henry philip tappan, elements_of_logic

7/30/2019 Henry Philip Tappan, Elements_of_Logic

1/486


2/486


3/486


4/486
http://www.forgottenbooks.org/redirect.php?where=fb&pibn=1000002307http://www.forgottenbooks.org/redirect.php?where=it&pibn=1000002307http://www.forgottenbooks.org/redirect.php?where=es&pibn=1000002307http://www.forgottenbooks.org/redirect.php?where=fr&pibn=1000002307http://www.forgottenbooks.org/redirect.php?where=de&pibn=1000002307http://www.forgottenbooks.org/redirect.php?where=co.uk&pibn=1000002307http://www.forgottenbooks.org/redirect.php?where=com&pibn=1000002307


5/486


6/486


7/486

ELEMENTS OF LOGIC;

TOGETHER WITH AN

INTRODUCTORY VIEW

PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL,

PRELIMINARY VIEW OF THE REASON.

BY

HENRY P. TAPPAK

NEW YORK :D. APPLETON AND COMPANY

346 " 348 BROADWAY.

M.DCCC.LVI..UUUUL.VI. (~~\


8/486

34 3iy

Entekeb, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1855, by

D. APPLETON " COMPANY,

In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States for the SouthernDistrict of New York.

Pat. Otto* La*.A"rft 1014.

" l "!

% I **#" -'"".. \


9/486

PREFACE.

The work here undertaken differs somewhat in its

scope and design from systems of Logic which havehitherto been given to the world. The AristotelianLogic is simply the method of deduction ; and, assuch, it is complete. Subsequent works, in so faras they have been strictly logical, have closelycopied the great master, and have confined them-elves

to an exhibition of the deductive principlesand processes. Now, the deductive method com-rehends

merely the laws which govern inferencesor conclusions from premises previously established.These premises may, in their turn, be inferencesfrom other premises, and so on, to a certain extent ;and just so far this method is all sufficient. But itis evident that the evolution of premises and con-lusions,

and conclusions and premises, must have alimit. There must be premises which are not con-lusions

from other premises, but which arise insome other way. Now, a complete and adequate


10/486

PREFACE.

Logic ought to exhibit this other way likewise : itought to inform us how the most originalpremisesarise,and upon what basis they rest.

Other methods,indeed,have been abroad in theworld,but without beingsystematicallyropoundedas parts of Logic. Thus, the Platonic philosophyreallycontains a Logicaldevelopment of the mostoriginalorms of human thought,springingout ofthe intuitive faculty. And the Novum Organumof Bacon contains a logicalexpositionf the methodof establishingirst principleshrough the observa-ion

of phenomena.Both Plato and Bacon have had many able dis-iplesand expounders; and both are dailycoming

out into a broader and clearer light,ot as oppo-ents,but " to adopt the thought of Coleridge as

the oppositepoles of one great and harmonioussystem.

The present attempt, therefore,s to make outthe system of Logic under its several departments;and to present it not merely as a method of obtain-ng

inferences from truths,ut also as a method ofestablishinghose first truths and generalprincipleswhich must precede all deduction.

With all humility, acknowledge my indebted-essto the great thinkers who have preceded me.

I have of course read as well as thought ; and mythinkingand readingare naturallylended together.With this acknowledgment,may I be permittedtogo on with my work, without stoppingto note nar-


11/486

PREFACE. 5

rowly in my own mmd, or to remark to my reader,when I am drawing from original, and when fromother sources? I ought, perhaps, in justice to my-elf,

to remark, that the entire plan of this workwas struck out several years since, and differentportions of it written before Professor Whewell'sand Mr. Mills' elaborate and suggestive works hadfallen under my eye.

That Logic really embraces all the parts whichI have assigned to it, I think will fully appear inthe sequel. It is that branch of philosophy whichexpounds the laws of the Reason as the faculty oftruth and reality.

The view which I have taken of Logic, will jus-ifythe prolegomena. I give the Introduction to

Philosophy in General, in order to point out therelative position and importance of Logic in a philo-ophical

system. And I give the Preliminary Viewof the Reason, because, since this is the facultywhich reasons, or logieizes, I deemed that such aview, if given both clearly and briefly, would besatisfactory in this place.


12/486


13/486

CONTENTS.

PART I.

INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL.

PAGE

Section I."

Definition of Philosophy 15II.

"Distinction between the Phenomenal and the Metaphe-

nomenal 23III.

"Of the Reality of the Metaphenomenal 27

IV." The Objective and the Subjective 32V.

"Reason and Sense 39

VI."

Sensualism and Transcendentalism 42VII.

"Ideas and Laws 50

VIII." Primary and Secondary Phenomena 58

IX."

Antecedence in Time and in Necessary Existence 60X.

"Ideas the last Authority of all Judgments or Knowledges

....64

XI."

Divisions of PhilosophyI. Metaphysics 70

ComprehendingPsychology 71Dynamics 73Anthropology 74Ontology 75

II. Nomology; comprehendingThe Morale 80Esthetics ib.

Somatology 82Logic. ., 83


14/486

8 CONTENTS.

PAGESect. XII." Of the Relations between Philosophy and the Sciences and

Arts... 86Geometry 89Sciences of Discrete Quantity 91Natural Science 92Conditional and Unconditional Science 95Art 99

XIII. " Reason, the Organ of Philosophy 103XIV." Criteria of a True Philosophy 108

PART II.PRELIMINARY VIEW OF THE REASON.

Section I. General IntroductoryConsiderations respectingthe Reason... 123II." Outline of the Ideas and Functions of the Reason 129III. Explicationof Ideas 138IV. " Explicationof the Functions of the Reason 143V. " Does Logic comprehend all the Functions of the Reason?.,., 144

PART III.LOGIC PROPER.

BOOK I.

PRIMORDIAL, LOGIC.

Section I.-r-General Laws of the Evolution of Ideas 148II. Metaphysical Ideas ; comprehending

I. Subject and ObjeotiveExteriority 155II. Time and Space 156III. The Infinite and the Finite 159IV. Quantity ib.V. Quality 165VI. Relation 167VII. Modality 172

III. Nomological Ideas; comprehendingL Law 177


15/486

CONTENTS. 9

PAGE

II. Matter and Spirit 178III. Perfection ib.IV. Right and Wrong. 180V. Freedom and Responsibility 182VI. Personal Identity 183VII. Immortality 184VIII. The Beautiful,comprehending

Symmetry 187Grace 188Regularity,Uniformity,Variety ib.Determinate Form 189The Sublime 190Melody '. 191Harmony ib.

IX. The Useful 196X. Centralization and Diffusion 198XL Affinityand Repulsion 199XII. Life ib.XIII. Polarity 200XIV. Instinct 201XV. Regularity, Uniformity, Variety, Symmetry, and

Determinate Form 202XVI. Identity,Difference, Resemblance 203XVII. Design, Final Cause, Means and End 205XVIII. Truth 207XIX. The Philosophical Idea 209XX. Intuition 210XXI. Involution and Evolution 211XXII. Analysis and Synthesis 213

IV. " Primary Sensuous Cognitions, or Cognitions of the ExteriorConsciousness 219

V. " Primary Subjective Cognitions, or Cognitionsof the InteriorConsciousness 222

VI." Axioms 224Metaphysical Axioms 226NOmological Axioms 228

VII. " Of the Characteristics of Axioms in general . 235VIDI. " General Relations of Axioms 240IX." Definitions 243


16/486

10 CONTENTS.

BOOK II.

INDUCTIVE LOGIC.PAGE

Section I. Introduction 249II. " Causes and Laws 252

III." The Human Reason, as related to the ObjectiveWorld 259IV. " General View of Classification 262V. " Principlesdetermining the Induction of Phenomena in Clas-ification

265VI. " Distinction between a General Fact and an Absolute and

Fixed Law 276VII." The Logic of General Facts 283

Principlesof Elimination :I. General Difference with Uniform Agreement in One

Point 288II. General Agreement with Uniform Difference in One

Point 289III. Elimination by Corresponding Quantities and Inten-ities

291IV. Elimination of the Terms of a Sequence, in order to

determine which is the Antecedent and which theConsequent 294

VIII. " Inductive Logic of Universal and Necessary Laws 303IX." The Logic of Art 315

BOOK III.

deductive logic.

Section I. Introduction 318II. " Analysis of Propositions 320

III." Of Propositions,s opposed to each other 325TV. " Of the Conversion of Propositions 328V. " Propositionsconstructed into Syllogisms 332

VI." Of Moods and Figures 347VII." Of the Reduction of Syllogisms 351

VLTI. " Of Modal, Hypothetical,and DisjunctivePropositions 354IX. " HypotheticalReasoning 357X." Of the Dilemma 362

XL" Of the Sorites 365XH. " Applicationof the Deductive Formula 368


17/486

CONTENTS. 11

PAGESec. XIII." Of Fallacies.

