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40 Years of High-speed Railways

Feature

Japan Railway & Transport Review 40 • March 200536 Copyright © 2005 EJRCF. All rights reserved.

High-speed Railways in Germany

Klaus Ebeling

High Speed?

When the railway appeared as a newmeans of transportation in the first halfof the 19th century, its top speed of 30 to40 km/h was considered dangerous. InGermany, where Adler transported twobarrels of beer between Nuremberg andFürth in 1835 as the first German railfreight, physicians warned people againstsuch perilous adventures and farmerswere worried that their cows grazingalongside the tracks would ‘go mad’ atthe sight of the ‘rushing steel monsters’and that the milk would sour.Although these worries turned out to beunfounded, there were renewedwarnings against further speed increaseswhen railways were already welldeveloped. In Paris in the TwentiethCentury (writ ten in 1863 but notpublished in English until 1997), JulesVerne (1828–1905), the famous Frenchauthor of science fiction literatureincluding Around the World in EightyDays, Twenty Thousand Leagues underthe Sea described a future fantasy worldof shiny skyscrapers made of glass andsteel, high-speed trains, gas-drivenautomobiles, computers, fax machinesand a global communications network.Verne’s farsighted vision of futuretechnologies is set against the backgroundof the tragic struggle of an idealistic youngman searching for happiness in anunmerciful materialistic dystopia. In thisgloomy picture, Verne fears the approachof a future in which loss of humanity isthe price paid for the unscrupulousapplication of perfected technology.Friedrich List (1789–1846), the founder ofthe German macroeconomic science, hada different attitude toward the new meansof transportation. He was a champion ofGermany economic unity and had aprofound impact on German railways; heestabl ished the Leipzig–DresdenEisenbahngesellschaft in 1834 as the basis

of his planned railway system covering allGermany. In The National System ofEconomic Policy (1841, uncompleted),his main work on economics, hecountered Adam Smith’s (1723–90) classicdoctrine of free trade with a ‘theory ofproductive forces’ orientated towardeconomic practice and describing theimpac t o f a speed inc rea se i ntransportation on industrial and economicissues. Subsequent modern experienceproved his hypothesis of the extraordinaryeconomic development set in motion byshortened travel times and expansion ofpeople’s range of action. His appraisalwas shared by Goethe (1749–1832) whodid not experience rail travel but realizedthat such an effective means of transportcould have political repercussions as well.Goethe said he was not worried aboutGerman unity (at that time Germany

consisted of several states) because therailways would solve the problem.History proved him right!The railway’s greater speed compared toprevious means of transportation playeda major role in the huge industrial boomin Europe and America at the end of the19th century and railway’s pre-eminencewas only jeopardized by the later adventof the more-flexible automobile and thefaster aeroplane.The s t r ugg l e f o r sup remacy i ntransportation is not a recent phenomenonand railway advocates have longpondered how to compete against air androad. The earliest and obvious solutionwas found by increasing speed and theearly years of the 20th century weremarked by successive breakings of variousrail speed records. In 1903, Germany setan early record of 200 km/h with an

Planned Trans European Network Transport (TEN-T)

Source: UIC

NurembergNuremberg

GlasgoGlasgow

Valencia

BarBari

MilanMilan

BolognaBologna

LjubLjubljanaljana

Tiranaana

HambHamburgurg

AmsterdamAmsterdam

SkSkopjeopje

DubDublinLondonLondon

GenoGenova

BordeauxBordeaux

RennesRennes

Porto

Lisboa

MunichMunichMunich

NurembergFrankfurankfurt

BrBrussels

Luxemboembowgwg

CologneCologne

HannoHannoverer

ViennaViennaVienna

RomeRome

NaplesNaples

BucharestBucharest

GdanGdansk

Málaga

MarseilleMarseille

BarcelonaBarcelona

EdinbEdinburghGlasgow

Valencia

Barcelona

Marseille

Bari

Istanbul

Ankara

Kishina

Bucharest

KievLvïv

Minsk

HelsinkiHelsinkiHelsinki

Vilnius

Warsaw

Katowice

Bratislava

Zürich

Geneva Milan

Bologna

Budapest

Belgrade

ZagrebLjubljana

Sofia

Tirana

Riga

TallinnStocStockholmkholmStockholm

SundsvSundsvallallSundsvall

St. Petersburg

Moscow

Hamburg

Amsterdam

Skopje

Sarajevo

Berlin

Edinburgh

DublinLondon Hannover

Cologne

LuxembowgFrankfurt Prague

Oslo

Genova

Bordeaux

Rennes

Paris

Lyon

Madrid

Porto

SeSevilla

Lisboa

Sevilla0 500 km

Improved route

New route

HG-Netz 2020

Málaga

GothenbGothenburgurg

CopenhagenCopenhagenCopenhagen Gdansk

AthensAthens

Gothenburg

Athens

Naples

Rome

Brussels

Japan Railway & Transport Review 40 • March 2005 37Copyright © 2005 EJRCF. All rights reserved.

