, wooden mangers werepositioned between them. The potential forchaos in choppy conditions clearly existed;and the Bay of Biscay duly produced lashinggales. The vessel's main and mizzen mastswere broken, men dodged the frightenedhooves of animals as the human sick andinjured cried continuously and piteously.Five horses, including Fanny's, were lost

during the stressful voyage. But after amonth they reached the Dardanelles inbright sunshine, and spirits climbed.

Fanny recorded that the regiment beganto disembark at Scutari prior to occupyingnearby barracks on 23 May, but thesuperficial attraction of colourfulaccommodation quickly palled on discoverythat multitudes of fleas and rats were alreadyin residence. The officers hastily returned toShooting Star. When orders were received toproceed to Varna, the divisional commander(Lord Lucan) forbade any woman to leaveScutari. He had not counted on Fanny'singenuity. Ostentatiously, she left the shipafter persuading two crew members tore-embark her at night. Hidden in the hold,Fanny suffered during repeated delays untilat length the ship sailed on 31 May. Then,with Lucan safely ashore at divisionalheadquarters, she went on deck scornfully tosurvey the Hotel d'Angleterre where otherofficers' wives had taken refuge.

She was going to war. The landing atVarna on 1 June proved somewhatdisorganised, and the Duberlys' tent waspitched in darkness a mile (1.6km) out oftown. Not until 5 June did they leave thereon an eight-hour 'jog' to their permanentinland camp at Devna in scorching sun,beset by clouds of dust and flies. To makematters worse, the whole of the LightDivision soon arrived, which over-strainedfood supplies. 'Stale eggs ... and sour milk'became commonplace, to Fanny's disgust.A violent dust-storm on 2 July liberallysprinkled white powder and horse manureover the whole camp. Moreover, LordCardigan, the Light Brigade commander,proved a positive pest with a torrent of pettyregulations and endless drills. Uncharitably,Fanny hoped he 'will get his head into sucha jolly bag that he will never get it out again... [he] neither feels for man nor horse'.Many men were soon struck down withsevere diarrhoea or dysentery, and thencholera began to claim lives.

Moving the whole cavalry camp toanother location brought scant relief. Therewas little opportunity for recreation to


distract her from these problems, thoughFanny did make various sketches of hersurroundings. On 10 August, she rode15 miles (24km) to Turkish-held Shumla, a'picturesquely filthy' town. In the hotelroom where she rested, 'the bugs took leaseof me and the fleas in innumerable hoststook possession. A bright-eyed little mousesat demurely in the corner watching me.'Fanny's restful excursion had thus misfired.

En route to Varna, where the Light Brigadewould embark for the Crimea, on 29 Augustshe sighted 'the forest of masts, the flutteringensigns and signal flags' of the invasion fleet.Fanny was forbidden to sail in it. Disguisedas a sick soldier's wife she was neverthelesssmuggled aboard Himalaya, but not until theafternoon of 5 September did the steamerleave harbour. Cholera had meanwhile

Frances (Fanny) Duberly. An accomplishedhorsewoman, whose Crimean journal waslater published, seen here with her husbandHenry, paymaster of the 8th Royal Irish Hussars.(Hulton Getty)

struck again and 'faces which should havebeen bronzed by sun and wind wereputty-faced' in terror. Sailing close in-shoreon 13 September, even without a telescopeFanny could see a peaceful pastoral scene ofhouses, cattle and corn on the Crimeanpeninsula. When the port of Eupatoriasurrendered, Fanny explored it on horsebackwith its new British governor. 'After we hadfinished our ride, we went to one of thedeserted houses, where we found a grandpiano - the first I had played on for so long!'

The following day, disembarkationcommenced. Like Nell Butler, Fanny Duberly

Portrait of a civilian 83

watched from afar. The 8th Hussars did notland until 16 September, when Fannypredicted that Sevastopol would fall 'in afew days'. In the meantime, she went to seeher husband, but could only watch fromthe ship once more as the allied forcecommenced its southward march on19 September. That afternoon, Fanny wasalarmed to hear distant volleys, unknown toher from the minor clash on the Bulganekriver, causing her to worry about Henry'sfate. The next day, intermittent sounds ofbattle on the Alma reached the troopshipsoff Eupatoria, and Fanny's anxiety mountedfurther. A false report that 'our poor cavalryfellows are all dead' greatly disturbed her. Atlength, though, reliable information arrivedthat Henry had survived. Having beenthoroughly alarmed, fearing that she mightbe a widow, Fanny determined never to beparted from her husband again.

Eventually she reached Balaclava, whereshe stayed on board ship rather than live ina tent ashore. Nevertheless, she madefrequent visits to the cavalry camp and thesiege lines. One night she stood 'on the browof a hill ... the doomed city [Sevastopol]beneath our feet and the pale moon above; itwas indeed a moment worth a hundred yearsof every day existence'.

