-.. -�

ON THE ESSENCE OF LANGUAGE

-.. .

SUNY series in c, lNTEMI'( l!U\RY Cl lNTINENTAL I'JIJLOS( WI IY

Dennis J . Schmidt editor

MAl�.TIN HEIDEC>CJER

ON T HE ESSENCE OF LANGUAGE

The Metaphysics of Language and the Esscncing of the Word

Concerning Herder's Treatise On the Origin of Langiwgc

TrnnslatcJ by Wanda Torres Gregory

and Yvonne Unna

STAIT UNIVJJZSJTY ( 1F N1:w Ye mK !'1u::-;:-;

l'ubli.,hecl in ( Jl'rll><lll <b Vmn Wcscn dcr Sjm1che. /Jic Mewjihy.1ik dcr Sprnchc

w1d die Wcsung des Wuncs. Zu Hcrdcrs Alilwmllung "Uher den Ursprnnf-'. dcr Sjm1chc" (CJ \l)l)l) hy Vittorio Klnsterman11. Fro111kfurt Am Mai11.

UA IV, i:lS. Urnduate semi11ar, summer semester of 19)9. N,itl'S ;1nd

minutes. Edited hy Ingrid Schi1(lkr.

Puhlishcd hy

ST,\TL UNJVLR-.;JTY ()J'. NF:W Yl lf\K, ALB/\NY <g 2004 State U11iversity of New York

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Heidegl-'.cr. Manin, \ 81:\9-1976. \Vom Wesen der Sprachc. Eng!iohJ ( )n the e;serice of language: the met;1physics of Linguagc and the

e5'cncing of the wmd; concerning Herder's treatise Un the origin

"I Llllguage/ !vLirtin l kidegv,er; t1«111'lated by Wanda Torres Gregory

<lllcl YvotllH.' Unna. p. ctn. -- (SUNY series in contemporary umtinental philosophy)

lncl11dl's bibliogr;1phirn\ references and index. lSl\N 0-7914--<1271-4 (alk. paper) l . Lmgrr.igl' ;m,l Lmguages--l'hilmophy. 2. Lmguage and

Lmgu;ige;--( )ri�:in. \. Herder, Joh;mn Uottfried von, l 744-1803. J\hlr,llldlung r"ibcr den Ursprung dcr Sprache. 4. Language and

Lingrr<1gl's. I. ()1Tgnry, Wand<r Turrcs. ll. Unna, Yvonne.

lll. Tit le. JV. Series.

PlLl7.ll4S 1 l 2L!Ll4 401--dc22

/-' / ·-1 U,1

10 9 8 7 (i

2004049125

4 2

Cc)NTENTS

Trnnslators' Forcwnnl

I . CONCEIZNINC1 Tl I E !NTERI 'IZETATION OF 1 IEIWER, ON THE ORIUIN OF LANC1UACJE

I . The hum:m hc ing has Lmguagc-Thc word has

the hum:m heing 2. The rr; 1dition:il urnkrs1<111di11g ,if " l: 1 11guage" (A.oyoc;)

:md the essence of the IH1nrnn hcing (an imalhood )

:md Herder's posing of the quest ion

3. On the cs.scnce "f l:ingu:1gc

4. Why do we :1sk J;ir the csse11ce nf l :mgu:ige1

5. Our reflection lln l:mgua,ge

6. The d i st inctitm het1wen : 1 1 1 im:d :md hum:m hcing

7. Herder's treatise 8. On the "lvton:1do l<1gy"

I I . CONSTRUCT!( )N OF Tl I E ORIC1 lN OF LANUUACJE IN TllE MODE OF USE OF Tl IE Fl \EELY Ul'ERATINC} REFLECTION

9. Origin of l:mgu:igc I 0. The hum:1 11 hcing l l. The :111alogue ctm->trnct ion "f the essence of the hum:111

heing, devcl,ipnl from the :m im:il ecllll<llll'y'

12. !Zcflccti\'c aw:ircm·ss 1 ) . !Zdlcctinn a11d :1ttentilln (d i(frrc11ti: 1t ing), d i->tinct ,

interpretable rq1resenting 14. Cognitio distincra (d isti11crm·s-;) 15. Rdlcctive awareness and frcc-st:111d ingncss l Ci. "Rctlcctivc :1w:1renL'>'" and "langu:igc" l 7. The inner wnrd: 111:irk "f : 1 d ist inct reflection

xi

3 4

4

4

5 5 9

1 3 i l

l 3 14

l 5 1 (1 16

16

17

\'

vi

I

18. lnventing-by-iimling 19. Individual considerations and conceptual determinations

Ill. TOWARD A D!SCUSSION WITH HERDER

20. Tuward a fundamental discussion with Herder 2 \. Critical question regarding the analogue construcrion

of rlw human being 22. Essemi<1l steps 21. Fmc-grasp 24. Question-the fundamental position

IV. ON THE ESSENCE OF LANCiUAGE

25. The wmd as essencing of being [des Seym\ 26. Language 2 7. L111gu<1ge and "language" 28. The traditional-metaphysical appearance of language 29. The human being and "language" 10. "Lmgu<1ge" ) I. Un the essence of language

V. ON HERDER, ON THE ORIGIN OF LANCiUAUE

12. I krder l l. Un l Icrdcr in genn :d

H. I krder and Lcihniz

) 5. Lmgu;1ge--speak i11g l6. l luman languagc-:111im:d Lmgu;1gc l7. I krdcr\ first secrin11

l8. "The tirsr word" l9. Rdkcrin11 (reflex io11)

40. !Zetlen i \'C ;nv;1rcncss-rdlecti( m-t hi nk i ng ( 1vcr-rdlcx i( ll1

41. The erern:d merry-go-round 42. L111g11:1gc--tlll' l111rn<111 heing 4 l. I krdn-- on the (irigin uf Lmgu;1gc 44. M()ml--"voicc"

VI. l'llILOSOPHY OF LANC;UAC!E

45. The beginning of philosophy of Lmguage proper during the Enlightenment

18 19

23 24 24 24

27 27 27 28 29 30 30

43

'.-,

CllNTENTS

46. "Origin" 4 7. On the essence of language 48. The word 49. The other beginning

VII. CROSSING

50. The knowledge of the crossing 51. The word "of" being [ "des" Scyns]

VIII. METAPHYSICS OF LANGUAGE AND THE CROSSING

52. The metaphysics "of" "language" and the consideration of language within metaphysics

53. Decisions, developed from the metaphysics of language 54. Psychology of language

IX. STEFAN GEORGE

55. Crossing word 56. Sea Song 57. Sea Song 58. Sea Song 59. The Word

X. LANGUACE-FREEDOM-WORD

60. Freedom and word 61. Animal and human being

vii

4 3 44 46 47

51 52

55 55 55

59 59 60 60 61

65 (15

XI. ON THE QUESTION OF THE ORIGIN AND THE HERDERIAN MEDITATION ON THE ORIGIN AS METAPHYSICAL

62. Humboldt 63. Drives of the unfolding and development of language 64. Herder's meditation on the origin as metaphysical 65. Herder's question of the origin (Jn how far "question

of the essence"?) 66. "Reason" 6 7. Question of the origin as question of rhe essence

(metaphysical ly-heing-hisrorical [y)

69 69 (19

70 72

72

viii CllNTTNTS

68. Question of the essence anJ of the origin 69. Question of the origin and question. of the essence 70. "Origin of language"

X I I . DISPOSITION

71. Question of the origin-as que-,tion of origination and of essence

72. Question of the origin 71. Structure and course of the meditation on the origin 74. Inner and outer language 75. Inn.er and outer word 76. The rnle of hearing 77. Overview 78. Herder: the human being 79. Three hints on being [das Seyn] (and being-there)

XIII. QUESTION OF T H E ORIGIN

80. Question of the origin as question of origination and of essence

81. Essence as hcingness and essencing

82. "Project"

XIV FROM HERDER TO cm.IMM (METAI'I-IYSICS AND SCIENCE OF LANGUAGE)

83. Grimm\ :1ddn:'>s ( 185 l ) 84. From I lerdcr to ( )rimm 85. Frnm I lerder to Urimm 86. From I lerdcr to Grimm 87. The "divine" origin of language

XV SAYINC] AN[) HEARING-SOUND AND SILENCE

88. I learkcning 89. Sounding (sound)

73 73 73

77 77 78 78 79 79 79 79 80

83 83 84

87 87 87 89 89

93 93

90. Sound 9 I. Hearing and hearkening 92. "Hearing" and heing !.Seynl 93. Mark :md sound 94. "Sound" and m:JJ"k 95. The outer word 96. Sounding and scripr 97. Language (human) ancl he:iring 98. Herder: "rhar which is :dive"

IX

93 94 94 95 95 95 95 96 97

XVI. I IEARKENINC"J AS MIDDLE OF THE SEN SORIUM COMMUNE "SOUNDING' AND THE "TONE THAT BREAKS FREE"

99. Herder's consider:Hilln llf the role llf hearing I 00. Hearing, Lmgu:1ge, making stlunds, sounding

Quesrilln of decisilln I 0 I. The heing-histmic:d respllme (cf. Question of decisilln) 102. Hearing as middle of rhe sensorium Clllllllllllll' and the

essence of hearkening I 03. The sounding of l:i11guage

XVII. "FEELINU" AND "SENSE OF HEARING' IN HERDER SOUN DI NC; AN[) MAKIN<..! SOUNDS

104. Feeli11g I 05. The se11soriu111 u1mm1me a11d the sense tif hc:iri11g I 06. L:mgu:1ge and st nmd I 07. Herder's approach 108. Rel:ll io11 hct ween the 2"d :md )'d 'ccrio11 llf the I'' part I 09. What is rc:1so11?

XVIII. "TI IE SI-IEE!' BLEATS"

110. "You are the one bleating" 111. "Bblli11g" I 12. "Listen!" "The ,heep hle:irs" 1I3. "The e:ll" the first tc:ichcr of l:i11guagc" I 14. Sound :md to11e

IOI

101 I02

102 109

I 1 3 I I 3 I 13 I 13 114 115

119 I I9 I 19 120 I20

x

XIX. LANGUAGE AND REASON

115. Reason and language 116. Reflective awareness and language (inner word) 117. Reflective awarern:ss and mark 118. Wanting to know 119. Rctkcrive awareness 120. The distinction 121. The''<!'/' and the "for" 122. Language as "medium of our spiritual self-feeling

and consciousness" 123. Mark-thought in being-historical manner 124. M<1rk-inncr word and dialogue 125. Aping and imitating 126. Origin of language: The question of the origin as

question of the essence 127. The one and the other project of the essence of language 128. Language-the word 129. The experience of the word

l 1t Class: Alfred Franz

APPENDIX SEMINAR MINUTES

2nd Cl:iss: ( 1eorg Schmiege lrd C:b-;s: l-Iei11: /\/Lieder

4th C:h,s: Elis;1herh Schmidt Srh Clao,s: Siegfried Bri\se 6th C:hss: Dr. Wolfg:111g Rit:el 7rh CLhs: Orro Ib,;per 8th Class: I !ans I !eruwnn ( lrootlwff

lJth Cl:iss: lnng:ml Mylius I 0th CL1,,: K;1rl Ulmer

11 rh Class: 1';1111 Wettach

Editor's Epilog11e Lexicon

123 123 123 124 124 124 125

125 126 126 126

126 127 128 128

131 133 HS 1.39 144 149 154 157 160 164 169

175 179

--1 )�

TRANSLAT( m.s' Fe mEWORD

This hook i' a tr;mslation ,if thL· text of a grndu:ltc se111inar Martin Heidegger

offered in the -;um111er sc111estcr of! 9 l9 ;it the University ofFreihurg. The Uer-

1m111 text was puhlished in ! 999 as \'olu111e 85 of Heidegger's Ucsmnumsgabc (Collected Works). It cont;1ins Heidegger's lecture notes :md eleven minutes

wken hy students wl1ti p;irticip;1ted in the seminar.

Written as a series of outline:.;, with many cllipticil sentences and concep­

wal diagrams, Heidegger's lecture notes for the seminar afford a direct view into

his thinking in the works. Their comhin;1tion with the student minutes also of­

fers a unique perspective into his role as a reacher. This translation aims ttl re­

produce such modes of access for English re:1ders. In the effort to preserve the

integrity of the original wmk, we have left all of Heidegger's abbreviated for­

mulations int;1cr, ;md we have rest r;Iined from inserring completions, correc­

tions, and remarks into the text ;1s a wlwle. To ensure a consistent rcadin,g, we

have also rrnnslated all of the excerpts fwm tlthcr works quoted hy Heidegger

and his students.

The wel l-kntlwn difficulties of twmLiting Heidegger arc cnmpoumled in

this text hec1use nf the schc111:nic form of his lectures notes. To assist the

reader, we h:n·e ;1ppended ;111 English-Ucr111an lexicon of the teclmical terms

and neologisms that he 11SL's in these notc-;. J\;ither than adding numerous foot­

notes on the transhtion of individual words and p;1ss:1gcs, we shall confine our

remarks here to three general ohscrv;Hitlm:

I. We hm·c tr;mslated the c;erman words Se in and Sc'Yn with the English

word "being." To d istinguish the two ncrman terms in the trnnsla­tion, we have interpolated the wmd Snn in square brackets whenever it appc;irs in the mig in <il text. The only exception tu this rnlc is rhc wt ml SC'YrIS/�t'schichrlich--rr;moLncd simply as "hcing-h is tt lrical"-hc­e<lll'il' llcidcgger docs ntit 11.sc rlw term scinsgcschichrlich.

2. I !cideggcr use-; a numhcr of words beginning with the inscp;1rahlc

prefix er-, and often sql-.ir;Hes rhis prdix from the mot of the word with a ii when, as with tlw wtirds Er-ci,�11i.1 :md Er-fiwltm,r.;. ( ;erm;m wmds hcgi nn ing w ith er- t ypirn 11 y dcs ign;1tc two d ilfrrcn t kinds of ;1c­t it n1: the beginning of an l'\'L'IH tlr ;1 change of state, and the end of

xi

xii

/

/

T!ZAN:-;1.ATUR -;' F< llZEWl llU)

l 1 . . . . I * H " lcmrcr\ hy-an evcnr t \at resu ts m smnerhmg hcmg affcctec. eIL '""

· f · · · I " · , . ·h conno-phcnatwn u words w1rh this prchx may he crnp 1:1s1Z1ng sue

J rations of action and highlighti11.0 the root meanings of the WL�r · , . . ,.., \ . (;Cf'

English terms with hyphenated "-in"" endings translate t wse f h . 10

man er- words in which the root meaning is akin to the mcarnng/

h I l I Tl · · I · I I . ·\l. ·1s er-di:n <en t e wore as a w 10 e. \IS is t 1e case wit 1 WLlrc s sue ' ·

J (think-ing) and Er-Khwcigung (silenc-ing). Compound hyphenate

terms in English transbte rhose German er- words in which the root

meaning differs from the meaning of the word as <I whole. Words such

as Er-eignung (appropriating-event) and Er-find1mg (inventing-hy­

finding) fall under this category. We have resorted to the same strat­

egy with terms with other prefixes where Heidegger plays out the dif­

ferent meanings, such as Ab-grund (ahysmal-grnunJ) and wr-nehmcn (percciving-hy-rnk ing).

3. Important nuances arc often lost in the translation of Heidegger's tenm, particularly when Gernwn and English words Jo not slwrc the same roots. Here, this is especially true of the cluster of words that arc related to the verb rnerken (to notice), the substantivized infinitive Merkcn (attention), and the noun Mcrkmal (mark). It is worth observ­ing that their meanings are at play in the following terms: ab-rnerkcn (to de-mark), m1frncrkcn (to attend to), auf-mcrken (being-attentive­on), m1f-mcrk-sam (attentive-to-mmk), he-merkbm (percept-ihle), be-merl<en (to note), hin-mcrkcn (being-attentive-toward), Ich-rnerken (I-marking), Mcrkbildung (mark-formation), Merk-med (mark-sign), Ma/rnng (noticing), Mcrkwort (mark-word), and vcr-merl<t (noted­down).

We wi->h to thank the Deutsche Literatur;1rchiv in Marbach and the c· (_' liege FtlllLI 'Llr f\c",C'll'Ch We also whh tLl express our gratitude to ,>lllllllOll'i ,l) I' ' · ·

Su-;an CJ I asper, I \1vid W:ilter-;, <llld Li:1m U1111a Walters.

i'f Jwlen. ( JrmnnuHilc da dcHhchen ( ;l'f!,C11H'llr(\�j>radw. � . , ncu he;uhcllett und cnvl'1te1 te 1\11fLigc. J\c·,irhctlcl \'llll l\1111 ( !rd•c'. Uudcn, ll:md ·\. llihl1ogrn11lii,d1C'' Jn,11t11r AG, M:mnlwi1n

l'J7l

I . CONCERNING TI-IE INT ERPRETAT ION OF HERDER,

ON T HE ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE

' ---

I . The hwnan heing has lan,guagc-The word has the human being

The "human heing" "has" "language" (rntio ct oratio), ("anim;il rationale" "is able" "to speak" and "speaks" necessarily hy virtue of his essence).

The "word" "has" the "human heing" (hcing-thcrc "grounds"-guanlian­ship of being [des Scyns]).

Crossing from the met;1physics "of" language toward the think-ing leap into the cssencing of the being-historical word.

2. The traditional understanding of "language" ( i\.c.iyo£') and the essence of the human hcing ( animallwod)

and Herder's posing of the question

If "language"-distinguishing the animal-then its essence on the grnund of the distinction hccween animal and hwnan being.

Two of Herder's statements: I . "Already as animal the human being has language" ( 5 ). 1

a) The human being is animal-h) There is an animal language (sounding in sensations)

Language: to make oneself noticeable, /iercc/>t-ihlc "Mechanical language": screams and sounds hreaking out by themse lve.-.. To make manifest: to fccl-"with," "dark, sensuous accord in the circle of its dctcrmin<ition and ;ictiviry" (24)

2. "l-luman beings arc for us the only creatures endowed with language that we know .. . they distinguish themselves precisely through language frnm all animals" (21). a) Langu;1gc-the n011-aninwlistic, thac which distinguishes the human being h) The human being not "only" animal.

3. Cmn/iatihilicy of lmth statcmcms. The differenr and yet uniform cm1cept of language. Ft irmal I y: making .1cm1cthing noticcohlc hy making manifest, "the jJ/.:rn-

I. J. ll. 1 lenkr, Uhl'l" den Ur,pn111g dl'l" Spracl1e. From the pri:c '''"'\' """1rdcd hy the

Arndemy of Scielll L'' in Berl i n i n 1 7 70. Acrording to till' "'l'llnd fl'\' i"'ll edi t ion publi,hed lll 11l'l" l i n in I 78lJ. In: I knkh /\11,gewahlt e Wule in drci ll:imkn. Ed 1 tnl with an intrllduct ion hy Adolf Stern. Lc1p:ig, Verlag l'h i l i p p Rccl:1m, n.d., rnl. l, J'I'- h l 0--70 1 .

Editor\ rhlll': The page rl'frrl'IKl':-. ft)r the interprl' tat ilm tll lerdl'r's t ext an: JHH ci ted hcrl' from l-lcidcggcr\ per..,Pn;d copy ment ioned ah()\T, hut (nm1 t he cnt ical cditit111 tha1 he ;d-.n u-;ed: Joh:inn (�ot1fr1cd I knkr, S>immtl1clll' Wei kc, edited hy I\. Suphan, l\l'l"lin I 891 , \'ol. 5, !'!'· 1-- 1 54.

4 !. C:< )NU'RNIN<; TI II' lNTl'IU'RETATI< 1N < 1F Huull'IZ

liar language of each creature" (25), rhe way of"coloring" and of"cornmuni­

cation" thar is appropriate to its sphere.

3. On the essence of language

l '' class: On the (received) questioning concerning language. Philosophy of

language-Science of language-Metaphysics of language (Question of

"essence" and of "origin"). 2'"1 class: On the Western determination of the essence of language: Lan­

guage as distinction of the human heing-formal concept of language as an ex­pression that makes something manifcst-av8pui1wi; 1;,qiov /....6yov £xov.

/,6yoi;: (I) Reason (Thinking) ratio et (2) Speaking (l)iscourse) oratio

as capacity of a living heing (of an animal).

Language: 1. the distinctive capacity occurring in the living human being with a deter­

minate cause of origination ("Nature"-God); 2. a "being," extant.

Preview on Herder.

4. \Vhy do we ask for the es.1cnce of language?

I las not this question in�: already completely fallen out of the immediate acting "l ife" 1 Is there not a manifold entanglement and matting in it? The suhsequent and elusive-or I something entirely other? (The word of being [des Scyns])

But how thrnugh such reflection? Only through the saying! But if pote ncy

and impotency -,urrmmd and determine the possibilities-must not the origi­nal .,uhrnission ro the word first lie gniunded? Yet, how else this hut as through a reflection on the e-,scnce 1

For the word i-, ;ilre;1dy said�-those who listen "are" not yet and find not yet into the essence.

Thus rhc thinkers are needed.

5. ( )ur reflection on langual',e

First fol lowing the guiding thread of the question concerning the "origin of lan­

guage" lour reflection] docs not have an eye on the science of language and its

foundation. Just a-; little does it wanr to deal with a particular area, a discipline,

7. f-JEJ\llE!Z's Tl\EATISE 5

of philosophy. It :ilso docs not cLiim ro make the "philosophy of language" the fundament:d discipline of philosophy. Neither science of language nor philos­ophy of language is meant, but r:1ther the reflection on the "origin" (ground of the essence) of language from the word; the word, however, as essencing of the truth of being [des .Sc:vns]. Why this reflection?

The reflection on language counts here as a decisive way toward the lca/J inw the com/Jlctely other, namely !icing-historical thinhing. "Decisive" in being-historical sense. The /JOc t of decision: Hiilderlin.

The crossing must. however, he undertaken from metaphysics, since it is not a matter of overthrowing, nor of counterhal:mcing. The "metaphysics" of lan­guage asks in the form of the question concerning the "origin of language," be­cause metaphysical thinking asks for the wmmd of beings.

6. The distinction betwcoi m1imal and hurrwn being

Fore-having: prcscnt-:n-h:md living beings Fore-sight: aA.oyov-A.<'iyov f.xov + A.oyor; Fore-wasp: 011 capacity-properties.

How does Herder develop this distinction? What result docs this have for the determination of the essence of language? Wlrnt is cssenti:il in language and as language? (The distinctive cap:Kity of the human being, of the being of

the human hein.�-how and what for?)

7. Herder's treatise

I. The external order of the trnill of thcmght (Part I, Section 1 and 2, pp. 5-4 7) 2. The /no[lcr a/J/>rnach

3. The essential line of vision and the mcta/Jh:vsirnl finmdation 4. The standard dctcnJ1inotioJ1 of h1mwn l11n.�1taf!.e.

"Origin" and "essence" of the hum:m l:inguage, concept of "inventing-hy­finding." Whither met:iphysically rhe essence of language and with it also the possibility to experience :md contemplate language becomes shifred! The human being-the animal that is able to /Jrod11cc verhal langllilf!.C:

On I. The cxtcrrwl order of the trnin of tlwuglu. Part I. I and 2 ] '1 Section

a) The rnitural lm1gw1gc of rhc /11mwn hcinl!, and "nature-" language in gen-

eral (distinguished fnllll :irtiticial and technical language, invented at

first for thar purpose). The .rnundillg of sensations- in such utterances directed to other crea-

tures (dark, sensuous ;1ecord).

6

------

L CONCERN\NG THE lNTE\WRETf\TlON OF HEil.DER

. ,, f Na-The "interjections," "throwing-in-between," "exclctmanons 1° , n

" · · l L\ " d" "1 " l · th-1t enliven 1um'' ture, not pnnc1pa u )ers an roots, out t 1e saps ' . "1, t-\ \ f · · -h1ne 1"'1 \anguage" (9) according to the naturn aw o a sentient t��lc "'feel-ural law of the sentient machmc not to be exp lamed further-how ing" (sensation) can express itself in sound (63). .

Fron1 such cries human language never originates ( 17). Thus: a p<H� ticular ground for the origination of human language. Animal !lingual(

and human language distinguished according to "kind" (quale): , be Thus the question concernmg the ongm of human languag<.: to

posed only on the ground of the difference in kind between ctnimal and human

being, respectively, in connection with this distinction. b) The difference between ctnimctl ancl human being-distinction of the

"spheres" and "capacities" (abilities). Law of the inverse corrcsf)ondcnce between sphere and capacity (circle and abilities).

2"'1 Section a) The distinctive character of the human being: reflective awareness (fun­

damental power of reason and freedom) b) Reflective awareness (reflexion) and the invention of language c) The essence of human language

Word of the soul (mark of the object noticed), "Expression" of this "word"

3''1 Section Which were the first (inner?) marks, of what kind were they in order to be­come "elements" of saying, of expressing, of announcing? They had to be in ad­vance "distinct," distinguishable: bleating, barking, cooing-

Saying and sounding-tone ancl hectring-ear Being attentive-hearkening-hearing!

On l . Does the human being hearken because he hears, or can he hear because he he<irkens and obeys? And what makes hearkening possible, being attentive­on am\ <ittentive-toward as perceiving of "beings," the perceiving of the sound­ing "acts"? "Processes": "sighing," "murmuring," "rustling"?

But-i-; it the "phonetical" only, and is this sounding as such capable of giv­ing something, if nut already mark?

Herder sees the sense of hearing essentially in relation to the rendering pos­sible of sounding and announcing-with regard to the "outer" word, but essen­tial for the "inner," that is, for that which lies before inside and outside. The sense of hearing ttnd obedience: the insistence that hearkens and awctits in the clear­ing. Cf. Language and Hearing, no. 97.

On 2. The jlrnjier ajijiroach (in presenting the origin of human language) a) lmmediate description of animal and the human being? Of their distinc­

tion aml of the process of the invention of language? No!

"fU&iiW&L =

7. HERDER'S TREATISE 7

b) The main ste/Js: a) Starting tJOint with the animal-as living being (sphere and abi l it ies in

determinate relation). P) Conversely, in the same respects, but completely different the human

being. y) Here-animal language does not suffice for the human being, not

rich, not d ist inct enough. o) The human being as human being also does not have any instinctual

speech. ·

E) The human being born mute-destined to a large circle . Greatest d ispro-

portion-lack and want of "nature" impossible-thus, compensation

necessary. /;;) For the human being as "living being"-from Mother Nature- a gift

of Nature required, according to "reason" and "fairness," that fulfills

that want and thereby at the same time constitutes the distinctive

character of the human being. 11) Such: what cause of the wants (in contrast with animal) and what at

the same time the "germ of re/Jlacement" at the core of privation of

artificial drives . (The free c ircle of reflection for "everything"). In

how far? 8) If in this necessary essential character the ground of the origination

of language-then language necessarily a "natural" production (in­

vention) of the human being appropriate to the human being's na­

ture, insofar as the human being himself must be "naturally" an in­

ventor in order to replace this want itself and to balance the "great

d isproportion"; harmonia. c) The essence of this a/J/Jroach

a) Fore-leaf! into the rational character of the human being: The great

circle (the free c ircle of reflection of the cold, bright self-knowing

reflective awareness-of "everything").

P) Determined from this fore-having the "/wtabasis" to the animal and

the starting point with the aniirn;l and the "anabasis" to the human

being. y) The law ruling the stages of the "anabasis" is the analogy, the presu[J-

[Josed correspondence . "The great correlation that runs through the chain of l iv ing

beings . . . " (23)

"The corres/Jonclencc"-the human being-<God

Animal

�---

8 I. C(lNCEl\NJN(; Tl IE ]NTERl'RET/\Tll lN (lF l-IERJlER

8) This correspondence grounds in the application of the "animal econ­

omy" (23), of the regulated economy of all living beings , of their "rw ·

l" I " 1 1 " · d · , nd regulw tiona anc reasona 1 e equipment, an conservation a tion through the maternal Nature. Harmonia-"Perfectio" (omne ens

honurn). God-the just and calculating and efficient father of the house'

lwU.l for the world- (and soul-) economy, the economy of beings as .;1 l I I-1 h. k " j · " h . " y" ·uHJ IS w 10 e. 1uman reason t m s accorc mg to t is econom '

therefore "rational," prudent and practical! Fore-leap: human being as .1tandard mid-J>oint Srnrting point: the liveliness of Nature .

On ) . The essential line of vision and the metaJ>hysical fundamental f>osition a) "Metaphysics" toward:

- "Nature"-in the sense of Mother Nature ( qrucru;), - "natura" (source of the essence of all becoming and being),

(presence-at-hand, presencing and constancy of the emergence) -animalitas-1 i vel iness -rationalitas-reflective awareness (calm possession of consciousness).

h) But this monadological? yes and no , "t>artly monadological ." ex) The essence of the monad does not (as Herder himself at the begin­

ning of the treatise would like to make believe) consist in the holted isolation of particular things, but

[3) l ''in the simplicity of the fundamental power and its respective j)()int of view and field of vision. For Herder, essential:

(I) Power-fundamental power, perceptio appetitus potentia conatus

(2) "Circle" ( 3) Corres/Jondcnce ( 4) /Jcrfcctio-the most pcrf ect of all ivorld.1;

yet everything from "outside" in spite of the sensitivity and

liveliness. 2'"1 That indeed precisely every monad mundu.1 concentratus-living

mirror, wherein mundus sets itself hcfore itself and this representing essence of the monad itself.

l"1 In ;,uch a w;1y reL1ted e.11cntially to "universum"-not only through outer mediation. The latter conversely a possibility of the essence and result of the originally sole relation. rcJmicscntatio: representing that sets-before Simple-11ni-ty-heing.

y) Therefore, in Herder the construction through analoi.,ry sets the stan'

d;ml. In the monadologica l inrerpreration of the ens as rnonas for

the first time the mctaJ>hysical JnesuJ!JJosition is created for the "anal,

8. ON Tl IF "M\ lNAll\ ll\X;Y"

ogy"-as relation of the essence of heings themsel ves-heyond a merely curn/Jaratitic t'icw. The rn-rcspo11dcn cc as belonging t\l beings themselves! no longer "ens creatum" and .111hstantia in tr:1ditional sense. Cf. Middle Ages "crcatio"-cns creatum. I. "The sphere" of the l iving heing 2. The simple, encompassing fundamental power 3. The reflex ion and regarding-the-reflection.

o) Everything in the realm of the monadology and thus in rhe funda­menta l positions of metaphysics; a lso the law of the inverse corrc­Sj)()nden ce , cf. the hierarchy of the monads, the breadth of their field of vision, and its brightness, and the k ind of fundamental power (perccptio-appctitus) .

8. On the "Monadology"

9

Is the monad "egoistic"? that is, intent on itself as "ego" and onl y concerned with itself?- Egoism onl y where cgoicity, 1-ncss. But egoism only one possibility of the essence into unessence, out of the latter as ;1 resul t; never to determine the ground of t he essence as "egoistic ."

But then monad at b1sr "I- l ike" (cf. ()erhardt, Brief an de Voider from Jime 20, 170)).1 Yet, what docs this mean? ego cogi to, ergo sum-ego as "suhjccturn."

The monad in general is veluri TO Ego vcl simi le ( ib id.) , "I-similar," "I-Iii«:." Good, hut what constitutes the cssc1ice of the "!"! (cf. Monadologic ** 29, 30). 2 Reflex ion, which for the first r ime makes possible the rurning-row:ml-the-1 , is "knowledge of the necessary truths" ( undersrand ing of being!!)

Herc a great step is sensed: Selfhood gniundcd in rhc rrurh of being [des Seyns]! And yet! not able tu be followed.

Egoicity-gruunded in heingness and besides this in ego-primari ly-mir-roring of Illl!rldus and itself m1mdm! (cf. the mentioned Brief.)

But how the '\vimlmvlcssness" of the In\lll:ld? Nor negat ive as locking up and isohiring, hut sign of the positive higher prinwnlia lness of t he world rcla­tion -frrnn which {(Jr the first time the phenomenal connexus and the relarions of the derivative powers originate.

Leibniz regards the nHmas from the suhjecrrnn, from the "ego" :is suhjcct!lm ( that being, that which is to he encountered, what distinguished by the c:1p;1c-

I. G W. LL·ihnic. DiL" l'l"l""'rhi,clwn Schrif1L"n. Edi1cd hy C. J. l;L"rh.mh. Berlin IK79. SL"cond Vulu1m-. I'· 2'i I.

2. Li. W. Lc1hn1:. i\11.rn;1dn\ug1e. In: /\u�gew;ihltc Philo:-.npl11-..chc Schriften 1m l )nginal-

1e·x1. 2'"1 vol. Ed1tcd hy 11. Sch1n:dc·nh;ich. LL"iJ1"'� 1915, pp. I l l-51.

--

IO J. Ct lNl To\ZN!Nl; Tl IE INTEIZl'l\ETAf\llN lll' 1-!ER])ER

ity of the principles; therefore!) and yet , that which is essenti a l is the "ent­

elechy." But the "ego" [is] not "egoistic." The monad "I-l ike"- but not "egoist ic." "I-like": self, representing itself in the representing of m u ndus , being­rnundus. Monad:

I. simple standing-in-itself 2. originally unifying

3. isolating to itself-(but as mundus )

4. striving for-by-representing-that-sets-before 5. power-vis primitiva-activa-passiva

S1h cm be understood from ] ''-4'", that is, 5rh is the ground of the essence

for 1"-4'"·

"Entelechy": in letting-presence as mundus repraesentatio-representing and "heing" oneself in such way.

IL CONST RUCT ION OF T HE ORIGIN OF LANGU AGE

IN T HE MODE OF U SE OF THE FREELY OPERAT ING REFLECT ION

-forma l structure of this construct ion -essence of the reflective awareness -reflect ion and attention -rn;irk and inner word -inner word and its expression

9. ( )rigin of lm1guage

In the essential character of the human being-as the weak, instinct-/Joor crea­ture />laceJ in che grcm circle-lan guage formation becomes necessary.

I' laced in t he great circle: reflective awareness-freely o/Jerating. Origin of language: 1. within rcfiectiw awareness-reflexion (inner word) 2. The inner word becomes outcr-s/Jeakin g, announcing. What language may be in essence-conceptually fixed in advance. Cf.

Critique.

I 0. The human being

What renders it possible so that he-with weakened and unsure instincts, but more numerous and more dispersed senses-can " live" in the great circle? This which renders possible is the distinctive character of the being of the human being: the reflective awareness as capacity of reflection.

I. The essence of this character. 2. In how far its use is nothing other than coming inro being of language. 3. In which sense is here at first "language" understood? (The inner word

as mark-word). 4. In how far the cause of the want in this character (of the distance be­

tween capacity and great circle)? and in how far the germ of the over­coming? ("for compensation").

5. In how far based on this character not difference in degree, hut in essence from the animal ?-different way to be.

1 I . The analogue construction of the essence of the human bein g, devclo/Jed from the animal economy

Formally: If the human being is not lii•inR being as animal, /nit-although another living hein1;-still must he able to subsist equally, he must be such and s11ch way.

13

14 0 . " 01' L/\NUU/\(iE ll. CoNSTRUC!lON Of' THE 11.K>l" ·

Animal and Human

according to "life circle" and "cat>acity" (abilities)

Animal Human being

Life circle encompasses: Life circle encompasses:

"Everything," large . "A few things," small and narrow

abilities fewer, numerous

capacities more, more

but but sharper and more driven

and more certain

weaker, more vacilh1ting,

more uncertain

Therefore: entire "disposition"

of an powers imiformally

other\ How?

( what .

. . f or less at However, the d1fference nevertheless not m terms o more

d ,5 th<1t

amount would human circle begin'), but according to kind. What oe

mean? ln general circle-against circle (small and large)?

Or: Wrnt> (daze) and world (proiect of being)

respectively formal "whole" Insistence

(Wholeness saying nothing)

f . hnguage lf the human being not animal . . . then reflective awareness and t 1en.