electric locomotive between Marienfeldand Zossen. A new dimension incommercial high speed on rails wasi n a u g u r a t e d b y t h e D e u t s c h eReichsbahngesellschaft in 1933 when theworld-famous Fliegender Hamburger(Flying Hamburger) achieved an averagespeed of 122 km/h and a maximum speedof 160 km/between Berlin and Hamburg.Japan’s railways came to the forefront ofattention in 1964 with still higher speedswhen the Tokaido Shinkansen openedbetween Tokyo and Shin Osaka withoperations starting at 210 km/h. TheFrench topped this in 1981 with speedsof 270 km/h on the new TGV line betweenParis and Lyon. These two mammothrailway achievements were followed bylong debate on the relative merits ofdistr ibuted tract ion (used by theshinkansen) and centralized traction witha locomotive (used by the TGV), as wellas on the value of separation of passengersand freight or use of mixed transport.Germany finally followed the Japaneseand French achievements with thedevelopment of the InterCity Express (ICE)described in more detail below.As commercial speeds rose, variousrailway operators conducted ever-fastertrial runs to investigate pushing thecommercial speed envelope higher.France set a new world record forelectric traction in 1955 with a test runof 331 km/h. This was broken byGermany in 1988 with an ICE test run of406.8 km/h. This was beaten in turn afew weeks later by France with 408 km/hand then again in 1990 with 482.4 km/h.France still holds the current world speedrecord for wheels on rails with 513.3 km/hachieved in 1990 using a production TGV.These test runs have helped prove there l i ab i l i t y o f ro l l ing s tock andinfrastructure at high speeds and railwayengineers now describe speeds above200 km/h as ‘high speed.’ However,actual commercial speeds have graduallybeen pushed well beyond 200 km/h to

reach between 300 and 350 km/h,depending on local topography, and thehigh-speed records prove that the wheel–rail system still has the technical potentialto go beyond present commercial speeds,although noise and energy consumptionconsiderations have prevented this so far.High-speed railways are being plannedin other countries too, including Spain,Italy, Korea and Taiwan. In somecountries, high-speed trains operate onexisting conventional lines by keeping tothe 200 km/h maximum limit. Forexample, Switzerland’s mountainoustopography allows no other solution thatstays within reasonable cost limits. InSweden, despite very long lines that canonly operate at a profit by connecting majorconurbations, the low population densitymakes little sense of going overboard onhigh-speed transportation. In mountainouscountries, a common solution is to usetilting trains permitting up to 30% higherspeeds on conventional lines.

Separate or Mixed Passengerand Freight Traffic?

The German preparations for adoption ofhigh-speed services saw a very time-consuming debate between the Ministry

of Transport and railway managementcentred on the key issue of whether newlines should be dedicated solely topassenger traffic (following the Japaneseand French model) or whether mixedpassenger and freight traffic would bebest. The state railways obtained a largepart of their income from freight trafficand were therefore inclined to offset thehigh investment in new infrastructure byserving freight traffic as well. On theother hand, some top persons advocatedseparation of passengers and freight.Although the Cologne–Frankfurt line wasintended to be the first new high-speedline, the planning schedule has beendelayed by this dispute to such an extentthat it has fallen behind the Hannover–Würzburg and Mannheim–Stuttgart lines.Although the first decision was to buildthe Cologne–Frankfurt line as a mixedpassenger–freight line, experience fromthe other lines showed that freight trafficcould only be accommodated withsevere restr ict ions. Firs t , i t wasimpossible to create a reasonabletimetable for daytime freight due to largespeed differences between passenger andfreight traffic. Second, the required timeslots for night freight traffic could not beallocated because high-speed lines

ICE 3 running parallel to the Autobahn A3 between Cologne and Frankfurt (Bildarchiv DB AG)

Japan Railway & Transport Review 40 • March 200538


Copyright © 2005 EJRCF. All rights reserved.

require high levels of maintenance thatcan only be done at night. The differentweight of passenger and freight trains isanother factor favouring separation ofpassenger and freight traffic; lighterpassenger trains can negotiate steepergrades (35 per mil or 35‰) than heavierfreight trains (10 per mil or 10‰),permitting more direct alignments withfewer tunnels. The Hannover–Würzburgline was the first to be operated at highspeed but the initially planned freighttraffic was soon discontinued for theabove reasons, only to be subsequentlyresumed. At present, heavy freight trainsrun every 6 minutes at night at 120 km/h,while more lightly loaded trains arepermitted to run at 160 km/h.Another dispute that required resolutionwas the incompatibility between high-speed traffic and short-distance traffic,especially in conurbations. The solutionrequ i red separa t ion o f the twoinfrastructures and giving priority to high-speed services. But freight traffic is nowdemanding the same privileges to protectits business quality, which suffers seriousdelays at some times of day by being‘pushed aside’ in favour of short-distancecommuter traffic, which has absolutepriority. To their regret, freight trafficmanagers cannot overcome this inherentdisadvantage of freight through extrapayments to the infrastructure manager/owner, because the priority of commutertraffic is based on social necessity.Another key issue that became an almostideological debate was about whetherfuture high-speed rolling stock should usedistributed traction like the Japaneseshinkansen or be hauled by powerfullocomotives like the French TGV.Advocates of distributed traction arguedthat it enables flexible adjustment ofcapacity to demand. Its opponents arguethat in a high-speed world, no time wouldbe available for shunting and flexibilityonly makes sense if two or three motorunits can be coupled together.