On the morning of the Battle of Balaclava,25 October, a note from Henry warned herthat fighting had commenced: 'Lose no time,but come up as quickly as you can; do notwait for breakfast.' Hurrying across the plain,because the Turkish redoubts had alreadyfallen, she reached the heights in time toobserve the 'Thin Red Line' clash and theensuing cavalry charges. As paymaster,Henry did not ride with the Light Brigadeduring its disastrous charge, but Fanny spent'a lurid night' recalling the sight of thatdreadful spectacle, in which her maid'shusband rode to his death.

When supply and transport services brokedown before Sevastopol, Fanny bitterlyrecorded her views of administrativeincompetence, which led to widespreadsuffering among men and horses, besidesmaking Balaclava into 'a village of ruined

houses and hovels in the extremest state ofall imaginable dirt'. While on board SansPareil there, she witnessed the devastatingstorm on 14 November 1854: 'the harbourwas seething and covered with foam ... Icould hardly, even when clinging to theship, keep my footing on deck.'

However, with the advent of spring andwarmer weather, conditions improved.Fanny rode in the 'valley of death', where'we gathered handfuls of flowers andthought - oh, how sadly - of the flowers ofEnglish chivalry that had there been reapedand mown away'. Elsewhere on the plain,troops organised race meetings and Fannymused that perhaps she should rename herjournal 'The Spring Calendar'. After thesouthern part of Sevastopol had fallen inSeptember, Fanny and Henry explored theruins of the Redan, where so many lives hadbeen lost, before riding into the port itself.She had a shock. 'We had fancied the townwas almost uninjured - so calm, and white,and fair did it look from a distance; but theruined walls, the riddled roofs, the greencupola of the church, split and splintered toribands, told a very different tale.'

Fanny Duberly was the only officer's wifeto last the entire campaign. Queen Victoria,though, considered her behaviourunladylike, refused dedication of thepublished journal to her and even ignoredFanny during a review, when one of theroyal children pointed her out. Shortly afterreturning to England, Fanny and Henry leftfor India. There she was referred to as 'theCrimean heroine', akin to Nell Butler'sepitaph. In truth, the two women led fardifferent lives in the Crimea, underlining thesocial distinctions of the day.

Neither came close to the wretchedexistence of 250 wives who came out withtheir husbands but were left in Turkey orBulgaria when the regiments moved on.Accompanied by their children, somenewly born, they were found abandoned inthe dark, verminous cellars of the notoriousBarrack Hospital at Scutari, many lying 'on aheap of filthy black rags'. Several would beburied anonymously as 'A Woman'.

How the war ended

Guns fall silent

To Queen Victoria, Panmure underlined 'thisgreat success ... The excitement is verygreat.' However, Prince Gorchakov retained astrong force in Sevastopol's northern suburband his field army still lurked beyond theTchernaya, totalling, Sir James Simpsonestimated, '13 or 14 divisions of infantry,numerous artillery and Cossacks withoutend'.

Elation swiftly turned to carping criticism,as realisation dawned that the enemy wouldnot soon be crushed. Palmerston complainedthat 'our two armies seem disposed to restunder their laurels and to live in goodbrotherhood with the Russians'; the Queenaccused Simpson of 'showing a total want ofenergy of mind'. Panmure expressed his aciddispleasure in lengthy dispatches to theBritish commander, who pointed to theimpossibility of assaulting the northernsuburb without exposing Balaclava to attackfrom the Mackenzie Heights. Then herevealed that enemy salvoes acrossSevastopol Bay had made southern areas ofthe city 'untenable', causing withdrawal ofallied troops. Evidently, Sevastopol had notbeen captured after all.

Simpson reacted to Panmure's subsequentangry hectoring by declaring: 'I am mortifiedand disgusted,' and resigned his command.On 11 November 1855, he handed over toGeneral Sir William Codrington, whoreiterated his predecessor's unpalatableassessment: 'The enemy holds as muchcontrol over the harbour as we do ... it is alarge mutual wet ditch under fire from bothsides.' In effect, military stalemate. TheFrench, too, almost had a change of C-in-C.Frustrated by lack of forward movement, onseveral occasions Napoleon III came close todismissing Pélissier.

Extracted from the ghostly ruins ofsouthern Sevastopol out of range of enemy

artillery, at least soldiers on the Chersoneseupland enjoyed a more comfortable secondwinter. Paymaster Dixon explained: 'Ourroads are getting on capitally and therailway is splendidly drained, so there is nofear now of our transport breaking down thiswinter. We also have at least six weeks' storesin advance up here now.' Not least throughthe influence of Florence Nightingale,medical services improved to the extent thathelp could be offered to the French.

