HISTORICAL RESEARCH REPORTResearch Report TM/92/11

1992

Usability of manual handling guidance Tesh K, Symes AM, Graveling RA, Hutchison PA, Wetherill GZ

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Usability of manual handling guidance

Tesh K, Symes AM, Graveling RA, Hutchison PA, Wetherill GZ This document is a facsimile of an original copy of the report, which has been scanned as an image, with searchable text. Because the quality of this scanned image is determined by the clarity of the original text pages, there may be variations in the overall appearance of pages within the report. The scanning of this and the other historical reports in the Research Reports series was funded by a grant from the Wellcome Trust. The IOM’s research reports are freely available for download as PDF files from our web site: http://www.iom-world.org/research/libraryentry.php

HISTORICAL RESEARCH REPORTResearch Report TM/92/11

1992

ii Research Report TM/92/11

USABILITY OF MANUAL

HANDLING GUIDANCE

KM Tesh, AM Symes, RA Graveling,PA Hutchison, GZ Wetherill

July 1992IOM Report TM/92/11

Report No. TM/92/11

INSTITUTE OF OCCUPATIONAL MEDICINE

USABILITY OF MANUAL HANDLING GUIDANCE

By

K M Tesh, A M Symes, R A Graveling, P A Hutchison and G Z WetherUl

FINAL REPORT

Duration of project: July 1991 to June 1992

Price: £40.00 (UK)£45.00 (Overseas) July 1992

This report is one of a series of Technical Memoranda (TM) distributed by theInstitute of Occupational Medicine. Current and earlier lists of these reports andof other Institute publications, are available from the Librarian/Information Officer.

CONTENTS

Page No.SUMMARY

1. INTRODUCTION 1

2. PROJECT AIMS 3

3. METHODOLOGY 5

3.1 The Companies 5

3.2 IOM Procedure 6

3.2.1 Preliminary visit 63.2.2 Manual handling audit (MHA) 63.2.3 The assessment 73.2.4 Assessment debrief 73.2.5 Sickness absence and accident records 7

4. RESULTS 9

4.1 The Audit and Assessment Process 9

4.1.1 Nominated company official 94.1.2 Time to undertake exercise 94.1.3 Breakdown of manual handling tasks 94.1.4 Percentage of workforce covered 14

4.2 The Checklist 15

4.2.1 Post-assessment comments 154.2.2 Conclusion of checklist findings 15

4.3 Statistical Analysis of the Checklist Responses 16

4.3.1 The checklist responses 164.3.2 Experts versus non-experts 174.3.3 Individual tasks for each company 234.3.4 Scores averaged over the tasks 234.3.5 Expert versus expert 254.3.6 Conclusion of checklist analysis 29

4.4 Sickness Absence and Accident Records 29

4.4.1 Company 1 . 294.4.2 Company 2 30

<• 4.4.3 Company 3 314.4.4 Company 4 334.4.5 Company 5 34

Page No.

5. DISCUSSION 35

5.1 The Assessment Team 35

5.2 The Audit and Assessment Process 35

5.3 A Checklist 37

5.4 Risk Reduction 37

5.5 Corroborating the Assessment 39

6. CHANGES TO THE GUIDANCE TEXT 41

7. CONCLUSIONS 49

8. POSTSCRIPT 51

9. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 53

10. REFERENCES 55APPENDIX 1 57APPENDIX 2 73

Report No. TM/92/11

INSTITUTE OF OCCUPATIONAL MEDICINE

USABILITY OF MANUAL HANDLING GUIDELINES

by

K M Tesh, A M Symes, R A Graveling, P A Hutchison and G Z Wetherill

SUMMARY

The study was undertaken to examine the guidance provided in the ConsultativeDocument "Manual Handling of Loads. Proposals for Regulations and Guidance".Five companies from different industrial sectors were selected to participate in thestudy. Company officials, the "non-experts", were asked to implement the manualhandling regulations to establish how easy they were to use and to compare theiruse or interpretation with that of the "experts", the ergonomists. To help thenon-expert a checklist was extracted from the regulations to assess those manualhandling tasks deemed to be risky. Company sickness and accident data wereexamined to corroborate the assessments.

The main findings showed that further guidance was needed in the interpretation ofthe checklist questions which required a value judgement. The checklist was foundto be very helpful but a degree of risk was requested so tasks could be prioritised.Analysis of the checklist questions showed that about a quarter of questionresponses by the non-expert disagreed with the expert. Comparison betweenexperts showed very good agreement. Examination of companies' sickness andaccident records showed the information was not in a suitable form to allow anyanalysis with the ergonomic assessment of manual handling risks. Recommendationson changes to the guidance and a proposed checklist were suggested and reportedto Health and Safety Executive (HSE) prior to the completion of this report.

1. INTRODUCTION

The risk of injury due to manual handling has long been a major concern to industry.Troup and Edwards (1985) report figures which show that, as early as 1930, reportedhandling accidents accounted for over 20% of the total. The data also show a gradualrise until 1977 (the last year presented) by which time handling accidents accounted forvirtually 30% of the total. A high proportion of these accidents result in injury to theback. Troup and Edwards reported data from 1979 which indicated that 61% of "overexertion" injuries (the most appropriate classification) were to the back.

These figures only represent part of the picture, namely that attributable to a traumaticincident or injury. Magora (1974) reported data which showed that, amongst light industryworkers, only 37% attributed their low back pain to sudden onset - the others reportinginsidious onset or "cannot define" - presumably not sudden onset. Even amongst heavyindustry workers, only 56% definitely attributed their low back pain to sudden onset.Benn and Wood (1975) reported data from 1969/70 which showed that days claimed assickness benefit, attributed to back problems, were twenty times the number of daysclaimed as injury benefit - and this against a background of there being advantages to 'claim injury rather than sickness if at all possible. While these figures were undoubtedlyinfluenced by many factors, and include spells triggered by many activities other thanmanual handling, they undoubtedly reflect the fact that much industrial back pain is ofchronic onset and not attributed, to an acute event.

Against this background of an undoubted risk of injury or ill health it is initially surprisingthat there has previously been little legislation to attempt to control this. Carter (1969)briefly reviewed the situation as then applied, identifying International Labour Organisation(ILO) maximum permissible weights published in 1964 but indicating that, apart from afew industry-specific provisions, there had been no UK government legislation on this issue- and very little of any substance from many other countries. At first, it seems strangethat such an obviously known problem has had little control exerted over it. However,the complexity of the problem soon becomes apparent when investigating the scientificknowledge which would have to provide the basis for any such control. Indeed, Carter(1969) concluded that it was "pretty well impossible" to establish scientifically validstandard weights. Drury and Pfeil (1975), in a paper describing a predictive model,described twenty variables "potentially affecting lifting performance". These ranged fromhighly specific factors such as "height at start of lift" to seemingly impossible generalvariables "lighting, noise, chemical environment" as well as other unquantifiable elementssuch as "motivation". Despite these difficulties, it has become increasingly apparent thatsome form of guidance was becoming more desirable. There have been some attempts atproducing numerical guidelines, such as those produced on behalf of the European Coaland Steel Community (MHRU, 1980). Apart from the questions which have been raisedregarding their accuracy (eg. Mital, 1984), these guidelines have been very complex toadminister, and/or heavily constrained in their use by caveats. Perhaps the most notableof these is the predictive equation derived for the National Institute for OccupationalSafety and Health (NIOSH) which, in addition to being restricted in application to smooth,two-handed lifting in the sagittal plane, etc. has the almost unworkable assumption that,when not engaged in lifting activities the worker is at rest.

Against this background, the Health and Safety Executive, in 1982, published a consultativedocument containing guidance for manual handling - and including numerical "actionlevels". This document was not well received and clearly required substantial revision. In1988, the publication of a second consultative document coincided with the publication ofa draft European Directive and further development of the UK documentation was

deferred until the final form of this Directive became clear. In 1990, a Council Directive"on the minimum health and safety requirements for the manual handling of loads wherethere is a risk particularly of back injury to workers" was approved, clearing the way forwork to complete the UK legislation, now mandated under the Directive. In late 1991, athird Consultative Document was published, containing proposals for Regulations andguidance.

The proposed Regulations were formulated to comply with the European Council Directive.They placed a series of requirements on employers to: (i) avoid hazardous manualhandling operations so far as is reasonably practicable; (ii) assess any hazardous manualhandling operations that cannot be avoided; and (iii) reduce the risk of injury so far as isreasonably practicable." The guidance concentrates on the latter two of these, assessingoperations and reducing risk. Evaluating the risks associated with any manual handlingoperation can be extremely complex. In some instances, the influence of a single factorcan be so overwhelming that it is immediately apparent where the risk lies. In othercases, the risk may arise from a complex interaction between factors. Untangling thatinteraction to establish the degree of risk may not be easy - even for an ergonomist.Providing adequate guidance to assist the non-ergonomist in understanding the complexitiesof manual handling, sufficient not only to unravel the influences of different factors toestablish risk but also then to identify suitable avenues for risk reduction, is clearlytherefore not going to be a straightforward task. Nevertheless, if these proposedRegulations are going to be honoured it is clearly essential that every effort is made toproduce guidance which is as user-friendly as such a complex issue can be.

It was against this background that the present project was conceived. Having identified aneed for user-friendly guidance it was recognised that it would be useful to establish howeasy they were to use by non-experts and to compare their use and interpretation of theguidance with that of ergonomists. A further factor related to the breadth of applicationof the guidance. The proposed Regulations define manual handling as "any transportingor supporting of a load (including the lifting, putting down, pushing, pulling, carrying ormoving thereof by hand or by bodily force)". However, much of the scientific literaturehas concentrated on lifting tasks, with a marked reduction in the extent of knowledgerelating to other handling activities. It was clearly important therefore that these guidanceshould not just relate to smooth, two-handed lifting in the sagittal plane - or some othernarrowly defined activity - but should be equally applicable across the wide range ofhandling activities.

Finally, the proposed Regulations (and guidance) were aimed first and foremost at reducinginjuries from manual handling. A full indication of their effectiveness in this role canonly be obtained by analysing data on sickness absence and accident records following theirimplementation. However, in an attempt to corroborate the risk assessments, attention wasdrawn to existing sickness absence and accident records.

2. PROJECT AIMS

The broad aim of the research project was to examine the guidance provided in theConsultative Document "Manual handling of loads. Proposals for Regulations andguidance" (HSC, 1991) - in particular that on the assessment of the risk of injury.Several specific objectives were identified:

i To establish how easily the guidance could be used by non-experts.

ii To give some<;;. indication *of -the .'-.extent' of '-agreement obtainable in its applicationbetween experts (ergonomists) and- non-experts.-

iii To establish its utility across a range of manual handling tasks - not just lifting.

iv To determine whether it was possible to use existing company sickness and accidentdata to corroborate assessments.

Finally, the main outcome of the project was intended to be the provision of practicaladvice on ways of improving aspects of the guidance where appropriate.

3. METHODOLOGY

In consultation with the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) five companies were selectedto participate in this study. The five were chosen to cover a range of different industrialsectors. One company pulled out at an early stage because of personnel changes withintheir organisation. A substitute company was identified and permitted to participatefollowing agreement with the HSE. For the sake of confidentiality the five companies willbe referred to in the text as Company 1 to Company 5.

3.1 The Companies

Company 1 -

Company 2 -

Company 3 -

Company 4 -

Was a major retail organisation. The study was undertaken at one oftheir distribution plants. The plant was split into two, the "garment"and "London" warehouse. In the garment warehouse garments werereceived, packed and stored in boxes on the floor or hanging on rails.Garments were subsequently despatched from here to all the companystores throughout the country. The London warehouse dealt with theother items sold by the company. In this section these items werereceived from the stores for temporary storage and then delivered tohouseholders in the London area.

Was a major automobile tyre manufacturer producing 15 different typesof tyre. The plant was split broadly into three areas.

a) Preparation - the constituent parts of fabricating the tyre wereprepared. Solutions were prepared for applying to the curedproduct. This area had a high incidence of manual handlingoperations.

b) Assembly and Finishing - this predominantly automated stageassembled the tyres for curing.

c) Curing, Verification, Storage and Despatch - turned the "cover"into a recognised tyre product. As with preparation this stage alsoprovided frequent manual handling operations.

Manufactured treated dairy goods such as condensed milk, cream, milkpowder, etc. for consumption in Britain and overseas.

The manufacturing area was split into various sections most of whichwere fully automated. There was however some manual handling in mostof the sections. The tins for some products were made in the tin shop,the tins were then filled and if need be sterilised in the sterilisationroom. From here the tins were fed onto one of several, mostlyautomated, production lines where the product was packaged and stored.The majority of the manual handling in the factory occurred in thesterilisation room, the bagging room (powdered milk bagged) and thewarehouse, where the products were loaded by hand onto lorries forNational' distribution.

Was an international company involved in the manufacture of advancedceramics and refractories for steel foundries.

The site was split into four parts:

a) Stopper Plant - manufacture of stoppers (pressed, kilned andpackaged).

b) Crucible Plant - manufacture of crucibles (jiggered, glazed, kilnedand packaged).

c) Mixing Plant - materials were mixed together to feed isostatic(ISO) plant.

d) ISO Plant - pressing plant producing alumina - graphiterefractories.

Company 5 - Was a construction company involved in a wide range of areas ofconstruction ranging from domestic dwellings, through office andcommercial buildings to civil engineering projects.

3.2 IOM Procedure

3.2.1 Preliminary visit

After initial contact with each company a preliminary visit was made to each site toobserve the processes involved and the scale of manual handling operations beingundertaken. The visit also gave an opportunity to explain to the employers therequirements of the Regulations and the processes involved.

3.2.2 Manual handling audit (MHA)

The procedure adopted by the IOM in undertaking the manual handling exercise with eachcompany was essentially that described in the Regulations. The first stage was a MHA tolist all the manual handling tasks undertaken in the company.