L f re:

a) lf not sharply tied to small spot, then indeterminately bound. There 0

"advantage of freedom"-the "senses" and sense "in general." "wider h) lf not "restricted" to one single artifact and artificial drive, then ,e"

f sp'IC outlook" (field of vision and possibilities), consequently: " ree '

("possibility of practicing," "improvement," "progression"). . tO' c) lf not encapsulated in an "instinct" (dark, simple impulse) driven

wards and carried away, then "greater clarity" (discernment)· h Therefore: "free-standing" -freedom can "look at himself in himself," cun se<irc

' - 4'put' for hi1me\f u sphere of reflection (reflex), becomes his own free am1 open

pose" of the work. ad But!! The essential condition for all of this?? Reflective awareness_.alre y

essential consequence of the project of being and of thrownness,

12 . Reflective au1areness

The unified and total command over all powers, the fundamental power (2S)· A "completely different kind of direction and unfolding of all powers" (29).

I 3. Ru1.�c:TJUN /\Nil /\TTENTJON

Possibil i ty of d i rection-space? whereto?

"Reflective awareness" (pure contemplative being attentive and having-before­oneself) . Reflect ive awareness: a direction of all powers specific to the human species (powers of representing-by-serring-hefore ) . "Growth"-as unfolded use of the already ruling power in its germ.

Reflective awareness a direction of the fundamental power ( the representing ) Wh 1 t . " 11" l · l " l ' · " All �>l d' . one . erew. to t111s a anl m anot ier way: L tstmct. ness anc istmct-

ness ( totum-sirnul-praesens). The notio distincta of Leibniz, cf. Meditationes de Cognirione, Verirate er Ideis. 16841 [Sec no. 14. Cognitio d istincta].

"The reflective awareness of a human concept" (34 ) : Free operating : to de­tach, to stop-by-holding-in, to bring before oneself and to become conscious of oneself, ad-/Jerceptio , assensus , ac-lmowledgment, to gather-to l inger-to take under observation-to de-each marks , ro de-mark; to ac-lmowled1;e something as that and that, as d i fferent by oneself.

Signs for this attention that holds firmly. Such marks , the "inner" (spiritual) "word." "Word" is "mark-sign"; furnished with sounds; "distinctly"-recognizing interpretable: to recognize and name with a mark.

to notice-to attend to-

to note-to de-mark-> to reta in � to note down-

13. Reflection and attention (differentiating). distinct , inter/ire cable re/iresentinr;

to sense, to perceive to turn oneself towards, to stay with, wait ing anxiously, l urking to /neview--Dverview, "free" to firmly grasp sign to keep mark, to store, to register, to note down to hold fast in a mark

to make noticeable - to make known.

mark- note, notio, no�r- istic, fixinr; of the /iermanent and always constant in itself; To differentiate: to ac-knowledge oneself in a differenti­ating manner. ad-perccptio ad-sens us �---> "oneself"-"saying"!

to notice: as lett ing prc-scnce, ro make-present, recainable through "sir;ns"

I. (]. W. Leibniz, MeJitationcs de Cognitionc, Vcrinitc ct Icici« In: Die philosophischcn

Schrifrcn. EditcJ hy C. J. C1crhardt. r:ounh volume. Berlin I 880, pp. 422-26.

1

/

-

J [ . CUNSTIZUCTJllN l ll' Tl IE 0J1.ll> IN < lf· LANUUAl;t:

Use-of-reason is mark-formation insofar as through it ob-ject i s brought to sr;ind

and to self-subsistence and kept free l y avai lable . Mark-formation h word-formation, insofar as i n the word: mark of a dist inct

reflection. Reflective awarenes'i a nd freedom: freedom and " la nguage."

14 . Cognitio distincta (distinctness)

r' , · t. · d ff I · ] · . · th· 1t and 'ecugrn ion: to re -cogn 1ze = to iJJerent iate, t mt 1s, somet ·1111.g ,1s '

that, and thus to grasp it as "itself. " ohscura: where no agnoscere and recognitio possible clara: where a nota, which makes such possible confttsa : where indeed clarae notae-but not separat im enunt iab i le in rem

praesentem ducerc, hut through senses ( tone of color-clear, but indist inct and

vague, blurring) , that is, not counted after the individual marks and completely

differentiated. clistincta : where notae enun tiahiles , clcfinitio nominalis , enumeratio nocarum

mfficicntiwn ; naming-name>-word-nora . Th is cognitio measured against

intuitus-as claccrc i n naturam-totam simul /Jracscntem (suffic ient for whar ? ) :

I . I pure, complete making-present, a-; far as and how /Joss ihle for the human Jemg.

1 5 . I?.eflcctive awareness and free-standingness

The standing-free-' (Leibniz : Knowledge of the necessary eternal truths.

"Identity"-! ) "Self-sameness": Condi tion o f the possibil ity of grasping selfhood i n i ts per­

manence and self-sameness and from this the " ! ." ( Bu t what docs selfhood con­! ,, si-;1 i n ? as possibi l i ty of rhe "oneself," "yourself' and "myself' and "ourse ves

and "yourselves," of grasping "reflex ive ly. " ) And rhus in one: the arnund and ahout oneself­

spherc of reg<irding-of-thc-reflection free s/iherc of reflection " i tself' in "itself' "The direction"-whereto ? Cf. Freedom and Word [no. 60] .

1 6. " T\eflective awareness" and "language"

The freely operat ing reflect ive awareness i n ve n ts language-is l a nguagc­i nvcnt ion. (H ff.)

Mark: to dcmark the oh-jeer, with this the "soul" marks for itself rhe ohject <t.'> that and thar.

1 7. Ti IL JNNEI\ Wl )j( i )

T h i s mmk i n g-for-onesclf a nd making oorice;1b lc a s speaking to oneself-the

marl< a.1 in ner word "d ia logui og" -hecmncs then furn ishul with sound and is ar the

same r i m e rhe rem:1rk i n u and communicatinu to an orher.

Langwige-ro note i i� i r rhe mark of d iffrr�nce of our species from outside ·

Reason-th e san1e from inside (47). To notice: marc- w direct the senses and the sense wward.

"Note": to attend to, a ttentive-to-mark-to mark for oneself, to keep in

mind-to turn-haci<wanls .

"to n ot i ce" as "to sense," .fur mahing a note 1-notio 1

I 7. The inner word : marl< of a distincc reflection fl . ,,

the inner necessary genesis of a word as the mark of a e lem re ecnon

( 45 ) . Word rhe grnsped s ign of rhe recol lection for oneself of someth ing as one

a n d the same. distinctly-d ist i ncr-clif.fcrenticuin1;-contrm1ing o.f somdhin1; agains t some-

thing-d ifferen ti ; 1t ing between one and ;mother ( two) demands a third ( 39) . Being :ntent i ve-to, to and fro, free ly oper:1t ing reflect ion.

To operate fredy: to he ahle to de-tach, stopping-by-IHlld ing-on, to l inger by,

to gather oneself i n a moment of u'Cli<e , ro acknowledge something as d i fferen-

t iated and d i ffe rentiat ing in onesel f.

Ac-knowledgment-Cl/i-/ierceptio , roward onese lf-to perceive oh-jeer and

thus to perceive mic:scl.f with i r .

D i d t h e acknowl edging occm through a mark ?-or d i d the mark first come into

being thni ugh the <1ck 1ll)wledging?-or is i t hoth at rhe same r ime and whar

does this rne:m ?

Example of the Lunb ( "the one that hlears" ) : /ntrc disinterested contcrn/ila-

tion-the need to hecmnc-ocquaintccl!

The truly firs t inner marl<-word is the tightly held view o.f the di.f.fcrcncc ( 39) ·

Reflect ive <1w: treness: in addit ion-nor d i sturbed and driven and restless

through sensuousness and dri Ve !

Mark: as sign of recogn it ion-of the identifying-it as the same of the iden-

cical what-" idea"-d isr ing1 1 i sl 1able-,gms/iccl .

Human language: g;1theri n)-'. of such grasped signs.

Language i n genern l : s(gn ifying, !err ing-notice.

Use of reason not only not /m>ficr ( "nor convenient" ( 39 ) ) and re:i lly possible

w ithout m ar k , hut not m all so1

Why nor ? Because just reason, reflective awareness: is wh:n i Grasping of he-

ini;s as such . Whcrchy hcin,g11cs.1 means : l'cnnancnce and self-sameness o.f the rc-

sJ>ective indit•idual , diffcrcnticued .

f

1 8 ] [ . CONSTRUCTION OF THE 0RICl!N O F LANlllJACJE A.6yoi; has in this respect -as perce1vmg of bemgs as sue am e

. . . h . I b ingness-d f · 'b · 1 · B "l " 7 presence-its groun o mner poss1 1 ity. ut anguage . Language neither through organization of the mouth, nor through cries of feeling, nor through imitation ( aping) , not thmogh agteement o f '"iety (38 ) .

'"' Lan""4ge of th, human being it th"*""d , >ounding ""'°" ( 4 5f.) · L"''" ;,

in gtntm\ it tounding in '""'"""'" . Howcv,,, the Ve<b\ expte,,ion in th'.. OU

wmd, The tone from innct Wntd to "toond"-wotd·tnund that "wundt. t· "Long"'tge"--in tpitc of all-the tnmpen"tion lot the '""°'' di.tptop:n­

ti.on; an '""''""' oid! fa, "'"ting the homan bdng't rmnantnte in the t

imal economy. (Leibniz on language, cf. Nouveaux Essais sur l'Emendemen humain, first published in 1765, 50 years after Leibniz's death. )

mark-word

statement saying word attention

and

* mark

truth l . being [Seyn)

representing-by-setting-before

c earing

k directing toward-attentive-to-mar Perceiving-"to sense" that which is ob-jective-present-at· hand-"beings"

Finding:

Inventing:

G iven:

Sought:

1 8 . Inventing-by-finding

un· a !>resent-at-hand , but to find-ou t something kn th . . b csent·

0wn at is 1naccessi le, to encounter as pr at-hand, to ascertain. to manufacture what is in general not yet present-at· hand, t "f l " ·

nt in 0 ree Y invent , to imagine, in making stateme front of court, e.g. , "the unknown man."

to-invent-by.finding: e.g. , the match , the airplane. 1 . a need and a purpose, 2. material, tools. a means for its fulfillment and indeed: easy, conven­ient, cheap. For everyone and useful .

1 9 1 9. JNi llV!lllJAL CONSll lERATIONS

Inver . 1t1on-by-fi' d. ,1 1ng: Where also the purfJose is produced as if emphasized­

from a need long in existence, but thought to be

satisfied (tinder and flint) or

simply "fmJducing" in wider sense, that is, the need is

s imultaneously awakened, raised and mastered.

And what l ies therein ? Securing-em/Jowering of

the human being-transformat ion . ]nventing-by­

find ing as possibi l ities , predispositions ( to develo/J) ·

Inventing-by-find ing: to produce something-not yet

present-at-hand-to remedy a want and as compensa­

tion-to experience the want-to pose its remedy as

task-; to go after the means and ways.

1 9 . Ind· .d .

l rvr ual considerations and conceptual determination

· Ev 2 ..,..hery animal 11· .

. l e "gr ,ls its circle (22ff.) .

3 . Tl ' . eat relatio , , I . . . . ff )

" ;unp[ , f n t mt rnnnhrnughm.r the chmn of hvmg bo<ngd23 · ·

4 tefloct1vc . ' tmdmnental pow« of tho '"'"" of the humen being' th<

. Ref] ' . awareness (28ff ) ect1ve . . .

gu·1 , c1wareness · f fl · · · b · f I ' ge ' 04ff. ). · -use o re ecrron as the "coining mto emg o an-

On I · · Thesis TI Const· · 1C c i rel I · l

dntly sh ·f " e not meant "ontically," but ontologically. For t w anuna

lv! 1 ts plac " j' · "W 1 1 "

" 0Vernc e, at any rate possible within determinate rrnr ts. or c .

societ ,, nt-food ( , ) " l . . "

"1o y. pccy • ptcmv,,ion (enemy) , pa idng I ;e,) , " "'"""" '

I . c·

a c1rcle-"to re1 .

" . . b . I d I ·d Daze· have" .

dpt iv I nam m it- eciuse c1pr rvatec an c aze · ·

2 . atec 1 , . ' '

· tightly 1 --{_ etcrm mate l imitation

3 . . 0ound - , . . Wrthin t1 . emergrng m this · l ms daze ( · J fl

I 1, h · ti s

<lnc thus-wit 1out re ection) and in this precise y a ue- avmg iu,

() "bi l it; , . · Alwoy; a wrnin kew"Y foe th<' fixored po>'ihi l ide; of the

n 2 . A . es and dri , . shar ) , . ves . But never freedom ? Why not?

the · . I cnmg of ti . · · · I · · fi ' " I k ' ll f

anrfic" I d . · 1e senses and a sm1pl ificat10n of t 1c at n c 1,1 s t s , 0

11ot 1'1 nves ( f , . .

· -

onous . , . . · 0 ten completely smel l , sight , monotonous course, mo

de F act1vr t ) . f I , .

. · � .g . e l . Y corresponds to the diminution and narrowmg o t lC ctr-

lts ·} ' ag e : 1 d , I · · d

.. ' '"'P v . n <cc wKbd idd of vhion, definitdy nor nonow -00 Y"

sron . rs1on (25) B . . d . , -

rarlwa , . · · ut not meant ontical ly: Alps and c tnes an suspen

In ys ,\J1d sk' r · . k vers l a mg rm s

spond e y : The ·1 ' . . . I 1 · f . l orre-

. to ti . ' ugmcntatton and manifoldedness of t 1e t e c trc e c

and le dtstril · I · f I ses

artificial d . iut ton, L ispers ion, weakening. I nconstancy o t 1e sen

nvcs and actions.

20 II. CONSTRUCTION OF THE ORIGIN OF LANUUAUE

h . . ·fi . l d . , . frotn the T erefore pnnc1ple of the explanation of the art! eta

. nves. I.aw

power w represent the having of the circle . That is, also the mventwn of , guage (of the artificial language ) from representing of the reflective awa�

fl . . . Th 11 the circle , t e

ness-re ex1on-representmg-appercept1on. e sma er more all pulled together, the less "language" needed (24) .

I I I . T OWARD A DISCUSSION

WIT H HERDER

-:

20. Toward a fimdamenwl disrnssion with Herder

Herder presupposes essence of language as gathering of grasped signs of ob­jec t-signs, which .s inl l l l raneously "express" rhemsclvcs.

The quest ion is : 1 . Justification and p;rmmd and direction of this jJosing of essence , 2. realm of dec ision of th is posing of essence.

Need ing for th is to grasp I lerder's pos ing of the essence itself (and thus, the mctaphys irnl in genera l ) primord ia l ly-ro lead hack to that ujJon which i t is grounded-what i r however is not ahle w sec as such and st i l l less to ask for.

Two things have to he asked for: I . Project of the essence of

the h uman being 2. Project of the essence of language

Understanding of hcing-heing

Truth of being-being-there

2 1 . Critical question regarding the analogue construction of the essence of the hwnan heing

l . M an only "more unhllund" ? w i th wider v iew? wi th more clarity I

A l l th i s st i l l d i fferent in terms of degree. 2. How thus "free-stand ing" w ith this I

a ) free from . . . and i ts cond i t ion h) free-standing! Which "stand"? "Selfhoocl" free from a l imited poi nt and

smal l spot! Bur in such a way rh:it in esscnti :dly different way wwmd open­

ness of beings as such B c learing of being [des Seyns] , insisrencc in it . Whence "rcgarding-ufthc-rcflcctio11" ? (presupposes turning-hack to i t ­

se lf, ahi l i ry ro turn back ro irsclf; to " i tsclf"-a self) . ( 2) nllt a l ready with ( I ) . Ami i f a l ready the s:1me, wherein is all this wounded ?

In such a way indeed th:ir rill' grnund first constitutes the dec isive essential dif­ference from the :mi ma!?

Be ings-1JjJenncss-l1cing.

2 J

-

I l l . TOWARD A DISCUSSION wrn I J--!ERl lER

22 . Essential s tejis

Reason -1,

Capacity of the principles ,j,

Understanding of be ing ( project) -1, here a leap

Clearing of being ldes Seyns] ,j,

into a completely other

Essencing of being [des Seyns] towards the clearing

b . " questioning and " e ing

and Founding of this as there ( I nsistence in being-there)

in being-there fore-leap

23 . Fore-[.,>rasJi

Fore-grasp on the "free circle of reflection" of the cold-bright-self-knowinl reflective awareness. From this the anabasis to the human being detennine ·

Therefore, "circle"-No! Not that fore-grasp, but the question of which kind and whether prim or:,

<lially sufficient, whether not still anirnalhoo<l, animal, and therefore "analogy .

The human being not from "animal ," not from "God"-both t i mes met�­

physically-present-at-hand and cause of the supplying of the present-at-ban.·

Every time the human being not brought to his essential ground-wh ich is

the abysmal-ground of being [Ab-grund des Seyns) ! Need.

24 . Question-the fundamental position

l l · l l · l " · \ " B \ b "'1nimal" at the - uman m r 1e ana og:y wit i annna economy. ut t 1ere Y ' ' same time in the (descending) catalogy with the human being.

But the human being-as rational animal. Question: Through what world-width wider and clearer and freer?

Only according to "degree" ? No! What means: directed toward "everything" ? and therefore to each according to the possibil ity-why ? World -width wider and clearer and more free-standing-s imply only posed ! Yes and no .

\. - � --

IV. ON TI-IE ESSENCE OF LANGUAGE

25 . The word as essencing of being [des Seyns]

"Being" [Das "Seyn"] as "word "-mcrc "wmd" st i l l and ground-word in which linguistic forms whatsoever.

26 . Language

Language as object present-at-lwnd Language as tool Language as real m of work Language as l i fe phenomenon

* Language as overpowering of the word through the use of words and wear and tear.

* Language as speaking / process Language as h istory, history that has haj>j>ened Sj>eaking from a trad it ional language and back into it .

2 7. Language and "language"

Language: 1 . From the h uman being-speaking, d iscoursing. Cf. the tradit ional meta·

physical appearance of language.

2. Th is language (proper) formal ized-into language as signifying, making no­ticeable .

3. This essence (forma l ly ) as guid ing for the i nrerpretation of the proper hu­man language.

Question: 1 . Is the language of the human being "language" !-in rhe ( formal sense)­

or

2 . i s a l ready this characterization of d iscourse as "language" ( in the narrower sense of making word sounds) a determinate, if not accidental misunder­stand ing of the essence of the word?

3. The essence of the word.

Language: Language "of" the human being, cf. av8pcorwc; �cJ.iov 'A.6yov £xov.

-

IV. ON TI IE Es,;LN< :io < 11· LAN< i l JA< ;1·.

28 . The traclitional-meta/ihysical af>f>eamnce of language

F · · l l · · · f · · · . " . " "(_'f , -i1ressi ng. " 01 m,1 Y ,1 strucrure o s1gn-1hcat 1on-of lett ing- n otice . 1 ex

Tl r l f l ' l I · . ·1 nifesta-iereinre t 1e orma tze< concept of language , as s ign pro< uction, Ill< . t ion-expression. Thereby guiding: heillgs ( th i n g ) a nd word as sound form,,:.__a The soundini; ("sounding"-correspond( illg ) w the "mak i ng sounds

"statement" in i tself a lready related to "mean ing," "content" ) s ignihes The signify ing means hy denot ing / The mean ing means The opin ion set->-hefore The repre->ent ing-hy-setting-hefore- ? heings ( bei ng ) . _ d Here different possible beginning points of d ifferent w;1ys of considerat llln <1n

explanation.

*

The essential Jiroject of the e.1sence of "lani;uage " : Whence and wherefrom ? To dec ide after wha t ! . . 1 Tl ·

l f I · l · · · tt ese <J L1est1ons . 1 a t we m genera or once experience w ·ia t 1s < ec1s1ve 111 n ·

*

Th ·1 · · l / · l f l · j , · I tint the hu-e traumuna meta/i iysrca afiJiearance o anguage : not acct< e n ta ' nwn hei ng first takes the word a<> sound form and s ign of the th ing . The su­premacy ofheing-; in general and this d ispla c ing of the vulgarizat ion of the word

in the word -smmd. But what underl ies ( metaphysica l l y a lways i naccessibl e ) the appearance of

th:n structure ? The clearing-preserv ing "of" being [ "des " .Seym] , the si lencing of the ahy.smal -grounJ-(of the s i lence) , t he '>i lencing: rhe first "word"-"of' be ing [ "des " .Seyns] (being [Seyn] as

del iverance-event of rhe reply and of the str ife ) . )-I " h · " [ l " '-' "I · lf 1 h ,, . " J · t "m 'r"" 'Vi>rd-sound . ow ctni; L a'i ,1eyn 1tsc emu t e is egenerate m o e L ' •

How heini; [da'i Seyn[ nevenheless the i;round-word . Thar which has the character of s i lence is that which is broken-and what

t hus sti l l l ies in the saying itself. Sayi ng-hur not "expression," making noticeable. Sayi ng-- indeed "sounding," hut this having the character of s tr i fe ( ea rth­

wmld ) , a grnunding of a /m1jcct , of a foundation .

2lJ . Ti IL 1 1 1 11\tAN l\ l' !Nl ; ;\N I ) "L\Nl ;1 I/\( ;r:"

29. The hzmwn heing and "lm1guug<' "

1 . dv8pomo�-�(�ov A.(iyov i:xov. . the an im<i l rhar h<1s L111gu:1gc (nor a.1 ;m i m<1 i )-hut rhrough language to tll!S animal : lnzm<m hcing. A.oyo�: AEYEl v-rh ink ing and saying ( making suund rlwt g<1thers)

Think ing ( rcaoo n ) and Lmguage-togcther from ;mcient r imes. Th i n k i ng-a ) not witholll language

h) YL'S indeed through language c ) hut language yet aga in not bej!ire think ing d ) language through th ink ing

Thinking ancl saying cq11ij>rimordially and of the same essence . ( I n the use of t h i n k ing at the same t ime " i rwenr ion-by-tinding" oflanguage ) Herder. How i nvent ing mean t ? In how far and why of the same essence?

"Think ing" -as represent ing-by-setting-before of beings as such in general . "Sayi ng"-primord ia l s i lenc i ng c learing o f be ing! Th ink ing-saying­

poe t iz ing . 2 . "The h uman he ing i s only human being through hmguage; bur in order to

i n vent l anguage he would a l ready h ;1ve to he human" ( therefore no inven­t i on ) . Wi l h e l m von 1-lu mboldt , Ober d;1s verglc ichende Sprachstudium 1 820. 1 Language-"pLiced i 111111edi < 1tely in the human being" and indeed "as law" th <! t "cond i t ions the funct i1ms of the power of rlwught. " The "tirst word " "resounds a l ready toward the whole language and presupposes i t ."2

3 . Language cl1aracteri :eo, the human being. But who is the human being ? I f t h e d e term inat ion o f h i s essence were < i i ways only to c ircumscribe the de­terminab i l i ty of langu<1ge 1 ( I l uman being ;1s an imal-''<mimal language")

4. Break ing through th is-language <IS won!. 5. The h u man ! ic ing has language ( d iscourse )-rh ink ing-The word "has " the

human hcing (cf. Zur Besin 11 u 1 1g-Wort uml Sprache, p. 6) 1 No rct'ersul­bw c.1scntial transformation .

6. W h ar docs the determ ination of rhe es;,ence of the human bei ng according to the guiding thr<'cul of the di.1tinction uf the h 111nan b<.:ing agaimt th<' aninwl mean ?- ( that rhe h um:m heing-h i lllself----- is determined essential ly and for a l l further mea.,ure as an i lll;i l and l i v ing being ) .

1 . W. v. I I u m h1 il d t , Uher li . 1-., \'L'rglcichcndc �prad1: .. 1 ul l 1 u m in Bc:iehung auf die n:r­.'>ch i cdencn Eruchen der �prachent\\'lt. \dung. I n : l )ic �prat'hph i Jn..,oph i�chen Wcrkc Wilhelm':-. von l l u n 1 holJr. hl 1 1 "d < ind cxpL1 i ncd hy 1 1 . S 1 l'mtl i ; 1 \ . lkrl 1n 1 00 l, f' · S I .

2 . lh id . ) , ivf . I J c 1 dcg�:cr. nc .... inrnm�:. ( lc-.,; 1 1 1 lLll !\!..:ahc \'l)I . 66 . l'l lncd hy F -w. \', l lcrrnwnn. Fr�111k­

fur1 "· M. l 997, p. 0.

-

30 IV. ON Tl lE ESSENCE UF LANUUACE

7. Is there another possihil ity of the determination of the essence! ( aside frorn hody-spirit-soul ) .

8 . Th . · . · 0ncern ing e question concern mg the essence of language-as quest ion c

the "origin." Cf. Das Wesen des Menschen. Chris tmas I 944.4

30 . " Language"

I . Expression-making-manifest 2 · as discourse-word; human heing

Therefore 1 · · I · g the hu-e uest1on concernmg anguage-the question concernm

man heing! But how this question? It appears always broader; language only one-:

per-

haps very e . . , · I . r . · t "I , !"-with see-ssentia -capacity, 1or example m contrast w1 tn 1,inl

ing " Yet h· d . . f h . n be ing frorn · w at oes very essential mean? How-1f essence o um,i "language"-cf. trad itional determination ? But how then language ? Language

and the word . . .

3 1 . On the essence of language

I . Language a) Ability to speak ( to lose "language")-speech act iv i ty. h) Making manifest-utterance-making signs ( flower language)

"Form language" a favorite expression of the art h istorian. c) The constitutive parts of the speech process in the sense of the infonna­

tion through use of words. d) Manner of speaking-

word use and statement formation:

�omethini; />re-given , extant , beings . 2 . Essence"

Goethe's language

language of peoples and races,

language of "crooks,"

language of the "academics,"

language of the "newspaper."

Most general properties in the unity of a condi t ion of the possibi l i ty of .�h� present-at-hand, that it can thus be, how i t-as this present-at-hand- 15 (and b assumed as "heing" ) . Essence thus as "ground," apx�. "origin."

4. M. 1 le idegger. Das Wesen des M ense hen ( Das (Jecbchtnis im Ereignh). Printed in 1 993 yearly umtrihutim1 for the members of the Martin-l leidegger-Socicty. Intended for puhlication in

tl 1e (Jc...,amta11�ahe m volume T'>.

3 I

3 . "Origin" of language, hur at rhe same time and often in rhe sense a ) Origination of the ah i l i r y to spe;1k and of rhe manufacturing of words ( in­

vention) n ) our of which const i tu t ive pans and means rhar l ie-before: "sounds,"

"s igns," the "signifiahlc" 13) how speak ing develops itsel f from this .

h) Provenance of the language apri rude n) God's creation f3) human !icing's invent ion y) pred isposition, result of "nature ."

4. Language (as use of words )-and the human being. The h uman he ing-the animal that has l anguage, nor as animal, but

through language to this animal, S,qlov A.6yov £xov. 5. f'hi l osnphy-orlanguage ( Enl igh tenment-the three Hs) [Hamann, Herder,

H u m bo ldt ] ; sc ience of l angu;1gc ( ] l) 1 h century: cf. Bnpp: A l lgemeine

Sprachwissenscl 1aft ) . 6. The t rad i t ional ( metaphysica l ) characteri:ation of language

a ) the grammatica l - log ica l : sy l lahles, letters, words, word sequences and se­quence unities, statements, statement sequences

h) The word ( the words) in its strncturc sound-script im;1ge

} <j>ov11 �tEta <j>nvmcrim; <j>OVll <JllPCXVtl K�

meaning opinion object be ings

these-in represent ing-by-sett ing-before -th ink ing

c ) Language and think ing, "consc iousness" d ) Word body-sou l-spir it: " the human being"

scnstH ius-nl m-senstH ius-super-scnsw ius: metaphysics. 7. The conception of language <J t rhe end of metaphysics 1-legel-Nicrzschc

( "logical") . 8. The otherwise and hrnadened investigation of language

psychology of langu;1ge phys io logy (phoner ics )-parhology ( aphas ia ) aesthetics th el 1 1 ( igy-mysric ism (J akt ih B( 1ehme) Pierism.

) .

I I >--:-- � , ' , I 1

V. ON HERDER, ON T HE ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE

) !: :

' ,,_ ' 1 '

-

3 2 . l-l crdcr

Aga inst the empt i ness ;md hatTen ness of the deducted concepts, ;ig;i i nst the

ground- less nde of the undnsra n d i !l ,g alld ca lcu lmi ( ln of reason, for the passion of the exc i tement - t l 1 e feel i l l" of l ife

A l l s tate of emotion ;md .·' 1� 1ddcr, :i 1 1 f lung o u t, unusual exc i rahi l i ty, which

responds to a lot , which ;1ffc c t s much. The "primordia l pown" sough t i n e\'ery t h i ng and i ts inunedi:ite utternnce­

rern a i ns i n the surging h;1ck ;md forth . Historica l l y esse n t i a l : ; 1w;1 k e n i ng--forehod i ng a nd poi n t i ng in adv;ince for

that course of the Ccrnwn j1oeti�in" mid Sll'Vi1w uncl 11ctin�-. But n ot "ahsol u t e"-a nd n� Jt

,�o he t;�h::1 emire l y,j(ir itself, i ts ;inragonism

bend i ng over imo the merely pos i t i ve. "Life"-n a t i l l l1;d i ty-hu.sr le-t urmoi l i n fee l i ng.

Herder: h is torica l ly ;1 great reflect ion for h is era-th;1 t grasped the rask! Bur how-if Herder hecomes the ch ief w i tn ess of something thm j ust the

same stays h;Kk , hd1 incl h i m and rhe Ucrm;in mmTmen r and only deri \'t'S its appa ren t j u s t i ti c i t i o n from t he i mpotency of t h i n k i ng; whereby-righ t l y seen-something ent i re l y other is re;d rh;m t h e " l i ve-a l l " of t h i s p i t ifu l "doc­trin e of l i fe . "

33 . C ) n I Icrdcr iii general

A n a b u ndance of oh.snv; i t i ( l ! ls :md fee l i ng-our, ;m u1H 1.sual power of re-"expe­

r iencing," a l i ve ly, ch;mn ing prcsemat i ( ln . Secure and .sh ; i rp i ll the cr i t ique of "r;J t ional ism" a n d "sensual ism . " -Alld

yet: a very dangerous g; ime , hecll !se :1pp;1renr ly just i fied 11guinst rar i ,1nalism and

for the live-exj1ericncing. A m i x i n,g ;md hlurr ing of a l l question ing-and of the

gen u i ne "reflecr io 1 1" ( 1 7 ) . A n d where he i n \'okes sens; ir ion ;md i t s tone ( 1 7) , there h e overlooks how

precise ly a l l of t h i s rest s on ;1 deeper ground, \\'h ich , granted, is not the CllUl1-terpart of fee l i n g ( re;iso11 ) ;md not the co11cept and not the intention and rhe

-r£xvri-hut t h e m- ttmcm cn t uf hl'ing Ides Seym] and its trnth .

*

l 5

v. ON 1-ILRl lER

Tl1c tre·1t1' se 1 l l · · l 1· · l l 1 1 · · · rl·1 <' ;1· fJmilch [and ' · l r anguage-a .rn cone ltlonec iy t le c 1scuss1on wt �" f

his] proof that the origin of human language is d iv ine ( 1 766 ) . 1 Sustained hy the search "of life" and of "origins."

34 . Herder ancl Leibniz

l-1 · I , · · · "L 'h · ,, I I I l l " 1 · l froin Le ib-eic et is no et rnzean, le cannot 1e " 1istorica y exp arnec nizean ph ilosophy.

All l 't· 1 · · · · I ' I · · I " ·1lthough not L ye . 11s most proper creation pnx uces 't le more v1v1c , '

"in tenm of think ing," h istorical influence of Leibnizean rlwught in the shap­

ing of the German essence in the age of the "classic" and of "German ide<il­isnL"

Herder brings thus the accord ing weight , the impulse and flood , the

overflowing and the wild, the dark and the weaving to free re ign in the Ger­

man essence and first intensifies the hatrle over this-wi thout that having p re­

pared any step beyond Western metaphysics; on the contrary: the fate of his re­newal in the "life" philosophy and in folks iness!

35 . Language-s/>cal<ing

Because th is expression , "manifestation," therefore any k ind of ex/ncssion lan­

guage: to signify something through something. "Sign" -languages ( particular agreed-upon "signs"-Morse signs)

"Form language"-jlower language .

*

Language in the sense of sounding of sensations ( Herder) : cries-groans­sighs-noises.

Language-human: inner rnarl<-worcl and its sonorous cxJircssion .

Language (formally ) : "sign," signal.

I . J . f'. SiiJlmilch. VeN1ch eine' Bcweise;, Ja[l die erste Sprache ihren Ursprung nichr volll Men..,chen, 'IDJH.lern vnm Sd1()pfcr crhalrcn hahc, in der acadcmischt·n Vcr�ammlung vorgclcscn

und zum l lruck uhergehen. Berlin 1 7(i6.

37

36. Hwnan language-animal language

H" b · " l h l " l d" I " l1e ing able to in-

�man emg: natura a i itics": - surrenc ere to t 1ese,

vent"-"art." ,1

Th h I · ] ] " l l " · I " · t nl hngu·ige and

e uman le1ng 1as anguage a real y as ;muna , n.i u ' ' . ' '

as C · · fl · 1 1 · "l " " If , tl1"1·ell1re want to

onsc1ous re ecting amrna ie mvents ;1nguage. we �

c11l ti · j· l f · ] " ( 1 7 ) The hn<>ua<>e of

' 1ese 11nn1el rate SllU!ll s o sensat 10n anguage , · · · ' "' ,.,

the reflect ing ani mal (our "artificial language" ( 7 ) , "a uillection of marks cap­

tured in sound s igns," ( 3 7 )-"memory signs" ) , something entirely other than

cries of sensation� ( 1 7 ) Th roughout Herder's m anner of discourse the tradit ional metaphysical

views. The human being no "egoistic monad . "

Animal language-hu man language: qru0£1-1£xvri. hut TEXVTl itself natw

ral ability of the human being -"nature" and "nature . "

I n order for humcm language to be: 1 . understanding must "come to" the cries,

2. must "use" the "tone" "with intention " = 1£xv11 .

3 7 . Herder's first section

"Animal" "immediate self-ex/Jression"

"d i rected to an expression toward other creatures" ( 5 ) "without will and intention" letting feeling sound "the maternal language" "natural language"

Language of Scnsotion

"cries," "groans," "gnunbles,"

"buzzing," "sighs"

no se lf-enc losing

"sounding," Ina not "tlepicting" (9)

"announcement" (7 ) che momentary emotion and /Jassion

Th e mutual understanding of animal ;md hum;m being. Every species of l iv ing

beings (animals) a lways has its respective natural language. The human natu­

ral l anguage: "interjections , " "throwing-in-hctwee11 , " "exclamations": "A las,"

"Ah"- "Oh"- "Ho,"-he "goes" Ho.

" lnterj ec tions"-hetween-where 1 Between langu;1ge proper and its essential

ground and-realm and, only from there, are they what they me: Our-bursts !

(What does this m ean in terms of ex istence?)

The reminiscing of the tones of interj ection in al l Jirimordial umguages of hu-

m a n beings-not roots, hut "saps," which enliven the roots of language .

" late invented metaphysical language" and "ol d , savage languages"-these

"nearer to the orig in ," mother.

( What does origin mean ! Which d i fference does Herder make here ! ) The

)

(.

. .

V. ON H rn l lrn

"original" -the "natural"-the' other of "reason," of mere "calculat ing" and un­

derstamling !-"thc savage," ahistorical, cultureless. The return to such "nature" essentially modern; the cxfJeriencini.;, the "ani­

mal." Origin: the nature of life . But, what is "nature" ? Fumfomental pmuer.

The human hcini.; . Human language from the "analogy" with "animal econ­

omy" in spite of ;i ll the emphasis on the other "kind" and "spec ies."

38. "The first word"

"Mark of reason" ( 41 )-"word of the soul": to ac-knowledge something as ch ar­;icterist ic, a-; diffcrentiatinp; and belonging; to pose to oneself, ai;reemen t ' to­speak-to-oncself ( 44) .