Fallacies of Deduction 377

ComprehendingI. Fallacies in the Formula 378II. Fallacies in the Matter 380

1. Ambiguous Middle ib.2. Fallacies relating to the Connection between the

Matter of the Premises and that of the Conclusion. 383Fallacies of Induction ; comprehending

I. Fallacies of Observation 393II. Fallacies in Determining General Facts 396III. Fallacies in Inducting Laws 398

Fallacies in respect to Intuition 399

BOOK IV.

DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.

Section I." Nature of Proof. 403II.

"The different kinds of " priori and a posteriori Proof. 408

III."

Of the Nature of the Relation between Antecedents and Con-equents413

IY." Of Degrees of Evidence 416V." Of Testimony 430

VI."

Circumstantial Evidence 436VII.

" Argument from Progressive Approach 443VIII.

" Proving by Example 446IX.

" Reasoning from Experience 451X.

" Reasoning from Resemblance and Analogy 454XL

"Demonstrative Proof. 462

XII." Calculation of Probabilities and Chances 463


18/486


19/486

PART I.

INTEODUCTOKY VIEW OF PHILOSOPHY

IN GENERAL.


20/486


21/486

PART I.

INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL.

SECTION I.

DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY.

The term Philosophy in common usage has obtained anindefinite and often an improper application. When em-loyed

alone, and without relation to any specific subject,it is generally supposed to refer to natural science : andthus a Treatise, or Essay, or Lecture, on Philosophy, wouldbe expected to embrace something relating to Mechanics,Astronomy, Chemistry, Electricity, or Magnetism.

Some undoubtedly would go beyond this ; and regardthe term in its higher applications, as expressing somethingin relation to the doctrines of the intellectual and moral

powers : or they would simply identify it with Metaphysics,a term no less vague and obscure to common apprehension.

It is to be expected that the affirmation will at firstappear to many paradoxical, that Mechanics, Astronomy,Chemistry, "c, are not branches of Philosophy : but in theend it will appear perfectly just. Philosophy indeed holdsa close and most important relation to these sciences : theyare grand results of philosophy ; but they are not philoso-hyitself. And even Metaphysics, general and compre-


22/486

16 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF

hensive as it is,does not comprehend all philosophy itonly forms one of its important divisions.

In definingphilosophy,e may go on to say, that it isthe Scientia Scientiarum " " the Science of Sciences ; asitsobjectis to explainthe principlesnd causes of all thingsexisting; and to supply the defects of inferior sciences,which do not demonstrate, or sufficientlyxplain theirprinciples/' Or we may call it the " Science of the Uni-ersal

and the Absolute." But this is not enough. Itwould be like definingAstronomy as the " Science of theHeavens." A definition may be just,and yet by reasonof its dry,general,echnical,nd elaborate form of expres-ion,

may fall short of the true end of all definition,iz.,to lead the intelligenceo a clearer insightnd a more per-ect

comprehension.Philosophy is a word formed from the Greek $"koao-

$"ia.It primarilyexpresses a mental affection " a love ofknowledge or of wisdom.

It cannot be questionedthat such an affection is in-erentin the human mind. It appears in feeble infancyit stimulates the activities of the busy prattlingchild " it

forms the wakeful earnestness and joy of youth " it stirsnobly in manhood " it decays not with the decay of age.It is a moving spiritven in savage life,nd shows man,when lowest,as still above the brute. This impulse toknow, this restless curiosity, is connected with the wholedevelopment of humanity in Science,Arts,Government,and Keligion. Co-existent with this love of knowledge isthe love of external action. Hence, the development ofhumanity appears not only in the cultivation of the intel-igence

and the consequent unfoldingof the sciences ; butalso in the construction of implements and machinery,and

* Ed. Ency.


23/486
http://www.forgottenbooks.org/in.php?btn=4&pibn=1000002307&from=pdfhttp://www.forgottenbooks.org/in.php?btn=3&pibn=1000002307&from=pdfhttp://www.forgottenbooks.org/in.php?btn=2&pibn=1000002307&from=pdfhttp://www.forgottenbooks.org/in.php?btn=1&pibn=1000002307&from=pdf


24/486


into music ; he takes the chisel,and from the marhlequarry springup forms whose beauty is divine ; and ma-estic

temples,which seem born with them as their fithabitation ; he takes the pencil,and dipping it in thecolors of heaven,imitates every form of life,nd advancesbeyond Nature herself : he affirms,easons, and believes ;draws out pure abstractions from his thought ; advancesinto Nature, and searches out laws for her phenomena ;and thus builds up systems of science : he invents a methodof analysis,and, in the laboratory,compels Nature to re-eal

her more secret processes ; and, not content with thisworld,the light of heaven, which has lightedhim to hislabors here,he seizes upon as his minister,and makes itreveal to him the worlds from whence it has travelled.Still more " from these finite forms,he ascends up to theInfinite ; he is a worshipper of God, and an expectantof immortality.

" Imagine a beingwho had been present at the earliestdays of the universe,and of human life ; who had seen theexternal surface of the Earth, as it came forth from thehands of Nature, and looked upon all the beauty of thoseancient times ; who had seen the beautiful forms whichNature presented,and heard the melodious sounds whichshe then uttered ; in a word, a being who had been a spec-ator

of the first exhibition of the primitiveworld, andwho should return at the present day amidst the prodigiesof our industry,our institutions,nd our arts ; would itnot seem to him in his astonishment as if he no longerrecognizedthe ancient dwelling-placeof man ; as if beingsof a superior order had transferred their abode to theEarth and had metamorphosed it ? " * Or contemplate an

* Introduction Generate a l'Histoire de la Philosophie,ar M, Cousin,Lee. I. Linberg'sTranslation.


25/486

PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 19

epitome of the whole mighty development of mind in asingleindividual,ppearingfirst on the shore of this worlda feeble infant,and in less than a century assuming thecharacter of a Newton, a Leibnitz,a Milton : and as anillustration of the changes made in the condition of theworld by human invention and skill,ake the historyofMechanics, of the Needle and the Telescope.

In contemplating these developments and changes,what enquiry springsup, yea, irresistiblypringsup, inthe mind ? Do we not ask,how all this came to pass, andwhy the developments and changes came up under theseparticularforms 7 Do we not ask,why did man changethe face of the Earth ? Why did he create government 1Why did he give birth to science and art ? Where andhow did the development of his mind begin ; and how didit proceed? What are the laws of his thought, theground of his knowledges and beliefs,he forms of his rea-onings,

and the methods of his investigations Whatare the laws of his emotions and passions What are thecapacityand force,and what the laws of his will ?Enquirieslike these evince the workingsof the philo-ophic

spirit they are found under some form, in somedegree,in every human mind. Few, indeed,take in thatwhole field of enquiry,which embraces the complete de-elopme

of humanity ; but whether in the child,or inthe adult,in the savage, or in cultivated man, you perceivequestioningsafter the originand reason of things afterefficient and final causes " an earnest prying of the mindinto something beyond mere visible and tangibleforms,you there perceivethe workings of the philosophicimpulse" the $L\o(ro"f"ia.his is the dawn of philosophy. Theimpulse to know and to do, the elements of philosophyspontaneouslyat work in the mind, lead forth the develop-


26/486


ments and changes above mentioned. The enquiry afterthe causes and reasons of these developments and changes,after they have in any degree taken place,is the higherform of the "PiXoao"f)ia,nd leads forth the mind to theconstruction of philosophyas a system. Under the firstform, the mind appears intent upon its objects,thinking,feeling,oing,and making its inherent energieso appearin external effects. Under the second form, it turns backupon itself,that is,makes itselfits own objectby an actof reflection,nd finds out its own reach and limits,itsown aims and laws.

"f"i\oao$la,rom expressingthe impulse to know andthe consequent causal activityof man, and from express-ng,

after the development of humanity has taken place,the impulse to seek after the laws and principleshichhave governed this development, comes to express theselaws and principleshemselves. These laws and princi-les,

like the simple desire of knowledge,act spontaneouslyin the development of humanity. They are in the highestsense philosophicallements of our being,inseparablefromit,and energizings a plasticpower within,and as suchdistinguishablerom philosophyas an expressed systemwithout, laid down in books, or in the lectures of theschools. The first,f course, givesbirth to the second,asthought givesbirth to language.