Kinburn and Kars

Partly to placate the home governments,an allied expedition was mounted to themouth of the Dnieper river, on thenorth-western shore of the Black Sea. TheBritish would have preferred to land at Kaffa(Theodosia), on the southern coast of theCrimea east of Balaclava to threaten theenemy field army and interrupt supply linesstill in use via the north-eastern Crimea. On7 October, however, the French prevailedand ten transports carrying 10,000 Britishand French troops set sail from Kamiesch.They were protected by a powerful navalflotilla of nearly 40 ships, including specialboats armed with mortars and three 'floatingsteam batteries' carrying heavy-calibre siegeguns. The immediate objectives were theforts of Kinburn and Ochakov, covering theentrance to the river that led to the navalbase at Nikolayev and the provincial capitalof Kherson.

After a feint towards Odessa, theexpedition anchored close to Kinburn on14 October. Gunboats then swept a beach3 miles (5km) upstream on the spit leadingto the fort, where, under Brigadier-Generalthe Hon. A. A. Spencer, two British infantrybrigades, supported by engineers, artillery

How the war ended 85

and cavalry, landed on the right; Frenchunits led by General A.-F. Bazaine on the left.During the morning of 17 October, Kinburnwas bombarded from land and sea, at noonthe first breach in the walls occurredand three hours later its garrison of700 surrendered with 80 guns. Next day, theRussians blew up Orchakov and retirednorthwards. Allied cavalry scouted thehinterland, but it became clear that nofurther progress could be expected beforewinter. The main body, therefore, returnedto the Crimea, leaving a small garrison inKinburn to repair damage and prepare forrenewed operations in 1856. When theRussians strengthened the approaches toNikolayev and Kherson, even that force waswithdrawn and the pointless militaryenterprise came to its inglorious close.

Nor was the news from Armenia, whereKars remained under siege, more cheerful.During the summer of 1855, Russian attackson the beleaguered garrison intensified, butOmar Pasha could persuade neither his owngovernment nor the allies that he shouldtake troops from the Crimea to its aid.Eventually, he left the peninsula on6 September and a strong contingent ofTurkish troops followed him on the 29th.All too late. On 25 November, with foodsupplies exhausted and disease rife, Karssurrendered. Meanwhile, apart fromoccasional, ritual exchanges of fire frombatteries facing one another across the bayand occasional skirmishes in the BaidarValley around Sevastopol, 1855 came to aninauspicious close. An enormous explosionin the French lines on 15 November, whichkilled 80 and wounded almost 300, resultedfrom mishandling of ammunition notenemy action.

Peace overtures

In the opening weeks of 1856, typhus andcholera struck once more, especially amongthe French, who suffered over 50,000 cases,of which one-fifth died. Dixon recorded inJanuary: 'The French are dreadfully badly

off, much worse than last winter, they aredropping off in scores, nay hundreds.' TheBritish now had an abundance, and in someinstances a surplus, of clothing and huts,and as the weather improved they beganorganising drag hunts and race meetings.Regimental theatres put on plays and arange of speakers delivered educationallectures, too. Militarily, the allies undertookmusketry training and field exercises. But itall lacked purpose. In Dixon's words, 'roadmaking here and I suppose diplomacy athome have taken its [fighting's] place'.Soldiers and sailors were marking timeuntil the small print of peace could befashioned into an acceptable document.French fantasies about attacking Russia'sPolish provinces through Germany andBritish dreams of reducing Kronstadt andHelsingfors (Helsinki) in the Balticprovided the unrealistic backdrop fornegotiation.

Almost throughout the entire war, fitfulattempts at securing peace had been goingon in Vienna, but during the autumn of1855 clandestine bilateral contacts were alsoestablished between Paris and St Petersburg.Discovery of these prompted Austria to takethe initiative. On 16 December 1855, CountEsterhazy led a mission to St Petersburg,which conveyed conditions for peace:confirmation of autonomy for Moldavia andWallachia; freedom of navigation for allnations on the Danube; neutralisation of theBlack Sea, with abolition of militaryinstallations on its shores; guarantee of therights of all Christian subjects in Turkey.A fifth condition, allegedly added on Britishinsistence, provided for further matters tobe raised during subsequent talks 'in theinterest of lasting peace'. The Holy Places inJerusalem, the Bosphorus and DardanellesStraits or Sevastopol were not highlighted.In that respect, the Tsar would not behumiliated. However, if Russia did notaccept the submission by 18 January, Austriathreatened war.

Despite some reluctance and oppositionamong his ministers, two days before thedeadline Alexander II accepted these terms.


Count D. N. Bludov recalled Louis XIV'sresignation at the conclusion of theSeven Years War in 1763: 'If we no longerhave the means to make war, then let usmake peace.' The news reached Sevastopoleight days later. There was still time forforces on both sides to make militarypoints. On 29 January, Russian guns inSevastopol's northern suburb let loose avast cannonade against the Karabel andon 4 February the French destroyedFort Nicholas. Honour seemed to besatisfied. Hostilities petered out.

The peace conference gathered in Paris on25 February 1856, and three days later anarmistice lasting until 31 March was signed.The following morning, 29 February, alliedand Russian representatives met nearTractir Bridge to discuss the new situationamicably. Reviews of one another's troopswere arranged to celebrate peace, and on24 March the British commander,Codrington, invited Russian officers to arace meeting near the Tchernaya.