How docs something become mark ? How in gcncrnl is something as some­thing-as enduring. First it must be cndurini; in order to become mark.

The mark, the third through which two d ifferentiate themselves ( regard ) , becomes "inner rnark-word"-th;1t is, inner "sign," s ign;1l of the d ifferenc e .

39 . H.eflection (reflexion)

Ac-knowlcdgmem, ap-perceptio, ad-sensus-to pose-> to oneself. Ohject-ification (presupposes however the more primord ial-project of be­

ing) . H.eflcctive awarcne.1.1 and freedom. Not hound to-but able to stojJ i tself.

40 . lfrf!cctivc awareness-reflection-thinking over-reflexion

A human being l ies "unconsc ious" (hra in concuss ion ) , that i s , he has not

l ' . ,, ac 1 ieved "cnnsciousness" yet. Reflective awareness not as separate 'capaci ty,

hut the f1mdamental-jJowcr of the human soul-vis pr imit iva activa (Leibniz ) .

The disposition- disj!osini; di.mihution-to he grasped only and properly as undcr1wnding of hcins;' !

41 . The eternal merry-go-round

With the u'>c of reason s imultaneously invention of language .

A<ryoc, reason ratio et d iscmmc oratio

4 2 . LANl <lJN ;r-TI I E 1 1u�t;\N J\EtNl ;

42 . Lan?,Hagc-1he lumwn hcing

"Agreement of the soul with itself." P lato: monologue of the sou l . Lan1;ua1;e ahility : ab i l ity o f expression for signs

I . Manifestation of sensations 2 . Abi l ity to grasp s igns as marks.

Undcrswndin?, and reflexion : natural endowment of his s/Jccics-creature of reflective awareness. Understand ing need,; the mark-words.

43 . Herdcr--on the orii;in of lan1;1WJZC

Not d iv ine, not an irna l istic, hut "human" ! ! That says only: language chm;ic­terizcs the h uman being-but who is the human being!

To be ind icated through language ! But how! Nor by the fact that it is again proven as human form-because the question regarding the human being stands-rather:

Language-> Word->Clearing-Being [Scyn]-l1eing-there.

44. Mood-"voicc"

Mood-( c learing-silent glow) and "voice" from the s i lencing.

)

!'· . ·. ··\ ' '

·· ........ ".

VI. PHILOSOPHY OF LANGU AGE

45 . The lxginning of /Jhiloso/>hy of language /m>J>er during the Enlightenment

Where the human being as subjectum in rhe sense of rhe rational ;mimal be­comes serious wi th reason in a subject ive manner and attempts tti grasp reason itse l f. Reason is A.6yo£" ( Hamann) 1 -"Language"-Word. But lrnm:m reason is not the reason of the animal . Animalhood and lan,�uagc ( l-Icrdcr). Humanity of rhe h uman being in langu;1ge: hzmwnitas (Humboldt) .

Language, as determination of rhe essence of the ration:1 l animal nor only an object of phi losophy, but essentia l realm-insofar as .mhjcctit•ity is this . The unfold ing of rhe human being as subjectum presupposi t ion of phi losophy of l anguage proper.

Distinct from this , the logical grammar (M iddle Ages) and the theological doctrine of language (for example, Jakob Boehme) ; d ifferent from this the an­c ient considerat ion and d iscussion of the word. Here already beginning of the metaphysics tif " language": <j)(l)Vll pnc'x <jlavrnaiai; and <jloivfi mwavn K1'1 .

Our reflection no phi losophy of language, also no phi losophy of the word. Phi losophy has in genera l , espec ia l l y as being-h istorical think ing, no "what · · · about" as object-also not being [dm Scyn] .

Rather i t "is" of being [des Scyns] in the way in which this decides the his­toric ity of h istory as ground ing of the truth of being [des Seyns]. (The letting go into H istory during the age of metaphysics ) .

l . From where o f r h e origination-as composit ion 2. From where and manner of rhe deve lopment-unwrapping of the a lready

present-at-hand 3. From where and whereof the mere swrting point-provenance (source) 4. Poss ib i l i ty of the e'i'iencc-(esscnce as idea ) 5. Ground of the essence <ls ahysmal-gruund 6. rhe firsr leap into the cssenc ing and th is itself.

*

I . ]. CJ. I lamann. Bnd an I krdn v. 1 0. r\ugu;t 1 71'4. I n : l lamann\ Schri frc·n. Edited hy F Rot h . Volume 7 , Lcip:ig 1 82 5, p. 1 5 1 .

4 I

)

/'· ' . , · ' 1 .

. . '

44 VI . f'l l l LU'.->t ll'l IY ( )!' L\Nl i l J1\l i L

homo fol icr-faher l i ngl!ac And does the human being not work on langllagc ! Docs he not tend to it­

docs he not let i t decay ?

*

Presupposition for th inking the h llman being as self-manufacturer of language: The hl!man being, m ind iv idual , represents someth ing for h imself-that re­quires the jinn holding and the means for passing hack-and-o n . The sound­form of words achieve but h .

47. On the essence of language

If we indicate the plan of a reflection through such t it le , then we hold ourselves in the usual field of vis ion of the "philosophical" consideration.

I . 'The" language-as something pregiven, k nown; 2 . On the "csscncc"-to feature the most general qual it ies of this pregiven

thing and to br ing i t upon a un iform ground-in the sense of a demon­strable cond it ion of possibi l i ty.

Accordingly phi lmophy "of languagc"-likc phi losophy of art, of rel igion, of technology, of h istory. To th ink suhsequently about " language."

We will only a[Jjmrcntly move on the course of such after-, that is , post­thinking and theref ore prov ide nothing fur the demands of the usual phi loso­phy of language and sc ience of language.

"Language"-wh:n do we mean by that ? - ahility fin langwige ( someone loses " language" ) language as "expression i n

word..;,,"

- the language-means as "const i tut ive c lements"-( not tools-like lary n x , tongue) b u t the "words,"

- the "s/Joken "-thc "language" of the sjJeakcr-the spoken, the p roperly /nes-c nr-at-hand actu<tl language.

--"Lmguagcs" of peoples and tribes, - "language" of the diffcrcllt classes and gu i lds and occupations, - "academic langttui;e"-Lmguage of the "common man," -- "style of exprcssion"-usc of words-statemen t formation. K ind and man-

ner of speak ing a nd i ts structure. - The mention ing of "langu :1gc ," somehow meant as present-at-hand , from

t h e d ifferent sc i ences and d isc ipl ines ( consequence of the metaphysics of the quotat ion nf the i;,qlov Myov £xov ) . General science of language. Phi lologies and their d ifferent tasks: styl is­

tics-acsrhct ics-metrics-cultural philology; />hilology of exj;rcssion : biologi­cal , ethn ic , folk philology.

4 7. ON TH F ESSENCE l lF LANUUr\t;E 45

Psychology : physiology ( WunJt, e .g. : language as "movemenr of expression") 1 "Phoneti cs"; pathology (aphasias) Aesthetics of the art of poetry-sociology-/JhilosojJhies-theology. Language-that which is sj>ol<en in hccoming>s/>ol<en-aml here again seem-

ingly the c l mest and most rea l : rhe announcemeni and that which is written . Whereon only then is the act of meaning in a way annexed as proper hearer.

Indiv idual sounds: their resoimdin1;, composit ion. However: The whole of a

word sound determ ines the individual sounds. The statemenr "sounds" thus and thus-"sounding."

Sound - meaning - opin ion - what is meant "Syllable" "word" statement object

A l l seen here too external ly and too narrowly and from the objective rep­resenting! Why stopping at "what is meant"? What is meant-beings-and this? Being and i ts truth ! And this? Neither can meaning, opinion, what is meant ( cf. a l ready Aristo t le ) he stuck on to or raised to ¢wvr\-nor does this series a l low i tself to he simply reversed and a so-called "sense"- imparring can be accompl ished from what is meant to the exterior of the word-body. At play everywhere here-in add i t ion to the metaphysical fundamental att itude in general-sensuous, non-sensuous and the conception of rhe human being as animal rat ionale.

Rather sounding and opinion and meaning are equiprimordia l in essence and grounded in the essence of being [des .Scyns] itself. The "smmding"-as happen i ng of rhe strife of earth and world-presupposes already the strife and the c learing. Likewise "mean ing" and opin ion are not the last of language, bur belong with i t in the unknown metaphysical fore-groumledness of che word .

Philoso/Jhy of language-as question concerning the origin of Lmguage. Ami "origin"? Cf. Herder, Hwnholdr , Jal<oh (1rimm ( I 85 I ) . 2-

0rigin:

I . as origination of the language process

2 . provenance and causation of the language abi l ity 3. ground of the poss ib i l i ty of language.

"Essence"-tlwt which remains throughout the same in all different k inds of "languages" and rheir structure. -Language types-comparative l ingu istics. I n all of this a lready the obj ectificat ion of lan.�1w1;e .

Language itself, however, a lready an unknown "ohjectitlcat ion" of the "word" into the jJresent-at-hancl.

I . W. Wundt , Vi1 lkerp-,ychulugic. Einc Unter:--uchung der Ent\\' i ck !ung-igcset::e von Sp"iche, Myt hu, uml Sitte. bt Vol. Die Spraclw. lrd newly revi,c·d edition. !'art I . Leipzig I 9 1 1 . p. 4 )

2 . J . Crnnm. Uher den U r,pnmg der Sprache. Abdemtevnrle,ung I H 5 1 . In : Kkim·tT Schrifren. Vol . I. Berl i n I K972, pp. 2 56-99.

·)·

. ,

I/ ,/ '

. '\�

VI. P1 ! 1 1.osr WHY OF LANr :uAnE

In how far inevitable ?-And what that means ? Dis'iection of " language" according to all possible respects of explanation

and through that precisely it is increasingly pushed into the presenr-at-hand­in spite of the metaphysical background (Humboldt, etc . ) .

The essence of language-not asked metaphysically: "Essence" therefore not £looc;-beingness and its more general representat ionality as cond it ion, rather: belongingness in being [das Seyn}, in the event as deliverance .

*

The origin and the mystery of the "as"-something as something-from the event as deliverance.

Individual "objects," things, in general ever this and that-as one: always already out and in the wrJrIJ.:Carth. The "as" the concealed and in this word only barely graspable abys�md] of the word.

*

The word grounds not only "world, " hut is of being [des Seyns] and /!reserves dis­cretely the clearing of the there .

Meaning and sound ing and script only shoot up to it and are not the "essence."

A l l descriptions of the "phenomena" under these t itles remain adhered to language and do not reach to the word .

48. The word

The word-the words [Das Wort-Die Worte] The word-the words [Das Wort-Die Wiirter] How words becomes words [Wilrtcrn] How language from words [Wiirtern]-

The word-word essentially richer than language. Language a decl ine and an al i enation of rhe word i nt o the present-at-hand .

Hav ing the word-A.ciyov EXOV: A.6yoc;? Word ? aA.oyov-�0ov. The wmd-not as singular to words, not ;m individual "word ," but naming,

s/Jrn/<-to , address and before that and essentially word of being [des Seyns]-that is! Silencing of the deliverance-( event) original clearing.

The human heing and language-The word and the human being, cf. be­ing ldm Seyn] and the human being. Humboldt's statement on this relat ion:

49. THr: UT! !ER BH >INN!Nc; 47

"The human heing is human only through language; hut in order to invenr lan­guage, he would have ro he already human. " 1

49 . The other beginning

The question of the essence as question of origin:

Origin: 1 . I n the sense of origination of language ahil ity-manufocruring of words 2. as origin of the gift of language

3. as making essence possible, condit ion of essence and, more specifical ly, meta­physical ly

4. being-historically If 4. then not ex[>lain language and leaving basically more and more as pres­

ent-at-hand and actual, but to ground it back in the word. This however only through poesy i tself and indeed not any, hut single one. Thus no phi losophy-of- language-but another beginning of [lhiloso[Jhy in gen­

eral . The decision and i ts preparation.

1 . Uher das vcrglcichendc Sprac hstudium, 1820. In: Ilic 'llfachphi losophisclll'n Wcrkc

Wilhel m's v. I lu 111holdt, i h i d . , p. 5 I .

VII . CROSSING

I I ,, "

�'

50. The knowledge of the crossing

Stefan Geo "S rge: � ca Song" ( 1 9 1 9)

Stefan G eorge: "The Word" ( 1 9 1 9 )

Stef G an eorg . "L· what ti

e. tsten to le soml )er earth speaks"

( 1 9 1 9 ) 1

Crossing The blond child-

( whether it comes or does not come)

The treasure rich and delicate

( the word foils, being [das Seyn] denies)

the beautiful and new face

( who can see i t ?)

Wherein you cling, that you do not know.

. -'--·-·-------

But t or now th· . k Presurn . ts now ledge is too weak and confused, counts only as unusual

Pt ton-of . 1· . l I f d ,

states w· I· me 1v1c ua s-and is reckoned as a consequence o to ay s

f ' tt lOUt . ' I l 0 the aba d

see mg w 1at these are themselves : being-historica consequence

for whi hn onment of being-that the individuals belong to an essential history ,

awaren� we are not a match-neither in the attitude nor in the reflective

SS . Ster G ian eorg l R 'l . . . . .

cqu.ate, but thee a.nc .! !(e � '.'f zetzsche and Holderlm �lenve not h1sroncally and

llaltty. lustoncal untqueness and d istance tn rank-and of the ongt-

Cros . b smg tak , · h · 1 1 I 1 1 e abandc en as t e transitory , the incidental, what, barely t 1oug lt , s HI

experien . med . Thus the attitudes are completely foreign to the possibility of

a . fi cmg the er . cl J .

' 5 Xed sta ossmg as the unique and loftiest of history an to grounu 1t , not

.,..h

' te, but from I . . . h .

1 c rul · t w m.mtence m t e crossing.

lr1 mg of th , · ·1 1 Stead of th . . e ex[Ject-atwn; the constancy of the s1 ence .

. h ts . . c it er fl . h as wha

1.g t back into the h itherto or rush-that-tumbles-over into the new

2. . t Is every t ' either l tmc conclusive, "something true."

to le·i c emancl ing a solution way out-or nihilism: remain solely in that and

• Ve ev h ' '

thing. eryt mg to itself as having no way out and only to say no to every-

*

Bon J · . I . Stephan G . . . ,

' 1 . Ninth vol . eoige, Das Neue Reich. In: Gesa!llt-Ausgabe dcr Werke. Published by Georg

ume, Ilcrlin 1 928, p. 1 30f. , p. 1 34, p. 1 29.

5 1

VII. CROSSING Thc mi,huling thmugh H;,mry. Evecything nnm<l-pubhc. <lom,

·m-

We "' in

. . efficient-calculable-and therefore bemg-there already as unreal, impossible. insufficiency with regard to being [Seyn] ! I t overshadowed by beings.

5 J . The word "of' being ["des" Seyns]

l about

Co,.\<l we then, if we octecnpt the ""·%ing thoceto, "ill tolk in geneo. in·

"l " ' M I h . I . d . If-in its s

anguage . ust we t 1en not try ear-mg t 1e cross mg wor itse gul0<ity!

\y

B I d . .

. . iscent

ut 1ow o we determine this? From the distant that nngs remm thereto?

VIII . METAPHYSICS OF LANGUAGE AND THE CROSSING

52. The metapl . · " f" "l ,, l h · 1 . f iysics o anguagc anc t e cons1c eratwn o

language within mctafihysics

Lctng . . Udge ts as AO . . . . . . . .

1 . to bei . yoi:;-rdtto put m the relation (obiccttvc comrnumcanon) :

ngs as s 1 I ( f L[ a) the ob ' . L

.c 1 c · i crdcr: word as mark-sign)

b) an<l .?ectifymg of the object

2 nature" . to the hL iman being I· · ·l ' · · h (" 1 · " I I f I

orient· . -as lIS c rstmcttve c aracter mcc 1um anc po e o t 1e

atron of . . . . Being ·

. . .

consc iousness to self-conscrousness) : subiect.

s as sud b · Precisely .

1 1 emgness , the human being and his essence, srand however

Ph outside ·1 f l

d f

Ysics . ' ny urt ler question; they are the questionless groun o meta-

But the . · . trad itiorl'l(uestion rs that concerning the truth of being [des Seyns] . With it, the

Worthin '.

realms of the connection of language come along into question-

ers into h �us even more so "language" itself, thus indeed, that it also en-

t ess and tl t e l]Ues t1 ·

Origin of h on ccmcernmg the truth of being.

\ ' t e " d" f ivietat>hy . war ram the essencing of bein� [des Seyns].

SlCS of /a '

nguage S ign and Sound

m1�1£'i ov qiwvi\

Both only t . 0 •

0i']pa ypaµµata

also "Ian ° Jje,cttve foreground of the rntionnl consideration of be ings in which

ab guagc ' a I " · l l I

ove al l wh ' nc speaktng l iving being" arc present-at-hanc . But 10w, am

Y then otherwise ? 1 . Beings and "being." 2 . The word-

53 . Decisons , developed from the mctaf>hysics of language

l'he rnea · st· . rung of h 0 • ·k , · . · · , ( l

and ing of b- , . ed'. cnmg, but not recognized as berng-attcnnve-on um er-

question · I . cr ng) . Supposing, however, that it were to come to that, then the

( s · s ht"1rl- · · -£ f

· Peakin , ' 'cnmg a being attentive and language rherc1ore rom reason

rat ' g cxecut , l · I I I Iona! !iv ·

cc 111 perceiving, the hurmm being, who 1as anguage as t 1e

of b · rng being) · · J k · · 1 · · f I · ·1 · f I ' I ' · eing ti -

m rs lear en mg the sr enc mg o t 1e sl ence o t lC t 1cte

- icre ?

\ , 54. Psychology of lan1,,ruage

sp nvestigat ' I

0nds " . ions of language with rcg·1rd to the sjieed of speec l-corre-!Y[Ost i

a "ntrrel l '

nee" of 1 · Y to t le world view and may wel l represent the "peak perform-

ingurst ics.

. �·

IX. STEFAN GEORGE

Sea Song The Word

Listen to what the somber earth speaks

5 5 . Crossing word

Word of b · th is emg [des Seyns] , but veiled and at first word of being-there and also

and earth-in (- '.�g, co'.;1prehensive, rather naming immediately from world not a th ' I .

Positi (not image of a sense) rather earth! y, worlding pugnacious trans-

on, forebodi · h . . · · · f b · h

as abys l ng m t e remmiscence-that 1s, tun mg v01ce o emg-t ere ,

the strmf a

)-ground of the truth of being [des Seyns]. (That which is pugnacious in

i e.

56 . Sea Song

When on the edge in gentle fall I n dips the fiery red ball: Then I l inger in the dunes for a rest Wondering whether to me wil l appear a dear guest .

At this hour i t is deserted at home, The flower wilts in salty foam. � the last house of the woman from far away

0 one steps in to stay.

With naked l imbs with lucent eye A golden-haired chi ld now comes by, He dances and sings along his path And disappears behind a large craft.

ihead and after h im I glance hough of h is speaking to me never a chance �nd never do I a word from him know:

dis b · f ne appearance sets me aglow.

My hearth is good, my roof is taut, Yet on . d Tl

e Joy wells there not. le nets did I them all mend

And to stove and room did I attend.

So I sit · · h I 11

' wamng on t e sane emple throbbing in my hand:

60 IX. STEf'AN GEOl\UE

What use is to me my whole <lay If the blond ch i ld comes not this way.

Rest and Being-there Passion of the reflect ion

Awaiting I ------=------ 6 -the refusal-

\ / Insistence in the refusal

Outsiue 2 I Where I 5 clear-fit together-resolved lonely indeed There but -prepared strnnge

/ \ Corning 3 The blond 4 A ttunernent of the affection and -� child � and foreboding of the di-;appearing belongingness

The tllning silence-no uescription, no report of an experience, no interpreta­t i on of one's own fate. Rather-?

Starting-to-tune of the fundamental-mood of being-there .

57 . Sea Song

The pronounc- ing of a reminiscence of insistence in the open of the refusal. Foreboding of being-there. The saying tuning in the ground tune of the

startl-ing in the abandonment of being of beings. The poem has no "content . " S ranl-ing-tuning in the wait-ing.

58. Sea Song

To ask : about what is spoken there-possible, even necessary. But ! The song however no communication.

59. Ti IE Wl lRJ) 6 1

Ask: whether an " image" is drawn there that sensualizes a "sense" ( "symbol­ically") ( "metaphor") . But-"image" and "sense"? Sense: a doctrine, a statement.

Or? In saying and as saying fmmouncing and fneserving of a reminiscence of be­ing-there and , still further concealed , of bein?: [des Seyns]. Hear-ing of an insis­tence .

Being-there-A[JJ>ruJJriating-event ( A ppropriateness-of-the-event in the event-of-aJ>/m!Jniation) .

59 . The Word

Wonder from afar or dream thing To the borders of my land d id I bring

A nd wai ted for the gray norn to tell The name found in her well-

Then could I grasp it tight and more I t blooms and sh ines now to the core . . .

Once I arrived after a happy tra i l With a j ewel r ich and fra il

Long she searched and me she told : "Nothing such sleeps here in this deep fold"

Whereupon i t s l ipped through my hand And never was the treasure won by my land . . .

So I sadly l earned to forsake: No thing may be where the word does break.

*

"No thing may be where the word does break." 1 . The word first lets a being he a being (cf. I-liilderl in) . 2. But why? What is the "word" ? Name , naming. 3. Ambigu i ty of the essence of the word.

*

The "word" is word "of being ["des" Seyns] ( tuning "voice" of the s i lencing si­lence . S i lence: refusal ( reign) of the abysmal-ground of the appropriating­event of del iverance) .

IX. STEFAN GEORC)E

If . h ' . Jeni[1l it the word does break-being [das Seyn] denies itself. But m t 1" l

reveals itself in its refusal-as silence, as "in between," as there. Only now

essence-nearness-and no "forsaking." George speaks, barely intimating it , in the manner of crossing.

*

Listen to what the somber earth speaks

Listen to what the somber earth speaks: You free as bird or fi.sh-Wherein you cling, that you do not know.

Perhaps a later mouth is to reveal: You sat at our table to share And tasted with us of our meal.

A face fine and new did come to you in stow Yet time became old, no man l ives today, Whether he will ever come that you do not know

Who still can see this face.

X. LANGUAGE-FREEDOM-WORD

(

60 . Freedom and word

The essence of freedom-from essence of the truth of being [des Seyns]; from the same ahysnwl-ground: the essence of the word.

Neither rn be looked for in the essence of the "human be ing" as rational an· imal , nor in the surrounding objects, and certainly not in the relation that stretches subsequently between horh , but in the in-between , that (possessing and grounding) through inhabit ing, through the taking of residence, trans· forms the he i ng-there the human being into guard ianship.

To avoid wi th the question concerning freedom overal l the view of the hu­man equ ipment and the explanation from the present-at-hand and "l ife" and e n tirely of the subject -object relat ion.

6 J . Animal and human being

Freedom: I . No longer capt ivated by a wrnp. 2. Mobile wwcml . . . , hut such "mobility" st i l l also within the daze. 3. The mere "free" frnm . . . leads at most to the destruction of the l iving

being. 4. Freedom must therefore have another essential origin. One says (distin·

gu is h i ng negative and pos i t ive freedom) : instead of a free from-a free for . . . But wh<1t does "free" mean here ?

5 . 0/>en-reluly-! fit together-hearkening closely to . . . ; therefore, bind· ing itself, search ing for measure, " itself," it "self. "

6. A lso the freedom f(Jr . . . -the what for, so that from out of here first open· ness and fitting together !-is not yet the essential ground of "freedom."

7. Into which region must then "freedom" he taken hac k ? In a region at a l l ? Freedom as the being-"there."

8. Freedom and "spontane ity"; spontaneous: from itself, namely to be an orig· inal-t h i ng-tha t -ca uses. The from-itself is here agai n essent ia l .

9 . FreeJom points towards .1elfl10od . But how and from where do we grasp this ? A lways st i l l from cgoicity !-subjectum!-uu-roi;-au-c\suh-life of the soul . Also this s/>ontaneity !

I O. Freedom for . . . as hcing ava i lable for­AJJ/>rof>riat-inR the event·of-a/1/m!/>riation Belont;inR·to in the truth of heing [des Seyns]

I / - ! >· ' i

66 X , LAN(;lJAUE-FREE!lOM-W( lR!l

Belonging-to-hearkening as silencing Abysmal-grounding re-fusaL

Freedom is not "condition of the poss ib i l i ty" of the word, bu t it is in i tself as belongingness in the appropriating-event-the silence of being [des Seyns] itself, is "word , "

XI. ON THE QUESTION OF THE ORIGIN

AND THE H ER DERIAN MEDITATION ON THE ORIGIN AS METAPHYSICAL

!, ,, .,., ) l '

"'

'

...

62. Humboldt

The fundamental d ifficulty for grasping the essence of language is: "The un­

fathomable depth of the proper act of understanding," 1 namely for metaphysics,

which does not know the question of being. Act of understanding and project of being, project and clearing.

63 . Drives of the unfolding and develo/m1ent of language

1 . The human being as free thinking, progressive being. In general self-forming.

2. The human being as herd creature. Develo/1ment of language natural, essen­

t ial , necessary.

3. The entire human race cannot remain one herd. Therefore also not one lan­

guage: development of different national languages. 4. The entire human race a progressive whole in a great household; likewise

also all languages and the entire chain of development.

*

Departing from one's own place and the historical condition of his time-un­

der the point of view of the enlightened education of the human race.

Is the departure historical-or does it have the character of a decision ?-or

both blurred ? (cf. 9 1 )

64. Herder's meditation on the origin as metaphysical

Part I. Knowing what reason is; exposition of the essential predisposition for the production of language (Conclusion of Part I ( 89) ) . Essence of the human being.

Part I I . The rational l iving being, free-standing in the household of "nature"; ref­erence to the necessary drives for the immediate f>roduction "of language" in its manifoldness.

l . Cf. Herder, "he who only knows what reason is," p. 89.

) !·"'.·. " / - !

· '. 'l- . ' i "

'·-.

7° XL ON Tl IE QuESTION , , . ( JF THE OruuiN AS M ETAl'f !YSICAL

Origin : Thus nevertheless "origination"-whence ; from which pred ispos i ­

tions anJ through which drives does language hecome real. Production of the

real. Preview of the human being as rational natural heing with the objective of

the free progressive unfolding anJ becoming manifold of its uniform develop­

ment. L:mgucig-c : in the essential service for the preservation of the anima l econ­

omy of the human animal in the household of nature ( "sign" and "tone") .

Securing of the continuance of the human being as subjectum ( rods and

med ium ) , which forms in an historical-technological manner the world and it­

self in it .

Language-the fundamental form and the "medium" of the h istorie<1 l - tcchno­logical self-erecting of the human being into his subjectivity for its /Jerfection .

65 . Herder's question of the origin On how far "question of the essence" !)

I . Determined from the causally th inking explanatory question, whether made by God and supplied, whether originated from animal development, whether produced by the human being h imself.

2 , The fore-gras/i of the "essence" of lang-uage-essence of the human being-, denotative announcement cpovii cniµfrn Ki]

>< sound ing sign Aoyoc;-ratio-reason ,

3 . If produced by human being (inventing-by-finding, finding oneself, perform­

ing, unfolding a'i rational animal ) , then to show, "Predisposit ion" a) what the conditions of the possibility of production

and its necessity; "Drives" b) how the production took place.

4. Question of the essence only i n passing (in the d irection of the ontical pre­

dhpmition of the present-at-hand known human be ing as such) and with­

out deci.1ion and reflection a) in terms of content "essence" decided from language and "the h uman

heing" h) "formally"-"essential ity" in the same.

5. "Essence"-the what-being, wherein the real i ty of the real is seen, so that

the being of beings; accord ing to that the {Jossibility and mak ing possible; the

present-at-hand ( set-forth, brought-forth; whence-apxi]-ai'. nov--and

6 5 . I-lrn.1 1rn's l.)LJl'STillN ur TI !E 01rn ;1N

i ts ambiguity ) . Essence as heingness, essentiality of the essence: how heing­ness i nt e rpreted. The in i t ia l indecisiveness of the aA.118na and 8umc;. oucri a-TO Tl Tiv El Vat -KO! vov-essentia-quidditas-idea Dei creawris­creatio . Coup l i ng of Platon ism and the explanation of the origin. fJossibilitas-Leihniz : n isus ad ex istendum; "Condition of the jJossibility of ohjectivity"-Kant; "Concept," "ahsolute idea"-Hegcl; "Value"-N i e tzsche.

6. In the essentiality of the essence always already decis ion on truth of being; the manner, how be i ngs experienced; the "real . "

Herder does not go i n the d irection of grammar and its ru les drawn from logic­but searches for "the true d i v ine nature of language," which arises from the l ive­liness of the human being, who always stands in the great c ircle, and this cir­

cle is one of "needs, of dangers , of pressing demands," which fulfil ls the human

being always completely and zinew. (cf. , Part I I , 89) . The turning away from "logic" certa inly correct, and yet he remains stuck in

the logos of reason, of the formation of marks, and supplements everything only from the economy of nature . But this turning away overlooks that behind logic and grammar, but also beh i nd reason and reflective awareness, something more origina l ru les , which at first-and nearly st i l l in the field of vision of meta­physics- may he i nd icated as "zmderstanding of being , " as jJYoject of being and which assigns to "language" a more original essence.

*

Is language and i ts essence expla ined and graspable through the meditation on

the origin ? What do "expla in" and "grn;pahle" mean here! The essence of reason is still

not grasfJed at all-becm1.11: unquestioned . Are there here more original steps ? And must they only he taken out of c uriosity and addict ion to progress ? Or is the question concerning the essence of the word grounded differently ? Necessary out of a want of essence 1 The want of wantlessness . (The abandon-

ment of be ing in beings ) .

*

Can and must he asked for accordi ng to the origin of reason itself?

But how "origin" here ? ( i n the sense of the explanation that produces?) or? that which is ungraspahle ?-helieving ? or the com/Jrehensive-lmowing-questioning.

Hear- ing the abysmal-grou nd ing belongingness-to!

I I

L

72 X I . ON Tl IE QUESTION . . . OF THE 0RJUIN AS ME1Al'l-IYSIC:AL

Sign showing attention reason rationalitas

Tone-Scream announcing hearing sensibil ity animali tas

*

66 . "Reason"

Reason as representing-by-setting-before that marks-reason as the " logos,"

God of creation. Does metaphysics know what reason i s ? Can it know that ? The in timating

of the poetizing essence ? But what is and why here poesy? -Project ? Because clearing and this : clearing of being [des Seyns] !

Metaphysics cannot know about that, because it "l ives" as metaphysics of the non-questioning of this question concerning the truth of being [des Seyns] unknown to i t .

67. Question of the origin as question of the essence ( metafJhysically-being-historically)

I . How in general "essence" and lmowinp; of essence? 2. The respective imjJlication of the jnoject of essence-in which realm of essence ?

human being-reason-beings-object. 3. The stipulation of the cond itions of the essence. 4. The determination of the cond itions themselves.

Beingness (objectivity )-"animal household. "

*

Undecided, because not at all questioned: Be ing-understand ing of being-clear ing-be ing [Seyn]-being-there­

si lence-abysmal-ground of the decision between opposition and strife . Decision of the in-between.

68. Question of the essence and of the orip;in

Does the proof of the origin ever guarantee the knowledge of the essence­

( What shall and will be the knowledge of the essence?) or is there not already

69. QUl'ST!l lN l ll · Tl IE l llUl ; 1 N J\ N l l (ll J ESTll lN l lf' Tf /E i>:SENCE 73

a decision about the essence with the question of the origin I What i s cal led "essence" there ?

It could be that the origin of language i n the sense of origination as wel l as the origin of the essence is presented "correcrly"-and st i l l the essence of lan­guage could rem a i n complete ly locked. Because the dec ision concern ing essence is nor at a l l reached and cannot he reached from dec isive decisions.

Essence determines i tself according to the essencing and this is ru l ing of the truth of being [des SeynsJ. And bei ng [das Seyn) ? The leap!

69. Question of the origin and question of the essence

Origin as name for essence. apx11 <md ai Ti a ambiguous; then at first: back into the cond it ions of the essence.

But essence itself not without origin-in i ts essent ia l i ty; always a decision of the truth of being [des SeynsJ and with this also about the role of the question­of-the-or(r.;in . Thought of the origin not necessari ly belonging to every essencing.

lies in the essence of the use of reason-self-actualization of the own essence · Language is "necessary " ( i nner language fi rst) , if the human being is w feel

h i mself as "self" and thus exist in the m idsr of nature and according to i ts house­hold.

Selflwod: belonging-to-oneself i n essence. And essence ? Comportment to­ward bei ngs as such.

Question of the orif:in : project towards l i vel iness project towards rationa l i ty project towards constancy project towards beingness as representedness

Where the jJrojJcr origin of the deej1cr essence of language-as saga and saying? In being [Seyn). The word "of" being [ "des " Seyns].

c ' '1 .

XII . DISPOSITION

)

7 1 . Question of the origin-as L]uestion of originMion and of essence

- Concept of the essence

- the /Jruject-representing / casting " i tself" out - the setting asunder of the projects

- the inner limits of meta/>hysics : that which is necessari ly unquestioned in its questioning-that which is unsaid in saying-even i f said, then nor itself said, hut as ex/Jression abow . . . respectively car­rying the expression-the "is ." Thus nevertheless said [cr-sagt] because only thus say- and unsayable ;

- three hints regarding hcing (Seyn] - language and word-theses - essencing of the word - the cross ing - the say-ing and th ink- ing - hints

7 2 . Question of the origin

1 . Project of the human being (cf. conclusion of Part I, 89) , decisi-vc : "knowing what reason is ."

2. Proof of the conditions of chis essence . 3 . Determination of what has sprung-of language-from these conditions.

*

Decisive: Who is the human being ? The hearer o f language ( £xov) or Who is sustained hy the word ( the word "of' being [ "des" Seyns] ) . If t h is, what dec is ive ? Then not: Knowing what reason is-( self-consciousness of the subjectum!

modern i ty ! ) , hut : that truth of heing [des Seyns] and this itself the most qttestion­worthy.

The word-as si lence of being [des Scyns ] .

7 7

)

!. ·' /

�-·---... .

71) X I L D1s1'osrnoN

7 3. Structure and course of the meditation on the origin

I . Resounding in sensations-

mark formation ( inner word) -resounding mark-sounding word (outer word)-

2. The role of hearing and sound ing hearkening and attention-

The word-the saying Sound and ring-

.j,

or 1' as ring-ing of the silence

A.

B.

Human being as animal, " language" d istinctio as essence of reason as animal ra tionale language as sensual and sound form.

the original un ity of the essence of the human being. But from where ? Being [Seyn].

ring and sound only sensib i l ization, d istinguished from color, scent

/irecisely- but the sounding com/iletely different , namely: 1' peal 1' of si lence.

7 4. Inner and outer language

I . Language as inner language ( l-marking-"saying") a) "med ium" of the sclftt being b) "rods for erecting"-standing, standing aga inst the ob-jeer. Because the

human being a sensible bei ng. c ) "dialogue"-with oneself

2. The outer language only extra-for the purpose of mediation ? Or the outer already what essences with the inner word? Why this as rod for erectins;?

75 . Inner and outer word

I . Inner word-de-noting Ohjectification-of what "stands," the steadfast, the constant

7(1. Tl IE Rt ll.f' ( lF 1 IEAR!Nt> 79

2 . Outer word- inform i ng-by-making-constant about what is each t ime steady and stand ing, " i tself' with another-unit­ing. I nform ing-hy-mak ing-corntant as co-municating of the objectification.

76 . The role of hearing

l . Heari ng-ear-sense-sens ib i l i ty. Concept of feel ing.

2. The sound ing mark and i ts announc i ng. "The sheep bleats."

3 . Word -sounding-where no resounding marks.

77. Oi1erview

1 . The m idd le-and role of communicat ing of hearing. 2. The contribution of Part I I of the treatise to the med itat ion on the origin. 3 . Herder's med i ta t ion on the origin as metaf)hysical (what is unsaid in i t ) . 4. Reflective awareness-reason-freedom and word. {Cf. The Word and Lan­

guage, note 85 ) 5 . Does Herder a n d does metaf>hysics in general know what reason is? (89).