In that earlyperiodof humanity to which we have ad-erted,it could not exist as a developed system : it was

then in man as a lightand a power, under which he thoughtand acted,but upon which he did not reflect : Thus theidea of the useful,led him to change the face of natureand to originatehe ordinaryarts : The idea of justice,led him to constitute government and law : The idea ofthe beautiful,ed him to the creations of painting,sculp-


27/486

PHILOSOPHY IN GENEKAL. 21

ture,music, and poetry : The inherent laws of Ms intelli-ence,guidedhim in his reasonings he believed,because

he could not disbelieve,nd faith appeared in him like asublime and divine instinct : When he looked out uponthe phenomena of the world, he assignedthem causes,because he could not think of "them without this relation :And from finite being,his mind necessarilyose up to theconceptionof the Infinite Being he became a worshipperunder the energy of a spontaneous and irresistibleidea.

At length reflection began when it began we knownot, but its beginning was the birth of philosophyas asystem developedand recognized.By the act of reflection,or self-consciousness,he mind turns back upon itself,ndmakes itselfthe objectof its own contemplations. All thephenomena of the mind, are presented in the field of itsconsciousness ; the sensations which are caused by theexternal world " the affirmations of the reason " the voli-ions

" must all alike appear there,in order to be known.There is an ordinaryconsciousness which belongs neces-arily

to every man ; but reflection is a specialnd volun-aryconsciousness,nd thence called a philosophicon-ciousness,which appears onlywhen the mind becomes the

objectof its own observation by an act of self-determina-ion.

Now in the exercise of this philosophicconsciousness,the mind questionsitself respectingthe grounds of itsknowledge and its faith " respectinghe forms of its think-ng,

and the modes of its investigationrespectingthegrounds of its decisions in arts,morals,government, andreligion it makes those very enquirieswhich we recog-ize

in ourselves,hen, reviewingthe progressivedevelop-entof humanity, we are struck with wonder and admira-ion

at what man has accomplished,and at what man has


28/486


himself become. The results of these enquiriesform sys-ematicphilosophy.

Let us sum up here the precedingobservations,o asto present a succinct definition.

1. Philosophy,from $t\oao"f)ia,xpresses the inherentdesire of knowledge in the human mind ; and as closelyconnected with this,the desire of action. Under the im-ulse

of these desires man begins to acquireknowledge ;and to exert his causalityin appropriatingthe materialssuppliedhim from the earth " in working in various arts,and in modifying the face of nature.

2. After a time he begins to reflect upon the develop-entof his mind, the facts he has observed,and the

works of his own power and skill : and now the QCkocrofyia,or love of knowing, takes a new direction,nd impels himto search out the causes, laws,and forms of the various de-elopme

of his own being.3. These causes, laws and forms reallyexisted subjec-ively,inseparablefrom himself,before he began to make

them the objectof his thought and curious inquiry: andthey,as the first principlesf his being,and as governingits manifestations,re the substantial elements of philo-ophy,

4. These first principlesf his being are known throughreflection,r self-consciousness ; and when stated methodi-ally,

under proper divisions,nd with clear definitionsand expositions,orm Didactic Philosophy.

The term $i\oGo$ia,which at first expressedonly thedesire of knowledge, or love of truth spontaneouslywork-ng

in the human mind, is thus employed to express all thegrand results of this high and gloriousimpulse.


29/486


SECTION II.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE PHENOMENAL AND THEMETAPHENOMENAL.

Consciousness is the common field of all our mentalactivity. All our sensations,ur perceptions,thinking,and reasoning,ur imaginationsand fancies,ur emotions,passions,eterminations,and volitions,like appear, andare recognizedhere. These affections of our being are notthe movements of an insensate mechanism : we know themin their going on, and we know ourselves as the subjectsof them.

Now there is an importantdistinction to be drawn here.The distinction between the immediate objectsof conscious-ess,

and those objectswhich, althoughknown, or at leastsupposed to be known, yet lie without the sphere of con-ciousness.The immediate objectsof our consciousness

axe phenomena, and these only are phenomena ; while thoseobjectswhich, by supposition,ie beyond immediate con-ciousness,

are metaphenomenal."What are the immediate objectsf consciousness,r of

what are we immediately conscious ? This is the firstenquiry.

Let us beginwith our sensations. The sensations areaffections of our inner being,and unquestionablyare theimmediate objectsof consciousness. But there are manyperceptionsand judgments which come up to view in con-ection

with the sensations,which, togetherwith their


30/486


objects,re entirelydistinct from trie sensations. Thebare sensations are those of color,of sound, of fragrance,of taste,of touch, of heat and cold,of titillation,nd ofpain and pleasure. In these are contained what are com-only

called the secondaryqualitiesof matter : but thisdesignation cannot be made from the bare sensations.We have in the sensations mere internal experiences,rmovements of our own inner being. We are not consciousof matter, distance,space, substance, or cause ; we areconscious of sensations only. We may be conscious of theaction of other faculties of our being,affirmingr perceiv-ng

the existence of body, distance,space, substance,andcause ; but the bare sensations are no such affirmation,rperception. I think it must be plain to every mind thatwill reflect a little,hat if we had only the sensationsabove mentioned, we should have no knowledge of an ex-ernal

world whatever.The same conclusion must be drawn with respect to

the primary qualitiesf matter. These are extension andresistance. But resistance to immediate consciousness isonly an internal experience,nd extension only a repetitionof this experience. There is nothing in this experiencetogive us a knowledge of any thing external : time, space,substance,and cause, are not contained in a mere inwardexperience, mere modification of our own being. In theprimary qualities,herefore,e have no immediate con-ciousness

of an external world. It thus appears, in gen-ral,that we have an immediate consciousness only of cer-ainaffections or modifications of our own being. What

immediately appears to us, what we immediately know,are these affections. These are trulythe phenomenal. Ifthere be an external world, if there be substance,space,time,and cause, " they are not phenomenal, or immediately


31/486


32/486


are the phenomena, while the relations and truths aremetaphenomenal.

Again, God is invisible : He is neither as a substanceaddressed to the senses, nor is he manifested to the con-ciousness

as a modification of our interior being ; but still,if known at all, he must be known by these modifications :He is not the phenomena of consciousness, but knownthrougli them.

Here, then, we have the broad and clear distinction be-weenthe phenomenal and the metaphenomenal. Sensa-ions,emotions and passions, acts of perceiving, judging,

reasoning and imagining, acts of choice and volition"

these, as the immediate objects of consciousness, are phe-omenal; but the causes of sensation, emotion, and pas-ion,

the objects and truths perceived, affirmed, or deduced,the objects of the imagination, of choice and volition

"

these, not being the immediate objects of consciousness,are metaphenomenal.


33/486


SECTION III.

OF THE REALITY OF THE METAPHENOMENAL.

The reality of the phenomenal is not questioned. That Ihave certain sensations,perceptions,emotions, passions,and volitions,his is immediate knowledge and conscious-ess

: but whether the objectsof these acts and experiencesof my being have a real,positive,nd independent exist-nce,

this may be and has been questioned,and even de-ied: The realityof the metaphenomenal has been ques-ioned

and denied.It will be readilygranted by all,that by the imagina-ionwe can create objectswhich are unreal ; and that in

our actual perceptionswe are often mistaken, and seem toperceivewhat we afterwards discover to have no reality,rto be a very different objectfrom what we thought it to be.But, beyond all this,it has been contended that there is noobjectiverealitywhatever ; that the tree and the housewhich I now see, and which everybody sees, has no exist-nce

out of,and independentlyof,the perceptionof whichI and everybody are immediately conscious ; and the sameof all objects,hether external things,r internal truths.

It is undeniable that men generallybelieve in the re-lityof the metaphenomenal ; nay, that only a few specu-ativephilosophers,ave ever denied it.

Now, the aim of philosophyis to explain the actualdevelopment of our being,of all that man has thought


34/486


and done. Hence even the errors of man must be ex-lained.If,therefore,en have erred in their belief in

the realityof the metaphenomenal, it must be shown boththat it cannot exist,and how men have come to entertainthis universal but erroneous belief.

Those who believe in the realityf the metaphenomenalare indeed required,s philosophers,o show, how it is le-itimat

attained : but, on the other hand, those whodeny this reality,n oppositionto a common sentiment,are justlyrequiredto explainthis common sentiment.

The denial of the metaphenomenal had its originin amode of explainingthe attainment of it. Its realityasat first assumed as unquestionable; but the explanationgiven,finallydeveloped the denial as a legitimateconse-uence.

The cardinal principleof this mode, was the assump-ionthat the mind could perceiveonlyby coming in contact

with the object of perception,in accordance with a sup-osedaxiom, nihil agit,nisi cum, et ubi est,nothing can act

except when and where it is. This principleas suggestedby an apparent law in physics,viz. : that one body can actupon another only by actual contact. The truth of thislaw is now disputed,and even the impossibilityf an actualcontact between the particlesof bodies firmly believed.But if the law were unquestionable in respect to physics,on what legitimategrounds can it be taken as a law ofequal appropriatenessand validityin explainingthe per-eptions

of the mind ? That the mind can perceiveonlyby coming in contact with the objectsof perception,mustbe a mere assumption. Besides,by the physicalanalogy,the mind perceivingas well as the objectperceivedmustbe material.