Even more fundamental questions werebeing raised about the necessity for high-speed trains based on economic, socialand env i ronmen ta l ob j ec t i on s .Undoubtedly, high-speed track, rollingstock, and safety infrastructure areincredibly expensive and state fundingtends to leave government coffers withhardly any funds for regional middle-distance traffic. Short-distance commutertraffic tends to be exempt from thisproblem because politicians realize thatpublic service obligations (PSOs) are ahot potato they ignore at their peril.Critics of high-speed rail argue that thereis no good justification for ignoringmiddle-distance regional traffic, whichcarries many more ordinary people thanthe ‘elite’ high-speed traffic used mostlyby a relatively small number of businesstravellers. A second fundamentalcriticism of high-speed trains is that theyconsume too much energy and generatetoo much noise. The energy merits ofhigh-speed trains versus short-distance airtravel have been questioned by ProfessorRoger Kemp of Lancaster University in arecent UK study, but opinion remainsdivided. Environmental criticisms havebeen rebuffed so far by taking carefulmeasures to protect wildlife. Forexample, expensive sound barriers havebeen built to protect the breeding sitesof bustards, etc., and deer can continuefollowing 1000-year old paths throughrailway underpasses.

Rolling Stock

The German ICE operated today byDeutsche Bahn AG (DB AG) waspreceded by the short-lived Class ET403railcar developed in 1972 by DeutscheBundesbahn (DB). The German intercitynetwork was inaugurated during the1971–72 period coupled with a massivetimetable revision and the developmentof the ET403 railcar at the same time that

the state-of-the-art Class 103 electriclocomotive came into scheduled serviceand is a good indicator of the internaldisputes described above. The ET403came into full service with the 1974–75winter timetable revision and was actuallya very advanced concept. It hadunderfloor motors driving all axles,providing advantages of low axial load,reduced rail wear and good acceleration.Passive tilting technology enabled it totravel at a maximum speed of 200 km/heven on tracks with many curves buttechnical shortcomings made somepassengers travel-sick, resulting in thetemporary abandonment of tiltingtechnology. On the other hand, the air-bolster suspension provided a verycomfortable ride in combination with aluxurious interior with heated windowpanes and swivel seats. Although the first-class-only Star train continued theRheingold luxury coach tradition, and wasvery popular with the travelling public,only three sets were built and theyremained in service for just 4.5 years untilthe 1978–79 winter timetable revision.Their operation life was short because lackof suitable tracks mostly prevented themrunning at their maximum speed.However, economic and ecologicalreasons prompted the Ministry of Transportto implement a policy of replacing internaldomestic flights with railway services andthe ET403 was revived in March 1982 asthe Lufthansa Airport Express servicebetween Düsseldorf and Frankfurt. Theconcept was expanded using loco-hauled trains between Stuttgart andFrankfurt but was discontinued when thediscovery of severe corrosion damageforced the ET403 to be scrapped. Thisearly sensible cooperation between railand air services was continued byallowing air travellers to reserve seats onregular trains. Undoubtedly, DB’s ET403was ahead of its time and must take thehonour of being the forerunner of Germanhigh-speed services.


Despite the problems with the ET403 andthe success of the Class 103 locomotive,DB proceeded with designing an EMUtaking into consideration aerodynamicrequirements at higher speeds. Afterextensive studies by the Federal Ministryof Research and Technology (FMRT),financing was secured to start buildingthe Series 410-001 InterCity Experimentalin September 1982. About 60% of theDM94 million in construction costs wascovered by the FMRT with the remainderborne by the manufacturers and DB. TheClass 410 entered service on 19 March1985 soon after leaving the works andbecame the first train in the history ofGerman railways to pass the 300 km/hmark on a test track between Bielefeld andHamm on 26 October 1985 when it set anew record of 317 km/h. This record wasbroken again by the ICE when it set a worldrecord of 406.9 km/h on 1 May 1988.The InterCity Experimental incorporatedvarious design innovations from the fieldsof aeronautics and aerospace engineeringto achieve excellent aerodynamicperformance. The axles used solidmonobloc wheels as wel l as a i rsuspension. The two power units hadpowered bogies with two three-phaseasynchronous motors each for a total ratedpower of 4.2 MW. The braking system