7R . Herder : the hwnon being

1 . a hearken i ng, <1tten t ive c reature (49 ) , � 2. a t h i n k ing sensori um commune (61 ) , touched only from different sides {cf.

space as sensor ium [ki-nuil<ing-j>resenc) . The hearkeni ng-that o f the sensor ium, which properly communicates. But how! If hearkening and noticing of a being, because of a more original ground , not distribuced to sensibility and 1.mderstanding, but also not merely re­verted to a f>ositive fundamental force ( Kant's transcendental i magination) (sensib le reason) , but to the essencing of being as and in the being-there.

Hearkening-s i le1 1ce-st1u11di ng-earth-attentitm-world project: there-.

*

Because the h uman being sensible being, therefore only through marks a self­consciousness. Because sens i b i l i ty, therefore "rods for erecting" through this: what i s object i ve.

I I ,,

> .. . ,,

80 X I I . DISPOSITION

"a hearkening-attentive creature" ( 49) . Herder appears to assign attention

to the inner word and its "genesis" and "hearkening" to the outer and i ts gen-.

h · I d ' · d ("b · " ) ·111d es1s as t e essentta con 1 t 1ons ! But: attention goes outwar s emgs '

hearkening goes "inwards" (being) . Unity of hearing and attend ing. Perceiving-by-taking- I . taking-in (sensing)

2. in a taking-before-oneself 3. and to listen-out what is taken-before in the

manner of perceiving-by-raking, hearing-off . This the original of "reason . "

Hearkening-Attention Attunement as insistence in the in-between (c learing of being [des Seyns] ) .

79 . Three hints on being [das Seyn) (and being-there)

1 . The inner l imits of metaphysics ( in the questioning after beings as such-the truth of being [des Seyns) un­

questioned) . The overshadowing of being by beings. 2. Language: mark, sounding-free-stand ingness-freedom-ground­

abysmal-ground-belongingness-to in the clearing of being [des SeynsJ ·

Freedom: from being-there grounding itself its essence. 1. Saying-hearing-hearkening-being-silent-silenc-ing

XIII . QUESTION OF THE ORIGIN

- Question of origination and essence - Essence (beingness and essenc ing) - Project

80. Question of the origin as lJliCstion of origination and of essence

With LJuestion uf origination , question of the essence decided, and indeed l . in terms of content :1 ) hunrnn being, h) language 2. essent ia l i ty of essence.

But a lso the questiun of the "essence" is q11e:;tion of origin , that is, cssenrial­ity of the essence is resolved, because question of the essence :is metaphysical =

the represe n t ing-by-setti ng-before ( thinking) of what is pre-vious as what is properly constant , present.

"Essence" : l . as what-heing-i;\ i:cni ; Kot vov­

bcingncss of hcings-io£a; i;o i;( 11v £vm 2. Christ ian coupl i ng: of P la to nism and the question of the nrigination

(causa prima) creatio ; Ciod's thoughts. 3. poss i h i l i t as-n isus ad ex istendum-v i s-subsrnnti a-nrnking poss ible:

mere freedom of contrndict itln 4. Kant : cond i t ion of the possibi l i ty of obj ecti\' ity 5. Hegel : concept-absolute idea-"real ity"

( Sublat ing the contrad iction ? No, making possible) 6. N i etzsche: "value"-cnndition of the enhancing of life (form of the wil l to

powe r ) . I n the essen t i a l i ty o f essence, regardi ng t h e truth o f be ing resolved without

quest i on ing, and at one with this (with that of heingness) on the standard be­ing-reality .

The mcta{Jhysical question of essence is always question of origin . ( 1( i1v­frorn-ou t of what is previous-"a priori" in the sense uf the return to what is fi rst present-the /ircsencc and comtmicy itself) but this ?

A n d because question of the origin, therefore the danger of ambigu i ty and blurring with the question of the origination espec ia l ly strung.

The amb igu i ty of the concept of essence.

8 J . Essence as hein,�ncss and cssencing

Wesen as what is /JYe-vious-(thc what of beings ) Essen c e as esscncing of heing [des Seyns] ( tnah o f being)

H ow being [dm Seyn] "is" its truth ( transit ive ) . What properly "is ," is being [das Seyn] .

B u t i n a d i fferent sense than the ovwc; ov. Herc being is the most being­what suffices for beingnc�,s. There prec isely: be ing [elm Scyn] never a "being"-

)

X I I I . QuEo;TJl lN l ir- TI 1E 0Rll > I N

rather esscncin1.; (clearing as belonging to being [Seyn], apfm!/iriat-ing as event from it) . Essencin1.;: Groundinp; and ap/m!/niatin1.; its "what" in how .

82 . "Project"

I . Re-presenting-of what is pre-vious as heingness. Fixing of essence and consolidation as far as to the "subjectum" as the ground of the a priori.

2. Ca,ting-itself out-into the free-standingness out of the clearing of be ing

[des SeynsJ . Transformation of the essence of the human bein1.; (animal rationale-subjec­

tum) On I : "Project" of heings towards heingness. On 2: "Project" of being towards truth as its essencing. (2 ) is not simply the similar, only repeated raising of I . Project on what is pro­jected in it. The metaphysical way of talking of conditions of the poss ib i l ity misleads to such opinion.

But: From the essence of the ground !

*

! . Departing from "what is real" towards the "making possihle." apxiJ-that which conditions things. Present-at-hand, beings standard and bad< to it: out of the representing-by-setting-before of the pre-vious the proof of the conditions.

2. Leap into-places into question reality of the real, that is, here, the already overtaken sealing of beings (the truth of being [des Seyns] that lies therein, hut unrecognized). [Leap into] not toward the conditions of things, but rather into the abysmal-ground of the grounding of the truth of being [des Seyns].

*

I . The setting asunder of the "projects," of the "representing" (metaphysical

projects) among themselves. 2 · The setting asunder of the whole of metaphysical "fJrojects" and the being­

historical /noject .

XIV. FROM HERDER TO GRIMM (Metaphysics and Science of Language)

Hamann: "The origin of human language and the invention of the partium ora­tion is are as widely d i fferent from one another as reason, logic and Barbara

Celarent. " 1

I . ) . G . l l a ma n n . Zwo Recensionen hetr. d e n Ursprung dn Sprachc. I n : I Linunn\ Schriftcn. Edited hy F Rot h . Fourth part , Ber l in 1 82 3, p. 41:

--- ------ -

I � I /

83 . Grimm's address ( 1 85 1 ) 1

1 . How Grimm understands the question concerning the origin and in which way he wi l l answer it .

2 . The answer to the question concerning the origin of the question in three steps. a) Proof that language is not of divine, but of human origin. b) How language sprung out from the human being. c) How language sprung from the human being.

a) Disclosing of the original language. p) The development of the original language.

3. Summary.

84 . From Herder to Grimm

I n between l ies: Kant- ( Humboldt, Schiller) , German idcalism-(Schellin,r;, Hege l ) , sjiirit-history-art-and, concealed and unrecognized, also Hiilderlin.

All this not there, not essential , but un the contrary : "science," "research" and otherwise it stays the "same," that is, l ike Herder posed it , the question of the origin ! How must he have posed it so that only the ways and means changed themselves-Yet also only as question of origination!

85 . From Herder w Grimm

I. What the same and how?

1 . Essence of language: a) denotative announcing b) d is t inguishing the human being (The human being is human only

through language ) . 2 . Human /miduction ( nor created and delivered b y God-not developed from

animal ) . Through and in the being human language comes into being and, vice versa; in the coming imo being of language the human being "is" the human being.

l . J. Grimm. Uher den Ursprung der Sprache. In: Klcinere Schrifrcn. Fir>t volume, lkrl 1n 1 8791, pp. 256�99.

88 XIV. FRl )tvf l l rn 1 1rn Tl 1 G1u11.1tvt

I I . What transforms itself!

I . The manner of />roving the origin , that is , of the prod uction through rhe hu­m<m heing. a) not what essent ia l ly belongs to it, bur rather how the production pro­

ceeded, how it />layed itself out-h) thus the question concerning the earl iest and first language, "cradle."

Original langlla,�c . -Rut th is nor encount e red i mmed i ;1tely , our weak knowledge of the past; thm first "to be d isclosed" aga i n . <x) Experiment , sett ing up of experiment rej ected on moral grnimds .

f:I ) To crmclude in retracing-( I ) Starring point at inflect ion-as middle. ( 2 ) Latu of formation from ourselves and comfwrison .

Compari<ion awakens the appearance of manifoldedness, the con­crete, the real-and in spite of this ! 1

( 3) Funhn hack than nature observation. Compi lation of words-fi tting together and i nflect ion-step to­ward though r .

2 . The manner of narnining lnnguage : " i nflection," grammar, hut "his torical . " Development, consonant shift I What i s sonorous, phonetical-what i s prop­erly "real . "

The s/>ecc!t /Jrncos and its causes and laws of formation . Variat i o ns an<l k ind-;. Dialects. Lang11agc geogrn/ifty , " language atlas , " "J>.1yclwlogy , " "soc io l­ogy." P!ty1 iology . A naromy.-"Language" i tself as means for historical investi­gation ; al l 1)0:-.s ihk and feasible, with d i l igence and sagacity.

llut! 1�-the word ! in spite of the science of language the desolati o n and comumpt ion of t he word-both the same .

1 . The k i nd of l01uwlcdgc claim . A. "\Visscmclwft"-·scicnce-natural sc ience-ex/Jlanation according to devel­

o/nnent-the lead ing image thus: a) "experi ment"! b ) h i'itorica l law of Lkvelopment , even farther hack than natural sc ience.

The r;1cc ;1ga in 'it i t . B. Everything eo;:-.cnt ia l , the .rn-rnlled "/>re.l!lj>/Jositions , " shoved off into the in­

detnminate and general: "th i n k i ng ," "so u l , " "art ," " c u l ture ," h istory,

" idea\111 value:-,. a ) nor only this considered in a mudd led fash ion i n terms of its content ,

hut h) a hove all : the regions for the questioning and reflecting unknown, leaving

indifferen t . Marter of the personal or any "world v iew" now. This "lib­eral" only raised to the author itative and to "principle."

86. Flu '�1 I lrn1 lf'I( ·r ' 1 G1u�1�1

The scientific cx/Jlanmion as priority ; at the same t ime with this, change and forc ing away of the ohject .

Culture, ; i s means of propaganda, ;ippeal ro the earlier fur which

one is not responsible. t l istoric ism; one celebrates a holiday of Cler-­man art , /mnnenading ir /lllhlicly in wagons !

The " ideological superstructure" in essence al l rhar which M arx

pronmmced only very resolutely and wirh pol i t ical radical ism; now veiled.

I I I . What l ies i n rhis threefold change !

a) Consol idat ion of the question of the origin-to origination : U nessent ia l i ty of the question of the essence.

b) indirect u nveil ing of its proper but metaphysical ly in essence sr i l l undc-­cided character.

Back to Herder and he as a whole .

86 . From Herder to Urimm The experiment of rhe /lrnducrion of lang11age

What would be experienced if we could wi rncss rhe origination of language ?

Thar and only that which we h;1ve thereby asked hcfordwnd! and rnn mk accord­ing to the historical fundamental /lmition . Therefore perhaps a/Jrnlwcly norhing concerning the "essence" of language !

The experi ment with pos i t ive proof-----the ohert'ation of the facwal /Jwccss of

invention-the s/Jcakcr of "a" language . The floint of departur<'-the innecrion ( thus still rhe gramnrntirnl i nrcrprera-­

t ion of language ! ) -fn mi it hacl<wards and forwmds . What docs chis clc/Jart11rc and its clctcrminacion rncan 1

87. The "divine" origin of language

That i s , produced through Ciod-as prima causa. Causa must contain that which

i t brings about! 1 Therefore, God must have a hocly . Bur s ince God is a pure spirit,

he cannot have made language. Su/lfJlying rhe human being with sounds and instruments for the production

of sound.

Here an ens-( ens ent ium ) , there an ens--( ens crearu m ) . One "makes" the

other. A l arge worl<Siw/1-81w101Jpy6c;.

- ------------- -- --� -

XV. SAYING AND I-IEARING­SOUND AND SILENCE

I �

--�--·--- -· ---- -

'II

� .

The inner (drawing in)

} spreading out The removing gathering

88 . Hearkening

attuned insistence in the in-between } being-there

(The in-between of the there- announces itself here . )

Essentially the sound and tone is not for itself-and the ear as instrument

of reception; ear and tone themselves essence in the "in-between," that is, in

Herder's terms: in "hearing," what indicates the deeper sense of perce}ltion .

The openness for as simultaneously withdrawing and yet leaving what is

taken in its place-yes indeed-going beyond sound and tone .

But the l imit of h is posing of question: modern

1 . Subjectivity-reason, 2. Power and ab i l ity-"l ife ."

89 . Sounding (sound)

1 . Sound , tone-distinguished from color, scent and the like .

2. Sound ( "perceptual" )-and "silence . " Silence only privation-or ground of

the "sound"? or even abysmal-ground ?

3 . Sound as marking, messenger, conveyor.

4. Sound as keeping that preserves-earth of the world .

Cf. silence as in-between .

90 . Sound

Only marking of communication l Tram-mission and messenger-conveyor? Or is

the "sound" of more original essence ? and of which?

1 . Earth-world 2. and this as sound-rift-strife

3 . Call-4. S ilencing-s ilence 5 . Exploration of si lence.

93

· · .

94 xv Sl\Y IN< � /\NI ) l l! ·/\\\ IN( ; . . .

lJ I . Hearing and hearkenin,1(

\ -l c ar ing-ru perceive " w i th" the ear-to pcrc c i vc-"thrnugh"-"ear"­"t<Jnc." \ \caring only p<Niib\c in hearkening? T<J cast , to ca:it-tnwanl ( i n mid­dle high Ucrman, upper (:Jerman, d ialectic) . The animal " hearing" ( scent, tcn­

siun, "tu prick up the ears" ) . Hearkening and listening attcntivcly-" listcning to" Hearkening am\ being obedicnt-"tu lend" his "car."

To be able to follow, that is, going al<Jng with- and tha t is going ahead of. \'V'ait-ing jlre/Jmcdness for that , whence ddivercd-owr-whence and whither ajJ/Jro­/iriat-ed .

l )< 1cs the human being hearken because he can hear, nr can he hear because he can hearken? AnLl what does heing ahlc to hearken mean ! AnLl ivlwt does the \n1man being "hear" ? Th<it to which he hearkens-what does he hearken to ?

Pieing able to hearken-be ing ah\e-"to hear" and insistence in what is ques­timlClblc and question-tuonhy . At-t1mcmcnt-rnlled.

I-lrnrkening-<1bediencc Hearkening, li-.tening to-submitt ing-oneself to the urder. Order- ing of the or­der, of the -;nifc.

Be stiW he<irken!

Listening tn--as being silent , accepting-by-taking- in , "saying nothing to tha t , " s i lenc- ing. Hearing-the rnrrying-oHt of the re/Jly and of the strife , the "or­dering" in the evcnt -nf-apprnpriatinn. Insistence in the word-as .t,rroimclecl say­ing . Ncwr: nbed ient to command.

9 2 . " Hearing" and being [Seyn]

At the -.arne t ime: I . \nncrnes-;-tak ing-in 2. Stretch ing m1t-l istening cl<Jscly to; being compliant ,

whole ear. ). At-tuned fm-against , tuned-off-to,

Attunemenr and rnoocl .-Silenc - ing of the event-of-ap­

prnpriat inn.

93. Mark and sound

S<1un,\ nllt �1cldcd tll me<ming, rather the meaning so11nds , the mark resourK\s, bl'ttcr: The resounding i-. t<1ken m sign in attentiun, that is, resounding does not

94. "Sl 'l JN\ 1" 1\N \1 1'\i\JU� 95

resound into the "ear , " but in the "sou[ , " that is, into the understanding of hcing. Therefore "sounLling" is at first a self-showing as a being , an afijicaring , that lets

appear, hut non-object ively. Sounding essences between p�1gs. Only in hearkening �

hearing hecom.cs possible and what is l!udih[c jicrce/itual .

94 . "Sound" and mark

"Bleating"-the mark that breaks itself away am\ yet precisely turns back to and rernain.s with the object and comes toward �>� the perceiver.

pressing against the ear and yet belonging to the shceji . > 1 . The step of perceiving-by-taking-of wanting to kn.ow.

2. The half-way coopcratilln llf nature; not only re.munding "forth," but in-to , because "bleating" i tself notes thrmi,e,h sign-mmking: "You blcat"-"You are

the one bleating!" Here bleating: that m what !

A t first: to know an interest , " urgency to name" (49f. ) ; "resounding acts," "re­

sounding processes," "muu," "lmah ." P,ut not all objects resound!

9 5 . The olltcr word

The inner word the nomination-by-rwming of something to something, setting up and establishing as . . . ; only then: Nominming 1 Nomina ante res ! !

The sound ldcr Laut]-thc smmding-the Sllund ldcr Schall). Also the sound must first become an "inner": "hlcming inwmds" ( ) 7 ) . The "smtnLl ing- tmvmds ," that i s , in general tll take that which sound-; m such-not swept and carried away to something (hens, chicks) hy tllne and nllise and scre<nn, but first as this , that i s , "bleating."

The sounding and rcsotmding is nllthing, if i t not itself tirst noted am\ notecl­down . The sig11 for the noted must itself tirst and simultaneously be noted down .

96 . S01mding and scri/Jt

Script as rrwking-conswnt the sounding that is simultaneously transformecl and

fust ordered thruugh "grammata." We take, also where we he<ir, mostly already in script that which is spoken at Kl speaking. Script, hrnvever, never recording that copies the sounding; rather transformat ic11 1 .

\ \

xv. SJ\YJN( ; J\N l l HEJ\R!Nli . . .

Word script and letter script. Letter script and alphabet-all languages can

be written down in the same way. The language that is readable in script a lso changes that which is spoken and said-heings. That which is scripted as pres­ent-at-hand-ready-to-hand.

9 7 . Langiiage (human) and hearirw

I . To let notice-"denoting" inner 2 '-' d . ( ) " k . ,, Manifestation . ooun mg tones - spea mg outer

( inforrning-by-maldng-constant , communication-also ! / but only ? / but a t first ? / but real ly ? The human being-being [das Seyn] ! )

The sense of hearing-Perceiving of tones and sounds as letting "the senses" fore-sounding -t of language '

The sense of hearing-the middle , mediating sense between sight and touch ( that i s touching, smell ing, tasting) accord ing to seven different respects .-

s �I fl � cn�tive awareness. Hearing-nor from car and tone, not from sense of hearing-but fro m hear­

kening and obeyinp,. That which is essential in jJerceivinp, in the human being: "hearing" more Jierceivinp, than "seeing." "Seeing" in one respect "more " a d i ­recting oneself t o . . . , going u p t o . . . , having-before-oneself. Hearing, the being-attentive-on, to let come up to oneself, and at the same time not so much given out to . . . as inclusion ("innerness" ) , but at the same time agai n so that the perceiving is once aga in a 11,iving out to . . . What Herder senses with the "middle" character of "hear ing" i s the in-between and in the m idst of the clearing.

Clcarini; and sounding.

The ability to heed one ilnother and to hear one another! The towards us and away from . . . the traversing of the in-between, the call-on and call-w, which simultaneously call over beyond themselves and never fas ten tlJ themselves . The "call ing" in the clearing of the ap-propriation; the tuning of the ground-tuning.

From the next beginning point of a project of heing-therc, from the everyday hci 11g-i11-thc-world. Why exactly this ?

The sense of hearing and the car-the ability to hear.

· .... .

98. HERllER: "Tl l/\T WI !IC! I IS /\LIVE"

98 . Herder: "that which is alive "

Susceptibil i lty-sensibi l i ty-thinking Withdrawing (pain)-Wanting there (Joy)

97

Human being: Innerness and s[>reading out (to unite the many towards "in­side" ) , activity that looks within itself: reflexion-apperception.

- -- ·-- ·- -

XVI. H EARKENING AS MIDDLE OF THE SENSORIUM COMMUNE

"Sounding" and the "tone that breaks free"

,\

99 . Herder's consideration of the role of hearing ( I n how far Herder sees and forms clearly and unequivocally and above all from adequate project realm is indifferent for us here. )

1 . In itself and in its limits significant . Its intention i s to explain i n which way a lso that which is non-sonorous comes to word as sonorous language. How that which is non-sonorous can gather itself in a middle region, how this m iddle is of such a kind that it mediates everything that is felt into a sound­ing. Towards this middle and through it everything a "hearing. "

2 . Without properly grasping it and indeed measuring its importance, Herder exec utes here an interpretation of hearing as hearkening in the sense of being-attentive-on . But this as ground-execution of the erecting of the self, of reflection . The setting-oneself- in-the-open space-of-the-great-ci rcle, to adopt the ind icated stand is the being-attentive-on in the sense of"reascm," reflection .

3. But this a lso points to an essentially deeper and completely different con­s ideration: The attending to beings as pro-jeering of and self-thrusting in the clearing of being [des Seyns] . (Cf. [Chap. XV.] Saying and hearing)

1 00 . Hearing, language , making sounds , sounding Question of decision

Hearing is essential : 1 . for taking up what is spoken, of that which is said and with this for passing

on (communication) , 2. but before for Herder for the perceiving of sonorous marks (sonorous acts)­

the noticing of the first mark ! 3 . both important and yet not decisive, especially since already on the ground

of the mark character of the word. The announcing sound: ( 1 ) announcing the object-sonorous mark that makes manifest ( 2 ) announcing the said word-co-munirnting

Therefore the question of decision needed: a ) Is hearing essential because the tone p lays a main role as announcing

sound in the twofold sense or does the tone have this role because hear­ing essentia l ?

b ) But why is hearing essential ? Because i t the middle of the sensorium? Why m iddle ? as special sense or is it this middle because it is the hear­kening as being attentive and this essential for coming into being of word ?

I O I

I02 XV!. HEARKEN!N(; . . . AND T! !E "TONE THAT BREAKS FREE"

c) But why is the heing attentive essentia l ? Because it in it iates mark for­mation or because i tself carried and attuned by another ? Understand ing of being?

1 0 1 . The being-historical response (cf. Question of decision)

Assuming that in general "mark" constitutes the essence of the word, must the

first mark be a sonorous one ? Here already this having in view the word-sound as sound and, that is, as an­

nouncement and noting! in the manner of a special sensible givenness. Bu t

I . the word-not first word o f objects , beings , but of being [des Seyns] . 2 . The sound-not first relative to ear, but to silence-that is, not "relat ive,"

but a manner of silence itself. I ts rend ing-the "rift."

I 02 . Hearing as middle of the sensorium commune and the essence of hearkening

The human being is a thinking sensorium commune . ! . sensorium--contact , in the widest sense of "fcel ing."

I-laving a sense-to sense. a) in the sense of being aj1proached b) to track after and ahead, on the track toward .

Thus sensorium not mere "receptivity" respectively this not as jJassivity , but at the same t ime and equally essential: s/1reading out to . . ., removing to . . . and this simultaneously with the receiving and collecting, with the in-nerness ( taking within into the inner) as a gathering, holding in. �ensorium-contact (feeling, fore-feeling)

having a sense (being approached, on the track) Thus: inner spreading out and gathering that removes , no mere d ispersion and scattering; (only partial and external view) , rather: mediating m id­dle, that goes for the middle and at the same t ime always swings out.

The sensoriurn-sensibility-properly neither only swinging out nor capturing, nor both shoved together, but that, which in between, that is, both at once in their original unity, that is, a certain "in between," the between-like of "that which is al ive" in general and of the human being in an essential sense.

_,

1 02 . I-!EARINl ; AS M l l lllLE OF Tl IE SENSCJRIUM COMMUNE 103

To grasp sensibility only from here. The between-like itself the middle open region for all rushing on and to.

2 . The sensorium is in itself a commune-will say: it 1;athers and unifies and must thus have a "middle , " which satisfies such mediation. The commune in twofold sense: a) gathering unifying under the manifoldedness of the sensible rush of the

d ifferent senses-communio ("connection line") . b) drawing in as a whole in general that whereto the sensorium itself just

breaks out: communicatio ( "door-to soul" ) . sensorium commune: co-rnunicating and distributing ( connection l ine) ( the whole of the sensorium) taking to ( door) .

3 . Hearing i s the middle of the sensorium commune , "the sense of hearing . " This d istinction of the sense of hearing is made evident through a contrast a ) of its position between the coarser sense ( "feeling," touch) and the "finer"

sense ( "sight") . b) This position in between is clarified according to six respects.

To asl<: 1 . for text and the respects; 2. how it stands with the unity of the six respects and their provenance; 3. what results from it for the charac­terization of hearing and of sensibility as a whole; 4. whether the an­nouncement of the non-sonorous marks is thus "explained."

The position between and in the middle of the sense of hearing between fee ling and sight is settled according to following six respects: 1 . the sphere of sensibility from outside of this "sense." 2. The distinctness and clarity of this sense. 3 . The liveliness of th is sense. 4 . The duration of the effect of this sense and its .1ensed . 5 . The need of expression of this sense. 6. The development of this sense.

Regarding ( 1 ) question : how far touch, sight, sense of hearing bringing from outside and thus co-municating from inside?

The comparison in the manner of a consideration of limit: If sensibility only and comfJletely touch? then narrowest restriction . Touch, hack to itself and pressed in, fee ls in the organ ! If sensibility only and comtJletely sight, then widest disper­sion . S ight, thrust outside itself, letting itself behind itself and through itself (but also in the eye motion and pain noticeable, then different from finger pres­sure for example ) . Never a constancy of an encirclement that sets against and d istances.

But how with the sense of hearing ? Here advancing to meet (feeling)-from expanse ( sigh t ) . And yet not d ispersion ---> and yet not fircsscd in .

I o4 XVI. HEARKENING . . . AN!l TI IE "TONE THAT BREAKS FREE"

The sense of hearing therefore the middle with regard to the distancing con­

stancy , with regard to what stands in the objective circle. The middle region .

But how, if every sense out of the full sensorium-then also conversely.

-Touch: handshake reaches to "heart"; sight: glaring lightning lays on the eyes l ike

a blow. The sense of hearing and radio . "To hear" London now but not to see ? Sense

of hearing thrusts us farther out than sight? No! For her: i t is not about the dis­

tance that is objectively measurable and thought, which is overcome, but about

the kind of possession that perceives. In hearing a nearing. And here is dec isive:

the lacl< of distinction concerning the d istance, whether someone speaks in the

room or from the other side of the Channel, indifferent . Here something is de­

stroyed-and what is changed in hearing? The possibil ity of the immediate di­

alogue. But telephonic-s/Jeal<ing? "We become as it were a hearing through all senses" ( 65 ) (not "because" of al l

senses, as a consequence of their combined action) . What does this say ? We hear through al l senses. Touching, smell ing, seeing we listen to that which re­sounds, that which sounds and take that which is encountered thus in the word sound . All senses perceive by hearing and have thus a tone in the "ear," which becomes a naming word sound.

On ( 2) : Distinctness and clarity-in how far a sense and how it clear and d is­tinct, therefore that which is noticeable , having mark character, can pose along immediately. ( Is this ever possible for a sense ! Not signs, but having sign char­acter, able to be sign . )

Touch: dark, not to grasp, indistinct, "in one another," blending, "deafened" (not free, removed) .

Sight: clear, overglowing, too much and many, and thereby again not always a

sole one , that which is contrasted? Sense of hearing: from the dark and bright, what can give nothing notice­

able from a too little and a too much, "a tone breaks free," "one," "this one"!

"ha" ! (and indeed in the manner of bringing along! ) clarifies the darl< , dampens the brightness , gives always one and creates the possibil ity of contrasting-that­

lifts-out and distinction and thereby first unity , one with which can linger.

On ( 3) : The liveliness of this sense (erecting into the self-standingness). Cf. ( 6) and ( I ) opposing expanse.

Feeling: overpowers, presses too deep in us, com/Jels (sting, blow, pressure,

\hove). Sight: leaves cold, remains too calm before us, does not elevate .

1 02 . HEARING AS MIDDLE OF THE SENSORIUM COMMUNE 1 05

Sense of hearing: penetrates us , but in such a way that it simultaneously erects . In this sense we can last longer and stay; leaves free , does not tire, but elates and makes v ibrate . Hence (6 ) .

On ( 4) : "Duration of the effect . " (Dedication of the we at circle in the unity of its manifoldedness ) Cf. ( 1 ) .

Feeling: everything at once, short, bursting Sight: everything next to one another, spreading out, measurable Sense of hearing: After one another, always bringing in a single one and yet con­

trasted, contrasting itself in the after one another-together. Unity of a manifold.

On (5) : The "need for ex/Jression. Neediness! (The neediness for a constancy that announces itself as mark. Claim upon that . )

Feeling: sunken i n itself, self-absorbed, does not want to manifest? ! ? (But every feel ing stil l scream! ! ) Yet this not sign ! and that is what is here meant by "expression," cf. sight. Feeling may not be spoken.

S ight: That which is seen remains, does not at all first need attention and capturing; stands already, hints suffice .

Sense of hearing: Tones sweep past, but in order to give themselves for at­tention; they want to hold themselves and be held .

On ( 6) : The "develo/Jment . " (The course of erecting into free-standingness) Cf. ( 3 ) .

Feeling: is the human being initially whole and necessary , but-thus precisely not yet self!

Sight: he can never only be-Sense of hearing: awake, forms; manner of the crossing over. The kind of

proper transposition into the economy of nature.

With this consideration of the limit it is overlooked that if the senses are taken in thei r full essence ( vibrating in reflective awareness) , the corresponding pos­sibil it ies ( e.g. , the dull ing and spreading out) still subsist overall. The fact that here the sense of hearing as perceiving with the ear has in no way priority, but only insofar as it is grasped as perceiving in the sense of being-attentive, of hearkening, of being-silent.

But whence the appearance of the priority of hearing? Does it not still corre­spond in a privileged sense to hearkening?

Yes and no ! In any case, it must be seen that the respects of its characteriza­tion as "middle" are not drawn from sensibility.

\

I 06 XVI. HEARKEN INC ; . . . AND Tl IE "Tc lNE Tl lAT BREAKS FREE"

Overview of the six res/Jects with a view to their unity and provenance

I . distant-standing, counter-standing constancy of an encirclernent­(great circle ) . Cf. ( 5 ) .

2 . immediate setting-by of what has the character of mark, making possible the ac-knowledging appeal . The self-contrasting of the distantly obtrusive one. " Unity" as contrasted distinction of a single this. Cf. ( 5 ) .

3 . Erecting into the self-standini.,rriess ( l iveliness) Cf. (6) .

4. Dedication of the great circle in the manifoldedness of its unity . (duration )

5 . the neediness for a comtancy chat announces itself; Claim upon that. cf. ( I ) , ( 2 ) .

6. Course of the erecting into the free­.1 tandingness . Cf. ( 3 ) . Trans/Jortation of what is free­standing into the animal economy ( in the '\chool of nature") .

*

Everywhere not moment of sensibility, but of reflective awareness • in which everything is rooted as the fundamental power.

*

Look towards essence and unfoldi ng of the free-standingness in the objective circle of that which is constant (of beings as a whole)

*

Look towards the historical being of the human in the whole of "nature " and according to its household.

*

The middle of sensibil ity from the essence of reflective awareness. How hearing as being-attentive satisfies "attention" (cf. earlier) .

*

TI1us then st i l l mediate the essence of reflective awareness (attention that hearkens) i l lustrated more richly.

1 02 . HEJ\RINU AS M J [)Jll.E ( lF TI IE SENSORIUM COMMUNE

But is the sounding and resounding of what is non-sonorous thus explained in terms of the role of hearing! No 1

Rather it is only shown that everything that is sensible, including sounding, essences in advance already in the ofJen realm of reflective awareness and can only be grasped from here.

( Reflection: as elucidation of what is sensible and as sensihil ization of rea­son into one . )

B u t this says: that then the resounding marks have no jniority a t all over the non-sounding-that it does not depend upon sounding, but upon: the Jiresenc­ing of beings as such , that is, upon being.

That consequently also sounding not essentially related to the tone and sound, but to the openness and clearing of being and, that is, to the si lence and the rend ing of the si lence in the strife of world and earth.

*

The deepest essence of perceiving is the insistence in the there -. Hearkening as: being-the si lence!

*

"The tone that breaks free"-as first mark. Now that attention more clearly grasped in terms of the being-attentive

(on) that hearkens and is s imultaneously referred to its ground (understanding

of being ) , i t may be good to think through once more the "first" mark-for­mat ion, the first resounding of the first word into the soul .

Now i t appears: i t does not at all depend on the "acoustical" and "phoneti­cal" processes-but what Herder has in mind there is something completely other and everywhere (where beings as such appear) self-showing.

Break ing free and penetrating is in essence: the cssencing-to and /ircsencing of what subsists and emerges toward us-and yet remaining in what is fircsent-at­hand. Essencing-on as letting a/i/iear-ing that emerges . Bur this fircsencing as event of the being of beings. Why and how sound? Because previously and properly the being-silent, and in how far this rended?

*

Only in the open of the presencing a rush of this and that-but this first and most importantly worldly . Presencing as worlding-the world ing, but earthly. World and earth in strife.

I o8 XVI. HEARKENING . . . ANll Tl IE "TONE Tl !AT BREAKS FREE"

*

Also the "tone" coul<l not break free in the mentioned manner and yet remain clt the sheep, if it were not already previously <lrawn as "mark." Whence this Jrawing? from world ( reference whole) .

*

fhe remaining that breaks free +.- � is exactly that which <loes not concern :he release an<l propagation of a soun<l-but beings as such , that is, here ob­ectivity.

But therefore necessary to clarify sufficiently the breal<ing free .

*

)oes the presupposit ion hol<l: Because the outer wor<l is a sonorous one, the

nitial first inner word must also b e a sonorous mark ? How does it stand with the distinction in outer and inner word ? What about

he conception of the sound as "tone"? What about the application of the word

of that which says) as mark-sign?

.anguage in Herder's project:

Sign ( indicating) Re;mm as attention rationalitas

lerder

and

*

Tune Sensibility Scream of the self-announcing sensation animalitas

*

osition on the otherwise considerable emj)hasis on that which is sonorous and on

:aring. 1 spite of all Herder remains with his stress on hearing an<l hearkening in the

icoustical"-"phonetical," with what has the character of "sound. "

H e does not even see the essence of hearing a s hearkening and still less the

mer connection of hearing as hearkening with being attentive ( reflective aware­

�ss, perceiving) ; he does not realize that he sees the "sense of hearing" already

sentially different.

------

1 03. T! J[' SOUN! l!NC> OF LANCiUAGE 1 09 But even he·irk . b . h

t i al l! . ' enmg as eing attentive remains then at most m t e essen-

n1ty with · t · �h k · 7 Th Proh a tent1on an<l reason. But what is reason and ear enmg. e

;--er decision [ · • . h . . . . � ls h , . ies t us m an entirely different regzon:

I earken1n b · ·1 · .r · ence...__b .

g a emg attentive-reason? or is hearkening the si encmg o; si-

emg-there ?

I 03. The sounding of language

Is the . sound and th h · I h fi · l'f ent-at-h d at w tc 1 as the character of sound something or itse f1res-

sentia[ an . and accordingly real? Or does sounding belong in a different more es-reahty and wt . t . h . h . t d d fi . " " r l

sound 7 ' illcn ts t ts w icn groun s an rst gives space 1or t ie

l'he c learing fb · [d ' fi I

bec0111 h 0 emg es Seyns]. So that sound can never for itself and rst Y

lapse . e t at which sets the measure; if this happens, then everything would

Into error.

- ----------

XVII. "FEELING" AND "SENSE OF HEARING" IN HERDER

SOUNDING AND MAKING SOUNDS

------

---·-·------ - --------------------·-

1 04 . Feeling

1 . lo 1. 2 T" ucn-touching-touched-sensing . reel i l 'b ' l ' in the whole re-

. ng touc 1Cd-affection-receptivity-suscepn ! uy , gion of the senses: he has a "feeling" for things.