Having assumed the law, however,the great aim now


35/486


naturallybecame to explain how the contact betweenmind and its objectstakes place.

In the firstplace,it was plainthat mind and the ex-ernalmaterial objectsdo not immediately come in contact.

The mind perceives,therefore,ot the material objectsthemselves,bnt certain representationsof these objects,which were variouslycalled species,forms, images, andideas. But what are these representativeorms ? Variouswere the explications.The old Aristotelians held thatthey are made up of fine material particleshich enterthe different organs of sense, and form themselves into therequiredimage in the brain, and that there the mindcomes in contact with them.

After the age of Des Cartes,this theorywas abandoned ;and the image or idea was spoken of as an impressionmade upon the brain like that made upon wax by a seal.Here no material particleswere received into the brainthrough the organs of sense ; but, impressionsbeingmadeupon the organs from without,images were shaped uponthe brain correspondingo the external objects.It is evident that the representativeimage once ad-itted,

must become a fruitful subject of speculation.These speculations,owever, all tended to one .result aresult proclaimed in part by Berkley,and fullyby Hume" namely, that above mentioned, the denial of the meta-phenomenal.

If we know only the representativemages affirmed tobe in the mind, then we can have no legitimatenowledgeof any thing out of the mind ; for,as in all our attemptsto approach exteriority,e are met merelyby these images,they are all that we can possiblyattain to. Hence,Berkley, on this principle,annot be confuted,when heaffirms," The existence of a body out of a mind perceiv-


36/486


ing it,is not onlyimpossible,nd a contradiction in terms,but, were it possible,nd even real,it were impossiblethatthe mind should ever know it." Hume is equallyconsist-nt

in his sweeping affirmation : " Now, since nothing isever present to the mind but perceptions,and since allideas are derived from something antecedentlypresent tothe mind, it follows that 'tis impossiblefor us so much asto conceive or form an idea of any thing specificallyiffer-nt

from ideas and impressions. Let us fix our attentionout of ourselves as much as possible; let us chase ourimaginationsto the heavens,or to the utmost limits of theuniverse ; we never reallyadvance a step beyond ourselves,nor can we conceive any kind of existence but those per-eptions

which have appeared in that narrow compass.This is the universe of the imagination; nor have we anyidea but what is there produced."

The denial of the metaphenomenal appeared under twoforms : " First,that of Idealism. Here the facts of imme-iate

consciousness were taken as the only universe," theuniverse of the imagination." Secondly,that of Material-sm.Here the representativeimages were merely con-idered

as arisingfrom material objects,and impingingupon material organs, and thence affectinghe brain,orsensorium. What now is the soul which receives the nextimpression but a finer form of matter, and what are itssensations and ideas but a movement of the internal or-anism

?There is a class of philosophers,nd Keid may be placed

at their head, who endeavor to dissipatethe dogmas ofboth Idealism and Materialism- by the stern voice of Com-on

Sense. Every man believes in the metaphenomenal "in objectiverealityand truth ; therefore,t exists for everyman. Here common sense pauses : but the philosophical


37/486


impulse still urges to the enquiry, Is there not reality inopposition to Idealism and Materialism ? Is there not re-lity

independently of a mere subjective persuasion ? Thefirst are forms of a philosophy which, on its received prin-iples,

demonstrates conclusions in opposition to generalbelief. And is the general belief incapable of explainingitself by demonstrating the reality of its objects ? Must itmerely doggedly affirm itself in opposition to the philoso-hical

diagrams paraded before it ? And shall the unitedefforts of the human mind end in the birth of two greatparties, both occupying absurd positions

"

the one affirm-ng," I prove, although I do not believe ; " and the other,

" I believe, although I cannot prove ? " May we not proveand believe, and believe and prove ?

It is now evident, I think, that the cardinal aim ofphilosophy must be to reach the metaphenomenal. If theexistence of the metaphenomenal can be demonstrated,then the facts of consciousness, the phenomenal, are ac-ounted

for.


38/486

32 INTEODUCTOKY VIEW OF

SECTION IV.

THE OBJECTIVE AND THE SUBJECTIVE.

In determining the actual development of our being,inits various relations,e find ourselves at once introducedto two forms of being : the subjective, and the objec-ive.

The subjective,nder its simplestand most uniqueform, is myself ; and the objective,nder its most generalform, comprehends whatever is not expressed in the termme, or myself. Again, the simple subjective,yself,be-omes

objective,when, in an act of self-consciousness,make it the objectof my thought. And again,the objec-ive

general,r whatever is not myself,must be subdividedinto the purely objectiveand the subjectivegeneral. Thepurely objectiveis that which is not only not myself,buttotallyunlike myself different in kind " having no proper-ies

in common. The subjectivegeneral is that which,embracing myself,islike myself the same in kind " havingpropertiesin common : a distinction of personalities,flaws,causalities,nd sympathies" but yet agreeingin be-ng

connected with personalities,n implying the presenceof mind, and in being capable of being referred in kind tothe finite and the infinite mind.

I will explain: I have developed to my own conscious-essa thinking principle, will or free causality,nd va-iousemotions and passions; and these,either as consti-uting

or as being inseparablefrom my own personality,


39/486


40/486


but be involved in some way in such personalities,incetheir explicationand conceptionis impossiblein any otherway.

But what is then the pure objective,r that which canin no sense be subjective? Whatever is directlynown bythe senses, or by the muscular organism,is purelyobjective.I see and smell a flower " that is,I have certain sensa-ions,

which arise from the correlation between my sensesand a certain substance lying in space and exterior tomyself. Now, I say not that I could form the judgmenthere expressed,without subjectiveprinciples but the ex-erior

substance which I name a flower in expressingthisjudgment, I conceive of not as life,ut as a product oflife,and upheld by life ; not as a formative power, aforma formans, but as a substance informed, a formaformata. Again, a ball is tossed towards me, and I catchit in my hands. In doing this,I have the sensation ofhardness, or, in other words, I experiencea muscular re-istance.

Now, here again, I do not say that I couldhave formed this judgment without subjectiveprinciplesbut the ball,or body, I conceive of not as itself a resistingcause, or as a gravitatingpower, but as that in which sucha cause and power are habitant ; and while cause andpower belong to the subjective, cannot but assign thegross material phenomena to the purely objective. Theyare not me, nor like me : they are not life,r formativepower : they are not a force or a law. " In the materialsense of the word Nature, we mean by it the sum total ofall things,as far as they are objectsof our senses, and con-equently

of possibleexperience the aggregate of phe-omena.* All that is exterior to me, and phenomenal

* Coleridge.


41/486


to the outer senses, and which does not account for andexplain itself as, for example, effects require causes toexplainthem, " is purelyobjective.But not only are all material phenomena purely objec-ive

; all phenomena of consciousness which are knownmerely as acts or movements of the thinking,willing,ndsensitive faculties " that is,all which comes into the con-ciousness

through the outer senses, and thence called sen-ations; and all which is presentedin the activities of the

internal faculties,he perceptions,easoningsand imagina-ions,the acts of memory and fancy,and the volitions,

emotions,and passions,re objectivelikewise.The distinction between the subjectiveeneral,here-ore,and the pure objective,s co-extensive with the meta-

phenomenal and the phenomenal. " But in this point ofview, it is a distinction in the kind or nature of the par-iculars

compared. The metaphenomenal is subjective,because itis that upon which the development of our beingultimatelyrests : the phenomenal is objective,ecause itis that in which the development of our being appears ac-uallytakingplace.

The development of the Intelligenceust ultimatelyrest upon ideas,principles,r first truths. In the processof this development, appear its perceptions,reasonings,imaginations,and so on.

The development of the Will must ultimately restupon the laws of the Keason. In the process of this de-elopme

appear choices and volitions.The development of the Sensitivityust ultimately

rest upon the laws of the Beason, likewise. In the pro-essof this development appear the various sensations,

emotions, and passions. When the subjectiveis fullyattained, that is,when all principlesre known, all laws


42/486


obeyed, all fitting sensations,emotions, and passionsbrought out and regulatedby reason, then the develop-ent

of our being is complete. While this developmentis going on, the phenomenal, or the purely objective,isthrown out.

But, although the phenomenal is always and onlyobjective,e have seen that the subjectivecan also be-ome

objective; but this last distinction does not, like theformer,arise from a difference in kind, but merely from achange of positionor relation. Every intelligentersonalsubjectcan make all else objectiveo itself nay, can makeitselfobjectiveto itself,y an act of reflection.