It was decided that, at'larger; more complex sites, not every manual handling task couldbe covered. On discussion^ with company officials, specific departments were selected thatwere known to have a high incidence of manual handling practices. Company records onhealth and safety were also used to indicate areas of manual handling risk. It wasstressed during the discussions that although those areas identified as having fewer highmanual handling operations were not covered by this current study the company wereobliged under the Regulations to be aware of all manual handling jobs taking place on siteand if any of these were judged to be a potential risk then they would need to betackled in the same structured approach as being undertaken by company officials andIOM personnel.

To aid the nominated company official he or she was issued with a copy of theconsultative document and some guideline. notes drawn up by the ergonomics team withinthe IOM. One form provided the official with an audit record of each manual handlingactivity (see Appendix la). In order to help the company official identify which of thosetasks identified on the audit sheet needed assessment several paragraphs were extractedfrom the consultative document including the weight guideline figures from Appendix 2 tothe Guidelines (see Appendix Ib). To aid their use, a second set of figures was producedincorporating the suggested reduction of 30% to extend the protection to "nearly all"working women. Having listed the handling tasks, those identified as being a risk and

requiring an assessment were then underlined. The nominated company official and theergonomist carried out the audit process independently and at different times to avoidcollaboration on results.

Following the audit the selections of tasks requiring assessment were compared between thetwo groups. This post-audit debrief allowed the ergonomist to highlight tasks that in hisjudgement warranted assessment but were not detected by the company official, andvice-versa. It was inevitable that with "a snap shot" view the ergonomist would not coverall the variations in jobs being undertaken. Similarly the ergonomist would identifyone-off or non-routine tasks that were not done on a regular basis. Due to the timescale of the study these irregular tasks were noted down by the company official so theycould be assessed at a later date within the company's own timetable. Differences intasks identified were discussed. and a list of tasks was compiled that both company andIOM staff agreed needed further assessment. The post-audit debrief also looked at eachtask requiring assessment in turn to clarify between the groups the exact location in theplant where the task was being undertaken. The start and finishing points of each taskwere also defined. Careful pre-planning prior to the assessment reduced time beingwasted on covering different tasks.

3.2.3 The assessment

Like the MHA the assessment was carried out independently and at different times by thecompany official and the ergonomist. To aid in documenting the different factors of thetask the risk factors itemised in the consultative document (paragraphs 43-91) were drawntogether as a checklist with simple "yes" and "no" boxes to record the presence orabsence of any particular factor. It was initially intended that no re-wording or additionalexplanation of terms or phrases would be included in order to assess the text as written.However, before the onset of this phase of the study, it was recognised that someexplanations were necessary and a limited number were appended to the checklist.

Each task identified as a possible risk to the operator was assessed, considering the fourmain factors of the task ie. the task, the load, the environment and the individualcapability. If the observer considered an element within the task to be risky he or shewould tick or mark the box adjacent to the question with Y for yes. If the observerconsidered the question did not give risk to the operator it was left blank or marked Nfor no. While the company official assessed the areas of risk he or she was asked toconsider solutions to any yes answers highlighted in the checklist (see Appendix Ic).

3.2.4 Assessment debrief

Following the assessment the company official and ergonomist discussed each assessed taskto compare results on the checklist and discuss areas where discrepancies occurred. Thedebrief session also allowed the ergonomist to seek solutions from the company official andhow he or she would minimise or eradicate the risky areas highlighted. Views and ideaswere also sought on the format and content of the consultative document. Backgroundinformation was also obtained on the process of implementing the audit and assessment ie.time taken, personnel involved, etc.

3.2.5 Sickness absence and accident records

It had been realised that a comprehensive evaluation of the effectiveness of the guidancewould not be possible in the time scale of the proposed work. However, as some interesthad been expressed in providing some means of providing objective corroboration of theassessment procedure in identifying risk, the sickness and absence records of theparticipating companies were examined. These record systems were investigated to

establish whether the level of detail recorded was sufficient to allow their use in anyanalysis that would corroborate the ergonomic assessment of manual handling risk. Oncethis level of detail had been established it was also necessary to work out the scale ofeffort required to extract the relevant information from the various health, safety andpersonnel records.

The site visits were carried out by a system analyst accompanied by the ergonomistinvolved in the assessment procedures at that site. The pattern of these visits was thesame at all sites and comprised a tour of the site to establish the processes andoccupations involved. After this reconnaissance a series of meetings with the health,safety, personnel and salaries staff were held. Examination of the various record keepingprocedures established-*answers-*to>"a^series^of^questions:-

(a) What information was recorded?(b) Where was the information recorded?(c) Who recorded what information?(d) Who was responsible for the recording and reporting procedures?(e) How/where were the data stored?(f) What procedures were in operation if key reporting personnel were absent?(g) What links existed between the various accident/absence/time records systems?(h) At what level of detail was recorded on each record system?

4. RESULTS

4.1 The Audit and Assessment Process

4.1.1 Nominated company official ,

All the company representatives who undertook the exercise were selected by the individualcompanies. They are shown in Table 4.1. Each team member from Company 2 carriedout the study in their part of the factory where they were the residing Industrial Engineer(IE).

4.1.2 Time to -undertake exercise

Table 4.2 shows the total time in days for both the company official and IOM personnelto undertake the audit and assessment stages of the study. A glance shows that onaverage both groups took similar time to undertake the study. The ergonomist tended totake longer to carry out the assessment which may be due to either more time spentconsidering how to reduce the risk compared to the non-expert or unfamiliarity of expertwith working process.

4.1.3 Breakdown of manual handling tasks

Table 4.3 compares the number of tasks at different stages of the process for eachcompany. The last two columns show the number of tasks agreed between the twogroups as requiring assessment following the audit debrief, and the actual number of tasksdiscussed at the final debrief. The reason for the decrease in number of tasks followingthe assessment are discussed below.

Company 1 The Occupational Health Nurse (OHN) identified a larger number oftasks than the ergonomist because she had a more in depth knowledge ofthe variation in the manufacturing process. All tasks identified by theergonomist for assessment were picked up by the OHN. The additionaltasks identified by the OHN as requiring an assessment were tasks notseen by the ergonomist.

In view-of 4his it • was decided that the 42 tasks identified both by theergonomist and the OHN would be assessed as it was likely that bothwould be able to observe these tasks in progress. Of the 42 tasksrequiring an assessment two of the tasks were deemed to be replicatedfurther down the list. In addition, it was recognised that the ergonomistwould not see one of the tasks as it would not be taking place at anytime during his later visit. Therefore 39 assessments were agreed byboth the OHN and the ergonomist. Only 37 tasks were assessedeventually as a further two tasks did not occur during the ergonomist'sfinal assessment visit.

Company 2 The team of Industrial Engineers (IBs) undertook the manual handlingaudit at their desks and so information on tasks was gleaned principallyfrom time-study data and knowledge of the job. All manual handlingtasks listed were considered by all lEs to have some degree of risk andso the two different stages, audit and assessment, were merged into one.

In the three days on site the ergonomist identified less than half thetasks selected by the lEs. The main reasons for this discrepancy were

10

Table 4.1. Nominated Company Official who undertook the studies

Company(Comp)

Compl

Comp2

CompS

Comp4

CompS

Nominated Company Official

Occupational Health Nurse (OHN)

Team of 7 Industrial Engineers (IE)

OHN

Plant Training Manager

Group Safety Adviser

Table 4.2. Time to undertake study (days)

COMPANY(Comp)

Compl

Comp2

Comp3

Comp 4

CompS

COMPANY OFFICIAL

MHA

2-3

3

2i

5

i

ASS

2-3

3J

2

5

i

IOM PERSONNEL

MHA

2

3

1J-2

2J

1J

ASS

4

5

3

4

1

Key

MHA - Manual Handling AuditASS - Assessment

11

Table 4.3. Breakdown of Manual Handling tasks by company

COMPANY(Comp)

Compl

Comp2

Comp3

Comp4

CompS

COMPANYOFFICIAL

MHA

120#

241

19

407

9

ASS

. . .72 :

241

19

247

9

IOMPERSONNEL

MHA

50

102

32

100

26

ASS

42

56

21

48

11

AGREEDNO.POSTAUDIT

39

61

21

43

11/9*

ACTUALNO.POSTASSESS-MENT

37

52

19

37

11/9*

Key

MHA - Manual Handling AuditASS - Assessment# - Number of tasks* - Ergonomist assessed his 11 tasks

while CompS official assessedhis own 9 tasks

12

that the IE had a better understanding of the job variation and that theytended to list every task without grouping them into similar generic typesand categories. Despite this, approximately one fifth (12) of the taskswere identified by the ergonomist as being risky but not selected by theIBs. The ergonomist initially identified 56 tasks requiring assessment butthis figure was revised to 61 because eight tasks were not seen during thefirst site visit but were known by the IBs to be manual handling problemareas and three tasks observed were non-routine and would not havebeen seen during the second visit.

The number of tasks actually assessed by the two groups differed fromthesnumberirselectedsiforf: the??following reasons:

a) Equipment required for undertaking one task was awaiting repairand could not be assessed.

b) A change in IE personnel between the audit and assessment stagesmeant that the company official misunderstood a task to beassessed.

c) One IE consulted a training manager on how the job should bedone and marked his checklist accordingly without observing thetask himself.

d) It was subsequently decided that one of the tasks identified forassessment was not a manual handling operation and therefore wasnot covered in this study.

Two of the tasks identified for assessment were in engineeringmaintenance. As the company adopted a routine maintenance policy onprocess machinery essential to the quality of the product, an audit andassessment was arranged around the maintenance timetable in advance ofthe ergonomist commencing the study.

Company 3 The OHN interpreted the wording in the consultative document as< meaning- that- all -manual -handling • tasks required assessment hence the

identical,, figures in Table' 4.3 for the audit and assessment stages by thecompany official. The ergonomist identified 32 manual handling tasks ofwhich 21 were selected as requiring an assessment. As factory productionwas mostly automated the number of manual handling tasks were fewerthan at the other participating companies. However, of those manualhandling tasks identified, a high proportion required an assessment.

The 19 tasks that the OHN judged needed assessment were also identifiedby the ergonomist. The slight discrepancy between the two audits wasdue to two tasks which the ergonomist had observed but were not inoperation at the time of the OHN's observations. These two tasks wereincluded as it was agreed that they would both required assessments andbecause both would be in operation at the time the assessments werecarried out. Hence the total number of tasks to be assessed totalled 21.However, two of the tasks were not assessed. One of these was notobserved by the OHN during her assessment period and the other was nolonger operation.

13

Table 4.4. Percentage of workforce covered by study

COMPANY(Comp)

Compl

Comp2

Comp3

Comp4

CompS

TOTALWORKFORCE

585

1251

304

290

70

% OF WORKFORCECOVERED BY STUDY

75

60

100

86

85

14

Company 4 The main reason for the large disparity between the number of manualhandling tasks recorded by the training manager and the ergonomist wasdue to a more in-depth knowledge of the processes, and variations inthese processes, by the company official. The training manager carriedout a detailed task analysis as this was required for other purposes.Therefore each variation of every task was accounted for in the audit.The ergonomist's audit was limited in the respect that he could only takeaccount of what was happening when he made his visit. Although thetimetable for the visit was arranged to observe the whole breadth ofactivities, not all activities were continuous and undoubtedly someprocesses were missed because they did not take place during the periodof.'.observationA«.iJn iaddition;. - instead of using the manual handling audit

- sheets^; provided1; a thee company .^official compiled his own set of recordingsheets to meet his additional requirements from the exercise.

Following the post-audit debrief the 247 tasks identified by the managerhad been consolidated into fewer generic manual handling tasks requiringan assessment. Comparison of the 247 with the 48 tasks identified bythe ergonomist resulted in a list of 43 tasks being selected. Of theseneither the training manager nor the ergonomist could completeassessments for four because they were not carried out at all during theallotted period for the assessments. In addition, when the ergonomistcarried out his assessments on the remaining 39 tasks, two of these couldnot be assessed for similar reasons. Hence the total number of tasksdiscussed post-assessment at the debrief was 37. As with the manualhandling audit the training manager compiled his own version of theassessment sheets. It included all the items on the checklist with a fewmore items added for his own purposes.

Company 5 Building operations constitute a considerable test of the new Regulations.The complexity and variability of activities mean that virtually everyindividual worker on site is carrying out a range of different handlingactivities which may vary on an hourly basis (or less). Because of thiscomplexity, the group safety adviser decided to concentrate on twospecific jobs on the site chosen (a commercial building) because he knew

> from .past experience working on other similar sites that these were likelyto present problems. The two jobs included nine separate handling tasks.All nine of these tasks were assessed by the company official. However,although he correctly identified these nine as warranting attention, he didnot follow the guidance text (or complete the checklist) in doing so,preferring to rely on his own experience. The ergonomist identified 11out of the 26 tasks as requiring assessment which included thosehighlighted by the company official. As the company official didn'tfollow the checklist provided this company was excluded from thestatistical analysis carried out on the checklist and the follow up reportingon sickness absence and accident reports.

4.1.4 Percentage of workforce covered

Table 4.4 shows the total number of employees at each site and the percentage ofworkforce covered by this study. As discussed in section 3.2.2, time and cost prevented afull appraisal of all manual handling tasks undertaken on each site. The smallercompanies tended to be better represented by this study's approach.

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4.2 The Checklist

Results from the checklist have been broken down into two parts. The first partaddresses comments reported by company officials at the post-assessment debriefing sessionsand observations from IOM staff while using the checklist during the exercise.

The second part covers the statistical analyses both of individual elements of theassessment and of the overall conclusions of the checklist scores for the company officialand the ergonomist. Results of assessments scores were also compared between experts.