was especially noteworthy because itconsisted of an electrical regenerativebrake, mechanical disc brakes and a railbrake using eddy current.While the InterCity Experimental(sometimes called the ICE-V) was still indevelopment, in the summer of 1988, DBordered 82 units of the first-generation Class401 ICE 1. It was designed to reach amaximum speed of 280 km/h on new tracksand 200 km/h on existing tracks. Themaximum speed through tunnels waslimited to 250 km/h due to large pressure-wave effects in trains closing head-on. TheICE 1 train set consists of two identicalmotor cars (one at each end) and 12 carsbetween them. An optical-fibre controlcable runs the full 400-m length of the setensuring that driving and brakingc o m m a n d s a r r i v e p r a c t i c a l l ysimultaneously at both motor cars. If theoptical fibre parts while the train is moving,a fail-safe mechanism activates full servicebraking (automatic train stop). The ICE 1has a Scharfenberg coupler that allows anICE to be towed in an emergency but doesnot permit double heading of two ICE trains,which only became possible with ICE 2trains (Class 402).The two ICE 1 motor cars haveindependent brake systems. Most servicebraking uses the regenerative brakes and

the pneumatic disc brakes (two per axle)are only used when additional brakingpower is needed and to prevent a stoppedtrain rolling. In addition to disc brakes,the passenger cars also have rail brakesbut the system is different to the eddy-current based rail brakes of the ICE-V,which had brake problems. The ICE-Vsuffered from some noise and vibration,especially in the restaurant car, so DBchanged from the earlier solid monoblocwheels to resilient wheels. Although thischange cut the in-carriage noise andvibration, the disintegration of the tyre ofa resilient wheel was a principal factorcausing the Eschede accident in June 1998that killed 101 people. As a result, alltrains have been retrofitted with theoriginal solid monobloc wheels.Compared to the French TGV, the ICE 1is much more comfortable and morespacious but at DM50 million per train, itis nearly three times more expensive thana TGV Atlantique train. The much highercost is mainly due to the more complexelectronics in the monitoring anddiagnostic systems. On the other hand,the TGV has the advantage of Jacobs-typebogies with superior aerodynamics andbetter stability in a derailment. However,the TGV has disadvantages of narrowercar passages and a restricted axle load of17 tonnes . A l though the TGVintermediate cars are shorter than thoseof the ICE 1, two TGVs can be coupled toprovide an adequate number of seats evenduring peak periods.The ICE 1 changed the fundamentals ofGerman railways; speeds of 310 km/hwere easily reached during test runs insummer 1990. The first 23 trains enteredscheduled service at a maximum speedof 250 km/h between Hamburg andMunich in June 1991, considerablyshortening travel times between manyGerman cities and cutting 62 minutes offthe journey between Hamburg andFrankfurt and up to 115 minutes fromHamburg to Stuttgart.

Driver’s cab of ICE 3 (Bildarchin DB AG)




Services were easily extended intoAustria and Switzerland although Swissservices required addition of a narrowerpantograph. However, internationalservices to the Netherlands, Belgium andFrance were blocked by incompatiblesignalling; France also objected that theICE trains are too wide and too heavy forthe French gauge. On the other hand,an ICE 1 t ra in se t even made atransatlantic journey as described in thearticle by Mr Black on pp. 18–21 in thisissue of JRTR. Although the ICE 1 set anAmerican speed record of 260 km/h andoperated as the Amtrak Metroliner forseveral months, a variant of the FrenchTGV was chosen for budget reasons.Following the first 60 ICE 1 train sets, DBordered 44 second-generation ICE 2 trainsets in August 1993. They are shorter setsthat can run on busy track sections as acombination of two coupled trains anddouble heading. Some pantographproblems arose because vibration ofclosely adjacent pantographs causes thetrailing pantograph to lose proper wirecontact. Tests were run in cooperation withTGV engineers—who have been doubleheading TGVs for more than 18 years—tosolve these problems and for testing thebow flaps for firmness in the opened state.Following the tragic Eschede accident in1998, DB AG fitted the ICE 2 with an earlywarning system to detect incipientdamage to bogies and wheels. Sensorson each bogie detect the occurrence ofcracks or other signs of wear from thebogie vibration profile. Apart from theICE, only Eurostar services through theChannel Tunnel between Europe and theUK have this type of wheel diagnostics.A special problem occurs when thedriving trailer of the ICE 2 is running inthe lead. Since the driving trailer has nomotors or power converter, it is lighterthan the driving unit and there is dangerof the trailer rising and derailing whenthere are strong cross-winds on opensections. In the UK, this problem was