Herder' · . . . ( , · 7) F ,eJing-as s concept of feelmg ( of the sensible ) . sens us perceptto · · e touch . . . ( . . · d · ing concep-

t; ' sensmg properly touch, taste, smell ) : pressing ofJpresszon , riv

•On , fee l 1 " · · 11 I I ,nses are only r 1 . 5 everytning only in itself. Rece/Jtivity- ongma Y a se iee IQa" (63 ) ""

l "' , 1ee ing underl ies al l senses" ( 6 1 ) . The senses and the sensible-the interwoven, dark, blurring, manifold, cap-tunng p , · · 1 . . . d

· · · ' ) S ' ressmg c tstress. (The non-distinct , not-yet- 1stmct. enses:

1. Kinds f · I · d . · · 0 refJresentatwn of the soul perceptto -+ to zstmctness. If d ' . . h istmct, t en mark then inner word.

l. Kinds of feeling of the s�ul / ap-petitus to -> resounding. What in resounding irnrnediately has i ts sound; if raised ro d istinctness, then outer word. Therefore language-elucidation, noticing of the sensible , ratio of the animal.

I 05. The sensoriwn commune and the sense of hearing

Hearing the m iddle of the mediation, communio, connection line between hu­man being and human being. Communication--door to the soul.

"S ensibility" not less essential than "reason"; indeed both here the same.

/ 06 . Language and sound

Saying-yet "also" announcing ' Yet only in the sense of communicating-or? Sounding as earthing of the clearing and only because of that useful as path for commun ication. The resounding word and the sounding mark. The sense of hear­ing and reason.

1 07 . Herder's a/!/Jroach

Decisive : "Knowing, what reason is" (89) , cf. (6 1 ) . Sounding of sensations­sensibi l i ty/animal.

1 1 3

----_

I 1 4 XVI I . " FEELINc ;" ANll "SENsE OF H EARINC�" 1N H uu lEIZ

1 . Attent ion-mark-formation in general 2 . But at the same t ime and at first-to notice tones an<l to form i nto marks­

to convey to the tongue through the car and thereby sound ing out the inner word. "Speaking" as speak ing-out-"Language"

3. The resounding acts-the first . "That which is moved" ("resound" and swee p past) (67 ) a) Movement-presencing of the di-fference of the from-towards b) This wh ich is moved, i tself moving-come toward the one who hears­

Dreal<ing-free and yet remaining on!.

4. How the non-sonorous objects to "sounds" ! How sayable!

I 08 . Relation between the 2nd and Jrd section of the I" /Jart

2nd Section : Use of reason-reflection � Mark-formation, becom ing wor<l. yd Section : Which the first marks "elements of language" as meaningful announce­

ment and communication . ( 1 ) the fore-soimdins; tone (hearing, hearkening) ( 2) how language (sound) where no tone resounds?

Fore-1,'Tas/J : Consequently "\anguage"-saying a) as notins; down , "noting," b) letting announce.

yc1 Section : 1 . takes up ( 2 ) once again, i ndeed gives it first the {mJfJer ground and grasps "reason" more essentially (hearkening, l isten ing attentivel y) in spite of the other appearance, as if it were concerned now and subsequently only w i th announcement.

From the 2'"1 Section of the I' ' part, as the middle, forth to the yd and back to the l '' and thereby looking through the whole and prepming a posit ion, which has something essent ial as the goal: position concerning <111Y kmd of metaphysics and science of language.

Language / reason / human being / beings Language-reslJumling-soumling Language-hearkening Decisive: the essence of the sound and of sounding belong to saga. Script,

th<it which is scripted, that which is readable.

- -· - --- ··---------�-· - -

1 09. WHAT IS REASON ? 1 1 5

I 09 . What is reason?

Elucidation of h . _ . the ann

t e sens ible-and because of that it is "language" in the sense of

ouncem , f Re•L .

ent o meaning. J '-'"Ctlon-that-s . . h

Ref1ect . f enses-t e one fundamental power of being human.

. ion-t tat-senses . . h d d h fi k mg sens .b l

· -raising t e senses t o istinctness a n t us rst ma -

1 e and thus b · · d ' f l l b ·

accord in H nngmg to resoun . Cf. the essence o t le lllman emg

" g to erder.

Reason" · d essencin

, �n eefJer sense : where no longer ability and power, but sign of the

"Listen" g an rule of being-there. -be still, silence the silence !

-----

\ ,. ,

-------------- ---

XVIII. "THE SHEEP BLEATS"

-

-------_.

---- ·-· · --�-· . -----· -· -----�--

1 1 0 . "You are the one bleating"

"You a r , bl · " · 'd " e eatmg -you-"are": the jJro/Jerly scud unscu · . That which bleats"--a being in such a manner. Only on the ground and abyss

of ��e cl�aring of being [des Seyns] a "bleating ." baah -not · · b · · k . f "01 " e·1st1re' rr1easure raken. W: . dpmg, ut m1m1c 1ng-a ter. 1m -m • · , . . . �;re against-to stand-away and erect itself as what srands-agamst. It as it . baah" = there is the "baah" !-The properly said is not that which is sounded,

post-sounded, but "the silence , " being [das Seyn]. The sound-less ·

1 1 1 . "Bleating"

"baah"-1 . breaks itself free by itself, comes to us from the "slate of nature"! pressing-in 2· ye t remains at the sheep , indicates it as ( ! ! ) baah-making. 3 · this resounding an act, that which moves . Presencing of the crossing, of the con-

tras ting. Distinct. The baah: showing itself by distinguishing. 4. pressing-deeply . Why ? because the depth of the soul, its with-itself, the self.

Baah-as sign, that which is contrasted, the self-contrasting and standing standingness; that is, erecting-u/i . 5 · to make that which is noted noticeable, immediately-"bleating," the baah­baah; but sheefJ? Therefore hearing taking up with the ear, a hearl<.ening­submitting itself, perceiving-by-taking-to that which is constant, set , remain­ing . Attention grounds in hearkening, but hearkening the deeper essence of reason. "Hearkening"-spreading out that catches up (voui;) , removed gathering (Myoi;) .

1 1 2 . "Listen! " "The sheefJ bleats "

Attention to the resounding mark must itself resound; thereby it comes to be the outer word. "A mark breaks free there" already above, cf. section Z, P· 36. Where from does it break free? From the other marks ( ! ) of viewing and touch­ing, from the viewed and touched (65 ) .

Human being: sensible creature , folded i n and enclosed i n manifoldedness "of feelings . " Therefore-in order to take and to perceive something, destroy

1 1 9

' ' .t.»

1 20 XVI I I . "T1 IE S1 IEE!' IlJ.E/\TS" I " something else. "To set off one against the other" with regard to third . "Mar<

necessary , i n order t o grasp object. In how far "breaking free" ! anJ indeed "by itself ' ? "Resound ing"-but l isten !

Resounding-"to move i tself," rustling , sighing, trickle , "resounding acts ' " pass­

mg by, essencing-on. Being-moved is /Jrcsencing of the crossing-over from · · · to,

of the difference ! Constrast ing-that-l ifts-out, contrast ing- that- l ifts- i tse lf­

out-penetrates deeply and distinctly into the soul, does not remain cl inging

m the cars, not in through one and out the other. In how far? Because noted down as mark-for the self0"sranding."

"It sounded"-when and how did it sound for the "hearken" ? What is with this­

"hearken" ! Be still , be attentive on , perceive what is markable, Ji-fferentiate!

The sound as noted fulfills something that is already perceived (noted down)

and brings it-leaving it to the object-at the same time to the human being. But

how! What is heard only audible as something that is already hearkened to ' but

the tone at the same time impulse of the hearkened-to; this /necedes essential ly

l " ' d k " t ie pomte ears," only within it is this "pointed cars" possible . "Hear en -

how to take ? Only as stretching toward a "sound" ? No: More essential ly the ;.ore-having and fore-taking of what essences-on, essences-to ( the "canvas ," the

great slate of nature , " the "having in mind") . The silence-ab-sence of noises ? or? The s i lence more essential . "Hearken"-to be still , to enter into silence , silence of the there- . Hearken­

not only: "be all ears," but be one who perceives-by-taking, who you a lready

are, without fathoming and even only knowing and grounding your "being."

He who can hear-hearkener-of which essence and importance is hear­

kening! Always according to that which obeys-by-hearing, of the ordering­

always according to the rule of the order.

1 1 3 . "The ear the first teacher of language . " ( 48)

Language: distinct use of the marks and announcement. Only that which is d is­

tinct , the d ifferent expressible. Announcement . The sense of he�1ring.

The seme of hearing-the most pl iable sense for language.

1 1 4 . Sound and tone

Which the most />liable sense for language ! Where and how sensibi l ization of the

inner word , with that to give further and beyond to others. Language is resound­

ing. Sayini; as soundini; already established. The inner word already takes first a

resounding mark !

XIX. LANGUAGE AND REASON

' !,

....,.-o,_..: -­

- -- -�-:=:-:-::--------

" - --·---- - ·

1 1 5 . Reason and language

Reason is la f d h . " . If . d g1'v ing oneself to .

· nguage rom insi e: t e "saymg to onese an . not ice L· . k lf perceivable 1 11 "

· anguage 1s reason from outside: to ma e onese sounds." " I nside" and "outside" ? . .

Hege l c il · l . l G . 243 ) 1 "th · visible 111v1s-. . . a s anguage ( Phanomenolog1e L es e1stes, e ibihty of its [the Spirit's] essence." Cf. Jenenser Realphilosophie II ( l SOS/6) , ed. Hoffmeister, p. 1 8 3f.l

I 1 6 . Reflective awareness and langiwge (inner word)

l . Reflective awareness as the fundamental power-the attention ( in the dif-ferent l y tiered meanings ) : wanting-to-know, mark-searching. . 2· Mark form ation and distinctio . Distinctness. -cognitio distincta and its metaphysical ground--clucere in rem (naturam) simul praesentem . ( intuitus) (Leibniz) / Essence of the difference and decision . 3 . The fundamental power in "com/iletely other direction": as reflexio-to the "self," self-standingness, erecting-up, only in the realm of object-standing, and there by to the "great" c ircle, (everything ) , the whole .

4. Reflective awareness and the free c ircle of reflection ( the mirroring) . Free-standingness. Freedom and langiwge . 5 . The inner word-as the ori1;inal-as mono-logue-"dialoguing."

1 1 7. Heflective awareness and mark

The need to hecome acquainted with something ( 3 6) . As soon as the human being comes into this need-to make know-able, to

become acquainted with-something in which, what it is, as the knowin1; and

that which is known and the dist inguishing and "settin1;": what something is and that it is in such a manner,-sorncthin1; as a heing. That is, if comportin1; oneself

toward beings as such , what is grounded in the human being scandin1; in the un­concealment of heings ( i n the clearing of being [des Seyns] ) .

1 . G. W. F. l !egcl, l'h>inomenologie dl's c;e i,res. I n : Werke. Vol lst>irnl ige Ausgahe durch

einen Yerein von Frcundcn des Ycrcwigtcn. Vol . 2, Berl in 1 81 2 , p. 243 .

2 . G . W. F. Hegel, Jenen<er Realphilosophie. I I . Die Vorlesungen from 1 805/06. Edited hy Hoffmeister. Leipzig 1 9 l l , p. 1 8 lf.

I 2 3

.. .,- ' , '

XIX. LANc;uAuE ANll REASON

*

Whence the searcli after mark-si[fll ? Because without this no d istinctness. Bur wh� such ? In order to grasp each one-<>elfsame as such-against the many ! W�Y· Because swndin[flless ' [Searching] after such, whereon and wherein something

that is standing shows itself. To know with mark and to know humanly. Mark-sign suffices and fulfills the

need of knowing ( making-present) .

1 1 8 . Wanting to /mow

Wanting to know-("something" ) as that and that. What is that? What ? But suchlike only, if at all interest in "heing"; and that means ? 0/Jenness of the jJres­

encing.

1 1 9 . Reflective awareness

Which is the "comjJletely different direction" and unfolding of all powers through the fundamental power of reflective awareness? ( 29) The direction to the "self"­re-flexion, ap-perception-and this d irection is erecting of oneself in the midst and toward beings as such.

But how? Through objectification-and only in its realm and medium . The di­rection-nor perhaps to the "great circle," hut this "great ," "everything" only

therefore, because each and in general that which is individual as this which is distinguished . But this one, because back to itself, that is, understanding of be­

ing. lnncrness and with it first spreading out in the great circ le.

1 20. The distinction

l . The distinction-<li-stinctio, dis-stinguo, <Htc;(J)--to-point-apart, to tighten, owipi.:au;-as abil ity of perception (to under-take, to fore-take ) . But ''rea­son" the first and the last. The distinction and reason (abil it ies-objects ) ; thme which are distinguished similarly represented-by-being-set-before and even the regard for it as "third."

2 . The distinction as de-cision . The separating of the scparatedness. The sep­aratedness out of the in-between (c learing). The di-stinction and the truth of bcin1; [des Seyns] "in-between . " ( De-cision . )

�.,,. _. ---Cc·=--------------

1 2 l . T1 IF ";\:-.;" ;\N l l T i f f "r:o!Z"

3 . as "bridg " I . . , , f I , ·ds-bcincrs and b . e -t 1(' as . The questionlessness () t 1e n--qua--, . ,.., '

eing-itsc]f first of all only as "distinction , " cf. the concept of the ontologi-cal differeric , " l 11 ' c , transcenl en cc."

1 2 1 . The "as " and the "for"

The tak · · ( I · J ) (39) Th is the "fi ,, mg- mto-regar d : Distingu ish with regard to t 1 1 rL · · . irst -as h f I . r "W 1 1" , l "as"-enablmg! w at o t 1e reprcsentinr.;-h'Y-settmg-be1ore ! or L c1m · . What f: f l ' · . l . 1d its or 0 t 1e regard-"as" towards us. That-wh1ch-stanL s-,iway at

ground ing clearing. The d 1' s t ' · l · l ·

· h· · 'presentincr-by-. - 1ngu1s 11 ng-re-praesentare as o 1-iectt catton, re ·

" . setting-before-to the truth of beings as such. But not in the grounding of being. Praesenti ·• " · " .. . I 0- t l lne - m- Jc tween . "

. Di-st ingu ishing-and de-cision . I n general first se/Jarntedness-"between'.'­

m-between-(in the m idst, meanwhile) . The "in-between" and the clearmg. He

.rder and the entire metaphysics arc not able to see all this, because animal

rationale Ali ' l ' t , I . '" I " . l l y cllll re-presentations; ll eas .

1 22 . Language as "medium of our s/Jiritual self-feeling and consciousness"

( Cf. Herder, Vom Erkennen uml Ernpfinden der mcnsc h l ichen Seele. ) 1

Enabling and course of the completely other direction. Knowing "needs ," "if it

wants to feel itself deepest as self," "rods for erecting" "inner language."2 Signs­rods.

Marl<-sigYJ-in how far erecting-up I Stand ing � against -> object, on some­

thing as such- " i rself" referring and thus standing by-setting itself over again.i t . LaYJguage : rat io-as self-consc iousness (cogitu � cogito me cogirnrc-ego

sum). LaYJguage-whcrein and through which the human being comes to him­self, is h i mself and free . (Cf. Herder on susceptibility, sensibility, thinking. )

I . J . G. l lenlcr. Volll Erkcnm·n und Elllplindcn dcr ll1Cmchl1chcn Sec le . In : l lcrdcrs

Sarnmtl ichc Wcrkc. Ed1 1cd by v. !\. Suphan. Vol . 'i, Berlin 1 892 , p. 1 97 . 2 . lbiJ. , p . 2 0 1 .

X I X . LANliUl\l}E AN! l REASUN

I 23 . Mark-tlw11ght in hcing-historirnl manner

What lies , tlwuglu being-historically, in the inter/Jretation of the word as mark' .

, M. \· .· . . . 'f . l I fi l . l f' c i ngness ,1r vs1gn-s1gn-s1gn1 ymg: name y r 1c spcci c o 11cct as sue l. '

as ohj ecrivity of the represcnting-hy-scrting-heforc. Prescncing . I · I l l k l f "T h" · tl , sense of ,.inguage anL worL row:irL s now edge 0 ohjecrs- rut 111 H:: • ,,

rhe correcrness of representarion. A lso here "language" grasped "logical ly -

Ex-pressing-by-saying about beings as ser-hefore, ser object . N ot only from ''<m­

i mal economy," hut in one with this from the trad i t iona l interpreration of be­

ings as such .

I 24. Mark-inner word and dialogue

To note to oneself .rnmcthing as that and that-saying to oneself, speak i ng with

oneself-self to itself ( Plato )-monologue , in it beings as such-speak i ng as say­

ing ->"to oneself, " i.1 already saying to . . , .1/1caking with .

1 25 . A/1ing and imitating

lmi t :H ing--"Ohm"-me:m1re. To measure accordingly, to take some t h i ng as memurc for "itself," that is, something as this and, that is, for +-i tself. To adapt

"oneself' to anorher as one such. Aping-"abo thus"-without taking "as such" onesel f and having i t for one­

self; "apish"-without "self-determinarion." Mimicking-after only where se1f-standingness 1

1 26 . Origin of language : The question of the origin m question of the essence

I . The respective range of the project of the essence-proj ect of the real m of the essence, humans-:m im:d rationale.

2. The sri/mlation of the conditions of cs1encing-l:mguage "medium," "rods for erecting."

- -----------

1 2 7 1 27 . Ti IE ONE /\ N i l Tl lE OTHER

3 · The de t . · . l l · t • vhole of beings. c rm 1natron of these conditions t lcmse ves m rne \

( Be i ngs ( ) 1 l - t le luman being)

&ing - I d " . unl ersran mg of bemg Clearing Being [Seyn] Be ing-there

animal economy

1 beingness as objectivity

the being-historical fore-leap into the essence of the word

The being-historical fore-lea/> into the de-cision of the in-between as clearing of the carrying-out of the reply and strife .

O n which "single point" docs Herder search for the origin of language ? ( 3 5 , 45) In the mark-formation . Tone as sign-rwtcd for something that is noticed . Something as something-to become acquainted with ! But Herder does not

� � search for the under­stand ing of being, he does not search!

The "-- ,, l " • " u 1 1 u "

. as Cleanng : as and for. . This open space-The "freedom" for the "as"-n-qua-"as"-such, which-t el, quel,-"relative."

" The origi n is not yet found, but only the />lace of what has s/irung, something

that has sprung" found , where something of the essence of language visible.

*

The agreement of the human being "with himself'-cf. language-as "medium" and "rod for erecting . "

1 27 . The one and the other Jiroject of the essence of language

1 . Herder's and metaphysics's project of the essence: so that the known human being be what he is------distinction .

2. Being-historically : so that first the essential ground becomes question-worthy and everyth ing be appreciated and grounded in its ground-de-cision . That which is ours i s something completely other-and a s long as we are

onl y lurking for instructions, information, new points of view, we belong to the hitherto.

------- · -

XIX. LANGUAGE AND REASON

1 28 . Language-the word

1 . The reification of language and of languages. ,, a) How and how many with this to be investigated scientifically in manY re spec ts.

h) How manifold the respects, according to which language can be meta-physicaHy explained.

. . do-2. The establishment of language as discourse as means for esrabhshmg the.

· f b · d h f b · P · er ·md un-mgs o emgs an t e priority o the human being as su iect . ow '

potency of discourse. 3 . The al ienation of language with regard to beings as such ( that is, with ��­gard to the still ungrounded and unexperienced truth of being [des Seyns · 4. The decision towards the essence of the word from the essencing of bemg [des Seyns] .

1 29 . The experience of the word

Nor the perception of "words" as objects, but the journey into the attuneme nt and mood.

Which and how? Tl · h · 1 · ·

· f h d l · · · , ·e in the clear-iat m t e st encmg mtonatton o t e wor -t le ms1stenc ing executes itself. And "language" and its essence and unessence hitherto ?

L

APPENDIX

SEMINAR MINUTES

-------·

... / �-..{

--------------------------

] '' Class

The c1uest ' f l · f l T l , v 1rd "language" . ion o t us class is ahout the essence o anguage. 1e \ ( is equivo . l · - . . . . l ' 1 . k ' , 1u rselves what ci ' we must hrst recogmze ns equ 1voca tty 1y ,1s mg l we think about the word "language ."

f LangL · , · . . f 1 . · i · utterance o t<1ge is u tterance. The dercrm 1narwn o angtuge ' s thoughts i . I . . · l l · . . Thought sound, n sounL s is common. The marks arc given wit 1 t 11s . ' . utterance � l · . l l , . . , r ime the realm 111

. or .inguage 1n a narrnw sense, anL at t 1e s,1mc which langL . . I . I L · h ' . . ·e "Xt' sts only where

. . tage occurs 1s L eten11meL : anguage 111 t is sens � ·

thinking oc . , . l curs, ,1n1ong 1L11nans. Language is expression. When rhe arr h istorians rnlk about language of forms, they mean l anguage in the broad meaning of expression, without thought and sound as necessary marks .

We also talk about language when w e really mean the ability to speak-like �hen we say that somebody lost his speech. His capacity to express thoughts IS temporarily interrupted, without him stopping to think.

We mean a special k ind of speaking when we rnlk about Goethe's language; -a certain way to use words and word constructions.

We are asking for the essence of language as the unity of the determinations of that whi ch we know as that which is asked about. The question concerning the essence of language depends upon the mode and manner in which we start w it h that which is interrogated, -so that the return to the uniformity of the determinat ions is conditioned by what we understand as language from the be­ginning.

We a re asking after the essence as the ground , apx11, origin of language. Our questioning moves thus in rhe amb igui ty rhar already l ies in the word "origin": it means origination and origin of the essence at the same time-that wherein language is grounded.

The question concerning rhe essence of language is a rheological question.

It is first asked in a properly philosophical manner-as the question of the ori­gin-, where the h uman being becomes questionable ro himself, where the hu­man be ing is no longer creature, hut has become suhiectum. That happens first in the 1 7'h and l 8r 1 1 centuries.

The philosophy of language was essentially founded by three thinkers, po­ets and writers: Hamann, Herder and Humboldt. Herder can be regarded as Hamann's student; both have influe!lccd Humboldt. All three with their ques­tion concerning the esse!lce of lallguage arc in d iscussion with the French En­lightenment. In connection with rhe philosophy of language, a comparative science of lallguage based on phonetics and grammar arose, which entered

I 3 1

)

[ 3 2 SEMINAi\ M J N I JTJ:S

phi lology. The rransir ion from the phi losoph icd quesr ioning after the origin of language to the historirnl i nvestig;i t ion unicern ing i ts origi nat ion i n the pos i t ive exact science took place later. A physiology of the speec h organs and a psychology of language arose-in rhe service of the h isrory of language and iml i rccrly derermined rhrough i t hy the phi losophy of l a nguage, in w h i c h ,i ll language research is grounded.

Why docs the language research take place based on phonetics and gram­

mar? That which is sonorous and scriptura l is foremost access ible as thar w h ich

is physical in language. First i n Creek phi losophy, with Plato and A ristor l e, the

consideration of language as ypciµµu or <jloivn cnwavn KTJ and <j>u)VTJ µETCx <jlav­nxcrim; is established-as ;mnouncemenr, which a i ms ar somet h i ng, w h ich means someth i ng; as tone, sound , with w h i c h something appears , that srnnds with it i n a pec u l iar relat ion, that of meani ng.

What appears with the <Pu)Vll, whm i t a i ms for, is that which i s properl y heard , VlJ TW<X. <jlulVTJ and voriµa are related to one ;mother i n mea n i ng. The sound meam that which is properly he;ird-the mea n i ng means an object, a being.

The begin n i ng point of language as someth i ng, which i s decided in gram­

mar and logic , rub, Western th ink ing up to its compl et ion by H egel and N ietz­sche. For horh rhinkers Lmguage i s an affa i r of logic i tse l f and nor obj ecr of es­sen tial question i ng. Language is rea l l y not rakcn seriously,-ir is o n l y garment of the concept.

The next task of this c lass is now to ask aga i n in an origi n a l manner for the essence of language hascd on Herder's wri t i n g "Uber d e n Urspru n g de r Spracl i c , " 1 which appeared in 1770. I n this wri t i ng J-lerdcr asks: Is rhe origin of language a d i vine one ' Was i t placed i n the human being w i th h i s cre­at ion !-Or did the human being i n vent language ? Docs it belong to rhe h u ­m a n heing h y nature ? O r does language develop i tself accord ing t o naru re ar a certa in s J agc of the evol ut ion of the human hei n g 1

A lfred Franz ( Fa l len in Russ ia 1 94 1 )

1 . I lcrder, Uher den Urspn111g der Sprachc· . Frnm the prize es"IY awarded hy the lkrl m

i\c:idcmy o f the Sc ic l ll l'..., in 1 770. ALcordmg t o t h e -..ccond rcvi�ed edit ion pu hl i:-.hcd in Berl in i n

l 7H0. In : 1 lcrder\ Ausgew;d i l re Werke 1 11 drei ll:indc·n. Edited w i t h an i ntroduction hy Adnlf

Stern. Le1p:1�;: Vc-rlag Pl 1 1 l ipp Rec lam. n .d . , t h ird v\llume . !'I'· 6 1 0-70 1 . �mce th h cd i t ion, wh ich I- fc1dc�:�:cr tlWrH:d a'> a per1.,nnal copy, 1 :-. -.;carccly acce.-.sihlc today, the

rage l l l l l l l hcr1i of l- Ierdcr\ trca ri.-.c ;Hl' c i ted according to Bernhard Suplun\ edi tion: HcrJcr, A h�

handlung 1d1er den U"pnmg dcr Sprache, which w:h awarded t h e prize e.st:d1l ishcd hy the Royal

Academy of the Sc·rcnces Im the year ol 1 770. In: Herders S>un m r l i c h c Wcrkc. Edited by B. S11ph:1n. l\crlin l il1J l . h l t h volume, pp. 1 - 1 54.

1 3 3

2'"1 Class \V'e start d Proach the e��lt from language, which we fi nd among beings. In ,;uch an <ip­ily dependent

en t i a l determi nation of that wh ich we are ask ing for is neccssar­lvan r to ;1sk ab

llPon wha t we mean in advance with the question. We do nor

language i . our hinguagc i n a hroad scnse-hmgungc of forms-hut to place \ h · h

n a rela t · . . . . 1 . " 11 1c we find . 10n to rhe h uman hemg. Starrmg from the h uman anguage, comes de� l in nature, we develop a schema of this being. In doing so it be-. «r t lat t} . · I · · . l 1ngs thernseJ v . .

1 15 nemg-language-srands i n an essentwl rclanon fll 1c-11Di l ity of es. I n language we always mean a being. From this resu l ts the pos-

. llndcrst· 1 · l essence of bcin : <lnl mg la nguage nor from the human being, but from t 1e

lhe sound gs. Bur the rela ti o n of language to bei ngs is nor evident. We say:

lh rneans . l , · .

. . .

e sound . d 1e1 11g. Wh a t docs rhar mea n ? Is 1r rhe same when we s.iy. ls a sig r l If We take

n ior a 'lci ng? th langu ·1g'' . . . t. .

r 1 l . e 1nore ge ' � ,1s expression o . . . , sign ror . . . , r 1cn we 1<1ve again

t nera l con . f. l ) . l o separate cept o a nguagc as language of forms from w uc 1 we want Understand ·oursel ves. Bur now whar i s the h uman language ? The traditional h ing tak , . l . . . l f t e human l· cs t l ls more genera l concept of language as the u111versa o

(swov A.6yovd�1guagc. The h uman being is th tb the an imal that has language Th exov). e quest · the questio

ion concerning the essence of the human language is coupled wi th <l n concern · } .

-.

. . ·

etermined th mg r le e.)Se!lcc of the human bemg. But this 1s of course gets thus into .

rough language. The question concerning the essence of language e I c1 circ le w,, ·i • · · l I k · 1 I 0 ' · · r y mean } · � ' re ti ymg ro a, vance 1Y as · 1 11g w 1at l oes "oyrn; p rop-. !ere. A.€y£ ,, . in such a w· f

1 v means to gar her, to read. In langu;ige we gather ohJecrs ti . c1y t iat th;, g·1rh • · · l · · B l · l · na t i s contai , . . · '

e rmg 1s a r t ·1e smnc rune a saymg. ur r ·11s gat iermg . ned I l l h11gt1 · 1 · · 1 1 " l · k · " L guage 1s there{, ' ' ge is w iat we mean w 1en we s;1y t 1m · 1 11g. an-

tion of the ,

. ore u nderstood douhly, i t is th inking and saying. The derermin:i-

h essence of 1 • l . l . . t us sorner} . t le 1unia 11 1C1ng as an anmwl rhat has l :ingu;ige, means l ing tw >fi I I Tl l The re l · r ·

( 0 l ; ic wman heing is the :in imal rhar s<iys and rhinb. I .

d ion o f t f . 1 . I . 1es conceal ·d . . . l<l t w i 1 c 1 is sonorous (sa ying) to heings ( thinking) thus h 1 e 1 1 1 th i s d • t . · · f 1 ' · 1· t e negi n . · t en11 1 1ianon o t Jc essence of the human oema rom d n ing of West ' l ' · k ' l l "' ua lity in d , I

· ern t 1 11 i · mg-a nl t iat i n an unresol ved m;mner. This le l ctcnn i · · { I also makes .

n a rio n o t le essence of the h uman being rules and now . possible wh·n l ·' t ' 1 , I , . . " I ·1 l · 1 " I . ence of J·ir ' " e r l e ve ops a s p 1 1 osOf1 1y of anguagc anl sci-' iguage. ' We want to . . . . dsccrtam wll 'lt I-lei· I , " · · · · · l l I · concernin , } . . . ' l e r s pos1non is wit 1 rcgarL to t ie question g t ie ongm of hng . ' , l I " . . -r1 I l . l . Vented Ian , .

' u,igc . n l ls ,111.,wer: 1e 1uman 1Clllg ias m-f l- gudge as rariol1'il l , · ( ·( 34) L/ I . . o t 1e ment · . I ' K mg c · P· , 1 en er stands 1 11 the nuddle 1 i o 1 i cl problem F . l . anguage ti . . .

· or we saw t iar reason 1s alw<iys at rhc s;1mc rime I

' 1at ts, that rcas (t l . k ' . ) . . anguage. · 011 1 1 11 l l lg is < 1 necessary part of the whole of

1 34 SE1'vt!NAJ( MlNl ITES

Humboldt sees this problem in the following form: "The human be i ng is

only human through language; but in order to invent languag<: he would al­

ready have to he human."2 From this it would follow that language cannot be invented. Humboldt says therefore, language has heen placed in the huma n be­ing. What would Herder say to this? We must ask what "inventing-by-fin d ing " really means here. This question as partial question must first b e placed in its occasion. This was offered hy SLif3milch's writing: "Beweis, daf3 der Ursprung der Sprache giittlich sci" ( 1 766) . 3 This occasion already indicates to us exter­nally that Herder takes a position in his writing regarding a certain trad it ion of Western thinking. But by bringing language into connection with reason , he still remains completely biased i n favor of the trad ition of Western think­

ing in a broader sense precisely in his discussion of the thesis of the divine ori­gin of language. He takes language as logical-exactly like Western thinkers up to and including Hegel and Nietzsche.

Also for him the human being is the animal rationale, the rational animal . Herder is thus pushed to interrogate the essence of the human being in c on­

trast with that which appears in the animal as linguistic. He starts out from that which is sonorous. This question as the proper question of the origin suggests how Herder understands "origin." Origin is to be taken as life that emanates.

Herder's concept of language is unclear. In the statement "Already as ani­mal the human being has language" ( Herder, ibid. , ed. Suphan, p . 5) he means by language the animal sounds, while in the sentence: "The human beings are the only language creatures that we know . . . " (cf. p. 2 1 ) , language is under­<>tood as what befits only the human being. But this lack of clarity is not deci­sive. Rather what is decisive is that which is asked for as essence of the human language. This can only be attempted by postulating the being of humans as "reflective animal," as Herder's designation reads.

Beforehand we ask after other possih i l it ics to determine the essence of the human being. The human being as "God 's l ikeness." This appears to be an en­tirely different determination of essence. But G od is A,oyoc;, reason. The essence of the human being is thus likewise determined from reason, which-as we saw-i<; somehow grounded in language. Only the relation of A-oyoc; to the hu­man being seems to be a different one and must be discovered in that which is understood as l ikeness. In our context, such an investigation would go too far.

We pose the fundamental question whether the essence of the human be-

Z . W. v. I Iumholdr, Uher das vcrgle ichende Spracli>tud ium i n Re2ichung auf die vcr­sch1cdcnen Epochcn der Sprnchentwicklung. In: Die sprachph i losophischcn Wcrkc Wilhelm's

von l l umholdt. Edited and expbined hy Dr. I-1. St c int lrnl . Berl i n I 88 3 , p. 1 5 I . l . J . l'. S1iflmilch, Vcrsuch cincs Bewciscs, dafl d ie crstc Sprache ihrcn Ursprung nicht vom

Men..,chen, �ondcrn ;1 1 l c in vom Schi)rfr r crhaltcn hahe, in dcr acndcmi-;chen Vcrsammlung vorgc� le sen und wrn I lnick tihergchcn. Berl in I 76r1.

----------

)"" CLASS 1 3 5

ing can b , l . . , W I · ,h] ight a few ex-

1 e c etermtned otherwise rhan as from A.oyoc;. e Hg

l I . , . amp es "TI h . I I · " " he ·1nirna t iat uses t I

· le u man being is the an imal with ianc s, t ' oo s. ''

Georg Schmiege

ya Class

After we I I . . . f h , k · J of question­

. lac given m the l '' c lass a general overview o t e me

. I mg and a . . . d · 1 , II · t · penphern scertame that a proper science of language-wtt!l a 1 s . areas· ph . l f I , eding phi­!

· onettcs, etc.- had developed first on the grounc o t ie prec f osophy of language of the 1 8'" century, we tried ro determine the concept 0

language I I . . · II c n ·1 double more c osely in the second class anc came 1111t1a Y up 1 ' sense of ''[- ,,

" anguage at that t ime: l , Mani fest·it · · 1 " " " ' ton in genera , announcement : 2. Verbal Ia . nguage m a narrower sense, In th is sen h h b . . . . b . I h· . I· aae The dou-se t e u man emg is the ! tvmg emg w 10 dS angu, "' , . ble meanin f , , " 1 . ,, d " " · · d with Herder li1 g o "'oyoc; as c 1scourse an reason is m1rrore the concept pair "ratio" and "oratio. " He is s ituated thus within a Western way of th inkin I · I f I· · k ' r Stil l with g, w 11c 1 grasps the essence of language rom t l ln mg. Hege l an I N · h . l J , t i the hu-e tetzsc e logic takes over language. Language ie ongs c man being in such a way that it d istinguishes him as human. Three fundamen­tal poss ibi l i ties for the origin of the human language thus result with that: I . from the animal nature of the human being, 2, as gift of God 3, from the rati�nal essence of the human being. Herder thus says, the human being was ahle to and had to invent language him­self. We wi l J st i l I show how a certain metaphysical conception of the essence of the human being and the perfection of his natural equipment underlies the Herderian approach.

A l l considerations of language h itherto rested on the characterization of the human being as l;;tj)ov A.oyov iixov. But perhaps this determination is not at all so self-evident ? Perhaps we can succeed i n grasping the essence of language more originally i n a d ifferent way.

"The h u man bei ng has language"-against this we advance the statement: "The word has the human being. " In a purely formal manner this is a mere re­

versal ; yet i t is c lear that "word" and "have" here have a different meaning that is to be c larified first.

With this it shall be suggested that we strive for a more original relationship

regarding the word-not in the sense of new scientific insights into language, rather the approach of the trad it ional philosophy of language is nothing self-

--

SEM INJ\R M I N UTE-;

ev ident for us. It determined the human being w i t h the pred icate " lan­guagc."-Languagc i s something that i s precisel y a lready and that i s then sub­sequently determined further. Rut with this such philosophizing itself becomes something subsequent .