4.2.1 Post-assessment comments

During the post-assessment, debriefing sessionsva: number of comments were raised on thecontent and format of the checklist. These points and others from the ergonomist'sexperience during the exercise are listed below:

a) The checklist was well laid out with the questions adequately covering all ergonomicaspects of the task.

b) Most of the nominated company officials understood the questions on individualelements of the assessment but many reported the need to interpret the wording insome questions to give an answer. For example, words like "excessive", "away fromthe body", "frequent or prolonged", "insufficient", "bulky or unwieldy", "slippery","extremes", "unusual" and "put at risk" required interpretation. Users wanted moreguidance on these terms to enable them to make a more objective reply to thequestion.

c) Company officials remarked that a simple yes/no answer was not an appropriateresponse to these assessment questions. Comments like "it depends on" or"sometimes" were often used to clarify the respondent's answer. Many preferred tosee some sort of rating scale showing different degrees of risk. This scale wouldthen allow the user to prioritise the risk and subsequently concentrate their initialefforts on minimising or reducing the high risk tasks before tackling the low risktasks.

d) Two questions in the individual capability section, D2 and D3 were reported by manycompany officials to be redundant. Employers commented that no employee wouldbe put in charge of a task without special knowledge or training (D3) and all jobswould put at risk to varying degrees those who were pregnant or had a healthproblem (D2).

e) Two company officials requested that to help them refer to the relevant paragraphs inthe guidance, paragraph numbers should be cited against each individual questions onthe checklist.

f) Company officials believed the additional explanatory notes provided at the back ofthe checklist were useful and would have liked to see this expanded to cover otherquestions to avoid the need to refer to the full text in the consultative document.

g) On undertaking the assessment it became apparent that the checklist response coulddepend on other factors that could not be highlighted due to the wording of thequestion. For example, if a gloved operator lifted an object that was sharp then theanswer to question five under the load section "Is the load sharp, hot, or otherwisepotentially damaging?" would be complicated by the fact that, although the load wassharp, the risk was controlled by the use of gloves. Two responses could be

16

appropriate: Yes - finding an alternative to relying on gloves may be preferable; No- the gloves adequately control the risk - but make a note to check on controls onissue and use of gloves. The question/questionnaire was not sufficiently sophisticatedto pick up these possible reactions.

h) It is recommended that additional note should be added to the checklist to informthe reader that the checklist should be used in conjuction with the accompanying textprovided.

4.2.2 Conclusion of checklist findings

The checklist extracted-from-the -main, consultative document was well received by theparticipating companies. They generally thought it was a useful recording sheet forhighlighting individual factors and pointed the way to remedial actions. As a result of thecomments expressed above a revised checklist was suggested for future assessments (seeAppendix Id). The modified checklist incorporated a risk rating scale and rewordedassessment questions.

4.3 Statistical analysis of the checklist responses

One aim of the study was to give some indication of the extent of agreement between theexperts (ergonomists) and non-experts (company officials) in applying the checklistextracted from the consultative document. By comparing the yes and no responses on thechecklists for the two groups one can get an measure of the usability of the HSEguidance.

It should be noted that this examines the responses to the individual questions on thechecklist and is naturally limited to those tasks which both expert and non-expert wereable to assess.

4.3.1 The checklist responses

Four possible patterns of responses can be identified for any particular question:

YY both the expert and the non-expert say yes;YN the expert says yes, but the non-expert says no;NY the expert says no, but the non-expert says yes;NN both the expert and the non-expert say no.

In this notation, the first letter represents the expert's response and the second that ofthe non-expert. Therefore, YY and NN indicate agreement between the expert andnon-expert whilst YN and NY indicate disagreement.

Since the expert has specific training relevant to this exercise, it would seem reasonable toassume that the expert's response should be more reliable. Also, as an outsider, he willbe able to make a more objective evaluation of the risks. Although the expert'sresponses may not be "exact" it seems reasonable to assume that most of the differencesbetween the expert and the non-expert can be attributed to the non-expert.

An NY response to a question means that the non-expert thinks that there was aproblem, but where no risk exists: a false positive. This might lead to safety measuresbeing introduced where none were needed. Although this was not harmful it could meanthe company unnecessarily spending capital on tasks that have no risk. In contrast, theYN response means that the non-expert has overlooked a problem, leading to thecontinuation of a risk, and possible injury.

17

Thus the practical significance of the NY and YN responses were different, with the YNcategory being much more important. Calculating overall percentage agreements betweenthe expert and the non-expert would hide this important difference. Instead, twosummaries were calculated: the percentage agreement when the expert says yes, and thepercentage agreement when the expert said no. Details of the calculations are given inthe next section.

The first of these was the percentage agreement between expert and non-expert when theexpert said yes. Using the formula:

100 x YY > 100 x No., of. tasks where expert and non-expert said yes

(YY + YN) No. of tasks where expert said yes

this gives the percentage of the problems identified by the expert which were alsoidentified by the non-expert. It is perhaps more meaningful to think of the remainder[100 - (percentage agreement)] which represents the percentage of task elements which thenon-expert did not consider to be risky but the expert did (false negatives). A figure of66% means, loosely speaking that 1 in 3 "risks" are being missed by the non-expert.

The second percentage agreement between expert and non-expert was when the expertsaid no. Using the formula:

100 x NN 100 x No. of tasks where expert and non-expert said no

(NN + NY) No. of tasks where expert said no

A low percentage agreement gives a high percentage of false positives, meaning that thenon-expert was identifying a lot of items which were not really a problem. Thepercentage false positives:

100 x NY 100 x No. of tasks where only the non-expert said yes

(YY + NY) No. of tasks where the non-expert said yes

This may be serious if the total number of NY's was so large that it distracts thenon-expert from the real problems that have been identified (YY's). However, if thenon-expert was able to correctly identify the most important problems out of those thatshe/he identified, even this might not be a problem.

4.3.2 Experts versus non-experts

Table 4.5 gives a brief summary of the performance of the non-experts, compared withthe experts, using the classification previously described (YY, YN, NY, NN).

Examining the results for Company 1 it can be seen that the expert said yes to achecklist question a total of 250 + 129 = 379 times. In comparison, the non-expert saidyes 250 + 88 = 338 times. Thus the expert said yes slightly more often than thenon-expert - identifying more task elements as presenting a risk of injury. Of these twosets of data, both observers said yes 250 times to the same task elements. Thus, thepercentage agreement between the two was 100*250/379 = 66%. Similarly, the expert saidno 88 + 589 = 677 times compared to the non-expert's 129 + 589 =718 times with apercentage agreement of 100*589/677 = 87%.

18

Table 4.S. Summary of the results for each company, giving thetotal numbers of responses, and the percentage agreements

between expert and non-expert.

Company(Comp)

Compl

Comp2

CompS

Comp4

Total

Total numbers of responses

YY YN NY NN

250 129 88 589

241 277 63 667

129 7 79 217

46 179 19 572

666 592 249 2045

Percentage agreements

Expert-Y Expert-N

66 87

47 91

95 73

20 97

53 89

% FalsePositives

26

21

38

29

27

19

Table 4.6a-4.6d. Percentage agreement with the expert and the numbers of responsesfor each task at each company: 4.6a (Company 1)

Company Task

Compl 123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445

Total

Numbers of

YY

4106281042*341091214624222591299084985667777645910

250

YN

40935030*0503035557445310350083201223004015214

129

responses

NY

21051034*231104313211211501220433433302020540

NN

141391410141418*19121311121612121411171715154151714131413141212131312141711171515121010

88 589

Percentage

Expert-Y

5010040406210057100*

10044100751002544552936333329634725291001000736710089717567100100641008644719071

66

Agreement

Expert-N

889310074911008282*9180939210080809282859494889480751009387881007880807781808210085100881007171100

87

20

Table 4.6a-4.6d. Percentage agreement with the expert and the numbers of responsesfor each task at each company: 4.6b (Company 2)

Company Task

Comp2 12345678910111213141516171819202122232425262728293031323334353637383940414243444546474849505152

Total

Numbers of

YY

4343443232525753857768534338238755765244844448435472

241

YN

857923

1198531245145946534784502314647763324549923941077

277

responses

NY

0000212000001001020120101325312414211435021002200001

63

NN

1216131216168131317161014121816118131011131414111414111717139121181012151413121315111112151215101014

667

Percentage

Expert-Y

333836256757211827296314565883436236645455735630334338100505089644656504646405767674450313180572556295022

47

Agreement

Expert-N

100100100100899480100100100100100931001009410080100918510093100928288698594876992738091927982721008794100100868810010010010093

91

21

Table 4.6a-4.6d. Percentage agreement with the expert and the numbers of responsesfor each task at each company: 4.6c (Company 3)

Company Task

Comp3 123456789101112131415161718

Total

Numbers of

YY YN

21281037759104921010984

129

000020000011101100

7

responses

NY

3312344630276110112

11

79

NN

1991512161313131214177151333149

217

Percentage

Expert-Y

100100100100601001001001001008090671009190100100

95

Agreement

Expert-N

8675948684777768801009050719323218845

73

22

Table 4.6a-4.6d. Percentage agreement with the expert and the numbers of responsesfor each task at each company: 4.6d (Company 4)

Company Task

Comp4 12345678910111213141516171819202122232425262728293031323334

Total

Numbers of

YY

1201101600204111231033361200001000

46

YN

368355551333785246543668

115624173566

179

responses

NY

1001011303102000110001000100011000

19

NN

1916161918181710111818171018211915151921151413718152220231619191818

572

Percentage

Expert-Y

2525025170175500400331733202538200333327351725000025000

20

Agreement

Expert-N

9510010095100959477100869510083100100100949410010010093100100100941001001009495100100100

97

23

Similar calculations can be carried out for all four companies - as reported in Table 4.5.They show that the percentage agreement when the expert said no was high for allcompanies, perhaps suggesting that non-experts were better at identifying when therewasn't a problem than when there was. However, this percentage can be misleading as itmasks situations such as Company 4 where the non-expert from Company 4 only agreedwith a yes statement 20% of the time, indicating a high number of false negatives.Nevertheless, the yes statements of this non-expert (65) still included 19 (about 30%) falsepositives.

In contrast, the non-expert of Company 3 had a very high YY agreement (95%) as theresult of a tendency to say yes more often than the expert (208 vs 136) but thereforedemonstrated a high proportion of false positives.

It should be stressed that the differences between companies will be due to several factors,including the differences in the types of work involved and the tasks identified at eachcompany, as well as the differences between the non-experts.

4.3.3 Individual tasks for each company

Tables 4.6a-4.6d expand on the data in Table 4.5, separating each task at each companybut summarising across the 24 checklist questions (task components). The figures,especiallythe percentage agreement when the expert says yes, were quite variable, due to therelatively small numbers of questions involved. Any tasks that show different results fromthe rest can be identified:

a) Company 1 - There was no obvious pattern.

b) Company 2 - This company used several non-experts. The first non-expert (tasks1-16 and 48-50) identified fewer problems than the rest. He had a very highpercentage agreement when the expert said no (mean 97%) and a low percentageagreement (mean 37%) when the expert said yes. These results show some similaritywith the non-expert for Company 4. For the second non-expert (tasks 17-26), thepercentage agreement (when the experts said yes) was higher for tasks 17-23 than fortasks 24-26 from a different part of the operation: with means of 56% and 34%respectively. Such variation was not surprising, simply reflecting the different tasksinvolved and the variation in the ease with which they could be assessed.

c) Company 3 - The percentage agreements were very good, but it was noticeable thatmost of the disagreements occurred in the later tasks.

d) Company 4 - Tasks 3, 9 and 12 had a large number of yeses from the expert, butnone from the non-expert. There were also very few yeses at all from thenon-expert for the last 8 tasks (27-34).

4.3.4 Scores averaged over the tasks

Table 4.7 provides a summary of the percentage agreement for each question at eachcompany, averaged over the tasks. The asterisks are where there were not any yeses (ornoes as appropriate) from the expert for that question and company. The right handcolumn gives the overall percentage agreement (when the expert said yes) for eachquestion, averaging over the companies. Note, from this column, that questions A5, A7,C2, C4, C5 and Dl show very poor agreement with the expert. In fact, for A5, A7,C2, C4 and C5 the non-experts were just as likely to put no when the expert said yes asthey were when the expert said no.

24

Table 4.7. Percentage agreement of the non-experts with the experts,for each question and each company.

Question

AlA2A3

A4A5A6

A7A8A9A10All

BlB2B3B4B5

ClC2C3C4C5

DlD2D3

OVERALL

% Agreement expert-Y

Compl

884076

9110078

467475*67

8772786160

5820338*

05757

66

Comp2

705573

57044

13500*0

585413020

242645160

89467

47

Comp3

60100100

100*

100

*100100**

100100100100100

92*82**

*10089

95

Comp4 OVERALL

05658

0*27

013**25

381340050

0251700

5000

20

705774

671354

276364*45

6860544341

392545110

86351

53

% Agreement expert-N

Compl

257270

739394

907697100100

50585788100

919510084100

9510086

87

Comp2

757553

869892

838996100100

7177979595

919193100100

100074

91

Comp3

836967

9083100

67558810078

7517386950

83838667100

39**

73

Comp4

939260

100100100

889697100100

1001009697100

1008995100100

100100100

97

OVERALL

667861

889596

84849610097

7875809192

93919590100

878381

89

25

To look at these questions in more detail, Appendix 2 gives individual summary tables foreach question. For questions A5 and A7, Company 2 non-expert gave a high proportionof false negatives (YN). (Note that the 100% agreement for Company 1, question A5 wasbased on one observation). For C2 and C4 both Company 1 and Company 2 non-expertshad poor percentage agreements when the expert said yes, based on reasonable numbersof tasks. For C5 and Dl, it was again the Company 2 non-experts that was responsible.In fact, for these non-experts, questions B3-B5 and Cl also had poor percentageagreements (when the expert said yes), but these results conflicted with good agreementsfrom the non-experts at Company 1 and Company 3. Thus, questions C2 and C4 weremost clearly questions which cause difficulties in interpretation, with a number of otherquestions also causing difficulties.