The Treaty of Paris, formally bringing theCrimean War to a close, was signed on30 March, signalled by a 101-gun salute inthe Crimea on 2 April and finally ratified bysignatory nations on 27 April. Its provisionsreferred to 'the independence and territorialintegrity of the Ottoman Empire' and theSultan's 'generous intentions towards theChristian population of his empire ...ameliorating their conditions withoutdistinction of religion or race'. The Black Seawas to be neutralised, 'in consequence [ofwhich] His Majesty the Emperor of All theRussias and His Imperial Majesty the Sultanengage not to establish or to maintain uponthat coast any military-maritime arsenal'.The principalities of Moldavia and Wallachiawere to enjoy 'the privileges and immunitiesof which they are in possession ... under thesuzerainty of the Porte ... without separateright of interference in their internal affairs... by any of the Guaranteeing Powers'. Theprincipality of Servia would 'preserve itsindependence and national administration,as well as full liberty of worship, oflegislation, of commerce, and of navigation'.

Prince Albert commented: 'It is not suchas we could have wished; still, infinitely tobe preferred to the prosecution of war.'Queen Victoria consoled herself with thethought that England had saved Europefrom 'the arrogance and pretensions of thatbarbarous power, Russia'. She 'disliked theidea of peace', Lord Clarendon noted, butwas 'reconciled' to it. France had no suchqualms. The Crimean War was a triumph for


Napoleon III, who had 'given France aglorious victory of arms and peace toEurope'. Russia emerged from the peacetalks more buoyant than expected. Thenaval base of Nikolayev, not being on theBlack Sea shore, was excluded from thetreaty provisions; shipbuilding had notbeen banned; although Kars would goback to Turkey, no restrictions were placedon Russian fortifications or troop

deployments in the Caucasus; perhapsof most importance, the question ofnavigation on the Danube was relegatedto a series of commissions tasked toreport at a later date.

Sightseeing. With an armistice signed, troopscrossed one another's lines. Here British officersare depicted sightseeing on the south coast of theCrimea, near Yalta. (Patrick Mercer)


The troops depart

It took some weeks for allied troops to leavethe Crimea, Codrington doing so on 12 Julywith the last of his command. Significantly,before departing, he received the thanks oflocal Tartars. The third and final commanderof the British Expeditionary Force left

behind memorials to the battles of Balaclava,Inkerman and the Redan, besides threededicated to Lord Raglan in and around thefarmhouse that had housed his headquarterson the Chersonese upland. By the light oftallow candles and a lantern, provided bytheir former foes, two British privatescompleted the blackening of letters on one


of the outside memorials to Raglan at11 pm on 10 July. Captain Frederic Brineexplained to the Field Marshal's widow thatthis 'was the last thing executed by theBritish soldier on that blood-stained land'.

Before peace was concluded, 4,273 Britishofficers and 107,040 men reached theCrimea, of whom 2,755 were killed in action

and 2,019 died of wounds (4,774 in total).However, officially 21,097 died in thetheatre of war, which means that 16,323succumbed to disease, figures that do notinclude those who died after returninghome. The French sent out over 300,000men. French writers give 10,240 killed inaction and a round 20,000 who died ofwounds. Possibly a further 75,000 were lostto disease. The Sardinians committed 15,000men, of whom approximately 2,050 diedfrom all causes. Turkish casualties in theestimated 35,000 sent to the Crimea are notclear, but overall allied losses have beencalculated at about 140,000, with theRussians suffering a minimum 110,000 dead.The French historian Paul de la Gorce maynot therefore be far wrong in claiming totallosses of over 300,000 among the fivebelligerent nations.

Sailing across the Black Sea with the lastBritish contingent to leave Balaclava,the adjutant of the Scots Fusilier Guardsissued a stern rebuke: 'There is no objectionto singing in the Officers' Cabin up to10 o'clock p.m., after which hour it mustcease or Lights will be put out. The singinglast night became a noise and a nuisance.'They were glad to be going home.

Peace celebrations. At 9.00 pm on 23 April 1856,following a review by Queen Victoria at Spitheadbetween Portshead and the Isle of Wight that day,' the whole fleet at anchor burst into light as bymagic', followed by a spectacular firework display.(Ann Ronan Picture Library)

Conclusion and consequences

Counting the cost

The Crimean War was fought by the allies toremove the threat of Russian aggressionagainst Turkey on land or by sea. Invasion ofMoldavia and Wallachia in July 1853 anddevastation of the Turkish fleet at Sinope fourmonths later were stark reminders of Russianmilitary potential. Dispute over the rights ofCatholic monks in Jerusalem provided anexcuse for armed conflict. The morefundamental hidden agenda involvedprotection of trade routes in theMediterranean (especially to India), Britishand French commercial interests in theOttoman Empire, especially the Levant, andwider stability in south-eastern Europe in thewake of Greek independence and disaffectionamong Christian subjects of the Sultan.