solved for the Inter City 225 by using anartificial ballast. In Germany, wind breaksand protective walls have been built alongthe track and anemometers are installedat known windy locations. When thewind speed exceeds the threshold, a signalis sent directly to the ICE automatic traincontrol system informing the driver to slowto a maximum speed of 200 km/h evenon sections with a speed limit of 250 or280 km/h. This problem does not occurwhen running with the driving unit in thelead or when double heading with thedriving unit at the front, so the speedrestriction does not apply in these cases.T h e I C E 2 s t a r t e d c o m m e rc i a lopera t ions in June 1997 on theCologne–Hannover–Berlin l ine atmaximum speeds of 250 km/h. Thislimit was later increased to 280 km/hexcept in tunnels. Initially, ICE 2 trainsonly served east–west lines but they arenow found on most ICE lines except inAustria and Switzerland. A more powerfulcomputer was installed to improve controlfor double heading as well as for betterwheel-slip and wheel-skid prevention.Data are displayed on two monitors, oneeach in the lead and trailing units. Thebogies are fitted with air suspension toimprove the running stability over theICE 1, making it possible to retrofit thelow-maintenance time-tested solidmonobloc wheels without problems. TheICE 2 exterior is similar to that of the ICE 1but the domed roof of the restaurant car(which was criticized by the public asbeing out of harmony with the overalldesign theme) was eliminated foraerodynamic reasons. The passenger seatsweigh only 25 kg, 50% less than ICE 1 seats.Every car has power outlets to support ACoperation of laptop computers. However,despite the overall success of the ICE 2,DB AG does not envisage placinganother order for more sets because the40 per mil (40‰) grade on the plannedFrankfurt–Cologne high-speed line wouldovertax the present ICE series.

Following the ICE 2, DB AG faced a majordecision about whether to stay with thepresent system of centralized traction orto develop new distributed-traction EMUslike the Japanese shinkansen. Past Frenchand German experience spoke for keepingcentralized traction, but economicconsiderations favoured a differentsolution. For example, about 17% of a200-m long French TGV is occupied bythe two motor cars, which do not producefare revenues from seats. In the case of ashinkansen EMU where traction motorsare distributed throughout the train length,passengers can be seated along the fulllength except in the driver ’s cab.Moreover, the EMU principle has theadvantage of low static axle loadsmeaning less track wear and tear, etc.The optimum internal divisions andexternal design were determined bybuilding a full-scale model in 1996 andICE 3 production started a year later.Although DB AG had to wait a long timebefore the ICE became a distributed tractionsystem, the ICE-M is now a reality. Seventeenof the first 50 ICE 3 sets (Class 403) aremultiple units (Class 406). Four of the first17 sets were supplied to NetherlandsRailways (NS) due to urgent rolling-stockneeds, and December 2000 saw ICE 3trials in Switzerland. More ICE 3 testswere made in June 2001 betweenStrasbourg, Nancy, and Mulhouse inFrance. A train was tested in Belgium inJanuary 2002 and subsequently made testruns between Calais and Lille. The Frenchtrials were made to test the compatibilityof power systems and brakes with SNCFregulations, as well to investigate theinteraction between the pantograph andcatenary. The goal is to obtain type approvalfor operations on the French network.Eleven ICE 3 train sets were incorporatedinto the timetable for the Hannover EXPO2000, meeting with success right from thestart. ICE 3 services have been operatingbetween Frankfurt (Main) and Cologneevery 2 hours since 4 November 2000


with alternate intermediate stops atLimburg, Montabaur, and Siegburg; everytrain stops at Frankfurt Airport and servicefrequencies were increased to 1-hourintervals on 15 September 2002. Six newICE lines are now running on this newinfrastructure.Raising the maximum speed to 300 km/hsoon showed up a number of deficienciesin couplings, air-conditioning, rail brakes,disc brakes and motors. The remediesrequired many meetings between DB AGand the builders, suggesting that thedevelopment time was too short and DBAG did not allow sufficient time foroperation tests.ICE 3 services have been running toAmsterdam since June 2000 and three runsper day were added between Frankfurt(Main) and Brussels (Bruxelles-Midi) in timefo r the 2002 win te r t ime tab le .Unfortunately, use on the Belgian high-speed line has yet to be approved, so theICE 3 services run on the old line, taking15 minutes longer than would be possibleon the high-speed line. When the high-speed tests have been completed, thejourney between Frankfurt and Brusselswill drop to 3 hours and 32 minutes.The future TGV Est Européen line fromParis via Strasbourg to Munich will beserved by both French TGVs and GermanICE 3s. Spanish National Railways(RENFE) has decided in favour of theICE 3 for its service on the new Madrid–Zaragoza–Barcelona line where trains willrun at service speeds of 350 km/h—thehighest in the world.This performance is possible because halfof all the ICE 3 bogies are powered,guaranteeing excellent acceleration.Unlike the TGV, centre bogies were notchosen because priority was given toquick bogie replaceability. The new SGP500 bogie used by the ICE 3 is lighter thanthe SGP 400 of the ICE 2, and the stillolder design of the ICE 1. Both the designof the bogie frame and coach body ensurevery quiet running. All bogies have disc

brakes while the traction motors serve asregenerative brakes supplying power backto the catenary during service braking.The pneumatic disc brakes are only usedat lower speeds. Since some countriesdo not permit back-supply to the catenaryat regenerative braking, brake resistorsare installed in the ICE-M units to absorbthe regenerated power as heat. Railbraking using eddy current is very effectiveunder all rail conditions but the highmagnetic field induced by eddy current

can interfere with signals, so tracksidesignalling systems must be shielded.The ICE 3 train sets have lavish interiorswith an attractive lounge at each endwhere passengers can get a driver’s eyeview of the tracks.