The Company 4 non^expert«-had^ver.y«-low-percentage agreements with the expert for anumber of questions. Some of these (A7 and B4) were zeroes based on only oneobservation. Questions Al, A4, Cl, C4 and C5 were based on more observations. But itwas questions D2 and D3 that provided the greatest contrast. The expert had almost allyeses, and the non-expert had almost all noes. In fact both the experts and all theother non-experts put all or mostly yeses for these two questions. (The first non-expertfor Company 2 had only one YY, and 9 YN's for question D3, but this was the onlyexception). The non-expert at Company 4 constructed his own checklist. Had heomitted anything from his checklist? Did he overlook these questions? Did heassumethat, for example, no pregnant women would do these jobs (D2)? Even whencomparing questions D2 and D3 with the other questions for the Company 4 non-expert,the results for D2 and D3 still seem somewhat remarkable.

Looking at the percentage agreement when the expert said no, there was poor agreement(and therefore a high proportion of false positives) for the Company 3 non-expert incompleting, questions B2, B3 and Dl. The non-expert at Company 3 had a high numberof false positives overall. Perhaps most noticeable was the low agreement (25%) forquestion Al at Company 1. This non-expert classed many things as being held awayfrom the body that the expert did not. Was the non-expert perhaps taking the questiontoo literally?

4.3.5 Expert versus expert

As an initial check on the degree of agreement between the experts, two ergonomistsassessed 10 tasks at Company 4. The 10 tasks were chosen from one department.Following the assessments the ergonomists held a debrief to compare results. Althoughthis sub-study only covered a relatively small number of tasks it was sufficient to detectany major differences in interpretation of the assessment questions.

Generally the experts had close agreement on most assessment questions but there was aslight discrepancy in some areas. These were: holding the load away from the body(Question Al); twisting the trunk (A2) and; frequent and prolonged physical effort (A8).The reason for the disagreement in these areas was the expert's different interpretation ofthe question. Considering the degree of interpretation throughout the checklist to onlydisagree on 3 out of 24 questions showed a high level of consistency between the experts.

A more detailed analysis of the expert versus expert data can be made by looking at thecomplete set of data in Appendix 2. Expert 1 assessed companies 1, 3 and 4 and Expert2 assessed company 1. Looking at question Al for expert 1 (Company 2), there were 40yeses out of 52 tasks. Therefore the percentage yeses were 100*40/52 = 77%. Similarlywe can calculate the percentage yeses for the other questions for expert 1. For expert 2we calculate corresponding figures by counting the total number of yeses over the three

26

Table 4.8. Comparison of percentage of Y's for each question across companies.

Ques-tion

AlA2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9A10AllBlB2B3B4B5ClC2C3C4C5DlD2D3

AverageEx2

272073391

2815409010726340221536223017399586

ComplEx2

361177502203052180148673524123271114270169584

ComplNE

8030665992020501609

82 <64613214237514055550

Comp2Exl

778571581352311540273253117295637213727759863

Comp2NE

605065382271517400503164101715156069452

Comp3Ex2

332867440390396005667281111670

61000

100100

CompSNE

33507850173933671702267947239566717563306110089

Comp4Ex2

1226712103232400126247293632473512969182

Comp4NE

621530091263032461533018900300

TotalAverage

4740684152919318076446341817322021176227961

Key

ExlEx2NE

- Expert 1- Expert 2- Non-expert

<N

cDCL

Eoo

<DCLX

LJ

/U

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0 c

• • i i I I I I I I I I— —

0

-

oA2

O0 Al

Dl

o

0o

0

.0 O

_ 0 0o

oo

0

oo

o- • -

0, 9 i i i i i i i i i

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 1 00 9<

Exper t 2

Figure 4.1. Plot of Expert 1 Y's v's Expert 2 Y's for each question

ro

28

Table 4.9. Percentage of Y's for each checklist question at each company.Questions put in increasing order of overall percentage

Ques-tion

A10A5C5AllA9B5C4B4A7C2C3DlA6A8ClB3A2A4B2AlD3BlA3D2

TotalEx2

0131091517221522309284036402039632786727395

ComplEx2

020141823274130111416205227521150733684867795

ComplNE

09091614143220755205023613059648050826655

Comp2Exl

013272429371731372175521556318558257763737198

Comp2NE

020041064151515627171765038316052506594

Comp3Ex2

00006

110

1100

61039396728284467331005667100

Comp3NE

01702217563339331756613967677250509433896778100

Comp4Ex2

0091206123347356322432292621471282627191

Comp4NE

000333031218939601521066024530

TotalAverage

0567817171819202122293132344041464761646879

Key

ExlEx2NE

- Expert 1- Expert 2- Non-expert

29

companies that he visited. These percentage yes figures are shown in Table 4.8 for eachchecklist question. We can then plot the figures for expert 2 against those for expert 1.This graph (See figure 4.1) shows good agreement for most of the questions. There werethree questions which were different:

For question Al, expert 1 has 77% of yeses and expert 2 had only 27% yeses. Notethat for this question the non-experts at Company 1 and Company 2 appear to agree withexpert 1, while those at Company 3 and Company 4 agree with expert 2. Obviously thisquestion was subject to varying interpretations, although the differences may be partly dueto the problem occurring more frequently at some sites than at others.

For question A2,-expert^4^had^85%i,yeses. >and«.expert 2 only 20%. The non-expert atCompany 2 also has a relatively high proportion of yeses, so the difference between theexperts could be partly due to the problem occurring more frequently at Company 2.

For question Dl, expert 1 had 75% yeses and expert 2 only 9%. This was the largestdifference between the experts. The difference was again due to differences ininterpretation of the question.

To summarise, the experts agreed closely for most questions, but there were threequestions on which there seems to be a difference of interpretation - even betweenexperts.

Table 4.9 shows the same data as in Table 4.8 but the checklist questions have beenordered for frequency of problem. For example in the right hand column question A10was the least common problem (0%) while question D2 was the most common (79%). Alook at the total average figures broadly shows that handling loads while seated (A10),excessive carrying distances (AS), poor lighting (C5) and team handling (All) were veryrarely observed at the four sites. On the other hand, special training (D3), heavy load(Bl), poor posture (A3) and pregnancy/health problems (D2) were more frequentlyobserved.

4.3.6 Conclusion of checklist analysis

Some questions seemed to cause difficulties for a number of people, while there were alsoisolated cases of individuals apparently misinterpreting, overlooking or having a "hobbyhorse" about individual questions. Overall there was a fairly good agreement,- between allof the individuals involved, about which problems (questions) most commonly arose, andwhich were least common.

There was relatively little evidence of differences in percentage agreement due to differenttasks. It appears that it is the other factors, ie. the checklist question and the individual,that were much more important. There were large differences between the non-experts,with a very wide range of percentage agreement with the expert. This could perhapshave been due to differences between companies, but was more likely due to thedifferences in training, profession and position of the people involved.

4.4 Sickness Absence and Accident Records

4.4.1 Company 1

Company 1 employed 585 people working on a three shift system. The majority of thestaff worked on two shifts covering 06:00 - 22:00 hrs. but a small number of the staffworked on a night shift. The responsibility for accident reporting and health surveillance

30

was principally undertaken by the occupational health nurse (OHN). The OHN alsoco-ordinated the 23 first aiders that were on this site and conducted the ergonomicassessments of manual handling.

Standard RIDDOR (Reporting of Injuries, Diseases & Dangerous Occurrences Regulations)procedures were used and so all serious accidents and incidents were well documented.All accidents from minor injuries (cut requiring an elastoplast etc.) were recorded inaccident report books which were centrally collated in the Medical Centre. In practice itwas likely that some minor accidents were not recorded. Clear lines of responsibility forthe reporting of accidents and incidents were in place and this responsibility hinged aroundthe departmental manager.Each departmental -; manager*--returned -weekly - reports of manpower deployment for allworkers in their section. There were 37 departmental managers and the workforce undereach manager could be up to about 50 but was typically 10 - 20. The manpowerdeployment report was sent to Registry and included details of hours worked and the areaworked in but not any direct detail of exactly what job any person was doing during thehours worked. In many instances the jobs and tasks could be inferred, but in otherdepartments one person may have been employed doing a number of distinctly differentjobs. The departmental reports also detailed sickness absence, holidays and accidents.

Sickness absence returns were filled in by all staff for any absence (half days or more)but these returns did not detail the reason for the absence. Most staff returned self-certifications for 4 days or more and medical certificates for 7 days or more but somemore senior staff were not obliged to do this although in practice most did follow thisprocedure. Any person who was absent for more than 7 days or absent because of awork-related accident, or any absence involving a period of hospitalisation, was required toreport to the OHN on return to work.

Employee health records were held on standardised record cards but the level of recordeddetail was dependant upon who made the entry. In theory it should record all absences,treatments and accidents. All of these records were on record cards and were notcomputerised. The Registry department entered absences onto the computer but no detailwas recorded other than which employee, how long he or she was absent and when theabsence period started. No details concerning symptoms or diagnosis were recorded onthe computer system. The absence certificates were sent to registry and a copy was sentto the Medical Centre where an entry was made on the employee's health record but theoriginal forms were shredded after approximately six months.

The occupational nurse had extracted some of the health records into a tabular form butnot in any great detail. During the last year there were 18 reportable accidents associatedwith at least 3 days off work and these accounted for a total of 253 days absence.Reportable incidents were not as well monitored and it was generally admitted that onlymajor incidents were likely to be recorded.

None of the computerised data held sufficiently detailed records to attempt to corroborateergonomic assessments of manual handling risks with sickness or accident data. To extractdetail from the manual records would have been time consuming as the only source ofdata was from the health records and these included a great deal of information that wasnot relevant. Furthermore, a lot of the records did not provide any detail of theemployees occupation but simply the department in which they were employed. For thesereasons it is very unlikely that records from this company would yield suitable data foranalysis.

31

4.4.2 Company 2

Company 2 employed 1251 people (including 200 staff and 250 engineers), working on afairly complex shift pattern that resulted in 24 hour production. There was a separatemedical centre with two nurses and on site there were 12 first aiders.

The standard RIDDOR procedure was followed. If an accident required medical attentionfrom a first aider, nurse or doctor then there would be an entry into a standard accidentreport book. Trivial cuts etc. were not entered in these books. All accident book entrieswould raise a report form and the responsibility for this was with the shift manager orshift supervisor. These reports were returned to the safety manager. The details of thesereports were entered-,; onto^ a < PC -'-database. The- database system was standardised throughoutall Company 2 sites nationally but was run locally on a stand-alone PC (ie not anetworked system). The database was used to generate managers' reports that werediscussed at safety meetings. All department managers and safety staff received copies ofthese reports. These meetings provided feedback to initiate larger studies of particularproblems. For example, the safety manager reported that a recently targeted area on amanual handling operation had been investigated by the quality improvement team usingthe 'Duran Duran' method and involving a number of different disciplines (ergonomic,economic, engineering, safety etc.).

Although quite a lot of detail was entered onto the database, there was often no exactjob description and any analysis using these data would probably be limited to the level ofprocess line or department. Many of the processes involved job rotation. Althoughinsufficiently detailed for the kind of analysis proposed, these data were recorded in moredetail than at the other three sites examined. Less effort would be required to add moredetail to these records than at the other sites. That effort would still however beconsiderable as it would at least require each of the accident reports to be consultedmanually and details transferred to the database.

Standard RIDDOR reports were sent out for 39 accidents involving 3 or more lost daysduring 1991. During 1992 there have been 9 reportable accidents up to 22nd May 1992.Hazardous events (near misses) were probably under-reported but encouragement was givento try and improve on the return response. At present there were approximately 10incidents reported monthly and these were investigated along with the accident reports.

Sickness absence was recorded on company forms for any absence of 1 day or more.This form gave some detail of any absence resulting from an accident at work. Theseforms were returned to the Wages department and a copy was sent to the Medical Centrewhere the details were transferred to the persons health record and the copy of the formwas shredded. A transcription was also made in a book that detailed employeedepartment, illness and when the absence occurred. Attendance at the Medical Centre wasalso recorded in both a book and the individual health records. None of these systemswere computerised and so considerable effort would be needed to extract the requireddata.

Time was recorded for pay purposes and recorded by the employee on a form that wascounter-signed by the shift supervisor. Time was returned by post number and this shouldequate closely to an actual job not just a process line or department. According to theStaff Manager, if an employee was involved in an area that involved job rotation then histime sheet should give hours worked at each post. This was a level of detail notencountered at any of the other sites. Thus, time on specific jobs should be available oncomputer on an individual basis (subject to checks on the accuracy of this recording).However, the sickness or accident data were either insufficiently detailed or only availableas a manual record.

32

4.4.3 Company 3

Company 3 employed 304 workers on a three shift system. There were two full-timehealth and safety staff on the site, an occupational health nurse (OHN) and a safetyofficer. There were also 21 certificated first-aiders to give localised help and to providesome medical care over the shifts as the two full-time staff worked on day shift only.

Minor injuries such as small cuts were only reported in the Medical Centre accident book.Any more serious accident was also reported in the book and an accident report wasgenerated. Serious incidents ('near misses') were also reported. Some of thecategorisation of an accident as being reportable seemed to be a little arbitrary but boththe health and the safety-staff were confident-that they would categorise in the same wayand that, by erring on the side of caution, no serious omissions from the reportingprocedure would occur. If the accident was connected with a sickness absence thenfurther, more detailed forms were filled in as this was management policy. The accidentreport provided recommendations from the safety officer on how to prevent similarincidents occurring. These recommendations were, where appropriate, discussed with seniormanagement before endorsing any required changes to working practices.

The Medical Centre accident report book was the master source for all accident recordsand contained details of all accidents or incidents on site. If an accident occurred whilethe nurse was not on duty the first aider would ensure that it was fully reported in thelocal accident book and it was the nurse's responsibility to update the central records.