Neutralisation of the shores of the BlackSea was thus a critical provision in the Peaceof Paris. It did not last long. Taking advantageof European preoccupation with the Franco-Prussian War, in 1871 the Tsar unilaterallyrevoked this clause. Military installationswould now be rebuilt and the Black Sea fleetresurrected. The following year Russia agreedto join the Dreikaiserbund with Prussia andAustria-Hungary, which had been devised toisolate France. It also left Britain withoutsupport for any action she might wish to takeover the Tsar's shredding of the 1856 treaty.Without the political will to enforce itsprovisions, that document was now worthless.Basically, the land and sea threats toConstantinople and the Straits for which theCrimean War had been fought had beenrevived. They soon seemed very real indeed.

Balkan unrest

In 1875 and 1876 subject nationalities in theBalkans rose up against their Turkish masters,who responded with customary vigour and

cruelty. The 'Bulgarian massacres' causedindignation in London largely through luridpress reports by the Daily News. More acutely,they gave Russia an ideal reason yet again topour into Moldavia and Wallachia andonwards across the Danube to protect fellowChristians. The former British Prime MinisterW. E. Gladstone rallied anti-Turkish feeling by-calling for the Turks to be cleared 'one and all,bag and baggage ... from the province[Bulgaria] they have desolated and profaned'.

However, political and public alarm washeightened when besieged Plevna fell to theRussians, who pressed on to Adrianople inJanuary 1878. Constantinople and the Straitswere evidently within the Tsar's grasp. Oldfears were reawakened. From merciless villainsthe Turks were rapidly transformed intowronged victims. Once more Russianambitions were checked, this time bydiplomatic rather than military meansthrough the Congress of Berlin (1878).

But the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 andthe Bulgarian unrest that preceded it servedonly to underline the weakness of theOttoman Empire and re-emphasise that Greekindependence (secured in 1830) was likely tobe the precursor of political disintegration inthe Balkans. And so it proved. By 1913, Turkeywould be reduced to a tiny rump west of theStraits, as Romania, Bulgaria, Servia,Montenegro, Albania and Macedonia gainedtheir independence. Unfortunately, the newstates could not co-exist peacefully and theirquarrels erupted into open warfare in1912-13. Separation of territories from Turkey,therefore, increased rather than solvedinherent problems in south-eastern Europe.

Tragically and directly, in the wake of theAustro-Servian confrontation after theassassination of the Austrian Archduke FranzFerdinand in Sarajevo, they played a crucialpart in the outbreak of the First World War.

Conclusion and consequences 91

Even before that cataclysmic development,the British statesman Lord Salisbury hadfamously pondered whether during theCrimean War 'we had backed the wronghorse', an effete, corrupt Turkey. Partition ofthe Ottoman Empire between the majorEuropean powers might well have broughtelusive stability to the Balkans and GavriloPrincip therefore might never have fired thefatal shot at the heir to the Austrian throneon 28 June 1914.

Justified war

That having been said, in 1853-54 it wouldhave been difficult not to support Turkey.Russia had been a bete noire in the Near Eastfor 30 years, twice in living memory (1828-29and 1833-41) having threatened eitherphysically to dominate the Straits orpolitically to force compliance from theSultan. Since destruction of the Turkish andEgyptian fleets in Navarino Bay (1827) duringthe Greek war of independence, Turkey hadposed no naval threat to the Mediterraneantrade routes. Theoretically, Russia did and thatwas the more immediate consideration.Sinking of Turkish vessels in Sinope harbourwith explosive shells, graphically portrayed inthe British and French press, provided anadded bonus for the bellicose.

In retrospect, Salisbury might have hada point. However, siding with Russia in spring1854 would have been politically impossible.The cheering crowds that accompanied troopsto the railway stations, and others whosehandkerchiefs waved them away from thedocks, demonstrated the depth of publicfeeling for the cause. Voices for peace, andothers reflecting Charles Greville's view thathe had 'hardly seen a madder business', werefew and muted. The words of a British soldier,Gunner Whitehead, illustrated the mood ofthe moment:

Grim War does summon me henceAnd I deem it my duty to fightTis an honour to stand in proud England's defenceWhen once she is proved in the right.

Despite question marks about itslong-term achievements, the Crimean Wardid stop Russia from making either politicalor military progress in Turkey. In 1833 theTsar had wrung favourable terms out of thePorte in the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, whichhad guaranteed that the Straits would beclosed to foreign warships at Russia's request.Nicholas I's instructions in 1853 that hisenvoy, Prince Menshikov, should hint atoccupation of Constantinople and theDardanelles if negotiations did not go his way,raised the spectre of military action and thepossibility of another diplomatic triumph.Allied intervention in the Crimea and thesubsequent peace, for all its imperfections,brought these aspirations to a firm halt.