Let us pursue first the k ind of quest ioning in Herder! Two statements that indicate the ambiguity in his posit ion were a lready picked out .

l . "Already as animal the human being has language" ( p . 5). Result ing from this: 1 . The human being is animal; the rece ived defin i t ion "homo est animal

rationale" is reminiscent here. 2 . There is for Herder an animal language; he has a very broad concept of

language.

3. Language is not verbal language here. The resounding in sensations i n the animal is language for Herder because i t i s a self-expressing, a man­i festing, is communication that is d i rected to a certai n c i rc le of activity and to s imi lar beings. The resound ing chord on the contrary has no "sonorous character"; i t utters nothing ;md has in this sense n o language.

I s t l i i <; concept of language something entirely d ifferent from the concept of the human language or is there s t i l l a unity here anyway! This must become a problem for us. Namely Herder's other statement reads:

I I . "Human beings arc for us the nnly c reatures endowed with language that

we know. They distinguish themselves thus through language from al l an­imals" (p . 2 1 ) . The unity of both of these statements must result from the whole of the trcati-;c.

In the [ '' section of the I'' part , Herder speaks about the language of the :mim:1ls, imofor as i t is also the language of the h uman hcing. H e rder knows a "language of nature" (p . 7 and 8) . The animal istic in the human being is here cilled a "nature" in the broader sense.

Thi<; animal language therefore is "manifesrmion," "sonorousness," "com ­munication." Herder docs not say that i n order tll do animal psychology, b u t w i t h reg:ml to the intent o f the first t w o sect ions: to determine w h a t is com­n m n l l l human and animal with regard to language and to contrast i t with what is specifica l ly human-and this again: in relat ion to other contemporary a t ­tempts to explain the development o f t h e human l anguage from t h e animal i n ­terj ect iom and vowels. In opposit ion t l l this, Herder shows that vowels reach farther t han script s igns, that their statu'i a s sounds is only ent i rely imperfect ly c1pt urcd in the written language, here poorly suggested by Spiritus and com­pletely lacking in 1-lcbrew, for example. The vowels arc not the "roots," but the '\:1p-." that enliven language (Cf. p . 9). The mere "resound ing i n sensat ions"

fol lows so to speak a "natural law of a sentient machine" ( p . 1 7 ) . The human language i'i therefore dist ingu ished in terms o f qual i ty from t h a t

o f the :mirnal ; it c a n therefore also have only a non-animal ist ic ground of or i -

----------------

) '' ' ' Cu\,;,.; 1 3 7 gin . For H , l l .

I l f · this· The question e re er, t 1C princ iple uf rhe approac l resu ts Hllll · . rnusr be r·1 · . , l I

. l 1 1 . n bein" But this d. . < tsel on t H: dist inctiun he tween ;1n1ma anL H l llld ,., .

Lst incti · . · lf - · t- the essence and

_ _ on ts i tse noth ing other th<m the detennmatton ° · ·

origin l f I · , . . I - _ I , -nrt Herder at

fi 1 dnguage. Su as not to cause a circle ng 1t h orn t 1e s ' ' rst tries to d e te rmine the d istinction without considering language.

. Seen , , 1 1 . . . I , f I , · · t inct in anmwl d

externa y an investigation on t 1e essence o t le ins an h urnan fol lows now.

The cha racte rization of the animal occurs in a double manner: �· through the sphere , the circ le, which belongs to every l iv ing heing, · through the law of inverse proportion .

. . Herder says, "Every animal has its c ircle to which it belongs from i ts btrth, enters i m , j · . l . l . . . 1 . - 1 l 1 · ." ( 22 ) We will snl l · mec i <1te y, 111 w 1 1c h it remains ite ong anL l ies P· ·

see th"t tl · - · . 1 . . - · 1 1 · -] I ' !1-i' ves · 11-e some-u l l s is not t 1e spatwl c ircle ot rhe anima , to w 1 1c l t 1c l · ' how "tai lored" subsec1uently hut the drives themselves co-determine fi rst what " . I . ' l l ctrc e" means here: Both is one. In this manner the c ircle is organizeL accorL ' ing to the d r i v es into food- , prey- , enemy-, sex- and soc iety - c i rcle. (Cf. Uexk " ll ' "B · 1 ll s 10 ogie der U mwelt". ) 4 But the idea of t h e l ife c ircle is already a fundamental idea in the Leibnizean mona<lology. Herder becomes herein the mediator for Goethe and Schell ing.

The law of inverse proportion is added secondly to the idea of the sphere: The wider the l ife circle, the more scattered and uncertain arc the abil ir ies of a. l iving being. One example : The spider-narrow l ife c ircle and great instinc­tive secur i ty in ir . But the eagle-we ask-does he not see much farther and nonetheless sharper! Yet what docs "farther" mean here ? Lcr us remember that the "circle" i s not meant spatially 1 Perhaps the eagle is bl ind to must of what is visible on earth . The c i rcle is indeed determined hy the interest . I n this sense the fly be longs in the c i rc le of the spider, but is no part of i r . The circle is norh­ing quan t i ta t ive and nothing thing-l ike.

All these determ inations are thought and applied from the point of view of the h u m an be ing. Fundamentally we know, l ike v. Uexhil l also emphasizes, very l ittle ahout the animal and irs c ircle . Herder has in m ind the concept of the sphere more intui tiVL'ly wi thout outl i ning it in a conceptually precise rnanner.

We pursue the treatise further. Herder says: "According to all l ikelihood and analogy al l art ific ia l drives and artific ia l abi l i t ies can be explained in terms of the powers of representation of the ani mal . _ . " (p. 2 1 ) .

But: Can drives have their origin i n representations-generally rheoretical capacit ies in pract ical ? In order to decide rhis, we would first have ru know whar

4. J . v. lJcxkli l l , Umwelt und lnnenwel t dL·r Tien .. · . 211'1, l'Xpanded and !lnprovcd editinn. Rerlin 1 92 I .

SEMINAR M I N l J'fl'S

Herder means by "representations." The mentioned statement does not srand

afrer the reference to the law of inverse proport ion by accident. H erder th inks

of the obj ectification of the c ircle as a represent ing, hut docs not reach thu s the height of the Lcihnizcan concept of the unity of pcrceptio and appe t irus : per­

ccptio, which i n i tself is a lready appetitus, and appetitus, which as such is al­

ready a represent ing appeti tus. The determ ination of the l i fe c ircle through representation enables He rde r

t o cross over t o t h e human l i fe c i rc l e-on ly here representa t ion become s thinking, that i s , "reflective awareness," t h a t i s , reason .

The law of inverse proportion is a lso appl ied to the language of the animal.

Apmt from the "sonorousness" of the "sentient machine" there is a lso an ani­mal language as "dark sensible agreement of an animal species a mong i tself concerning their determination, in the c i rc le of their activities" (p. 24 ). The human heing lacks such an inst inctual language completely.

The second section of the treatise proceeds into a determ ination of the essen c e o f the human heing. The human heing is n o t bound t o a determinate sphere: He is unbound, has freedom. Expressed d ifferen tly: The sphere of the human hcing is-everything. He is i nterested i n everything. S ince the h uman bei ng is set in the greatest circle, h is capac i ties arc scattered. Herder points to the helplessness of the newborn and the great d isproportion between i ts a b i l i ties and needs. This contradicts nature, which equips a l l l iv ing bei ngs accord i ng to "reason and fa irness." The old metaphysical statement stands in rhe back­ground here: Omne ens est honum (perfcc tum ) . This view carries the further l ine of proof. Because Herder conc ludes in the fo l lowing manner: Therefore the gap must he fi l led through such a characreristic that enables the human be­ing to subsist in the great c irc le. This characteristic must he just as m u c h the came of the lack as wel l as of its overcoming.

This characteristic is the "reflect ive awareness"-in a pure ly formal man­ner: the facu lty of reflection; for Herder: the conscious "d isposit ion" of the pow­ers; reflection, having consciousness of something, that is, reason in the sense of the Leihnizean morwdological conception- therefore a lso understood by Herder as "reflex ion"-, a concept that starting with Leibniz moved i n to the Kantian transcendental phi losophy: reflexio as thought, which does not con­cern objects, hut the relation of the powers of representation between one an­other.

Heinz Maeder

I 39 4 ' " Cu\:-;:-;

4'" Class The then , f , l , t f rhe proof of the " 1e 0 our last i nvest igation was Herder s Jcvc opmc n ° .

nece · . l · · t' n ot laiwuage. We i: ssary genetic ground" (p . 2 7 ) of the luman ong1m1 10 "'

iol lowc I h ' l l l l I . h . l t ts L eve opmen r under r ircc respects 'Y 2. l av'.ng ou t l ined Herder's approach in a schematic fashion,

laving w I l . 3 h . 0r <ec our the mer hod of proof, . . · av1ng a ·k ,J f . I . l .· · which susrams

l- · s e a ter the fundamental rnetap 1ys1ca posttton, ..,..IherJer's quest ion concerni ng the origin nf langu;1ge. l , 1 e suffi . · 1 . . . . d I · . , ·J · ng threac 1or

h ic 1ent c 1stmct1on between anunal an wman is gut 1 . . t e three v1· , . . . . . f. l . . , , of the ongm of l ewpomts. With this the determ1 11at1011 o t le essence

anguag · . . . 1 . d ' · · ·hed from the . e is given: the human being, insofar as le 1s 1stmgu is a111111aL Th·it · l . . ! . . f l , . l tl1·1t leads from h ' gi ves at t Jc same tune an II1L 1cat1on o t 1e pelt 1 ' t e begin · l · The ll'lth f 1 · n mg point-language-to rhc origi n-the human 1e1 11g: ' '

0 tne questi · · · 1 · · l · · p·1th For the . . . onmg concerning the origin of anguage 1s a c ircu ,11 ' •

on gin is ti l · l l · ' · I · 1 • forth as I.

le grounL of the essence of language, t iat w 11cn I t xmg:> anguage ti . h . l . l . . l " I l 't "111 in-1tion of 1 ' ldt w 1c l 1s xought forth 1s m rurn t le esscnnc1 c c cl ' tnat wh · ' l

1 icn irings forth. · HerJer c'1 •1 . . · l . l I " ! ·k . · · t,l , · iu1·ecmcnr of 1 , r,1ctcnzes r le an1 1na a nguage as a L ai scnst ' e ' ,.,

an. an im al spec ies among i tself concern ing its determination, in the circle

of I ts ·1c t ' · " ( 2 ) f t. l t. l , ·1!1innl-' 1v1ty p. 4 rnm the determination o t ie essence o t 1e ' ' the bei ng-one with the c i rc le . 2 · The second step of the investigation proceeds to the hulllan being and his c i rc l e. The human being is set in the "great ci rc le," which in opposit ion to the "one" of the animal is the "everything" that scatters and thus weakens the orienting sensib i l i ty .

. Herder shows the d isproportion between the determination of the human bemg for the great c ircle and his sens i b i l ity, which is clouded precisely bernuse of t h is Jetermination, through the example of rhe newborn child. On rhe one hand, he sheds l ight on rhe i nsec urity of the newborn from the disproportion betwee n c i rc l e capac ity and c irc le, and on the other hand, from rhe compar­ison with the a n imal secured by the order and u n i ty of its circ le. The finding of a d isproportion between dcterlll inat ion am! capac i ty of the ncwh,irn resul ts from Herder's pos i t ing the c h i ld as human-an imal rarionale-, since other­wise the absence of language, of the determ i nation of the essence of the hu­man being, could nor be seen as a want. "By n a tu re" and, that is, in this case: from the u n ity of c irc le anJ capacity the human being, l ike the animal, has no language. The sound language, which rhc a n i lllal that is born mute has "by nature," does not come into considera tion for the stand ing in the circle as a n a ture based on powers of representat ion. For that "sonorous nature" stands o u t as one that is pure l y animal istic frolll the one based on powers of repre­sentation.

SEMINAR M r N u-n:s

From the v iewpoint of the animal rationale the child appears endangered in its language. Ir stands with its undeveloped powers in the completely devel­oped c irc le . Bur s ince i t is determined for th i s c i rcle, the developmental con­d itions for stand ing in i t must he given in rhe chi ld , into whose developme n t i t must h e ahle ro find its way ahout. The example o f the newborn ind icates i n an espec ial ly d istinct manner the necessity of language for securing the subs is­

tence of the human being, and the determination of the human be ing for the great c ircle shows for i ts part that th i s securing of subsistence i s g iven , i f o n ly undeveloped.

The comparison with the animal also indicates that c ircle and capacity must he unified for the subsistence of the l iv ing creature. At the same t i me, i t le ts see that there is no entitlement to assume, that a nature that protects a n d se­cures the animal, has created the human being, to let h i m deteriorate.

In summary, i t should he said: It is necessary on three grounds to find t he

middle l ink of the d iverging and d isordered relat ions between c i rcle and c irc le

capacity in the newborn and to set this d isproportion in a right measure: I . From the posit ing of the newborn as animal rationale, in which the d iscov­

ery of the middle l ink is already set. 2. From the comparison with the secured animal . 3 . From the fundamental assumption that the creature is to be secured by the

unity of c ircle and c i rcle capaci ty. Afrer this comparative characterization of animal and human that leads to

the ground of the origination of language under the assumption of a mea n i ng­fu lly creating nature, we now stand before the l ine of proof i tself. Herder sees two possibi l i t ies for undertaking it: One option is to attribute a "language-cre­ative capacity" (p. 26) to the human being by a sudden "leap" over what h as heen shown unt i l now and thus to re linqu ish a proper proof. The second pos­sihil ity would he to proceed further by developing on the ground of the prepara­tory characterization of anim;il and human, that is, under the assumption that "gaps and wants cannot he the characteristic of a species" ( ibid . ) , to search fur­ther for the essence of the human being in the same. Herder decides for the second, the "genetic" line of proof.

I . The structure of the proof Herder searches for the connecting l ink of c i rcle and c i rcle capac ity i n the in­dicated lacks and wants. The germ for the overcoming of the incapaci ty seen

in animal and in child i s to be found on the ground of the determination of the

human being for the great c ircle and under the assumption of an ordered na­

ture. Insofar as i t is found in this incapaci ty, which indeed represents an essen­

tial consequence of the determination of the human being for the great c i rc le,

i t i s an endowment of nature correspond ing to the instinct of the animal .

4 ' " CL"""

Herder d 't . . l 1 1 , manner: once as

cau e ermmes this endowment of nature tn a c ou 1 e _ . ,

se of th , · . I I · rerrn tor its over-

corn· e tncapac1ty and a t the same time as a c eve opmg g h

mg in d · 1 . 1 · · f the human e-

ing t ie m1c st of th is impotency. The ueterm marion ° I

or the g · l I l · 1 · · 1bsist (of the 1u-

m b . rear c zrc e is the cause of his wants, t ie a 11 1ty to sL . . ,_

an e ing) . h . Tl , Jetern11nat1on s

ab· 1 · 111 t e great c ircle the germ for its overcoming. 1e

l ity to sub . . . . is the human

b · , sist -to say it in advance: the reflecnve awareness- .

e1ng s dist" . h . Lj distinguishes

h· mgu 1s mg characteristic conformable to nature. 1 e .

imself by th· · I . f -l . . ·t' res but also m is c 1aractenstic not only in terms o c egrees 01 s dg · '

terms of I . d f W

<_zn rom the animal . .

1 ere It to appear that the use of the reflective awareness or reason is the de-

ve 0Pmen t f b · f \- 1 nguage 15

b 0 ver al language , then that is the genetic proo t iat a .

rought forth f , h · · · l that reflective

rom tne nature of the human emg-precise Y awarenes · . l

b · "h " ·eflective

, 5 as a nguage ground . Insofar as the human e1 11g as 1

awareness l · · . l c1pacity

h as connecting l ink of the equation of c etenn111anon anc ' ' '

e also sp k b - 1 h' 1 · s given

h . ea s Y nature . Nevertheless he must invent anguage, w ic 1 1

to 1m by · h · l · t ·s rolded in nature 111 such a way; for at first only t e capacity t 1'1 t. 1'

correspond . h 1 . h · uiurse of

h s to t e completely unfolded circle. !nsig 1t 111to t e mner .

�- e proof is necessary in order ro see the determim1te particular sense of this

invent ' " f 1 ion o anguage.

B t l l ! ! . Method o f proof

y 0 owing the characterization of the hum<ll1 being as well as by micing the

str,�

cture of the proof it becomes clear that the continu ity of the proof rests on

a lea p " w· h I d · 1- first

· tt out this leap, which we encountered a rea Y 111 t ie

superfic ial pursui t of Herder's approach as fore-leap into the essence of the hw

man b · 1 Id

emg anc) as pre-supposition of an ordered nature, Herder cou not carry

out a "genetic proof." He must already constantly make use of what he wants

to prove. For it becomes clear that with the presentation of the evidence for

the origin of language, because it "gives way to" the use of reason, the positing

of the hu ma n being as animal rationale guided the speci<1l Herderian view of

the determination for the great circle from the beginning. But this fore-leap

guid�s not only the production of the proof, but the whole discussion. The be­

gmnmg of the d iscussion about the animal is at the same time a reversal from

the fore- lea p and beginning of the investigative passage to it. The continuity

of this passage is only possible because it occurs along the guiding thread of

what is established in the fore-leap, namely, the origin of language in the hu-

man being. The peculiar way of this passage is that of the comparison. The view of the

fundamental sameness of what is compared guides the comparative approach

to the origin of language: They are l iving beings. This sameness is unity, which

is a t the same t ime ground of the difference. For the living beings are charac­

terized by the respective determination of their correspon�l ing capac ities. On

SEMINAi\ MJNI JT L-.;

the ground of the i mprint that is determined in their l ivel iness animal and hu­man being stand in a correspondence and allow a comparative characteriza­t ion of the ir essent ia l equipment.

But Herder leads the proof not on ly from the fore-leap i n to the essence of

the human being. This fore-leap has sprung out of a completel y determined

conception of nature: The determination of the l i ving beings, to be placed wi t h

capaci t ies in c i rcles , i s guaran teed b y a certain kind o f capaci t ies. The essent ial

equipment of l iving beings secures their subsistence . I ts correspondence is at t he

same time stand ing apart and accord: The rea lm of l i fe is ordered i n i ts s tages

and forms -the "household" of wlrnt i s a l i ve i s regulated . -The course of

Herder's proof, in which he demonstrates from the determination of the h u ­

man being how language follows essent ia l l y a s the abi l i ty o f this determ in at i on

to subsist, encompasses the assumption of the perfection of nature, or, as Herder

says, of the "general animal economy" ( p . 2 7 ) . Summary: Under the assum/Jtion o f the regulated household o f nature­

namcly of the equ ipment, regulation and preservation of its regions "accord­

ing to reason and fo i mess" ( ibid. )-Herder guides his prnof by fore-s/Jringing into the essence of rhe human being.

I l l . The fundamental met;iphysical posit ion With the determination of beings i n general as perfect nature and their spec i a l determination a s l i vel iness, o f which a special case i s in t u rn reflect ive aware­ness as the determinat ion of the essence of the h uman be ing, Herder stands within the rrad it ion of Western metaphys ics. Th is general fumlmnenrnl Wes t ­e rn pmition is grasped in t h e idea o f t h e l ife c i rcles a n d capac i t ies. I t represents

the refore Leibniz 's part icular fundamental pos i t ion wi th in Western meta­physic;-a!though this fundamental posi t ion is not retained i n i ts strong rnon­adological character in Herder's trearise. It even seems as if Herder would turn agai nst Leibn iz, for he characterizes rhe !llonad as egoist ic and isolated w i th re­g�1rd to the sentient communication in terms of the sound: "So l i t t l e has na­ture I . . . I created us a-; egoist ic monad s ! " ( p. 5 ) . Yet in no way d oes this stance bl ! out of the mtm�1dological fundament a l pos it ion . For the character of the 111onad is precisely not egoistic isolation, but isolat ion and openness i n a per­fectly certain way.

Leihniz grasps thl' !llOnad in the manner of the perceptio, which is isolat ing

in itse lf and is as appet itus at the same time thrust beyond i tself as something that is i solated. Bur this thrust is not empty and b l ind; rather i t i s d i rected to the unity that determines what is isolat ing and isolated-the central monad. As appetitus, the perceptio that is isolated in i tself is an original u n i fy ing, that is , the power that compe ls what i s isolated to be together with the determin­ing uni ty ( vis-force-( )ewalr ) . The perceptio is in i tself appet itus , that i s , as the isolating pu l l ing together i t is at the same time fore-grasping the determina-

1 43

tion that , . -I . . . Tl . . - I . .. ' t ·rist ic of the cross­

in 1 b enc roac 1es on the detennnung uruty. irs c i.u .ic e ·

. I Tl , g . e long . I . . , if the mon.1c . ie c 5 to t 1e essence of the percepno <IS a manner l . . rossing . . I , . . . . l 1- . _ 1 - · ing unihcat IOn

w· l <ls t 1e ongtnal-represent mg-hy-settt ng- ie me c i iv f I It l the l 't , . . . . . I I l ·· 1"- informed o t 1e

rn L e e nn mlllg unity is the hemg-urnhec , t ie iel l ,.., . .. l onad w · h I . . . . . . . . If

.. !· , f . 1 of the gene1 ,1

a 1 I t t l is . Tl1 1s hemg-umhed expresses 1tse m t ie 01 n . . greemer t . . -I I ·r from thell' re-

. 1 -correspondence-of the monads among eac l ot 1e 8Pecr · · tve v i ewpoint , . the p , , · . . I . I . · t hick into itself . erce 1vmg monad is therefore at t 1e same tnne t 11 us ' and open r l . . . I . · l . · . a ·-renresents-th • · .

ior t le ur nverse . Open lll the manner t 1,H lt l l l ll,..,S t . e un1ve1·s,, l f. · lf 1 . . · l I f. J · 1e11t·1l nower of rep-,

� 1e ore ttse accorc 1no to Its imp antec un .in ' ' I resenting f> , . . ,... · I f. l · . , . 1 1 vcr that is lee l

· '-epresentatlon 1 11 the manner of t ic unc .1ment,1 Pl ' t lrougl1 ti. l ' . t' l· f l· ·nnl 1x1wer · . . ne tne of v is ion is mirroring. The essence u t ie unc ,ime ' rs as a rep , . , .

I . l I . If 1 ·f · E ry s ingle monad

h · resent ing t 1at thrusts itself out leyunc nse : I e. ve ·

as the j1«,, r . k . l . · · · " l t've·ly mirror. The . 1 '-- iorce sun ·en into a c etenn1nate v tewpmnt-ts .i trnage d · · 1 . . Tl ·mks to the . lat ts mirrored in the looking-throug i is not mere copy. 1' ·

. .

dtmpl ant ed fundamental pllwer-the imprint of God's creative powcr-n is

riven () f I . . ! I 1 l · I l ' , f. · . · 11 The l t fc ut o r ·1e mtenor of the nlllnad anc ie c 111 t 1e me O v1s!ll · of this 1 · I · · I !· · · !· , 1non·1d is tve Y m irror is the seeing (lf the universe. n t 11s seemg t ie ' open for the exterior, hecaw;e this interior is as fundamenta l power that Joes not let that which stands in i rself he enough. Yet while by driving it out of it­self it l1(1JJ . · · I I I I . I · · I f" · ts \'1"·w11oint ' s It in sue 1 a nianner t 1at t iat w uc 1 1s m u-rorel r om I · �

stands on the ground of the being-unified of the monad with the nHll1<IS in uni­son with the mirroring and reflection of the collectinn of all monads. The monad represents in itself the unison of the world.

With this determinate structure of the monad: in the mirroring that is iso­l at ing representing-in-itself, striving for rhe original unity and the all , Leibniz

anticipates Kant's transcendental phi losophy. This springs over-knowing the world-each s ingle being and rhus secs it in the l ight of its being and its inner order. Kant's transcendenta l consc iousness knows hy foreknowledge of a world m w h ic h beings stand in Uod's productive knowledge. In the reproductive clearing of human knowledge it lets come forth the same beings in the appear­ance pecul iar for their manner of being.

Leibniz's monadology first provided the grnunding for the procedure in the Herderian treatise. By showing that under the assumption of a perfected na­ture an i ma l and human each as individual being within their l i fe relation cor­respond to it and to each nther because of their sameness as l iv ing beings, Herder works with analogies, to which Leibniz had given their metaphysical ground ing.

Herder's partic u lar stance within the received pnsitinn is the question um­cerning language. In the seemingly anti -Leibnizean remark in the intrnduction he grasps i t-even at the stage of the mere sensation-as understanding: "The strung chord does its natural duty: it sounds ! " (p . 5 ) -Leihniz characterizes the

SF.MINAR M INUl p.;

monad as windowless from the view of its same-directeduess and perspect iva l

distinction-fundamental ways i n which the rnonas i s present .-Herder de­

parts from the fact of heing- informed, whose m etaphysical ground remains un­

questioned .-Leibniz places the monad in such a manner that the respecnve

individua l and fore-grasping unified fundamental power is the metaphysical

ground of the informed heing of the monad as ever- i nd ividual . I t is only the

thesis of the closed character of the monad that offers in the course of its un ­

folding the widest room f o r the fact o f language as conununicarion, which

Herder gathers and can seemingly play out against that which is grounding ..

Henceforth we stand in the position from which rhe unfold i ng of the ori­

gin of language can itself he pursued in detail along the l ine of the questions:

1 . Of which essence is the characteristic that fi lls the init ial gap and disnn-

guishes the essence of the human being? . 2 . In how far is the use of the fundamental power in i tself a coming into bemg

of language ? 3 . What is understood hy language at this stage of the unfolding of the origin

of the human language ? El isabeth Schmidt

5'1' Class

In the 1 " section of his treatise, H erder has dealt with the animal language b y which h e addresses the tone of sensation. I n t h e 2 "c1 section Herder deduces the completely different language of the human being.

Herder's method in this presentation of the genesis of the h uman language

is that of analogy: Animal and human correspond to one another in a certain

respect, and the necessity of an essential characteristic of the human be ing

from which language originates results from this correspondence . Seen schematically the development of H erder's prescntmion is as follows:

Human and animal are both living beings and as such have their circle , in

which they are their entire l i fetime. But the human being is not an animal ,

rather of another k ind, must however he correspond ingly capable of subsisting

like the animal , that is , secured in his c i rcle according to his capacities . Herder

names this requirement the "general animal economy" (p. 2 7 ) . Question: What

must he posited as essential characteristic of the h uman being to secure this an­

imal economy ! This approach of Herder manifests itself as attempting a metaphysical de­

duction of the human being as rational being. The fundamental distinction between animal and human being, which

Herder assumes openly as insightfully lying in the open, i s the d istinction in re­lation to the circle that each has: The animal has a small narrow circle, the hu­man being a great one, the whole world. Now the observation shows that the

5 " ' CLA:OS 1 4 5

smalle r tl . 1 !· . . , . ·md the more ex­a

1e c 1rc e of a living being the sharper are t ie senses ' . 1 . . . ct th e ab · t · . I h I · , sity of the ab1 mes

d 1 tt 1es; t 1e greater, the more the strengt anc mten . ec:re ase Th I 1 . . 1 b t ·trong nerfect, 111-. s . e a )ilities of the animal are thus muteu, u s ' '

I 5t1nctiv , · I . 1 · h . l a<ly related to t 1e . e in t ie sense of the certainty of the dnve, wruc is a re, . C!rde in · . d · . I · I 1 is no wavenng. Its nvmg, that is, is delimited; for t 1e annna mere ·

But b 'd · 1 ti hw of the rela-. now correspondingly the result is that, y cons1 enng 1e ' . . l tion bet . 1 b . . h h' . very big ctrc e:

l ween Clfc e size and abilities, for the human emg wit 15 . . . . l . Wh i l , h . 1 11 <l h . I . s sharp md1v1dua e t e an1ma is bound to its sma spot an t us 1d ab i li t i es , t he human being is unbound for his big circle and his senses are more 1 I-! . 1. . If l . · . I ,y 'U"e not related to genera , as erder expresses tt n1mse , t 1dt 1s, t 1 e ' some t hing part icular. "U niversal sense" means here therefore not the a'lcr8ccr1c; Kot vi\ of Aristotle, which we, in opposition to sensation, can t rans lat . · · · ( I t . ) th·it is th·1t which 111 e dS 1ntu1non movernent, rest, num 1er, e c. , ' , '

all sense perceptions is always perceived as common. The human's being-unbound means: With the deficit in the sharpness of the s ense s the h uman being attains the privilege of freedom. Herder's concept of freedo m is therefore not so much freedom of choice, has also nothmg to do With Kant's concept of freedom, at least here it does not seem to be so up to now, but evidently means: detachment, being-detached from a spot.

2· Whi le the animal is reduced with irs powers of representation to a smalL en t irely determined region, the human being has wider outlook , with this the possibil i ty of progression, of progress. 3 · While the animal darkly follows the drive, directed dully only to the one th i ng , the human being has, unbound and set in freedom, also "more bright­ness" (p . 28) . Brightness means: brightening up; the human being sees more s ides ; one is contrasted against the other for him, cleared. This threefold distinction between animal and human thus respectively re­

sults always in another d isposition of the human powers, which Herder sub­sumes under one fundamental power, which he calls reflective awareness. Herder e mphasizes that this d istinction from the animal that is characterized by the reflective awareness of the human being is not only one in terms of de­grees, but in terms of essence, is not an addition to the powers in the human being, a fourth level, given to the human being beyond that of the animal, hut in contrast w ith the animal a completely different direction and development of all powers. Nowhere does Herder say wherein the d istinction in terms of dif­ference in degrees and essential distinction lies here. And Herder a/J/Jarently does not properly arrive at the distinction in terms of essence, in spite of his claim; for the characteristic that distinguishes the human being from the ani­mal is e v idently taken in terms of what pertains to living beings. Herder rakes reason itself as a capacity of a living being (Aristotle: vouc; as what distinguishes the human being is a capacity of the \Jl'UX� = what-being of the living being that i s ) . And so Herder appears to remain in what is animalistic because he thinks from the beginning within the animal economy.

!l /

-

SEMINAR MINUTES

If essential distinction means: to be a different kind, which cannot be de­

termined through that of the animal, one could say, then Herder should not

start with "small circle-big circle," but should pose the distinction: circle­

no-circle. Now what is this reflective awareness, which Herder poses as essential c�ar­

acteristic of the human being? It is a capacity of the human being and prects.ely

that of reflection, which commands throughout all powers in the human bemg

as fundamental power. Reflecting is a representing. The animal also represents, b ut that is another

kind of representing: Sunken into its drives and thus tightly bound, the animal

does not stand freely with regard t o that which i s represented. I t i s d ifferent

with the human being: If he represents, he holds something firmly out of the

ocean of sensations that rushes past his senses and sets it thither in the "greater

brightness" that he has as human, "takes it in bright heed." There i t depends

on the human being firmly holding this as something that is selfsame. In this lies the fact that the human being distinguishes one from the other. The repre­senting that distinguishes sets the one against the other, what is possible in �h e brightening that constitutes the essence of the brightness i n the human bemg and that shows him many sides. And through this the one against the other becomes noticeable . This which is noticeable can now be taken as sign, as mark . Reflection is therefore the capacity for forming marks, for representing in the manner of marks.

Attention means: to sense, to perceive; further then: to be directed to some­

thing while sensing, to be attentive. This attentive attention and the tight hold­

ing of what is noted in the sense of marking-for-oneself is that which belongs to

the fundamental act of the distinguishing. Through the d istinguishing and mark

formation, says Herder, that which is distinguished becomes distinct . Distinct

knowledge is the one that separates marks, and these marks can be expressed

because they are signs . The mark is the inner word , is the word itself. Herder's return to Leibnizean philosophy is visible here. Herder says: I t is

not enough for reflective awareness that the human being gains a clear repre­

sentation of the firmly held object, but it must come to a d istinct cognition,

and this happens by the fact that he apperceives the object as different with its

many properties ( = acknowledges ) . Reason is for Herder a differentiating that

contrasts. This is the step that Leibniz consciously took against Descartes i n

his "Meditationes de Cognitione, Veritate et ldeis,"5 written in 1 684. Descartes

5. G. W. Leibniz. MeJitationes de Cognitione, Veritate et !Jeis. In: Die philosophischen Sduiften. EJited by C. j. Gerhardt. Fourth volume, Berlin 1 880, pp. 422-26. ( I n the German tramlation: CJ. W. Leibniz, Bctrachtungen i.ibcr Erkenntnis, Wahrheir und !Jee. In: G. W. Leib­

niz, 1 lauptschriftcn zur (]runJlegung Jcr Philosophic. Translated by Dr. A. Buchenau. Leipzig ( 1 903 ) , pp. 22-29.)

had said · E .d . ) . ·f ·t dare et distincte p . · very 1 ea ( = every represented thing is true 1 1

.f h �rctp itur, a nd what is true that "is." Leibniz says this axiom is useless 1 t e Ciiaract · · ' · because to th enzatzon of the clear and distinct is not used at the same time, '

e perso h . . d k d nfused often ap-p n w o J udges without reflecting what 1s ar an co . ears clear d d . . 1 , uence of stages m

kn a n 1stinct. Leibniz thus arranges a parncu ar seq owledge ( cf. ib id. ed. Gerhardt, P· 422 sq.; ed. Buchenau, PP· 22-25) :

A cognitio ( notio) i s either

(d obscura

fark, the rep resentation does not su fice t k or nowing the matter)

or clara ( if the representation makes possible the recognition of that which is denoted in the representation)

( confusa distincta confused, i f I cannot specify the (distinct; it ensues a separation

chara t · · 1 d t. n· c ensttcs of the matter that of the b urre representa 1o • serve for the distinction; then the marks are contrasted, sufficient '.epresenta tion is blurred, flowing for a distinction) into on e another)

u � . inadequata � � adequata ( i ndividual marks in the distinct ( appropriate: a dissolution of a

representation are themselves representation into all the sti ll confused ) determinations enclosed until a dissolution is no longer possible. The entire structure of the matter therefore lies open)

symbolica � intuitiva (Leibniz says also caeca: if all (when all marks are entirely characteristics are indeed known, grasped with one stroke. The but are not all realized in the matter is totum ( unum) simul representing ) praesens)

the cognitio perfectissima the knowledge of God

Leibniz therefore determines the distinct knowledge as that which separates marks, and Herder takes this over almost literally. Leibniz says further: "One is used to having such representations, which are common to several senses, such

SEMINAR MINUTES

as, for example, representation of number, size, figure, etc . , in short, of all

things, for which we possess the nominal-definition, which is nothing other

than the enumeration of the sufficient marks ." (Cf. ibid . , ed . Gerhard , P· 424 sq. Translation by Heidegger. ) With the cognitio distincta there are therefore

nornina, more precisely: "there are" here not s imply nomina, but: at this stage

of being the represented beings ( that i s , the universe in a certa in perspec tive)

steps apart i n the representation and this which h a s stepped apart is a lways a

nomen. A "nomen" is in Leibniz "a mark for the d istinction of one matter from

another." (Cf. ibid . ) Herder says: the depicted kind of cognitio (of knowing) is "a naming in the soul." (cf. Herder, ibid. , p. 3 5 ) . Herder thus understands the word with Leibniz as sign, characteristic. The sign indicates the object itself, which first becomes object in the showing, which contrasts itself against �he other, stands away from the other and stands in itself. The sign is that which is brought to a stand and demarked from the object, and it becomes that by which I note it for myself.

In noting and noting down ( = retained) that which is dcmarked, the hu­man being is noticed at the same t ime. H erder also cal ls his reflective aware­ness reflexion. Reflexion means: turning back, carrying back that which i s

noted, therefore a mirroring back therein. Also in this the Leibnizean p hilos­

ophy comes to light in Herder: Reflex ion is for Leibniz that which d istinguishes

the human being as monad from the animal monad. Leibniz d istinguishes a hi­

erarchy of monad>: I . bare monad

}

2 . monad with memory (animal ) 3 · monad, which has the knowledge of the created

necessary and eternal truths ( that is, the human being)

4. the uncreated God monad. The first necessary and eternal truth is the original princ iple of identity ,

through which all other necessary truths are grounded. The human as monad b directed to itself through the knowledge of the necessary truths and can say "!." In this sense this level has self-consciousness, reflexion. This reflexion as perceptio, which perceives itself, Leibniz calls apperceptio.