The occupation of the person involved in the accident was not always fully recorded andit was explained that sometimes all the staff involved in a process line would rotatearound various jobs on the line to help combat boredom and to give all of the group theskills to allow good coverage in the case of an absence. Thus it was not always possibleor relevant to give a job title on the report. However a good description of what wasphysically being done at the time of the accident was recorded and this may allow theoccupation to be identified. This would not always be the case as a description such as'injured back while stooping to pick up box', would not allow any identification ofoccupation although it does allow a closer identification of the task involved in theaccident. Not all process lines were associated with job rotation.

The OHN kept a card file system with a record per employee, on which were recordedall details of accidents, absences, treatments and any other relevant details such as x-rayreports etc. In the previous year there were around 24 accidents recorded in the accidentbook and IS of these had warranted full accident reports.

With regard to sickness and absence records any employee off work for a day or morefilled in a yellow sickness absence form upon return to work. These yellow forms werestored along with the employees other personnel records. There was a physical file peremployee. The yellow forms were used to record 'clock' information and so any absenceswould be recorded on the individual time records and these records were computerised.These time records had no recording of the cause of absence or of the exact occupationof the individual at the time. As far as identifying what job a person was doing prior tothe absence, it was only possible to extract the 'process line' that the individual wasworking on. Time returns were recorded by line allocation and not by individual jobs.It would be possible to obtain summary statistics of how many people worked on whichlines and when, but this could not be linked to individual occupations. To get to theindividual occupation level of detail would require going back to the weekly time returnsheets that were used to create the computer files. Only the weekly totals were enteredonto the computer.

33

Personnel department kept a card reporting all absences by year and this could be used asa check on validating the accuracy of recording on OHN's card index system ('cardex').The OHN transfered the yellow form information onto the individuals' card and so thisinformation was held on the same card containing accident records for that individual. Ifan employee had been absent with a back problem that was not associated with anaccident report the OHN contacted the person upon return to work to ensure there wereno work-related problems.

It would be difficult to extract from Company 3 time records, the job that any employeewas doing at any particular point in time. This information would be required to allowoccupations to be linked to the frequency of any particular type of accident. Given theproblems detailed above^-itawould-i'seem-,unlikely ̂ that the available data from Company 3could readily be used < to corroborate the-assessments of manual handling risks.

4.4.4 Company 4

Again the full RIDDOR procedure was used. There were 1 8 - 2 0 first aiders including allshift supervisors. All accidents resulted in an entry in an accident book held in the firstaid room and each accident, from the most trivial cut, should be reported on an accidentreport although no cross-checking was conducted to verify that this was the case. Theaccident reports were input to a database system and were identified by the same reportnumber on both the form and the database. No description of the accident was held onthe database. Serious incidents were recorded on the same database but as with othercompanies this was thought to be under-reported. The database was still being developedand there was no overall database management system that limited the duplication of fieldsor of codes.

Sickness absence was included in the shift report sheet that was returned weekly by eachof the shift supervisors. These reports also included the hours worked by each employeebut the time allocated to a process line or area were not identifiable as individualoccupations, although the personnel department could probably identify the job performedby any person. As with the other companies it was impractical to operate a system thatlooked at the job any individual was doing during any period because that worker wasusually associated with a process line or plant, within which a number of distinctoccupations might be rotated.

Sickness absence records were kept as part of Personnel's records and would usuallyinclude a description of the reason for absence. These were manual records with onerecord per employee. Considerable effort would be required to extract the relevantinformation from these records as this would involve transferring any required informationfrom each employees health record onto some standardised form and many of these healthrecords were fairly extensive and included a lot of information. The original sicknessabsence certificates were all stored together with a certificate for any absence of 4 ormore days. It was thought that these certificates would be destroyed after a certainperiod had elapsed - possibly after one year.

Personnel records held sickness and holiday absence information but they were only timerecords and did not contain any job detail. The pay/time records were handled by anoutside firm. Each employee used a punch card to clock in but this time informationwas held by plant and so no further detail other than the cost centre level could beobtained.

Given that the database was not fully implemented and at present held no detail ofdescription of accidents or incidents, its potential use for any corroborative study wouldseem to be very low. The time records were largely processed outside the factory by an

34

agency and none of the time return records gave a level of detail greater than the processline or cost centre. For these reasons it was concluded that Company 4 records couldnot be used to corroborate the ergonomic assessment of manual handling risk.

4.4.5 Conclusion

There is an inherent problem of trying to corroborate a task-based assessment usingrecords that at their most detailed are indexed by job. While a job may be described asa summation of its component tasks this summation does not allow any detailed analysisthat will corroborate the task-based assessments of manual handling risks. Any analysiscould only look at*'the'.«job.^asTa-.summationy.;of -a-1 number of tasks and ascribe a "risk"index to each job.

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5. DISCUSSION

5.1 The Assessment Team

Before addressing the issue of the assessment process itself it seems appropriate to givesome consideration to who should carry out the exercise and how long it might beexpected to take. Representatives of various disciplines participated in the assessments.Amongst this very limited sample, the most successful were probably the two OccupationalHealth Nurses (OHN's).

Both at the audit and-? postrassessment^stage,-thev OHNs demonstrated a sound knowledge ofmanual handling problems and general ergonomic principles. They also showed moreinitiative on how to alleviate manual handling risks.

This was shown in the higher level of agreement with the ergonomists over whatconstituted a problem (66% and 95%) than was achieved by the non-OHNs (20% and47%). This stemmed in part from the relevance of their professional knowledge andtraining. However, a contributory factor appeared to be the extent of personal interestand commitment. Manual handling assessments, and ergonomics in general, were seen asa logical extension of the preventative role they were keen to establish or maintain - onecould almost say that they had a vested interest in the successful implementation of thiswork. In contrast, it was noticeable during the site visits involving those nominatedcompany officials who were non-OHNs, that there was a certain reluctance to undertakethis exercise. A feeling of the exercise being an unnecessary "chore" was evident. Thisprincipally seemed to stem from the higher management deciding who should do the workrather than first seeing what expertise was required and then discussing who would be bestsuited to do the job amongst the "likely" employees.

It would appear essential that any "promotional" literature should adopt a very positive,encouraging attitude, emphasising the genuine benefits to be derived from the exerciserather than merely wielding the big stick of legislation. To this end, experience hassuggested that National or even employment sector statistics do not create much of animpression as they appear too remote and impersonal - particularly amongstsmall-to-medium sized companies. Perhaps some well-chosen examples from individualcompanies - such as "Company X, with 300 employees, calculated that handling injurieswere costing them £70,000 a year in sick pay alone" - would have more impact.

Problems which might be encountered in attempting to reconcile the costs of compliancewith the Regulations with the costs of not complying (high sickness absence, accident rates,etc) are that: the costs will be seen as originating from different "cost centres" - healthand safety being separated from production; and the costs of changes will be moreimmediate whereas the ensuing benefit will be more long-term. There is some evidence(eg. Benson, 1987), that the repayment period need not be all that great. Someconsideration should, perhaps, be given to this issue in "selling" the Regulations.

5.2 The Audit and Assessment Process

Across a wide range of sizes of workforce and considerable variation in activitiesundertaken, the time taken to carry out the two parts of the exercise was remarkablyconsistent at two to three days for each part. The exceptions to this were Company 4 -where the exercise served a dual purpose - and Company 5 - where the assessor severelylimited the tasks considered. This is encouraging and warrants wider dissemination tocounter the belief that the whole exercise is a major undertaking which is going to occupy

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key staff for weeks (if not months). As a caveat to that, it must be remembered that,with the exception of Company 5, these were all discrete, production and/or storage anddistribution orientated sites. Experience gained in other industries and undertakings hassuggested that where tasks are less consistent - such as those involving construction(building, roads, etc), maintenance tasks, or the service sector - the tasks are much lessconsistent and predictable. However, although the tasks are unpredictable - no twodeliveries ever being the same - the risks or problems associated with them need not be.This would seem to indicate that an extension of the principle of generic grouping oftasks to genetically grouping the risks (and consequent solutions) could be beneficial.

Examples of the application of this concept can be derived from "industries" as diverse asSocial Services and-Chemical^ Engineering.* vHandling-people by Social Service staff hardlyrequires assessment to establish that it constitutes a risk - but the specific risks which maybe encountered should be examined and the risks and their potential solutions documented.Similarly, no two process plant maintenance tasks are likely to be the same - but manyare likely to present a risk of injury.

Because of the time scale of the project the audit and assessment stages during this studyfocused on the frequently occurring tasks because of the time scale of the project. Theless consistent tasks were noted by company officials but not assessed during this study.Even though these tasks were infrequent they may still carry more danger whenundertaken because of their unfamiliarity to the operator. This reinforces the argumentfor having suitable staff within an organisation who are familiar with all of the companiesactivities from a regular to a one-off task.

Turning to the assessment process itself, analysis of the checklist questions averaged overthe four companies showed that about a quarter of the question responses disagreed withthe expert. Although there were only four companies and lack of observations from anysite could distort the overall average score some general comments can be drawn.

The six questions that showed the largest disagreement with the expert were:-

A5 - Does the task involve excessive carrying distances?A7 - Does the task involve a risk of sudden movement of the load?C2 - Are there uneven, slippery or unstable floors?C4 - Are there extremes of temperature, humidity or air movements?C5 - Are there poor lighting conditions?Dl - Does the task require unusual strength, height, etc?

Certainly the main explanation for these poor agreements with the expert was theinterpretation of the question. The non-expert consistently remarked at thepost-assessment debrief on the lack of guidance on those questions which contained wordslike excessive (A5), extremes (C4), poor (C5) and unusual (Dl) - requiring a valuejudgement.

Another reason for the discrepancy in the scores could be the nature of the work. Theexpert may regard some elements of the task a potential risk but the non-expert found itnot out of the ordinary for that factory environment. An example of this wasdemonstrated at Company 4 on the question of slippery floors. The Senior TrainingManager only answered yes on this question if he thought the floor was very slippery.He expected a general slipperiness as a consequence of manual handling fine powders suchas carbon and graphite. An extreme example of this might be underfoot conditions inmines or quarries. Good, even exemplary flooring underground would probably still beconsidered unacceptable in a factory.

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Comparison of results between ergonomic experts showed very good agreement consideringthe degree of subjectivity in the checklist questions. Only three out of twenty-fourquestions showed marked disagreement between experts. This result compared favourablywith an actual cross-check test between experts at Company 4 over ten tasks.

5.3 A Checklist

The Consultative Document asks whether a checklist would be helpful and, if so, whatform this should take. In the present study, to avoid imposing any particular checkliststyle on participants, a deliberately simplistic approach was adopted. This involved simplyreproducing the questions asked in the guidance with a facility for a straightforwardYES/NO response. Apart from the problems raised over specific issues - such as that ofthe requirement for value judgements raised earlier - two particular issues emerged:Firstly, there needed to be provision for some means of indicating the degree of risk -the all-or-none YES/NO recording being considered too insensitive - particularly when itcame to considering priorities for action. However, it was recognised that there was novalue in introducing an inappropriate degree of resolution and that a three level (low,medium, high) rating would probably suffice. Even then, the medium category may bedifficult to apply and interpret consistently.

Concomitant with this change, the wording of the questions themselves was questioned.Interpreted literally, the questions asked whether a particular risk factor was present - notwhether any risk arose as a result. Two instances can be cited to illustrate the potentialfor differences in interpretation which may arise as a result. The first can be illustratedby considering the first question - "Is the load held at a distance from the trunk?". Itmay be that it is, but that other task/load characteristics mean that this does not presenta significant risk. Alternatively, a risk such as sharp edges may exist - but be adequatelycontrolled by the provision (and use) of good quality protective gloves. Ideally, thesefactors should be controlled - even if it does not present a risk, holding a load awayfrom the body is not good practice, or changing the nature of the load to remove sharpedges is preferable to relying on personal protective clothing. However, many may wellnot identify either as constituting a risk or, even where they do, they are unlikely toassign it a particularly high priority for resolution. Adopting a realistic, somewhatpragmatic approach of structuring the checklist to how the guidance is most likely to beused it is therefore suggested that altering the tone of the questions to address the issueof whether a risk exists would result in a more usable (and used) checklist format.

The revised checklist (see Appendix Id) would attract quite different responses as thequestions have been reworded and the YES/NO recording replaced by a three level (low,medium and high) risk rating. With a three level risk scale the assessor would probablytend to opt for the middle or lower level of risk thereby reducing the overall level of riskfor a particular task. If a risk scale were used and it was found that low risk scorestended to predominate, further work would be required to revise the risk categories andtheir definitions. The assessor may also tend only to identify high risk tasks when theycan envisage an easy risk reduction strategy. Although there are some inherent problemsin using a risk rating scale the participating company officials felt that the YES/NOcategorisation was not suitable in this application and some measure indicating the degreeof risk was required.

5.4 Risk Reduction

Because of the nature of the investigative exercise, evaluating particularly the audit andassessment processes, comparatively little attention was paid by company personnel to therisk-reduction process, although the issue was always addressed at the interactive debriefingsessions with each company. A review of the implementation of the COSHH Regulations

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(Anon, 1991) indicated that, although company awareness of the issue had been raised bythe processes of assessing and controlling the use of substances, not enough was generallybeing done to prevent the exposure. Discussing the Regulations in a variety of industries- not restricted to the five participants - an impression was formed that, while theassessment process was seen (unnecessarily) as complex and time-consuming it would becarried out because "that was what the Regulations were all about". The final phase isalso seen as time-consuming but also expensive - with beliefs that "all handling has to beautomated", and similar misconceptions, prevalent.

Visiting five companies (which demonstrated a wide range of manual handling operations)during the course of the project, together with visits to other sites to advise on manualhandling, has demonstrated ^thatvVas- large* numbers of -tasks can be improved relatively simplyand cheaply by usingv "simple s.ergonomic?,, principles.',. Comments from some organisationssuch as "we have carried out an exercise and found that approximately 90% of taskswhich are identified as risky can be relatively easily dealt with" support this.Nevertheless, the contrary view is still widely encountered and must be vigorouslycountered in any literature, especially leaflets, produced. There may be some benefit inincreasing the public profile through a programme of meetings promoted through tradeorganisations, employer's federations, etc at which the realistic message could be putacross.