Allied benefits

In Britain, the Crimean War did bringlong-term benefit by providing the platformfor army reform. In 1854, precisely how manyauthorities were responsible for the armyremained obscure: estimates varied betweenseven and 14. Small wonder, therefore, thathorses starved and men suffered at the handsof an ineffective supply system in the Crimea.There was no Cabinet minister solely incharge of the army. The Secretary of State forWar and the Colonies may have had'authority in all matters relating generally tothe army', but the 'colonies' demanded thebulk of his attention, and much of his workfell to another minister, the Secretary at War,whose official duties concerned military lawand finance. Military command of the landforces rested with the C-in-C (infantry andcavalry) and Master-General of the Ordnance(artillery and engineers). Supply was theprovince of the civilian Commissariat (underthe Treasury) and Board of Ordnance(responsible to the Master-General).

Schemes for rationalising and improvingthis ramshackle system had hitherto founderedon lack of support. It had, after all, broughtBritain a vast empire during the past 200 years.The furore engendered by press reports ofchaos in the Crimea created the political and


public atmosphere for change. By 1856, adistinct Secretary of State for War (in fact, thearmy) had been created and absorbed theresponsibilities of the Secretary at War, whosepost completely disappeared in 1863. Theposition of Master-General of the Ordnancevanished; the C-in-C gained command of allthe military arms. So one civilian minister andone officer were hence-forth responsible forpolicy and fighting efficiency.

During the war, glaring examples of supplyshortcomings and lack of men for non-militarytasks at the front led to five ad hoc supportservices being hastily put together in Londonand sent to the Crimea. Two survived beyond1856 to become permanent military bodies.Reports of indiscipline and disorganisation ledthe Duke of Newcastle, as Secretary of State forWar, to create 'a staff corps for the purpose ofproviding a police force for the army fin theCrimea]'; it was called the Mounted StaffCorps. The Metropolitan Police and IrishConstabulary provided initial recruits, but thecorps failed to make an impact and simplyfaded away. The Civil Engineering Corps,comprising employees under contract hiredby a civilian firm, built and maintained therailway from Balaclava to the camps, butdid not survive beyond the end of hostilities.

Like the Civil Engineering Corps, the ArmyWorks Corps had been formed for a specificpurpose. In May 1855, James Beatty (chiefengineer of the railway) wrote: 'That a CivilCorps ... of mechanics, navvies and in factevery description of labourer would be of thegreatest service to an army is abundantlyshown by the experience of the last ninemonths here.' The new corps, designed tocarry out general labouring work, did notarrive in the Crimea until July 1855. It provedill disciplined and virtually useless. In the faceof protests from politicians that it had beeneminently worthwhile, Codrington repliedthat it would take 'a stretch of imagination'to conclude that the civilian labourers hadmade any meaningful contribution at thefront: 800 were sent home for a range ofoffences, including persistent drunkennessand insubordination. Codrington suggestedto Panmure, Newcastle's successor, that 'your

lordship would be somewhat surprised at thecost ... compared with the real amount ofwork done'.

Two other of the ancillary corps not onlycontinued beyond 1856, but also becamepermanent military bodies. The Land TransportCorps, born out of the chaotic inefficiency ofthe Commissariat's wartime efforts, wasreorganised as the Military Train under theC-in-C in London, evolved into the ArmyService Corps in 1870 and over a century latermerged with other formations into the RoyalLogistic Corps. The Medical Staff Corps, toprovide hospital orderlies, also owed its birthto the Crimean War. A Parliamentary SelectCommittee recommended that it 'shouldcontinue as part of the Peace Establishment'and in 1857 it was reorganised and renamedthe Army Hospital Corps. In 1898 it joined theMedical Staff Corps of doctors to form theRoyal Army Medical Corps. FlorenceNightingale's work at Scutari and her persistent,post-war pressure for improvements innursing care in civilian hospitals was anotherdirect result of the Crimean War.

For the Sardinians, siding with the alliesbrought international recognition, whichduring the ensuing 15 years played animportant role in the struggle to gain aunified, independent state of Italy. In a widercontext, the doubtful long-term benefits of thewar in political and diplomatic terms wereheavily underscored within three years of thePeace of Paris. Yet another serious breakdownof relations between London and Paris led tofear of war with France, the prospect ofinvasion from across the Channel andformation of the Volunteer Corps to defendBritain's shores.

Nothing, though, could detract from thereform of the British Army, which gave it notonly cohesive direction in the hands of onecivilian minister and one military officer, butalso permanent, military support services.Furthermore, an overhaul of staff trainingresulted in opening of a dedicated ArmyCommand and Staff College at Camberley in1862. Without the Crimean War, none of thiswould have occurred when it did and much ofit may never have happened.

Further reading

Calthorpe, S. J. G., Letters from Headquarters.By an Officer on the Staff, 2 vols, London,1856-7.

Fitzherbert, C. (ed.), Henry Clifford VC: HisLetters and Sketches from the Crimea,London, 1956.

Hibbert, C, The Destruction of Lord Raglan,London, 1961.

Kinglake, A. W., The Invasion of the Crimea,8 vols, London, 1863-87.