To sum up the precedingdistinctions,e have all pos-ibleforms of being embraced under the subjectiveand

the objective,s follows :1. The subjectivesimple,or myself;2. The subjectivesimple, taken as objectiveo my-elf;3. The objectivegeneral,r whatever is not myself;4. The objectivegeneral,divided into the subjectivegeneral and the pure objective; the first comprising

whatever is metaphenomenal " the second whatever is phe-omenal

The distinctions made and explained above, give usthe leadingphilosophicalconception,and enable us clearlyand succinctlyto state the leading problems. The lead-ng

philosophicalconception is that of explaining thedevelopment of my being. Now this development pre-ents

me,First,the phenomenal, or what appears to my imme-iate

consciousness. This consciousness I can divide intothe exterior,r that which contains mere sensations ; andthe interior,r that which contains the movements of my


43/486


own faculties. Now, all these phenomena, whether of theexterior or interior consciousness,onstitute the pure ob-ective

because they lie before the reflective power.Secondly,I have the metaphenomenal, or that whichlies beyond the phenomena : and this admits likewise of atwofold division. The metaphenomenal in the worldwithout,which is to account for the sensations ; and themetaphenomenal within,which is to account for the actswhich take place upon the sensations. Now, the meta-henomenal

without and within,onstitutes the subjectivegeneral,because it lies under and sustains the phenomenalas the ground of its possibility.

Hence we announce a main problem in philosophy,namely : To determine the validitynd the forms of thesubjective,nd to show its relations to the objective.

Again, in the development of my being,the earliestconviction at which I arrive is the Ego sum, I am. Now,startingwith this conviction, find that all which I know,I know not only in the field of my consciousness,ut alsoin the determination and activityf my personality.I findthus,that I am a simple,unique subject,yingin somesort under all being whatever,determining the mode andextent of its cognizance,and even its reality.

Hence we announce another problem in philosophy,oless important than the preceding,namely : To determineobjectivereality or the realityof the objectivegeneral,of that which is not myself.

The first problem is disputed by the sensualists,rthose who derive the materials of all cognitionfrom expe-ience.

The second is disputed by the idealists,r thosewho, like Berkley and Hume, deny the possibilityf know-ng

an external world.* Ob and jaceo. t Sub and jaceo,


44/486


Once more : The subjective simple which attempts toreach the objective general, attempts also to reach itself.This it can do only by making itself an object to itself.Hence arises a new and unique form of knowledge throughthe power of reflection or self-consciousness ; and thus wehave the problem : To determine the faculties and laws ofthe simple subjective.

These three problems cover the whole field of Philoso-hy,as will be apparent when we come to consider its

cardinal divisions.


45/486


SECTION Y.

REASON AND SENSE.

In the present developedstate of my faculties,know my-elfas Body and Spirit. Spiritis the subjectivityithin,

which thinks,feels,nd wills. The body, the material ta-ernacleof the spirit,s a part of the great system of ex-ernal

nature : it is the same, mechanically and chemi-ally; and it lives and decays like all other livingthings-

What is its relation to the spirit? It is the curious andwonderful mediator between matter and spirit.Throughthe nerves, distributed into five external senses, and

through the muscular organism sometimes called the"sixth sense" and the sense of resistance,ature reachesthe spirit.What is the product of this union ? Sensa-ions,

and nothing more. No thought, no knowledge "simply an experienceof sound, color,sapidness,fragrance,touch, and resistance. But the cognitivefacultywithinis not unfurnished. It is prepared to know the world,from whence the sensations arise ; and it is prepared toknow itself. Sensation conditionates the reason in twoways : "

First " In sensation,n common with all the subjectivefaculties,t wakes to self-conscious activity. It here be-ins

to live its knowing and thoughtfullife.Secondly Sensation furnishes materials of cognition


46/486


or signs which the reason appropriatesreadilyand fa-iliarlyin reading the external world.

The lower faculty,s it were, singsa joyfulmatin songunder the window of the reason ; then this gloriouspowerawakes, and lookingout, recognizesthe reality,eauty,andlaws of God's works, and the Great Maker himself ; andthen,turning back upon itself,ees there the image of theDivine wisdom and love. In knowing the world,the mindis developed,and all its faculties brought into exercise ;and as consciousness necessarilyccompanies every internalmovement, the mind is likewise revealed to itself.

The firstknowledge of both spiritnd nature is spon-aneous.Afterwards,comes the period for philosophical

reflection upon the one, and philosophicalobservationupon the other ; and then,psychologyand natural scienceare born.

As our faculties become unfolded in their relationswith nature, important changes take place. The sensa-ions

and muscular resistance,hich originallyould di-ectlyof themselves give us no knowledge, are nowtransformed into apt and familiar signs of all external

bodies,forms and qualities.The different shades of lightand color,ow associated with bodies,forms and qualities,readilyrepresentthem, and we seem to know every thingby the eye. It is now almost an universal sense. So alsothe different sounds received by the ear, enable us to dis-inguish

persons, things,places,and distances. The sameprincipleappliesto all the senses. The reason has appro-riated

them all,and made them such quick and familiarservitors of"knowledge, that we now seem to have an im-ediate

perception of the outer world. On the otherhand, Keason, having from the first activityof the sensewhich opened the play of the mental powers, entered upon


47/486


48/486


SECTION VI.

SENSUALISM AND TRANSCENDENTALISM.

We now arrive at the point of departureof two great sys-emsof philosophy. Taken under their modern develop-ents,

Locke may be said to represent the one, and Kantthe other.

Sensualism,concentratingits thought in the sensuousconditions of knowledge, loses sightof the truth that theyare merely conditions ; and goes on to expound them asthe primary and radical elements of knowledge itself.Hence the utmost development of the human intelligencepresents us only the combination and expansion of theseelements. The reason is absolutelyincapableof arrivingat any truth whose generating or constitutive elementshave not first entered the senses. The senses thus be-ome

the sources and measure of all knowledge.Transcendentalism beginswith sensation no less than

sensualism. Kant opens his great work with the affirma-ion," That all our knowledge begins with experience,

does not admit of a doubt." But then transcendentalismdoes not make the sensations,he radical,generating andconstitutive elements of knowledge ; but conditions,nderwhich the cognitivefacultybegins to act,and suggestions,upon "which,by its own force,and according to its ownideas and laws,it forms cognitions.

The views which the two systems entertain respecting


49/486


the primordialstate of the mind, differ widely. Locke re-resentsthe state of mind before sensation takes placeby

a sheet of white paper, and Hobbes by a slate,n whichthere is no idea or element of knowledge,bnt merely asusceptibilityf being written upon. To this view all theadherents of this system conform.

Transcendentalism represents the mind as having thepossibility,he scope, the law and the form of all know-edge

within itself. Whatever the mind be, whatever itsfaculty of knowing, and with whatever elements it beprimordiallyurnished,it is easilyconceivable that in theact of knowing it bringsthis facultyand these elements tobear. Now, in order to determine the reach of the cog-itive

faculty,nd whether the mind reallyhave primordialelements of knowledge, we need only examine our actualknowledges. The sensations can easilybe analyzed : andif they be the primary elements of knowledge, they willappear every where in the composition and deduction ofthought : for every mere composition must preserve theoriginalelements, and can show nothing absolutelynew ;and every deduction must keep within the measure andkind of the startingpoints.

But if in our actual knowledges, there be found ele-entswhich, so far from belongingto the sense, appear

in their nature and characteristics to transcend the utmostcapacityof the sense, then these elements unquestionablylay claim to a higherorigin. And if these elements,whendisintegratedrom our complex knowledges and held upbefore the reason, are readilyrecognizedand reaffirmed bythis facultyas necessary, universal and absolute,then maythey legitimatelye claimed as the product of this facultyalone.

Now the sensations are those of the eye, consistingf


50/486

44 INTKODUCTOEY VIEW OF

light and color ; of the ear, consistingof the varioussounds ; of smelling and tasting,consistingof odor andsapidnessin their endless varieties ; of touch, consistingof simple and uniform impressionsupon the nerves wher-ver

they are distributed ; of muscular resistance,onsist-ngof hardness and softness,moothness and roughness;

and, in the last place,the sensations of pleasureand pain,and of titillation.

But our actual knowledges bring to view substance,cause, time, space, truth,justice,nd many other ideas ofsimilar characteristics " ideas which no analysisof the meresensations can ever unfold. And while these ideas can bebrought under the observation of the senses, even now thatthey are known, no more than they could at the first beevolved out of them, to the reason itself they are intui-ively

true, universal,nd necessary.When we speak, therefore,f transcendental truth in

the justphilosophicalense, we speak of nothing doubtful,but of that which both in itself is most certainlyknown,and in its relations makes all other knowledge possible.The applicationof the term transcendental is con-enient

and appropriate,because it is descriptive. Ittells the simple fact,that the human mind, while it issusceptibleof impressionsfrom without by means of theorgans of sense " impressions which conditionate its firstdevelopment, and afford materials for an important de-artment

of its knowledge, nevertheless contains withinitself those elements of truth,those forms of knowledge,those first principlesf all thought and reasoning,whichtranscend the reach of the senses. The lower facultyisconnected with that corporealorganism, through whichspiritommunes with nature. It occupiesthe sphere ap-ropriat

to it,and does its work well. The higher


51/486


facultyof the pure Keason has its sphere also ; and is justas capablein its sphere of announcing primordialtruths,the forms of perception,nd the laws of reasoning,s thesense in its sphereis of givingforth sensations.