An alternative approach could be to carry out some case-studies in different organisationsof various sizes to demonstrate that risk reduction using the ergonomic approach can besimple and cheap to undertake. These studies could be extended to show the long termfinancial benefits to be derived from this exercise by measuring the change in accidentand sickness absence records, productivity, etc before and after implementing theregulations. As this study has shown, further work would be required on the level ofdata detail kept by organisations so that risk reduction areas could be corroborated withspecific tasks (see next section).

Although a wide range of manual handling operations were seen, some types of tasks werevery rare, for example, team handling and handling a load while seated. The lack ofrepresentation of those particular tasks meant that the wording for those checklist questionswere not adequately tested. Consequently the thought process for seeking a solution toeradicating or minimising the risk was not undertaken.

One particularly problematic area from the point of view of risk reduction which hasbecome increasingly apparent during the project is that of maintenance. Ferguson et al(1985), in a major study of the maintenance of mining machinery, identified manual forceapplication - both for moving machine parts, etc and to tools and fasteners - to be themajor area of ergonomics problems. Few maintenance jobs were observed within theparticipating companies but these, together with others observed elsewhere, showed thatcoal mining was not unique in this context. The high incidence of manual handling tasksin maintenance jobs is further complicated by their variety. A holistic approach thereforebecomes appropriate whereby maintenance workers are trained to recognise the risks, toaccept the need for action and to identify appropriate action to reduce the risk ofpersonal injury thus placing a different emphasis on and creating a different role forhandling awareness training.

o

Such training - as opposed to technical training in handling techniques - will need to bean integral part of any risk reduction package, educating the workers in the correct wayto undertake jobs so as to minimise manual handling problems. The approach needed bycompany enforcers, to change the operators' attitudes on safer working practices, will bechallenging but essential, particularly amongst those workers who have years of experiencedoing the job without suffering any previous back pain problems.

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Finally, there was much evidence amongst the five participating companies in the studythat in areas recognised in having manual handling problems that remedial action whetherby mechanical lifting aids or process change had taken place. But many of the liftingaids remained unused because the operator found the device too awkward to use, slow andunproductive. Instances have been encountered elsewhere where such devices had beenfound to create other problems. Clearly, efforts must be made to improve the ergonomicsof handling aids. However, their use will nevertheless frequently slow the process down.Where this is inevitable then management attitudes and organisational procedures should bemodified to reflect this - workers should not be penalised for doing tasks in the correctmanner.

5.5 Corroborating the Assessment

Attempts to use existing company records to corroborate assessments identified an inherentproblem of trying to corroborate a task-based assessment using records that at their mostdetailed were indexed by job. While a job may be described as a summation of itscomponent tasks this summation does not allow any detailed analysis that will corroboratethe task-based assessments of manual handling risks. Any analysis could only look at thejob as a summation of a number of tasks and ascribe an overall 'risk' index to each job.This could be followed by an analysis of the relationships between risk from manualhandling and the explanatory variables such as accidents, sickness absence or reportedserious incidents. The relationship to time lost through accidents and sickness absencecould for example be investigated with some classification of the nature of the accidentand the cause of sickness absence being included in the analysis.

The scale of effort in creating task indexed sickness absence, accident, and manualdeployment records retrospectively would be immense and quite probably could not in factbe fully achieved. So any analysis of these relationships can only be performed at thejob-based level using the job equals summation of tasks equation discussed above.

Some effort would also need to be made to describe the general manpower deployment ateach site being investigated. This would include some interpretation of the time recordsto describe how many people were doing which jobs and how many hours were worked atthese jobs. This would allow relative frequencies of certain events, such as time lost dueto back injuries for example, to be investigated.

Unfortunately none of the sites participating in the study held computerised information ina suitable form to allow any analysis of the relationships between the ergonomicassessment of manual handling risks with the potential explanatory variables, to be carriedout. To obtain records suitable for the kind of analysis that has been described wouldhave involved the transcription of large amounts of information from manual recordsystems onto a pro-forma suitable for entry to a computer system. This was not feasiblewithin the time-scales of the project which were largely determined by the requirement toproduce the manual handling guidance on schedule.

It is worth reporting that a close study of the individual site reports revealed that theeffort being spent by most of the companies in collecting the various accident, sicknessand time data was considerable. The worth of these data could be made greater byapplying a more systematic approach to their collection and by a more carefulconsideration of what data are actually required. For example, a system could beimplemented for recording accidents that result in lost time. This sytem would record avery detailed description of the activities of the casualty prior to the accident. This wouldallow any relationship with the assessment of risk from manual handling to be investigatedat the task based level.

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The problems encountered in this facet of the project can be regarded as a furtherexample of the problems associated with accident recording systems described by Gravelinget al (1987). Studies of the recording system used by British Coal - since supported byinformation gained on systems used in other industries - indicated that the prime purposeof accident recording systems was to record that an accident took place. Attempts tomake any sensible analysis of such records for realistic accident prevention failed becauseof inadequacies of the data collected. As a result a vicious circle was initiated whereby,because the data were not regarded as being of much use little care was taken over itscollection thus exacerbating the situation. Once the collection and maintenance of suchrecords becomes regarded as an administrative chore then their value will drop stillfurther.

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6. CHANGES TO THE GUIDANCE TEXT

As part of the revision to the guidance text the main aspects of the findings werereported to the HSE prior to the completion of the project. This section details thosepoints raised.

Comments and observations have arisen as a result of the debriefing sessions and using thechecklist in the workplace. Technical points and the layout of the guidance notes havealso been addressed. To help the reader follow each point the page and paragraphnumbers were listed.'•against^each? comment ;in« sequential order;

Page Para Comments

4 2 Emphasise Manual Handling occurs not only in factories

It has become apparent on attending meetings and working partiesthat many people were of the opinion that manual handlingproblems only occur in factory environments. It is recommendedthat the guidance notes should emphasis the point that manualhandling problems can occur in all types of work. Well-chosenillustrations might be helpful in getting over this point.

26 10 Formalise initial appraisal (Audit) - "Tasks thatwarrant a second look"

The role and function of the initial appraisal does not come overparticularly well amongst readers of the current text. It wasapparent that some form of initial audit was required before a full,formal assessment was made in order to screen out those minorhandling operations which clearly do not present a hazard and donot need to be considered further. It is recommended that theseactivities be logically filtered out before needing to contemplateelimination, automation etc.

27 It is recommended that the 'Is there a risk of injury1 element ofthe flow chart be presented more clearly as identifying tasks whichmay bear a risk of injury and therefore require a more detailedappraisal.

29 16 Emphasise moving/transporting a load rather thanapplying a force

Many people do not appear to appreciate the distinction made herebetween moving a load and moving a control, or pulling a loadand pulling on a rope. In part this was probably due to peoplenot bothering to read the guidance fully. It is recommended thatthe paragraph be reworded to make this point more clearer.

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Page Para Comments

32 30 Example of generic task grouping(cont.)

All the companies who correctly undertook the manual handlingexercise tended to list every variation of every task at the initialaudit stage. Company personnel were unaware that they couldgroup similar tasks together for assessment so long as they wereaware of the range of risks that each group category presented.This issue has also become apparent in discussions with otherindividuals and groups who have been considering their course of

ss-. action*inv!complying'."withi-thesev Regulations. This misunderstanding• was crucial as it will clearly result in a lot of unnecessary activity

which will make the whole exercise much more extensive (andcostly) and create antagonism to the legislation. This point needsto be re-emphasised to avoid the employer duplicating similar tasksat the assessment stage.

32 34 Who should carry out the assessment?

Experience working with the different companies showed that therewere four fields of knowledge required within an organisation tocarry out a meaningful assessment. These are:

1. Line Manager, foreman or industrial engineer (IE) who have athorough practical understanding of the day to day process and itsvariations.

2. An occupational health nurse or safety professional who canprovide information on health and safety issues to identify high riskareas in manual handling.

3. Someone in the organisation who has an appreciation of humancapabilities who can provide a basic knowledge of ergonomicprinciples in interpreting and understanding the guidance andguidelines provided in the document.

4. A line manager, foreman, designer, industrial, or productionengineer who can provide an engineering input into changing theprocess or working practices of the operator to reduce or alleviatethe risk identified.

This does not necessarily involve four individuals. Anoccupational health nurse may be able to fulfil roles 2 and 3whereas a safety professional may also have knowledge appropriatefor 1 or 4 (or both). Neither should it imply that all four haveto carry out the assessment en masse. However, it isrecommended all four skill bases be available for consultation atappropriate times. Functions 3 and 4 in particular represent areaswhere a company may have recourse to external advice orassistance - as referred to in paragraph 36.

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Page Para Comments

33 37 Clearer definition on initial appraisal (Audit)(cont.) and assessment so hierarchy of measures can be followed

If the process of undertaking some form of initial audit wasrequired prior to a formal assessment being made then it isrecommended the paragraph be worded accordingly.

There was clearly some scope for misunderstanding of the proposedsequence of actions here - in particular the role of the screening

•:>: • guidelines!..in .Appendix*. 2.; Many interested parties were clearly•' concerned that there should be some form of initial screening — to

remove the otherwise 'silly1 tasks from needing formal assessment.

33 39 Chronic onset of manual handling problem not immediatelyapparent from accident records

Readers of the current text tended to think that accident recordswere the only source of identifying the high risk areas of manualhandling operations. While this data provides information onacute accidents at work it does not pick up on chronic oraccumulative manual handling problems. For example, theoperator who phones into work one morning to complain of a soreback would not be registered in the accident report records.Sickness absence records should identify this case if detailed recordswere kept. Sickness absence records may identify the morechronic onset problems and should be used at the initial audit stagewith accident records to identify areas of high risk.

33 39 It would also be worth seriously considering making a commentabout the poor quality of many accident recording systems in thatthe information collected may not actually be very useful in thisprocess - or indeed in any serious attempt at reduction of risks ofany type. It was appreciated that this was peripheral to the mainissue but it has to be recognised that advising people to consultpoor data may not be appreciated.

34 The Task - Making an assessment

At several points in this section, reference was made to reductionof safe capacity. However, quite deliberately (and correctly) therehas been no attempt to define safe capacity. However, thiscaused some concern amongst some users who looked for a 'safecapacity' to which they could apply the reduction factors. Thishelps to reinforce the misconception that the numbers presented inAppendix 2 were safe capacities.

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Page Para Comments

34 (cont.) One solution may be to reword the text throughout to individuallifting capacity - thus moving away from the concept of a groupnorm. However, this may be too subtle a change to have thedesired effect. A more radical approach would be to rework thepercentages and present them as 'increases in stress'.

This will have implications for their subsequent use as reductionfactors in relation to Appendix 2. This aspect was discussedbelow.

- On undertaking a -task assessment while an operator was pushing or- pulling the'task question No. 1 - "Is the load held a distance from

trunk'? - was not relevant and caused some confusion. Astatement that not all factors listed in Schedule 1 were necessarilyrelevant to all tasks was required.

34 43 Clarify holding at arms length

Some of those involved requested the safe capacity figures atdifferent degrees of arm length, not only at full arm length.This would allow the assessor to compare the effect on safecapacity using different lifting postures i.e. stooping vs holding loadat distance from trunk.

As a rough guide one's individual lifting capacity will be reducedby 20%, 50% and 70% when holding load at elbow length, wristlength (arms slightly bent) and at arms length compared withholding load close to body.

A diagram showing these reductions may help to clarify thesepoints.

35 47 Stooping

Although biomechanical calculations would indicate this to be thecase, the changes in intervertebral angle concomitant with stoopingmay well increase the susceptibility of the spine to damage.Thus, although the compressive force was the same the potentialfor injury would be increased. It should also be consideredwhether the stooped posture will increase the strain on themusculature of the back.

A bent back lift, if it results in the load being closer horizontallyto the base of the spine, may produce less risk of injury than abent-knee lift with the load beyond the knees and the backstraight. However, that was because the horizontal distance factoroutweighs the disadvantages of the bent back.

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Page Para Comments

35 49 Vertical location of lift vs lifting/lowering distances(cont.)

1. The heading for paragraph 49 actually addresses the text inparagraph 50. Paragraph 49 considers the vertical location of theload at the start and finish of the lift therefore it is recommendedthat an appropriate heading be inserted.

2. The influence on one's individual lifting capacity needs to bequantified when lifting at different vertical locations. For example,

•.£•-••• -lifts-:- undertakenrrcbetweensnwaist and shoulder height reduces one'sindividual lifting capacity by 20% while lifting or lowering outsidethese ranges reduces one's individual lifting capacity by 30%.

35 50 It is recommended that paragraph 49 heading be paragraph 50'sheading. See note above (page 35 para. 49)

Company personnel working with the guidance commented on thelack of guidance on statements using the word excessive. Thestatement on excessive lifting or lowering distances needs to bequantified. For example, as a rough guide vertical lifting distancesbetween 30cms and 50cms will reduce one's individual liftingcapacity by 10% while lifting vertically over distances over SOcmswill reduce capacity by 20%.

35/36 52/53 Application of force when pushing/pulling

The guidance address pushing/pulling in the horizontal planebetween shoulder and waist height and not in the vertical oroblique plane such as pulling a manual pallet truck.

Clarify pushing/pulling outside suitable vertical range

Pushing or pulling needs quantifying when undertaken below waistor above shoulder height. For example, if pushing and pulling wasundertaken above shoulder height and below knee height one'spushing/pulling capacity will be reduced by 40% and 50%respectively.

NB: Incorporated "one's individual pushing/pulling capacity' ratherthan 'safe capacity'.