This entire connection is not detailed in Herder, but i t clearly stays in the

background. When it was said that Herder seemingly arrived only at a d istinctio n i n

terms of degree between human and animal, i t appears otherwise i f w e cons ider

Herder's resting upon Leibnizean philosophy and understand his expositions

from here: For Leibniz, the essence of the monad in general is the cognit io

(against Descartes, who adopted representation only starting with the human

being, hecause for him the representing-with-oneself belongs to representing,

which in Leibniz happens only at the third stage of representing, that is , with

-------------

1 49

the huma b . . . . ch ) · representing m n erng , but does nor belong to perceptto as su ' cans fo i. · ·I ,sent and more sp . r n un: representer, that is, to make present anc to pre ' ec1ficll l h . . . . . · · I . . n·mner a how: it h c Y t e m u lttp ltc1ty in the urnty. This cogmtion 1as c1 1 ' ' . as the J . . . . . . · Th , striving goes Ll1 th . c idr<1cter of a stnvrng, representmg 1s appetttus. e , e d1rectio f . i. 1 . . . f I C(Jgnitio. fhe mon·

. d n o ever-greater bngntness, c rstmctness o t ie a s a re l ' · . . , . · · and sepa-r- Imtte d by the degrees of d1stmctness of the representations

<lted from . . Th . , d ' . · ctions in terms f one dnother; so are annnal and human. ese rsttn

0 degr f t . · I · l 01nd· the d ee 0 tne cognitio show a metaphysical gradatton wrt 1m t ie m ' ' egrees f k f b · A j · f · 1 leed one 0 nowledge are determinate degrees o emg. nc 1 1 1c

Wants t k f k ' d h · · · terms of 0 spea at all about the d istinction in terms o m , t at is, m essence at th " . · . f b · h h , l11'er·uchy must co . Is starrrng pomr of the concept o emg, t en t e '

nstitute the essential d istinction-in Leibniz as in Herder. We thus found: The content of the znd section of Herder's treatise is the

genesis ofth · l :I . · · b · f l· · ge 1· s L111derstood , e inner wore , anc this coming mto emg o angu,1 · as the cap · < d . . . acny 1or 1st1nct1on. Now, in th e Jrd section, Herder turns to language as announcement. Siegfried BrCise

6'h Class

Herder's treatise on the origin of language is guided by the insight into the con­n�ction between reason and language, between ratio and oratio. But of what kind is this connectio n ? Does it appear in Herder only as an empirical psycho­logical fact, or does it contain relations that necessarily bind both moments, ratio a n d oratio, to one another and first makes each possible in this relation to each the other? Does the question of the origin that Herder poses and an­swers w i th relation to language-in order to consider similarly the question concerning the origin of knowledge-have only the rank of the question con­cerning the commencement , beginning of our knowledge, or does it have the log­ical validity of the question concerning where our knowledge and all knowl­edge simply originates , as Kant formu lates?

Only if the character of the question of the origin is c larified with regard to this disj unct ion can it also be decided whether with its answer there is at the same time an answer given to the question concerning the essence of lan­guage-as indeed also the question concerning the essence of know ledge can­not be solved by regressing to the temporal beginnings, bur rather by illumi­nating its atemporal origin.

In the discussion of the question of the origin Herder rakes as his starting point a determination of the essence of the human being. The moment that distinguishes the human being from all other l iving beings is that of reflective awareness, or as it is otherwise called, rationality, that is, the control of all pow-

SEMINAR MINUTES

crs towards the main direction indicated by reason. What first makes the h�­

man being human lies in the fact that this direction is indicated by reason; dus

should not of course imply and mean that these powers already follow de fa�to

the indicated direction in each individual case . However, with this d irectton

the standard for the human value of each one is characterized, as the logical

conditions of possible degeneration and corruption can also be seen in it . With

this these appearances of course also always bear a specifically human stamp:

Only in the knowledge of the kind is a criterion assigned that allows to speak

of degeneration! The reflective awareness or rationality as the "complete determination" of

the "thinking power" of the human being in "relation to his sensibility and

drives" (p. 30) is now asserted in the "need [ . . . ] to become acquainted" (p. 36 ) . But the becoming-acquainted and wanting-to-become-acquainted never a ims

at an arbitrary thing, but always to something that is somehow already deter­

mined, to something that as what is-to-be-acquainted-with is already fixed , must be fixed, so that the acquainting subject knows in general what it wants to become acquainted with, so that it can firmly grasp the identity of the ob­ject in the process of becoming acquainted.

This becoming-acquainted is certainly not a matter of gaining scientific

knowledge. Yet the passage in the "Kritik der reinen Vcrnunft" can be remem­bered here by way of comparison where Kant states, with regard to the under­taking of the grounding of the exact sciences, that the "concept" as "something general that serves as rule" 1 forms the foundation of the respectively produced connection of representations. To be sure, the fixation of the object, with which-according to Herder-one should become acquainted, is not yet the construction of the concept. But it plays the same role in becoming acquainted as in the latter construction in the scientific progress.

Meanwhile-the object to-be-acquainted-with is not yet fixed in the mean­time, it thus docs not yet have the validity of the object, as which it indeed al­ready constituted the foundation for the progress in acquaintance. But the ob­ject comes to be fixed-and that means it is first fixed as a being, thus becoming an object only then-in the marl<. Only now, after, for example, the sheep is somehow produced as a being in general through the mark "bleating" ( cf. Herder, ibid. ed. Suphan, p. 36 ) , does the becoming-acquainted start; only now is the sheep experienced as "white, soft, wooly"-since only now is indeed a sub­strate won, a starting point for possible experience: precisely the "one bleating"!

The inner mark-word is now to be seen in the mark-according to Herder the original essence of the word in general; with this the origin of language is

I. Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Accord ing ro the first and second original edition newly edited hy Raymond Schmidt. Leipzig 1 926. A I 06.

6 " ' CLASS

also s � · · · to ·1f-fe

een in th e mark.-It is undecided how far this moment contmues ' Ct the m l l . f ·t ith Herder can

b oc e rn P ulosophy of language and how ar a contras w e establi 1_ . 1 l l f 1 . r at least counts as

s neu toe ay, i nsofar as the idealist t ieory o t 1e presen ' . the l innt -. · . . . l . f h h · l merit-and nrec1sely · "' 1 1st1c ong1na function o t e statement, t e JUl g ' J llst acco d · I · I my c1se such a

r i ng to the narrow connection of ratio ane owno. n ' ' · . n. oppos· · 1_ d F · b , , ssumed with i t io n s nould not be hastily constructe : or it can e a . good reas h l--I · 1 , k )rd not as iso-1 on t at erder takes the mark, respective Y mar -W( •

. · ated word ( wh i ch as such woulcl have only the role of a product of abstracnon, �n.deed , wh i c h utterly isolatecl would have no, not even, psychological reality ! ) , Ut as a rr1 · 1. l I f 1 · · · f · 1.)eing as such. orr1e n t in t ne re ·itional ore er o t ·1e recoamtton o <l L

But it can now he asked'. ls this tracing hack of lc�nguage to reason a critical grounding of language, does it truly clarify the origin and thus further the ;�s�nce of lan guage, or cloes it derive language from a moment that only has

r it the mean1· f · · · · · 1 ' ng o starting its ongmanon . Herder's formulation that the human being searches for marks as soon as the

1'.eed beco mes awakened in h i m to become acquainted, misplaces the connec­tion into the tempora l and can thus lead to the view that the issue here is only about a cont ingen t concurrence of the coming into force of the capacity oflan­guage w ith t h e awakening of reason, respectively abm1t a mere release of the former through the latter. But according to the earlier presentation, is it really the case that t h is temporal concurrence is only the consequence of the logical connection, that the getting together follows from their belonging together. Just as the distinguishing determination of beings as beings in general through the mark is what first makes the activity of reason, the becorning acquainted Possible-wh ic h really is always about a being-so on the other hand it is rea­son that also first turns the cletermination of beings through the mark into what it is : into the production of the object as object.

Mark-formation is not to be confused with the conceptual construction that i� necessary for scien tific knowledge; that was a lready emphasized on the occa­sion of an example from the "Kritik der reinen Vernunft"-it becomes espe­cially clear where Herder explains the mark-formation as distinction, which concerns distinctiveness. When Herder in this distinction first lets objectivity "come i n to being," then it is however not objectivity in the critical sense of the word, it is not the obj ectivity for which, according to Leibniz, the defini­tion forms t h e conclit ion. For the distinguishing determination of the object through a mark cloes not assign to the object a determinate place in the logi­cal orders of a system that is built and articulated according to principles. Rather, it releases the obj ect from any order, any system-provided one can talk of such system at that point at which the human being first "comes to need, · · . to b e come acquainted" (p . 36 ) .

The differentiation, which helps the respective object into objectivity, i s a holding against of that What with that from which it is d istinguished. The dis-

J

SEMINAR MINUTES t' . f l h 1 · . tion l ies mct1on o t 1e two can only be recognized through a third; t e c 1stmc in the third, through which both terms of the distinction are produced-f?r

example, that of the bleating sheep from the crowing cock-in the sound, m the tone. But: This tertium comparationis is not also at the same time already

a criterion of the logical affinity of the two terms of the d istinction, and it does

not as such criterion become here the ground of the d istinction ! According to Herder, it is the original essence o f the word t o b e inner n:1ar�­

word. The sound, which breaks free from the bleating sheep, resounds wt�ht� the soul-but not as something that remains outside as what is "self-standing ( Hegel) 1 : rather by the soul receiving this bleating, by it bleating inside 1

.ts�lf,

its bleating and the bleating one become one inner thing for it-and as this m­

ner, as name, as tone, that which is perceived henceforth has its true bein?. Only

as an inner is the animal for the human being (respectively the thing 1� gen­

eral) ; but just this inner is the human being himself. He is his represent mg­

the object has its objectivity in its representedness, the perceptum has its esse .

Thus the human being can, for example, say: I am-the donkey. I t i s unnec­

essary then to assert that he is no donkey, which of course in no way contra­

dicts the first statement; it is unnecessary insofar as the donkey not only can­

not itself say: I am-the human, but not even: I am a donkey. Because for the

animal there are no marks, consequently also no objects, that is, but that also

means no judgments. Therefore only because the human being is j ust the hu­man being and not the donkey, can he declare himself to be the donkey-of

course in a sense in which even this cannot be said of the donkey! It is according to all this the human being who, while he actualizes h imse�f

as rational being in becoming acquainted, invents language. The task that is set for this self-actualization, namely the becoming acquainted, but not , for ex­ample, already the science, is thus also the measure for the achievement of the invention of language , especially the moment of the idea that comes into ef­fect here. If, according to Herder, the soul recognizes the sheep by the fact that on the occasion of the bleating it clearly reflects for itself an idea as a s ign that is grasped once and for all-then there lies in the idea, which gives the sheep as something that is, a stock of idealistic thoughts that are certainly pre- and

post-Herderian. But it does not provide the standards, according to which the achievement of reflection on this idea is to be measured: The d istinctness and thus completeness of representing is measured here rather accord ing to whether it suffices for del imiting and setting apart the object against something other.-

I . Cf. G. W. F Hegel, Vorlcsungen uhcr die Acsthctik. Third volume. In: Werke. Yoll­stiinJigc Ausgahc Jurch cincn Vcrcin von Frcunden des Vcrcwigtcn. J O•h Volume. Berlin 1832 , I'· 1 54.

6T1 ' CLASS 1 53

Furthe b . . . . . l If li7ation of the hu-rrnore, a egmnmg point is given m t 1e se -actua -man bein . d

, · d tory remarks about h

g as a rational being to follow Her er s mtro uc h t e d istinction between human and animal. What is to be understood by t e

c�mh

p letely d ifferent direction and unfolding of all human powers in condtra

dst

wit th · I . b · stages an a -d . . e anima , smce that distinction really may not e seen m

itions ? I n th ·

d 1 · · being a deter-. ose Introductory remarks Herder grante to every 1vmg minate c ircle wi th i n which it can exercise its functions with ever-greater au­�omatic perfection the smaller and narrower the circle is. However, that which Is Parti 1 h · I · d' to Herder to b

cu ar to t e human life- and activity-C1rc e IS, accor mg ' e se en in that fact that the human being is not bound to a certain group of

fun ction h h . d · d d nt upon hvmg . s, t a t e ts free to move about an is not epen e . With in a determinate s ingle circle-that because of this he lacks the perfecuon

of activity, s ince he works in that which is unlimited, while nature with regard to th e a · 1 h · · d Meanwhile-the . n i ma accomplishes perfection in w at IS restncte · '

imperfection of human work is not, like the perfection in the animals, neces­sary; on the other hand it does not follow from human will as opposed to the an imal's restriction-rather it stands already under the standard of reason, in �rder to be even determined as imperfection. For the human being is a reflec­tive, that is, a rational being. But thus reason is not only a standard that is ap­plied fro m ou tside-it is rather inner principle of human efficiency, insofar as this efficiency serves the task of the self-actualization, of the self-realization of reason. With this the direction of the human powers in the formation of marks and in becoming acquainted with the thus gained objects runs back to the hu­man being himself as in the activity of such self-actualization of reason.

In this retrograde direction that also grounds the consciousness of objects thus o riginates self-consciousness; in it the possibility is planted not only to recognize, to feel , to will, but also to know that one recognizes, feels, wills. The human bein g in h is relation to beings as beings stands thus always already in a b roader relationship , the one to his own being. With the language ability grounded in this relation to beings he stands moreover at a point where all pre­vious explanations of the human origin of language in general first begin, which therefore also presupposes what of course is already given here: the origination of lan guage from and according to its origin. Therefore Herder dismisses these explanations of the origination of language-for example, from the moment of imitation-precisely because of the now gained and secured position.

The non-human l iving beings are bound to and through their circle-that of the human being leaves him the freedom; indeed this freedom belongs es: .. � sentially to the activity- and life-circle of the human being: The activity of tKe� · . --. ..._ . ·. -........, human being is indeed the self-actualization of reason, to be s"r" nonhe self.'S> · · · \. . actualization that is realized by means of a cunning of reason thH'5"1:i-)+�:.u-"'-".JY:� "=''''"�" - -- "' conscious medium of this reason-rather the human being, who rec<>1·(�1t/?"'.;'°'1 '11

SEMINAR M INUTES

knows that he recognizes, is reason itself. With the actualization of self-con­

sciousness, that i s , with the conscious adoption of the d irection of al l human

powers toward himself and thus toward the self-actualization of reason, how­

ever, freedom is required. In the "need · · · to become acquainted" ( p. 3 6 ) the rational ity of the hu­

man being manifests itself and w ith t h i s his freedom; in th is need Herder ex­

hibits at the same time the origin of language. With this that new problem is

posed: What is the inner connection between the essence of freedom a nd the

essence of language ?

7'11 Class

Dr. Wolfgang Ritzel

In the last class, the metaphysical position of Herder's "Abhandlung i.iber den Ursprung der Sprache" was shown with the question: How he carries out the crossing from the inner word, from mark, to outer word, to resounding lan­guage. Mark is the essence of the inner word; mark-formation, as the most orig­inal ll'ie of reason, is the inner coming into being of word. It is through that "act of acknowledgment," as Herder says, that the things are fixed and thus be­come identical, selfsame things-with this for the first t ime becoming things for the human being in general, since the EV belongs to the ov; through which act on the other hand the human being comes to himself, s ince the formation of marks is executed in him, that is, the tone, the mark breaks free from the things as it were, resounds into the soul and thus makes it resound itself. I n the ascertainment of an object as an identical one the human being executes in reflexion the ascertainment of the object in his relation to hi mself.

At the beginning of the third section, where the crossing from the inner language to outer is carried out externally in the treatise, it says: "The focus is settled at the point where Prometheus's heavenly spark lights up in the human soul-with the first mark there was lan/;[Wge; hut which were the first marks to hecome elements of language ?" (p. 48) J ust as through Prometheus's fire, the mipqi<'ipoc;, the human beings were able to create their world, this world began in language and through language with the first mark, which the human be­ing-to be sure without the help of a God , but in virtue of his being human­found. This is the "focus," which is settled in the first section.

"Which were the first marks?" That is the decisive question through whose a mwer what is particular to Herder's conception becomes recognizable, which shows in a particular manner from the traditional metaphysical fundamental position the unity of the sensible and rational in the essence of language-cor­responding to his conception of the unity of the animalistic and rational in the traditional view of the human being. The crossing to the outer word is created

7 " ' CLASS With th is , . . . k r · is investi-gat

question; at the same time the process of mdf -1ormatwn . ed aga in · h h l k · · · · ssence sound, is th W1t t e special emphasis that t le mar 1s 111 its e e alread r d k f l · <l deenened per-ha Y 10un nowledue of the essence o t le mner wor t '

Ps Witho · h . "' . b l · · t the foreground

th ut It av mg been Herder's intentton, y pus 1111g 111 ° e sound ch· . f l T dracter o anguage. . i h e sound c haracter of the in.ark makes possible the necessary crossl11g from nner to ou t 1 l . . . . 1 . d " ,lement of the

[spo er wore , w 1 1ch is at the same tune mner wore an e .

to ken] language" (cf. p . 4 8 ) . This sound character points from the mner word

·the outer. Yet unti l now the assertion that the mark is sound has remamed

without s H I . . h · . . b 1 · · re :l the bleat-. upport. e re er also silently postpones t is. y lavmg Cl c �:��heep as object for the first mark-formation, it .was possible �o already ref�r

e sound character of language, without 1t having been already complete Y ::cured. I f we fol low Herder's approach, we must consider the statement that . at first only asserted: "The mark is sound , " and in general take further steps int

_o the area of the sensible to its grounding an<l <leepcning with the question

of in h r ow J ar can and m ust the mark be sound. Two possibil i t ies are distinguished a lrea<ly with the formation of the mark

as inner, resounding word . One: where a tone , as Herder says, breaks free an<l penetrates deeply and clearly into the soul as "a mark from the canvas of the color image, where i n so l ittle was to be d istinguished. " (Cf. P· 49. ) This is the case w i th the example of the bleating sheep, of the barking dog and others.­Then: where the things appear to he mute, where a tone that can become mark does not give itself. And yet here too the mark is sound and nothing else. In order to support this we consider the central position of the sense of hearing among the senses as the only and originally mediating sense between things and the human being.

Thi s special position of the sense of hearing surprises us , since for Her<ler the human being is actually a "hearkening, attentive creature" ( ibid . ) . Since the totality of nature resounded for the original human, the whole sensible world came togethe r to him in this one sense. The hearkening and attentive crea­ture is therefore none other than the animal rationale . If at another place (p. 6 1 ) Herder calls the human being a "thinking sensorium commune," then this sensorium commune is the sense of hearing as a gathering, unifying sense. In this context we can point to Newton's thought about space as sensorium Dei, whereby sensoriurn is for h i m the place where God, who as the one who is om­niscient t h inks all things, executes the making-present. Thus the sense of hear­ing is in H erder the place where all feelings come together, where the making­present of the sensible worl<l is miginally executed, and that: in the act of the formation of resoun<lin.g marks that is accomplishe<l by reason.

In connection with this process of making-present the connection of sensi­bil ity and ratio in the Herderian conception can be remembered once again, and indeed in a manner similar to that of the j ust mentioned process of mark-

J

SEMINAR M INUTES

formation as the form of execution of the making-present. For already reason, which creates the mark that is at the same time inner word and is a imed at the external language through its sound character, cannot therefore be grasped as mere ratio, as a derached, single working power (cf. p. 29) , but "it is the entire equipment of all human powers, the whole household of his sensible and per­ceptual [. · . ) nature" (p. 28) , as Herder says-the reflective awareness.

In order to reconsider the crossing from inner to outer word, which Herder carries out from the 2nJ to the }'d section of the treatise, the properly sensible realm of language is asked about. With regard to the question concerning sen­sibility we consider Herder's statement "All senses [are) nothing hut modes of representation of the soul" (p. 64 ) . For this I would like to quote a statement from the second section of the treatise: "As soon as he [the human being] comes into the need to become acquainted with the sheep, then no instinct disturbs him, then no sense draws him too near or too far away from the same thing, i t stands there, completely a s it expresses itself t o h i s senses. White, soft , wooly­its sensible active soul searches for a mark-the sheep bleats ! "It has found a mark" (p. 36 ) . The senses give the soul "clear representation," they ascertain something: the object is "white, soft, wooly," perceived by reason-following Kant, under the category of reality: thinghood. The representational charac­ter of sensibility thus grants the possibil ity of elucidation; and with this the ground is given to reason for the formation of marks.

To this, Herder's second statement about the senses: "Feeling underlies a l l senses" (p . 6 1 ) , or "all senses [are] nothing else than modes of feeling of a soul" (p. 64 ) . Feeling is in Herder touch, yet this word is not taken in the usual but in a wider sense: I f we see the essence of touching, which i s similar to feel ing, in the object becoming inner, as well as in becoming-affected as in responding; if we recognize the character of drive ( in the sense of the Leihnizean appeti­tus) in touching as feeling, which expresses itself in a certain urging, that is a t the same time a becoming distressed. Al l the senses have this character. S o the statement has to be understood as saying that a feeling underlies a l l senses.

But the feelings, and that is decisive, resound according "to a law of sensa­tion of the animal nature" ( ibid . ) ; and here the circle, which was opened wi th the starting point with the animal, closes.

This double character of sensibil ity is the ground for the Herderian concep­tion of the origin of language. Through it he carries out the crossing from in­ner to outer word and ascertains the unity of both. Schematically, one can say: Sensibility provides the ground for the formation of marks insofar as the senses are modes of re/>resentation of the soul. The sensibility provides the ground for the outer word insofar as the senses are modes of feeling of the soul. In this man­ner the unity of the inner and outer word is given since they are both based in sensibility.

8 ' 1 1 CLASS 1 5 7

Wi th th 1·s b, · . f l I- . . . ' II . that reason is none other h as1s o t le lerderian position it 10 ows ' . t an the C' , · , . "bl d the sensible rea-apacny 1or the elucidation of what i s sens1 e, an

sofln the fundame ntal power of the human being: the capacity of reflection, the

re e ctiv 1 · 1 · · H d r is concen­e a waren ess. If we now remember how sensio1 tty m er e trated as ·t · f h · then we under-1 Were m that one middle sense, the sense o eanng, stand w · th d

· st be sound-. ' 1 regar to language, why it, according to its essence, mu �ng; With regard to the human being, that he is a being who is "naturally formed or language" (p. 49) .

Otto Rasper

8'/i Class

We · f h yu were stand ing in the discussion of the introductory statement 0 t e s�ction: "The focus is settled at the point where Prometheus's heavenly spark l ights up in the human soul-with the first mark there was language ; but which Were the firs t marks to be elements of language ?" (p. 48) The znd section showed h o w with the first mark language, that is, inner word, became mark­word; the task of the J rd section is therefore to uncover: "Which were the first marks to b e e l ements of language?" Language, that is, now outer announced word, and e lements means: Fundamental words, upon which language is built. The stre s s on the question to he answered in the Jrd section lies accordingly in the s e arch for the marks that could become first fundamental words of the an­nouncing language.

. To pursue the question properly, one thing may be noted in advance: It is

important that Herder sets the sound form in the foreground more than oth­ers before o r after h im. This appears at first glance to be superficial, but in truth through his reference to the essentially sonorous character of language makes visible something that in its meaning for the essence of language is yet to be evaluated. For i t has been i n general the case that a deeper conception of lan­guage should h ave bee n based on a c larification of its interior: The inner word stood at the center of the consideration of language.

It has to be seen whether and how that is in truth a different case. As a re­sult of this reference there follows for the present question the necessity to ask explicitly about the sound. How therefore does Herder understand the sound? The sound is c lassified with the sense of hearing, that is, the sound is grasped as a determinate sensation that is distinguished from something else, from the color, etc.

This determination of the sound is the fam iliar one in the context of and on the basis of the determination of the human being as "animal rationale," for "animal" means that which is distinguished by senses, that is, what is what it

SEMINAR MINUTES

is because of its eyes, ears, etc. But is th is classification of the sound to the sens e

of hearing the only one that is possible and thus self-evident 1 Can there in gen ­

eral be another one ? By recalling the reference to the importance of what is sonorous for t he

question concerning the essence of language, it can now be seen already tha t

the sound can also b e classified with language, announcing, voice. This means that the question concerning the sound is intensified further. I t

is necessary therefore to think through the yd section with this explicit ques­

tion concerning the sound in connection w ith the essence of language .

At the beginning of the Jrd section the example of the sheep is taken up

again: "There i s , for example, the sheep" (p . 48) . Two questions force thexn­

sel ves here: 1 . Why does the sheep really come into a metaphysical discussion of language ?

2 . And why does it appear here for the second time ? With regard to the first question: We encounter the sheep i n Herder's trea­

tise for the first time, where the statement from the introduction to the yd sec­tion " . . . with the first mark language came into being" ( ibid . ) was pointed out . Herder says in the correspond ing passage ( p . 36) : "As soon as he [the h um a n being] comes t o need t o become acquainted with the sheep . . . " "As soon as" meant here: As soon as the human being attains reason. And "becoming ac­quainted," meant: wanting to represent something as being thus and thus.

With this wanting to become acquainted the mark was that which fi rs t fixes a being as a being and selfsame. The formation of marks was accordingly d is­tinction. But the distinction requires the "tertium comparationis." A nd this was the tone. "Ha! You are the one bleating ! "

But alrea<ly a t that point Her<ler says, anticipating h is course o f thinking i n a certain sense: ''Thi5 bleating, which makes the strongest impression on it [the soul], which broke free from all other properties of beholding an<l touching, sprang forth, penetrate<l most deeply, remains with it" ( ibid . ) . But how the mat­ter stands properly with this breaking free and penetrating is shown only i n the 3 1cI section.

With this the 211d question "Why does the sheep appear for a secon<l t i m e ?"

is reached. At first the sheep was only an example of an encountere<l being; b u t

now it unveils its own example character: It is a being that is encountere d ,

which resounds . The first marks to be elements of language are tones, for example, the "baah"

of t he sheep. The elements of language are therefore no "notiones communes," but tones, sounds. I t must now be shown how these elements become the full sonorom word. But is not the tone of the sheep already the naturally ful l word !

A child who sees a sheep for the first time and hears it bleat, points w ith the finger to it and says "Baah." It means with this: "You are the one who goes haah," "You are the haah ." A being-and indeed an in<l ividual of a being-is

8' ' ' CLASS 1 59 noted and , ,

. · . . , · between mark nameJ on the gruund of its haah and baah. This connection -word an I i: II J · [ [ I , [ · r1 regard to that which i .

c iu wor m ust be grasped stt more s rnrp Y WI n I l

s sonorou s . Herder h i mself offers direction for this.

etra�� ie znu and 3 rc1 sections H erder speaks about rhe breaking free and pen­

the on g o f the tone. The passage from the znd section has already been quoted;

canva .e from the J rd says the following: "There a mark breaks away from the

and c!:�f the co lo r i mages, where in so l ittle could be d istinguished: It is deep�y

b , k arly pen etrated into the soul" (p. 49) . Therefore, the mark, the tone,

rea s aw, , d · 1. 1 f · · If But . ay an comes towards me. I r makes itself nottceao e rom itse ·

something el . 1 · . . I . . I I h· b , k . free some-thing sh .se ies m t 11s at the same tune: In t 1e sounc t dt red s

. ,

Th ows Itself as that which sounds: The sound announces its provenance.

f erefore someth i ng twofold happens: ( I ) A "towards me." ( 2 ) A turning

o me towa d . Tt. . f h . b l >ng to b

r s. nrough the peculiar breakmg free o t e tone its e ongi . ecom�s clear for the first t ime. ( The "towards me" is thus not to be understood m spatial ter . b · · l " 1 h· · · orous it-

lf b ms, u t tt ts precisely in the " rowarc s me tnat w dt is son se ecomes noticeable. ) Now we see something new: Because the deep penetrating occurs on the grou

_nd of a resound ing or also of a sudden flash, etc . , because the resounding,

e�c. is action, the first full words have the word character of verbs. A movement t ere�ore underl ies the first fu l l words. But movement is a crossing from one

;.rate �,nto another. I n the movement there l ies a "from-to. " And both, rh� from and th " " h b "t. " d "rti ' . e to t us ecome c lear. In the movement a rom an a '

that is a d · · · r I · · · · I · ' tst1nct 1on comes to presence. We see there1ore t wr tt ts precise Y m the �ovement that what is noticeable becomes noticeable. First of all we want to pursue further the breaking-free and penetrating.

Her�er: The tone penetrates deeply into the soul (cf. p. 49) . When Herder de­termines reflec tive awareness as fundamental power of the human being, then the soul must be reflective awareness. But reflective awareness according to

Herder means the free-stand ing aga inst something. Penetrating, that is, there­fore: encountering the human being, who as one who is free-standing stands o�er against that which pushes-forth and penetrates. And penetrating deeply , bnngs about, then, that the thus encountered human being says "you." , But what is thus properly being said w i rh this ? "This here is ." Properly what IS thus expressed is the i nexpressible, being.

The "baah" of the chi ld proved ro be something twofold: I " resounding mark, z nd sonorous word. Underlying this twofold is the fact that the "baah" is never a mere tone in the sense of hearing, as acoustics has subsequently ab­�tracted it as th e obj ect, but i t is a lways being and representation: If we hear �omething, even if we do nor see ir at the same time, then we never hear a mere noise, but we hear perhaps steps, etc. Bur that means: We hear beings by rep­re'ienting.-The sound is not classified with the sense of hearing a lone in a self­evident manner.

1 60 SEMINAR MINUTES

We are standing in the question concerning the first marks that come to be el­

ements of language. These first marks are the resounding ones . But how, thus arises the next necessary question, is non-sonorous being no­

ticed and named? The being that is encountered announces itself through t he

senses and especially through the sense of hearing. Herder characterizes t his

sense of hearing with respect to the other senses and the being that announces

itself through them in a twofold manner: 1 . as a middle sense, 2. as a mediating sense.

By asking after this, the ground for the connection between mark-word and

full word, which holds for all beings that are encountered, must reveal itse lf.

The middle- and mediating-position of the sense of hearing therefore must be

clarified.

Hans-Hermann Groothoff

In the consideration of the question of the origin of language we had arrived at the distinguished role of hearing and ask why hearing has this emphasized meaning. Hearing is essential for language as communication and understand­ing in general, but for Herder in particular because he determines the first fun­damental word as resounding. Herder grasps language as announcement, and for him the resounding mark i s the first fundamental word of language because the tone provides the mark character and word sound at the same time. This exhibition of the fundamental word as resounding simultaneously indicates that there is also that which is noticeable, which does not resound, and this other that is noticeable must stand in connection with tones so that i t can be­come mark-word. But how can non-sonorous marks become sound ?

From Herder's posing of the question, which is to show how the whole of the great circle that crowds the human being comes to language, that is, to an­nouncement, there thus arises the particular problem of how that which is non­sonorous can be seen in connection with the tone.

Here hearing then becomes essential as middle and connection line of the senses. Herder says: "The sensations unite and all come therefore near the re­gion where marks become sounds. In this manner what one sees, what one fee ls

becomes also sonorous" (p. 65) . Hearing is therefore essential not only within language as communication, but especially for Herder, insofar as i t transforms marks into sounds, and correspondingly also the sound has a double function in language: 1 . in the fact that it announces the object, is resounding mark-word, 2. in the fact that it communicates the announcement.-

-- �· �--_ .. -. .

L

9rn CLASS 1 6 1

Sine . e We wan t l I H l , · h j , " 11·1te questtons we are n ' to unc crstanc crl er s text wit c eterm1 ' '

ow compeI J ,d l .d h h 1 · · - - · l because the tone Pia e to c ec1 e w ct er ncanng is essenna , ys a tnain I · I f 1 · iund ·md of the a

ro e m anguage in the twofold sense o tne announcing S( . '

bee n nou ncernent , or whether inversely the tone has only this possible role ause hea · · . . . . . · F" ·r explain why he . r'.ng is essential m ccmnect1on with saying. 1rst we mus

anng is essent ia l . Herder det · h h " · 1 · 1 · ( f 64) and it h e rm mes earing as m iddle wit m sens1 11 tty c · P· ' t us seems fi l " · t " g it is th at rs t to have only a particular meaning, because as mec Id in e assernbl · r . ·d · i l l show h h Y pomt ror the rest of sensibi l i ty. Bur our cons1 eratton w t at t e . f . . h . . . I r-

d sense o h eari ng can o n ly thus be rr11dclle, because earing is unc e stoo as b . h . . h I of

midd! eing a ttenti ve, and that where Herder presents eanng m t e ro e

. _e, he deals e xc l us i vely with hearkening. From this results that in the pres-entation of th I d II in h e sense of hearing as middle sense Herl er oes nor at a move t e analy . - . f h H . sis o t e sensibi l i ty.

h hearing is therefore determ ined by Herder as middle of sensil

.i i l i ry, which

e c aracter· I t · Id! position f izes as sensorium commune. In ore er to survey tne m1c e

0 the sense of h earing in a clearer fashion, we must first clarify the essence of

�h�t wherein it is the m iddle. We ask therefore about the essence of sensibi l ity m mterpret in . cl S g its etermina tion as sensorium commune. ensorium is understood as fe e l i ng, that is, the having of feel ing in a com­pl�tely broad sense. And i ndeed on the one hand having the feeling of some­thing, sensing in the sense of being approached, then as having a feel ing for someth ing · h . f . , r I f . . · S · rium is , in t e sense o p u ttmg out one s 1ee ers, o sensmg. enso

�herefore feeling or sensing in a double sense: I " perceiving, z nd tracing, be­mg o n the track. Sensori u m is thus not mere receptivity or grasped as such, not. �ere pass iv i ty, rather in the sens i b i l i ty as a whole l ies this double and op­positional d irection that feel i ng spreads itself out, yet th is spreading out is not mere scattering, but a t the same t i me a tak ing into the interior. In this sense

Herder uses the expression i nner and means with this a turning towards the soul.

We determine the sensibi l i ty therefore as inner extJansion or in a counter turning as removed gathering. For in the innerness l ies a gathering that occurs withi n a removal. With this what Herder means by sensorium is clarified, we now ask about the "commune." Commune means communal , common, genera l . I t points here to that which is common in the gathering, it purports to characterize taking into a unity, thus properly means unifying. A l l that crowds comes together, yet without becom­ing an accumulation, rather there is a gathering into a particular middle.

The sensorium s hows itself as commune in a dou ble sense: on the one hand, insofar as each sense stands in a communio with each other, on the other hand, insofar as the sensor i u m presents at the same time a communicatio with that which in general becomes accessible through senses. In the closer determina-

SEM INAR M I NUTES

tion of the sensorium as communio a middle shows i tself as connection line and door, that is, gathering in the interior, related to the world.

This middle in relation to the inner expansion of the entire sensibility is the sense of hearing. Hearing is the open region in which and towards which this gathering in the sensibility takes place. Herder attempts to clarify this excep­tional position of hearing in six points. We want to consider them now in or­der to ask for their inner unity. It will then become possible for us to determine the provenance of the leading respects of the consideration and to ascertain from that how Herder understands from the beginning this determinate sense.

The sense of hearing is placed between touch and sight as middle sense. The comparison between the senses is carried out as limit consideration. The result is thus that if touch and sight were the only sense, the sonorous language would not be able to come into existence. But the sense of hearing grants the possi­bility for language.

We see this first of all from the relation of the senses to one another w ith regard to the

sphere of sentiency from outside . Herder says: "Sight casts us out long distances far from ourselves" (p. 64 ) .- "Feel­ing experiences everything only in itself and in its organ" ( ibid . ) .-Touch has the proper impression by lying upon. In touching lies the fact that I touch with the finger. Touching is experienced in the organ, and this is thus sensed at the same time, while in seeing I see through the eyes, that is, I do not perceive the eye itself while I see the object. The widest scattering out beyond us is in seeing, in touch, the sense is pressed back to itself in the impression and remains in that.