From this it is evident that the metaphenomenal andsubjectiveidentifythemselves with the transcendental.

Locke is a great and venerable name ; and no one mayspeak lightlyof him. But an excessive veneration has ledsome who disclaim sensualism,to claim for his doctrinescertain savingclauses in those passages where he speaksof Eeflection as one of the sources of ideas.

There is no school of philosophythat might not be am-itiousof retaining,s an authority,such a man as Locke ;

and one cannot well conceive how any thing less than asupreme and honest love of truth could influence any oneto dispensewith his authority.

For my part, I can say from my heart that I admireand love Locke. His clear and penetrating intellect,isgood sense and manly candour ; his strong Englishheart,his pure English style; and his decided moral and religiousprinciples,lways quietlyabout him like the coat he wears,like the air he breathes,like the familiar tones of his com-on

discourse,nd the prevailingexpressionof his honestface, altogether admire and love him. And notwith-tanding

the errors of his system, I shall continue to readand admire and love him.

Locke refers all our knowledge to two sources, Sensa-ionand Eeflection. The latter,s he defines it,*is un-oubtedly

the interior consciousness, it embraces theoperations of the mental faculties : and the former isequivalentto the exterior consciousness. All that appears

* Book II.,ch. 1, " 4.


52/486

46 INTKODUCTOKY VIEW OF

to us, therefore,appears in the consciousness ; and allwhich there appears, consists of the simplesensations,ndthe operationsof the mind, and whatever is revealed in orby the operationsof the mind. Now so far the Transcen-dentalist will go with Locke ; so far there is no differencewhatever. But when we come to consider the mentaloperationsthemselves,we find the great pointof departureof the two systems. According to Locke, the mental facul-ies,

when they go into action,not onlybegin conditionallyand in point of time with sensation,ut they also deriveall the materials and elements upon which their activityis expended, from sensation,nd the conscious experiencesof the mental activityitself. The sensations,togetherwith the acts of " perception,thinking,doubting,believ-ng,

reasoning,knowing, willing,and all the different act-ngsof our own minds," are the firstradical elements from

which all possibleknowledges are formed.Now, the introduction here of the ideas of reflection or

the interior consciousness,y no means changes the charac-erof the system ; for these,no less than the sensations,are merely phenomenal. The operationsof the mind, as

well as the sensations,re conditions of knowing the tran- "scendental truths. Thus the succession of thought, as wellas the succession of sensations,s a condition of knowingtime. Indeed,.the most important truths are revealedupon condition of the experiencesof the interior conscious-ess.But recollect that the contents of sensation and re-lection,

while to the transcendentalist they are mere con-itionsof conceivingtime, space, substance,power, and so

on ; to Locke and his school they are the simple ideas orelements out of which these,and all the most abstrusetruths are compounded, or drawn.*

* Book II.,ch. 12, " 1 and " 8.


53/486


The transcendentalist can say that sensation and re-lection,or the exterior and interior consciousness,re the

only sources of our knowledge ; understandingby this thatall that we know we know either upon the experienceofsensations,r in the acts of knowing, of which we are con-cious

; but this is a very different thingfrom making thesensations and the acts of knowing the materials or ele-ents

out of which all that we know is compounded. Ihave alreadydistinguishedbetween the mere act of know-ng

and that which is known, callinghe first the phenom-nal,and the second the metaphenomenal ; and just as

broadly as that distinction are the two systems to be dis-inguisSensualism merges every thing into the phe-omena

: Transcendentalism transcends or passes beyondthe phenomenal, and reaches the universal and necessarytruth,the substantial and real being ; that which is therational ground of all phenomena, without which theycould have had no existence,and without which, now thatthey exist,they cannot be explainedand accounted for.

Men generally,nd even most philosophers,n dailythought and occupation,are more with the phenomenalthan the metaphenomenal, and thus from the familiarityof use, the phenomenal comes to be regarded as more un-uestionabl

and certain than truths of pure reason. Ithink,however, that a little quietthinking must dissipatethis illusion from every mind. How do we reach the phe-omenal

that is,our sensations and the operationsof ourmental faculties ? Is it not simply by a form of knowing," namely, consciousness? Now, if there be a form ofknowing adapted to the metaphenomenal, why do we notknow this as well as the phenomenal ? But there is sucha form of knowing, namely, Intuition,r the direct per-eption

and insightof Keason ; and we are conscious of


54/486


the exercise of the function implied in this form " we areconscious of knowing by intuition. Is not the act of in-uition

of which we are conscious,s valid as the sensa-ionof which we are conscious? Nay, more, is not thetruth,which we are conscious of knowing in the exerciseof the intuitive function,as valid as the conscious act bywhich it is known? To immediate consciousness,s aform of knowing, we refer sensation and the operationsofthe mental faculties. To the intuition of reason, asanother form of knowing, we refer the transcendentaltruths. This is the whole account of the matter. Thesensualistic school will insist upon it that the objectsofimmediate consciousness alone are the elements of know-edge

"while the transcendental school affirm that the

fundamental elements are found beyond immediate con-ciousness.

But the principlesn which transcendental truths aredenied,involve the denial of all objectiverealitywhatever,beyond immediate consciousness. It is not merely theideas of pure reason, which lie beyond immediate con-ciousness

; all the pure mathematics transcend it like-ise.Nay, the entire outer world transcends it ; for all

must allow,that not the received objectsof the externalworld are immediate objects of consciousness,but onlythe sensations supposed to arise from these objects. In-eed,

in this very way were Berkley and Hume led todeny all objectivereality,out of consciousness. It isplain that they deduced their doctrines legitimatelyfromthe system of Locke.

I conclude here by remarking, that the denial of themetaphenomenal as that which transcends immediateconsciousness must involve the destruction of all philosophy.If we are shut up to mere phenomena, we can account for


55/486


56/486


SECTION VII.

IDEAS AND LAWS.

The word "idea/' according to the usage of Locke, ex-resseswhatever we are immediately conscious of. The

word "idea/' accordingto the usage of Plato,expresseswhat we cannot be immediately conscious of. In theusage of Plato, however, "idea" does not express anything transcendental of consciousness in the externalworld,hut only the metaphenomenal, lying in the minditself. And here we see at once the fallacyof all thatLocke has said respectinginnate ideas. Taking the wordin his usage, that ideas cannot be innate,is a truism ; fornothing is more evident,than that mere sensations andacts of the mind, that is, mere phenomena, cannot beinnate

" they exist only as they appear in the conscious-ess.His reasoning,therefore,oes not reach the point

in debate. On the other hand, "ideas," in the Platonicusage, cannot but be innate,since the word expressesthose primordiallaws of knowing, thinkingand reasoning,and those necessary and absolute elementarytruths whichare inseparablefrom the mind itself.

In order to form a clear conception of idefbs in thePlatonic,or transcendental sense, let us recm to the dis-inction

of the subjectiveand the objective. The sub-ectivesimple,or mind, is directlyopposed to all supposed

forms of being,lying out of mind, and comprisedin the


57/486


phenomena of sensation,and whatever in the exteriorworld is connected with their production. It is the op-ositio

of the spiritualsubjective,yself,and the un-spiritualobjective,xterior to myself. Now, the truePlatonist or transcendentalist views every thing existingbeside mind, as made by mind, after the laws of mind,and primarilyfor mind.

It is a kindlydoctrine,and to be heartilyreceived,that one design of the great Creator,in forming thecountless tribes of animals,was to multiplythe forms ofenjoyment. Every sensitive creature hath its sphereoflife,ts bountiful provisions,nd its term of happiness.But irrational creatures comprehend neither the world inwhich they subsist,or the curious workmanship of theirown organism. The world,in its wise designs,ts exactorder,and its beautiful forms,is not made for them. Itis made for them only in respect to the gratificationftheir mere animal wants. But under all these higherpointsof view, it is obviouslymade for rational beings.Our physicalconstitution,ndeed, finds its fittingpro-isionsand accommodations in the world ; but we are notconfined to these. To us, the world is a vast and sublimeexhibition of design,skill,ausative and regulativeforce,harmonious relations,nd beautiful forms.