Russell, W. H., The Great War with Russia,London, 1895.

Seaton, A., The Crimean War: A RussianChronicle, London, 1977.

Sweetman, J., Raglan: From the Peninsula tothe Crimea, London, 1993.

Index

Figures in bold refer to illustrations

Alexander II, Tsar of Russia 66, 69, 82Allied forces 32-33, 42-43, 75, 84 see also British

forces; trench Forces; Sardinian forces; Turkishforcescouncil of war 60-61invasion of the Crimea 34marches on Sevastopol 43plans 10, 43, 44, 66, 66-67

Alma, battle of the, 20th September 1854 37,38(map), 39-40, 40-41, 77

Ardent, Colonel 28Austria 19, 20, 81-82

Balaclava 45battle of, 25th October 1854 49-50, 51(map), 52,52-56, 54-55, 77, 78, 83

Baltic Sea, the 10-12Belbec, river 44, 45Black Sea, the 20, 22, 87, 90Bousquet General 56, 59, 68British forces 23, 24, 28, 30, 56, 66, 86-87 see also

Allied forcesadministrative control 15-16, 91-92at the Alma 40, 41-42ancillary corps 92at Balaclava 52, 53, 53-54, 55-56casualties 10, 42, 53, 55, 56, 60, 67, 68, 74, 89

generals 61, 64cholera 34departure of 28, 29departs from the Crimea 88at Gallipoli 28the Heavy Brigade 24, 51(map), 52, 53, 54, 55the invasion of the Crimea 32, 33, 35at Inkerman 56-57, 57, 59, 60, 60, 70at Kinburn 84the Light Brigade 24, 25, 42, S3, 54, 54-55, 55, 78medical services 30, 62-63, 64-65, 66, 84, 92organisation 24reforms 91-92, 93at Sevastopol 45, 47-48, 48, 61, 64, 65, 67, 68

fall of 71, 74, 75supplies 16, 30, 33, 64, 85, 92at the Tchernaya 69

Brown, Lieutenant-General Sir George (1790-1865) 23,23, 32-33, 67

Bulganek river, the 36, 37, 77Bulgaria 28, 29, 90Burgoyne, Lieutenant-General Sir John Fox

(1782-1871) 24, 28, 44, 44, 47, 61, 65, 67, 74Butler, Ellen (Nell) 80-81

Calamita Bay 36Cambridge, Lieutenant-General George Frederick

Charles, the Duke of (1819-1904) 23, 24, 35Campbell, Major-General Sir Colin (1792-1863) 42,

42, 52Canrobert, General Francois Certain (1809-95) 45,

45, 67

Cardigan, James Brudenell, Major-General Lord(1797-1868) 23, 24, 37, 44, 56, 64, 81at Balaclava 54, 55, 78

casualties 10, 56, 80, 89the Alma 42Balaclava 53, 55, 56to disease 34, 81, 89Inkerman 60Odessa 28Sevastopol 67, 68, 69, 71, 74, 86the Tchernaya 71

Cathcart, Major-General the Hon. Sir George 23-24,59

causes of the war 17,90cholera 30, 34-35, 68, 81, 85chronology 7-8Codrington, Sir William 79, 88

Dardanelles Straits, the 17Duberly, Frances (Fanny) 81-83, 82Dundas, Vice-Admiral Sir James Deans (1785-1862)

24, 47, 48, 61Dundas, Rear-Admiral Sir Richard 11

Eastern Question, the 17England, Major-General Sir Richard 23Estcourt, Major-General J. B. 33Eupatoria 25, 27, 36, 37, 65, 82

families, soldiers 79, 85Fenton, Roger (1819-69) 15, 15France 19, 90French forces 24-25, 28, 56, 66, 84 see also Allied

forcesat the Alma 40, 42at Balaclava 53, 55casualties 10, 42, 60, 67, 68, 71, 75, 85, 89cholera 34, 68, 85at Gallipoli 28, 28-29at Inkerman 56, 59, 60the invasion of the Crimea 35at Kinburn 79, 84plans 44, 65, 66at Sevastopol 45, 47, 48, 49, 64, 67, 68

the fall 71, 74at the Tchernaya 69, 71

French navy 11, 12, 20, 25

Gorchakov, General Prince Mikhail Dmitrievich(1795-1861) 66,68 ,69,71,84at the Alma 39, 42-43at Sevastopol 74, 74-75

Graham, Sir James 22Great Britain 16, 19, 65, 90, 91

benefits gained 91-92declaration of war 9, 17, 20-21

Hamelin, Vice-Admiral F. A. 25

Inkerman, battle of, 5th November 1854 56-57, 57,58(map), 59-60, 60, 70

Index 95

Jerusalem 19

Kars 79-81Kertch 67Khomutov, General P. F. 26Kinburn 79-80Kornilov, Vice-Admiral V. A. 26, 49Kvitsinsky, Lieutenant-General D. A. 39