36 55 Clarify frequency of lifts

There was undoubtedly a grey area of indistinction betweenhandling tasks which occur fairly frequently but were undoubtedlyprincipally 'manual handling of loads' and tasks where the loadhandling itself was insignificant but it was the repetitivepostural/force excesses that create a risk - particularly of upperlimb disorders. Such tasks may still involve relatively gross upper

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Page

36(cont.)

Para

55

Comments

body movements, resulting in, for example, injuries to the shouldergirdle. For example, at one factory visited, the final productweighed 6.5kg which falls below the weight guidelines for manualhandling injury, but an operator could handle up to 1500 items pershift and even then each item could involve up to 5 separatehandling tasks. Even though the load in this example falls belowthe recommended guidelines more detailed assesment of riskreduction would still need to be undertaken in light of the highrepetitive-awork?.-..load-.;..,; Indeed,.- the engineers in charge of the highvolume production areas rightly recognised that the biggest risk tothe operator was the daily tonnage of material handled and notnecessarily individual product weights.

Although frequency/weight interactions were complex, it isrecommended that some further guidance be provided ininterpreting this paragraph. The table below, synthesised from thescientific literature on this topic (Graveling et al. 1992), mayprovide the basis for such guidance.

FREQUENCY MULTIPLIERInfrequent (<1 in 30 mins) 1Occasional (1 in 5-30 mins) 0.81 in 5 mins to 1 min~1 0.71-4 min~1 0.65-8 min~1 0.59-12 min-1 0.4>12 min-1 0.2

36 57 Clarify rest/recovery periods

A parallel can be drawn here to the debate over the DisplayScreen Equipment (DSE) Regulations as to the distinction betweena work break - i.e. doing some other work but having a breakfrom the task in question - and a rest break.

Several interviewed engineers were unsure whether the rest/recoveryperiods referred to the rest between tasks or rest breaks from thejob.

This point could be clarified by adding that risk was reduced bybreaks which allow heavily used muscles to recover - perhaps whilethe handler was doing other jobs. Where fixed postures wereidentified, activities which encourage movement of the affectedmuscles may be beneficial.

42 94 Explicit reference to Emergency Services

Discussions with the Fire Service revealed a concern that they werenot mentioned explicitly as an example of a job where workingenvironments continually change.

47

Page Para Comments

42 94(cont.) It was not immediately apparent to them that this paragraph

applied to them. This was possibly because the nature of thechange was different. Unlike mining and construction where anindividual workplace may be changing, the Fire Service encounterchange because each incident is effectively a different workplace.Similar situations would be experienced by delivery staff, particularlythose making deliveries to domestic dwellings. This may be anopportune point to reiterate the concept of generic assessments as

A ..applying -.to;- bothv formssof >: change.

44 103 Comment on leg lift preferred to back lift if load issmall enough to be located close to body

While the desire to avoid any tendency to place undue emphasis onlifting technique, and therefore reinforce the misconception thathandling training was an adequate solution, was appreciated, itseems rather strange that no reference was made to using thestrong leg muscles rather than the back muscles when lifting loadsat or near floor level was unavoidable provided the load was smallenough.

51 150 No set time period for reviewing audit and assessment

A number of people with whom the guidance/regulations werediscussed expressed surprise that no maximum time limit was setfor repeating the audit and assessment of the manual handlingregulations. This would ensure that no tasks have slipped throughthe initial previous appraisal and that the topic of manual handlingwas not forgotten after the initial exercise.

55 Appendix 2 Heading - Numerical Guidelines for initial audit

Apart from this suggested change to the title, to clarify its position,several issues must be raised concerning these guidelines.

1. Some earlier work, such as the intra-abdominal pressure(lAP)-based guidance produced by Manual Handling Research Unit(MHRU, 1980), has indicated that the load on the spine wasunaffected by leg angle if the back was upright ('Lifts whenstanding or squatting'). In the assumptions underlying the use ofthis figure (paragraph 5) it was stated that the handler was standingor crouching in a stable body position with the back substantiallyupright*. It would appear that the values in figure 5, reducingbelow knuckle height, actually therefore include a reduction forstooping. If the stooping reduction factor was subsequentlyapplied then unnecessarily low values were obtained. It wassuggested that the boxes below knuckle height were omitted and thefigure retitled 'Lifting and lowering - standing or crouching with anupright back*.

48

Page Para

55 Appendix 2(cont.)

Comments

2. The reduction factors earlier in the text were not particularlyaccessible when using this Appendix. Also, if the suggestion topresent them as 'increases in risk1 rather than 'reduction in safecapacity* was adopted then they will not be in a suitable formatfor direct application. It was suggested that the need to applythem (paragraph 6) would be more explicit and the ease ofidentifying them would be enhanced if they were presented intabular form in this Appendix.

General Comment

Guidance on post risk reduction stage.

Some people interviewed were concerned about the lack of guidance following the riskreduction stage. Comments such as "Will the HSE close the company down if elementsof a task still show a risk?" The companies need to be assured that if they havefollowed the regulations and have reduced the risk of injury so far as reasonablypracticable, then that was all that was required of the company by the Regulations.Although many will appreciate this there was nevertheless a concern that, having ticked abox to say 'yes there was a risk', they were liable to adverse action if they appear tohave done nothing.

Concomitant with this comment, is that every effort should be made by employers andemployees to identify all manual handling risks. Failure to do so will breach therequirements of the Regulations.

49

7. CONCLUSIONS

The study demonstrated that for an organisation to be effective in minimising the risksassociated with manual handling a multi-disciplinary team approach was required.

A need was identified for a more positive approach to "selling" the benefits of theRegulations. As part of this benefit the publication of case studies undertaken in differentorganisations could be helpful in demonstrating that the process need not be as timeconsuming, ineffective and expensive as is widely believed.

During the field work 'alb'companies.ihaditaskssvthat; were considered to be a risk but werenot assessed because, they were not seen when both the ergonomist and companyrepresentative were present. This point should be seen as reinforcing the idea that riskreduction and assessment is an on-going activity and not an isolated event which is filedaway and forgotten. It also bolsters the argument that companies should build up theirown expertise within their organisation rather than contracting out the whole exercise.

A strong message from all the participating companies was that more guidance wasrequired in the interpretation of those checklist questions which required a valuejudgement. The checklist was seen as an essential part of the Regulations judged by thenumber of organisations who are already producing their own checklists. The checklistshould include provision for indicating degrees of risk and notes for possible avenues ofrisk reduction.

Considerable impact can be achieved in risk reduction from relatively simple designchanges. These changes can also lead to a more efficient and streamlined work process.It was very evident while talking about ergonomics with company officials during the riskreduction stage that it tended to trigger off thoughts of other problem areas on the sitewhere similar solutions could be equally well applied.

As part of the continuing reviewing and updating of the assessment recommended in theguidance it should not be assumed that ameliorative measures such as providing lifting aidshave solved all manual handling problems. Many instances were observed in this studyand in other consultancy work where lifting aids were installed but the associated manualhandling while working with these .devices caused additional risks to the operator.

Equally, some lifting aids were not employed because they were slow, awkward to use andtheir workrate did not match the production demands. If the lifting aid was designed tomeet production demands and operated within the user's capabilities the operator needs tobe trained and educated on its benefits and the consequences to the operator's health ifthe equipment is not used. On the other hand if the fault of the mismatch is due to therate of the process line this also needs to be addressed. A poorly designed lifting aidthat is difficult and slow to operate will increase the worker's resistance to change his ownworking practice as a consequence of this impending legislation.

The present guidance draws attention to the potential role of accident and sicknessrecords. However, our examination of such records has shown that records normally keptare not necessarily adequate for this purpose. It is recommended that attention be givento providing further guidance on what data should be collected and how it should berecorded and stored. With emphasis given to the value of these data it might be realisedthat much more information could be extracted from such record systems.

A series of recommended changes was produced and reported on practical ways ofimproving aspects of the guidance.

50

51

8. POSTSCRIPT

The "guidance" referred to in this report was published in November 1991 in the Healthand Safety Commission's consultative document "Manual Handling of Loads" (CD36)alongside the proposed Manual Handling Operations Regulations.

The HSE saw this research project as a valuable opportunity for an independent practicaltrial of the guidance while the proposals were still at the consultative stage and thereforecapable of amendment.

The changes to the guidance suggested .in this report have been given careful considerationalongside the many other comments and suggestions made in response to the consultativedocument. The majority of the suggestions made here have been accommodated. Insome instances the form in which they have been adopted has been varied in order alsoto accommodate the views and suggestions of other respondents.

The HSE is grateful to the Institute of Occupational Medicine for its constructive help indeveloping useful practical guidance on the Regulations.

52

53

9. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This work was funded by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE). Special thanks are alsodue to the participating companies and staff who allowed us into their premises toundertake this study and carried out the assessment task. Without their support andco-operation this research would not have been possible.

54

55

10. REFERENCES

Anon (1991). Health and Safety at Work; 13 (11): 15.

Benn RT, Wood PHN (1975). Pain in the back; an attempt to estimate the size of theproblem. Rheumatology and Rehabilitation; 14: 121-128.

Benson JD (1987). Application of manual handling task redesign in the control of lowback pain. In: Asfour SS, ed. Trends in ergonomics/human factors IV. Amsterdam:Elsevier: 909-915.

Carter PJ (1969). Manual lifting and carrying. Work Study and Management Services;(June): 362-365.

Drury CG, Pfeil RE (1975). A task-based model of manual lifting performance.International Journal of Production Research; 13: 137-148.

Ferguson CA, Mason S, Collier SG, Golding D, Graveling RA, Morris LA, Pethick AJ,Simpson GC (1985). The ergonomics of the maintenance of mining equipment (includingergonomic principles in designing for maintainability). Final report on CEC Contract7247/12/008. Edinburgh: Institute of Occupational Medicine. (IOM Report TM/86/12).

Graveling RA, Johnstone J, Symes AM (1992). Development of a Screening Method forManual Handling. Edinburgh: Institute of Occupational Medicine. (IOM ReportTM/92/08).

Graveling RA, Mason S, Rushworth AM, Simpson GC, Sims MT (1987). Utilisation ofaccident data to improve safety in. the human facts aspects of system design. Final reporton CEC Project 7258/01/113/08. Edinburgh: Institute of Occupational Medicine. (IOMReport TM/85/12).

Health and Safety Commission (1991). Manual handling of loads. Proposals forRegulations and guidance. Consultative Document, London: HM Stationery Office (CD36).

Magora A (1974). Investigation of the relation between low back pain and occupation.Scandinavian Journal of Rehabilitation Medicine; 6: 81-88.

Manual Handling Research Unit (1980). Force limits in manual work. Luxembourg:Community Ergonomics Action.

Mital A (1984). The psychophysical approach in manual lifting - a verification study.Human Factors; 25: 485-491.

NIOSH (1981). Work practices guide for manual lifting. Washington: US GovernmentPrinting Office. (DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 81-122).

Troup JDG, Edwards FC (1985). Manual handling - a review paper. London: HMStationery Office

56

57

APPENDIX la

Manual Handling Audit

JOB MANUAL HANDLING TASKS

(i)(H)(iii)(iv)

58

59

APPENDIX Ib

HSE Manual Handling Operations Regulations 199-

1. Identify manual handling tasks where there is a risk of injury.

a) What is required at first is an audit of all manual handling operations carried out inthe workplace. Using the manual handling audit sheet(s) attached, list the job titleand any task elements which involve manual handling (make extra copies as required).

b) The next stages-requires'-?a^judgement*'as1.-'to'•• whether the particular manual handlingtask involves a real chance of injury. The most useful tools at this stage are agrasp of the basic principles of safety in manual handling supplemented, wherepossible, with knowledge of past experience in the company or industry concerned.

Guidelines are provided for manual handling operations involving lifting and lowering(Figure 1) and handling while seated (Figure 2). Guidelines are also provided for pushingand pulling, whether the load is slid, rolled or supported on wheels. The guideline figurefor starting or stopping the load is a force of about 250 newtons (ie. a force of about25Kg as measured by a spring balance). The guideline figure for keeping the load inmotion is a force of about 100 newtons. These figures assume that the force is appliedwith the hands between knuckle and shoulder height.

All of these numerical guidelines set out an approximate boundary within which manualhandling operations are unlikely to create a risk of injury sufficient to warrant further,detailed assessment. However, even operations found to lie within the boundary should beavoided or made less demanding wherever it is reasonably practicable to do so.

The figures quoted for weight will give reasonable protection to nearly all men andbetween one half and two thirds of women. "Nearly all" in this context means about95%. To provide an equivalent degree of protection to nearly all working women thefigures should be reduced by about 40% (see Figures 3 and 4). Where the operationinvolves moving the hands through more than one of the box zones the smallest figureshould be used.

The guidelines cannot supply precise answers and must be applied with caution, notingparticularly the following assumptions:

a) the handler is standing or crouching in a stable body position with the backsubstantially upright;

b) the truck is not twisted during the operation;c) both hands are used to grasp the load;d) the hands are not more than shoulder width apart;e) the load is positioned centrally in front of the body and is itself reasonably

symmetrical;f) the work area does not restrict the handler's posture;g) the working environment (heat, cold, wet, condition of floor) and any personal

protective equipment used do not interfere with performance of the task.

If these assumptions do not apply the task will require assessment.

Having completed the Manual Handling Audit underline those manual handling taskswhich in your estimation involve a real chance of injury.

60

fulJ height

shoulder ht

elbow ht

knuckle hi

knee ht

Note: No attempt shouldbe made to interpret thisdiagram without first read-ing the accompanying text.

Figure Lilting aud lowering

Note: No attempt shouldbe made to interpret thisdiagram without first read-ing the accompanying text.

Figure <-- Handling while seated

61

full height /

>

— -s/ —r^

shonlde.r hr / \ Vl-Ll

\elbow ht }|

\knuckle lit

knee ht

1

1

ww

/

^

I3kg

Note: No attempt shouldbe made to interpret thisdiagram without first read-

_^_ — . . ^ ing the accompanying text.. -"' "~*P .