We can conceive of a periodwhen there was as yetno creation,nd the Creator dwelt alone in the immensityof his being. Now we cannot but believe there wasarrayed before his mind, every possibleform of being,every possibleconstitution of a universe,every possiblevarietyof life ; and there,also,laythe map of the worldswhich were ordained actuallyto be. In his mind was allthe science and art,accordingto which, the Universe wasto be bodied forth : and there,too, was that creative


58/486


energy, which had but to exert itself,nd Creation wouldstand forth in all its gloryand magnificence. Now thepreconceivedlaws,forms and relations of the universe,sthey lay in the Divine mind, are a part of the Divineideas. Viewed in relation to the Eternal Keason, as givingthe originalthought and law, they are ideas simply.Viewed in relation to the Divine imagination,s givingforth definite forms and relations,they become ideals,models, or archetypes. Divine ideas,as the originatingthoughts and archetypesof worlds,cannot be exhaustedin the actual creation,or God is infinite. Again, theremust be in the Divine mind thoughts and conceptionswhich do not take their embodiment in material forms.Such are those which relate to pure science and moral gov-rnment.

Whatever thus lies in the Divine mind, consti-utesthe Divine ideas.

Suppose the infinite mind to constitute another mindlike itself. This mind, of course, must be finite ; butinasmuch as it is mind, it must have the same ideas,accord-ng

to its measure, which are found in the Divine original.These ideas, perhaps, could not be given in a fullydeveloped state,that is,drawn out into all their conse-uences

and applications,or this would appear to borderupon the infinite ; but given in their elementary state, tobe unfolded by the active and free thought of the beingthus gloriouslyconstituted. Such a being may be con-eived

of,as existingwithout a body and organs of sense" a pure spirit and althoughthus without sensation,ndsupposed even to have no knowledge of a real world,inits pure thoughts and imaginationsit might have,not onlymental activity,ut emotions of beauty and grandeur ex-uisitely

delightful.For such emotions even now areawakened in our minds, without callingin the aid of im-


59/486


mediate sensation,when in dreams, and esthetical effortsof the imagination,e are entertained with forms of great-ess

and beauty beyond the power of mere sense to reveal.But now, suppose this being to be introduced to the actualcreation, would not the possibilityf its knowing andcomprehending it,arise from the correspondence betweenthe outward realityand the ideas within ? Would it notunderstand the real world,just so far as it had the pre-onceive

law and archetypewithin? At least,to a beingdestitute of sensation,no other possibleway could exist.Let us, then, make another supposition,namely :" Thata being be constituted like the Divine mind ; but insteadof existings a pure spirit,hat it be connected with amaterial body, with organs of sense " this body itselfforming a part of the system of things without ; andthat its relations to this body are such that it cannotbecome conscious of existence,nor begin the play of itspowers until sensations are produced within,by corporealimpressionswithout. Shall the law of perceptionand theforms of knowledge now be changed, because sensuousconditions are demanded for their development ? It isimpossibleand inconceivable. The originatingpower andlaw of thought must still remain in the spirit,o whichthey of necessitybelong. This last new form of being,isnew only in respect to the conditions of its beginningtoact, and the mode and conditions of its communicationwith the external world ; while the possibility,nd thedeterminate form of its knowing, still lie in its inherentspiritualaculties,nd its necessary and constitutive ideas.The universe represents the Divine thought ; and now itcannot but represent the thought given likewise to thishighlyendowed creature, whom we recognizeas man him-


60/486


When man, therefore,as placed upon the smilingoutspread earth,and beneath the bright starryheavens,he did not find himself a stranger and out of place. Hismind and heart responded to the works of his Creator.His spiritdrank in the livingbeauty of all things,becausehe was formed to know the beautiful. He saw the wisedesign of Creation,because he himself was endowed witha designingmind. He searched and found out the orderof the heavens and the earth,and the great and all-regu-ating

laws,because the principlesf science,the founda-ionsof law, were laid in his own intelligence.We have

a strikingillustration of this mutual adaptationand har-onyin the science of mathematics, This science is

drawn directlyfrom the reason of man. By this sciencehe is enabled to measure the planets. The Great andDivine Mathematician made the universe according tothese loftyand exact principles. He then gave his crea-ure

the capacity to construct this pure and unerringscience ; and thus man has a ladder by which he canmount from earth to heaven.If ideas of the reason are embodied in the externalworld,determining its forms, relations,nd movements,what do they become when thus embodied ? The answeris given in one word " Laws. Force or power has its originin the Divine causality; but that which appropriates,compounds, directs,nd governs force,is Law, answeringto the Divine idea. All ideas do not become laws,regu*latingForce in the exteriorsphereof their manifestations,Some ideas give the law to perception,and determine ourknowledges :" others give the law to the fine arts,anddetermine the forms of the beautiful *, others,again,givethe law to the free casualityr the responsiblewill,anddetermine moral rectitude, But these all go out intq


61/486


some form of law. Law and idea are thus the same.Viewed in respect to the reason, originating,onceiving,and projecting,e speak of the idea : viewed in respectto the sphere of determinate movement and action,espeak of the law.

Now, if the ohjectof science be to ascertain the lawsof the universe,e see how it depends upon, and mustgrow out of,philosophy.

There is a periodin the development of mind in rela-ionto external nature,when observation and thoughtfirst

awake. It is a period of spontaneous communicationbetween the soul and nature, springingup from the rela-ion

between the ideas within and their embodiment with-ut.A voice from without calls to the soul within,and

the soul joyfullynswers back. In the very impressionsmade upon the sensitivityy nature, the occasion appearswhen the ideas are required,in order to know and compre-end.

The reason is noticingcarefully,nd strugglingocomprehend : in the very effort of earnest thought it per-eives

ideas,vaguely,perhaps,at first,nd immediatelycarries them out to nature as a tentative law. The firstefforts to assignlaws to nature, ancfto expound her greatsystem, may be crude and imperfect,ild and imaginative,because observation is limited,and reason only partiallydeveloped; but the process is the same in kind, at thedawn of science,and at its gloriousnoontide. It is theunion of ideas and observation. This first periodmay becalled the Time of Awakening,

The second period is the Time of Prophecy. Themind now realizes in clear and decided reflection,hat itwants. It proceeds,therefore,o,make out the system ofnature by mapping out the related bodies,their forms,magnitudes, and relations,nd assigningthem forces and


62/486


laws. In this work the mind is prone to become intoxi-atedby its first glimpses of the grand mechanism of the

world, and to imagine that the great discoveryis com-leted: here,then, it pauses, and givesitself up to dog-atizin

In realityit has only arrived at a theory, or atentative system of nature : it has made propheciesmoreor less clear,but nothing yet is established.

The third period is The Time of Elaborate Obser-ation,Experiment, and Calculation. Dissatisfied

with precedingresults,nd yet taking advantage of them,the mind now sets itself at work afresh. It endeavors tothink more profoundly,to reason more logically,nd thusto escape from empty conjecturesand fallacies. Now itaims to observe more extensivelyand accurately,at thesame time reducing its observations to an exact and con-enient

classification : and not content with the facts ofnature as they present themselves of their own accord,byingeniouslycontrived experiments it forces out new andmore curious facts from the hitherto silent and veiledbosom of nature. Now, too, it diligentlyultivates purescience,that it may construct formulas for the solution ofthe problems which come thronging in.

The fourth period is the Time of Determinate Sci-nce.Now imaginary conceptions,and the ideas of

merely possiblesystems, are set aside,and the true ideafinds its correspondinglaw.Thales belongs to the first period ; Pythagoras and

Ptolemy to the second ; Copernicus, Kepler, and TychoBrahe to the third ; Newton and La Place to the fourth.

In the amazing advance which has been made in de-erminascience,and in perfectingmethods of investiga-ion,

the four periodsin respect to any new subjectmay be


63/486


64/486


SECTION VIII.

PRIMARY AND SECONDARY PHENOMENA.

We shall begin with the exterior consciousness. The pri-aryphenomena are the simple sensations. These are in

themselves incapableof projectingthemselves beyond thesphere of consciousness. But when the ideas are added tothem, moulding and appropriatingthem by the laws ofperception,hen they become merged into positivejudg-ents

respectingbodies,in space with forms, qualities,distances,magnitudes, and movements. The sensationsnow habituallyare not thought of as simple affections ofthe sensitivitybut whenever they arise,he mind is busyin noticingthe goings on of the world in space. Hence,when we speak of phenomena in this developed state ofperception,e mean not the mere sensations,ut the ac-ual

appearances and changes of bodies,of which the sen-ationshave now become such apt and familiar signs that

we lose sight of their originalsimplicityand bareness.Just as in language,when we hear the familiar and appro-riate

sounds, or see the familiar symbols, we seem atonce to be present to the world of thought and imagination.