The German Railway Network

Heavy aerial bombing during WWII left theGerman rail network badly damaged.

German High-speed Network

Innsbruck

Karisrune

Saarbrücken

Dulsburg

Freiburg

Brussels

Kiel

Copenhagen

Hamburg

ABS 230 km/h

Berlin Warsaw

Magdeburg

Braunschweig

Hamm Göttingen

Leipzig

Nuremberg

Dresden

Vienna

ViennaSalzburg

Brenner

Innsbruck

Garmisch

Ulm Augsburg

Zürich

FreiburgMunich

Stuttgart

Heidelberg

Frankfurt

Prague

ICE-TD

ICE-TD

Halle

Kassel

AachenBonn

Cologne

Dulsburg

Amsterdam

BrusselsFulda

FRA

Mainz

Mannheim

Karisrune

Saarbrücken

Paris

Strasbourg

Würzburg

Hannover

Bremen

Münster

Dortmund

Erfurt

Passau

New route (NBS)250 – 300 km/hImproved route (ABS)160 – 200 km/hImproved junction

Basle




Moreover, the political division of Germanyinto West and East cut the mainly east–westoriented network, forcing a north–southreorientation in what was then WestGermany. The West German federalgovernment developed a comprehensiveplan for the entire transportationinfrastructure including railways. The DBcomponent envisaged 2225 km of newlines supporting speeds up to 300 km/h anddevelopment of a further 1250 km forspeeds up to 200 km/h. Work on the firstnew Hannover–Würzburg line (327 km)started in August 1973 and it was openedin sections between 1988 and 1991. Othernew lines were envisaged betweenCologne and Frankfurt (177 km), andMannheim and Stuttgart (100 km). Thelatter line was opened between 1987 and1991. However, the First Gulf War andsubsequent oil crisis forced the plans to bescaled back; the Cologne–Frankfurt linewas dropped and less ambitious operationstargets were set for the other new lines withmixed passenger and freight traffic runningat maximum speeds of 200 and 80 km/h,respectively.The 1981 opening of the first TGV linebetween Paris and Lyons and subsequentsuccessful operations inspired DB toformulate a High-speed Transportation Planfor the Nineties in 1984. The three keyelements were full utilization of the plannednew lines and extensions; development ofhigh-speed trains based on the latest R&Dinto ‘wheels on steel’; and furtherdevelopment of the Inter City system startedin 1979 under the slogan ‘Every hour—Everyclass’ and now forming the core ofpassenger traffic on regular lines.The commercial idea was based on theconcept of ‘half as fast as the aeroplane—twice as fast as the car.’ In contrast to theFrench concept, the proviso was that high-speed trains should only operate to aminor degree on conventional lines,because they could not display theiradvantages on such lines. On the otherhand, Germany’s polycentric structure

made it impossible to operate radiallyfrom the centre of the country; the existingIC network formed the shape of a figure‘8’ with hub stations where passengerscould make easy cross-pla t formconnections to another line.In the course of this new impetus,planning of the Cologne–Frankfurt linewas resumed, but now as a pure passengerline. However, it was not the next line tobe handed over to passenger traffic. Dueto the sudden fall of the Berlin Wall andsubsequent German reunification, the‘provisional’ West German capital of Bonnwas moved back to Berlin, resulting in therelocation of the German government andmaking new transport planning an urgentnecessity. In 1992, a new federaltimetable was issued which foresaw a newline between Hannover (more preciselyWolfsburg) and Berlin. It too was to besolely a passenger line with the old tracksrunning parallel to the new alignment tobe freight-only. Clearly a new railwaystrategy was in the offing—systematicseparation of passengers and freight—under a plan known as ‘Network 21,’ thename indicating the enormity of the task.The so-called East–West line enteredoperation in 1998, while the Cologne–Frankfurt line was delayed until 2002.Due to constraints on the public purse,new plans today centre on projects tocomplete the intra-German system,including raising speeds on the Hamburg–Berlin line to 230 km/h and connectingthe southern conurbation of Munich viaThuringen (Erfurt) and Saxony (Leipzig) toBerlin. However, as the central railway,DB AG must comply with EU plans forEuropean-wide rail transport. TheMannheim–Basle line is important forsouthbound traffic to Switzerland andItaly, and the Cologne–Aix-la-Chapelle–Lüttich link will complete the Paris–Brussels–Amsterdam–Cologne (PBKA)system. Extensions, starting with theFrankfurt–Basle line towards Saarbrückenand Strasbourg will make a great