Lacy Evans, Lieutenant-General Sir George de 23,56, 60

Little Inkerman 56Lucan, George Charles Bingham, Lieutenant-General

Lord (1800-88) 23, 24, 37, 42, 56, 64, 66, 78, 81at Balaclava 52, 54, 55, 76, 78

Lyons, Rear-Admiral Sir Edmund (1790-1858) 24, 43, 44

medical services 30, 62-63, 64-65, 66, 79, 80, 92Menshikov, General Prince Alexander Sergeevich

(1781-1869) 19, 26, 26, 27, 34, 44, 66, 91and the Allied invasion of the Crimea 37at the Alma 37, 39, 42, 43and Inkerman 57

Moeller, Lieutenant-General F. F. von 26-27, 49

Nachimov, Vice-Admiral P. F. 26, 49, 68-69Napier, Vice-Admiral Sir Charles (1786-1860) 11, 14Napoleon III, Emperor of France (1808-73) 19, 19, 21,

66, 67, 79, 87Newcastle, Duke of 22, 29-30, 32, 33, 65, 80Nicholas 1, Tsar of Russia (1796-1855) 17, 17, 19, 21,

66, 91Nightingale, Florence (1820-1910) 62-63, 64-65, 84, 92Nolan, Captain Lewis Edward (1818-54) 54-55, 55, 76,

76-77

Odessa 28Oltenitza 20

Paget, Lieutenant-Colonel Lord George 52, 78Palmerston, Henry John Temple, Lord (1784-1865) 17,

20, 21, 65, 66, 84Paris Treaty of 86-87Pasha, General Omar (1806-71) 9, 25, 25, 30, 65, 67, 85Paskevich, Field Marshal I. F. 34peace talks 85-87Pélissier, General A.J. J. 9, 67, 68, 69, 74Pennefather, Major-General J. L. 56, 57, 60photography 15, 15press, the 14-15, 20Prussia 19

Raglan, Fitzroy Henry James, Field-Marshal Lord(1788-1855) 9, 22, 22-23, 23, 28, 33at the Alma 37, 40, 41, 42at Balaclava 49, 53, 54, 55, 56, 78criticism of 14, 14-15, 65, 66criticism of Lucan 64death of 68the flank march 45at Inkerman 59, 60, 61instructions 29-30and the invasion of the Crimea 31-32, 36, 37problems 16, 64relationship with allied generals 30at Sevastopol 47, 48, 61, 65, 68staff 23, 65

Roebuck J. A. 67Royal Navy 16, 19-20, 24, 88-89

Baltic expeditions 10-11,10-12enters the Black Sea 20

Russell, William Howard (1820-1907) 14, 14, 53, 77Russia 16, 84, 90, 91

declaration of war 21territorial expansion 9, 17, 19, 90

Russian forces 26, 27, 29, 56, 79allied invasion of the Crimea 33-34, 36, 37at the Alma 37, 39, 40, 42at Balaclava 50, 52, 53, 54, 56casualties 10, 42, 56, 60, 68, 69, 71, 74, 89at Inkerman 57, 59, 60at Kars 85at Kinburn 85opening moves 20, 31at Sevastopol 27, 44, 47, 48, 49, 67, 68, 69

the fall of 71, 74, 75at the Tchernaya 69, 71

Russian navy 10, 17, 20'Russian War', the 10-13Russo-Turkish War, 1877-78 90

Sardinian forces 66, 75, 92 see also Allied forcescasualties 10, 71, 89at the Tchernaya 69, 71

Scarlett, Brigadier-General the Hon. James 24, 53Sevastopol 12-13, 17, 22, 43, 44, 46(map), 48-49, 50,

64, 84, 86, 87civilian population 45defences 44, 47, 65, 72-73garrison 27, 67siege of 47, 47-49, 60-61, 64, 66, 67, 67-69the fall 71, 74-75, 74-75

'Sevastopol Committee' the 67Silistria 30-31, 31Simpson, Lieutenant-General Sir James 65, 68, 84Sinope 20, 91St Arnaud, Marshal Armand Jacques Leroy de

(1801-54) 24, 42, 43, 45the invasion of the Crimea 36, 37and Raglan 30

St Jean d'Angely, Regnaud de 68

Tchernaya, battle of the, 16th August 1855 69, 71, 71telegraph, the 14, 67theatre of operations 18(map), 35(map), 70(map)Todleben, Lieutenant-Colonel F. E. I. (1818-84) 27, 49,

50, 69Turkish Empire, the 16, 19

declares war on Russia 20disintegration of 17,90-91

Turkish forces 25, 35, 66, 75 see also Allied forcesat Balaclava 52, 53casualties 10, 84at Eupatoria 65at Kars 85at Oltenitza 20at the Tchernaya 69

Turkish navy 20, 25

Victoria, Queen of Great Britain and Ireland(1819-1901) 83, 84, 86, 89

Windham, Brigadier-General C. A. 74, 75women 85, 79-83

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