Now the phenomena transferred from the sensitivity,and characterized and classified as the phenomena of anoutward world,constitute the secondary phenomena of theexterior consciousness.

A similar transformation takes place in the interior


65/486


consciousness. Here the primary phenomena are simpleacts, or movements. But the ideas here also add them-elves

to the phenomena, and we come to know a subject" a personality, endowed with power, intelligence andfreedom. The mere phenomena could not carry them-elves

back into spiritual reality, but of themselves wouldremain a bare flow of appearances through the field of theconsciousness, without telling the fountain from whencethey came, or whither they were tending. But in the verygiving forth of the phenomena in the consciousness, theideas make their appearance under the form of an intuitiveperception and affirmation ; and then the mind knows it-elf

as spirit endowed with reason, power and freedom,and perceives design and law in every movement. Thence-orward

there are no more bare phenomena ; but it is thereason, knowing, designing, and commanding ; the willexerting causality ; the sensitivity alive with emotion andpassion ; the glorious mind exerting itself in its propersphere. The acts and affections of definite powers are thesecondary phenomena of the interior consciousness.

The above distinction is an important one ; for mengenerally think of phenomena under their secondary formin the developed state of the mind : many, therefore,might fall into some confusion when the phenomenal isrepresented as lying wholly in the field of consciousness,under its primary presentation.


66/486


SECTION IX

This is what Cousin stylesChronological,nd LogicalAntecedence.

The first is the antecedence of the primary phenomena ;the second,the antecedence of ideas.

To a mind not placed under sensuous conditions,hephenomena of the interior consciousness would alone claimantecedence in time. To man, who is mind under theseconditions,he phenomena of the exterior,s well as of theinterior consciousness,claim this antecedence. Did thephenomena alone exist,o question respectingnecessaryexistence could arise ; but in the actual manifestation ofideas within the sphere of thought,this questioncannot beavoided.

The distinction here held up to view is very important,and reallynot difficult to comprehend. In the actual de-elopment

of our being,the primary phenomena obviouslymust first appear in the order of time ; for sensation is thefirst awakening of conscious existence,phenomena are theimmediate objectsof consciousness,nd consciousness isthe first form of knowledge. The knowledges to which weattain through the consciousness of phenomena, are pre-ented

under the form of judgments or affirmations madeby the Keason. But these judgments, as acts of the Rea-on,

are phenomena of the interior consciousness ; as phe-


67/486

PHILOSOPHY IN GENEBAL. 61

nomena they must rest upon something antecedent ; butthis something antecedent is not sensation,or sensationstands only in the relation of a condition,nd does notcontain the elements of the judgments. Upon analysis,these elements are found to be ideas. Ideas,then,musthave the antecedence of necessary existence. Mere sensa-ion,

in a particularorm of being,may exist without in-olvinantecedent ideas in the sphereof that being; but

judgments or knowledges formed upon the basis of ideas,necessarilyinvolve their priorexistence ; and as ideascan be traced to nothinghigher,heir antecedence must bethat of necessary existence.

Sensations demand a previousnecessary existence,nlyas all phenomena demand antecedent causality. But thephenomena of the interior consciousness,n addition tothis,demand a constructive reason.

Sensations are known before cause is known ; and yetas without an antecedent cause they could not have ex-sted,

so neither could they have been known under thecausal relation,without the antecedent idea of cause.Affirmations of the reason appear, before the reason and itsideas come into the field of reflection ; and yet, had notthese had a necessary prior existence,the affirmationswould not have been possible.

Experienceis the conditionatingtartingpoint in theorder of time. Ideas are the determiningstartingpointinthe order of rational judgments.

Experiencemarks the time when the knowledgesbegin.Ideas alone make the knowledgespossible.Experience isthe dial-hand which tells the hour of the mind's morningwhen it awakes to thought. Ideas necessitate the move-ent

of the dial-hand itself.Again : As the sensuous experiencesof the exterior


68/486


consciousness conditionate the reason in the order of timein the development of those ideas by which it knows theexternal world ; and as the experiencesof the interiorconsciousness conditionate it in the order of time in thedevelopment of those ideas by which it knows the intel-ectual

world : while,on the other hand, in the order ofnecessary priorexistence,ideas determine all the know-edges

arrived at : so, likewise,he particularjudgmentsformed respectingbjectsin either world,conditionate theuniversal truths in the order of time ; while these truths,in the order of necessary priorexistence,etermine theparticularjudgments. For example : in the externalworld the particularjudgment that a given body is inspace, precedesin time the universal judgment that everybody must be in space ; while the universal judgmentcomprehended in the ideas of space and substance,musthave had a priornecessary existence in order to make theother possible. And in the interior and intellectual sphere,although the affirmation that all phenomena must be as-igned

to causality,ould not have been formed until aparticularinstance of causalityhad appeared ; still,n theorder of necessary priorexistence,he universal truth musthave been embraced in the inherent idea of causality,rthe particularudgment assigning particularhenomenonto an appropriatecause, would have been impossible,shaving no basis on which to make its appearance.

To sum up the whole in brief : In the development ofour being,the phenomenal as to time precedes the meta-phenomenal ; in necessary existence,the latter precedesthe former. The phenomenal is first known, but it couldnot be known at all in its actual state,unless the meta-phenomenal had had a priorexistence : and as the univer-al

belongsonly to the metaphenomenal, the universal and


69/486


particular come into the same conditionating relations.The particular is first known, and yet it could not beknown at all unless there had been a necessary prior exist-nce

of the universal. The phenomenal, are first appear-ncesin time : the metaphenomenal, cause them by a

oecessary spontaneous power. The metaphenomenal ex-stedout of the relation of time, and independently of it ;

when the phenomena were given in this relation, then thecondition was supplied, under which, the metaphenomenalcould be apprehended by an act of knowing standing inthis relation also.


70/486


SECTION X.

IDEAS THE LAST AUTHORITY OF ALL JUDGMENTS ORKNOWLEDGES.

A judgment or knowledge is an affirmation of the reason.When expressed in language, it becomes a propositionbecause,it then passes beyond the sphereof the individualconsciousness,nd is propounded to generalthought.

Every propositionconsists of a subject and predicate.The subjectis that of which the affirmation is made. Thepredicateis that which is affirmed of the subject. Theaffirmation is either positiver negative; that is,n affirma-ion

of agreement or disagreement.Fixing the mind upon the question of agreement ordisagreement,it is evident that there are onlytwo ways in

which it can be determined, namely, by deduction or byintuition. If by deduction,then the subjectand predicateare compared by means of a third or middle term, withwhich they both agree ; or with which one disagrees,ndthe other agrees. This forms the syllogism,hich will beanalysedhereafter. But a question arises,espectingtheagreement of the two terms with the third,respectively"Is this known by deduction or by intuition ? If by deduc-ion,

then we have had a previouscomparison subsidiaryto the one in hand. But, again,how was the agreementseen in this previouscomparison, by deduction,or by in-uition

? If by deduction,then there must have been a


71/486


72/486


son of foregoingcognitions.Take, for example, the propo-ition,Every body is in space. We have here the cogni-ion

of body, and that of space : Now, if it were grantedthat body is derived from a preceding comparison,it isplainlyimpossible that space could be thus derived. Inspace, then, we have a simple originalcognition. Thesame must appear in tracingback every cognition. Thesefirst elements of thought, whatever they be, must be thefoundations of all the subsequent cognitions.If,accordingto Locke, these first elements were merely the phenomenawhich form the immediate objectsof consciousness,heyundoubtedly would be the foundations of all the subsequentknowledges, as he has representedthem.

According to the transcendental system, however, theoriginalelements are ideas or simpleintuitions of the purereason, given upon sensuous conditions,ut not formed outof them. The truth of the latter system appears uponthe last analysisof our knowledges, since this analysisdoes not give us bare phenomena of the interior and exte-ior

consciousness,ut ideas,as the constitutive elements.We may next view the subjectand the predicatein

their particularrelation to each other. Here propositionstake a two-fold designation. They are either Analyticalor Synthetical.

First,the Analytical.* Here the subjectcontains thepredicate and, in the form of the proposition,he predi-ate

is wound out of it. Nothing more is reallysaid inthe predicatethan what is implied in the enunciation ofthe subject; but for the purpose of definition or explana-ion,

that which is implied in the subject,is stated fullyand clearly. For example : when we say, Body is ex~

* AvaXvw, to unwind or unravel.


73/486


tended,the predicatextended affirms nothing more thanwhat is impliedin Body, for body is inconceivable withoutextension. The immediate basis of every analyticalropo-itionmust, therefore,e the cognitionexpressionin thesubject. Then the questioncomes up next, What is thebasis of the cognitiontself? And here,as before,e arecarried back to some o

henry philip tappan, elements_of_logic

Documents