If I now hear a tone, I thus hear outwards, yet I can also say that I have the tone in my ear. A twofold therefore lies in hearing: outside, but not a scatter­ing; inside, but not pressed in. As what stands- away-from-towards-me, the sense of hearing has a middle position between touch and sight, where the d is­tance is on the one hand too far-mere scattering-, on the other hand too small-mere impression. Distance means here the expansion of the comport­ment itself, not the objective expanse.

Of course this entire consideration is conditioned. We could also turn around and say: What is seen lies on, for example, as the lighting in the eyes, what is touched reaches afar, for example, the handshake. We leave this open and take hold only the result to which Herder's consideration i s aimed. In the first respect the essential result for the sense of hearing from a middle between mere distance and intrusion is the {Jossibility of s tanding against .

The second comparison concerns the distinctness and clarity .

Sight is too bright, it supplies so many marks that it becomes hard to separate one. It is a non-surveyable being apart. Touch is dulled, too l ittle raises itself out so that one could separate a mark. I t is a dark in one another.

Bur th . f h . . d · .d 1 h h 'ch stands out from out f .

e sense o eanng gives an 1n 1v1 ua , t at w 1 . If 0 Itself. Th s · . l s contrasts 1tse as .

· e tone breaks free from the obj ect! mce It t ni . . an 1ndi 'd I . . . bl F its midpomt 111 l

vi ua , it has the character of what LS noncea e. rom c arity a d I 'b 'l ' f th mark n c earness, sense of hearing has the poss1 1 1ty o e ·

The third respect of the consideration is the

F 1 . liveliness (p. 65 ) . I . ee ing ·

, too deep y mto overpowers. A push, a blow forces us down,-Lt presses us. Sigh · 1 1 l b i: The tone en-! . 1 is co d and indifferent, it remains ca m Y e1ore us. IVens ·

k d II While there-t

,-it presses closely into the soul, but does not ma e u · . ore what is seen does not lift up, feeling forces us down, the tone lifts us mto

a Part1eular independence. w T�e sense of hearing thus erects into the s[Jhere of the object ' in the open of

hat is objective . The fourth middle position of the sense of hearing results from the

h . time , in which it operates (p. 66 f. ) ; t at is , not the external duration of the effect, for example, how long I see or hear. Duration is here the manner in which the sense makes the manifold ac­cessibl · · · · 1 b t too

. e Ill Its u111ty. Fee ling casts everything at once m us, strong y, u

briefly for a manifold to become perceptible. Sight sets everything next to one another, too much to grasp it in a unifying manner.

. . The sense of hearing gives one tone after the other. The single tone lifts it­self out, has a certain duration and wants to be preserved. A certain together­ness forms itself in which the tones make themselves known one after the other. In the one after the other they stand at the same time in a certain unity. The middle in the duration of the effect grants the possibility of gras[Jing the manifold in unity .

The fifth comparison concerns the intention of the need to express oneself (p. 67) .

Feeling is inexpressibly dark, it may not be expressed, says Herder. We com­pare this with section I , that feeling resounds according to a natural law.-But this is not taken into consideration here; question is, in how far a claim to be able to be marked and having a mark character lies in the sense. And there feeling is too dark, too sunken in itself, then that it could be released into a mark-word. What is seen does not need to be expressed, it already stands; the objects remain, thus I can point to it.

But tones are in motion, they sweep by; they must be sustained, expressed. In the sense of hearing lies the need for mark-formation .

The last comparison concerns the develo/Jment of senses (p. 67 ff. ) .

We interpret development a s the course of the erection into the free-standing­ness of the human being. The human being is at first all feeling, therefore he cannot be himself; the soul first becomes awake for the distinct sensation

SEMINAR M INUTES

through the sense of hearing. If the human being were all sight he could not be himself,-the sense of hearing first refines sight.

The sense of hearing has therefore the character of the crossing from one to another. It brings the human being into h is own free-standingness , into the per­ce{Jtual relation to the world: "The human being as a hearkening, attentive crea­ture is therefore naturally formed for language" ( p. 49) .

The entire distinction in Herder i s very obscure, b u t i t shows in itself a unified direction of questioning. The sense of hearing was determined as mid­dle in the sensibility, which we clarified as inner expansion. In this middle po­sition the sense of hearing was to be shown to be the proper sense for language. Herder therefore placed the sense of hearing as middle sense between touch and sight. He then asked in how far each of the senses make possible from them­selves the objectification of the circle and the free-standingness of the human being. From the consideration we learned that only hearing can set the open of objectivity, and that is because hearing is understood as hearkening. Hear­ing is therefore not seen as sense, but in a certain manner from reason. This is important in order to clarify how things stand with Herder's deduction of the mark from the first mark in the sense of the resounding one. We consider the example of the sheep once more. It said: The tone "breaks free" . . . , this mark "is deeply and clearly pressed into the soul," "there it has a resounding word" (p. 49) . We now see after we have determined that hearing is understood as hearkening: it is not a matter of the tone here, but of the fact that something shows itself as something that presences.-It is not because the tone delivers the mark that the sense of hearing is essential, but because the sense of hear­ing is understood m hearkening, grants the possibility of the standing-against, of attention in general, and because further, hearing stands in a connection with saying, that the tone has this possible role.

That something shows itself as presencing, is not a matter of the tone, of the ear or of hearing, hut something more essential.

There is thus an indication to consider the role that sensibility has and can have for the origin of language.

Irmgard Mylius

I O'h Class

The first essential characterization of language occurs in the l " section of part I of Herder's treatise: Language is sonorous expression, which communicates something. Language is therefore conceived and determined from sound. This characterization appears at first to include human language and animal voice, therefore a general concept of language to be present. But insofar as human language is the essential determination of human in contrast with the animal,

l Orn CLASS it must . l · 1 · l . 1 voice not only as a <l so L lstinguish itself essenti'1lly from t ie ;mima ' case. · · '

Ace d · I d 'termine language f

or mg y, Herder makes an additional attempt to e . . ,_

ro1n the , - d . . . f om reflecuve aware essence of the human being: the wor ongmates r . . f ness as .

fi . 1 haractenzat1on o

l ' mner mark-word. But by retaining the rst essentia c ' '

bl l anguage . . . l , the thus Jou Y L e-- as announcement the problem anses as to W Jere l h termined

, . · fi d . 1ner and t 1us t e

. essence of language is grounded m a ulll e mar '

h d 'f, question .1 . l . 1 . d . und both of sue I

i; ' 5 to ·1ow mner and outer wore , meanmg an so ' erent b ,· h 1 I e

.mg-c aracter can be connected.

. b . f a ' erde 1 · ·k word as emg 0 " .

r attempts a solution by assessing t ie mner mar - . sun1hr k' I l . 11 bl , to be sonorous.

Th ' me as t ie outer, thus as sonorous or essent1a Y a e

k e const · . · f h · ous ·1mong mar s, 2nd ruct1ve outcome is 1 st a prionty o w at 1s sonar '

W. a priority of hearing among sensible comportments.

1th th , l [ l h . l w in the first case , h .

e examp e of the bleating sheep, I- ere er s ows 10 . !di t e mn , d l · l . · a as the 1rnc e er wor )ecomes the outer word. By presenung ieann,, '

b sense H , d . . k · are able to e-' er er attempts to show how the non-sonorous mar 5 ' . h' come sonorous, and thus of a similar kind as the outer word. "Middle" is m t is

clase to be understood in a twofold manner: · med" t ' 2 ia mg among the senses-tie, · producing a connection with the world--door.

d . Sensibi l ity, in which the sense of hearing is to be the middle, was eter-

mmed i h · . l · · f " - 'nsorium com-n t e mterpretation of the Herdenan c es1gnat10n o se . d mune" ·1s· · · d 1 · Tl · · 1 1 , ·tructure graspe

. ' · · inner expansion, remove gat ienng. 11s sens1 1 e s

. . m the 1 • f . . l l r l th·it which is

. nanner o a contrary expression, 1s t 1e grounc wr 10W ' . alive liv , . . I l · l . l b b · g in a certain es. n Je mg preoccupied with that w 11c 1 urges or Y em manner outside with it , this which drives at the same time is selected by that which is alive and related to it. As such its life is a being-between , between it and the circle, in which it moves, to which it is handed over and which it y

.et

111 a certain way masters. As this "between" what is alive lives over beyond it­self, though this "over beyond itself" cannot be called transcendence. This dou­ble d irection that is founded in sensibility was grasped from both sides in "Sem und Zeit" Sp·1t" l ' t f I' . d . l b' . But with this

• 1a 1 y o 1ase1n an space m t ie o 1 ect1ve sense. . only one moment of the "between," as what Dasein is, is meant. As a whole, it

is covered by space and time, which again only are cm the ground of the there ' o f the openness, in which Dasein stands. Only on the ground of the there i s th� human being the between. The structure of sensibility and the "being-between that is given with it, is a uniform phenomenon, that is, from one ground; if it 15 grasped doubly, this means only that is cannot yet be grasped differently.

ln this sensibility structured in this manner the sense of hearing shall be I shown to he the middle. This middle position shall result from the consider<1' \I tton of the sense of hearing in six respects. It turns out I st that an individual. 1 that which is differentiated, noticeable is lifted out from it, znd that which

)

1 66 SEMINAR M INUTES

stands away and stands against forms in it yc1 that in it the human being comes

to stand, to standing-over-against, 4th th,at in it what is given is distinguish�d

in itself and is thus noticeable, 5rh that what is given in it requires noticeabil­

ity, 6'h that a growing free-standingness of the human being in relation to the

whole of the great circle develops in it . . But it becomes clear from these six determinations that with it Herder did

not, as he means, grasp hearing as this determinate sensible comportment an� determine it as middle of sensibility, but that hearkening is uncovered as this

middle in the sense of attention, of hearkening, of perceiving. As middle in th.e

twofold sense, insofar as it renders the objectification and underlies all sensi­

ble comportments. While Herder believes to have still a determinate sensible

comportment, hearing, before himself, he has already left the realm of sensi­

bility in general and moves in a determination of the reflective awareness, of

reason. But that was only possible because the sensibility was already under­

stood in rational terms: the direction inwards, the moment of the gathering

(A.£yEtv) is its logical, rational moment. With regard to the initial question this means: . 1 . The resounding mark has no priority over the other marks. For all that is given to the senses is only noticeable, if there is already something there,

which, grasped as a being, is noticeable. Such a hearing does not carry out the objectification, the noticeable character of the tone is not grounded in it as such. And that is why with the example of the bleating sheep the "breaking free" of the tone cannot be understood in acoustical terms, be­

cause with it no objectification and mark-formation could be carried out.

Rather the "breaking-free" of the tone is to be understood as an advancing

towards us, in such a manner that what advances falls behind and comes to stand in itself; therefore as this presencing that is experienced in attention. The inner mark word as such does not have essentially sound character.

2 . It is not explained in relation to and from hearing how the non-sonorous marks become sonorous. As a whole: the problem of sound character of language is not solved, the

connection between inner and outer word is not grasped in its ground. Herder does not see into which realm he advances with the determination

of sensibility, and that it stands, and in which way it stands, in a connection with reflective awareness. He does not succeed in grasping the essence of the human being as reflective awareness in a unified and general manner; he does not succeed in leaving the traditional determination of the human being as an­imal rationale: the human neing is thinking sensorium commune, hearkening, attentive creature. And this twofold determination of the human being has as a consequence that also language is determined from two sides: "Already as an­imal, the human being has language" (p. 5 ) , that is, sonorous expression; "Set in the state of reflective awareness, the human being [ . . . ] has invented lan­guage" (p. 34), that is, inner mark-word.

l Orn CLASS

And as Herder does not succeed, even ifhe also aims at this, in grasping the human being in his essence (thinking and sensibility) in a uniform manner and th us in contrasting him essentially against the animal, he does not succeed in deriving the word in its double structure in a uniform manner. Thus, verbal �anguage remains only a certain kind of sonorous, communicating expres:ion 111 contrast with the animal's voice, the cry of sensation, and is not essentially d istinguished from it, although the claim for such an essential distinction is made.

And if Herder says toward the end of part l of his investigation that in or­der to explain the origin of language it is decisive to know what reason is, then one can say that Herder did not know what reason really is and that conse­quently he posed and in general could pose the question of the origin only as far as metaphysics as a whole.

The Herderian consideration of the origin and its development has decisively

determined all subsequent questions concerning language, but was modified with the rise of the science of language and philosophy of language in terms of sense and direction.

How in the time to come this question of the origin was determined by Herder and what became of it in our time is to be shown with regard to the po­

sition of the linguist Jacob Grimm. This position can be characterized as dis­tinctive turning point in the development of the question concerning lan­guage, because it first points back to the Herderian tradition and rests upon it, and secondly because it represents the deflection of Herder's question into the science of language, and thus has provided the further foundation in the time to come.

J acob Grimm's essay "Uber den Ursprung der Sprache" 1 was composed in 1 85 1 , therefore eighty years after Herder's writing. The report on this essay summarized in six points showed:

l . Making explicit reference to Herder, Grimm poses for himself the same task as Herder's: [to elucidate] the origin of language from the human being as against the possibility of the origin from God or animal.

2. Grimm wants to elucidate this origin with the help of linguistics. That has as a consequence that: a) The question becomes for him the question con­cerning the origin of the original language from the original human being. b) The real problem of language is not seen in its essence and its determination, but in the darkness in which the original language lies for us.

3 . Thus language is in its entire structure: presupposed as uniform connec­tion of sound, meaning, object; but still only the moments sound, meaning, ar-

I . J . Grimm, Uher den Ursprung der Sprachc. Akademicvorlcsung 1 8 5 1 . In: K\cinerc Schrifrcn, vol. I , Berlin, 2nd ed. 1 879, pp. 256-99.

1 68 SEMINAR MINUTES

ticulation as well as their development are seen as properly belonging to lan­

guage. Though the question concerning the unity of these moments has been

lost, the question concerning the provenance of the single moments neverthe­

less remains for language investigation.

4. These different questions are no longer seen in their essential connec­

tion; accordingly their answer is accomplished at entirely different levels and

in different ways.

S. By answering this question Grimm follows tradition: a ) Insofar as the humanity of language is proven without appealing to a

determinate representation of God, it rests on a distinction of the hu­man being from the animal. The human being is understood as ani­mal rationale. But next to thinking as a distinguishing determination there appear already those of a different kind such as: upright walk, organs.

b) These distinguishing marks are at the same time the grounds for the difference of human language from the animal voice. With this they provide the ground for one moment of language; that is, the moments of language are traced back to different properties.

c) Essence and determination of language is: to bring a thought to ex­pression through sound ( <j>wvfi 011µavn Ki) ) .

d) The determination of original language moves within these meta­physical presuppositions about the human being and language.

6. For Grimm, the origin of language is clarified by indicating the origina­tion of the original language. But since the provenance of its constitutive parts and moments is already indicated, furthermore its language structure is presup­posed as self-evident, only the formation of sound of the original language as origin of language from the human being remains to be determined. It is in­vention of a sound, fit to express a determinate thought in d istinction from an­other.

What is decisive in the thus outlined position in the question concerning the origin of language lies not only in the fact that the main weight of the ques­tion falls on the question concerning the original language, but above all in the fact that Grimm believes to have just posed and answered the Herderian question.

That was possible only because Herder's question, like every metaphysical question concerning the origin of language, is not unambiguous in itself, what again depends on the ambiguity of the leading concept: Origin-apxi). Origin means l" provenance of essence 2"J first cause (aii:i.a) , that which came first into existence, out of which what follows has developed.

Only thus is it comprehensible that Herder's question was understood es­sentially as question concerning the original language. But since Herder, inso-

- ,� ,,_;/ -'";... _____ _

1 1 11 1 CL\:-iS far as h , I . . · 1 1 · , ral seizes it in a philo-' · e even l etermmes the ongma anguage tn gene ' •

sop! · l · I igin of hn-ltca way, bur on the other hand the question concernmg t le or .

' guage has become the main task of the science of language, the Herdenan ap­proach c an he understood as non-scient ific and philosophical matters m general as science with inadequate means. From out of this then the task can grow to answer the same question more scientifically. .

At one with the shift in the center of gravity in the question concernmg the origin of language there is a transformation in the kind of approach in it: Thou gh the determination of the essential provenance is necessarily coupled With this question and for Grimm thus not to he c ircumvented, now it only ap­pears in the form of a general, indeterminate consideration. That which is es­sen tial for Grimm h i mself starts only there where the original language be­comes the topic and the science of language can be applied.

The inflected language as the fact underlying all procedure is the beginning point; thus the beginn ing is made with the articulated, already grammatically u nderstood language . Under the leading thought of the development there is from there I sr a going hack to the original language as that which is primitive from which the later languages have developed, znd a preview given into the further development up to a certain goal (Grimm, ibid. , p. 295 ) .

The shift of the main focus and one-sided displacement of the question to the level of science must appear strange, if one considers that Kant and the en­t�re Cierman idealism ( Fichte, Hegel, Schelling) stand between Herder and G n mm. Except for the thought of development, which through Hegel pene­trates incisively into science, though in a changed form, there is no more to trace of the entire field of metaphysics.

But the situation that is thus given to science is not simply characterized by the fact that it reduces itself one-sidedly in its work to the determination of facts, in the case of the science of language to the investigation of sound, of sound formation and sound shifting; hut above all in the fact that at the same t ime the other is stil l there: thinking, the spirit of language, spiritual develop­ment; that one bases one's work on it, but only lets it he valid without it being the object of serious concern. Spirit becomes a cultural value, while science concerns itself with more palpable things.

But on the ground of metaphysics and developing from it, this science is still at bottom metaphysics.

Karl Ulmer

I ] 'Ii Class

The Greek word apx11 is ambiguous. On the one hand, it means origin in the sense of the coming from a being from another, on the other hand it means the

1 70 SEMIN/\R M I N L JTI''-'

essential ground that hears a being. The question concerning the origin of lan­guage is subjected to this ambiguity, l ike every question concerning the origin. How does Herder grasp the origin of language ? Enti rely in terms of the one meant first! If w e asked in the investigation of the 1 -lerderian treat ise after the essential foundations on which it rests and recognized their mer:1physical char­acter, thus we do not commit an injust ice against H erder, but only see him from

the perspective in wh ich he h i mself stands without quest ion and questionless . The understanding o f the human being a s the so)ov t..6yov £xov guides his

thinking: The human being is the animal who has the Logos. Logos means ra­

t io and orario at the same t i me. In the realization of the rat io the h u man be­ing comes to hiimelf as to his own, to the rational . The occurrence of this re­al izat ion is the mark-formation. With it-following Herder's expression-the inner word originates. He does not prove i ts connection to the outer, the sonorous word. His consideration of the sense of hearing as rhe m iddle of the senses, which as a comequence of its m iddle posi tion should he capable of lend ­i ng the chmactcr of sound to all sense impressions, docs not solve the problem of the sound character of language, for before a mark resounds, i t is already mark , regardless of through which sense what presses on was let in .

If now with Herder also inner and outer, mark and sound stand unconnected next to one another, h is manner of considera t ion remains nevertheless of si gnificance for the time to come, and that in such a way that the sound structure of language entered into the foreground of reflection, while the meaning char­acter of the word is moved to the background, as smnchow already understood.

We have i nvest igated the conception of l anguage of one of the most renowned investigators of language of the t i me to come, Jacob (3r imm. J acob ()rimm stands thoroughly in Herder's tradi tion. The d ivergences from him arc characteristic. We ask : [ '' Whm is comn1on to Herder's and l)rirnm's fumb­mental posit ions ? 211c1 What is differen t ? I. Common t o hoth and also not p u t into question unr i l today:

a ) The underst;mding of the essence of l anguage as denotative ;mnouncc­ment, thar is, the :mnouncement of a thought , in U reek <po)Vil a11�1uv-1:lK�.

h) The thus determined language constitutes the essence of the human be­

ing, hecausc indeed the human heing is animal wtionale, hut the rntio­

as j ust said-he longs to the essence of language. c) Language is something created by the human being and not for instance

del ivered hy ( )od to the human being. But i t is also not given i n the an­

imal i t<!'; of the human being, but someth ing special compared to i t . 2 . The J>roof of the human origin is different in hoth: a ) in H erder-b) i n

Urimm. a ) Herder shows in the first part of his treatise how the human be ing as ra­

tional l iving being is made for language. The human being must invent

l l 1 1 1 C1.N-:S h . . . Tl , 1-1 , J , "in ex11ression " in-' ngu,ige for l1 1msclf hecausc he is human. 1e er er1< ve t . " . . , . . , Tl , essence of rhe hu-n 111g means: to hnd oneself mto one s essence. ie . in� h · . . . , . . 1 the human bemg "11 emg is reason. Therefore: In commg to 1 edso1 ,

.

c 1 , . I · · ·

M I r • rion is becommg < mes to i nnsclt. Or, expressed di fferently : ar <-1orm,i h uman .

I 1 k H I . r ir hws of nature, n t ie second part of h is wor , erl er names im ' ·

. which he hi mself found, as the essential drives of the development of lanf guage from the origi nation of language up to the manifold actuality 0 language.

Fr 1 . f l I I . . . . . i· t I1ecomes clear 0111 t 1 1s structure o t 1e J- erl enan mvcsng,it !lln l that i ts weight docs not l ie in the unfolding of the origin of the essence of language, but in the proof of its h istorica l origination . Otherwise Herder would not ar a l l ask i n the direct ion of an eluc idation of the pres­ent-at-hand languages, bur would he concerned with reason as that which is essential to language. If the question of the essence were for him a burning and driving one, he would ask: what properly is that, reason?­a nd would not be satisfied with the answer that is given by the general metaphysica l thinking, that reason is mark-formation.

b) The question of the origin (as question of the essence) is also no longer posed in the t ime to come. Though Herder ( i n the first part of his nea­tise ) and then H umholdt still saw it in a certain respect, still scientific in­vestigation only knows no more than the question of the historical orig­inat ion. It conti nues tu proceed in the d irection taken by Herder (especially in the second part of h is investigation ) . It wants to know not only something general about the drives of the development of language, hur also to sec clearly how this origination of language really happened. Enclosed in it l ies the question concerning the h istorical original lan­guage from which all present-at-hand languages developed accord ing tll certain regubrities.

Those are the approaches ]acoh Grimm adopted to solve the problem of provenance. 1-l is starting position is -as we showed-the same as in Herder; hut the k ind of proof of the human origin of language is different. Herder has, as Grimm believes, made rhe human provenance intell igible through his trea­t ise on the origin of language from the essence of the human being in general, hut n ot proven i t .1cientifically. His intent ion is to do that.

He names twu approaches for obtaining this goal: the cx/Jcriment and the re­construction . He refra ins from the ideal proof of the experiment on moral grounds. Bur the fcict that he quotes the experiment as a possibil ity of proof shows that he regards the natura l scient i fic explanatinn as the scientific ideal, thus the tracing of one thing present-at-hand to another.

What could he gained for the knowledge of the essence oflanguage through the experi1nenr is something we have found in a short consideration in which

)

SEMIN;\I\ MINlJTE:-i

we left aside Grimm's moral inhibitions and carried out his experiment in

thought : The two children abandoned in solitude, mute servants lookmg. after

them, would find some kind of communication, a kind of language. I n this ob­

servation, we would see confirmed what we a lready know before, namely that

language is denotative announcement.

The other possibility, the reconstruction, is the way that the science of lan­

guage has followed. Certain laws of formation are recognized through the com­

parison of languages. If the conditions for their application are given, one now

concludes: Language must have looked thm and thus at a ccrtam tune, and its

change, its "development," must have taken place in this or that way. Grimm

calls this construction more scientific than, for example, an assertion about the

structure of the earth strata. The laws of formation, which operate i n the hu­

man language, can be known by the human being as something that concerns

him and d irectly relates to him, earlier and more accurately than the laws of the earth stratum that rule outside of him. Since we know these only from the outside, we can also draw only indirect conclusions about them. The fi ndings about human language are therefore more scientific than those about nature i tself. Or: natural science celebrates its highest triumph in the realm of human language-whereby the reality of language is seen only in terms of what is sonorous. The speech process is in the same way an object of investigation as, for example, electricity or another natural phenomenon. Countless possibi l i­ties for scientific works on language arc given with this; auxil iary sciences arise. One pursues language-anatomy, -psychology, -geography, to name only a few. All this seriously and dil igently.

Ami while language thus becomes easily accessible to everyone and the sci­ence of language makes progress-language itself becomes only a means to an end, is squandered away and misused, it nu longer addresses, and i t is the ques­tion of whether language still is what counts as language. Superficial ways of thinking or lack of respect for language are not to he made responsible for this; this process is grounded rather in the metaphysical character of language itsel f.

In this relation of the human being to language a process is reflected that extends to the relation of the human being to beings in general: The scientific knowledge has become the standard knowledge ! The other: thinking, spirit of language, history, culture is still there, yet dragged along into a certain inde­terminatenes-;. I t is decisive that the consciousness was lost as to where this other belongs and of what kind must the reflection be in order to st i l l experi­ence it essentially.

The l 9'h century coined the concept of "Weltanschauuni;. " Now al l of those not so accurately conceivable magnitudes move away into its realm. With re­gard to metaphy>ics this means a reversal of the position of idealism insofar as now that which is at hand, what can he explained counts as the real, while w it h Hegel the ideas were precisely the proper reality. This reversal is carried out in

J J T " CLA:->:-> ' 7 3

an extreme form in Marxism. Marx consciously stood Hegel 011 his he<Kl: The '1bs<il · I I · l l · l · . ·tr· · ture ·1bove the economic ' Ute IL ea now lecomes an IL co ogrca supets uc ' relat ions. That which is spiritual is no longer the moving power, but only the function of the given soc ial conditions.

Th is process, which in Grimm has become clear to us like a watercourse, charac terizes the whole l 9'h century and determines the structure of the en­tire historical Dasein in which we still stand today.

W 1 f . f l . • J · 't·ii1hysics the four driv-. c o iscrvc rom the perspecttve o t ic reverse me • ·

mg laws of the development of language, which Herder names: . l . The human being as free-standing, that is, as free-thinking bemg, docs not

stop, but advances. In the use of reason language also develops. 2 . The human being is a herd creature. The mutual dependence on one an­

other proves to be the drive of the development of language. 3 . The human herd cannot remain one ( Herder does not say why) . It results

in the formation of the different nations and thus in the multipl icity of na­t ional languages. 4. These different languages move forth in themselves hy stages and attain an always-higher degree of formation. Herder therefore also starts from the reality given to him and tries to clar­

ify its development by explaining it in retrospect. In so doing he secs the hu­man being as a free-standing natural being that is inserted in the animal econ­omy. The progressive unfolding of his essence means an always-h igher perfecting for the human being. In this perfect ing the cultural stock created by the human being is secured and during the subsequent cultivation more defin i­t ively consolidated. This approach, which is made possible hy the metaphysi­cal character of language and driven forward by the science of language, char­acterizes in i tself an increasing d istanc ing from the proper ground of the essence of language. Our reflecri�m tm language wants ro push forward to it, re­spect ively to find our way back to i t .

In doing so one could ask oneself whether such a reflection is not itself a fur­ther exaggeration of that which constitutes the entire historicism of roJay's Da­sein. If we already stand in a metaphysical rebtion or misrelatiun to languagc­why should we still analyze i t ! The analysis itself could be yet again a distortion of reflexion. I-low do we come out of there ! And what does language have to do hcre 7 Is there within the consideration oflanguage itself a possibility uflead­ing it out of the realm in which it movcs ?-We are speaking of the metaphysics of language, what is posed w ith i t ! That the essence of language is denotat ive announcement ! But has this dctcnnination fallen out of the heavens 1 If it is given with the essence of the human being as 1;,tjiov 'Aoyov �:xov-whence then comes this understanding of the hum;m being?

Let us look at Herder! For him language is amHnmcement, manifesta t ion, assertion of a thought , of die inner word, as he ca !ls i t. The inner word is mark.

1 74 SEM INAR MINUTE�

But mark of what ! Of a being ! Mark-formation is the bringing-into-appearance

of a being.

In the statement: "You arc the one bleating" what is properly said is not the

sonorous rendition of the resounding, but the "is" of the one bleating. This de­

terminate being is expressed, the i\v Ti i\v-. Language fixates the human be­

ing's conception of beings and his relation in and towards beings. Language i s rooted in a fundamental conception of being itself that is not grounded further in its metaphysics and in the science of language. With this somethi ng ques­tion-worthy appears in the metaphysics of language. An un-ground opens it­self up that compels us with necessity towards a deeper questioning concern­ing the essence of language. Perhaps we do not yet know at all what the word

is! For what do we know ahout heing ! In each word that we say, we properly express what remains first and last and always fundamentally unsaid and un­sayable: being. Only because being is said can a being be asserted. But what about being? And what about us?

Perhaps the possibil ity opens itself up here to ask after the essence of lan­guage, yet for once in a way that is different from what has been done unti l now. Not in the sense of another theory, but from the need and necessity that imperatively advances towards us from the ground of the matter.

Paul Wettach

ED I TOR'S EPILOGUE

The volume presented here offers Martin Heidegger's notes and plans for a two­hour graduate seminar that was held in the summer semester of 1 939. It is about the essence and essencing of language, and the discussion of J . G. Herder and his award-winning essay "Uber Jen Ursprung dcr Sprache."

The appendix con rains eleven student seminar notes from the respect ive sessions, which belong to Heidegger's posthumous work. They mirwr the ac­tual course of the classes and the results arrived in them from the perspective of the partic ipants. A comparison with the "Notes" shows that they go beyond what was lectured in the seminar-particularly, in the area of the being-histor­ical d iscussion on the essencing of the word.

For the preparation of the printed text, I had the fol lowing materials at my d isposition i n M mbach: 1 . The handwritten manuscript, consisting of 19 bundles of paper with a total

of 24 7 h:mdwritten pages-mainly in DIN format size AS or smaller. Hei­

degger has carefully collected and bundled these pages under individual ti­

tles. 2 . A copy of the transcript made by Hi ldegard Feick, of 1 65 pages DIN format

size A4. Heidegger had them transcribed in such a manner so that the im­age of every page, and with it the path of thinking itself, remains somehow v isible. The transcription was revised by himself, it contains several hand­written add it ions in places d ifficult to read. With this a high grade of au­thentic i ty is guaranteed.

1. A copy of the handwritten sem inar notes, of 66 pages DIN format size AS. 4 . A typed transcript of the student notes made b y Mrs. Feick, o f 8 1 pages. M anuscripts and transcripts were col lated for the present volume, and smal l oversights and umissions were corrected and completed.

In arranging the printed text the goal was to preserve as transparently as

possible the note character of the manuscript, thar is, the path of thinking and "leaps ," which Feick's transcript also tried ro do, whi le simultaneously striving to meet the demands for an editorial uniformity.

The general organizmion and division of the /nintcd text follows the organi.za­

t ion of the manuscript bundles and manuscript pages provided hy Martin l lei­dcgger hi mself. Th<.' titles numbered comcrntivcly with roman numerals correspond

1 7 5

El l!T\ lR'-, El'lL< )( ; [ JE

preJominanrly with the t i t les that HciJegger h imself.wrote on the bundle

wrappers. ( )nly on a few of the wrappers are such t i tles rn1s-;mg. I suppl 1cd those

t i tles accord ing to the formulations of the ensuing mmrnscript pages. This was

ncccs'iary for chapters I I , I V, XII and XIX.

The cicles nwnhcrcd comecwivcly with arabic nwncrnls correspond w i th the t i ­

t les in the headings of s ingle o r several connected manuscript pages . I n the few

cases where such a line was m iss ing, I have also supplied the t i tles according to the ensuing text. This is the case with sect ions no. 16 , 49 , 74, 7 5 ;md 1 2 3 .

The asterisks between the text blocks correspond with the d iv ision o f text blocks made hy Heidegger h imself-mmtly w i th a horizontal dash. He idegger's own hibliogra/Jhical references are preserved unchanged in the text, yet have been supplemented or cmnpleted by me i n the footnotes. The order of th<! derail of the text was preserved so far as it is conduc ive to <m ordered /irintecl /licture . In particular, impmtance was given to reproduce conceptu;1l schemes ;md ref­erence marks (arrows, dashes) as completely and faithfu lly as po,;sible.- The iwlic; in the printed text reproduce Heidegger's underl ining and brackets i n the manuscript.

The /mnctuation was completed in a careful way. Th is was espec ial ly un­avoidable where occ1sionally d isparate standing concepts \ l r expressions had to he hrnughr for rhe benefit of an ordered printed pic ture in rhe cont inuation of a l ine or of a paragraph.

With reg<ml to the citation from the text by J . G. l lerder that serves as the rhematicil base the references of the 'iources quoted arc nor from H eidegger's personal copy of the three-volume edit ion hy Adolf Stern ( Leipz ig, n . d . ) , for i t i-, today scirccly ;ivailable, but from the cr i t ical edit ion h y R . Suphan ( Berl in 1 89 1 ) , also used hy He idegger. Quotes that have been rendered e i ther incom­pletely or incorrectly hy I lc idcgger were corrected accord ing to the cr i t ical edi­t ion. The page references to Herder's text follow immediately after the quotes ( in parcnrl1cse-,) , in cmrcspondence wi th I lc ideggcr's pr;1c t ice in the manu­script .

The /Jarcnthe.1e.1 in rhc tex t arc I l c idcggcr's. Likewise the brackets i n the c i t < 1t ions of other authors; they mark He idegger's explanatory ;1dd i r ions . Whcrca'> the few square brackets in the other parts of the text mark my con­jectures.

In the -;eminar notes primed in the append ix, the abbreviated first names of rhc recorders were completed on the bas is of the seminar hook .

Thc'ie note-; lead us immediately into the th inker's worbhop, that is, they a l ­low the reader to part icipatc in rhc man ifold questions w i th which Marr i n Hei ­degger accompanies the exposit ion of I lcnlcr's thought. They derive l ife from

E1 1rn w ':-; EP1u x ;LJE

;.he contrast i ng o( the metaphysical and hcing-historic;1l views of language,

,,roin the c ircl e around the l i m i ts of metaphysics and from the effort to tind the

t other heginni ng" and, fro m there, to think anew the old questions. The ques-Ions are opened i n constant ly new attempts, l i k e the stormy sea that heats un­

ceasingly aga i nst the shore. The true struggle concerns the crossing from the nlet;iph ysics of language accmding to Western trad i t ion�the human hcing as <lIHma l rmiona l e-to the " th ink- ing leap into the essenc ing of the heing-his-tonc d w i ·J " Tl r · s·, . (' ' t.I . l . . . le . f ' \ 1 · ·1ree o , tcfan ieorge s poems serve ,- etl egge1 as ex<1mp s o the "er · " ossrng word .

In h is "Retrospect ion on t h e Way," Heidegger l ater wri tes about t h e "Notes on the Classes" i n genera l : "The actual course uf the c lasses cannot a lways be gk'aned from them ; t his i ns ight is provided hy the 'Notes,' each of which a l ­ways has a d ifferent 'value, ' and even there where t h e y report ' l i tera l l y' never presen t the question just as J had cumpletely c haracterized and ta lked them over " ( Fr· "T' · " (.'A I 6( 42 1 ) Tl

· l · um 'es1nnung, 1 , vo . , 1 , p. J . le companson m a y 1e re-warding for the reader, for h e has the opporruni t·y here to luok over the shou l -der nf ti , I · k . le t im er l · le 1degger next to the teacher.

I . I cordial ly thank Dr. Hermann Heidegger for his t-rusting cooperation and

F:Is cunstancy in lending an car as prnhlems arose. ] am grateful to Prof. Dr. Ttedric h- Wil he l m von Herrmann for the great help w i r h carrying our rhe print

d es ign ot the tex t . l wo u ld a lso l i k e to rhank [ k I bnnut Tietjen very much for the lahori · · I , 1· 1· 1 · I 1 · . . I - l . I · l l . l ou, wrn ' o prno real mg t ie L 1 ttnc11t l rafts, anl for i 1s ic p wit i colllplcr ing the suurccs. I woul d also I ikc to t hank h i m for h is cardul cdiring and l i k ewise L) · ! " · I) k l II 1· l · · t · f l . ' · ' 1 . cte1 von '-UC ' tesc ic or lIS attenrive real mg o t ie text Wt th Ille.

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