contribution to the European Paris–easternFrance–south Germany–Vienna axis (POS).Although we are still seeing what has beentermed the ‘frontier effect’ (in which a fulltrain becomes nearly empty at the lastborder station and then fills up again atthe first station across the border), theplans for a European high-speed networkintroduced as early as 1989 by theInternational Railway Association (UIC)and the Community of European Railways(representing railways at the EU inBrussels) are continuing and are reflectedin the concept of the trans-Europeannetwork pursued by the EU Commission.The Commission made an importantcontribution by pushing interoperabilityin the European high-speed system. Itissued guidelines on interoperability thatcame into effect on 17 September 1996.The amended guideline became part ofGerman law in 1999 and stipulates thekey aims of interoperability, the scope ofapplication and implementation ofprovisions, as well as the process fordrawing up and adopting the technicalspecifications for interoperability.The guideline sets its sights on the entiresystem, both infrastructure (track, powersupply, train control/signalling, and rollingstock) and performance (maintenance,operation, environment, and passengers).The aim of the Commission’s policy is free,unimpeded transport of goods andpassengers within the European market.Although there was some previouscompatibility in conventional traffic, withpassenger carriages and freight wagonstravelling across borders throughout theentire continent, the different power andsignalling systems represented obstaclesthat hindered the transition of nationalrailway systems to a liberal Europe-widerailway market. The problems of differentpower suppl ies were so lved bydevelopment of multiple-power systemsbecause nobody had the massive fundsrequired to standardize power supplysystems. However, standardization of


s igna l l ing on which h igh-speedtechnology is very dependent isconsidered rational. Therefore, the EU issupporting development of a standardizedEuropean signalling technology calledE u r o p e a n R a i l w a y s Tr a n s p o r tManagement System (ERMTS) or, inaccordance with the parlance of railways,the European Train Control System (ETCS)using funds from the research budget.Introduction of ETCS is intended tosupplant the multitude of national train-safety systems in high-speed railways,enable more intelligent design of traincontrol and safety through integration,save costs for maintenance and operationof fixed installations, and increase linecapacity and speeds. In 1999, the ETCSspecified by the UIC was successfullytested on the Vienna–Budapest line butDB AG estimates that Europe-wideintroduction of ETCS will take 15 to 20years with costs of about €500 million inGermany alone and about €8 billionEurope-wide. The present system, whichis backwards-compatible with existingsignalling systems, is not yet fully mature,so DB AG had to delay its plannedintroduction on the new Cologne–Frankfurtline and reverted to DB AG’s provencontinuous train control system (LZB).Unlike conventional systems, with theLZB system the train driver is not guidedby trackside signals, which only safelypermit speeds up to 160 km/h due to slowhuman reaction times. Instead, the driverfollows information displayed in the cab.The most distinctive feature of the systemis one cable running along the middle ofthe track and a second cable runningalong the inside rail. The cables crossevery 100 m at track conductors and datais passed from these crossing points to theconnected signal box. The dispatchers.stationmaster, etc., can determine the trainlocation to within 100 m. Three LZBcomputers operating in parallel in thesignal boxes feed data to the track andget data from it. At least two of the three

computers must arrive at the same resultbefore a command is passed on. Thistechnology extends the ‘view’ of the traindriver by several kilometers, permittingon-t ime driver react ions even atsubs tan t ia l ly h igher speeds . Adevelopment of LZB is the so-calledComputer Integrated Railroading—Increaseof Efficiency in Core Network (CIR-ELKE)system, which permits more trains to travelalong a track and increases track capacityone step further.

Economics

The high-speed trains of DB AG met withimmediate popular success just like theirpredecessors in Japan and France. Thenumber of train-kilometers increased anddemand showed corresponding growthwith improving revenues in long-distancepassenger traffic. In Germany, with itslarge population and polycentricconurbations, the economic efficiency

Main Rail Passenger Flows in Germany




could be sound if the federal governmentcon t inues he lp ing to fund newinfrastructure. However, the lowpopulation density in France coupled withsmaller and fewer conurbations suggeststhere is a limit to the profitability of high-speed railways there.The new efficient high-speed railwayshave had more impact on air traffic thanroad traffic; short-haul air traffic hasdeclined noticeably wherever high-speedtrain services make an appearance. Thisis especially apparent in France where allair services between Paris and Brusselshave been discontinued because the TGVruns from Brussels’ South Station to Paris’Charles de Gaulle Airport and from ParisNorth to Zaventem International Airportin Brussels. Since the TGV Méditeranéestarted covering the 700 km between Parisand Marseille in 3 hours, many airlinecustomers on this sector have changed tothe train. This policy has been pursuedin Germany by including the airports atFrankfurt and Cologne in the high-speednetwork. Budget airlines are a danger dueto their unbeatable low prices thanks tofuel and VAT tax exemptions andsometimes preferential treatment by local

authorities. Whether this is a correctpolicy in view of efforts to use moreenvironment-friendly transportation ishotly debated in Europe. However, high-speed rail passenger traffic in Europe stilllooks very promising, especially after thenext round of line improvements.

Alternatives to SteelWheels on Rails?