/2kg fekg

1

'5kg

12. kg

6kg

\,

9-kg

6kg

3kg

Figure 3 Lifting and lowering

Note: No attempt shouldbe made to interpret thisdiagram without first read-ing the accompanying text.

Figure Handling while seated

62

63

APPENDIX Ic

Assessment of the Risk of Injuryfrom Manual Handling Tasks

using the Proposed HSE Guidelines

Making an Assessment

Checklist

A. The Task

Al. Is the load held away from the body? Y/N [ ]

A2. Does the task involve twisting the trunk? Y/N [ ][see explanatory note EN A(i)]

A3. Does the task involve adopting a poorposture, such as stooping? Y/N [ ]

[see explanatory note EN A(ii)]

A4. Does the task involve excessive lifting orlowering distances? Y/N ]

A5. Does the task involve excessive carryingdistances? Y/N [ ]

A6. Does the task involve excessive pushing orpulling of the load? Y/N [ ]

A7. Does the task involve a risk of suddenmovement of the load? Y/N [ ]

A8. Does the task involve- frequent or prolongedphysical effort? Y/N [ ]

A9. Does the task involve insufficient rest orrecovery periods? Y/N [ ]

A10. Does the task involve handling a loadwhilst seated? Y/N [ ]

Al 1. Does the task involve two or more peoplehandling the load at the same time? Y/N [ ]

64

B. The Load

Bl. Is the load heavy? Y/N [ ]

B2. Is the load bulky or unwieldy? Y/N [ ]

B3. Is the load difficult to grasp? Y/N [ ]

B4. Is the load unstable, or are its contentslikely to shift? Y/N [ ]

[see explanatory note EN B(i)]

B5. Is the load*sharp,<-hot..or* otherwise-, ,~ ,...potentially damaging? Y/N [ ]

[see explanatory note EN B(ii)]

C. The Working Environment

Cl. Are there space constraints preventinggood posture? Y/N [ ]

C2. Are there uneven, slippery or unstablefloors? Y/N [ ]

C3. Are there variations in the level of floorsor work surfaces? Y/N [ ]

C4. Are there extremes of temperature, humidityor air movement? Y/N [ ]

C5. Are there poor lighting conditions? Y/N [ ]

D. Individual Capability

Dl. Does the task require unusual strength,height, etc? Y/N [ ]

D2. Does the job put at risk those who arepregnant or have a health problem? Y/N [ ]

D3. Does the task require special knowledgeor training for its safe performance? Y/N [ ]

65

Additional Explanatory Notes

The Task

A(i) In this question the twisting refers to a sideways movement of the upper body(Trunk) whilst the feet are planted.

A(ii) A poor posture is one where the body is NOT well placed to transmit forcesefficiently between the floor and the load.

The Load

B(i) A load may be unstable if parts may be loose, it lacks rigidity, or may otherwisemove unexpectedly eg. handling people or animals.

B(ii) The load may be potentially damaging if the external state of the load impairs grip,discourages good posture or otherwise interferes with safe handling.

66

67

APPENDIX Id

Suggested revised checklist following usability trials and debriefing sessions

with company representatives

68

ASSESSMENT OF THE RISK OF INJURY FROM MANUAL HANDLING TASKSUSING THE PROPOSED HSE GUIDELINES

(This checklist should be used in conjunction with the accompanying text provided)

ASSESSOR COMPANY TASK DATE

MAKING AN ASSESSMENT

CHECKLIST

A. The Task

1. Is there a risk of an injury due to the load being held away from the body?

No [ ] Yes - L [ ]M [ ]H [ ]

2. Is there a risk of an injury due to twisting the trunk?

No [ ] Yes - L [ ]M [ ]H [ ]

3. Is there a risk of an injury due to adopting a poor posture such as stooping?

No [ ] Yes - L [ ]M [ ]H [ 3

4. Is there a risk of an injury due to excessive lifting or lowering distances?

No [ ] Yes - L [ ]M [ ]H [ ]

No - No Risk L - Low Risk

Task carries Task has lowno risk. No risk. Monitoraction required to ensure no

change.

M - Moderate Risk H - High Risk

Task could be risky High risk of injuryparticularly if other and task must betask components areident i fied as ofmoderate risk. Reducerisk to low level.

removed immediatelyor risk minimisedto low level.

69

5. Is there a risk of an injury due to excessive carrying distances?

No [ ] Yes - L [ ]M [ ]H [ ]

6. Is there a risk of an injury due to excessive pushing or pulling of the load?

No [ ] Yes - L [ ]M [ ]H [ ]

7. Is there a risk of an injury due to a sudden movement of the load?

No [ ] Yes - L [ ]M [ ]H [ ]

8. Is there a risk of an injury due to frequent or prolonged physical effort?

No ( ] Yes - L [ ]M

9. Is there a risk of an injury due to insufficient rest or recovery periods?

[ ]H [ ]

No [ ] Yes - L [ ]M [ ]H [ ]

10. Is there a risk of an injury due to handling a load whilst seated?

No [ ] Yes - L [ ]M [ ]H [ ]

11. Is there a risk of an injury as a result of two or more people handling the load atthe same time?

No [ ] Yes - L [ ]M [ ]H [ ]

No - No Risk Low Risk

Task has lowrisk. Monitor

Task carriesno risk. Noaction required to ensure no

change.

M - Moderate Risk

Task could be riskyparticularly if othertask components areidentified as ofmoderate risk. Reducerisk to low level.

H - High Risk

High risk of injuryand task must beremoved immediatelyor risk minimisedto low level.

70

B. The Load

1. Is there a risk of an injury due to the load being heavy?

No [ ] Yes - L [ ]M [ ]H [ ]

2. Is there a risk of an injury due to the load being bulky or unwieldy?

No [ ] Yes - L [ ]M [ ]H [ ]

3. Is there a risk of an injury due to the load being difficult to grasp?

No [ ] Yes - L [ ]M [ ]H [ ]

4. Is there a risk of an injury due to the load being unstable or by its contentsshifting?

No [ ] Yes - L [ ]M [ ]H [ ]

5. Is there a risk of an injury due to the load being sharp, hot or otherwisepotentially damaging?

No [ ] Yes - L [ ]M [ ]H [ 1

C. The Working Environment

1. Is there a risk.of an injury due to space constraints preventing good posture?

No [ ] Yes - L [ ]M [ ]H [ 1

No = No Risk L •= Low Risk

Task has lowrisk. Monitor

Task carriesno risk. Noaction required to ensure no

change.

M - Moderate Risk H - High Risk

Task could be risky High risk of injuryparticularly if other and task must betask components are removed immediatelyidentified as of or risk minimisedmoderate risk. Reduce to low level,risk to low level.

71

2. Is there a risk of an injury due to uneven, slippery or unstable floors?

No [ ] Yes - L [M [H [

3. Is there a risk of an injury due to extremes of temperature, humidity or airmovement?

No [ 1 Yes - L fM [H [

4. Is there a risk of an'injury; duel to-.poor lighting: conditions?

No [ ] Yes - L [M [H r

D. Individual Capability

1. Is there a risk of an injury due to the task requiring unusual strength, height,etc?

No [ ] Yes - L [ ]M [ ]H [ ]

2. Is there a risk of an injury to those who are pregnant or have a health problem?

No [ ] Yes - L [ ]M [ ]H [ ]

3. Is there a risk of an injury due to special knowledge or training having to beacquired for its safe performance.

No [ ] Yes - L [ ]M [ ]H [ ]

No •=• No Risk Low Risk

Task carries Task has lowno risk. No risk. Monitoraction required to ensure no

change.

M - Moderate Risk H - High Risk

Task could be risky High risk of injuryparticularly if other and task must betask components areident i fied as ofmoderate risk. Reducerisk to low level.

removed immediatelyor risk minimisedto low level.

72

73

APPENDIX 2

Summary tables for each question, giving the numbers of responses and percentageagreements for each company

Question Al

company: ComplComp2Comp3Comp4

Overal 1

YY

142840

46

Numbers

YN

21224

20

of responses

NY

21322

28

NN

791028

54

% agreement

Exp-Y

8770660

69

Exp-N

25758393

65

Question A2

company : ComplComp2Comp3Comp4

Overall

YY

22455

36

Numbers

YN

32004

27

of responses

NY

11242

19

NN

286923

66

% agreement

Exp-Y

405410055

57

Exp-N

71756992

77

Question A3

company: ComplComp2Comp3Comp4

Overal 1

YY

26271214

79

Numbers

YN

810010

28

of responses

NY

3724

16

NN

7846

25

% agreement

Exp-Y

767310058

73

Exp-N

70536660

61

74

Quest ion A4

company: ComplComp2Comp3Comp4

Overal 1

YY

201780

45

Numbers

YN

21307

22

of responses

NY

6310

10

NN

1619927

71

% agreement

Exp-Y

90561000

67

Exp-N

728690100

87

Quest ion AS

company: ComplComp2

Comp3Comp4

Overal 1

YY

10

00

1

Numbers

YN

07

00

7

of responses

NY

31

30

7

NN

4044

1534

133

% agreement

Exp-Y

1000

**

12

Exp-N

9397

83100

95

Quest ion A6

company: ComplComp2Comp3Comp4

Overal 1

YY

71273

29

Numbers

YN

21508

25

of responses

NY

2200

4

NN

33231123

90

% agreement

Exp-Y

774410027

53

Exp-N

9492100100

95

75

Quest ion A7

company: ComplComp2CompSComp4

Overal 1

YY

6200

8

Numbers of

YN

71401

22

responses

NY

3664

19

NN

28301229

99

% agreement

Exp-Y

4612*0

26

Exp-N

90836687

83

Question A8

company: ComplComp2Comp3Comp4

Overal 1

YY

17471

29

Numbers

YN

6407

17

of responses

NY

5551

16

NN

1639625

86

% agreement

Exp-Y

735010012

63

Exp-N

76885496

84

Question A9

company: ComplComp2Comp3Comp4

Overal 1

V. ..

YY

6010

7

Number sr

YN

2200

4

of -responses

NY

1221

6

NN

35481533

131

% agreement

Exp-Y

750

100*

63

Exp-N

97968897

95

76

Quest ion A10

company: ComplComp2Comp3Comp4

Overal 1

YY

0000

0

Numbers

YN

0000

0

of responses

NY

0000

0

NN

44521834

148

% agreement

Exp-Y

****

*

Exp-N

100100100100

100

Quest ion All

company: ComplComp2Comp3Comp4

Overal 1

YY

4001

5

Numbers of

YN

2103

6

responses

NY

0040

4

NN

38511430

133

% agreement

Exp=Y

660*25

45

Exp=N

10010077100

97

Quest ion Bl

company: ComplComp2Comp3Comp4

Overal 1

YY

3322108

73

Numbers of

YN

516013

34

responses

NY

3420

9

NN

310613

32

% agreement

Exp=Y

865710038

68

Exp=N

507175100

78

77

Quest ion B2

company: ComplComp2Comp3Comp4

Overal 1

YY

237122

44

Numbers

YN

96014

29

of responses

NY

5950

19

NN

7301

18

56

% agreement

Exp-Y

715310012

60

Exp=N

587616100

74

Quest Ion B3

company: ComplComp2Comp3Comp4

Overal 1

YY

18254

29

Numbers

YN

51406

25

of responses

NY

9181

19

NN

1235523

75

% agreement

Exp-Y

781210040

53

Exp-N

57973895

79

Quest ion B4

company: ComplComp2Comp3Comp4

Overal 1

YY

11020

13

Numbers

YN

7901

17

of responses

NY

3251

11

NN

23411132

107

% agreement

Exp-Y

610

1000

43

Exp-N

88956897

90

78

Quest ion B5

company: ComplComp2CompSComp4

Overal 1

YY

6321

12

Numbers

YN

41201

17

of responses

NY

0280

10

NN

3435832

109

% agreement

Exp-Y

602010050

41

Exp-N

1009450100

91

Quest ion Cl

company: ComplComp2Comp3Comp4

Overal 1

YY

77

110

25

Numbers

YN

5221

11

39

of responses

NY

3210

6

NN

2921523

78

% agreement

Exp-Y

5824910

39

Exp-N

909183100

92

Quest ion C2

company: ComplComp2Comp3Comp4

Overal 1

YY

1504

10

Numbers *of

YN

414012

30

•responses

NY

2332

10

NN

37301516

98

% agreement

Exp-Y

2026*25

25

Exp=N

94908388

90

79

Question C3

company: ComplComp2Comp3Comp4

Overal 1

YY

2592

18

Numbers

YN

46210

22

of responses

NY

0311

5

NN

3838621

103

% agreement

Exp-Y

33458116

45

Exp-N

100928595

95

Question C4

company: ComplComp2Comp3Comp4

Overal 1

YY

1300

4

Numbers of

YN

111604

31

responses

NY

5060

11

NN

27331230

102

% agreement

Exp-Y

8100*0

11

Exp=N

841566100

90

Quest ion C5

company: ComplComp2Comp3Comp4

Overal 1

YY

0000

0

Numbers

YN

01403

17

of responses

NY

0000

0

NN

44381831

131

% agreement

Exp=Y

*0*0

0

Exp=N

100100100100

100

80

Question Dl

company : ComplComp2CompSComp4

Overal 1

YY

0301

4

Numbers of

YN

73601

44

responses

NY

20110

13

NN

3513732

87

% agreement

Exp-Y

07*50

8

Exp-N

9410038100

87

Question D2

company: ComplComp2Comp3Comp4

Overal 1

YY

2448180

90

Numbers of

YN

1830

31

52

responses

NY

0100

1

NN

2003

5

% agreement

Exp-Y

57941000

63

Exp-N

1000*

100

83

Question D3

company : ComplComp2Comp3Comp4

Overal 1

YY

2122160

59

Numbers

YN

1611228

57

of responses

NY

1500

6

NN

61406

26

% agreement

Exp-Y

5666880

50

Exp=N

8573*

100

81

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