The German magnetic-levitation (maglev)system recently commercialized inShanghai might suffer the same fate asm a n y o t h e r G e r m a n h i g h - t e c hdevelopments. The development ofmagnetic-levitation systems goes back to1922 when Hermann Kemper was the firstperson to consider replacing train wheelswith electromagnets. Although hepatented his idea in 1934, the technologyat that time was inadequate to realize hisvision of ‘flying at zero altitude.’ Researchon magnetic levitation was only resumedin 1966 by a development team at BölkowKG. In 1968, Bölkow KG, DB, and StrabaBau AG established a company toevaluate the feasibility of magnetic-levitation technology compared to wheel–

Transrapid maglev running on test track (Author)

rail technology. It found that a magnetic-levitation ‘railway’ could be profitablealong Germany’s north–south axis. In thesame year, a maximum speed of 70 km/hwas achieved by an experimental vehicleon a 660-m track, providing proof of thetechnology concept.Development of a magnetic-levitationtrain in Japan began 2 years later than inGermany. Its proponents promised lowernoise levels with higher speeds than theshinkansen. Japan Airlines (JAL) sensed agood business chance with ‘flying at zeroaltitude’ and joined the development effortin 1971 using West-German technology.However, the experimental vehicleproduced in 1975 was very different fromthe German prototype. By 1977, theHSST-01 had reached speeds of 150 km/hsoon rising to 500 km/h state-of-the-artmagnetic t rains but no pract icalapplication was adopted. The idea ofbuilding a magnetic train betweenHamburg and Berlin was rejected by thehead of DB AG on the grounds of beinguneconomical. A minor success wasachieved in January 2001 when Chinadecided in favour of the GermanTransrapid for serv ices betweenShanghai ’s f inanc ia l cen t re andShanghai International Airport. Aftersome teething troubles, the system hasbeen running since early this year atspeeds up t o 430 km/h. Someproponents hoped it would also beadopted for the Shanghai–Beijing high-speed line, but traditional wheel–railtechnology was finally chosen instead.France also tested some alternatives towheels on steel even before the TGV,using the guided rapid-transit Aerotrainrunning at 418 km/h. To stay on track, thesystem had a concrete guideway withconcrete centre rail. A working model wasbuilt in 1963 to promote the idea of a rapid-transit connection between Paris and Lyonat 350 km/h but the project did not reachthe production stage due to politicalreasons. However, Jean Bertin became


Klaus Ebeling

Mr Ebeling is Secretary General of the European Intermodal Association. He has held various high-

level railway posts including Head of the European Policy Office of DB AG in Brussels, Executive

Board Director of DB AG, Deputy Secretary General of UIC, Head of International Department of DB,

and personal advisor to the President and CEO of DB.

Eurotrain with double-decker carriages (Author)

famous in railway circles with hisdevelopment of the air-cushion vehicles.Since these new systems are not easilycompatible with conventional wheel-on-steel railways, it seems unlikely that theywill be successful. There may be somepotential for long routes betweenWestern/Central Europe and Moscow, orfor Eurasian routes of 10,000 km or more.However, the outlook is poor andmanufacturers and potential operators aremaking only hesitant developmentattempts when governments come upwith guarantees or subsidies.At present, it seems more reasonable todevelop conventional Europe-widerailways with complete interoperability.

Outlook

Although the plans for new and extendedhigh-speed routes for passenger trafficlook promising, there must be a changeaway from the old postwar policiesfavouring roads over rail. For a region-wide population, continued heavyreliance on the automobile and highwaysmight be sustainable in Europe if allfreight switched from road to rail. Therailways have shown that there is stilldevelopment potential but the nextimportant stage is straightening out freightand passenger transport as envisaged byDB AG’s Network 21 plan for 6000 kmof new lines by 2010 supplemented byline extensions. Perhaps high-speedfreight transport might be possible givensu f f ic ien t resources wi th d i rec tconnections across 1500 to 2000 km, orin a hub-and-spoke system up to about750 km around an intercontinental airport.How liberalization of the railway marketwill impact the EU in the long term isanybody’s guess. So far, only small partsof short-distance traffic and even less ofmedium-distance traffic have transferredto newcomers. Inauguration of high speedby a newcomer railway seems out of the

question under current conditions. Theimmensely high requirements concerningtechnology and financing have given thefew major national railways embarking onthis new technology an enormous headstart that will be very hard to catch up with.What will happen where high-speedpassenger trains cross borders? Will therebe cooperation like the present examplesof Eurostar and Thalys, or will cross-bordercompetition develop as between Thalysand the ICE on the Cologne–Brussels line?In freight, the establishment of Railion byDB AG has formed the nucleus of asuccessful international freight-trafficrailway. Could this also happen in high-speed passenger transport? According tothe press, the heads of SNCF and DB AGhave discussed whether SNCF should takeover high-speed passenger transport inEurope in return for DB AG taking overcontinent-wide freight traffic. In thismatter, the EU Commission has signalled

that it would not accept such anarrangement unless there was competition.

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